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PFR Notes For Class 18112021
PFR Notes For Class 18112021
PFR Notes For Class 18112021
Facts:
Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and
Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or
refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for
such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal
Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of
plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in
favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the
states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states
did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.
Issue/s:
W/N the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to license a marriage between two people of
the same sex? Yes.
W/N the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to recognize a marriage between two people
of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state? Yes.
Held:
Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as
one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in
the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right
to marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy,
it protects the most intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and
families by according legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has
historically been recognized as the keystone of social order. Because there are no differences
between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the
exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also
guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-
sex couples equal protection under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed
through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of
liberty and equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects
the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First
Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it
does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those
for opposite-sex couples.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-sex
marriage might be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and therefore it
is beyond the purview of the Court to decide whether states have to recognize or license such
unions. Instead, this issue should be decided by individual state legislatures based on the will of
their electorates. The Constitution and judicial precedent clearly protect a right to marry and
require states to apply laws regarding marriage equally, but the Court cannot overstep its
bounds and engage in judicial policymaking. The precedents regarding the right to marry only
strike down unconstitutional limitations on marriage as it has been traditionally defined and
government intrusions, and therefore there is no precedential support for making a state alter
its definition of marriage. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the majority opinion relied on
an overly expansive reading of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment without engaging with the judicial analysis traditionally applied to such claims and
while disregarding the proper role of the courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin
Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.
Justice Scalia wrote that the majority opinion overstepped the bounds of the Court’s
authority both by exercising the legislative, rather than judicial, power and by doing so in a
realm that the Constitution reserves for the states. Justice Scalia argued that the question of
whether same-sex marriage should be recognized is one for the state legislatures, and that for
the issue to be decided by unelected judges goes against one of the most basic precepts of the
Constitution: that political change should occur through the votes of elected representatives. In
taking on this policymaking role, the majority opinion departed from established Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence to create a right where none exists in the Constitution. Justice
Thomas joined in the dissent.
Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion
stretched the doctrine of substantive due process rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment
too far and in doing so distorted the democratic process by taking power from the legislature
and putting it in the hands of the judiciary. Additionally, the legislative history of the Due
Process Clause in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments indicates that they were meant
to protect people from physical restraint and from government intervention, but they do not
grant them rights to government entitlements. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority
opinion impermissibly infringed on religious freedom by legislating from the bench rather than
allowing the state legislature to determine how best to address the competing rights and
interests at stake. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Constitution does not address the right of same-sex
couples to marry, and therefore the issue is reserved to the states to decide whether to
depart from the traditional definition of marriage. By allowing a majority of the Court to create
a new right, the majority opinion dangerously strayed from the democratic process and greatly
expanded the power of the judiciary beyond what the Constitution allows. Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.
Obergefell v. Hodges
and Nonmarriage Inequality
Although the Obergefell decision is a victory for same- sex couples that wish to marry, it is likely
to have negative repercussions for those—gay or straight—who, by choice or by circumstance,
live their lives outside of marriage. Obergefell builds the case for equal access to marriage on
the premise that marriage is the most profound, dignified, and fundamental institution that
individuals may enter. By comparison, alternatives to marriage, which I collectively term
“nonmarriage,” are less profound, less dignified, and less valuable. On this account, the
rationale for marriage equality rests—perhaps ironically—on the fundamental inequality of
other relationships and kinship forms.
But the decision has concrete implications for life outside of marriage. By further entrenching marriage’s
priority, Obergefell’s pro-marriage impulse not only demeans and challenges the status of nonmarriage,
it undermines the values and principles that underlie the jurisprudence of nonmarriage. ven as Obergefell
expands the right to marry, it may also diminish constitutional protection for life outside of marriage.
the Court’s decision invalidated the challenged state laws, opening the door to nationwide recognition of
marriage rights for same-sex couples.3 Finding that the challenged laws simultaneously “burden[ed] the
liberty of same-sex couples” and “abridge[d] central precepts of equality,” 4 a narrow majority of five
justices of the Court concluded that “same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry.”
the trouble is the rhetoric and rationale that the decision uses to undergird the constitutional imperative
for marriage equality.
Rhetorical choices can have doctrinal implications. Here, Obergefell’s rhetoric further entrenches
marriage’s cultural priority, and indeed, makes it a matter of constitutional law. More importantly,
Obergefell’s pro-marriage message has constitutional consequences that go beyond the expansion of civil
marriage.
the rights of nonmarital children and unmarried fathers, access to contraception, and most recently, the
criminalization of same-sex sodomy.
Despite the differences in subject matter, these cases together suggest the promise of constitutional
protection for nonmarriage, the unmarried, and nonmarital families, and therefore constitute a coherent
jurisprudence. Obergefell’s pro-marriage impulse, by contrast, demeans and challenges the status of
nonmarriage. More troublingly, it calls into question the promise of constitutional protection for
nonmarriage that these cases offered.
Part I briefly rehearses the Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. As it explains, the Obergefell
decision venerates marriage as the most “profound” relationship into which humans can enter. 14 In
praising marriage so lavishly, the decision, by implication, casts life outside of marriage as second-rate
and less worthy.
As Part II maintains, Obergefell’s disdain for nonmarriage is, in some respects, surprising—especially in
view of earlier Court decisions concerning life outside of marriage. These earlier decisions concerned
illegitimacy, unmarried persons’ use of contraception, and criminal prohibitions on same-sex sodomy.
Despite their disparate subject matter, these cases all asserted some measure of constitutional protection
for life outside of marriage and nonmarital families. In so doing, these cases formed the core of what I
call “the jurisprudence of nonmarriage.” Part II details the jurisprudence of nonmarriage, which emerged
contemporaneously with the Court’s jurisprudence on the right to marry, and was most recently
referenced in the Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas. On this interpretation, any protections for
nonmarriage that Lawrence might offer are merely placeholder protections until gay men and lesbians
become eligible for the constitutionally protected status of marriage.
Part III attempts to render intelligible Lawrence’s conscription into the project of marriage equality. As it
explains, the jurisprudence of nonmarriage, and its promise of constitutional protection for nonmarriage,
has always existed uneasily with our cultural and constitutional commitments to marriage and the right to
marry. Even as they recognize and protect nonmarriage, the cases that comprise the jurisprudence of
nonmarriage evince a tension between protecting nonmarriage and favoring marriage as the normative
ideal for intimate life. This helps to explain both how Lawrence came to serve as a jurisprudential
underpinning for same-sex marriage and Obergefell’s disdain for life outside of marriage.
Part IV returns to Obergefell. As it explains, Obergefell, with its pro-marriage rhetoric, preempts the
possibility of relationship and family pluralism in favor of a constitutional landscape in which marriage
exists alone as the constitutionally protected option for family and relationship formation.
In this regard, Obergefell does far more than venerate marriage for the purpose of democratizing access to
that institution. Instead, it forecloses on the promise of greater constitutional protection for nonmarriage
that Lawrence and its ilk offered. In so doing, Obergefell leaves nonmarriage and its constituents in a
constitutionally precarious position. To illustrate this precarious posture, I consider Obergefell’s likely
impact on a series of scenarios involving nonmarriage and nonmarital relationships. The Essay then
briefly concludes.
Loving v. Virginia
Facts:
In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white
man, were married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly
thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute,
which banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in
jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not
return for 25 years).
Issue: W/N Virginia's antimiscegenation law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
Held:
Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that distinctions drawn according to race were
generally "odious (extremely unpleasant;repulsive) to a free people" and were subject to "the
most rigid scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause. The Virginia law, the Court found, had
no legitimate purpose "independent of invidious racial discrimination." The Court rejected the
state's argument that the statute was legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and
whites and found that racial classifications were not subject to a "rational purpose" test under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the Virginia law violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Under our Constitution," wrote Chief Justice Earl
Warren, "the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the
individual, and cannot be infringed by the State."
Amendments to the Family Code (EO 209 – Family Code of the PH):
E.O. 227 AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
"FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES"
Sec. 1. Article 26 of the Executive Order No. 209 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 26. All marriage solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouses shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law."
Sec. 2. Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Sec. 3. Article 39 of the Executive Order No. 209 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage shall not
prescribe. However, in the case of marriages celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and
falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall have taken effect."
NOTE: Art. 39 - (As amended by Executive Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533; The phrase
“However, in case of marriage celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and falling under
Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall taken effect”
has been deleted by Republic Act No. 8533 [Approved February 23, 1998]).
Sec. 4. This Executive Order shall take effect upon the effectivity of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
eighty-seven.
Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided,
majority commences at the age of eighteen years."
Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.
Note: Art. 235. The provisions governing emancipation by recorded agreement shall also apply
to an orphan minor and the person exercising parental authority but the agreement must be
approved by the court before it is recorded.
Art. 237. The annulment or declaration of nullity of the marriage of a minor or of the recorded
agreement mentioned in the foregoing. Articles 234 and 235 shall revive the parental authority
over the minor but shall not affect acts and transactions that took place prior to the recording of
the final judgment in the Civil Register.
Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the
child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions
established by existing laws in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents
and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second
and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
Note: Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person
and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.
Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants, insurance
policies and similar instruments containing references and provisions favorable to minors will
not retroact to their prejudice.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
Jim Obergefell reads a news story online about the Supreme Court decision in a case known as
United States v. Windsor.
In that case, the Court decided that part of the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional.
This meant that same-sex married couples could have federal benefits as long as they were
married in states where same-sex marriages were legal.
Jim turned to his boyfriend of more than 20 years, John Arthur, who was laying in bed.
Arthur could no longer walk due to ALS, also known as Lou Gehrig’s disease, which was
quickly destroying his body.
Obergefell kissed Arthur on the forehead and said, “let’s get married.” “Ok,” Arthur replied.
They chose Maryland as the state to get married in, as same-sex marriage was illegal in their
home state of Ohio.
Turning to friends and family on Facebook, the couple raised $13,000 to have an ambulance take
them to the airport, where they then boarded a medically equipped plane to the Baltimore-
Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport, just outside Baltimore.
On that day, July 11, 2013, they were married inside the plane on the tarmac.
Unfortunately, once they returned to Ohio, they learned that Jim would not be listed on John’s
death certificate as his surviving spouse.
The reason? Ohio didn’t recognize their marriage for any purpose at all.
Ok, so really they sued the state of Ohio, but Kasich was the governor so his name went down as
the defendant.
And it was really just Jim at this point as John was too weak to act.
Jim argued that Ohio discriminated against same-sex couples who had married legally outside of
the state.
On July 22, the District Judge, a dude named Timothy Black, recognized the marriage,
preventing Ohio from leaving John’s name off the death certificate after he died.
While Jim’s name indeed did appear as John’s surviving spouse on the death certificate, Ohio
had appealed this to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
As it turns out, several others were suing their states for the same reason.
The Sixth Circuit combined six different decisions from four different states.
On November 6, 2014, by a vote of 2-1, the Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of the states with the
laws banning same-sex marriage.
It cited the Supreme Court case Baker v. Nelson, a decision which said states can limit marriage
to persons of the opposite sex, as justification for their ruling.
Writing for the majority, Judge Jeffrey Sutton wrote: "Not one of the plaintiffs' theories...makes
the case for constitutionalizing the definition of marriage and for removing the issue from the
place it has been since the founding: in the hands of state voters."
Jim and all the others challenging the state same-sex marriage bans appealed to the Supreme
Court.
The Court agreed to hear four of the same-sex marriage cases that directly challenged state laws
banning same-sex marriage.
Obergefell v. Hodges became the lead case and that’s why this video is called Obergefell v.
Hodges.
Anyway, all of those challenging the same-sex marriage bans argued such bans went against the
Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the 14th amendment.
One group even brought claims under the Civil Rights Act.
The Court heard oral arguments on April 28, 2015. During arguments, the justices considered
two big questions:
1: Does the 14th Amendment mandate that a state give a marriage license to two people of the
same sex?
2: Does the 14th Amendment mandate that a state recognize a marriage of two people of the
same sex who were legally married in another state?
During arguments, it was clear this would be another close one divided along ideological lines.
Justices Anthony Kennedy and John Roberts seemed to go back and forth, however.
On June 26, 2015, exactly two years after Jim Obergefell asked John Arthur to marry him, the
Court announced a 5-4 decision in their favor.
The Court argued that the 14th Amendment not only required all states to recognize same-sex
marriages in other states, but to recognize all same-sex marriages.
Yep, just like that, it legalized same-sex marriage and overturned Baker v. Nelson.
The Court held that marriage is a fundamental right to same-sex couples, as protected by the Due
Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
Writing for the majority and putting his reputation on the line as he has traditionally been one of
the more conservative justices on the Court, justice Kennedy wrote:
It would misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their
plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for
themselves.
Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization's oldest
institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that
right”
It’s important to note that the four justices who dissented weren’t necessarily against gay
marriage.
They generally just thought it wasn’t the Court’s job to decide on this matter.
The Constitution did not grant them such power, and so they argued it should be left to the
states.
I know it only happened, what two years ago, but this is one of the most important Supreme
Court cases in American history.
There was some pushback in certain states, and in some counties they don’t even issue marriage
licenses at all to get around it, but overall this decision is not as controversial as you might think.
One recent Gallup poll showed that 61% of Americans support gay marriage.
Today, Jim Obergefell remains a public figure, and still goes around giving speeches, honoring
and remembering his late husband, John.
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals: The sections were constitutional because it applies to both
individuals
(Loving’s ruling of freedom to choose one’s partner help permit same-sex marriage)
The ruling in Loving v Virginia Supreme Court Case broke barriers in anti-miscegenation and
segregation practices
so we strongly urge the court in considering this to consider this basicquestion may the
state proscribe a marriage between such individuals because of their race and their race
alone On June 2nd 1958 Richard loving and motor jeder committed a crime that would put them
in the national spotlight and would eventually level the scale of equality in America their crime
marriage Richard loving a Caucasian male construction worker and most importantly the close
friend of Mildred Jenner Mildred jeder was a woman of little african-american and mostly Native
American descent however she was classified as Colin and accordance with section 114 of the
Virginia State code which defines a colored person as any individual who has a slightest bit of
african-american lineage defying common segregation practices at the time Richard and Mildred
fell in love and soon due to Mildred being pregnant at age 18 the couple decided to get married
they tried to get married in their home state of Virginia but were denied because of the racial
integrity Act of 1924 this act prevented the mixing of white and colored individuals and also
made a law which require
itz this form would have to be reviewed by the Bureau of Vital Statistics in order to be married
and soon this act would prove to be instrumental in the segregation of marriage in Virginia in the
future the pair flew to Washington DC where interracial marriage was legal and on June 2nd
1958 they got married the newlyweds then proceeded to move back to their home Virginia
hoping to live a full and happy life together they live this dream for ultimately five weeks before
the police broke into the Lovings house on July 11 1958 at 2:00 a.m. and found them sleeping in
their bedroom almost immediately the local sheriff began to handcuff the Lovings despite their
feeble attempt to show their marriage certificate which was then said by an officer not to be valid
in Virginia this officer was referring to section 20 58 of the Virginia state code which states that
all interracial marriages that happen outside the state with the intention of returning shall be
punished as outlined in section 29 and told us to get up under Leslie Curtis to Bowling Green and
January they had to try after being arrested the couple was taken to the Virginia Caroline County
Circuit Court their judge Leon M basil found the couple guilty of breaking section 257 and
twenty 58 and then decided to imprison the couple for one year abiding by section 20 59 which
states that the punishment for breaking section 20 58 is imprisonment of one to five years
however the Lovings agreed to a plea deal which stated that the Lovings would leave virginia
immediately and would not return for 25 years after the court case the couple moved to
Washington DC where they remained married five years later after much struggle tired the
Lovings returned to Virginia in order to meet Mildred's relatives however instead of a
Robert F Kennedy
zero quo
quote