LEONARDO OSORIO VS.

TOMASA OSORIO, 41 PHIL 531

G.R. No. L-16544, March 30, 1921
FACTS:
D. Antonio Osorio had formed with Ynchausti & Co., a joint account for shipping
business, he being the owner of one-third of the company's capital. Upon his death, his
heirs agreed to authorize the defendant Da. Tomasa Osorio, then administratrix of the
estate of the deceased, to present a project of partition. The widow of D. Antonio
Osorio, Da. Petrona Reyes, now also deceased, executed before the notary public a
document of gift in favor of her son D. Leonardo Osorio, the plaintiff, giving to him one-
half of her share in the one-third part which belonged to her husband in the shipping
business of Ynchausti & Co., a donation which was duly accepted by the donee
Leonardo Osorio, who signed said document with the plaintiff. It was agreed upon by all
the interested parties that the share of Da. Reyes, widow of Osorio, in the vessel
Governor Forbes, at the time of the incorporation of "The Ynchausti Steamship Co."
was P61,000, equivalent to 610 shares of stock of said corporation. Said sum was
deposited with the Steamship Co. until the final settlement of the question that had
arisen between the heirs of Petrona Reyes as to the ownership thereof for, while the
plaintiff alleges that, by virtue of the donation made in his favor by Petrona Reyes, he is
the owner of said shares; the defendant on the other hand contends that said shares
are not included in the donation in question and belong to the heirs of Petrona Reyes.
ISSUE:
Whether the donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes in favor of the plaintiff was valid
under the law on succession particularly the future inheritance/property.
DECISION:
The donation by Da. Petrona Reyes is void. According to article 635 of the Civil
Code, the donation cannot include future property. By future property is meant that of
which the donor cannot dispose at the time of the donation. This court believe the
concurring opinion of Manresa that the future properties, the donation of which is
prohibited by said article, are those belonging to others, which, as such, cannot be the
object of disposal by the donor; but the properties of an existing inheritance, as those of
the case at bar, cannot be considered as another's property with relation to the heirs
who through a fiction of law continue the personality of the owner. Nor do they have the
character of future property because the died before 1912, his heirs acquired a right to
succeed him from the moment of his death, because of the principle announced in
article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code, according to which the heirs
succeed the deceased by the mere fact of his death. More of less time may elapse
before the heirs enter into the possession of the hereditary property, but this is not an
obstacle, for the acquisition of said property retroacts in any event to the moment of
death, according to article 989 of the Civil Code. The Civil Code does not prohibit
absolutely that future inheritance should be the object of agreement, for there are
certain cases in which agreements may be made as to them, beside that indicated in
article 1271. A donation being of a contractual nature, inasmuch as for its efficacy the
concurrence of two wills is required, that of the donor and the donee, we believe that
which may be the object of contract may also be the object of a donation. Ubi eadem
est ratio, ibi est eadem legis dispositio. We conclude that the donor Da. Petrona Reyes,

1
on February 28, 1912, and could legally dispose of her right through an act of liberality,
as she had done.
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY VS COURT OF APPEALS, 246 SCRA 511
G.R. No. 112230. July 17, 1995
FACTS:
In 1939, Don Ramon Lopez Sr. executed a deed of donation in favor of CPU together
with the following conditions: a) The land should be utilized by CPU exclusively for the
establishment & use of medical college; b) The said college shall not sell transfer or
convey to any 3rd party; c) The said land shall be called “Ramon Lopez Campus” and
any income from that land shall be put in the fund to be known as “Ramon Lopez
Campus Fund”. However, on May 31, 1989, PR, who are the heirs of Don Ramon filed
an action for annulment of donation, reconveyance & damages against CPU for not
complying with the conditions. The heirs also argued that CPU had negotiated with the
NHA to exchange the donated property with another land owned by the latter. Petitioner
alleged that the right of private respondents to file the action had prescribed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner failed to comply the resolutely conditions annotated at
the back of petitioner’s certificate of title without a fixed period when to comply with such
conditions
HELD:
Yes. Under Art. 1181, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights as well
the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired shall depend upon the happening
of the event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person donates land to
another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school is such a
resolutory one. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. If
there was no fulfillment with the condition such as what obtains in the instant case, the
donation may be revoked & all rights which the donee may have acquired shall be
deemed lost & extinguished. More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has
already been allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition
even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But,
unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a
term of the obligation when such procedure would be a mere technicality and formality
and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive
multiplication of suits.
Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed
of donation up to the time of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply
with its obligation as donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable
length of time. Hence, it is only just and equitable now to declare the subject donation
already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as donee should now

2
return the donated property to the heirs of the donor, private respondents herein, by
means of reconveyance.
EVELYN DE LUNA VS. SOFRONIO ABRIGO, 181 SCRA 150
G.R. No. L-57455, January 18, 1990
FACTS:
Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of lot in favor to the Luzonian University
Foundation, Inc, as embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos. The donation was
subject to certain terms and conditions and provided for the automatic reversion to the
donor of the donated property in case of violation or non-compliance, couched in the
following terms: That violation of any of the conditions herein provided shall cause the
automatic reversion of the donated area to the donor, his heirs, assigns and
representatives, without the need of executing any other document for that purpose and
without obligation whatever on the part of the DONOR. The foundation failed to comply
the conditions of the donation so that Prudencio revived the said donation in favor of the
foundation subject to terms and conditions, again with automatic reversion clause in
case of violation thereof. After the death of Prudencio, his heirs filed a complaint for the
cancellation of the donation and the reversion of the donated land to them, alleging that
the terms and conditions of the donation were not complied with by the foundation. In its
answer, the foundation claimed of partial and substantial compliance with the conditions
of the donation and that was granted an indefinite extension of time. The petitioners
brought the instant petition for review, contending that onerous donations are governed
by the rules on contracts and not by the rules on donations, so that the automatic
reversion of the donated area to the donor in case of violation of any of the conditions is
effective without the need of executing any other document for that purpose as
stipulated in the donation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulation of automatic reversion in the Deed of Donation is
valid and binding upon the foundation who voluntarily consented thereto.
DECISION:
Yes, the Supreme Court holds that stipulation not being contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy, is valid and binding upon the foundation.
Under Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, the parties to a contract have the right "to
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy." In the case at bar, the validity of the stipulation in the contract providing
for the automatic reversion of the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance
cannot be doubted. It is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to
rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach, without need of going to court. Thus,
the petition is GRANTED. Respondent judge is ordered to conduct a trial on the merits
to determine the propriety of the revocation of the subject donation.

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 PARTENZA LUCERNA VDA. DE TUPAS VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
G.R. No. L-65800 October 3, 1986
FACTS:
Tupas died who is childless, leaving his widow, Lucerna, as his only surviving
compulsory heir. He also left a will which was admitted to probate on 1980 in Special
Proceedings No. 13994 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. However, at
the time of his death, these lots were no longer owned by him, he having donated them
the year before his death to the Tupas Foundation, Inc., which had thereafter obtained
title to said lots. Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any
inheritance, Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. to have the
donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible
" ... by one-half or such proportion as ... (might be deemed) justified ... and " ... the
resulting deduction ... " restored and conveyed or delivered to her.
ISSUE:
whether or not a donation inter vivos by a donor now deceased is inofficious and
should be reduced at the instance of the donor's widow.
DECISION:
Yes, a person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations,
one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than he can give by will. The fact,
therefore, that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the
donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to
collation. Indeed, it is an obvious proposition that collation contemplates and particularly
applies to gifts inter vivos. The further fact that the lots donated were admittedly capital
or separate property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim of inofficiousness
does not assert that the donor gave what was not his, but that he gave more than what
was within his power to give. Since it is clear that the questioned donation is
collationable and that, having been made to a stranger it is, by law chargeable to the
freely disposable portion of the donor's estate, to be reduced insofar as in officious, that
it exceeds said portion and thus impairs the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in order to
find out whether it is in officious or not, recourse must be had to the rules established by
the Civil Code for the determination of the legitime and, by extension, of the disposable
portion. These rules are set forth in Articles 908, 909 and 910 of the Code, on the basis
of which the following step-by-step procedure has been correctly outlined: (1)
determination of the value of the property which remains at the time of the testator's
death; (2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to be paid
out or deducted from the value of the property thus left; (3) the determination of the
difference between the assets and the liabilities, giving rise to the hereditary estate; (4)
the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time they were made, of
donations subject to collation; and (5) the determination of the amount of the legitimes
by getting from the total thus found the portion that the law provides as the legitime of
each respective compulsory heir.8 Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the
hereditary estate leaves the freely disposable portion by which the donation in question
here must be measured. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and
must be reduced by the amount of said excess. In this case, if any excess be shown, it
shall be returned or reverted to the petitioner-appellant as the sole compulsory heir of
the deceased Epifanio R. Tupas.

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5
 BUHAY DE ROMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 152 SCRA 205
G.R. No. L-46903, July 23, 1987
FACTS:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and
Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration
proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private
respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due
time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that
certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not
been included. The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land
worth P10,297.50. There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties
cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private
respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code.
Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate because
the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not officious.
ISSUES:
Whether or not we should dwell on the error assigned by the petitioner.
DECISION:
No, there is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner
regarding the decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the 12-
month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As we
held in Marcelino v. Cruz, the said provision was merely directory and failure to decide
on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their
decisions invalid. It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been
reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses
upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy
disposition of the cases that have been clogging their dockets these many years.
Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that need.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.

6
 CLASSIFICATION OF DONATION:
PARKS VS. PROVINCE OF TARLAC, 49 PHIL 142
G.R. No. L-24190, July 13, 1926
FACTS:
In 1910, Concepcion Cirer and James Hill donated parcels of land to the
municipality of Tarlac on the condition that it be used absolutely and exclusively for the
erection of a central school and public parks, the work to commence within six months.
The president of the municipality of Tarlac accepted and registered the donation. In
1921, Cirer and Hill sold the same property to George L. Parks. Later on the, the
municipality of Tarlac transferred their rights in the property to the Province of Tarlac.
Parks filed a complaint seeking the annulment of the donation and asking that he be
declared the absolute owner of the property. Parks allege that the conditions of the
donation were not complied with.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation was coupled with a condition precedent? W/N the
action to revoke has prescribed?
HELD:
No. The condition to erect a school within six months is not a condition
precedent. The characteristic of a condition precedent is that the acquisiito of the right is
not effected while said condition is mot complied with or is not deemed complied with.
Meanwhile nothing is acquired and there is only an expectancy of a right. Consequently,
when a condition is imposed, the compliance of which cannot be effected except when
the right is deemed acquired, such condition cannot be a condition precedent. In the
present case the condition that a public school be erected and a public park be made of
the donated land could not be complied with except after giving effect to the donation.
The action to revoke the donation has prescribed. The prescriptive periods are: 5
years for the revocation by the subsequent birth of children, 1 year if by reason of
ingratitude. If no special period is prescribed, 10 years, for an onerous donation
following the law of contracts and general rules on prescriptions. The donation was
made in 1910, the cause of action accrued in 1911, while the action to revoke was filed
1924, twenty three years later.

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 RUFINA ZAPANTA VS. JUAN POSADAS, 52 PHIL 557
GR No. 29204, Dec 29, 1928
FACTS:
Father Braulio Pineda died without any ascendants or descendants leaving a will
in which he instituted his sister Irene Pineda as his sole heiress. During his lifetime
Father Braulio donated some of his property to the six plaintiffs, his relatives, severally,
with the condition that some of them would pay him a certain amount of rice, and others
of money every year, and with the express provision that failure to fulfill this condition
would revoke the donations ipso facto. They were accepted during Father Braulio's
lifetime by every one of the donees. CIR imposed upon the 6 plaintiffs separate
inheritance taxes on the donated properties in accordance with section 1536 of the
Administrative Code. Plaintiffs then paid the CIR sum of money as inheritance tax under
protest and filed separate civil action. The trial court held in these 6 cases held that the
donations made are donations inter vivos, and therefore not subject to inheritance tax.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation made by the deceased was a donation mortis
causa, and thus imposes inheritance tax.
DECISION:
No. It was donation inter vivos, and therefor not taxable. RATIO:  The principal
characteristics of a donation mortis causa, which distinguish it essentially from a
donation inter vivos, are that in the former it is the donor's death that determines the
acquisition of, or the right to, the property, and that it is revocable at the will of the
donor. In the donations in question, their effect, that is, the acquisition of, or the right to,
the property, was produced while the donor was still alive, for, according to their
expressed terms they were to have this effect upon acceptance, and this took place
during the donor's lifetime. the donations were made in consideration of the donor's
affection for the donees, and of the services they had rendered him, but he has charged
them with the obligation to pay him a certain amount of rice and money, respectively,
each year during his lifetime, the donations to become effective upon acceptance. They
are therefore not in the nature of donations mortis causa but intervivos. Neither can
these donations be considered as an advance on inheritance or legacy, because they
are neither an inheritance nor a legacy. And it cannot be said that the plaintiffs received
such advance on inheritance or legacy, since they were not heirs or legatees of their
predecessor in interest upon his death (sec. 1540).

8
 CASIANO JAVIER VS. MARIANO CABANGOS, 53 PHIL 678
G.R. No. 31284. October 28, 1929
FACTS:
That the debt of the plaintiff Casiano Javier is exactly ten thousand pesos instead
of P10,806. That the deed of sale with pacto de retro dated September 11, 1922, shall
be understood, to all intents and purposes, as a deed of mortgage. That the plaintiff
Casiano Javier shall execute a new deed of mortgage, which should be recorded, in
accordance herewith, after ten days. That the period for the redemption of the mortgage
will expire on September 11, 1927, instead of September 11, 1926. That the defendant
Cabanos shall continue in possession of the mortgaged property until the payment of
the aforesaid debt of ten thousand pesos. And lastly, the parties pray that the court
render judgment in accordance with this stipulation of fact. In accordance with the
foregoing stipulation, the corresponding final judgment was rendered, wherein, among
other things, the plaintiff was ordered to execute another deed of mortgage, in lieu of
the aforesaid deed of sale with pacto de retro. The appellant contends that the contract
entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant, pursuant to the judgment is one of
the antichresis, inasmuch as the creditor has been in possession of the land.
ISSUE: Whether the contract entered is one of the antichresis?
DECISION:
As such vendee with pacto de retro, Mariano acquired the ownership and
possession of the land sold, subject to the right of repurchase of Casiano Javier for a
period of 4 years, during the time the latter would make use of the purchase price and
the former of the lands and the fruits thereof. Before the expiration of the prior
repurchase, o Cabanos made a compromise with Casiano Javier, whereby he
renounced his better right as a vendee with pacto de retro and contended himself to be
a mere mortgage creditor. Under this new contract, the defendant should have
surrendered the possession of the lands to the plaintiff, but they did not do this and
preferred to maintain the former relation as to the lands, Cabanos making use of the
said lands and the fruits thereof, and Casiano of the capital. If, then, in the contract of
sale with pacto de retro, the interest of the capital was compensated by the fruits of the
land, of which the defendant took possession, and if the contracting parties, in
converting said contract of sale with pacto de retro into one of mortgage, did not wish to
alter the state of things as to the possession of the land by the defendant, it is evident
that in so doing they mutually understood that Casiano would continue making use of
the capital during the period of the contract and Cabanos would remain in possession of
the land, the interest on the capital being compensated by the fruits of the land of the
former. In view of this considerations, and giving to the new contract between the
parties the character of a contract of antichresis, the fruits received by the defendant
from the lands in question must be considered as compensation for the interest which
his capital should earn during the period of the contract, and Casiano Javier must pay

9
his creditor, Cabanos, the amount of the loan of P10,000, in order to recover the land
which is the subject matter of the antichresis.
EMILIANA BALAQUI VS. PLACIDA DONGSO, 53 PHIL 673
G.R. No. 31161, October 28, 1929
FACTS:
Hipolita Balaqui thru a deed of gift transferred parcels of land, together with the
contents thereof to Placida Dongso. Plaintiffs, heirs of Hipolita, contends that the deed
of gift was void and that Teodoro Valdez who bought the lot from Placida Dongso
should deliver the parcels of land back to them, the heirs of Hipolita. CFI of Ilocos
dismissed the complaint and held that Placida Dongso owned the parcels of land and
that the deed of sale was valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of donation is void.
DECISION:
No, the deed of donation is not void and it rightfully belongs to Placida Dongso.
The donor guaranteed the right which she conferred on the donee by virtue of the deed
of gift, wherein, in recompense of the latter’s good services to the former, she donates
to her the two parcels of land with their improvements, said gift is inter vivos and
irrevocable, and not mortis causa, notwithstanding the fact that the donor stated in said
deed that she did not transfer the ownership of the two parcels of land donated, save
upon her death, for such a statement can mean nothing else than that she only
reserved to herself the possession and usufruct of said property, and because the donor
could not very well guarantee the aforesaid right after her death.

10
 LORENZA CONCEPCION VS. EMILIA CONCEPCION
G.R. No. L-4225. August 25, 1952
FACTS:
Manuela Concepcion was the owner of the property disputed. She donated the
property to Emilia Concepcion through a Deed of Donation which states in the title
“Escritura De Donacion Onerosa Mortis Causa”. A little more than three years after, the
donor, Manuela, died. Herein plaintiffs-appellees who are the six nephews and nieces of
the donor instituted a special proceedings for the summary settlement of the estate of
their aunt. Because of this, Emilia, the donee filed an opposition to the summary
proceeding contending that a part of the estate subject the proceeding was already
donated to her, in fact a greater part of it.
Emilia claimed title to the properties by reason of the donation and submitted a copy of
the deed of donation.
ISSUE:
Is the donation mortis causa or inter vivos? If it is a mortis causa, the donation will be
not valid because the formalities on wills was not followed.
DECISION:
It is a rule consistently followed by the courts that it is the body of the document
of donation and the statements contained therein, and not the title that should be
considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor. In this case, the Supreme Court
ruled that the donation is an inter vivos. From all the preceding considerations, it is
clear that even when the donor calls the donation mortis causa instead of inter vivos,
even if he says it is to take effect after his death, when from the body of the instrument
or donation is to be gathered that the main consideration of the donation is not the
death of the donor but rather services rendered to him, by the donee or his affection for
the latter, then the donation should be considered as inter vivos, and when duly
accepted, it transfers title immediately to the donee, and the condition that the donation
is to take effect only after the death of donor should be interpreted as meaning that the
possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the property donated should take place only
after donor's death. In the present case, we may hold as we do that the donor or rather
the person who drafted the deed, in using the phrase "mortis causa" and in providing
that the donation should take effect only after the donor's death simply meant that the
possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the properties donated should take effect only
after the donor's death and not before, although this intention is rendered even dubious
due to the fact that in one paragraph of the donation, she stated that she had reserved
that was sufficient and necessary for her main tenance which may mean that all the
properties donated were deemed transferred to the donee imnmediately after the
donation had been accepted.

11
 JOSE CARINO VS. FERNANDO ABAYA
G.R. No. 46706, June 26, 1940
FACTS:
Petrona Gray and Dorotea Gray both died intestate and without either
ascendants or descendants. But before they died, they executed a document
concerning their properties. Miguel Carino, was designated as the one administer or
deliver the properties, predeceased Dorotea Gray. After the lapse of about seven years
from the death of Dorotea Gray, or on February 16, 1935, Jose Carino, son of Miguel
Carino and petitioner herein, commenced intestate proceedings in the CFI of Ilocos Sur
in which he prayed that he be appointed administrator of the estate left by the Gray
sisters. Father Fernando Ma. Abaya, respondent herein and first cousin of Petrona and
Dorotea Gray, interposed an opposition to the amended petition alleging that the
document executed by the Gray sisters is null and void and praying that the court make
an adjudication to that effect. While on the one hand, Jose Carino contended that the
document is a donation inter vivos creating at the time a trust, Father Fernando Abaya,
on the other, alleged that said document is a will. CFI ruled I favor of petitioner. Father
Abaya appealed in the CA contending that the document was neither a donation inter
vivos as contended by the petitioner nor a will, but a void donation mortis causa, void
because it was not executed with the formalities of a will.
ISSUE:
WON the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa
DECISION: Mortis causa
The SC concurs in the conclusion of the CA that the document in dispute is a
donation mortis causa. The seventh clause of the document reciting that "we the sisters
do hereby order that all these properties shall be given to those to whom they have
been assigned by virtue of this instrument at the expiration of thirty days after the death
of the last one to die between us," considered in conjunction with the fact that the
grantors employed the terms "there shall given to," "shall administer," and "shall be
administered," which have reference to the future, clearly brings forth the intention on
the part of the Gray sisters to make the distribution of their estate, effective after their
death. The seventh clause, being without limitation, applies as well to the properties
intended to be distributed as to the properties merely to be administered by Miguel
Carino. It is worthy of observation, also, that in the ninth clause of the document the
phrase "together with those who had been mentioned to inherit from us" supplies a
cogent reason for concluding that the grant therein made was meant to take effect the
death of the grantors for the word "inherit," as used here, implies the acquisition of
property by the heirs after the death of the Gray sisters. Donations which are to become
effective upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of disposals of property by
will and shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary successions. (Art.
620, Civil Code.) Accordingly, said donations can only be made with the formalities of a
will. As the document was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure, conspicuously for lack of attestation clause and marginal
signatures, we are constrained to hold that the same cannot be accorded any force and
effect

12
 HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 95 PHIL 481
GR No. L-6600, Jul 30, 1954
FACTS:
The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan by
respondents Josefa Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea
Nacario, both deceased. Their complaint charged that on the first day of December,
1949, Domingo Bonsatohad been induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds
of donations in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato ,
transferring to them several parcels of land both donations having been duly accepted
in the same act and documents. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were
mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite formalities. The defendants, Juan
Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in their favor
were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered by them to the late
Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without the use of force and
violence, misrepresentation or intimidation.
ISSUE:
Whether the donation was a donation mortis causa or a donation inter vivos?
DECISION:
The SC ruled that it was a donation inter vivos. If it was a donation mortis causa,
then the documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics: (1) Convey
no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer
should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided
for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties
conveyed; (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee. None of these characteristics appear in the deeds of donation executed by
the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the
owner’s share of the fruits or produce, a reservation that would be unnecessary if the
ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Further, the absence of
stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations, and on the contrary, the deeds
expressly declare them to be “irrevocable”, a quality absolutely incompatible with
conveyances mortis causa, where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent
that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code,
Art. 737; New Civil Code, Art. 828).

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 EVELYN DE LUNA VS. SOFRONIO ABRIGO, 181 SCRA 150
G.R. No. L-57455, January 18, 1990
FACTS:
In 1965, Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of a 7,500 sq. m. lot to the Luzonian
Colleges, Inc. The donation was embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was
subject to certain terms and conditions. In case of violation or non-compliance, the
property would automatically revert to the donor. When the Foundation failed to comply
with the conditions, de Luna “revived” the said donation by executing a Revival of
Donation Intervivos with the following terms and conditions: 1) The Donee shall
construct on the land and at its expense a Chapel, Nursery, and Kindergarten School to
be named after St. Veronica , and other constructions and Accessories shall be
constructed on the land herein being donated strictly in accordance with the plans and
specifications; 2) Construction shall start immediately and must be at least 70%
completed three years from the date of the Deed unless the Donor grants extensions; 3)
Automatic reversion in case of violation. The Foundation accepted and the donation
was registered and annotated in the TCT. By a Deed of Segregation, the foundation
was issued a TCT for area the lot donated while the remaining area was retained by the
De Luna. herein petitioners were the children and only heirs of the late De Luna filed a
complaint with the RTC for the cancellation of the donation on the ground that the terms
were violated. The Foundation defended itself by saying that it had partially and
substantially complied with the conditions and that the donor granted it an indefinite
extension of time to complete construction of the chapel. It also invoked the affirmative
defense of prescription of action and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the action prescribes in 4 years (based on art. 764 NCC-judicial decree of
revocation of the donation) or in 10 years (based on art. 1144 –enforcement of a written
contract).
DECISION:
The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. Under the old
Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not by
the law on donations but by the rules on contract. On the matter of prescription of
actions for the revocation of onerous donation, it was held that the general rules on
prescription apply. The same rules apply under the New Civil Code as provided in
Article 733 thereof which provides: Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed
by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present
Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed. It is true
that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a donation
must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the
donation. However, said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the
specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the
rules on contracts. The rules on prescription and not the rules on donation applies in the
case at bar.

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 ROMAN CATHOLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 198 SCRA 300
G.R. No. 77425, June 19, 1991
FACTS:
Rieta, now both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of defendant
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land. The deed of donation
allegedly provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of
one hundred years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of
such condition would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation and the
property would revert to the estate of the donors. It is further alleged, and while still
within the prohibitive period to dispose of the property, petitioner Roman Catholic
Bishop of Imus transferred by a deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the
donation in favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in consideration of the
sum of P114,000. 00. As a consequence of the sale, Transfer Certificate of Title was
issued by the Register of Deeds in the name of said petitioner spouses
ISSUE:
WON the act of selling the property revoked the donation
DECISION:
NO. When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic
revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the general
rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article
1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties
providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action
for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission
sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely
declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
On the foregoing ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals committed no error in
holding that the cause of action of herein private respondents has not yet prescribed
since an action to enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years. It is our view
that Article 764 was intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or
contravention of conditions specified in the deed of donation if and when the parties
have not agreed on the automatic revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of
the contingency contemplated therein. That is not the situation in the case at bar.
Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private respondents may not be
dismissed by reason of prescription, the same should be dismissed on the ground that
private respondents have no cause of action against petitioners. The cause of action of
private respondents is based on the alleged breach by petitioners of the resolutory
condition in the deed of donation that the property donated should not be sold within a
period of one hundred (100) years from the date of execution of the deed of donation.
Said condition, in our opinion, constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising from
ownership of petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to public policy.

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 CENTRAL PHILIPPINES UNIVERSITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 246 SCRA 511
G.R. No. 112127 July 17, 1995
FACTS:
Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., who was a member Central Philippine University
executed a deed of donation in favor of the latter, a parcel of land identified. The land
described shall be utilized by the CPU exclusively for the establishment and use of a
medical college with all its buildings as part of the curriculum. The said college shall not
sell, transfer or convey to any third party nor in any way encumber said land. The said
land shall be called "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS", and the said college shall be under
obligation to erect a cornerstone bearing that name. Any net income from the land or
any of its parks shall be put in a fund to be known as the "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS
FUND" to be used for improvements of said campus and erection of a building. The
heirs of Don Ramon filed an action for annulment of donation, reconveyance and
damages against CPU alleging that since 1939 up to the time the action was filed, the
latter had not complied with the conditions of the donation. o Heirs also argued that
petitioner had in fact negotiated with the (NHA) to exchange the donated property with
another land owned by the latter. PETITIONER ALLEGES that (1) the right of the heirs
to file the action had prescribed; (2) it did not violate any of the conditions in the deed of
donation because it never used the donated property for any other purpose than that for
which it was intended; and (3) it did not sell, transfer or convey it to any third party. RTC
ruled against the petitioner as it failed to comply with the conditions of the donation and
declared such null and void. It ruled that the annotations at the back of petitioner's
certificate of title were resolutory conditions breach of which should terminate the rights
of the donee thus making the donation revocable. However, the first condition which
mandated petitioner to utilize the donated property for the establishment of a medical
school, did not fix a period within which the condition must be fulfilled, hence, until a
period was fixed, petitioner could not be considered as having failed to comply with its
part of the bargain.
ISSUE:
WON the quoted annotations in the certificate of title of petitioner are onerous
obligations and resolutory conditions of the donation which must be fulfilled; non-
compliance of which would render the donation revocable.
RULING:
The donation of Don Ramon was onerous, one executed for a valuable
consideration which is considered the equivalent of the donation itself. Ex. when a
donation imposes a burden equivalent to the value of the donation. A gift of land to the
City of Manila requiring the latter to erect schools, construct a children's playground and
open streets on the land was considered an onerous donation. Similarly, where Don
Ramon donated the subject parcel of land to petitioner but imposed an obligation upon
the latter to establish a medical college thereon, the donation must be for an onerous
consideration. Applying Art. 1181, CC, when a person donates land to another on the
condition that the latter would build a school, the condition imposed was not a
suspensive condition but a resolutory one. The donation is valid before the fulfillment of
the condition. If there was no fulfillment or compliance with the condition, such as in this
case, the donation may now be revoked and all rights which the donee may have
acquired under it shall be deemed lost and extinguished.

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 SECRETARY OF EDUCATION VS HEIRS OF DULAY, 480 SCRA 511
G.R. NO. 164748 - January 27, 2006
Facts:
The spouses Rufino Dulay, Sr. and Ignacia Vicente executed a deed of donation
in favor of the Ministry of Education and Culture. The deed provided, among others:
That for and in consideration of the benefits that may be derived from the use of the
above described property which is intended for school purposes, the said DONORS do
by by (sic) these presents TRANSFER AND CONVEY by way of DONATION unto the
DONEE, its successors and assigns, the above property to become effective upon the
signing of this document. However, the property was not used for school purposes and
remained idle. Thereafter, the heirs of Dulay, Sr., filed a complaint for the revocation of
the deed of donation and cancellation. Respondents alleged that there was a condition
in the deed of donation: that the DECS, as donee, utilize the subject property for school
purposes, that is, the construction of a building to house the Rizal National High School.
Respondents alleged that the DECS did not fulfill the condition and that the land
remained idle up to the present. Respondents also averred that the donation inter vivos
was in officious, since the late Rufino Dulay, Sr. donated more than what he could give
by will. Petitioners, through the (OSG), interposed the following defenses: (a) the DECS
complied with said condition because the land was being used by the school as its
technology and home economics laboratory; (b) the donation was not in officious for the
donors were the owners of five other parcels of land, all located at Rizal, Santiago City.
Issue:
WON donation can be revoked
Held:
Yes. Court ruled that donee failed to comply with the condition imposed in the
deed of sale. Petitioner failed to prove that the property was used for school purposes
and upheld the fact-findings of the lower court. Another site was utilized for the
construction of the national high school. Moreover, the reuse of action is not barred by
prescription under Art764 (4 yrs. after the non-compliance of the condition). It must be
stressed that the donation is onerous because the DECS, as donee, was burdened with
the obligation to utilize the land donated for school purposes. Under Article 733 of the
New Civil Code, a donation with an onerous cause is essentially a contract and is thus
governed by the rules on contract. The applicable prescriptive period is based on
Art1144, which provides that the prescriptive period for an action arising from a written
contract is ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrues. In the case of
donation, the accrual of the cause ofa ction is from the expiration of the time within
which the donee must comply with the conditions or obligations of the donation. In the
instant case, however, it must be noted that the subject donation fixed no period within
which the donee can comply with the condition of donation. As such, resort to Article
1197 of the New Civil Code is necessary. Said article provides that if the obligation does
not fix aperiod, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period
was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof. Indeed, from the nature and
circumstances of the condition of the subject donation, it can be inferred that a period

17
was contemplated by the donors. The donors could not have intended their property t
oremain idle for a very long period of time when, in fact, they specifically obliged the
defendant-appellants to utilize the land donated.
ASTERIA BAUTISTA V. EPIFANIO SABINIANO
GR No. L-4236, Nov 20, 1952
Facts:
A part of the deed of donation reads as follows: 1. That meantime I am still living,
these properties donated are all yet at my disposal as well as the products therein
derived, and whatever properties or property left undisposed of me during my lifetime
will be the ones to be received by the donees if any. The trial Court found that the
donation is conditional and onerous, because the donor "continued to be the owner of
the properties donated in spite of the donation" and "because the donees were made to
pay under their personal responsibility all the debts of the donor incurred by him during
his lifetime or illness, and to finance his funeral services upon his death," and held that it
is null and void as to Marcelina and Candida surnamed Sabiniano and Alfredo de
Guzman, who were minors and were not duly represented by their legal representatives
upon the acceptance of the donation.
Issue:
Whether the donation is irrevocable
DECISION:
The conveyance to the donees by way of donation of the properties described in
the deed did not actually take effect on the date of the execution of the deed and of the
acceptance thereof for the reason hereafter to be stated. It is also unnecessary to
express opinion on whether the acceptance made in the deed is lawful and valid, for the
reason that the owner reserved during his lifetime the right to dispose of the properties
purportedly donated and to benefit from the products thereof. Except in the instances
expressly provided by law, such as the subsequent birth of children of the donor, failure
by the donee to comply with the conditions imposed, ingratitude of the done and
reduction of the donation in the event of inofficiousness thereof, a donation is
irrevocable.

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 ACCEPTANCE:
TITO LAGAZO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 287 SCRA 18
G.R. No. 112796 March 5, 1998
FACTS:
Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of plaintiff-appellee,
was awarded a 60.10-square meter lot which is a portion of the Monserrat Estate
located in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. The Monserrat Estate is a public land owned by the
City of Manila and distributed for sale to bona fide tenants under its land-for-the-
landless program. Catalina Jacob constructed a house on the lot. Shortly before she
left for Canada where she is now a permanent resident, Catalina Jacob executed a
special power of attorney in favor of her son-in-law Eduardo B. Español authorizing him
to execute all documents necessary for the final adjudication of her claim as awardee of
the lot.Due to the failure of Eduardo B. Español to accomplish the purpose of the power
of attorney granted to him, Catalina Jacob revoked said authority in an instrument
executed in Canada. Simultaneous with the revocation, Catalina Jacob executed
another power of attorney of the same tenor in favor plaintiff-appellee. Catalina Jacob
executed in Canada a Deed of Donation over the subject lot in favor of plaintiff-appellee.
Following the donation, plaintiff-appellee checked with the Register of Deeds and found
out that the property was in the delinquent list, so that he paid the installments in arrears
and the remaining balance on the lot and declared the said property in the name of
Catalina Jacob.. Petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions imposed
upon a donation need not be stated on the deed of donation itself. Thus, although the
deed did not categorically impose any charge, burden or condition to be satisfied by
him, the donation was onerous since he in fact and in reality, paid for the installments in
arrears and for the remaining balance of the lot in question. Being an onerous donation,
his acceptance thereof may be express or implied, as provided under Art. 1320 of the
Civil Code, and need not comply with the formalities required by Art. 749 of the same
code. His payment of the arrearages and balance and his assertion of his right of
possession against private respondent clearly indicate his acceptance of the donation.
ISSUE:
Where the acceptance of a donation was made in a separate instrument but not
formally communicated to the donor, may the donation be nonetheless considered
complete, valid and subsisting?
DECISION:
NO. As a pure or simple donation, the provisions of the civil code apply. The
donation, following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only
upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.” Furthermore, “[i]f
the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in
an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.” Acceptance of the

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donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence makes the donation null
and void

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 FLORENTINO GENATO VS. FELISA GENATO DE LORENZO, 23 SCRA 18
G.R. No. L-24983 May 20, 1968
FACTS:
The property under dispute in this case is the 530 shares of stocks of Genato
Commercal Corporation, which has P100 par value, of the deceased Simona B. De
Genato (Director and secretary-treasurer of the said company). The petitioners herein, 2
heirs of Simona, are claiming that they own 530 shares of stocks of Genato Commercal
Corporation because of the donation made by Simona to them. Respondents (other
remaining heirs), however, are trying to recover from the petitioners, their co-heirs, the
said stocks so they can include it in the intestate estate which should later be distributed
among all the surviving children of the decedent. Four or five days after having
Florentino Genato elected and designated as Assitant Secretary-Treasurer of the
Corporation, 265 shares were issued in favour of Florentino Genato and another 265
were issued in favour of Francisco G. Genato. These were not presented as evidence in
the course of the trial; they were merely mentioned by Florentino Genato in the course
of his testimony as a witness.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid donation?
DECISION:
NO. There was no valid donation for lack of proper acceptance. Incontestably,
one of the two donees was not present at the delivery, and there is no showing that
Francisco Genato had authorized his brother, Florentino to accept for both of them. The
delivery by the donor and the acceptance by done must be simultaneous and the
acceptance by a person other than the true done must be authorized by a proper power
of attorney set forth in a public document. None has been claimed to exist in this case.

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 ANTONIO ARANETA VS. ANTONIO PEREZ, 17 SCRA 643
G.R. No. L-18872, July 15, 1966
FACTS:
A trust was established pursuant to the will of the late Angela S. Tuason. J.
Antonio Araneta was appointed trustee and he qualified when he took his oath of office.
The beneficiaries of the trust are Benigno, Angela and Antonio, all surnamed Perez y
Tuason, the last two being represented by appellant Antonio Perez, who is their father
and judicial guardian. In the order appealed from the lower court approved, upon
petition of the trustee, a deed of donation executed by him in favor of the City of Manila
covering a lot pertaining to the trusteeship. Such approval was given over the opposition
of appellant Antonio Perez. On the lot in question the trustee had been paying an
annual realty tax. Appellant does not deny the beneficial aspects of the donation. But he
maintains that it is invalid on the ground that under Article 736 of the Civil Code
"guardians and trustees cannot donate the properties entrusted to them".
ISSUE:
Whether guardians and trustees cannot donate the properties entrusted to them.
DECISION:
In this case, the guardian may donate the properties entrusted to him. Although
Article 736, New Civil Code provides that, "guardians and trustees cannot donate the
properties entrusted to them", the same cannot be applied considering that the
aforecited provision only took effect on August 30, 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) and does
not apply retroactively to the testamentary trust established upon the death of Angela S.
Tuason on March 20, 1948. There being nothing in the old Civil Code which prohibits a
trustee from donating properties under trusteeship, and considering that the powers
given to herein appellee as trustee are of a plenary character, subject only to the
limitation that they should be permissible under the law; considering further that when
the testatrix conferred such powers she must have had in mind the law that was in force
at the time; and considering finally that after all a trust is created for the benefit of the
cestuis que trust and that in this particular case the acts of the trustee are subject to the
supervision of the Court.

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