HECTOR TREÑAS vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

TOPIC: Sec. 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that
"subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any
of its essential ingredients occurred."

FACTS:

In 1999, Margarita Alocilja wanted to buy a house and lot which is mortgaged to Maybank. The
bank manager recommended Trenas to private complainant Elizabeth for advice regarding the transfer of
title in the latter’s name. Trenas informed Elizabeth that the total expenses would amount to P150,000.00.
After payment, Trenas issued corresponding receipt to Elizabeth and prepared a Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage. However, Elizabeth consulted with the BIR and found out that the receipts
were fake. When Elizabeth confronted Trenas, he admitted that he used the money elsewhere. Elizabeth
then demanded the return of the money.

To settle the account, Trenas issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check. When the
check was. Deposited with PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that the
account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus,
the instant case of Estafa was filed against him with the RTC Makati.

The RTC rendered accused Hector Trenas guilty of the crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence
as penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and which offense was committed in the
manner described in the aforementioned information.

An MR was filed but was denied. On appeal, the CA rendered decision affirming the decision of
the RTC. Hence, this petition.

(singit ko lang dito) RELEVANT PLACES MENTIONED:

PCIBank where the check was dishonored - MAKATI

Trenas residence and office - ILOILO

Receipt of P150,000.00 – no place indicated but it was given in MAKATI

Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage – notarized in ILOILO

ISSUES: Whether or not the RTC of Makati failed to acquire jurisdiction on Trena’s case

RULING:

YES. The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is
jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed
outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People, this Court explained:
 The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action
but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be
acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense
was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must
also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction
of the court.

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph
(b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City. Aside
from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove
that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City. There is nothing in the
documentary evidence offered by the prosecution that points to where the offense, or any of its
elements, was committed.

The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks
jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of
the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be
conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise.

It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to
undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense
or it is not the court of proper venue. Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure of 2000 provides that "subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried
in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not compelled to move
to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed as it would
cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place. This
principle echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced
age and failing health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges against him.

There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has
no jurisdiction over the case.
 Mathay vs. PP and Gandionco
G.R. No. 218964, June 30, 2020
J. Caguioa

Facts:
Petitioners (Sonya, Ismael III, Ramon, and Maria Aurora) are siblings whose parents are the late
Quezon City Mayor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. (Ismael) and Sonya Gandionco Mathay.

On March 6, 1980, Sonya and her sons, Ismael III and Ramon, along with Sonya's youngest
sister, Andrea L. Gandionco (private respondent), organized Goldenrod, Inc. During her lifetime, Sonya
managed and operated Goldenrod, Inc.

At the time of her death on November 22, 2012, Goldenrod, Inc.'s General Information Sheet
(GIS) dated April 4, 2012 reflected Sonya as having subscribed to 30,000 shares of stocks in Goldenrod,
Inc., equivalent to 60% of its total shareholdings. This GIS was signed by its corporate secretary, Aida
Palarca (Aida), and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

After Sonya’s death, an amended GIS was filed with the SEC, it was signed and attested by Aida
and therein showed substantial reduction of the shares of Sonya from 60% to 8% ownership of
Goldenrod, Inc.'s outstanding shares. At the same time, the amended GIS showed that private respondent
Andrea owned 26,000 shares or 52% of the shareholdings of Goldenrod, Inc.

The amendment of the GIS was prompted by the presentation of a Declaration and Share
Purchase Agreement (SPA) by private respondent to Aida. The Declaration was dated December 24, 2011
and executed by Sonya, who acknowledged therein that private respondent is the real owner of the 60%
shares of stock in Goldenrod, Inc. she (Sonya) held on record. Sonya, in said Declaration, returned 52%
of said shares of stock to private respondent through the SPA. The remaining 8% shares, upon the wishes
of private respondent, were donated to petitioners, but were placed under Sonya's custodianship until their
actual distribution to petitioners.

On February 5, 2013 and February 11, 2013, petitioners successively filed two (2) GIS of
Goldenrod, Inc. (both for the year 2013) with the SEC. These were signed and attested by Ramon as the
new Corporate Secretary. Both GISs showed an increase of Sonya's shares to 60% (30,000 shares) from
the 8% shares (4,000 shares) reflected in the amended GIS dated December 7, 2012. Private respondent's
name as shareholder was likewise conspicuously absent.

On February 11, 2013, Goldenrod, Inc. executed the Deed of Absolute Sale of its real estate
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-92106 in favor of YIC Group of Companies, Inc. for
the sum of P8.1 Million.

RTC:
On February 18, 2013, private respondent filed a civil complaint for Injunction with Prayer for
the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and
Mandamus against petitioners before the RTC of QC. Private respondent claimed deprivation of 26,000
shares (52%) of Goldenrod, Inc. belonging to her by virtue of the SPA she allegedly entered into with
Sonya.

Ismael filed a complaint against private respondent to declare the SPA null and void.  Ismael
alleged that the SPA lacks his written consent, in contravention of Article 124 of the Family Code.

Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for Qualified Theft through Falsification
of Public Documents by a Private Individual.

Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion for: (1) Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2)
Annulment of the Resolution.

The RTC denied the motions of petitioners and ordered the issuance of the corresponding
warrants of arrest against them. Holding that a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction, the trial court found that the allegations in the
Information and the affidavit-complaint, together with the documents submitted by the prosecution, prima
facie show all the elements of qualified theft through falsification of public documents.

CA denied the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners. MR was filed but it was denied.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not there is a prejudicial question which warrants the suspension of the criminal
proceedings against petitioners.

Ruling:
The Court rules in the affirmative.

Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provide when a criminal action
may be suspended upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action, and what the elements of
the prejudicial question are, respectively:

(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court, but the jurisdiction to
try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime, but so intimately connected with it that its ascertainment determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused.

For it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.

Here, there are two pending civil cases which are determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
petitioners in the instant criminal case: 1. A complaint for nullity of the SPA and 2. involves private
respondent praying for the return to her of 26,000 shares of stock in Goldenrod, Inc., among others. She
claims ownership over these shares on the basis of the SPA.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment, argued that there can be no
prejudicial question in a complex crime for the reason that when a complex crime is charged and one
offense is not proven, the accused can be convicted of the other. It also argued that there is no prejudicial
question because Civil Case No. Q-13-73089 was already dismissed by the trial court.

Private respondent, for her part, argued that there can be no prejudicial question because even if the trial
court finds that the SPA is invalid, petitioners would still be liable for qualified theft on the basis of the
ruling in Miranda that the ownership of the stolen property is immaterial.

Here, should private respondent be adjudged not entitled to the 26,000 shares of stocks in the
pending civil cases, there could have been no crime of qualified theft to speak of as the elements of: (1)
the property belonging to another; (2) the taking done with intent to gain; (3) the taking done without the
owner's consent; and (4) the taking done with abuse of confidence would be absent.

In the same vein, there would be no crime of falsification to speak of, as well, because there
would be no perversion of truth and the statements in the two (2) GISs in 2013 would neither be
"untruthful statements in a narration of facts," nor "absolutely false."

VINCENT E. OMICTIN vs. CA

G.R. No.148004. January 22, 2007

FACTS:
 Petitioner Vincent E. Omictin, Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., filed a
complaint for two counts of estafa against private respondent George I. Lagos. He alleged that private
respondent, despite repeated demands, refused to return the two company vehicles entrusted to him when
he was still the president of Saag Phils., Inc..

On February 26, 1999, public prosecutor Bagaoisan recommended the indictment of private
respondent, and on the same day, respondent was charged with the crime of estafa under Article 315, par.
1(b) of the Revised Penal Code before RTC.

On June 24, 1999, private respondent filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the basis of a
prejudicial question because of a pending petition with the SEC involving the same parties.

It appears that on January 7, 1999, private respondent filed SEC Case No. 01-99-6185 for the:
1. declaration of nullity of the respective appointments of Alex Y. Tan and petitioner as
President Ad Interim and Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc.,
2. declaration of dividends,
3. recovery of share in the profits,
4. involuntary dissolution and the appointment of a receiver,
5. recovery of damages and
6. an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and injunction against Saag (S) Pte.
Ltd., Nicholas Ng, Janifer Yeo, Tan and petitioner.

The trial court, in an order dated September 8, 1999, denied respondent’s motion to suspend
proceedings and motion to recuse. An MR was filed but was denied.
On June 30, 2000, the CA rendered its challenged decision. In a case for estafa, a valid demand made by
an offended party is one of the essential elements. It appears from the records that the delay of delivery of
the motor vehicles by petitioner to Saag Corporation is by reason of petitioner’s contention that the
demand made by Omictin and Atty. Tan to him to return the subject vehicles is not a valid demand. As
earlier mentioned, petitioner filed a case with the SEC questioning therein private respondents’
appointment.
If the SEC should rule that the dissolution of Saag Phils. is proper, or that the appointments of
private respondents are invalid, the criminal case will eventually be dismissed due to the absence of one
of the essential elements of the crime of estafa.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that a prejudicial question exists which calls for the suspension
of the criminal proceedings before the lower court.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION EXISTS TO WARRANT THE

SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS PENDING THE RESOLUTION OF THE
INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSY THAT WAS ORIGINALLY FILED WITH THE SEC
RULING:
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.  Here,
the case which was lodged originally before the SEC and which is now pending before the RTC of
Mandaluyong City by virtue of Republic Act No. 8799 involves facts that are intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution is based.
Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the intra-corporate dispute will determine the
guilt or innocence of private respondent in the crime of estafa filed against him by petitioner before the
RTC of Makati. As correctly stated by the CA, one of the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of
confidence under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code is a demand made by the offended
party to the offender:
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence under subdivision No. 1, par. (b) of Art. 315 are as
follows:
1. That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same;
2. That there be misrepresentation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or
denial on his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended party to the offender.15
Logically, under the circumstances, since the alleged offended party is Saag Phils., Inc., the
validity of the demand for the delivery of the subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the person
making such a demand on the company’s behalf. Private respondent is challenging petitioner’s authority
to act for Saag Phils., Inc. in the corporate case pending before the RTC of Mandaluyong, Branch 214.
Taken in this light, if the supposed authority of petitioner is found to be defective, it is as if no
demand was ever made, hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper. Moreover, the mere failure
to return the thing received for safekeeping or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to deliver or to return the same or deliver the value thereof to the owner
could only give rise to a civil action and does not constitute the crime of estafa. This is because the crime
is committed by misappropriating or converting money or goods received by the offender under a lawful
transaction.