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Self Determination Sovereignity Terrritorial Integrity and The Right To Secession
Self Determination Sovereignity Terrritorial Integrity and The Right To Secession
SELF-DETERMINATION
Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and
the Right to Secession
Patricia Carley
UNITED STATES
INSTITUTE OF PEACE
CONTENTS
Summary v
Preface ix
1 Introduction 1
7 Conclusion 18
within the same territory. Moreover, the growth of conclusion the international community is largely
these movements is not a temporary phenome- unwilling to draw. Thus the question becomes,
non, but the direct result of changes in the world Can a principle be developed that stands some-
wrought by the universal application of Western where in between recognized human rights stan-
ideas such as democracy and human rights. Most dards and the right to self-determination?
of the world’s peoples have little experience with Somewhat ironically, the very propagation of
the West’s long history of sovereignty and state- the idea of human rights intensifies demands for
hood and are thus not prepared to adhere to the greater recognition among minority groups that in-
Western insistence on the inviolability of existing voke claims of human rights violations to support
borders. Those in the West who are alarmed by the their demands. However, the idea that human
growth of these nationalist movements should rights and political stability are bound to clash is
consider not whether these contemporary mani- tenuous, since states held together through terror
festations of nationalism are legal or appropriate, and repression are rarely stable in most senses of
but rather that they are happening—and that they the word. In the end, though, it may not be possi-
very likely cannot be stopped. The potential for vi- ble to compel an oppressive government to end its
olence and international instability becomes even unacceptable actions toward a minority group if
more obvious when one considers that some still outside countries are unwilling to intervene with
very large empires, such as Russia and China, are military force.
likely to be affected by these movements. U.S. policy interests in the self-determination
Unfortunately, turning to international legal debate beg a preliminary question: What exactly
standards on the right to self-determination does does the United States care about with regard to
not resolve the problem, since the right has never self-determination movements—the outcome of
been explicitly defined. In any case, it is impracti- the struggle (i.e., the shifting of boundaries and the
cal to assume that legal principles alone will re- proliferation of states) or the means used to obtain
solve what are essentially territorial and political it (i.e., the violence that frequently accompanies
disputes. Because the right has never been defined, such struggles)? Unfortunately, American diplo-
the notion of self-determination typically embraces macy often cannot decide between these two inter-
several different meanings, none of which ad- ests, making a response that much more difficult
dresses the central issue of how to respond to a na- to formulate. Generally, though, the United States
tional or other identity group’s aspirations for con- should be less concerned about outcomes in these
trol over the lives of its members. struggles than about the means used; international
Without a doubt, any new definition of self- political stability is more likely to be maintained by
determination must include customary human focusing on the process than by trying to manipu-
rights standards (e.g., respect for individual and late events to arrange a predetermined outcome.
minority rights) and the right of an appropriate The options for a minority group waging a
body to enforce those standards. In their later struggle for self-determination do not have to be
stages, self-determination movements typically be- viewed in the zero-sum terms of independence or
come the target of human rights violations, which assimilation, despite the fact that international law
should be addressed before they reach the often in- tends to reinforce this approach. The United States
tractable phase of organized struggle against the could encourage the practice of granting some in-
state. However, the right to self-determination termediate status short of independent statehood
must be separated from the right to secession and to unrecognized peoples or other distinct eco-
the establishment of independent statehood, with nomic or political entities. Parallel or multiple rep-
the understanding that there are intermediate cate- resentation for substate entities that function au-
gories short of statehood that can address a minor- tonomously (such as Taiwan’s participation in the
ity group’s interests and aspirations, such as mem- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) can pro-
bership in various international forums or regional vide outlets for what otherwise might be secession-
organizations. Human rights violations are easy to ist pressures. Legitimate secessionist aspirations
condemn; the dilemma is whether they justify the could be diverted to nonterritorial demands, thus
persecuted group’s secession from the state, a avoiding a strictly territorial interpretation of
vii
self-determination. The United States might also States should not be willing to tolerate another
consider advocating a change in the current sys- state’s repression or genocide in the name of terri-
tem that allows the government to conduct its af- torial integrity. Secession can be a legitimate aim of
fairs only with other states and not with subunits some self-determination movements, particularly
within states. However, offering subgroups some in response to gross and systematic violations of
sort of recognition or representation in interna- human rights and when the entity is potentially
tional forums or organizations may ultimately lead politically and economically viable.
to greater demands from smaller and smaller iden- Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to the
tity groups for independence and UN representa- dilemmas presented by self-determination move-
tion. ments in the world today. Clearly, in the face of the
The United States may have no choice but to growing number of such movements, establishing
avoid the pronouncement of clear doctrines and a definition of the right to self-determination is
principles regarding self-determination move- necessary, though agreement on such a definition
ments and thereby avoid being driven to intervene will not be easy—and even then, it will not likely be
in conflicts according to rigid principles that cer- conclusive and unequivocal. The desire among na-
tainly do not apply in every instance. The United tional groups to seek self-determination is not a
States should, however, make absolutely clear that simple matter with a single cause. Rather, it stems
secession has not been universally recognized as from multiple sources, including the denial of mi-
an international right. It may choose, on the basis nority rights, territorial disputes, national aspira-
of other interests, to support the secessionist tions, and the belief in economic and political via-
claims of a self-determination movement, but not bility, among others. This desire may develop
because the group is exercising its right to seces- gradually until the last resort to violence and seces-
sion, since no such right exists in international law. sion come into play. Unfortunately, the inattentive-
At the same time, an absolute rejection of secession ness of the world community often makes what is
in every case is unsound, because the United in fact a gradual process seem very sudden.
ix
follow-up meetings to explore the self-determina- like to thank Adam Wasserman of the Department
tion issue further, and reports from those sessions of State’s Policy Planning Staff for helping to orga-
will also be made available. nize the meeting. This report was prepared by Ms.
The meeting was organized by Institute pro- Carley and edited by Peter Pavilionis.
gram officer Patricia Carley. The Institute would
1
1
Charter. However, the self-determination principle
has been interpreted differently at different times
and has been inconsistently applied as a result. In
the wake of rapid political, social, and technologi-
cal changes in the world, distinct national groups
have pushed demands for their own states to the
INTRODUCTION top of their political agendas. These national
groups have armed themselves with the claim to
self-determination, in which the right to secession
is seen as an implicit, integral part. Because the is-
sue is so complex and potentially explosive, the re-
sponse of the international community has fre-
quently been to sidestep it.
However, this nonresponse is becoming in-
creasingly untenable as the inconsistencies in the
present system become more obvious. As a greater
number of national groups demand some level of
recognition, the international community finds it-
self without concrete principles with which to re-
spond. The failure to define self-determination ex-
rights by their rulers are more likely to resort to vi- States Institute of Peace convened a small study
olence than those who have been given a large group in February 1995 to address the issue. The
measure of local autonomy. Institute worked with the Policy Planning Staff of
Encouraging democracy and respect for human the U.S. Department of State to bring together
rights and granting local autonomy might be the lawyers, political scientists, and regional experts
answer to the self-determination dilemma, but this who have considered this question in the wider
approach does not resolve the matter across the sense, along with relevant policymakers who un-
board, as self-determination struggles leading to derstand the practical aspects of the problem. The
separatist demands exist in developed democra- discussion was chaired by Max Kampelman, vice
cies (e.g., Canada’s Quebecois separatists and the chairman of the Institute’s board of directors and
Scottish National Movement). Some nations or former U.S. ambassador to the Conference on
groups feel so aggrieved, so repressed by their (now Organization for) Security and Cooperation
rulers, that offers of local autonomy that might in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE). The purpose of the
have sufficed at one point are no longer adequate. meeting was to discuss candidly the nature of self-
It is as if a certain line has been crossed, a point of determination, its evolution, and the range of re-
no return, beyond which full independence be- cent applications. The primary focus was whether
comes the only acceptable goal. universal organizing principles can be formulated
to guide U.S. policymakers, and what likely chal-
lenges and opportunities will be presented by fu-
U.S. Interests ture appeals to the right to self-determination.
The discussion raised several questions of key
For its part, the United States has largely avoided significance to policymakers. Do international or-
defining exactly what the right to self-determina- ganizations to which the United States belongs—
tion includes. It is usually defined by describing such as the UN and OSCE—provide adequate guid-
what it does not include—the right to secession, for ance on the self-determination issue for policy-
example—but that response has not proved to be makers? If not, is it possible to develop a set of gen-
adequate, nor has it been found acceptable to eral principles to use in responding to self-determi-
many of the peoples in question. nation crises? In other words, to what extent is
The question should be asked, Must self-deter- each situation so specific that general principles
mination be explicitly defined? Why should the simply cannot be applied? What activities are ac-
United States want to address this complex and ceptable for a sovereign state to use to hold itself
potentially explosive issue? Perhaps there is no together? How can potential problems be identi-
practical course but to continue to approach the fied before they erupt into conflict? More practi-
matter on a case-by-case basis, taking into account cally, what influence can the United States exert on
other strategic, political, and economic interests in the governments and peoples involved in such
each instance. However, this course does have its conflicts?
drawbacks, as witnessed in the continuing chaos
and the terrorism that often accompany self-deter-
mination movements.
2
ably in terms of another, much more important,
political goal of promoting world peace.
These limitations on self-determination were ac-
cepted by President Woodrow Wilson, who was,
A HISTORY OF THE according to Hannum, the statesman most closely
identified with the principle. Ironically, however,
SELF-DETERMINATION the term “self-determination” does not appear in
Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” speech, which primar-
CONCEPT ily addresses autonomy and minority rights. More-
over, Wilson distinguished between “internal” and
“external” interpretations of self-determination; the
former, referring to a people’s right to choose its
own form of government without outside pres-
sure, was of far greater concern to him. Indeed, he
rarely mentioned the external aspect of self-deter-
mination, the one associated with the establish-
ment of independent states. Wilson did want an
article on self-determination included in the
Covenant of the League of Nations, but he was
overruled on this point, not least by the European
First, self-determination referred only to decolo- decolonization in the late 1970s and continues to
nization. Second, it did not apply to peoples but to the present. This stage is characterized by the at-
territories. Third, self-determination was now con- tempt in recent decades to fuse the first two eras;
sidered an absolute right—though, again, for that is, to combine the ethnic and cultural rights of
colonies only; this marked a significant change minorities that Wilson championed with the terri-
from the previous era. Finally, self-determination torial absolutism of decolonization. The result has
did not allow for secession; instead, the territorial been a tendency to redefine self-determination to
integrity of existing states and most colonial terri- mean that every distinctive ethnic or national
tories was assumed. The essential quality of self- group has a right to independence. But though
determination during this era, Hannum empha- self-determination has taken on this new meaning
sized, was not that all peoples had the right of in a popular sense, it has not been accepted by any
self-determination, but that all colonies had the state or by international law.
right to be independent.
The third, and most problematic, era in the de-
velopment of the concept began with the end of
5
3
“the law is running after reality.” In examining the
causes behind the outbreak of self-determination
movements, several realities of today’s world sim-
ply cannot be ignored. First, Fuller maintained
THE RISE OF that existing borders between internationally rec-
CONTEMPORARY ognized nation-states are “artificial, arbitrary, and
accidental.” Furthermore, they are not permanent.
SELF-DETERMINATION Second, although some states, mostly in the West,
are a reflection of the congruence of ethnic and ter-
MOVEMENTS ritorial boundaries, most are not so constituted.
These other states are typically “mini-empires” or
even greater empires of ethnically distinct peoples
who find themselves arbitrarily forced to live
within the same borders.
Third, the current concern over self-determina-
tion is not merely a “post-Soviet blip”; that is, the
dilemma is not just a regional, short-term phase
following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Many
peoples around the globe are going through their
own process of self-discovery. More than ever be-
economic changes are turning to ethnicity and na- in the camp of “matured nationalisms”—in western
tionalism to address their grievances. The “mass Europe, for example—whose members are rela-
culture” emanating from the United States reflects tively “fulfilled” in terms of identity and are thus
this gross imbalance of economic power and in- comfortable surrendering varying degrees of sov-
creases resentment among disadvantaged groups ereignty. Another, much larger, group of peoples
the world over. Nationalism, ethnicity, and religion lacks such fulfillment and thus clings tightly to
are increasingly used as instruments in expressing their ethnic sources of identity. For example, it is
such resentment. This is apparent in many Third very difficult to tell the Kazakhs to accept a multi-
World countries that are experiencing rapid eco- ethnic state cheerfully when they have just come
nomic development and urbanization along with out from under Russian domination. For a Kazakh,
T
declining public accepting a multi-
services. In these ethnic state is tan-
countries, margin- tamount to allow-
alized groups he continent of Africa is likely to be a ing the Russians to
search for new continue their aim
sources of identity “staggering mess” as the concepts of of destroying
and loyalty other Kazakh language
than those offered ethnicity and borders enter future debates and culture. Thus,
by a state that has the nation-building
apparently aban-
over identity. agenda of the
doned them. The Kazakh people is
adoption of alter- markedly different
nate sources of identity, such as ethnicity and reli- from a similar Western agenda, which typically em-
gion, and their use as political instruments is be- phasizes ethnic and cultural “diversity.” The reality
coming increasingly common. is that some peoples are moving away from a
Echoing some of Fuller’s assertions, Kampel- nation-state identity and giving up some sover-
man noted that people in some countries are eignty, while other groups—the majority—are de-
healthier and living longer than ever before; how- manding the right to establish themselves in a new
ever, a significant portion of the world has not en- nation-state, to build a “national project.”
joyed such an improvement in living standards. According to Fuller, the issue now is not
Global communications (mainly television and whether these manifestations of nationalism are le-
films) display these higher living standards to the gal or appropriate, but simply that they are hap-
world’s population, including those who have not pening. The question is what the West’s response
benefited from modernization. Understandably, will be. This process cannot be stopped, he con-
they too want to experience the benefits, and ten- tended: “There are no rules for saying that the
sions arise from the “unstoppable drive” of people gates of nationalism are closed because the rules
in the Third World wanting what the advanced in- are being changed all the time.” It is not sufficient
dustrial nations already have. This situation threat- to say “just assimilate,” because most groups are
ens those in the wealthier nations who are con- simply not going to “commit cultural suicide”
cerned that their benefits will decline as more through such assimilation. Furthermore, Fuller
economic resources are transferred abroad and said, the world is going to see some very big em-
those in the Third World who lead more tradi- pires, including China and Russia, affected by
tional lives and generally do not aspire to what these developments. The continent of Africa is
they perceive to be “crass Western materialism.” likely to be a “staggering mess” as the concepts of
ethnicity and borders enter future debates over
identity.
Unfulfilled Nationalism Scott Thompson of the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, a member of the Institute’s board
Fuller also described a global “cycle of ethnicity” of directors, disagreed with this last point, arguing
currently under way that has divided the world’s that in many Third World countries, such as those
peoples into two loose categories. There are those in Africa, new loyalties to the state are in fact
7
emerging. Over a period of forty years, for exam- their federations (e.g., the USSR or the Russian
ple, there have been no major challenges to the Federation) were in the process of breaking up and
colonial borders on the African continent. Indeed, that the same purportedly juridical result—the
for many African states, the colonially contrived emergence of an independent state—could be vali-
borders are the basis for their identity, and a new dated through the supposedly “legal” claim of self-
generation of elites in these countries owes its alle- determination.
giance to the state—though this is often the case, David Scheffer of the Department of State dis-
Thompson admitted, for less than admirable rea- agreed with Damrosch’s contention that the inter-
sons. national reaction to Yugoslavia’s dissolution has
In response, Fuller maintained that there will fueled not only the resulting mass violence, but
undoubtedly be a period of immense global chaos other peoples’ claims to the right to self-determina-
in the future. The United States is caught between tion as well. According to Scheffer, there is no evi-
what international law prescribes, on the one dence that if Yugoslavia had stayed together there
hand, and what its commitment to democratic val- would not have been acts of genocide. No one can
ues and human rights implies on the other. Provid- now establish for certain that there would not have
ing these restive groups with financial assistance been a vicious civil war even in a unified Yugo-
may ease the situation, but it will not solve the slavia. In fact, a great deal of the fighting occurred
problem, since these “urges are not at heart eco- before the breakup of the country in 1992. Now,
nomic.” Rather, they go to the matter of self- however, it seems like conventional wisdom to as-
identity and knowing one’s place in the world. sert that if only the Western powers had restrained
their willingness to recognize the independence of
the former Yugoslav republics, none of the fighting
Yugoslavia’s Breakup and the would have occurred.
Demonstration Effect Kampelman argued that, regardless of whether
or not hasty Western recognition of the Yugoslav
Outlining some of the reasons that the world is republics fueled independence movements, many
seeing such an unprecedented growth in seces- other peoples demanding self-determination have
sionist movements, Lori Damrosch of Columbia now seen in the Yugoslav situation that violence
University Law School suggested that the current can work; after all, he said, it is working for the
problem is only partially a reflection of ancient ani- Serbs. It is difficult to ask other groups to re-
mosities among peoples. The international re- nounce violence when it has gone so completely
sponse to the situation in the former Yugoslavia unpunished in the former Yugoslavia. Peter
has also exacerbated the problem. Other relatively Schoettle of the Department of State pointed out
small ethnic groups in the world, Damrosch ex- two other cases that illustrate why current self-
plained, have likened themselves to the various determination problems have become so acute,
ethnic groups in the Balkan territory and have often turning violent. Tamil separatists in Sri
come to believe that they too can get a similar re- Lanka and the Turkish community in Cyprus have
sponse from the international community to their sought a political solution to their grievances for
demands for self-determination. That response, es- decades. It became clear, however, that nonviolent
pecially from the European Community, suggested means were simply not working; consequently, the
that a “federation” in the process of disintegration two groups resorted to violence. Schoettle sug-
could seek “validation of a secessionist outcome gested that even if there were an international fo-
on the basis of a process that purported to be ju- rum that could have heard their grievances, or a
ridical, but in reality was essentially political,” ac- legal mechanism in place to respond to them, the
cording to Damrosch. Leaders of other secession- violent outcome probably would not have been
ist movements, she maintained, could believe that different.
they were in the midst of the same process, that
8
4
racy is essentially majority rule, and in most cases
the majority is more likely to trample on than to
honor the rights of a minority identity group. Fur-
THE SELF- thermore, international law is not univocal on the
value of independent statehood; it is currently soft-
DETERMINATION ening its “premium” on statehood by allowing non-
state actors to play roles in the articulation and en-
PRINCIPLE: LEGAL forcement of international law.
DEFINITIONS AND The third basic proposition about the legal con-
text of self-determination is that it is not a “suicide
OBLIGATIONS pact” in that it does not oblige any state to subju-
gate its own self-interest. Law is basically an ex-
pression of self-interest and has evolved accord-
ingly over time.
The fourth proposition is that law is constantly
changing. After several distinct eras, Steinhardt
maintained, the self-determination norm is at a leg-
islative turning point. There are several new mean-
ings or “clusters of principles” that should be in-
cluded in the right to self-determination, just as
rights to self-determination and secession. The lat- Self-Determination and Human Rights
ter is simply not, according to Kampelman, inher-
ent in the legally stated right of self-determination. Fuller suggested that the very propagation of the
Self-determination may be an internationally rec- idea of human rights intensifies demands for
ognized principle, but secession is a national issue, greater recognition among the unrecognized peo-
one for states themselves to decide. For example, a ples of the world. In telling other states to observe
government may wish to allow its nation’s con- the human rights of their citizens, the United
stituent parts the right to secession in its own set of States is giving these citizens a greater forum to de-
laws, but no international documents compel it to mand more for themselves. Steinhardt concurred
do so. Self-determination, Kampelman main- by suggesting that self-determination is a “symp-
tained, means inter alia the right to cultural inde- tom” of the human rights crisis. In fact, claims to
pendence, religious freedom, and the use of one’s self-determination usually indicate a human rights
own language, but not secession. Unlike secession, problem in its final stages. This is one of the main
these rights are “manageable,” making it possible reasons that complaints about human rights viola-
for the United States to both address and influence tions must be addressed before they reach this
them. stage.
Jamison Borek of the Department of State In this context, Scheffer disagreed with Han-
pointed out that legal principles are not the driving num’s assertion that the concept of self-determina-
factor behind either self-determination move- tion must return to the more static framework of
M
ments or U.S. policy to- previous eras. Scheffer
ward them. After all, the said rather that self-de-
United States has not termination “is a real-
taken a position on the any international docu- ity from which we can-
precise legal definition of not escape,” since
self-determination. Nor ments have established there are people all
has the scope of the term over the world who
“peoples” been deter- self-determination as a right, but it are “screaming that
mined, and the debate word.” What is
continues over whether has never been defined. needed, he said, is
self-determination in- greater recognition of
cludes a right to secede the postcolonial devel-
outside the context of decolonization. In general, opment of human rights law and principles as an
the United States has not recognized the right to influencing factor on self-determination move-
secession for portions of established countries. ments, however they are defined. Moreover, he
Moreover, in keeping with the general U.S. orienta- continued, democracy is increasingly considered
tion toward individual rights, U.S. policy prefers to an “entitlement.” Even the United Nations is em-
speak to individual human rights (including civil bracing this view in its formal documents, and
and political rights) rather than group rights such peoples in the process of asserting their right to
as self-determination. It is not productive, Borek self-determination increasingly look to interna-
continued, to debate legal principles in the ab- tional language on human rights as a moral pillar
stract without addressing pragmatic realities. A to support their claims.
fundamental problem is what the United States Referring to the international community’s de-
and other countries are willing and able to do sire to maintain world peace, Schoettle noted that
about situations in which governments actively op- in the past, the goal of world (and regional) peace
press minority groups in their countries. While the has generally ranked higher than the defense of
response options range from economic sanctions human rights. Which goal is more important to the
to the use of force, ultimately it is not possible to United States today? The policy of holding up re-
compel an oppressive government to change its gional peace as a more important goal than human
behavior if other countries are not prepared to in- rights risks achieving the opposite. Groups seeking
tervene militarily. independence will quickly realize that by creating
10
enough violence—significantly disturbing the wracked with internal dissent and held together
peace—their demands will more likely be satisfied, only through terror and repression are not neces-
or at least addressed, eventually in the name of sarily useful in the promotion of U.S. national in-
promoting peace. This will drive such groups to terests. In other words, such states do not merely
ever more extreme, peace-threatening actions. The pose a choice between human rights and stability
goal of maintaining regional peace also raises a for the United States, since a state that routinely vi-
moral question: Does the United States, or any olates its citizens’ human rights is rarely stable.
member of the international community, have the Kampelman added that the “confrontation” be-
right to tell a minority group that its human rights tween human rights and self-determination could
must be curtailed in some form to promote world be largely avoided if secession were not an inher-
peace? ent part of the discussion.
The issue of human rights and their violation is Gidon Gottlieb of the University of Chicago
relatively easy to react to, according to Borek, since Law School pointed out that in many ways the en-
acknowledged international standards exist. The tire discussion about human rights and the right
much more difficult question involves the right to to self-determination takes place in a Western (and
secession and independence: Does a people have a largely American) context. From the U.S. perspec-
right to independence? If there is going to be a tive, concern about human rights is based on
principle that recognizes this right, there must be American values and adherence to a particular
some consideration of whether that people has the view of individual rights. However, in many states
capability to establish independence and, if not, that are on the receiving end of Western criticism
whether the United States or any other state is go- over human rights, such rhetoric is perceived as an
ing to help them in the task, even if military force instrument to advance a certain minority group’s
must be used to do so. On this point, Borek sug- claims to independence. It is impossible for the
gested, there must be some realism. After all, the United States to ignore the impact of its human
United States is not in a position to support such rights arguments at the other end, where they may
endeavors all over the world. The crucial question be (perhaps deliberately) misinterpreted as sup-
in the interim is, Can the international community port for some group’s claims, while the U.S. objec-
find a guiding principle somewhere between de- tive may be precisely the opposite. The bottom
fending human rights and upholding the right to line, according to Gottlieb, is that the “consumers”
self-determination? of the human rights discourse in other countries
Fuller reiterated that there need be no clash be- may understand such claims in a very different
tween American values such as human rights and way than they are intended, a reality that cannot
the need to promote stability in a particular country, be ignored.
as neither of these is an absolute. Nations that are
11
5
recognition of Russia’s sovereign rights, but be-
cause that reiteration implied an approval of Russi-
a’s methods of asserting its sovereignty. It is impor-
tant to be consistent, Kampelman said. If minority
groups are told that achieving their aims through
A SPECIFIC CASE: THE violent means is unacceptable, then central gov-
ernments must be told this as well. The United
CRISIS IN CHECHNYA States did not make this clear to the Russian gov-
ernment in its initial reaction to the Chechen crisis.
Hannum suggested that in seeking a solution to
the Chechen conflict, greater attention should be
given to the example of Tatarstan, which was will-
ing to accept a “fuzzy, legally imprecise set of docu-
ments” in negotiating its status within the Russian
Federation that essentially deferred the most diffi-
cult questions indefinitely. This arrangement may
not solve all the problems between the Russian
government and the country’s non-Russians, but it
is an alternative to violent conflict. Patricia Carley
of the United States Institute of Peace pointed out
colonial or other major power. Under an earlier in- past experience does not necessarily justify the
ternational legal system, the Chechens would have perpetuation of a particular current status. In any
had no basis for advancing the type of claim to in- case, can it be considered the “fault” of the
dependence they are now pursuing, and the cur- Chechens, or any other peoples, that they have had
rent international system, according to Gottlieb, is the misfortune of existing as a tributary state for
at fault for raising their expectations to the point much of their history? In other words, must this
that they feel justified in making such a claim. Car- status determine their future as well? Can the
ley pointed out, though, that millions of people United States openly acknowledge that the repres-
throughout the world used to know only the exis- sive status the Chechens—or any other similarly
tence that Gottlieb described, and many of them oppressed peoples—have always known is the one
now live in independent states; thus, looking to in which they must remain?
13
6
means employed? Does the United States object
only to the shifting of borders as a threat to its na-
tional interest, or is it more concerned with the
means used to make those changes? If the concern
is with the means, the United States would most
U.S. INTERESTS AND likely not object to groups that seek to change ex-
POSSIBLE POLICY isting borders as long as they refrain from using vi-
olence and do not violate international law. Or per-
OPTIONS haps the United States would object to redrawing
borders along specifically ethnic and religious
lines, regardless of the means.
In fact, Nix continued, American diplomacy and
rhetoric are often in conflict over these issues. If
border changes are the primary concern, the range
of that concern will be relatively narrow, since
there are only a certain number of border changes
that the United States would consider threatening
to its national security. If the means of effecting
these changes is the paramount issue, some action
may be required to make groups accountable for
instance in which the United States may decide for parallel or multiple representation for territorial
reasons of policy to support the emergence of a units that function autonomously in such areas as
new state is in the “genocide or postgenocide” trade and international economic relations, pro-
phase. In that instance, all “legal inhibitions” could viding outlets for what might otherwise be seces-
be “shucked aside.” sionist pressures.
According to Hannum, the self-determination Damrosch went on to suggest that the U.S. gov-
debate would be much clearer if the United States ernment might consider expanding its range of of-
simply stated that there is no right to secession, ficial contacts in the international community from
with the possible exception of responding to geno- strictly interstate relations to contacts among sub-
cide (though such an exception would put the units of states; such contacts could be developed
United States in the position of arguing that the through functional relationships with unofficial
Kurds have a right to a separate state). Besides, entities. For example, Damrosch noted that the
U.S. foreign policy already has a method for deal- Russian constitution of 1993 allows some flexibil-
ing with minority problems in other countries: hu- ity in the establishment of foreign relations by sub-
man rights. Human and minority rights norms units within the Russian Federation; and Tatarstan,
continue to evolve, and the United States should after negotiating with Moscow, was given a very
declare its position as one of concern for the hu- functional flexibility in its external relations. An-
man rights of every state’s citizens. Beyond that, other option for the United States is economic
the United States should not enter into the debate sanctions, which, Damrosch suggested, could be
on the merits of self-determination claims. In fact, used in a differentiated fashion—either to punish
responding directly to claims for self-determina- the bad or reward the good territorial unit claiming
tion is probably the worst policy option for the the right to self-determination.
United States. Similarly, Steinhardt suggested that the United
States should recognize as legitimate intermediate
types of association to protect vulnerable popula-
Providing Outlets for Minority Groups tions. U.S. policy should not imply that minority
groups’ options are limited to secession or noth-
“Sovereignty does not have to be a zero-sum ing. Scheffer agreed that it is in the U.S. interest to
game,” Damrosch said, though international law deal with more than just central governments;
unfortunately tends to reinforce the zero-sum ap- there should be a dialogue with the subnational
proach. For example, when Taiwan lost its seat at groups involved as well. However, the United
the United Nations to the People’s Republic of States should strive to hold minority groups ac-
China, there was one big winner and one disap- countable so that they understand they have cer-
pointed loser. Now, however, Taiwan is pursuing a tain responsibilities as well, not only under inter-
more pragmatic arrangement of representation for national law but also in their domestic actions.
two governments from one divided state, using the Damrosch agreed that these groups should be
precedents of Germany and Korea. Unlike the UN, held accountable, but questioned whether the
Damrosch noted, international bodies that govern United States could hold out as a “carrot” the possi-
such spheres as trade and finance do not use the bility that, if they are democratic enough, they will
zero-sum approach. In these bodies, economic re- eventually gain international recognition. Scheffer
alities frequently take precedence over strictly for- countered that independence need not, and in
mal notions of sovereignty. Taiwan retained its most cases would not, be one of the carrots of-
membership in the Asian Development Bank, for fered, as many intrastate political arrangements
example, after its UN membership was revoked. short of independence are available, all with vary-
Similarly, Hong Kong and Macao enjoyed member- ing degrees of autonomy.
ship in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Gottlieb said that more effort should be made to
Trade (which has been succeeded by the World offer new outlets for legitimate aspirations of self-
Trade Organization) under provisions allowing determination movements in order to divert them
participation by nonstate entities that have func- to nonterritorial demands. Simply put, minority
tioning autonomy over their international eco- groups need an international forum to express
nomic relations. Policy options should include their desires, and a variety of regional organizations
15
could offer them such an arena. There is a need to recognize them. Members include the Chechens,
“deconstruct” the self-determination principle, Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvash, Gagauz, and Abkhaz,
Gottlieb said, to demonstrate that it has other in- all of whom are distinct peoples of the former So-
terpretations than just the territorial and that there viet Union who live within the territory of a state
are different ways identity groups can lead and ex- dominated by a different ethnic group. Other
press national life. Not every nation can be given a members are Tibet, East Turkestan, and Kurdistan.
territorial state, so there should be other options Many of UNPO’s members, Carley pointed out,
under the self-determination rubric and new ways consider themselves colonies, and many are, in
of relating to national minority groups in the inter- fact, in the generally recognized sense of that term.
national arena. The State Department could be the Furthermore, they believe that they did not gain in-
pioneer in such an effort, but the legislative branch dependence during the two great periods of decol-
can be in the forefront as well. Nongovernmental onization—immediately after World War II and fol-
organizations (NGOs) can also play a leading role lowing the breakup of the USSR—simply because
in this regard in much the same way as they pro- of bad luck or a quirk of fate, but not because they
vide advance warning of potential subnational are any less deserving. Will the international com-
conflicts. Congressional hearings already provide munity continue to ignore this group at its peril?
one way for minority groups to express their griev- Unlike other participants, Hannum cautioned
ances and speak about their national homelands against offering subgroups some sort of recogni-
as something other than states. In general, Gottlieb tion or representation in regional or trade organi-
asserted, the international community must zations or providing UNPO with a platform at the
change the perception that self-determination UN, which he said may ultimately lead to greater
leads only to the formation of a new state. Rather assertions from smaller and smaller identity
than setting the threshold of international recogni- groups, to the point where each is demanding in-
tion at the highest level of the state, organizations dependence and a seat at the UN. Raising false
and international conventions should be open to hopes, according to Hannum, may be the very
other political entities as well. worst step to take. International law and politics—
Responding to the notion that aggrieved minor- and U.S. policy—must reflect only the possible. But
ity groups should be satisfied with some status which approach is preferred: diffusing statehood
other than statehood, Gottlieb acknowledged that aspirations by offering platforms to nonstate sub-
this suggestion was in no way a universal remedy, units or providing such platforms only sparingly
although it might work in the case of the Basques to avoid raising a minority group’s expectations?
or the Corsicans. Its purpose is not to provide Gottlieb replied that both approaches are neces-
maximal solutions for minority groups, but a “re- sary. With regard to the UN, providing platforms is
lease process” for the United States and the groups probably a potentially destabilizing policy. How-
themselves. It may be possible to satisfy some na- ever, in the case of technical conventions on such
tional minority groups with something other than things as assigning communications frequencies,
statehood, though such solutions will not always maritime rules, or environmental protection, par-
be acceptable or realistic. Fuller responded that ticipation need not be limited to states. Gottlieb in-
any attempt to offer minority groups outlets in the sisted that the aura surrounding statehood should
international arena will be extremely menacing to be minimized and devalued.
the many “bad-guy” states that rule over them.
Carley suggested that the United States and
other Western governments consider giving more Proclaiming a Clearly Defined Principle
attention to such groups as the Unrepresented Na-
tions and Peoples Organization (UNPO), which Gottlieb asserted that the United States really has no
met in The Hague in January 1995 to determine choice but to “avoid clear doctrines and clear princi-
where potential conflicts over self-determination ples” when it comes to self-determination move-
movements might arise. This group of peoples that ments, as it would be “disastrous” for the United
do not have seats at the UN has been in existence States to be driven to intervene in remote conflicts
since 1991 and was organized in part to protest the by rigid principles that could not possibly apply
international community’s unwillingness to across the board. There are simply no appropriate
16
global principles, and no arrangements should be movements include Kosovo, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
promoted in terms of global principles. The only Tibet, Western Sahara, and parts of Kurdistan.
exception is the defense of human rights; for exam- Generally, Fuller maintained, it is in the interest
ple, the absolute unwillingness to tolerate geno- of the United States to see the proliferation of de-
cide. Agreeing with Hannum, Gottlieb maintained mocratic states in the world. Undemocratic states
that the United States should have a policy of “pas- that rely on force and repression to maintain their
sivity,” meaning that it should not take sides dur- existence not only run counter to American princi-
ing a conflict or take a stance on a particular out- ples, they are also unstable—maybe not so much in
come. Instead, the United States should use its the short term, but certainly in the longer term.
leverage to push toward an accommodation. Fur- Steinhardt contended that the United States
thermore, Gottlieb suggested that more could be should take a very high-profile position in interna-
done to make groups understand the costs of tional institutions, especially those that are region-
statehood—not only the economic costs, but the ally based, since these organizations have gener-
political ones as well. Hannum agreed that policy- ally proved to be good forums for articulating the
makers must keep their pronouncements on this idea that certain practices and behaviors of states
issue ambiguous, as it is impossible to articulate are required by law—a sort of psychology of com-
self-determination explicitly and absolutely. How- pulsion.
ever, principles such as human rights, democracy, Robert Hansen of the Department of State
and nonviolence can be articulated, and should be pointed out that there is danger in fostering confu-
supported and promoted consistently. sion between the standards for self-determination
On the other hand, Fuller noted that even ex- and state recognition on the one hand, and the
pressing ambivalence on the subject of self-deter- question of what the United States is prepared to
mination movements will make the United States do to effect that policy on the other (i.e., what
appear as an enemy to much of the Third World by Americans are or are not prepared to sacrifice in
threatening those states’ national unity. Obviously, terms of money and troops). Though the United
early intervention in such situations is highly de- States may decide not to take an active part in sup-
sirable, and Fuller suggested an approach along porting a particular self-determination movement,
the lines of marriage counseling. In any conflict be- that decision may not make it any less important
tween a central government and a secessionist that there be clear, defensible legal standards when
movement, all options short of “divorce” should be it comes to providing moral support. Perhaps
considered: cultural autonomy, political auton- more effort should be devoted to making a distinc-
omy, federation, confederation, or international tion between these two options.
guarantees, to name a few.
In any case, the United States should most defi-
nitely “put states on notice” that their repressive Approaching the Claim to Secession
policies will likely lead to the emergence of prob-
lems with their minority groups. Perhaps such no- Secession has not been identified as an interna-
tice could best be handled by NGOs to avoid the tional right, and Kampelman declared that this fact
political implications of warning a state that it is should be made clear to all groups with claims to
courting instability. Fuller stated that the United self-determination. If a particular group wants in-
States would do well to make it clear to states that dependence, he said, it can agitate, propose negoti-
if they cannot satisfy the cultural aspirations of ations, and/or initiate a propaganda campaign to
their minorities, they are headed for trouble. The convince the international community that its sta-
United States should also make it clear that it is not tus as part of another state is unjust. If major
going to be a guarantor of an unacceptable status bloodshed would likely result from such actions,
quo. Scheffer agreed that NGOs could publicly this would be because of a decision the minority
identify these potential hot spots, since govern- assumed when it chose to agitate for indepen-
ments cannot do so publicly, though they should dence. This is not to say that the United States
privately. He further suggested that places to watch should overlook the bloodshed, but that it should
in the future with regard to self-determination make clear to those seeking independence that
17
they cannot object to the violence waged against whatever the parties to the negotiations decide.
them by claiming they were simply attempting to Though it may be the case that some on either side
exercise their “right” to secession. In the end, it will not want to enter negotiations, there are fre-
may be in the U.S. national interest to help this quently cleavages within groups that leave some
group, but not because any international rights factions willing to negotiate. Furthermore, the
have been violated. Kampelman stressed that the United States should examine cases in which ac-
extent to which the United States and other states commodated outcomes have occurred, how and
make it clear that secession is not an international why they did, and which institutional arrange-
right will lessen the likelihood that violence will be ments were instrumental in resolving the conflict.
used toward this goal. In these instances, other av- Several options are available, such as the formation
enues would likely be pursued. of power-sharing or coalition governments and a
Secession is, according to Steinhardt, a legiti- proportionality of government appointments, op-
mate exercise of self-determination in some cases, tions that typically form a crucial part of a negoti-
particularly in response to gross and systematic vi- ated settlement. The main goal is to de-link ethnic-
olations of human rights and when the resulting ity from the state and from citizenship. It was
entity is economically viable. Thus, a rigid rejec- pointed out, however, that the cases that are usu-
tion of secession is unsound. Policymakers should ally the easiest to deal with are those in which the
abandon the distinction between self-determina- parties are willing to negotiate. It is possible, for ex-
tion and other categories of human rights. Like- ample, to imagine negotiations between Ottawa
wise, Alan Romberg of the Department of State and Montreal or London and Edinburgh. All too
noted that the right to secession cannot always be often this is not the case, and the fundamental
excluded as a matter of principle. The rights to self- problem or conflict stems from the inability of the
determination and secession may not be identical, sides to agree on the terms under which they
but they are also not entirely incompatible. Stating might consider even entering into negotiations.
that it is the means and not the aim of self-determi-
nation movements that should be of concern to
the United States, Romberg suggested that some Elections
standards of behavior for achieving the goal of in-
dependent statehood may be necessary. The participants did not view elections as a satis-
Steinhardt maintained that the United States factory way to determine the political status of a
should not allow its policy options to become po- particular region because secession is not an issue
larized because of an apparent tilt against seces- that can be voted on. Sisk mentioned the difficulty
sion. Kampelman argued in favor of such a bias, of relying on majority rule. Very often the cause of
since secession frequently entails mass violence. the problem in the first place is that a minority
Certainly, Steinhardt acknowledged, the United group believes it is repressed by the majority. Han-
States should be concerned about the unchecked num stated that the problem with elections is that
proliferation of states, but the question remains: if, say, Quebec voted to secede, smaller national
What is the United States prepared to tolerate in groups within Quebec would have to be given the
the name of territorial integrity? same right. Carley raised the problem of evaluating
the validity of elections in essentially totalitarian or
post-totalitarian states, reminding participants that
Negotiations only a few months before the Soviet Union col-
lapsed, its citizens voted en masse to remain part
Timothy Sisk of the United States Institute of Peace of the USSR in elections that were very much like
suggested that one option for resolving the old Soviet-style polls. Kampelman said that, ulti-
dilemma of self-determination versus territorial in- mately, it would not be useful for the United States
tegrity is the promotion of a negotiated settle- to set elections as a condition for any kind of pol-
ment—to the extent that it is possible. The United icy decision it wants to make.
States need only make clear that it will abide by
18
7 CONCLUSION
A
BOUT THE AUTHOR
The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created by
Congress to promote research, education, and training on the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.
Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including
research grants, fellowships, professional training programs, conferences and workshops, library services,
publications, and other educational activities. The Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed by the Presi-
dent of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.
Board of Directors
Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), Distinguished Research Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign
Service, Georgetown University
Max M. Kampelman, Esq. (Vice Chairman), Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, Washington, D.C.
Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University
Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus, University of Notre Dame
Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University
Christopher H. Phillips, former U.S. ambassador to Brunei
Mary Louise Smith, civic activist; former chairman, Republican National Committee
W. Scott Thompson, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
University
Allen Weinstein, President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C.
Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.
Members ex officio
Ralph Earle II, Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Toby Trister Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research
Ervin J. Rokke, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National Defense University
Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
Other titles in the Peaceworks series:
Turkey’s Role in the Middle East: A Conference Report by Patricia Carley (Peaceworks No.
1)
Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption, and Identity by Nancy Lubin (Peaceworks
No. 2)
From the Managing Chaos conference:
Keynote Addresses by Les Aspin and Ted Koppel (Peaceworks No. 3)
Sources of Conflict: G.M. Tamás and Samuel Huntington on “Identity and Conflict,”
and Robert Kaplan and Jessica Tuchman Mathews on “‘The Coming Anarchy’ and
the Nation-State under Siege” (Peaceworks No. 4)
NGOs and Conflict Management by Pamela R. Aall (Peaceworks No. 5)
Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa by David R. Smock (Peaceworks No. 6)
The views expressed in this report are those of the author or conference participants alone.
They do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.
Phone: 202-457-1700
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