G.R. No.

96938 October 15, 1991

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HEIRS OF ELIZAR NAMUCO, and HEIRS OF EUSEBIO MANUEL, respondents.

Benigno M. Puno for private respondents.

Fetalino, Llamas-Villanueva and Noro for CSC.

NARVASA, J.:

In May, 1981, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6) employees as being "notoriously
undersirable," they having allegedly been found to be connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials. The
dismissal was based on Article IX, Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law) 1 in relation to LOI 14-A and/or LOI No. 72.
The employees' Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied.

Five of these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The Board found the dismissals to be illegal
because effected without formal charges having been filed or an opportunity given to the employees to answer, and ordered the
remand of the cases to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinary proceedings.

The GSIS appealed tothe Civil Service Commission. By Resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Commission ruled that the
dismissal of all five was indeed illegal and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, it being obvious that respondents' separation from the service is illegal, the GSIS is directed to reinstate
them with payment of back salaries and benefits due them not later than ten (10) days from receipt of a copy hereof,
without prejudice to the right of the GSIS to pursue proper disciplinary action against them. It is also directed that the
services of their replacement be terminated effective upon reinstatement of herein respondents.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Still unconvinced, the GSIS appealed to the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 80321-22). Once more, it was rebuffed. On July 4, 1988
this Court's Second Division promulgated a Resolution which:

a) denied its petition for failing to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Civl Service Commission, the
dismissals of the employees having in truth been made without formal charge and hearin, and

b) declared that reinstatement of said five employees was proper, "without prejudice to the right of the GSIS to pursue
proper disciplinary action against them;"

c) MODIFIED, however, the challenged CSC Resolution of October 21, 1987 "by elminating the payment of back
salaries to private respondents (employees) until the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings is known, considering the
gravity of the offenses imputed to them ..., 2

d) ordered reinstatement only of three employees, namely: Domingo Canero, Renato Navarro and Belen Guerrero, "it
appearing that respondents Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel have since passed away." 3

On January 8, 1990, the aforesaid Resolution of July 4, 1988 having become final, the heirs of Namuco and Manuel filed a
motion for execution of the Civil Service Commission Resolution of October 21, 1987, supra. The GSIS opposed the motion. It
argued that the CSC Resolution of October 21, 1987 — directing reinstatement of the employees and payment to them of back
salaries and benefits — had been superseded by the Second Division’s Resolution of July 4, 1988 precisely eliminating the
payment of back salaries.

The Civil Service Commission granted the motion for execution in an Order dated June 20, 1990. It accordingly directed the
GSIS "to pay the compulsory heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal
separation up to the date of their demise." The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied by Order of the CSC dated
November 22, 1990.

Once again the GSIS has come to this Court, this time praying that certiorari issue to nullify the Orders of June 20, 1990 and
November 22, 1990. Here it contends that the Civil Service Commission has no power to execute its judgments and final orders
or resolutions, and even conceding the contrary, the writ of execution issued on June 20, 1990 is void because it varies this
Court’s Resolution of July 4, 1988.

The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, is a constitutional commission
invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, 4 but also with quasi-judicial
powers. 5 It has the authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on
appeal. 6 The Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for decision it within sixty days from the date of its submission for on certiorari by any
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. 7 It has the power, too, sitting en banc, to promulgate its own
rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices, which rules should not however diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. 8

On October 9, 1989, the Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779 adopting, approving and putting into
effect simplified rules of procedure on administrative disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant to the authority granted by the
constitutional and statutory provisions above cited, as well as Republic Act No. 6713. Those rules provide, among other
things, 10 that decision in "administrative disciplinary cases" shall be immediately executory unless a motion for reconsideration
is seasonably filed. If the decision of the Commission is brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari, the same shall still be
executory unless a restraining order or preliminary injunction is issued by the High Court." 11 This is similar to a provision in the
former Civil Service Rules authorizing the Commissioner, "if public interest so warrants, ... (to) order his decision executed
pending appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals." 12 The provisions are analogous and entirely consistent with the duty or
responsibility reposed in the Chairman by PD 807, subject to policies and resolutions adopted by the Commission, "to enforce
decision on administrative discipline involving officials of the Commission," 13 as well as with Section 37 of the same decree
declaring that an appeal to the Commission 14 "shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is
suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of
the appeal in the event he wins an appeal."

In light of all the foregoing consitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission
the power or authority or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it has been
exercising through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the
authority to see taht what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the
authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or
execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.

In any event, the Commission's exercise of that power of execution has been sanctioned by this Court in several cases.

In Cucharo v. Subido, 15 for instance, this Court sustained the challenged directive of the Civil Service Commissioner, that his
decision "be executed immediately 'but not beyond ten days from receipt thereof ...". The Court said:

As a major premise, it has been the repeated pronouncement of this Supreme Tribunal that the Civil Service
Commissioner has the discretion toorder the immediate execution in the public interst of his decision  separating
petitioner-appellant from the service, always sbuject however to the rule that, in the event the Civil Service Board of
Appeals or the proper court determines that his dismissal is illegal, he should be paid the salary corresponding to the
period of his separation from the service unitl his reinstatement.

Petitioner GSIS concedes that the heirs of Namuco and Manuel "are entitled tothe retirement/death and other benefits due them
as government employees" since, at the time of their death, they "can be considered not to have been separated from the
separated from the service." 16

It contends, however, that since Namuco and Manuel had not been "completely exonerated of the administrative charge filed
against them — as the filing of the proper disciplinary action was yet to have been taken had death not claimed them" — no
back salaries may be paid to them, although they "may charge the period of (their) suspension against (their) leave credits, if
any, and may commute such leave credits to money value;" this, on the authority of this Court's decision in Clemente v.
Commission on Audit. 18 It is in line with these considerations, it argues, that the final and executory Resolution of this Court's
Second Division of July 4, 1988 should be construed; 19 and since the Commission's Order of July 20, 1990 maikes a contrary
disposition, the latter order obviously cannot prevail and must be deemed void and ineffectual.

This Court's Resolution of July 4, 1988, as already stated, modified the Civil Service Commission's Resolution of October 21,
1987 — inter alia granting back salaries tothe five dismissed employees, including Namuco and Manuel — and pertinently reads
as follows:

We modify the said Order, however, by eliminating the payment of back salaries to private respondents until the
outcome of the disciplinary proceedings is known, considering the gravity of the offense imputed to them in connection
with the irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials at the GSIS.
 The reinstatement order shall apply only to respondents Domingo Canero, Renato Navarro and Belen Guerrero, it
appearing that respondents Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel have since passed away. ....

On the other hand, as also already stated, the Commission's Order of June 20, 1990 directed the GSIS "to pay the compulsory
heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal separation up to the date of
their demise."

The Commission asserted that in promulgating its disparate ruling, it was acting "in the interest of justice and for other
humanitarian reasons," since the question of whether or not Namuco and Manuel should receive back salaries was "dependent
on the result of the disciplinary proceedings against their co-respondents in the administrative case before the GSIS," and since
at the tiem of their death, "no formal charge ... (had) as yet been made, nor any finding of their personal culpability ... and ... they
are no longer in a position to refute the charge."

The Court agrees that the challenged orders of the Civil Service Commission should be upheld, and not merely upon
compassionate grounds, but simply because there is no fair and feasible alternative in the circumstances. To be sure, if the
deceased employees were still alive, it would at least be arguable, positing the primacy of this Court's final dispositions, that the
issue of payment of their back salaries should properly await the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings referred to in the
Second Division's Resolution of July 4, 1988.

Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation of disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the
continuation of any then pending, against the deceased employees. Whatever may be said of the binding force of the Resolution
of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and pursposes, it makes exoneration in the adminstrative proceedings a condition
precedent to payment of back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible performance or decree a useless exercise. Even in the
case of crimes, the death of the offender exteinguishes criminal liability, not only as to the personal, but also as to the pecuniary,
penalties if it occurs before final judgment. 20 In this context, the subsequent disciplinary proceedings, even if not assailable on
grounds of due process, would be an inutile, empty procedure in so far as the deceased employees are concerned; they could
not possibly be bound by any substatiation in said proceedings of the original charges: irrigularities in the canvass of supplies
and materials. The questioned order of the Civil Service Commission merely recognized the impossibility of complying with the
Resolution of July 4, 1988 and the legal futility of attempting a post-mortem investigation of the character contemplated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46496             February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.

LAUREL, J.:

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for
reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the
majority opinion of this Court:

1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una
determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago
de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;

2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con ell, sin
tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en
la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;

3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de
duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como
consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la
Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un
determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en
virtud del paro.

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority
of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:

1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making
it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and
unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.

2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent
the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles
from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio
Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)

5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective representation
are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)

6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous
civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a
modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.

7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor
Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
 8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence
they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.

9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union,
Inc.

In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration
of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this,
however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in
cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and
emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the
entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial
evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken
contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing
counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of
counsel have no evidentiary value.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when
its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of
Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises
judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It
has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or
dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them,
subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or
purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or
employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of
farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of
Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by
the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It
shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle
the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall
investigate and study all industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of
fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental
to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in
the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system
of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry
and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid
doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had
occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had
occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the
Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall
not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may
include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the
purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this
legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently
promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial
Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable
cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:
 (1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1,
58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S.
298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the
right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is
conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or
consideration."

(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot
be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs.
McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No.
45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington,
Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed.
965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations
Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall
not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the
compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial
proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44,
24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88,
93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed.
624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a
basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p.
131.)"

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57
Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively
to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and
informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of
investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any
matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any
public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such
board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but
such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may
be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them.
In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other
subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such
statutory authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement
between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst
for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union,
Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the
petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National
Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and
functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his
substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached
to the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By
and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if
the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as
may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it
acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by
the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case
shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may
be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
G.R. No. 194061, April 20, 2015

EMELIE L. BESAGA, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES FELIPE ACOSTA AND LUZVIMINDA ACOSTA AND DIGNA MATALANG
COCHING, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the October 30, 2009 decision2 and the October 1, 2010
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.'SP No. 100616.

The CA affirmed the decision4 of the Office of the President setting aside the resolution 5 of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary. The DENR Secretary earlier affirmed the orders dated December 1, 20036 and July 26,
20047 of the DENR Regional Executive Director (RED), Region IV-B-MIMAROPA.8

The Antecedents9

The dispute involved Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 located at Barangay Port Barton, San Vicente, Palawan, which are parts of a six-
hectare timberland.

On February 11, 2003, Emelie L. Besaga (petitioner) applied for a Special Land Use Permit (SLUP) for Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and
4514 for a bathing establishment. According to the petitioner, the lots are covered by Tax Declaration No. 048 in the name of her
father, the late Arturo Besaga, Sr. who allegedly occupied the land during his lifetime.

On February 13, 2003, spouses Felipe and Luzviminda Acosta (respondent spouses) also applied for SLUP for a bathing
establishment over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514. According to the respondent spouses, they acquired Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514
through a March 19, 1998 Affidavit of Waiver of Rights executed by Rogelio Maranon, a registered survey claimant, and a
February 9, 1999 Joint Affidavit of Waiver of Rights, executed by Arturo Besaga, Jr.,10 and Digna Matalang Coching (another
respondent in this case), also registered survey claimants.

On September 10, 2003, the respondents challenged the petitioner's SLUP application before the DENR. On December 1, 2003,
the RED issued the order giving due course to the petitioner's SLUP application and rejecting the respondents' SLUP
application. The RED later denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration on July 26, 2004.

The respondent spouses received the July 26, 2004 order on August 16, 2004. They tiled on. August 25, 2004, through
registered mail, an Appeal Memorandum to the Office of the DENR Secretary, copy furnished the petitioner's lawyer and
the Office of the RED. The appeal fee was paid on September 10, 2004. Respondent Digna Matalang Coching received the
July 26, 2004 order on August 30, 2004 and filed her appeal (which adopted the appeal of the respondent spouses) on
September 16, 2004.

While the appeal was pending in the Office of the DENR Secretary, the RED issued a Certificate of Finality11 declaring the
December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders final and executory for failure of the respondents to file a Notice of Appeal.

On December 10, 2004, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) issued the SLUP12 to the petitioner
covering Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514. On November 18, 2005, the SLUP was converted into a Special Forest Land-Use
Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT).

On August 6, 2006, the DENR Secretary rendered a decision (i) vacating the December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders of the
RED; (ii) amending the coverage of the SLUP of the petitioner to cover Lot No. 4513 only; and (iii) giving due course to the
SLUP of the respondent spouses to cover Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514.

Acting on the motion for reconsideration13 filed by the petitioner, the DENR Secretary reversed his August 6, 2006 decision on
October 17, 2006 and held that the December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders of the RED have attained finality because: (i)
the respondent spouses filed an Appeal Memorandum, instead of a Notice of Appeal; (ii) the Appeal Memorandum was directly
filed with the DENR Secretary and not with the RED; and (iii) the respondent spouses failed to pay the required appeal fees
within the reglementary period.

The Office of the President reversed the October 17, 2006 resolution of the DENR Secretary.

The CA, through the assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the decision of the Office of the President.

The petitioner filed the present petition to contest the CA's ruling.
 The DENR's Findings

The RED, relying mainly on the report14 prepared by the chief of Forest Management Services ruled in favor of the petitioner.

The report gave credence to Tax Declaration No. 048,15 which purportedly showed that Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514 are parts
of the six (6) hectare timberland occupied by the petitioner's father during his lifetime. The RED also gave weight to the
statements of two former Barangay Captains of Port Barton and the document signed by the alleged occupants of the said six
(6) hectare timberland supporting the petitioner's claim.

The DENR Secretary reversed the orders of the RED in his decision dated August 6, 2006.16

He ruled that the petitioner cannot claim preferential right to apply for an SLUP over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 in view of her
sweeping allegation that the said lots are part of the six (6) hectare timberland, which his father possessed in his lifetime and
whose possession she tacked. The DENR Secretary asked: if indeed the petitioner tacked the possession of his father and she
was the actual occupant over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514, why was she not made the survey claimants of the said lots?

The DENR Secretary found that the respondent spouses have a preferential right over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514. Rogelio
Maranon, the registered survey claimant and occupant of Lot No. 4512, waived and transferred his right over the lot in favor of
the respondent spouses in a duly-notarized Affidavit of Waiver of Rights. The respondent spouses derived their right over Lot
No. 4514 from Arturo Besaga, Jr. and Digna Matalang Coching, the registered survey claimants, who executed a duly-notarized
Joint-Affidavit of Waiver of Rights over the said lot. The DENR Secretary held that these are the legal and vital documents
(disregarded by the chief of Forest Management Services) which support the preferential rights of the respondent spouses over
Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514.

The DENR Secretary, however, reversed his August 6, 2006 decision in a resolution 17 dated October 17, 2006. He ruled that the
respondent spouses failed to perfect the appeal because they filed a Memorandum of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal
contrary to Section 1(a) of DENR Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 87, series of 1990.18

The Office of the President's Ruling 19

The Office of the President reversed the October 17, 2006 resolution of the DENR Secretary.

It held that the orders of the RED did not become final because there is no law, rule or regulation prohibiting an appellant to file
an appeal memorandum, instead of a notice of appeal, to the office concerned. It further held that the appeal memorandum itself
serves as a sufficient notice of the party's intention to elevate the case to a higher authority. The Office of the President
observed that in a plethora of cases, notices of appeal are filed directly with the DENR, rather than with the RED, which practice
has not since been prohibited nor made as a ground for the outright dismissal of the appeal. Finally, it found that the respondent
spouses paid the appeal fees. All of these negate the finding that the respondent spouses did not perfect their appeal to the
DENR Secretary.

As to the merits of the case, the Office of the President found that Tax Declaration No. 048 did not cover Lot Nos. 4512, 4513
and 4514 but Lot No. 4741, which is entirely different and distinct from the contested lots. It gave credence to the Affidavit of
Waiver of Rights executed by Rogelio Maranon and the Joint Affidavit of Waiver of Rights jointly executed by Arturo Besaga, Jr.
and Digna Matalang Coching in favor of the respondent spouses. No countervailing proof was presented by the petitioner to
impugn these affidavits.
The CA's Ruling

The CA sustained the Office of the President. Citing decisions of this Court, it held that rules of procedure are construed liberally
in proceedings before administrative bodies. They are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical manner, as they are used
only to hold secure and not to override substantial justice.

The CA ruled that the orders of the RED have not attained finality.

The Petition

The petitioner seeks reversal of the CA decision and resolution for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. She submits that the
respondent spouses failed to perfect an appeal in the administrative proceedings. She argues that the perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and that failure to conform to the
rules will render the judgment sought to be reviewed final and unappealable. She adds that the liberal interpretation of the rules
has no clear application in the present case because the respondents failed to adequately explain their non-compliance
therewith.

As is proper under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner does not raise any factual questions.
 Respondent's Comment20

The respondent spouses ask for the petition's dismissal for lack of merit. They submit that the CA acted in accordance with law
and jurisprudence in upholding the ruling of the Office of the President.

They argue that to dismiss the case on the mere ground of technicalities would mean to dispense with the determination of the
party having preferential right on the disputed lots and could cause the perpetuation of a wrong. They maintain that the cases
cited by the petitioner, where procedural rules were strictly enforced by this Court, involved violation of the rules either before the
trial court, the CA or before this Court, and not before an administrative agency like the DENR. In sum, the respondent spouses
contend that the orders of the RED have not attained finality, thus, said orders are still subject to reversal, amendment or
modification on appeal.

Issues

The petitioner raises the following issues:21

I. WHETHER THE APPEAL INTERPOSED BY THE RESPONDENTS WAS CORRECTLY FILED TO THE DENR
SECRETARY AND NOT TO THE REGIONAL OFFICE AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO NO. 87,
SERIES OF 1990;

II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS' APPEAL TO THE OFFICE OF THE DENR SECRETARY WAS PERFECTED
DESPITE OF THEIR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO NO. 87, SERIES OF 1990;

III. WHETHER THE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL INVOLVING ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS WAS CORRECTLY APPLIED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE CASE OF
RESPONDENTS;

IV. WHETHER  THE  ASSAILED  ORDERS,  ISSUED  ON DECEMBER 1, 2003 AND JULY 26, 2004, OF THE REGIONAL
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF DENR REGION IV-MIMAROPA IN DENR CASE NO. M-003-03-F, WERE ALREADY
FINAL AND EXECUTORY;

V. WHETHER THE PERFECTION OF APPEAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO NO. 87, SERIES OF
1990 IS NOT ONLY MANDATORY BUT JURISDICTIONAL; AND

VI. WHETHER THE ORDERS DATED DECEMBER 1, 2003 AND JULY 23, 2014 CAN STILL BE MODIFIED AND SET
ASIDE BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.

The resolution of these issues hinges on whether the orders of the RED dated December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 have
attained finality because the respondents filed a Memorandum of Appeal directly to the DENR Secretary instead of a Notice of
Appeal to the RED.

The Court's Ruling

We deny the petition.

The petitioner insists that the filing of a Memorandum of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal was fatal to the respondent
spouses' case.

We are not convinced of the merits of this position.

The crux of the dispute is Section 1(a) of DAO No. 87. It provides:

Section 1. Perfection of Appeals. - a) Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, appeals from the decisions/orders
of the DENR Regional Offices shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of a copy of the decision/order
complained of by the party adversely affected, by tiling with the Regional Office which adjudicated the case a notice of
appeal, serving copies thereof upon the prevailing party and Office of the Secretary, and paying the required fees.
[Emphasis ours.]

According to the petitioner, this provision is mandatory and jurisdictional. She argues that respondents filed a defective appeal
because: (i) they filed a Memorandum of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal; (ii) directly to the DENR and not to the Regional
Office, which adjudicated the case; and (iii) no docket fee was paid.22
The petitioner cites jurisprudence to bolster her argument that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not oniy mandatory but also jurisdictional.

We accordingly review the cited cases to determine the correctness of the petitioner's submitted position.

In Asian Spirit Airlines v. Bautista,23 the CA dismissed the appeal because the appellant failed to file his brief within the time
provided by the Rules of Court. The appellant not only neglected to file its brief within the stipulated time but also failed to seek
an extension of time based on a cogent ground before the expiration of the time sought to be extended. In sustaining the CA, we
held that liberality in the application of rules of procedure may not be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules
or cause needless delay in the administration of justice.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, 24 we affirmed the trial court when it considered a motion for reconsideration pro
forma  for not containing a notice of hearing. We held that a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is
nothing but a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to the
attention of the presiding judge.

In Videogram Regulatory Board v. CA,25 the Regional Trial Court granted the petitioner a non-extendible 15-day period to file a
Petition for Review from the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court. The petitioner failed to file the petition despite the
extension. We held that the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be
strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial
business.

In MC Engineering, Inc. v. NLRC, 26 we affirm the CA when it denied due course to the petitioner's appeal because of its failure to
explain why another mode of service other than personal service was resorted to. We held that an affidavit of service is required
merely as proof that service has been made to the other parties in a case. It is a requirement totally different from the
requirement that an explanation be made if personal service of pleadings was not resorted to.

Finally, in Artistica Ceramica v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner's Association, Inc.,27 the issue was whether the petitioner
properly filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We
held that as a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. The failure to file
the appeal within the 15-day reglementary period under Rule 45 is not an excuse to use Rule 65. Rule 65 is not a substitute for a
lost appeal,

In sum, all these cases strictly applied the rule that the right to appeal is a mere statutory right and the party who avails of such
right must comply with the law. Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost.

To reiterate, these involved violations of the Rules of Court while the cases were pending in the trial court, the CA or before this
Court. They do not involved violation of administrative rules of procedure. They are not strictly applicable in the present
case.

The Nature of Administrative Rules of Procedure

It is true that the right to appeal, being merely a statutory privilege, should be exercised in the manner prescribed by law. This
has been consistently held in relation to non-observance by a party-litigant of the Rules of Court and failure to offer a valid and
acceptable excuse for non-compliance.

Yet, it is equally true that in proceedings before administrative bodies the general rule has always been liberality.

Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not required by law.28  Administrative rules of procedure
should be construed liberally in order to promote their object to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their respective claims and defenses.29

In Birkenstock Orthopaedie GmbH and Co. KG v. Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corp., 30 we held:

It is well-settled that the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than its frustration.
A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that
is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the
other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free
from the constraints of technicalities, x x x This is especially true with quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, such as the
IPO, which are not bound by technical rules of procedure. [Emphasis supplied.]
The liberality of procedure in administrative actions, however, is subject to limitations imposed by the requirements of due
process.31

Administrative due process means reasonable opportunity to be heard. As held in Vivo v. Pagcor.32

The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process. The essence of
due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative
due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is
not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. [Emphasis supplied.]

Where due process is present, the administrative decision is generally sustained.33

Thus, while this Court allows liberal construction of administrative rules of procedure to enhance fair trial and expedite justice,
we are keenly aware that liberal construction has no application when due process is violated. The crucial point of inquiry in
cases involving violation of administrative rules of procedure is whether such violation disregards the basic tenets of
administrative due process. If the gravity of the violation of the rules is such that due process is breached, the rules of procedure
should be strictly applied. Otherwise, the rules are liberally construed.

Liberal Construction as Applied in the Present Case

It is undisputed that the respondent spouses, instead of filing a Notice of Appeal to the RED, filed a Memorandum of Appeal to
the DENR Secretary within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period. They paid the appeal fee, although beyond the fifteen (15)-
day period. These violate Section 1 (a) of DAO No. 87 which requires the filing of a Notice of Appeal and the payment of the
appeal fee within the reglementary period.

Do these errors breach due process so as to call for the strict application of administrative rules of procedure? Is there basis for
the liberal construction of the rules?

We uphold liberality.

First, there is no violation of due process. In fact, to sustain the position of the petitioner and strictly apply Section l(a) of DAO
No. 87 may violate the respondent spouses right to due process as this would result to a denial of their right to appeal.

We stress that the respondent spouses appealed within the reglementary period. The appeal was timely filed, albeit not
directly to the office which issued the order sought to be reviewed. They also paid the full appeal fees although beyond the 15-
day period.

We hold that these procedural lapses were neither prejudicial nor unfair to the petitioner. The petitioner's right to due process
was not breached.

Notably, both the petitioner and the RED were furnished copies of the Memorandum of Appeal, a fact that the petitioner
did not deny.34

We agree with the observation of the Office of the President that the Memorandum of Appeal essentially served the purpose of
the Notice of Appeal. The filing of the Memorandum of Appeal had the same practical effect had a Notice of Appeal been filed:
inform the RED that his order is sought to be appealed to the DENR Secretary.

Significantly, the respondent spouses notified the petitioner of the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal. The petitioner
subsequently filed her opposition thereto. When the DENR Secretary initially ruled in favor of the respondent spouses, the
petitioner tiled a motion for reconsideration of the said decision.

Clearly, the petitioner participated in every stage of the administrative proceeding. Her right to be heard was not compromised
despite the wrong mode of appeal.

As to the late payment of the appeal fee, suffice it to say that this Court has disregarded late payment of appeal fees  at the
administrative level in order to render substantial justice.35

Second, the liberal construction of DAO No. 87 would serve its purpose, i.e., grant a party the right to appeal decisions of the
Regional Offices to the DENR Secretary in order for the latter to review the findings of the former. To disallow appeal in this case
would not only work injustice to the respondent spouses, it would also diminish the DENR Secretary's power to review the
decision of the RED. It would deny the DENR Secretary the opportunity to correct, at the earliest opportunity, "errors of
judgment" of his subordinates. This is obviously not the intent of DAO No. 87.
Finally, the petitioner failed to convince us why liberality should not be applied. The petitioner does not claim that her right to due
process was violated as a result of the wrong mode of appeal. The petitioner merely asks this Court to strictly construe DAO No.
87 and affirm the orders of the RED, which according to her, have attained finality.

Between strict construction of administrative rules of procedure for their own sake and their liberal application in order to
enhance fair trials and expedite justice, we uphold the latter. After all, administrative rules of procedure do not operate in a
vacuum. The rules facilitate just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes before administrative bodies. The better policy is
to apply these rules in a manner that would give effect rather than defeat their intended purpose.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the October 30, 2009 decision and October 1, 2010
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100616, affirming the August 13, 2007 decision of the Office of the
President in O.P. Case No. 06-K-398.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149335            July 1, 2003

EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR, petitioner,
vs.
LUIS BUNDALIAN, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, Executive Secretary, Office of the President, AND GREGORIO R. VIGILAR,
Secretary, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), respondents.

PUNO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
April 18, 2001, affirming the decision of the Office of the President in Administrative Order No. 12 ordering petitioner’s dismissal
as Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for unexplained wealth.

Petitioner’s dismissal originated from an unverified letter-complaint, dated July 15, 1995, addressed by private respondent LUIS
BUNDALIAN to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. Private respondent accused petitioner,
then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 3019. Private respondent charged that in 1993, petitioner and his wife purchased a house and lot at 907 North Bel Aire
Drive, Burbank, Los Angeles, California, making a down payment of US$100,000.00. He further alleged that petitioner’s in-laws
who were living in California had a poor credit standing due to a number of debts and they could not have purchased such an
expensive property for petitioner and his wife. Private respondent accused petitioner of amassing wealth from lahar funds and
other public works projects.

Private respondent attached to his letter-complaint the following documents:

a) a copy of a Grant Deed, dated May 27, 1993, where spouses David and Judith Tedesco granted the subject property
to petitioner and his wife;

b) a copy of the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by petitioner and his wife in California appointing petitioner’s
sister-in-law Estela D. Fajardo as their attorney-in-fact, to negotiate and execute all documents and requirements to
complete the purchase of the subject property; and,

c) an excerpt from the newspaper column of Lito A. Catapusan in the Manila Bulletin, entitled "Beatwatch," where it was
reported that a low-ranking, multimillionaire DPWH employee, traveled to Europe and the U.S. with his family,
purchased an expensive house in California, appointed a woman through an SPA to manage the subject property and
had hidden and unexplained wealth in the Philippines and in the U.S.

Accordingly, the letter-complaint and its attached documents were indorsed by the Philippine Consulate General of San
Francisco, California, to the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC)1 for investigation. Petitioner,
represented by counsel, submitted his counter-affidavit before the PCAGC alleging that the real owner of the subject property
was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo. Petitioner explained that in view of the unstable condition of government service in 1991,
his wife inquired from her family in the U.S. about their possible emigration to the States. They were advised by an immigration
lawyer that it would be an advantage if they had real property in the U.S. Fajardo intimated to them that she was interested in
buying a house and lot in Burbank, California, but could not do so at that time as there was a provision in her mortgage contract
prohibiting her to purchase another property pending full payment of a real estate she earlier acquired in Palmdale, Los Angeles.
Fajardo offered to buy the Burbank property and put the title in the names of petitioner and his wife to support their emigration
plans and to enable her at the same time to circumvent the prohibition in her mortgage contract.

Petitioner likewise pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of similar cases filed before the Ombudsman. 2 He
attached to his counter-affidavit the Consolidated Investigation Report3 of the Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for
insufficiency of evidence.

From May 29, 1996 until March 13, 1997, the PCAGC conducted its own investigation of the complaint. While petitioner
participated in the proceedings and submitted various pleadings and documents through his counsel, private respondent-
complainant could not be located as his Philippine address could not be ascertained. In the course of the investigation, the
PCAGC repeatedly required petitioner to submit his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), Income Tax Returns
(ITRs) and Personal Data Sheet. Petitioner ignored these directives and submitted only his Service Record. He likewise
adduced in evidence the checks allegedly issued by his sister-in-law to pay for the house and lot in Burbank, California. When
the PCAGC requested the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to furnish it with copies of petitioner’s SALN from 1992-1994, it was
informed that petitioner failed to file his SALN for those years.

After the investigation, the PCAGC, in its Report to the Office of the President, made the following findings: Petitioner purchased
a house and lot in Burbank, California, for US$195,000.00 (or P3.9M at the exchange rate prevailing in 1993). The sale was
evidenced by a Grant Deed. The PCAGC concluded that the petitioner could not have been able to afford to buy the property on
his annual income of P168,648.00 in 1993 as appearing on his Service Record. It likewise found petitioner’s explanation as
unusual, largely unsubstantiated, unbelievable and self-serving. The PCAGC noted that instead of adducing evidence,
petitioner’s counsel exerted more effort in filing pleadings and motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. It also took
against petitioner his refusal to submit his SALN and ITR despite the undertaking made by his counsel which raised the
presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. The PCAGC concluded that as petitioner’s
acquisition of the subject property was manifestly out of proportion to his salary, it has been unlawfully acquired. Thus, it
recommended petitioner’s dismissal from service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019.

On August 24, 1998, the Office of the President, concurring with the findings and adopting the recommendation of the PCAGC,
issued Administrative Order No. 12,4 ordering petitioner’s dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government benefits.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. His appeal to the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed.5

Hence, this petition for review where petitioner raises the following issues for resolution: first, whether he was denied due
process in the investigation before the PCAGC; second, whether his guilt was proved by substantial evidence; and, third,
whether the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the PCAGC moot
and academic.

On the issue of due process, petitioner submits that the PCAGC committed infractions of the cardinal rules of administrative due
process when it relied on Bundalian’s unverified letter-complaint. He gripes that his counter-affidavit should have been given
more weight as the unverified complaint constitutes hearsay evidence. Moreover, petitioner insists that in ruling against him, the
PCAGC failed to respect his right to confront and cross-examine the complainant as the latter never appeared in any of the
hearings before the PCAGC nor did he send a representative therein.

We find no merit in his contentions. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s
side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard
before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. 6 In the case at bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts to
notify the complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine residence could not be located. 7 Be that as it may, petitioner cannot
argue that he was deprived of due process because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. Petitioner
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before it. He was duly represented by
counsel. He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of
Administrative Order No. 12 issued by the President and eventually filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active
participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and
satisfied the due process requirement. He cannot now be allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the
investigation.8

Neither can we sustain petitioner’s contention that the charge against him was unsupported by substantial evidence as it was
contained in an unverified complaint. The lack of verification of the administrative complaint and the non-appearance of the
complainant at the investigation did not divest the PCAGC of its authority to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. Under
Section 3 of Executive Order No. 151 creating the PCAGC, complaints involving graft and corruption may be filed before it in
any form or manner against presidential appointees in the executive department. Indeed, it is not totally uncommon that a
government agency is given a wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its investigative powers. The Ombudsman, under the
Constitution, is directed to act on any complaint likewise filed in any form and manner concerning official acts or omissions. The
Court Administrator of this Court investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but even anonymous complaints filed
against court employees or officials for violation of the Code of Ethical Conduct. This policy has been adopted in line with the
serious effort of the government to minimize, if not eradicate, graft and corruption in the service.

It is well to remember that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is
given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.9 This was afforded to the petitioner in the case at bar.

On the second issue, there is a need to lay down the basic principles in administrative investigations. First, the burden is on the
complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint.10 Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.11 Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the
executive branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence.
Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of
discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the
evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence
that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned.12
In the case at bar, petitioner admitted that the subject property was in his name. However, he insisted that it was his sister-in-law
Estela Fajardo who paid for the property in installments. He submitted as proof thereof the checks issued by Fajardo as payment
for the amortizations of the property. His evidence, however, likewise fail to convince us. First, the record is bereft of evidence to
prove the alleged internal arrangement petitioner entered into with Fajardo. He did not submit her affidavit to the investigating
body nor did she testify before it regarding her ownership of the Burbank property. Second, the checks allegedly issued by
Fajardo to pay for the monthly amortizations on the property have no evidentiary weight as Fajardo’s mere issuance thereof
cannot prove petitioner’s non-ownership of the property. Fajardo would naturally issue the checks as she was appointed by
petitioner as attorney-in-fact and the latter would naturally course through her the payments for the Burbank property. Third,
petitioner’s own evidence contradict his position. We cannot reconcile petitioner’s denial of ownership of the property with the
loan statement13 he adduced showing that he obtained a loan from the World Savings and Loan Association for $195,000.00 on
June 23, 1993 to finance the acquisition of the property. Then, three (3) years later, on May 30, 1996, petitioner and his wife
executed a Quitclaim Deed14 donating the Burbank property to his sisters-in-law Estela and Rose Fajardo allegedly to prove his
non-ownership of the property. It is obvious that the Quitclaim Deed is a mere afterthought, having been executed only after a
complaint for unexplained wealth was lodged against petitioner. Why the Quitclaim Deed included Rose Fajardo when it was
only Estela Fajardo who allegedly owned the property was not explained on the record. Petitioner’s evidence failed to clarify the
issue as it produced, rather than settled, more questions.

Petitioner admitted that the Grant Deed over the property was in his name. He never denied the existence and due execution of
the Grant Deed and the Special Power of Attorney he conferred to Estela Fajardo with respect to the acquisition of the Burbank
property. With these admissions, the burden of proof was shifted to petitioner to prove non-ownership of the property. He cannot
now ask this Court to remand the case to the PCAGC for reception of additional evidence as, in the absence of any errors of
law, it is not within the Court’s power to do so. He had every opportunity to adduce his evidence before the PCAGC.

Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioner’s stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered
the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does
not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. 15 Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his
possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the
PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGC’s investigation of petitioner
was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar.

Thus, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly sustained petitioner’s dismissal from service as the complaint and its
supporting documents established that he acquired a property whose value is disproportionate to his income in the government
service, unless he has other sources of income which he failed to reveal. His liability was proved by substantial evidence.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975

SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations, and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner,
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO
MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public Service Officer of Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
SIMILARLY SITUATED, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Ist. Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Bernardo P.
Pardo for petitioners.

Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents.

MARTIN, J.:

This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing,
etc.", which reads as follows:

IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their
agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in
connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting
contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).

Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code,1 the President of the
Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of
January 7, 1966.2 Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities:3

b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling
(physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the government
and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines.

c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather
necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .

h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts,
conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the
appropriate agency.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee
under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.4

Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando
Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear
as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there
to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."

Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First Instance of
Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality.

On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order:

IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their
agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in
connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting
contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 530 of the Revised
Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).
Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for reconsideration first filed on the fundamental
submission that the Order is a patent nullity.6

As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue
subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.

It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the
analysis of evidence.7 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and
licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation,
and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done.8 An administrative
agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in
proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be
taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general
inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. 10

We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5
which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the
investigation" 11 with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject
in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such
subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and
(h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function
under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one
another with the principal aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode
nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-
judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under
sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction
when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established
rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.

Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules of Court 13 to
abridge its application. The seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon
witnesses and the authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise shall be
"subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" cannot
be validly seized upon to require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the Rules, a specific case must be
pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court's
judicial or adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial subpoena can be issued by an administrative agency like petitioner
Agency. It must be emphasized, however, that an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly,
what the Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an
administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the "restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code could mean the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is
unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear. 15

Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is
involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown 16 and even before the issuance of a complaint. 17 It is not necessary, as
in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to
one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover
evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. 19 Its obligation
cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized
purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light. 20 Because judicial
power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that
an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry.
The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get
evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is
not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to
inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. 21 In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the
requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3)
the information is reasonably relevant. 22

There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain
public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions 23 fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that
the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, 24 is
reasonably relevant to the investigations.
We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to
adversary proceedings. 25 In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 26 the Court ruled that since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth
against the respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a
proceeding criminal or penal in nature, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching
upon his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 27 the same
approach was followed in the administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of
his privilege to practice the medical profession. Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando
Manalastas is not facing any administrative charge. 28 He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding
investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts
to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges. 29 Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover
facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise. 30 Anyway, by all means,
respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-
incrimination.

A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power of the President of the Philippines to issue
subpoena. 31 More tersely stated, respondents would now challenge, in a collateral way, the validity of the basic authority,
Executive Order No. 4, as amended in part by Executive Order No. 88. Unfortunately, for reasons of public policy, the
constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force and effect of statutes 32 cannot be collaterally
impeached. 33 Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the court below as to be acceptable for adjudication
now. 34 The settled rule is that the Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding
it. 35

Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent
Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue.

WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set aside and declared of no force and
effect.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12596             July 31, 1958

JOSE L. GUEVARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.

Dominador D. Dayot for respondent.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Petitioner was ordered by the Commissioner on Elections to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having
published in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 an article entitled "Ballot Boxes Contract Hit", which tended to interfere
with and influence the Commission on Elections and its members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending investigation
and determination before said body "arising from the third petition for reconsideration of May 20, 1957 and the supplementary
petition thereof of June 1, 1957 filed by Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc., praying for reconsideration of the resolutions of the
Commission of May 4 and 13, 1957, awarding the contracts for the manufacture and supply of 34,000 ballot boxes to the
National Shipyards & Steel Corporation and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. and the respective answers of the latter two
corporations to said petitions; and which article likewise tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and undermine the exclusive
constitutional function of this Commission and its Chairman Domingo Imperial and Member Sixto Brillantes in the administration
of all the laws relative to the conduct of elections."

Petitioner, answering summons issued to him by the Commission, appeared and filed a motion to quash on the following
grounds:

a) The Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article, as
neither in the Constitution nor in statutes is the Commission granted a power to so punish the same, for should Section
5 of Republic Act No. 180, vesting the Commission with "power to punish contempts provided for in Rule of the Court
under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein," be applied to the case at hand, said provision
would be unconstitutional.

b) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists, the same cannot be applied to the instant case,
where the Commission is exercising a purely administrative function for purchasing ballot boxes.

c) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists, said power cannot apply to the present case
because the matter of purchasing the ballot boxes was already a closed case when the article in question was
published.

d) Assuming that controversy contemplated by the law was still pending, the article in question was a fair report
because it could be assumed that the news report of the respondent was based on the motion for reconsideration filed
by the Acme Steel where there was an allegation of fraud, etc.

The Commission, after hearing, denied the motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of fifteen (15) days within which to
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court in view of the issue raised which assails the jurisdiction of the Commission to
investigate and punish petitioner for contempt in connection with the alleged publication. Hence the present petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction.

The facts which gave rise to the present contemptuous incident are: The Commission on Elections, on May 4, 1957, after proper
negotiations, awarded to the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation (NASSCO), the Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ACME), and the
Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ASIATIC), the contracts to manufacture and supply the Commission 12,000, 11,000 and 11,000
ballot boxes at P17.64, P14.00, and P17.00 each, respectively. On May 8, 1957, both the NASSCO and the ASIATIC signed
with the Commission on Elections the corresponding contracts thereon. On May 13, 1957, the Commission cancelled the award
to the ACME for failure of the latter to sign the contract within the designated time and awarded to the NASSCO and the
ASIATIC, one-half each, the 11,000 ballot boxes originally alloted to the ACME. The corresponding contracts thereon were
signed on May 16, 1957.

Then followed a series of petitions filed by the ACME for the reconsideration of the resolution of the Commission of May 13,
1957. The first of these petitions was filed on May 14, 1957 which, after hearing, was denied by the Commission in its resolution
of May 16, 1957. The second petition was filed on May 16, 1957 and was denied on May 17, 1957. The third petition was filed
on May 20, 1957, and because of the seriousness of the grounds alleged therein for the annulment of its previous resolutions,
the Commission resolved to conduct a formal investigation on the matter ordering the NASSCO and the ASIATIC to file their
respective answers. Thereafter, after these corporations had filed their answers, the Commission held a formal hearing thereon
on May 24, 1957. On May 28, 1957, the ACME filed a memorandum on the points adduced during the hearing, and on June 4,
1957, the Commission issued its resolution denying the third motion for reconsideration. The article signed by petitioner was
published in the June 2, 1957 issue of the Sunday Times, a newspaper of nation-wide circulation.

The question to be determined is whether the Commission on Elections has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt
proceedings against petitioner with a view to imposing upon him the necessary disciplinary penalty in connection with the
publication of an article in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 which, according to the charge, tended to interfere with and
influence said Commission in the adjudication of a controversy then pending determination and to degrade and undermine the
function of the Commission and its members in the administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections.

The Commission on Elections is an independent administrative body which was established by our Constitution to take charge
of the enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and devise means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of free, orderly, and honest elections (Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil., 288; Nacionalista
Party vs. The Solicitor General, 85 Phil., 101; 47 Off. Gaz. 2356). Its powers are defined in the Constitution. It provides that it
"shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall
exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all
administrative questions, affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the
appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials" (Section 2, Article X). The Revised Election Code supplements
what other powers may be exercised by said Commission. Among these powers are those embodied in Section 5 thereof which,
for ready reference, we quote:

SEC. 5. Powers of Commission. — The Commission on Elections or any of the members thereof shall have the power
to summon the parties to a controversy pending before it, issue subpoenas  and subpoenas duces tecum and otherwise
take testimony in any investigation or hearing pending before it, and delegate such power to any officer. Any
controversy submitted to the Commission on Elections shall be tried, heard and decided by it within fifteen days counted
from the time the corresponding petition giving rise to said controversy is filed. The Commission or any of the members
thereof shall have the power to punish contempts provided for in rule sixty-four of the Rules of Court, under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.

Any violation of any final and executory decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall constitute contempt of the
Commission.

Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ
of certiorari accordance with the Rules of Court or with such rules as may be promulgated by the Supreme Court.

It would therefore appear that the Commission on Elections not only has the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to
the conduct of elections but the power to try, hear and decide any controversy  that may be submitted to it in connection with the
elections. And as an incident of this power, it may also punish for contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. In this sense, the Commission, although it
cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 13, Article VIII), for it is merely an
independent administrative body (The Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 85 Phil., 126; 47 Off. Gaz. 2375), may however exercise
quasi-judicial functions in so far as controversies that by express provision of the law come under its jurisdiction. As to what
question may come within this category, neither the Constitution nor the Revised Election Code specifies. The former merely
provides that it shall come under its jurisdiction, saving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including
the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and other election
officials, while the latter is silent as to what questions may be brought it for determination. But it is clear that, to come under its
jurisdiction, the questions should be controversial in nature and must refer to the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of election. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between a duty which inherently is
administrative in character and a function which is justiciable and which would therefore call for judicial action by the
Commission. But this much depends upon the factors that may intervene when a controversy should arise.

Thus, it has been held that the Commission has no power to annul an election which might not have been free, orderly and
honest for such matter devolves upon other agencies of the Government (Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on Elections, 85
Phil., 148; 47 Off. Gaz. 2851); neither does it have the power to decide the validity or invalidity of votes cast in an election for
such devolves upon the courts or the electoral tribunals (Ibid.); it does not also have the power to order a recounting of the votes
before the proclamation of election even if there are discrepancies in the election returns for it is a function of our courts of
justice (Ramos vs. Commission on Elections, 80 Phil., 722); nor does it have the power to order the correction of a certificate of
canvass after a candidate had been proclaimed and assumed office (De Leon vs. Imperial, 94 Phil., 680); and only very recently
this Court has held that the Commission has no power to reject a certificate of candidacy except only when its purpose is to
create confusion in the minds of the electors (Abcede vs. Imperial, 103 Phil., 136).

On the other hand, it has been held that the Commission has the power to annul an illegal registry list of voters (Feliciano, et al.
vs. Lugay, et al., 93 Phil., 744; 49 Off. Gaz. 3863); to annul an election canvass made by a municipal board of canvassers
(Mintu vs. Enage, et al., G. R. No. L-1834); and to investigate and act on the illegality of a canvass of election made by a
municipal board of canvassers (Ramos vs. Commission on Elections, 80 Phil., 722). And as to what are the ministerial duties
which the Commission on Elections must perform in connection with the conduct of elections, the following resume made by the
Commission itself in a controversy which was submitted to it for determination is very enlightening:

In the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the first duty of the Commission is
to set in motion all the multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of election supplies, printing of
election forms and ballots, appointments of members of the boards of inspectors, establishment of precincts and
designation of polling places to the preparation of the registry lists of voters, so as to put in readiness on election day
the election machinery in order that the people who are legally qualified to exercise the right of suffrage may be able to
cast their votes to express their sovereign will. It is incumbent upon the Commission to see that all these preparatory
acts will insure free, orderly and honest elections. All provisions of the Revised Election Code contain regulations
relative to these processes preparatory for election day. It is incumbent upon the Commission on Elections to see that
all these preparatory acts are carried out freely, honestly and in an orderly manner. It is essential that the Commission
or its authorized representatives, in establishing precincts or designating polling places, must act freely, honestly and in
an orderly manner. It is also essential that the printing of election forms and the purchase of election supplies and their
distribution are done freely, honestly and in an orderly manner. It is further essential that the political parties or their duly
authorized representatives who are entitled to be represented in the boards of inspectors must have the freedom to
choose the person who will represent them in each precinct throughout the country. It is further essential that once
organized, the boards of inspectors shall be given all the opportunity to be able to perform their duties in accordance
with law freely, honestly and in an orderly manner, individually and as a whole. In other words, it is the duty of the
Commission to see that the boards of inspectors, in all their sessions, are placed in an atmosphere whereby they can
fulfill their duties without any pressure, influence and interference from any private person or public official. All these
preparatory steps are administrative in nature and all questions arising therefrom are within the exclusive powers of the
Commission to resolve. All irregularities, anomalies and misconduct committed by any official in these preparatory steps
are within the exclusive power of the Commission to correct. Any erring official must respond to the Commission for
investigation. Of these preparatory acts, the preparation of the permanent list of voters is the matter involved in this
case, which to our mind is completely an administrative matter. (Decision of the Commission on Elections, October 28,
1951, In Re Petition of Angel Genuino vs. Prudente, et al., Case No. 196)1

Considering that the paramount administrative duty of the Commission is to set in motion all the multifarious preparatory
processes ranging from the purchase of election supplies, printing of election forms and ballots, appoinments of members of the
board of inspectors, appointment of precincts and designation of polling preparation of registry lists of voters, so as to as to put
in readiness on election day the election machinery, it may also be reasonably said that the requisitioning and preparation of the
necessary ballot boxes to be used in the elections is by the same token an imperative ministerial duty which the Commission is
bound to perform if the elections are to be held. Such is the incident which gave rise to the contempt case before us. It stems
from the ministerial act of the Commission in requisitioning for the necessary ballot boxes in connection with the last elections
and in so proceeding it provoked a dispute between several dealers who offered to do the job.

Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several dealers, that however
merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of
elections ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any
judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such
power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its
existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and
mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice" (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U.
S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 Off. Gaz. 2570; In Re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944). The exercise of this power has always
been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by
administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony (People vs. Swena, 296 P.,
271). And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid
(Langenberg vs. Decker, 31 N.E. 190; In Re Sims 37 P., 135; Roberts vs. Hacney, 58 S.W., 810). We are therefore persuaded
to conclude that the Commission on Elections has no power nor authority to submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if its
purpose is to discipline him because of the publication of the article mentioned in the charge under consideration.

Wherefore, petition is granted. Respondent Commission is hereby enjoined from proceeding with the case set forth in its
resolution of June 20, 1957, with pronouncement as to costs.

The preliminary injunction issued by this Court is made permanent.

G.R. No. 116801 April 6, 1995

GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ, HONORABLE ARTURO C. MOJICA, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR
THE VISAYAS, and HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, and UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE
RAMON J. LIWAG, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This case requires us to determine the extent to which the Ombudsman may call upon government prosecutors for assistance in
the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his office and the conditions under which he may do so.

Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she and the Provincial Prosecutor
refused, or at any rate failed, to file a criminal charge as ordered by the Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime was filed against her and
the Provincial Prosecutor and a charge for indirect contempt was brought against them, both in the Office of the Ombudsman. In
the meantime the two were placed under preventive suspension. This is a petition for certiorari  and prohibition filed by petitioner
to set aside the orders of the Ombudsman with respect to the two proceedings.

The background of this case is as follows:

On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a criminal complaint for frustrated
rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of
Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. 1 The cases were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas where they were docketed as
OMB-VIS-(CRIM)-93-0140 and OMB-VIS-(ADM)-93-0036, respectively.

The complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who, after an investigation, found no prima facie evidence and
accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint. After reviewing the matter, however, the Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado
Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the
Regional Trial Court.2

Accordingly, in a letter dated May 17, 1994, the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, respondent Arturo C. Mojica, referred the case
to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar for the "filing of appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of
Danao City, . . ." 3 The case was eventually assigned to herein petitioner, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G.
Lastimosa.

It appears that petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of which she found that only acts of lasciviousness
had been committed.4 With the approval of Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar, she filed on July 4, 1994 an information for acts of
lasciviousness against Mayor Ilustrisimo with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Santa Fe. 5

In two letters written to the Provincial Prosecutor on July 11, 1994 and July 22, 1994, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica inquired as to
any action taken on the previous referral of the case, more specifically the directive of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor
Ilustrisimo with attempted rape.6

As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered on July 27, 1994
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for
"refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman. 7

For this purpose a hearing was set on August 1, 1994. Petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were given until August 3, 1994
within which to submit their answer. 8 An answer 9 was timely filed by them and hearings were thereupon conducted.

It appears that earlier, on July 22, 1994, two cases had been filed against the two prosecutors with the Office of the Ombudsman
for Visayas by Julian Menchavez, a resident of Santa Fe, Cebu. One was an administrative complaint for violation of Republic
Act No. 6713 and P.D. No. 807 (the Civil Service Law) 10 and another one was a criminal complaint for violation of §3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 and Art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code. 11 The complaints were based on the alleged refusal of
petitioner and Kintanar to obey the orders of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape.
In the administrative case (OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189) respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Mojica issued an order on
August 15, 1994, placing petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa and Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar under preventive
suspension for a period of six (6) months, 12 pursuant to Rule III, §9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Administrative Order No. 7), in relation to §24 of R.A. No. 6770. The order was approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez
on August 16, 1994 and on August 18, 1994 Acting Secretary of Justice Ramon J. Liwag designated Eduardo Concepcion of
Region VII as Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.

On the other hand, the Graft Investigation Officer II, Edgardo G. Canton, issued orders 13 in the two cases, directing petitioner
and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar to submit their counter affidavits and controverting evidence.

On September 6, 1994, petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the
following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman and Department of Justice:

(a) Letter dated May 17, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and related orders, referring
to the Office of the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor the records of OMB-VIS-CRIM-93-0140, entitled Jessica V.
Dayon vs. Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, "for filing of the appropriate action (for Attempted Rape) with the Regional
Trial Court of Danao City.

(b) Order dated July 27, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and related orders directing petitioner and Cebu
Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar to explain in writing within three (3) days from receipt why they should
not be punished for indirect Contempt of the Office of the Ombudsman "for refusing and failing . . . to file the
appropriate Information for Attempted Rape against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo.

(c) The 1st Indorsement  dated August 9, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Ramon J. Liwag, ordering the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor to comply with the directive of the Office of the Ombudsman that a charge for
attempted rape be filed against respondent Mayor Ilustrisimo in recognition of the authority of said Office.

(d) Order dated August 15, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica, duly approved by Ombudsman Conrado
Vasquez, and related orders in OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189, entitled Julian Menchavez vs. Oliveros Kintanar and
Gloria Lastimosa, placing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period
of six (6) months, without pay.

(e) The 1st Indorsement dated August 18, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Liwag directing Assistant Regional
State Prosecutor Eduardo O. Concepcion (Region VII) to implement the letter dated August 15, 1994 of
Ombudsman Vasquez, together with the Order dated August 15, 1994, placing petitioner and Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension.

(f) Department Order No. 259 issued by Acting Secretary Liwag on August 18, 1994, designating Assistant
Regional State Prosecutor Concepcion Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.

Petitioner raises a number of issues which will be discussed not necessarily in the order they are stated in the petition.

I.

The pivotal question in this case is whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to
assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo. Lastimosa claims that the Office of the
Ombudsman and the prosecutor's office have concurrent authority to investigate public officers or employees and that when the
former first took cognizance of the case against Mayor Ilustrisimo, it did so to the exclusion of the latter. It then became the duty
of the Ombudsman's office, according to petitioner, to finish the preliminary investigation by filing the information in court instead
of asking the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to do so. Petitioner contends that the preparation and filing of the information
were part and parcel of the preliminary investigation assumed by the Office of the Ombudsman and the filing of information in
court could not be delegated by it to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner defends her actuations in conducting a
preliminary investigation as having been made necessary by the insistence of the Ombudsman to delegate the filing of the case
to her office.

In any event, petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because the
crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office. For this reason it is argued that the Office of the
Ombudsman has no authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to follow
his orders and to cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 14 This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of
any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected
with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty 15 It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official.
Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute.

In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. §31 of the Ombudsman Act of
1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides:

Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or
designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special
investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or
deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control. (Emphasis added)

It was on the basis of this provision that Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez and Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica ordered the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu to file an information for attempted rape against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrismo.

It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary investigation and all that
remained to be done was for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court. Even if the
preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the
offense to be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because under §31 of the
Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which
means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's)
decision. 16 Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the
Ombudsman.

II.

The records show that despite repeated orders of the Ombudsman, petitioner refused to file an information for attempted rape
against Mayor Ilustrisimo, insisting that after investigating the complaint in the case she found that he had committed only acts of
lasciviousness.

§15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in accordance with the
Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein." There is no merit in the argument
that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an
administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner herself says in another
context, the preliminary investigation of a case, of which the filing of an information is a part, is quasi judicial in character.

Whether petitioner's refusal to follow the Ombudsman's orders constitutes a defiance, disobedience or resistance of a lawful
process, order or command of the Ombudsman thus making her liable for indirect contempt under Rule 71, §3 of the Rules of
Court is for respondents to determine after appropriate hearing. At this point it is important only to note the existence of the
contempt power of the Ombudsman as a means of enforcing his lawful orders.

III.

Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioner should it be found that she is guilty of grave
misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime under
preventive suspension. The pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 state:

§21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment
or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

§22. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may suspend any officer or employee under
his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued
stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
 The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not
more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the
Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay
shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

A.

Petitioner contends that her suspension is invalid because the order was issued without giving her and Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar the opportunity to refute the charges against them and because, at any rate, the evidence against them is not strong as
required by §24. The contention is without merit. Prior notice and hearing is a not required, such suspension not being a penalty
but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. As held in Nera v. Garcia: 17

In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint,
suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct
in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing
improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the opportunity to prove his innocence.
(Emphasis added).

It is true that, under §24 of the Ombudsman's Act, to justify the preventive suspension of a public official, the evidence against
him should be strong, and any of the following circumstances is present:

(a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect
in the performance of duty;

(b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or

(c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, 18 however, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the
Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him. A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving capital
offenses is not required. In rejecting a similar argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court said in that case:

The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide when the
evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such
determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint. . . . 19

In this case, respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica justified the preventive suspension of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar on the following grounds:

A careful assessment of the facts and circumstances of the herein cases and the records pertaining thereto
against respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] clearly leads to the conclusion that
the evidence on record of guilt is strong and the charges involved offenses of grave misconduct, gross neglect
of duty and dishonesty which will warrant respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner]
removal from the service. Moreover, considering the unabashed attitude of respondents in openly announcing
various false pretexts and alibis to justify their stubborn disregard for the lawful directives of the Ombudsman
as their official position in their pleadings filed in OMB-VIS-0-94-0478 and in print and broadcast media, the
probability is strong that public service more particularly in the prosecution of cases referred by the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's office will be disrupted and prejudiced and the records of said
cases even be tampered with if respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] are allowed
to stay in the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's Office during the pendency of these proceedings.

Indeed respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica had personal knowledge of the facts justifying the preventive suspension of
petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor since the acts alleged in the administrative complaint against them were done in the
course of their official transaction with the Office of the Ombudsman. The administrative complaint against petitioner and
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar was filed in connection with their designation as deputies of the ombudsman in the prosecution of
a criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Respondent Deputy Ombudsman did not have to go far to verify the matters
alleged in determine whether the evidence of guilt of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor was strong for the purpose of placing
them under preventive suspension.
Given the attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor toward the criminal case against Mayor Rogelio
Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is justified to the end that the proper prosecution of that case may not be hampered. 20 In
addition, because the charges against the two prosecutors involve grave misconduct, insubordination and neglect of duty and
these charges, if proven, can lead to a dismissal from public office, the Ombudsman was justified in ordering their preventive
suspension.

B.

Petitioner questions her preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay and contends that it should only be for ninety (90)
days on the basis of cases decided by this Court. Petitioner is in error. She is referring to cases where the law is either silent or
expressly limits the period of suspension to ninety (90) days. With respect to the first situation, we ruled in the case of Gonzaga
v. Sandiganbayan 21 that —

To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite suspension imposed either under Section 13 of Rep. Act
3019, or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807, it is best for the guidance of all concerned that this Court set forth the
rules on the period of preventive suspension under the aforementioned laws, as follows:

1. Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be limited to a maximum period of
ninety (90) days, from issuances thereof, and this applies to all public officers, (as defined in Section 2(b) of
Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged under said Act.

2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply to all officers or employees whose
positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as provided under Sections 3 and 4 of said Pres. Decree 807, and
shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days from issuance, except where there is delay in the
disposition of the case, which is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the
period of delay shall both be counted in computing the period of suspension herein stated; provided that if the
person suspended is a presidential appointee, the continuance of his suspension shall be for a reasonable time
as the circumstances of the case may warrant.

On the other hand, petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were placed under preventive suspension pursuant to §24 of the
Ombudsman Act which expressly provides that "the preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the
Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay." Their preventive suspension for six (6) months without
pay is thus according to law.

C.

Nor is there merit in petitioner's claim that the contempt charge should first be resolved before any action in the administrative
complaint case can be taken because the contempt case involves a prejudicial question. There is simply no basis for this
contention. The two cases arose out of the same act or omission and may proceed hand in hand, or one can be heard before
the other. Whatever order is followed will not really matter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186502December 13, 2017

CARLOS R. SAUNAR, Petitioner
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA AND CONSTANCIA P. DE GUZMAN, CHAIRPERSON OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION, Respondents

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the 20 October 2008 Decision1 and the 17 February 2009
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100157 which affirmed the 19 January 2007 decision3 of the Office
of the President (OP) dismissing petitioner Carlos R. Saunar (Saunar) from government service.

THE FACTS

Saunar was a former Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which he joined as an agent in 1988.
Through the years, he rose from the ranks and eventually became the Chief of the Anti-Graft Division. During his time as chief of
the said division, Saunar conducted an official investigation regarding the alleged corruption relative to the tobacco excise taxes
and involving then Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, former President Joseph E. Estrada (President Estrada), and former Senator
Jinggoy Estrada. President Estrada's assailed involvement in the tobacco excise tax issue became one of the predicate crimes
included in his indictment for plunder.4

In Special Order No. 40035 dated 27 August 2004, Saunar was reassigned as regional director for Western Mindanao based in
Zamboanga City. During his stint as such, he received a subpoena ad testificandum from the Sandiganbayan requiring him to
testify in the plunder case against President Estrada. After securing approval from his immediate supervisor Filomeno
Bautista (Bautista), Deputy Director for Regional Operation Services (DDROS), Saunar appeared before the Sandiganbayan on
several hearing dates, the last being on 27 October 2004.6

On 29 October 2004, then NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco (Wycoco) issued Special Order No. 0050337 informing Saunar that he
was relieved from his duties as regional director for Western Mindanao and was ordered to report to the DDROS for further
instructions. Pursuant thereto, he reported to Bautista on the first week of November 2004. Bautista informed Saunar that an
investigation was being conducted over his testimony before the Sandiganbayan and that he should just wait for the
developments in the investigation. In the meantime, Bautista did not assign him any duty and told him to be available at any time
whenever he would be needed. He made himself accessible by staying in establishments near the NBI. In addition, he also
attended court hearings whenever required.8

On 6 October 2006, Saunar received an order from the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) requiring him to answer the
allegations against him in the PAGC Formal Charge dated 3 October 2006. The charge was based on a letter, dated 19 August
2005, from Wycoco recommending an immediate appropriate action against Saunar for his failure to report for work since 24
March 2005, without approved leave of absence for four (4) months.9

On 23 October 2006, Saunar was reassigned as regional director of the Bicol Regional Office. On 29 January 2007, he received
a copy of the OP decision dismissing him from service.

The OP Decision

In its 19 January 2007 decision, the OP found Saunar guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of violating Section 3(e) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019, and dismissed him from service. It pointed out that Saunar failed to report for work for more than a year
which he himself admitted when he explained that he did not report for work because he had not been assigned any specific
duty or responsibility. The OP highlighted that he was clearly instructed to report to the DDROS but he did not do so. It added
that it would have been more prudent for Saunar to have reported for work even if no duty was specifically assigned to him, for
the precise reason that he may at any time be tasked with responsibilities. The OP, however, absolved Saunar from allegedly
keeping government property during the time he did not report for work, noting that he was able to account for all the items
attributed to him. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and as recommended by PAGC, Atty. Carlos R. Saunar, Regional Director, NBI, for Gross
Neglect of Duty under Section 22(b), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292 in relation to Section 4(A)
of RA 6713 and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, is hereby DISMISSED from government service with cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification for re-employment in the government service.10
Saunar moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the OP in its 12 June 2007 resolution.11 Undeterred, he appealed before
the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed 20 October 2008 decision, the CA affirmed in toto the OP decision. The appellate court ruled that Saunar was not
deprived of due process because he was informed of the charges against him and was given the opportunity to defend himself.
It expounded that the absence of formal hearings in administrative proceedings is not anathema to due process.

On the other hand, the CA agreed that Saunar was guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty as manifested by his being on Absence
Without Leave (AWOL) for a long period of time. The appellate court disregarded Saunar's explanation that he stayed in
establishments nearby and that he had attended court hearings from time to time. In addition, the CA found that Saunar violated
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 because public interest was prejudiced when he continued to receive his salary in spite of his
unjustified absences. Thus, it ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition for review filed in this case is hereby DENIED and,
consequently, DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the assailed Decision of the Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita dated
January 19, 2007 is hereby AFFIRMEDintoto.12

Saunar moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its assailed 17 February 2009 resolution.

Hence, this appeal raising the following:

ISSUES

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED DUE
PROCESS AND THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE AS
GUARANTEED IN THE CONSTITUTION; AND

II

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAELS GRAVELY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
UPHOLDING THE FINDINGS OF RESPONDENTS THAT PETITIONER COMMITTED GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY, HAD
ABANDONED HIS POST AND WENT ON AWOL FOR HIS ALLEGED FAILURE TO REPORT FOR WORK FROM MARCH
24, 2005 TO MAY 2006.13

THE COURT’S RULING

The petition is meritorious.

Administrative due process revisited

Saunar bewails that he was deprived of due process, pointing out that no real hearing was ever conducted considering that the
clarificatory conference conducted by the P AGC was a sham. In addition, he asserts that he was not notified of the charges
against him because he was only made aware of the allegations after the P AGC had formally charged him. Further, Saunar
highlights the delay between the time PAGC received Wycoco’s letter-complaint and when he received the formal charge from
the P AGC.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution is similar with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution in that it
guarantees that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. While the words used in our
Constitution slightly differ from the American Constitution, the guarantee of due process is used in the same sense and has the
same force and effect.14 Thus, while decisions on due process of American courts are not controlling in our jurisdiction, they may
serve as guideposts in the analysis of due process as applied in our legal system.

In American jurisprudence, the due process requirement entails the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.15 Likewise, it was characterized with fluidity in that it negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation.16
In Goldberg v. kelly(Goldberg), 17 the United States (US.) Supreme Court ruled that due process requires the opportunity for
welfare r,ecipients to confront the witnesses against them at a pre-termination hearing before welfare benefits are terminated, to
wit:

The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard. It is not enough
that a welfare recipient may present his position to the decision maker in writing or second hand through his caseworker.x x x
Moreover, written submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral presentations; they do not permit the recipient to mold his
argument to the issues the decision maker appears to regard as important. Particularly where credibility and veracity are at
issue, as they must be in many termination proceedings, written submissions are wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision.

In Goldberg, the U.S. Supreme Court went on to highlight the importance of confronting the witnesses presented against the
claimant, viz:

In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses. x x x What we said in Greene v McElroy, 360 US 474, 496-497, 3 Led 2d 1377, 1390, 1391,
79 S Ct 1400 (1959), is particularly pertinent here:

Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action
seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings the evidence used to prove the
Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is
important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of
individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness,
intolerance, prejudice or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-
examination. They have ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment . . . This Court has be zealous to protect
these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, but also in all types of cases where administrative actions
were under scrutiny.

Welfare recipients must therefore be given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses relied on by the
department.18

In subsequent decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that a lack of formal hearing in the administrative level does not
violate procedural due process. In Arnett v. Kennedy (Arnett), 19 a case involving the dismissal of a non-probationary federal
employee, the US Supreme Court ruled that a trial-type hearing before an impartial hearing officer was not necessary before the
employee could be removed from office because the hearing afforded by administrative appeal procedures after the actual
dismissal is a sufficient requirement of the Due Process Clause.

In Mathews v. Eldridge (Mathews), 20 the U.S. Supreme Court explained that an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of
disability benefits is not indispensable, to wit:

Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary deprivation. It was
emphasized there that welfare assistance is given to persons on the very margin of subsistence:

The crucial factor in this context x x x is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an
eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.

Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based upon financial need. x x x

xxxx

All that is necessary is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to the "capacities and circumstances
of those who are to be heard to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present their case. In assessing what
process is due in this case, substantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress
with the administration of social welfare programs that the procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of the
entitlement claims of individuals. This is especially so where, as here, the prescribed procedures not only provide the claimant
with an effective process for asserting his claim prior to any administrative action, but also assure a right to an evidentiary
hearing, as well as to subsequent judicial review, before the denial of his claim becomes final.21

It is true that in both Arnett and Mathews, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that due process. was not violated due to the lack of a
formal hearing before the employee "was dismissed and welfare benefits were cancelled in the respective cases: Nevertheless,
in bo.th cases it was recognized that the aggrieved party had the opportunity for a hearing to settle factual or evidentiary
disputes in subsequent procedures. In our legal system, however, the opportunity for a hearing after the administrative level may
not arise as the reception of evidence or the conduct of hearings are discretionary on the part of the appellate courts.
In our jurisdiction, the constitutional guarantee of due process is also not limited to an exact definition. 22 It is flexible in that it
depends on the circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation.23

In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations, 24 the Court eruditely expounded on the concept of due
process in administrative proceedings, to wit:

The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct.
773, 999, 82 Law. ed 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair
play."

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468,
56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the
person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity,
a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that
the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a
limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G. R. No. 45844,
promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXV10. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia & Maryland
Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law ed 965.) "Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations
Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, ·2 Cir.,
98 F. 2d 758, 760.) ... The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of
technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings
would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563,
568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 33 S. Ct. 185, 187,
57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288, 44 S. Ct. 565, 569, 68 Law. ed. lola; Tagg
Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 442, 50 S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable
flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative
force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only
by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know
and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced,
and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material
and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts
in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of
Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local
board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of
Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers
(Section 10, ibid.)

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the
volume of work is such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the Court of Industrial Relations personally to decide
all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority
,authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, but in our
case there is no such statutory authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty
is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.25 (emphases supplied)

From the pronouncements of the Court in Ang Tibay, the fluid concept of administrative due process continued to progress. In In
Re: De Borja and Flores,26 the Court ruled that there was no denial of due process when the Public Service Commission
cancelled the certificate of Jose de Borja to operate an ice plant without prior notice or hearing because a hearing was
conducted after the applicant filed a motion for reconsideration. In Manila Trading Supply Co. v. Philippine Labor Union, 27 the
Court ruled that due process was observed even if the report of the investigating officer was not set for hearing before the Court
of Industrial Relations because during the investigation stage, the parties were given the opportunity to cross-examine and
present their side to the case. It is noteworthy that in both cases due process was observed because the parties were given the
chance for a hearing where they could confront the witnesses against them.

In Gas Corporation of the Phils. v. Minister Inciong, 28 the Court explained that there is no denial of due process when a party is
afforded the right to cross-examine the witnesses but fails to exercise the same, to wit:

1. The vigor with which counsel for petitioner pressed the claim that there was a denial of procedural due process is inversely
proportional to the merit of this certiorari and prohibition suit as is quite evident from the Comment of the office of the Solicitor
General. It is undoubted that the due process mandate must be satisfied by an administrative tribunal or agency. So it
was announced by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. That is still good
law. It follows, therefore, that if procedural due process were in fact denied, then this petition must prosper. It is equally well-
settled, however, that the standard of due process that must be met in proceedings before administrative tribunals
allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored.  So the following recent cases have uniformly
held: Maglasang v. Opie, Nation Multi Service Labor Union v. Agcaoili, Jacqueline Industries v. National Labor Relations
Commission, Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations, Philippine Labor Alliance Council v.
Bureau of Labor Relations, and Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation. From the Comment of the office of the Solicitor
General, it is quite clear that no imputation of arbitrariness can be justified. The opportunity to present its side of the case was
given both parties to the controversy. If, for reasons best known to itself, petitioner did not avail of its right to do so, then it has
only itself to blame. No constitutional infirmity could then be imputed to the proceeding before the labor arbiter. 29 (emphasis
supplied)

Again, there was no denial of due process in the above-mentioned case because the parties were ultimately given the chance to
confront the witnesses against them. It just so happened that therein petitioner failed to promptly avail of the same.

In Arboleda v. National Labor Relations Commission (Arbqleda), 30 the Court expounded that administrative due process does
not necessarily connote full adversarial proceedings, to wit:

The requirement of notice and hearing in termination cases does not connote full adversarial proceedings as
elucidated in numerous cases decided by this Court. Actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for
clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. This is
a procedural right which the employee must ask for since it is not an inherent right, and summary proceedings may be
conducted thereon.31 (emphasis supplied)

Thus, while the Court in Arboleda recognized that the lack of a formal hearing does not necessarily transgress the due process
guarantee, it did not however regard the formal hearing as a mere superfluity. It continued that it is a procedural right that may
be invoked by the party. It is true that in subsequent cases,32 the Court reiterated that a formal hearing is not obligatory in
administrative proceedings because the due process requirement is satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity to explain
their respective sides through position papers or pleadings. Nonetheless, the idea that a formal hearing is not indispensable
should not be hastily thrown around by administrative bodies.

A closer perusal of past jurisprudence shows that the Court did not intend to trivialize the conduct of a formal hearing but merely
afforded latitude to administrative bodies especially in cases where a party fails to invoke the right to hearing or is given the
opportunity but opts not to avail of it. In the landmark case of Ang Tibay, the Court explained that administrative bodies are free
from a strict application of technical rules of procedure and are given sufficient leeway. In the said case, however, nothing was
said that the freedom included the setting aside of a hearing but merely to allow matters which would ordinarily be incompetent
or inadmissible in the usual judicial proceedings.

In fact, the seminal words of Ang Tibay manifest a desire for administrative bodies to exhaust all possible means to ensure that
the decision rendered be based on the accurate appreciation of facts. The Court reminded that administrative bodies have the
active duty to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant
to the controversy. As such, it would be more in keeping with administrative due process that the conduct of a hearing be the
general rule rather than the exception.

The observance of a formal hearing in ·administrative tribunal or bodies other than judicial is not novel. In Perez v. Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Company, 33 the Court opined that in illegal dismissal cases, a formal hearing or conference becomes
mandatory when requested by the employee in writing, or substantial evidentiary disputes exists, or a company rule or practice
requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it.

In Jason v. Executive Secretary Torres (Joson), 34 the Court ruled that the respondent was denied due process after he was
deprived of the right to a formal investigation with the opportunity to face the witnesses against him, to wit:

The rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due process. Section 5 of A.O. No. 23 provides
that at the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal
investigation. This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal
investigation would be conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. As respondent, he
is accorded several rights under the law, to wit:

xxxx

Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on the basis
of position papers. There is nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O.
No. 23 that provide that administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O.
No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda but this is only after
formal investigation and hearing. A.O. No. 23 does not authorize the Investigating Authority to dispense with a hearing
especially in cases involving allegations of fact which are not only in contrast but contradictory to each other.  These
contradictions are best settled by allowing the examination and cross-examination of witnesses. Position papers are often-times
prepared with the assistance of lawyers and their artful preparation can make the discovery of truth difficult. The jurisprudence
cited by the DILG in its order denying petitioner's motion for a formal investigation applies to appointive officials and employees.
Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective government officials are not exactly similar to those against appointive
officials. In fact, the provisions that apply to elective local officials are separate and distinct from appointive government officers
and employees. This can be gleaned from the Local Government Code itself.35 (emphases and underlining supplied)

xxxx

Under the P AGC rules of procedure, it is crystal clear that the conduct of clarificatory hearings is discretionary. Nevertheless, in
the event that it finds the necessity to conduct one, there are rules to be followed. One, the parties are to be notified of the
clarificatory hearings. Two, the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present in the hearings without the right to
examine witnesses. They, however, may ask questions and elicit answers from the opposing party coursed through the P AGC.

To reiterate, due process is a malleable concept anchored on fairness and equity. The due process requirement before
administrative bodies are not as strict compared to judicial tribunals in that it suffices that a party is given a reasonable
opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, such "reasonable opportunity" should not be confined to the mere submission of position
papers and/or affidavits and the parties must be given the opportunity to examine the witnesses against them. The right to a
hearing is a right which may be invoked by the parties to thresh out substantial factual issues. It becomes even more imperative
when the rules itself of the administrative body provides for one. While the absence of a formal hearing does not necessarily
result in the deprivation of due process, it should be acceptable only when the party does not invoke the said right or waives the
same.

The Court finds that Saunar was not treated fairly in the proceedings before the P AGC. He was deprived of the opportunity to
appear in all clarificatory hearings since he was not notified of the clarificatory hearing attended by an NBI official. Saunar was
thus denied the chance to propound questions through the P AGC against the opposing parties, when the rules of the P AGC
itself granted Saunar the right to be present during clarificatory hearings and the chance to ask questions against the opposing
party.

Even assuming that Saunar was not deprived of due process, we still find merit in reversing his dismissal from the government
service.

Gross neglect of duty negated by intent of the government employee concerned

It is true that the dropping from the rolls as a result of AWOL is not disciplinary in nature and does not result in the forfeiture of
benefits or disqualification from re-employment in the government. 36 Nevertheless, being on AWOL may constitute other
administrative offenses, which may result in the dismissal of the erring employees and a forfeiture of retirement benefits.37 In the
case at bar, Saunar was charged with the administrative offense of gross neglect of duty in view of his prolonged absence from
work.

The OP found Saunar guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 because he was on AWOL
from March 2005 to May 2006. He, however, bewails that from the time we was directed to report to the DDROS, he was never
assigned a particular duty or responsibility. As such, Saunar argues that he cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty because
there was no "duty" to speak of. In addition, he assails that he had made himself readily available because he stayed in
establishments near the NBI.

Gross Neglect of Duty, as an administrative offense, has been jurisprudentially defined. It refers to negligence characterized by
the glaring want of care; by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently, but willfully and
intentionally; or by acting with a conscious indifference to consequences with respect to other persons who may be affected.38

When Saunar was relieved as regional director of Western Mindanao and was ordered to report to the DDROS, he was
obligated to report to the said office. He, however, was not assigned any specific task or duty and was merely advised to make
himself readily available. Saunar often stayed in establishments near the NBI because he was also not provided a specific
station or office. The same, nonetheless, does not establish that he willfully and intentionally neglected his duties especially
since every time he was required to attend court hearings through special orders issued by the NBI, he would do so. Clearly,
Saunar never manifested any intention to neglect or abandon his duties as an NBI official as he remained compliant with the
lawful orders given to him. In addition, when he received the order reassigning him as the regional director for the NBI Bicol
Office, he also obeyed the same. Saunar’s continued compliance with the special orders given to him by his superiors to attend
court hearings negate the charge of gross neglect of duty as it evinces a desire to fulfil the duties and responsibilities specifically
assigned to him.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), however, argues that Saunar’s attendance at several court hearings pursuant to
special orders does not exculpate him from the charge of gross neglect of duty. As highlighted by the OSG, the certificate of
appearances Saunar presented account only for fourteen (14) days.39

Notwithstanding, Saunar’s conduct neither constitutes a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. In order to be liable for
violating the said provision, the following elements must concur: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. 40 As discussed above, Saunar’s action was not
tantamount to inexcusable or gross negligence considering that there was no intention to abandon his duty as an NBI officer.

Illegally dismissed government employees entitled to full back wages and retirement benefits

On 11 August 2014, Saunar reached the compulsory age of retirement from government service.41 In view of Saunar’s
retirement, reinstatement to

his previous position had become impossible. Thus, the only recourse left is to grant monetary benefits to which illegally
dismissed government employees are entitled.

In Campol v. Balao-as, 42 the Court extensively expounded the rationale behind the grant of full back wages to illegally dismissed
employees, to wit:

An employee of the civil service who is invalidly dismissed is entitled to the payment of backwages.  While this right is
not disputed, there have been variations in our jurisprudence as to the proper fixing of the amount of backwages that should be
awarded in these cases. We take this opportunity to clarify the doctrine on this matter.

Ginson and Regis also involved the question of the proper fixing of backwages. Both cases awarded backwages but limited it to
a period of five years. Ginson does not provide for an exhaustive explanation for this five-year cap. Regis, on the other hand,
cites Cristobal v. Melchor, Balquidra v. CFI of Capiz, Branch II, 32 Laganapan v. Asedillo, Antiporda v. Ticao, and San Luis v.
Court of Appeals, in support of its ruling. We note that these cases also do not clearly explain why there must be a cap for the
award of backwages, with the exception of Cristobal. In Cristobal, a 1977 case, we held that the award of backwages should be
for a fixed period of five years, applying by analogy the then prevailing doctrine in labor law involving employees who suffered
unfair labor practice. We highlight that this rule has been rendered obsolete by virtue of Republic Act No. 6175 which amended
the Labor Code. Under the Labor Code, employees illegally dismissed are entitled to the payment of backwages from the time
his or her compensation was withheld up to the time of his or her actual reinstatement.

In 2005, our jurisprudence on backwages for illegally dismissed employees of the civil service veered away from the ruling
in Cristobal.
Thus, in Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan, we categorically declared-

An illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to backwages and other monetary
benefits from the time of her illegal dismissal up to her reinstatement. This is only fair and just because an employee who is
reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is considered as not having left her office and should be given the corresponding
compensation at the time of her reinstatement.

We repeated this ruling in the 2005 case Batangas State University v. Bonifacio, in the 2007 case Ramagos v. Metro Cebu
Water District, and in the 2010 case Civil Service Commission v. Magnaye, Jr.

Thus, the Decision, in refusing to award backwages from Campol’s dismissal until his actual reinstatement, must be reversed.
There is no legal nor jurisprudential basis for this ruling. An employee of the civil service who is ordered reinstated is also
entitled to the full payment of his or her backwages during the entire period of time that he or she was wrongfully
prevented from performing the duties of his or her position and from enjoying its benefits. This is necessarily so
because, in the eyes of the law, the employee never truly left the office. Fixing the backwages to five years or to the period
of time until the employee found a new employment is not a full recompense for the damage done by the illegal
dismissal of an employee. Worse, it effectively punishes an employee for being dismissed without his or her fault. In cases
like this, the twin award of reinstatement and payment of full backwages are dictated by the constitutional mandate to protect
civil service employees' right to security of tenure. Anything less than this falls short of the justice due to government employees
unfairly removed from office. This is the prevailing doctrine and should be applied in Campol’s case.

This entitlement to full backwages also means that there is no need to deduct Campol’s earnings from his employment with PAO
from the award. The right to receive full backwages means exactly this - that it corresponds to Campol’s salary at the time of his
dismissal until his reinstatement. Any income he may have obtained during the litigation of the case shall not be deducted
from this amount. This is consistent with our ruling that an employee illegally dismissed has the right to live and to find
employment elsewhere during the pendency of the case. At the same time, an employer who illegally dismisses an
employee has the obligation to pay him or her what he or she should have received had the illegal act not be done.  It is
an employer's price or penalty for illegally dismissing an employee.

xxxx

We rule that employees in the civil service should be accorded this same right. It is only by imposing this rule that we will
be able to uphold the constitutional right to security of tenure with full force and effect. Through this, those who possess the
power to dismiss employees in the civil service will be reminded to be more circumspect in exercising their authority
as a breach of an employee's right to security of tenure will lead to the full application of law and jurisprudence to
ensure that the employee is reinstated and paid complete backwages. (emphasis supplied)

As it stands, Saunar should have been entitled to full back wages from the time he was illegally dismissed until his
reinstatement. In view of his retirement, however, reinstatement is no longer feasible. As such, the back wages should be
computed from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his compulsory retirement. 43 In addition, Saunar is entitled to receive the
retirement benefits he should have received if he were not illegally dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 20 October 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100157
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Carlos R. Saunar is entitled to full back wages from the time of his illegal dismissal
until his retirement and to receive his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.