UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN

POSTGRADUATE COLLEGE
FACULTY OF ART
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

COURSE TITLE: POLITICAL INSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT IN PRE-COLONIAL

NIGERIA
(HIS 710)

GROUP SEMINAR PAPERTPOIC

POLITICAL INSTITUTION IN HAUSALAND UP TO 1900

GROUP MEMBERS:
ABIBAT ABIODUN IBRAHIM 226227
DAHUNSI TAIWO ADEGBENRO 125326
IBIYEMI AYOMIDE SEUN 226143

LECTURER-IN-CHARGE
PROFESSOR V. O. EDO

NOVEMBER, 2021.
INTRODUCTION
Political institutions are the organization in a government that create, enforce, and apply laws.
They often mediate conflict, make (governmental) policy on the economic and social systems,
and otherwise provide representation for the population. Political system is the orderly
arrangement and combination of institutions and machineries by which a people govern
themselves.1 With reference to Nigeria situation, however, the study of the subject cannot be
simply as its definition given. There are methodological problems. First, in the Nigerian situation
up to 1900, there were many political systems. This was because of the fact that there were many
people, that is, ethnic or language groups, inhabiting the country and each had its own political
system (s).2 Such people numbered over 200. 3
Secondly, political systems are not static. They are dynamic, featuring changes and
continuities. There is, therefore, the problem of how to harmonise, in any account presented, the
changes and continuities that occurred at varying degrees of intensity and at different periods in
the many political systems in Nigeria.4
Thirdly, there is the problem of ascertaining the nature and factors of the changes and
continuities in political systems that developed at a period in Nigeria’s history not covered by
precise documentary evidence. There is the difficulty of probing into earlier periods of Nigeria’s
political culture, which for most parts was hardly in any detail, covered by written records before
1800.5 The usual sources, namely the unwritten ones, like archaeology, oral tradition, etc. at our
disposal for reconstructing the history of pre-literate Nigeria do not and cannot go to the root of
the matter. Political systems to be discussed were not just mechanistic: they were ideological. 6
___________________________________________
1
This definition is based on the dictionary meanings of the words “political” and “system”. Those
interested in more sophisticated definition can see the articles on “Systems Analysis”, particularly the
sections on “Social System” by Talcott Parson on pp. 458-472 and on “Political System” by William c.
Mitchell on pp. 473-472 of David Sills, (Ed.), International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, The
Macmillan Press and The Free Press, New York, vol. 15.
2
We indicate system or systems because of the warning that “it is well to often bear in mind that within a
single linguistic cultural area, we often find political systems which are very much unlike one another in
many important features, as given by M. Fortes and Evans-Pitchard in their ‘Introduction’ to their edited
work, African Political Systems, O.U.P London, 1940 (reprinted 1962), p.3.
3
For language identifications in Nigeria, see J.H. Greenberg, The Language of Africa, Indiana University,
Bloomington, 1970, Third Edition, Map C at the end of the book. Greenberg actually lists about 180 but
says the list does not include “any language that is merely a variant name, or the group (speaking it) is too
small to be indicated on a map of the present scale or they (its speakers) live within the speech area of
another people…” Allowing for such omission, the number he recognises will be over 200. The popular
figure in some circles in this country is 256.
4
J.A. Atanda. 2006. Political Systems of Nigerian Peoples Up to 1900, Ibadan: John Archers
(Publishers) Limited. p.3
5
J.F. Ade Ajayi and Bashir Ikara (eds), Evolution of Political Culture in Nigeria, University Press Ltd.
Ibadan, in their “introduction” titled ‘Nigeria’s Evolutionary Political Culture: Issues and Processes.’ p. 2
6
For the argument that pristine societies had ideologies, see Nnamdi Azikwe, An Ideology for Nigeria:
Capitalism, Socialism or Welfarism? Macmillan, Nigeria, Ibadan, 1979.
 In other words, they evolved in consequence of complex factors involving abstract
motions. But as has rightly been pointed out, “it is almost impossible to pursue abstract notion
such as ‘values’ ‘attitudes’ ‘sentiments’, and ‘beliefs’ in historical terms with any precision
through archaeological evidence,7 and, if one may add, through oral tradition or any other
unwritten source of that matter.
The foregoing are serious problems inhibiting the scholar of political systems in Nigeria
up to 1900. But they are not hopeless problems. There is a leeway in the challenge that
“historians need to develop the necessary techniques and methodologies for coping with the
history of those earlier epochs (of Nigerian history) through analysis of religious and institutional
change, linguistic and oral literatures.8 Such techniques and methodologies are, however, still in
their infancy. It is against the background of this limitation that the discussion of the subject of
this study must be viewed.
In approaching our task, we hold to the thesis that political systems in essentially
traditional societies,9 like those in Hausaland and in the Nigerian region for most of our period,
derived largely from socio-political organisations. We, therefore, begin by looking at the
evolution of socio-political organisations which formed the bedrock of political systems in
Nigeria up to 1900. We shall also focus attention on the factors affecting the transition from one
stage of evolution to the other as well as the ideological factor (s) running through the various
stage of evolution. Finally, we shall identify and discuss the nature of the major types of political
systems that emerged from the process of the evolution.
The evolution of socio-political organizations is the bedrock of political systems in
Nigeria up to 1900. No one can now say exactly how and when socio-political organizations
began to evolve in Nigeria. But we can put forward a plausible theory, based on self-evident
truth about human society in general, and supported by case studies in a number of Nigerian
societies such as the Hausa and Kanuri,10 Yoruba and Edo,11 Igbo and Tiv,12 etc. that socio-
political organization must have started to develop with the existence of the family. In other
words, the family was the primary unit of socio-political organization. When the family first
emerged in Nigerian society cannot be dated with precision. There is a view that it dated back to
earliest times when the peoples of Nigeria were living a nomadic life, substituting on hunting and
fruit gathering.
_____________________________________
7
Ajayi and Ikara, op. cit, p.2.
8
Ibid.
9
The term, ‘traditional … Societies’ in this context does not mean societies with unchanging customs, but
rather dynamic ones. But they were traditional in the sense that they were evolving within the society
rather than being the result of imposition by external forces.
10
Abdullahi Smith, “The Early States of the Central Sudan”, in J. F. Ade Ajayi and Micheal Crowder
(eds). History of West Africa, Longman, London, 1976. Vol.1, chapter 5.
11
Ade Obayemi “The Yoruba and Edo-speaking Peoples and their Neighbours Before 1600”, in Ajayi and
Crowder (eds), op cit, chapter 6.
12
Robin Horton, “Stateless Societies in the history of West Africa”, in Ajayi and Crowder (eds), op.
chapter 3
The suggestion is made on the ground that both occupations of hunting and gathering supported
population growth and also required some measure of organization which had to be directed or
coordinated by someone.13 There is another view suggesting that it may be at a later period when
food production had developed through each of arable farming and pastoral farming.14 Both
forms of farming would seem to be in vogue in the Nigerian region in the period c1000-500
B.C.15 Whichever suggestion is taken, it would mean that the family as an institution may have
begun in some centers in the Nigerian region in the last millennium B.C. or even earlier.
The nuclear family unit in each center of emergence would become larger as population
increased by procreation. The largeness would not be only in terms of number but also in terms
of layers of generation. Thus the nuclear family would become expanded to form what is called
the extended family or lineage. But each family unit did not extend ad infinitum. It “tended to
remain relatively small in size as discontented or enterprising members hived off.” 16 Those
members hiving off would establish their own nuclear families, each becoming again extended
and producing its own discontented or enterprising members who would also hive off. And so,
the process continued over time.
However, discontented or enterprising members who “hived off” tended to have a sense
of affinity through blood tie with the lineage from which they hived off. Such blood tie or
kinship was maintained among the filial lineages for some generations until the link was snapped
by “natural law of remoteness”.17 For as long as the link remained, the sense of kinship solidarity
among the filial lineages made them form what are called clans. But, either because of the reason
for hiving off or because of genealogical gap among filial lineages, each lineage tended to
cherish its autonomy. In other words, the solidarity within each filial clan. Indeed, the clan would
appear to be loose end of blood or kinship tie in the traditional Nigerian society. Beyond it, the
tie tended to be stretching towards a breaking point. The clan would also appear to be the
thickest end of the homogenous population peeled together by blood tie or kinship. Beyond it,
population tended genetically heterogeneous.
It must not be taken, however, that societal bond based on kinship ended with the loose
end of blood tie, i.e. at the clan level. A number of clans coalesced to form villages. But the
demographic structure of such villages or groups of villages. But the demographic structure of
_________________________________________________
13
See, for example, J. F. Ade Ajayi, “keynote Address: Factors in the Evolution of Political Culture in
Nigeria” in Ajayi and Ikara (eds), op. cit, p.11
14
See, for example, J. A. Atanda, “Historical Evaluation of Traditional Rulers and institutions in Nigeria
Up to c. 1900”. Paper presented at the conference on the Role of Traditional Rulers in the Governance of
Nigeria, organised by the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Sept. 1984, mimeograph, pp.
13-15.
15
Ibid., pp. 14-15.
16
Ajayi, “Factors in the Evolution of political culture” op. cit. p.11.
17
The concept of natural law of remoteness is influenced by similar legal phraseology in the Chiefs’ Law
of Western Nigeria by which royal families that did not produce an incumbent to the throne for about a
century were disqualified by “natural law of remoteness” from presenting further candidates for
succession contests.
such villages or group of villages tended to become complex. For one thing, becoming loose at
the clan end, blood tie no longer provided a sufficiently cohesive bond among filial clans. For
another, village settlements often accommodated clans whose kinship tie had been snapped by
the natural law of remoteness or even clans that had never had kinship tie at one time. Besides,
new forms of association which cut across the family began to develop with the emergence of the
village. These were age-grades, guilds or associations based on common occupations, etc.18
Because of the foregoing factors, the task of harmonious living and relationship within
the village or group of villages as well as with neighboring ones needed better and stronger
machinery than the family, lineage and clan heads could provide severally. Joint action was
required to regulate behavior and settle disputes among different families, lineages and clans
within the village or groups of villages; or similar disputes with neighboring villages. Such
disputes could be social, political, economic and religious. Whatever the case, any joint action
taken for the resolution of these conflicts meant a higher level of authority than that exercised
severally at the family, lineage and clan levels.
The impact of such higher authority was bound to affect the nature of authority exercised
at such earlier levels. The nature of the impact was a function of the operational relationship of a
combination of factors; ecology, land, the knowledge of the use of iron and other natural
resources, long distance trade, religion and defence requirements. The result, borrowing a leaf
from Robin Horton’s19 argument in a related context, would be one or the other of two situations.
Where these factors operated in the society in such a way as to leave the primary family, lineage
and clan units in their relative locational positions, maintaining a kind of societal equilibrium
termed “genealogical/spatial/social correspondence”,20 the resultant socio-political organization
would be the existence of micro-village settlements having loose links. In other words, authority
was not centralized. This gave rise to the concept of the non-centralized state. But where the
enumerated factors operated so as to upset the societal equilibrium, i.e. instead of leaving the
primary family, lineage and clan units in their relative locational positions, they forced a cross-
current or displacement and relocation of such units, the resultant settlement was likely to be one
in which authority was concentrated or centralized. This was because of the fact that the
problems within so disparate a society would become so aggravated that they would require
strong measures that only a more authoritarian ruler could give. This gave rise to the concept of
the centralized state.
From the foregoing it would appear that the political system of the Nigerian peoples evolved
through time and space, in stages as follows:
(i) Emergence of the nuclear family as the primary socio-economic political unit with
members bound together by very strong kinship tie.
___________________________________________
18
Ajayi, “Factors in the Evolution. . .” op. cit. p. 12
19
Horton, op. cit, pp. 75-81. We avoid Horton’s terminology, “stateless societies” to use “non-centralised
states” in agreement with the thesis in Ajayi’s “Factors in the Evolution. . . “ op. cit, p.12 to the effect that
“there are hardly any peoples in Nigeria without a concept of the state and pattern of authority extending
beyond the family unit”.
20
Ibid, p. 81.
(ii) The extension and aggregation of family units into lineages, each clan bound together
by strong kinship ties.
(iii) The extension and aggregation of lineages into clans, each clan bound together by
loose kinship while each lineage tended the retain its autonomy.
(iv) (a) the aggregation of lineages/clans into villages or village groups, in such a way
that each lineage retained considerable measure of autonomy, compromising it only
for the common good, thus bringing about the organization of villages or village
groups into loose or non-centralized states.
(b) the aggregation or expansion of villages in such a way that lineages/clans into
villages or village groups, in such a way that lineages/clan and village autonomies
were subordinated to the overall authority of the state thus bringing about the
organization of centralized states.
It would appear from this process of evolution outlined above that there were only two
major different political systems emerging among the Nigerian peoples up to 1900. One was the
non-centralized state system, while the other was the centralised state system as indicated in
stage iv (a) & (b) above. Both of these had as common base the family, i.e. from the nuclear
family to the extended family (lineage and clan levels as indicated i-iii above). Since the family
was basic to both systems, the discussion of the concept of authority at the family level must
precede the discussions of both political systems. But the concept of authority at the family level
would also not be meaningful without a discussion of the concept of the people’s world view.
That world view served as the bedrock of the ideology underpinning the concept of authority not
only at the family level but also at other levels of socio-political organisation among all the
Nigerian peoples, without exception up to 1900. A brief discussion of that world view and its
impact on the political systems is pertinent at this stage.
In the period under study, all the Nigerian peoples without exception, believed in the
existence of a Supreme Being, i.e. God in English culture. They gave Him specific names in
various localities. A few examples can be given. The Edo called Him Osanobua;21 the Igbo
called Him Chukwu or Chineke;22 the Hausa named Him Ubangiji,23 the Ibibio named Him
Abassi,24 the Jukun addressed Him as Chido;25 the Kagoro called Him Gwaza;26 while the
Yoruba named Him Olorun or Olodumare.27 All the Nigerian peoples also believed that the
Supreme Being created the visible world and the human beings living in it.
_____________________________________________
21
R.E. Bradbury, 1970. The Benin Kingdom and The Edo-speaking Peoples of South-Western Nigeria.
International African Institute, London, p.52
22
Daryl Forde and G. I. Jones, The Ibo and Ibibio- Speaking Peoples of South-Eastern Nigeria,
International African Institute, London.
23
Abdullahi Smith, “The Early States of the Central Sudan”, op cite., p. 190
24
Forde & Jones, op. cit.
25
C. K. Meek, A Sudanese Kingdom: An Ethnographic Study of the Jukun-speaking peoples of Nigeria,
Kegan Baul, Trench, Trubuer & Co. Ltd.
26
Harold D. Gunn, 1956, Pagan Peoples of the Central Area of Northern Nigeria. International African
Institute London, p. 101.
27
E. Bolaji Idowu, 1962. Olodumare: God in Yoruba Belief, London, Longmans.
In addition, they believed that the Supreme Being also created super natural beings or
spirits to live in the invisible world or the spirit world. The specific abodes of such spirits could
be in any of the many non-human beings created by the Supreme Being: trees, hills, rivers, air,
etc. It was also believed that human beings too possessed spirits, usually in form of alter ego, and
that as soon as human beings died such spirits also joined other spirits in the spirit world. Hence
the belief in ancestral spirits and the consequent ancestor worship. Of these spirits, some were
benevolent, bringing good to human beings while the others were malevolent, bringing evil to
human beings. The spirits of dead ancestors usually belonged more to the benevolent ones,
concerned as they were with the welfare of their forebears on earth. But they could also be
malevolent if provoked to anger.
To receive good or blessing, human beings were to live uprightly. Doing otherwise would
bring punishment in form of one evil or the other. Just as the people believed that human beings,
as individuals, could only have good or blessing by being in the right relationship with the
Supreme Being and the spirits, including those of the ancestors, so they believed that society, as
a corporate body of human beings and at what level of socio-political organization would only
have good or blessing in like manner. Thus, upright living became the ideology of individuals
and societies alike. However, the people realized their inability as human beings to guarantee
upright living always. And since the desire to receive the good was one of the strongest desires
of human beings, whether as individuals or as corporate bodies, the Nigerian peoples in the
period under survey took extra care to devise a system by which they believed that they could
placate the Supreme Being and the spirits who were His agents. To this end, they established a
religious system based on the belief in the Supreme Being and the worship of Him through the
spirits called deities for the purpose. The shrine for worshipping such deities was usually located
around or near where they believed that the relevant spirits existed: trees, hills, rivers, etc.
Similarly, the dead ancestors were also deified and their spirits worshipped.
Consequently, it became the bounding duty of rulers at what level of socio-political
organization to perform religious duties for the good of their society. Family heads, lineage and
clan heads, village heads and state chiefs and kings alike either functioned as priests or appointed
priests to perform necessary religious duties. The religious duties, which rulers had to perform,
made the political systems of the Nigerian peoples up to 1900 to have semblance of theocracies.
Strictly speaking, however, no real theocracies existed in the region until the establishment of the
Sokoto Caliphate in the 19th century. Real theocracies operate divine or revealed laws. But for
most of our period, the political systems in the Nigerian region operated human-made laws.
Nevertheless, because of the need for rulers and individuals alike to appease the gods, religions
played an important role in the people’s political systems. This role began right from the family
which formed the basis of the political systems.
The Family as the Base of Political Systems
That the family was crucial to the political systems that operated among the Nigerian peoples in
the period under survey cannot be over emphasized. Indeed, Professor J. F.Ade-Ajayi is right in
asserting that:
The most basic unit of the Nigerian society is of course the family, and it is through the
family that we all first experienced authority. The concept of authority transmitted
through the family is fundamental to any political culture as it tends to be embedded
within the deepest levels of our psyche. Our changing concepts of authority tends to be a
reflection of changes within the family structure.28
An understanding of the family structure in its socio-political setting is, therefore, crucial to the
understanding of the nature of the major political systems in the Nigerian region. In explaining
that structure, we have to look at the family not just in its nuclear form, but in its extended or
larger form to include the lineage and the clan.29 This is necessary because there was hardly
anywhere that the family did not exceed beyond the nuclear form in Nigeria. Up to 1900. We
also bear in mind that “owing to the needs of the different ecologies, occupations, and evolving
cultures”, and also owing to “the change over time”, there were many varieties and parents of the
family in different cultural areas of Nigeria up to 1900.30 But these varieties and patterns had “a
number of common features”31 that survived up to 1900 and beyond. Ethnographic studies have
revealed many of these common features. Through such studies, it is possible to present a
structure representative of the many family varieties and pattern in the different cultural areas.
Abdullahi Smith talks about the phenomenon in Hausaland before the emergence of state-like
political organisation as follows:
There is some reason to believe that the period between the desiccation and the rise of the
birane saw the development throughout Hausaland of small agricultural communities
known as Kauyaka (or sing., kauye, unguwa). There were nucleated hamlets organized
for crop production and consisting of family groups whose farmland (gona, gandu) was
contiguous and separated from that of other Kauyaka by waste (daji). In these hamlets
authority appears to have been of two kinds. Overall leadership (sarauta) vested in a ruler
seems to have been recognised only for specific purpose where communal discipline
transcending very ancient office was that of sarkin noma, the king of farming, whose
business was to organise the agriculture of the hamlet including the religious ritual
relating to the season. In matters not connected with agriculture authority appears to have
resided in the individual family head, for the Kauye was basically a collection of
particular family groups, gidajo (sin gida) recognising no superior to the family head
(maigida)32
POLITICAL INSTITUTION IN HAUSALAND BEFORE FULANI JIHAD (HABE
POLITICAL SYSTEM)
The founder of Habe states came to Northern Nigeria after a brief stay in Kanem
Bornu.Bayajidda who is the apical ancestor settled in Bornu from where he took a princess to
wife. He was sufficiently acquainted with the state organisation and it is not unlikely that when,
after his
___________________________________________
28
Ajayi, “Factors in the Evolution of Political Culture, op. cit., p. 11
29
Ibid, p.12
30
Ibid. p.11
31
Ibid.
32
Abdullahi Smith, op. cit, pp. 179-180.

encounter with and destruction of the proverbial snake, he was installed Sarki of Daura, he set up
an administration very much on the Bornu model. Similarly, his seven children who became the
eponymous founders of the “Hausa Bakwai” states must have modelled the administration of the
various states founded by them all over Hausaland after that of their father in Daura. The Jihad
invasion of Hausaland thoroughly destroyed this type of state organisation on the ground that it
was based on pagan beliefs and practices. Only three enclaves have remained to this day to give
account of traditional Habe state systems, having survived the systematic onslaught of the Fulani
Jihad. These are Daura, Argungu and Abuja. Therefore, any discussion of the indigenous
political system of the Hausa before they were overrun by the Fulani would have to focus on the
organisation of any of these surviving enclaves.33
Abuja: A model of Pre-Jihad Indigenous Political System Among the Hausa.
A foremost feature of the Abuja, as indeed any Habe, indigenous political system, is that the
population was divided into discrete status groups or categories as follows:
Royals: The royals were members of the king’s lineage or family and included most of the
hereditary chiefs.
Freemen: This group, sometimes referred to as commoners formed the bulk of the population.
They were eligible to receive fiefs from the king. In some cases, heritage of such fiefs ran along
descent lines.
Eunuchs; These were recruited by the king from certain villages. His condition rendered the
question of his freedom or slavery meaningless. He was unable to marry or have children who
could succeed him or inherit from him. Members of this group were therefore completely
dependent on their master.
Slaves: Slavery in Hausa society was a legal status terminable for both sexes by manumission,
purchase of freedom or death. For the female, it could also terminate by bearing of a child for the
master as his concubine. Freedom was also a mutable legal status since a recapture could lead to
death or further enslavement in another society.
Mallams: A fifth status group consisted of mallams who were freemen. As religious leaders,
however, they could not hold fiefs. In other words, they were a special group of freemen who
supplied a stabilising force in the system.
State Organisation
Superimposed on the status categories delineated above was a complex system of state
organisation. Titles were divided into different rank orders and there was an official order of
precedence among them. More importantly, promotional opportunities as well as appointments
were defined in terms of, and limited to, the social status of the individual.34
_____________________________________________________________________
33
Aminu A. A. Indigenous Political System, Know Your Country: Hausa & Fulani. Chapter Two, p. 30
34
Ibid, p. 31
Thus, a slave could only be appointed or aspire to be promoted to offices reserved exclusively
for slaves. So too were eunuchs, Mallams and Freemen. In other words, each status hierarchy
formed a separate promotional series.
In all, the state comprised seven major rank orders of officials which included:
1. Kingship
2. Chamber Eunuchs
3. Household officials
4. Public officials (senior and junior)
5. Royal officials
6. Slave officials
7. Mallams
Kingship was a focal point in the Habe political system. Everything centered around the king as
in a state system. However, the Habe King was far from an absolute or political king as is the
case with the Benin Oba or the Fulani Emir who succeeded him in most parts of Northern
Nigeria. For one thing, it was rotational rather than primogenitary. Thus, although Muhammed
Makau reigned in Zaria between 1802 and 1804 when he founded the Abuja government in exile,
and continue to rule in Zuba where he died in 1824, he was not succeeded by his son. Instead, the
kingship rotated between Abu ja, Au Kwakwa and their descendants, alternately. In very intimate
association with the king were the officials of the inner chamber also known as chamber
eunuchs. From this order were drawn the king’s advisers and agents who were partly dependent
on him for maintenance. However, being the medium for communicating for fief holders,
chamber officials were often in receipts of benefits and gifts and were therefore better than their
household counterparts.
The most important order in the Habe state system, politically speaking, was that of
household officials. It was an order organised internally on hierarchical lines. Household
officials blacked territorial fiefs and were completely dependent on the king for support. Like its
public counterpart, the household order had a military and a civil segment headed by the Barde
and Sarkin Fada respectively. In terms of opportunities, members of this order were eligible for
promotion to the highest office of the public fief-holding order, the Madawaki who was
Commander of the Armed Forces. Political, the household order was the pivot of the political
system to the extent that it appointed the other officials or rather had a veto power in their
appointments and promotions.
The next most important order in the kingdom was the order of public officials. Divided into
senior and junior segments, this order was also a hierarchic one. It was mainly responsible for
public administration in the state. This order provided the military and police services needed to
keep a conquest state as an on-going system. As such, it had great administrative responsibilities
as well as economic independence. Like the household, the order was divided into military and
civil segments and three of its four topmost positions, the Galadima, the Wombai, and Dallatu
(which were reserved exclusively for eunuchs) headed the civil division. The fourth position, that
of Madawaki, (reserved for freemen) headed the military division. 35
____________________________________________
35
Ibid p.32
The other orders of royal officials and mallams were not important politically speaking and
unlike the others, were not internally differentiated. The slave officials were likewise
undifferentiated, although, three groups corresponding to military, police and civil duties were
recognised. Whereas, the royal officials, as hereditary fief holders, were economically
independent of the king, mallams were only partly so. Lacking fiefs, mallams as ritual leaders
partly depended on consultations and partly on gifts and supports from the king. The Habe
system as represented by Abuja was one of segmentary political relations between the king and
his households and public orders.
On major issues, the king was customary obliged to consult his senior household officials
first and then the senior order of public officials i.e. the Madawaki and the three eunuchs.
Galadima, Wombai and Dallatu. If they all agreed on the course to be pursued, the king could
resist their advice. If he did, he risked the possibility of alienating the state. On the other hand,
policy moves be initiated Madawaki and the order of public officials could be vetoed by the
order of household officials under the leadership of Sarkin Fada or Chief of the palace. It is only
in the event of disagreement between the two orders i.e. the household and the senior public
officials, that the king was free to act independently as he saw fit. However, Sarkin Fada and his
household officials could influence the composition of the public orders by using their veto
power block proposed appointments to it or possibly becoming public officials themselves. Yet a
move to convert from household to public official required the co-operation of the Madawaki
and his group of public officials as well as the support of the king. In other words, all three _ the
King, his Household and public officials needed to work together as a team. Household officials
by themselves could not control policy decisions or appointments if the king and his senior
officials of the public order combined against them. It is also notable that although the king had
great administrative authority, he could not act politically against the combined force of his
household and public officials. The household officials had no administrative authority but they
enjoyed considerable political influence. On the contrary, the officials of the public order had
great administrative responsibilities and authority both as individuals in their separate fiefs as
well as collectively within the kingdom as a whole. Yet they had very little power of independent
political action in view of the veto power of the household officials. The chamber eunuchs who
were the king’s confidants stood outside this power bloc or triumvirate. They had neither
political power or independent administrative authority, although as we have already shown
above, three of the four most senior offices of the public order were reserved for eunuchs. In one
word, the affairs of the Habe kingdom with special reference to Abuja was divided between two
orders – the orders of household and public officials. The Galadima’s duties in the field of civil
administration contrated directly with those of the Madawaki – a contrast which was further
dramatized by their differences in social status, the Madawaki being a freeman nd the Galadima,
a eunuch. While the Galadima himself was in charge of the state police, his subordinate
controlled markets, exercised jurisdiction over miscellaneous civil matters while his deputy,
another eunuch acted as head of the army’s civil administration.
____________________________________
36
Ibid, p. 33

Checks and Balance in Habe State Administration

Habe state administration had a number of built-in checks and balances to forestall
autocracy and/or nepotism on the part of the king. One of these checks was to dissociate
whatever administrative authority vested in the royal lineage from the throne as such. Thus, for
example, two women of the royal family held titles but being women, both were ineligible for
succession. The Dan Galadima who was the king’s chosen successor lacked administrative fiefs,
which was obviously a disadvantage both economically no less politically. As if to complete the
political ineptitude of the royal lineage, the person who acted as its head (the Magajin Dangi)
was classified with the order of mallams and therefore communicated with the king through his
chamber eunuchs. He could not have any audience with the king, still less a private one. In other
words, the rules simultaneously limited the number of men of the royal lineage who could hold.
By these checks, the system of government was protected against royal nepotism or any
disruptive competition for succession between royal officials and/or members of the royal
lineage.37
In fact, another built-in check which precluded the type of disruptive competition referred
to was in the procedure for appointing a successor to the king. Although, there was a royal
successor, the Dan Galadima, the royal succession was not determined by the king or the royal
lineage to which he belonged. On the contrary, it was the responsibility of certain traditional
electors all of whom were officials. The two most senior officials of the public order – the
Madawaki who held the highest office open to freemen and the Galadima who held the highest
office open to eunuchs council were three Koranic scholars or mallams. It is notable that
mallams had a majority in the royal electoral council and were therefore able to hold the balance
of power in the council. The stabilising effect of this arrangement cannot be over-emphasized. It
meant that mallams who were above politics were usually able to decide the succession to the
kingship in a way that prevented dynastic struggle as well as forestalled intrigues and collusions
among/between the order of officials.
Once appointed, the king found that most offices ad officials were to him, a given. That
is, the officials of state were not easily dismissed, either individually or as a group and his own
power of appointment to office was limited by them. Not only were titled offices associated with
specific functions and tasks, it was also the case that thy did not forma single continuous series.
Rather, the titles were grouped into several orders of rank which were in turn arranged according
to specific functions. As far as the king was concerned there were limited possibilities for the
appointment of persons to one or the other, as eunuchs, slaves, mallams and freemen belonged to
different orders and could not transfer from one series to the other. Under these circumstances,
the king had very little to offer by way of gratification to clients. Put bluntly, personal clientage
was unlikely to be politically beneficial since it did not offer any basis for appointment to, or
promotion in office. Concerning the triumvirate or power bloc referred to, the Madawaki’s client
could be kept out of office by the veto of household officials.38
_________________________________________
37
Ibid, p. 34
38
Ibid, p. 35
So too, was it possible for the Madawaki’s group to oppose nominees or the clients of the Sarkin
Fada who head the household order. In like manner, the king’s personal clients would have to be
supported either by the public or household officials before he can appoint them. Considering
this delicate balance of power, it is unlikely that any single official including the king could
automatically appoint his personal clients to office. Clientage did not therefore offer any political
or economic opportunities in the Habe state organisation.
Mobility and Stability in the Habe Political System
Apart from the check and balances built into it, Habe indigenous political system had a
rather rigid structure of official relations to ensure stabilikty. The pattern of relationships of the
major orders to the throne were not only important but fixed features. So fixed indeed tat to
change the conditions of tenure of any of the offices would have necessitated a whole lot of
adjustments in the system itself. For example, relatiuons between chamber eunuchs, household
officials and the public order had not only a military and a civil division, it also had senior and
junior ranks. Equally differentiated not only in terms of rank order and precedence but also in
terms of promotional channels or mobility were the chamber and household orders. The mobility
opportunities were such that all holders of positions in the lower ranks were motivated by the
opportunities available for upward mobility in their respective ranks and orders. In other words,
whether in the military or civil division, there were opportunities for promotion to higher ranks
and position of Madawaki if one were a freeborn in the military division of the senior public
order, or that of Galadima if one were a eunuch and in the civil division of the senior public
order. Either of the positions enjoyed, as we have seen, considerable political power and
economic advantages. The contribution of these mobility opportunities to the stability of the
political machine cannot be overemphasized. For one thing, prescribed channels reduced the
dangers of infighting and unbridled 39 competition among officials for favours and promotion.
This fixity of the system made clientage unlikely to be of any political and/or economical
advantage. One last mechanism to ensure stability was in the interplay between, or rather
distribution of economic and political powers. To avoid instability, economic and political
powers were inversely distributed between groups. Thus household officials were very powerful
politically speaking. They exercised immeasurable influence over appointments, promotions, and
dismissal with political implications. Despite this influence, however, the order was
economically unrewarding. They depended on the throne and king for gratification. By contrast,
the public officials as we have seen carried great administrative responsibilities with definite
economic advantages but with very little political power. In the circumstances close and cordial
working relationships had to be worked out between the household and public officials. Even the
king was not exempted from this inverse distribution of economic/administrative and political
power. Although his income and economic independence surpassed everyone else’s and although
he had greater administrative authority, he was nevertheless a limited monarch. 40 He was
politically hamstrung and could only exercise a decisive influence on policy matters under
conditions of a political stalemate or disagreement between his public and household officials.
___________________________________________
39
Ibid, p. 36
40
Ibid, p. 37
Despite this limited nature of the monarchy, it was nevertheless essential for co-ordinating the
total system, and maintaining its stability. A no less important mechanism to ensure the stability
of the Habe system was the arrangement whereby an electoral council existed side by side a
chosen heir, the Dan Galadima, who rarely succeeded to the throne. Had the king been privileged
to direct his own succession, and had his heir been entitled to offices with great political and
economic powers, the equilibrium of the system might have been impaired sooner than later.
With these institutional provisions, the system might have endured for much longer but it was
abruptly brought to an end by conquest. As it turned out, this conquest was supplanted
everywhere, except for three enclaves, by political arrangement and an administration far from
like it the nature of which we now turn.
POLITICAL INSTITUTION IN HAUSALAND AFTER FULANI JIHAD (CALIPHATE
SYSTEM)
Zaria in the Nineteenth Century: A model of Fulani Indigenous Political System
The Fulani Jihad of 1804 established an empire which was co-terminous with what is now
Northern Nigeria. At the death of its founder, Usman Dan Fodio, the empire was divided into
eastern and western halves. The former was put under the charge of his son while the latter ws
under his brother. The Zaria regime fell in the eastern sector under the charge of Shehu’s son.
Also the Nupe system fell under the western sector. Whether east or west, the whole empire was
formed into a caliphate the overall headquarters of which was Sokoto which the Shehu had
chosen for his capital. All the conquered emirates became vassals of the Sokoto caliphate and
their Emirs ruled as his representatives.41
Clientage: Key to Fulani Politics and Admnistration
Zaria was not only one of the six most imptotant emirates of the Sokoto caliphate, it may
pass very easily for its most important vassal state. Zaria was also about the most important state
before the days of the Jihad in the sense that it bordered on the pagan peoples from whichit
supplied slaves. To capture these, it was involved in incessabt campaigns and raids. It grew into
a prosperous state with very brave and famous rulers such as Queen Amina for example, whose
empire was reputed to have stretched to the sea. Zaria under Fulani administration grew just as
important with several vassal states of its own strestching into the Plateau region and bordering
on Adamawa emirate. There were, however, important differences between the relations of
vassalage which bound Zaria to Sokoto and those binding the subordinate units to Zaria. For
clarity, we will discuss these two faces of clientage separately beginning with the former.
Sokoto-Zaria Relations
As a vassal state the Sultan of Sokoto could, and very often intervened in the government
and internal affairs of Zaria. The Sultan’s supervision was effected through the Waziri of
Sokoto.42 The overseers for different emirates who were normally resident between the Sultan of
Sokoto and
_______________________________________
41
Ibid, p. 38
42
Ibid, p. 39
the Emirs who ruled in his name in the caliphate. The Waziri paid regular visits to Sokoto both to
update himself as well as collect tributes for the Sultan. These tributes were made twice annually
on the occasion of the greater and lesser Sallah. During these feats, the kings of Zaria no less
than those of the other emirates were expected to take such tributes as slaves, Zaria cloth, mats
cowries etc. personally to the Caliph at Sokoto. Apart from these gifts which the Emir was
expected to make annually, levies of grain which the Emir was expected to be collected for the
Waziri each time he visited the emirate.
Gifts and levies apart, an even greater medium of control was through the direct appointment of
the Emirs of Zaria from one of the three dynasties – viz the Mallawa, the Bornawa and the
Katsinawa. In 1860, the Sultan of Sokoto deposed the Emir of Zaria and installed a new one in
his place.
To aid Sokoto in appointing the right candidate, an electoral council was established about year
1863 whose task it was to select the rank competitors. The council was made up of a chief priest,
the Galadima and another official mallam who was alsoi the chief judge of Alkali. It excluded
the competing candidates as well as members of the ruling lineages. The electoral council
deliberated upon and prepared a short list of three candidates ranked from the most to the least
favoured for the throne. This list was then forwarded through the Waziri to the Caliph who made
the final choice for the Waziri to install in his stead at Zaria.
Zaria as a Vassal State
Apart from annual tributes referred to earlier, the Emir of Zaria attended the Caliph’s
court to report on the affairs of his emirate and was duty bound to supply arms and /or military
aid if called upon to do so by the Sultan. As a vassal state, 43 the Sultan had rights to inherit
portions of the property left by the rulers of Zaria if they died in office. On such occasions, half
of the childless concubines and a third of his slaves and cattle were taken by the Caliph. In the
case of deposition, the Caliph’s portion was half of the deposed king’s personal slaves and cattle.
The right of a share in the personal property of Emirs which was sometimes considerable was a
major source of wealth for the Sultan. To forestall the official division of their estates which
often resulted in the impoverishment of their families, many Emirs restored to dividing up the
same among their children while still alive. This left little or nothing for the Sultan to share after
their death.
Zaria as an Emirate
Within the kingdom of Zaria, the Emir did not exercise as much authority over his vassals
as was exercised over him by the Sultan. For example, although, he could make appointments to,
promotions and dismissals from office etc., his decisions were not final. He could likewise not
reward his clients with vassal chieftaincy. Such appointments could and were often successfully
contested by the vassal states in question by appeal to Sokoto. 43 In other words, whereas the
Sultan had absolute powers over the Emir in matters of appointment and dismissals, the latter
had only
_______________________________________________
43
Ibid, p. 39

supervisory jurisdiction over his vassal states. He could neither choose nor depose but merely
confirm candidates chosen by the local electors. Each of the vassal states were linked to Zaria
through an intermediate official stationed in Zaria. Tributes from vassal states were sent through
latter officials who kept one fifth of whatever was collected just as much as the Waziris of
Sokoto kept of whatever came from the emirates including Zaria. In a few cases, however, the
Emir retained direct control of certain vassal states.
Some Basic Features of Fulani Indigenous Administration
Irrespective of the level in question, the two outstanding features of Fulani political
system were competition and clientage. Individuals often became clients of important persons,
office holders, or families. It was also possible for a family or descent groups to become a client
of another, the latter form of relationship usually being expressed through marriage alliances.
Clientage became important as the competition for office became keener. 44 In the years
immediately following Fulani conquest, for example, political office was equally open to Hausa
and Fulani alike but by the mid-nineteenth century when the caliphate had been firmly
established, almost all important offices were reserved for the Fulani. This created a situation
whereby the bulk of Hausa population was reduced to the level of clients to what increasingly
became Fulani overlords. For a subject population, clientage came to provide some form of
apprenticeship. It became the practice for people appointed to fief holding to have received some
form of training in politics and administration by serving as clients of Fulani senior officers.
This tended to increase competition which was the second essential element in Fulani
administration. The competition was as much between officials who competed against one
another by reason of the structure of the kinship system, as between the Hausa subject population
for political apprenticeship. This sense of competition was reinforced by the dynamic nature of
the political system. Competition for the high offices including kingship converted
administration into a political instrument no less than the prize. Thus a new king or vassal
dismissed his predecessor’s kinsmen and supporters from office and appointed his own who
were likewise dismissed en masse by his successor. In this way, offices circulated very rapidly
among an expanding population of competitors who thereby had increased prospects of
appointment. The logic was that this system of mass dismissals and appointments each time
offices changed hands ensured the new incumbent complete control by ensuring that officials
will be loyal. Thus a distinction was made between administrative and political offences in the
system. Administrative offence was the sin of omission such as failure to execute orders. 45
Though bad enough, such an offence was regarded as a kind of venial sin and did not necessarily
lead to dismissal. Political offence which was defined as loyalty to one’s political opponents was
the real sin, a mortal sin so to say, for which a man stood to be dismissed from office. It was thus
that a new incumbent to office dismissed all the officials who worked with his predecessor in
office especially, if he belonged to a rival political camp. Such officials stood to be suspected of
disloyalty, or potential disloyalty, and solidarity with the enemy.
_________________________________________
44
Ibid, p.40
45
Ibid, p.41
Thus, administration was inextricably tied up with politics and efficiency or inefficiency was
measured in terms of loyalty or disloyalty to the boss rather than performance on the job. This
acid test of loyalty could not but be a necessity in a political system in which an oligarchy,
divided into rival dynasties, ruled over a dominated majority.
Grassroot Administration
Public administration at the village level was to a lesser extent the replica of vassalage
and state administration as show above. Thus, within the community, the village chief
administered the population through a number of ward heads whom he was free to appoint,
promote or dismiss. He also appointed officials to administer the affairs of the various
occupations which functioned like guilds. Community chiefs or ward heads took responsibility
for such matters as repairs of town halls, public buildings like mosques, the chief’s residence etc.
Perhaps, the most important of the functions of grassroot officials were the collection of tax and
tributes, supervision of the local markets and caravan routes in the area, as well as other
miscellaneous revenue yielding assignments. These duties were discharged on behalf of the
village chief or fief lord to whom the officials were ultimately accountable. In other words, the
local communities were administered as fief holdings with approximately the same rights, duties
and privileges as those which attached to vassalage and state administration. It was a matter of
scale. 46
The Impact of the 19th Century Revolution on Traditional Political System
The 19th century in Nigeria, as indeed in West African history, has been generally described as a
century of revolutions. To the extent that revolution means an “extensive change in a condition,
method, idea, etc. The description is to a large extent an apt one. For, as will be sown presently,
drastic changes took place in the condition, method and idea underpinning events in the Nigerian
region in that century when compared with the preceding centuries. However, to the extent that a
revolution means the “overthrow and replacement of a government or political system by those
governed,”47 the description is very close to the reality of the situation. For the description to be
apt in this context, it would not be enough for the personnel of government to change, the
political system should change or at least be reformed. In this regard, Abdullahi Mahdi’s
observation with respect to Kano in particular and Hausaland in general after the jihad
movements is instructive. According to him, what happened in the long run was “a revolution
without (the) transformation of the pre-existing structures of the social system.” 48 That included
the political system as well.
To go back to the application of the first definition of the revolution given above, there is
no doubting the fact that drastic changes took place in the ideas underpinning political,
economic, religious and social events in the Nigerian region in the 19th century. These changes
were due to the effects of certain forces that started to operate in that region just at the turn of the
century. The forces were largely philosophical and religious and to some extent economic.
__________________________________________
46
Ibid, p. 42
47
Frank & Wagulls, Dictionary, op. cit., p. 1152
48
Abdullahi Mahdi “The Jihad and its Role in strengthening the Sarauta (Kingship) System in Hausaland
in the 19th Century: The case of Kano, in Ajayi & Ikara, Evolution of the Political Culture in Nigeria, op.
cit., p. 125
They all had grave consequences on political systems. In many cases, they interacted with obne
another and in such a way that they were difficult to separate both in their operation and in their
effects. But an understanding of each of the forces is a sine qua non to an understanding of their
operation and effects on the political system.
First was the change in the philosophy relating to the concept of power and leadership in
the society. Up to the end of the 18 th century, as has been outlined in the preceding section of this
paper, it was accepted philosophy in most parts of Nigeria that power belonged to communities
as corporate bodies, and not to individuals. The leadership of any such corporate body was only
bestowed on individuals who must ensure that power was used in the interest of all the members
of the corporate body. The individuals on whom leadership was bestowed got such privileged
position by virtue of either their age/wisdom (in the case of family/lineage head). The point
being made is that up to the 18th century, leadership was essentially by ascription.
Apart from the philosophical force of change, there was the religious one. This arose
from foreign religions: Islam and Christianity. Neither of them was a new introduction to the
Nigerian region in the new introduction to the Nigerian region in the 19 th century. Islam was
introduced to Northern Nigeria much earlier – to Borno as from 11 th century A.D and to
Hausaland from the 15th century A.D. it had spread to most of Northern Nigeria. Islam in its early
stages, sought accommodation within existing political systems. Its propagators wooed the rulers
and supported their administration. The rulers, on their part, professed new faith, but they did not
abandon their traditional religion which formed one of the major pillars of their authority and
which majority of their subjects held to tenaciously. As long as this situation of syncretism
continued, a foreign religion did not constitute a serious threat to the existing political system.
By the nineteenth century however, Islamic religion took a revivalist posture which
undermined the existing political system. First, they abhorred syncretism and decided to abolish
 it. In other words, this traditional religion was to be purified. For their purpose, the propagators
saw the masses as potentially more useful this time around than the traditional rulers. Islam
began by preaching against what its leader termed unislamic and oppressive rule of kings in
Hausaland. Asking those kings to reform or quit. The adherents of the religions were being
encouraged to rebel against and overthrow such kings as would not reform. The campaign, led
by Uthman dan Fodio, eventually resulted in overthrow of the Habe rulers. In the campaign, the
masses were so mobilized that the jihad – ‘holy’ war against the Habe rulers – could rightly be
called a mass movement. The masses, in turn, had great expectations of a reformed government
and society.
However, in the political structure that eventually emerged, the masses had little or no
place. First the political entity – the Caliphate – set up was to be governed in accordance with the
Sharia and other Islamic injunctions as contained in the Qur’an and Hadith. This meant that
government was guided by revealed laws, and, so the masses had no way of influencing it. But
there was something worse. The political structure set up to govern the Caliphate made no
institutional provision for the participation of the masses. It was a system of dominated by a new
ruling class, mostly chosen from certain families. It was a hierarchical form with the Sultan
based at Sokoto, as the overall head and viceroy of the Holy prophet Muhammed. Next, were the
Emirs who were appointed as deputies of the Sultan to govern the Caliphate’s component parts
named Emirates. It was true that the principle of acquisition, based on merit, i.e. deep knowledge
in Islamic science rather than ascription, underlined the first appointments. But either by accident
or by design, ascription soon came to play a dominant role in the appointment of Sultan and
Enirs. In short, the hereditary principle of the pre-jihad period became re-enthroned. The
situation was even made worse than in the pre-jihad period by allowing principle percolate
beyond the posts of rulers to the appointment of state officials. Abdullahi Mahdi puts the case as
follows:
In the pre-jihad period, appointment to important state offices was based largely on merit
and this explains why Kanuri, Arab and Wangarawa scholars occupied important positions
in the government of the Hausa states. But after the jihad, offices at the state and local
levels were tied to a handful of families thereby virtually excluding the greatest number of
the members of the society from participating in the governments of their states.52
In terms of political system, those so enthroned virtually restored the sarauta (kingship) system.
Abdullahi Mahdi has pointed that, from the strict Islamic point of view, the Caliphs and Emirs no
longer qualified to bear such titles from the middle of the 19 th century onwards. From all intents
and purposes they had become emperors and kings (Sarakuna) respectively in their pre-jihad
connotations in Hausaland. They were strongly supported by a ruling class the masu saratse all of
whom trampled on the rights of the masses, the talakawa. Thus, the attempt made to reform
society, guarantee individual liberty, and establish collective leadership under the aegis of Islamic
theocracy in Hausaland eventually ended in restoring and even reinforcing the principle of
privilege of birth, as the dominant criterion for leadership. The situation became one in which
rulers, strictly speaking, were accountable only to Allah rather than to their people, one in which
no Advisory Council checked the autocracy of rulers.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing account, it is clear that the political institution operated among the Hausa
peoples from the earliest times up to 1900 had their genesis in the families. Here, the term family
has been used in its most elastic from, stretching from the nuclear family to the extended family in
form of lineage and clan. The genesis of the family itself has been estimated to be any time from
about 4,000 or 6,000 years ago. Within these many thousands of years, the political system
evolved from the family in varying forms in consequence of varying factors in various localities.
The Hausa, traditionally live in small villages as well as in precolonial towns and cities where they
grow crops, raise livestock including cattle as well as engage in trade, both local and long distance
across Africa. They speak the Hausa language, an Afro-Asiatic language of the Chadic group. The
Hausa aristocracy had historically developed an equestrian based culture. Still a status symbol of
the traditional nobility in Hausa society, the horse still features in the Eid day celebrations, known
as Ranar Sallah (in English: the Day of the Prayer). Daura city is the cultural center of the Hausa
people. The town predates all the other major Hausa towns in tradition and culture.
Ever before the commencement of colonialism, the people of what later became known as Nigeria
were living under different administration or political arrangements. However, the pre-colonial
Nigeria symbolises the methods or ways by which Nigerians govern themselves before the advent
of colonialism. It means traditional systems preceded the era of colonialism. From the same
position, the pre-colonial Nigeria varies from one region the other because the ethnic and ethno-
linguistic differences. For instance, while some political systems are centralized or chiefly society
(e.g Yoruba pre-colonial system and Hausa/Fulani), others were decentralized or chiefless society
 (like the Igbo clan system which was acephalous in nature). Interestingly, indirect rule would not
have been possible without the already established pre-colonial system.
After the great Jihad war (1804-1810) led by Usman Dan Fodio, the former fourteen Hausa states
were merged and then divided into two caliphates. The eastern caliphate which included states like
Yola, Gombe, Kano, Zaria and Katsina had Sokoto as its capital while the western caliphate,
including Ilorin, Argungun and Kontagora had Gwandu as its capital. Usman Dan Fodio became
the head (Sarkin Muslim) of the whole Hausaland while the control of Sokoto (eastern) and
Gwandu (western) caliphates went to Bello, Usman Dan Fodio’s son and Abdullah, Usman Dan
Fodio’s brother respectively. Furthermore, the Sokoto and Gwandu caliphates were sub divided
into emirates for easy administration. Each emirate was headed by an Emir who was appointed
from two or three ruling families with the approval of the Emir of Sokoto or Gwandu, depending
on the emirate the selection was made. These lesser Emirs were responsible to the Emirs of Sokoto
and Gwandu respectively. However, in each emirate, the Emir was assisted by some officials who
were assigned to certain duties. These officials included:
the ‘Waziri‘ who was the administrative officer or prime minister;
the Galadima‘ who was in charge of the capitals;
the ‘Madawaki‘ who was the commander of the army;
the ‘Dogari‘ who was the head of the police;
the ‘Maaji‘, the treasurer;
the ‘Sarkin Ruwa Sarkin Ruwa‘, the river fishing official;
the ‘Sarkin Fada Sarkin Fada‘ who was responsible for the administration of the palace;
and the ‘Sarkin Pawa Sarkin Pawa‘, the head of all butchers.
All these officials, who were appointed by the Emir, were consulted in running the affairs of
the emirate. This can be said to be a similarity to the Yoruba political administration. But unlike a
Yoruba king, power was centralised in the hands of the Emir who had absolute control over these
officials and could depose any of them at his will. Each emirate was further divided into districts
which was headed by an official known as Hakimi. The Hakimi was appointed by the Emir to
oversee the affairs of each district which included maintaining peace and order and collection of taxes
like Jangali (cattle tax), Jizyah (land tax) and Zakat. The Hakimi was however assisted in carrying
out these functions by the village heads whom he appointed himself.
The judicial administration of Hausaland was based on Sharia law which covered a wide
range of issues like marriage, divorce, theft, murder, debt and so on. These laws were interpreted by
the Alkali judges in the Alkali courts. Each emirate could have more than one Alkali court depending
on its size. However, issues not covered by the Sharia law were transferred to the Emir court where
the Emir could preside over such issues. The Emir must be careful in making his laws or judgments
as they must not go against the will of Islam religion which was the main practice of the people in
Hausaland, for example, the Emir could not legalise the drinking of alcohol in the emirate. Therefore,
the legislative powers of the land can be said to be solely wielded by the Emir in accordance to the
religion of Islam. The Hausa pre-colonial political system was a highly centralised one with the Emir
possessing almost all the powers. This was one of the main reasons why the Indirect Rule System
was very successful in the Northern part of Nigeria (Hausa/Fulani empire).

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