Marine Pollution Bulletin 136 (2018) 84–91

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Marine Pollution Bulletin

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpolbul

Taiwan's legal framework for marine pollution control and responses to T

marine oil spills and its implementation on T.S. Taipei cargo shipwreck
salvage
⁎
Chihhao Fana, , Cheng-Jui Hsub, Jia-Yu Linb, Yung-Kai Kuanb, Chieh-Chung Yanga,
Jui-Hsiang Liuc, Jiunn-Horng Yehc
a
Department of Bioenvironmental Systems Engineering, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan
b
Geographic Information Technology Co., Ltd., Taipei 10694, Taiwan
c
Department of Water Quality Protection, Environmental Protection Administration, Taipei, Taiwan

A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Many shipwreck events occur in the neighboring areas of Taiwan due to the volume of maritime traffic and
Marine pollution geographical conditions around Taiwan. The oil spills from such events can be devastating for the surrounding
Oil spill sea and coastal areas. The government realized the importance of marine pollution prevention and enforced the
Oil spill response Marine Pollution Control Act and the Major Marine Oil Pollution Emergency Response Plan to mitigate the
T.S. Taipei
impact of oil spill pollution. The T.S. Taipei shipwreck highlighted the effectiveness of the national marine
Marine pollution control
pollution prevention system. Inter-departmental cooperation and collaboration with private sectors are the keys
for effective response. This article is the first detailed documentation of an oil spill response for a maritime
incident from the beginning to the final termination of shipwreck removal. It shows the people in Taiwan intend
to collaborate with other states to make a significant contribution to marine environment conservation and
sustainability.

1. Introduction
Taiwan is located at the junction of Eurasian Plate and Philippine
Sea Plate and is a vital maritime transportation hub for surface ship-
ment between Europe, America and eastern Asia. In recent years, the
maritime traffic in the areas around Taiwan has increased significantly
due to a massive volume of sea transportation caused by rapid eco-
nomic growth in southeastern Asia. High maritime traffic flow increases
the possibility for the occurrence of maritime incidents, and increases
the risk of marine pollution.
Taiwan is an island with a total of 1688 km of coastline that hosts an
abundance of marine ecosystems and diverse coastal topography. These
complex geographic and climatic characteristics expose maritime traffic
travelling close to the island to significant hazards such as coral reefs,
tropical weather and monsoon systems and weather fronts, resulting in
high risk of maritime pollution during shipwreck events.
Marine environmental pollution resulting from maritime transpor-
tation as well as other terrestrial sources has been reported frequently
(Vollaard, 2017; Singh et al., 2015; Larsen et al., 2007; Thia-Eng,
1999). In the study of marine debris by Kumar et al. (2016), plastic,
paper and wood debris was found to be the most common, followed by
food waste and metal, at Marina beach in India. The major contribution
to debris is the local recreational activity, suggesting that land-based
sources and human-driven activities provide the major inputs to plastic
pollution in the investigated area. To understand the oil spills influence
on the environment, Lee and Jung (2015) conducted a risk assessment
by calculating impact probability and the first impact time of an oil spill
incident. The pollution risk depends on the onset time of an accident
and the hydrodynamic conditions at sea. To improve the public per-
ception of marine conservation, a training course using integrated
coastal management approaches was proposed (Yu and Thia-Eng,
1998), and sharing experience and information was vital (Safford et al.,
2012). Other efforts to protect marine environmental resources include
the promotion of sustainable marine transportation (Walker, 2016), a
model-based management framework (Afenyo et al., 2017; Tiquio et al.,
2017; Ko and Chang, 2010) and the involvement of political parties in
the policy-making process (Tosun, 2011). It is also reported that
without proper implementation of management systems and control

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: chfan@ntu.edu.tw (C. Fan), cjh0102@gi-tech.com.tw (C.-J. Hsu), nora@gi-tech.com.tw (J.-Y. Lin), alvin@gi-tech.com.tw (Y.-K. Kuan),
jhliu@epa.gov.tw (J.-H. Liu), jhyeh@epa.gov.tw (J.-H. Yeh).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2018.09.005
Received 20 July 2018; Accepted 5 September 2018
0025-326X/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
C. Fan et al.
measures, marine environmental ecology and resources, as well as re-
gional economic development, may be threatened (Jang et al., 2014;
Liu and Zhu, 2014; Kennedy and Cheong, 2013).
Although many pollution control mechanisms have been proposed
and implemented, oil spill events still have a catastrophic impact on the
marine environment (Neves et al., 2015; Helle et al., 2015; El-Fadel
et al., 2012). However, the follow-up response is critical in mitigating
the negative influence on marine ecology and sustainable use of natural
resources (Fraser and Racine, 2016; Kang et al., 2016; Cunha et al.,
2014).
Therefore, the purpose of this article is to present the marine pol-
lution control mechanism of Taiwan, and the functionalities of the re-
lated regulations were explored. In addition, an oil responsive reaction
dealing with the shipwreck event of T.S. Taipei in 2016 conducted by
Taiwan government was introduced in detail to reverberate the marine
environment protection system and oil spill response mechanism. This
study is the first detail documentation ever reported regarding an oil
spill response dealing with a maritime incident from the initial me-
chanical failure through to the final removal of shipwreck.
2. Legal response framework in marine environment protection of
Taiwan
To protect the waters around Taiwan, it is of particular importance
to have both appropriate protocols and contingency coordination me-
chanisms in place that can effectively prevent and manage marine
pollution events before and after they occur. Shipwreck incidents are a
major source of marine oil pollution and the respective protocols for
responsive actions need to be included in the contingency arrange-
ments. Beyond following the International Maritime Conventions,
Taiwan also implements its own regulations of the Marine Pollution
Control Act and the Major Marine Oil Pollution Emergency Response
Plan to conserve the marine environment and ecological integrity. The
Marine Pollution Control Act is the most important law for managing
marine pollution in Taiwan, and it defines classes of marine pollutants,
marine environmental standards, marine environmental conservation,
and many other relevant concepts. It also specifies management pro-
tocols and details penalties associated with the pollution sources and
activities that may cause marine pollution, such as coastal engineering
projects, marine dumping, abandoned wrecks, offshore oil delivery, and
garbage from both marine and terrestrial sources. This Act safeguards
the marine environment around Taiwan by applying a number of ad-
ministrative control measures, educational programs, permit systems,
and on-site inspections, as well as penalties for illegal activities.
Composed of 61 articles, the Act is divided into 8 chapters, covering
General Principles, Basic Measures, Pollution Prevention from Inland
Sources, Pollution Prevention from Marine Projects, Pollution
Prevention from Waste Disposal at Sea, Prevention of Pollution of the
Sea by Ships, Liability for Damage Compensation and Penalty
Provisions (Fig. 1).
The Major Marine Oil Pollution Emergency Response Plan is a
guideline for the emergency response to a marine oil spill event, and it
specifies operations from the first response action, and equipment de-
ployment to working staff, right through to subsequent pollution miti-
gation procedures. It also specifies the obligations of specific ministries.
In terms of emergency notification, whichever agency becomes aware
of the situation first, whether the Office of Maritime Administration,
Port Management Authorities, coastal authorities, local government or
administrative units, must immediately inform the EPA and Coastal
Guard Administration (CGA) of all relevant information. The plan also
details the different severity levels of pollution events and corre-
sponding standard operating protocols (SOPs), such as the responsible
agencies to deal with the event (Fig. 2).
In a field action for marine oil spill pollution mitigation, the com-
plexity of the response was increased by rough seas, forcing decision
makers to consider not only the spread of marine pollution, but also
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Marine Pollution Bulletin 136 (2018) 84–91
ship engineering and structure design and the possible interactions
between them. Instead of treating all pollution events as the same, the
Plan separates the responsive mechanism into two sections. The first
section deals with pollution events caused by ship malfunctions, which
are managed by the Ministry of Transportation and Communication
(MOTC) who will establish a ship malfunction hazard response center.
The center would coordinate the emergency response and clean-up of
marine pollution, shipwreck cargo, residual and released oil, the re-
moval of wreckage and all other relevant tasks including the comple-
tion of environmental rehabilitation depending on the severity of the
situation. The second section deals with pollution events that are not
caused by ship malfunctions. In these cases, the response follows the
general environmental restoration concept, with the EPA making most
of the significant decisions, allowing for a better response to complex
pollution events.
Another import regulation in marine pollution control is the
Commercial Port Law, which specifies procedures for dealing with
pollution events and the responsibilities of respective parties when
these events occur in commercial ports. It also outlines protocols for
shipwreck removal from these ports. The Commercial Port Law ad-
dresses ship-related pollution and shipwreck disposal by providing
detailed specifications in the event that either or both occur, and pro-
vides detailed penalties for those responsible. The detail description of
these three regulations can be found in the supplementary materials.
3. A case illustration: the T.S. Taipei cargo shipwreck
A notable oil spill incident occurred in Taiwan, and its impact on the
marine and coastal environment has been successfully mitigated
through an immediate and proper response. Requiring both the removal
of a shipwreck and control of marine pollution, the T.S. Taipei cargo
incident was a complex type of shipwreck that occurred in March 2016.
The clean-up operation lasted for five months after the incident, with
almost 90% recovery of spilled oil, revealing the effectiveness of the
Taiwanese government in applying relevant regulations and inter-sec-
toral resource coordination. By relying on the aforementioned marine
pollution preventative and contingency mechanisms, as well as in-
tegrating civil and international efforts, the government was able to
dispose of both the pollution and hull wreckage within a five-month
period.
One thing should be noted is the last amendment of the Major
Marine Oil Pollution Emergency Response Plan was announced to be
effective on the 3rd of January 2017, and this timeline is several
months after the closure of T.S. Taipei Cargo Incident. Therefore, the
responsive action for the marine oil pollution prevention of T.S. Taipei
Cargo Incident still followed the previous version of the Plan that re-
quired EPA to establish and command the emergency response center
responsible for subsequent oil recovery, pollution control and in-
tegrated coordination among central and local agencies. However, the
Major Marine Oil Pollution Emergency Response Plan was subject to a
massive amendment after the T.S. Taipei Cargo Incident, which spe-
cifies the responsible commanding agencies depending on the sources
of marine pollution, if it is ship malfunction related or not. A further
discussion is introduced in the latter section.
3.1. Incident background
On March 10th 2016 at about 10 am the T.S. Taipei cargo ship, with
a displacement of 15,487 tons, experienced mechanical difficulties, and
lost power in a harsh northeastern monsoon that made for rough seas
around the Shimen area of northern Taiwan. Shortly after, it ran
aground 400 m from the shore in waters that were just 7 m deep. The
force of the impact ruptured the hull, causing it to take on water and
diesel oil began to leak. Shortly after, the national rescue command
center dispatched two helicopters, bringing all 21 crew members ashore
before 1 pm. On board there were approximately 505 m3 of three
C. Fan et al. Marine Pollution Bulletin 136 (2018) 84–91

Fig. 1. Framework of the Marine Pollution Control Act.

different types of oil, including 411 m3 of fuel, 42 of diesel and 52 of
lubricant, and 392 shipping containers, 149 of which were located on
deck and 243 in the cargo hold. Nine of the containers contained
dangerous goods. To make matters worse, the incident occurred close to
important and sensitive coastal environments, fishing grounds, and
tourist areas and 2 water intake stations of a nuclear power plant
(Fig. 3).
According to the existing Major Marine Oil Pollution Emergency
Response Plan at the time of the shipwreck occurrence, the incident was
of the second level of pollution severity, and it occurred in ordinary

Fig. 2. Marine pollution event classification and responsible agencies.

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C. Fan et al. Marine Pollution Bulletin 136 (2018) 84–91

Fig. 3. Geographical features of the surrounding coastal area of T.S. Taipei incident.

Fig. 4. Response process with respect to the T.S. Taipei incident.

marine waters. Therefore, the EPA was responsible for arranging and
managing the emergency response. On March 10th, the EPA established
an emergency response center to direct clean-up, coordinate actions
and follow-up procedures. Members of the emergency response center
included a government emergency response team and a ship owner's
emergency team. The government emergency response team consisted
of the personnel from EPA, MOTC, CGA, Council of Agriculture (COA),
local government offices and other relevant agencies, commissioned
professional consultants and specialists from salvage companies. The
ship owner's emergency response team included ship owners, the in-
surance company Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Club, professional
consultants from the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation
(ITOPF), and implementation companies. The emergency response ac-
tion was divided into two stages. The first stage was the “Marine
Pollution Emergency Response Stage” which involved pollution clean-
up, coordinated and directed by the EPA. The second stage, “Wreckage
Removal Emergency Response Stage”, was managed by the MOTC
(Fig. 4). The EPA was responsible for coastal clean-up, while the CGA
was responsible for removal and management of pollution from surface
waters, and the MOTC was responsible for the recovery of the re-
mainder of pollutants on board the ship as well as cargo container and
wreckage removal. Fig. 5 shows the response actions for pollution

87
C. Fan et al.
Fig. 5. Responses to the T.S. Taipei incident.
mitigation as well as wreckage removal. Besides, a video that described
the chronological actions of the response operation of the T.S. Taipei
Cargo Incident was included in the supplementary materials as a further
reference.
3.2. Marine pollution emergency response stage
In order to protect the coastline, fishing harbors and water intake
stations of the nuclear power plant, preliminary actions needed taking
while the ship owner's emergency response team was still organizing
themselves. Therefore, the initial emergency response relied on the
operations of government agencies to deploy response equipment such
as oil containment booms and cotton absorbent materials to contain
and recover as much oil as possible. The response center also applied
advanced technologies such as helicopters, unmanned aircraft systems
(UAS), inter-shore radar and closed-circuit television (CCTV) to mon-
itoring the wreckage and resulting pollution. A computer-assisted
modeling system was used to simulate and forecast the movement of
pollutants and predict where they would wash ashore.
3.2.1. Oil and pollutant retrieval operation
On the 16th of March the rough seas began to subside, allowing for
the proprietor commissioned professional salvage/rescue companies to
begin boarding the shipwreck and remove oil. Unfortunately, on the
23rd of March the northeastern monsoon system again strengthened
and caused worsening sea conditions. As a result, the rescue task was
temporarily suspended for a second time. On the morning of the 24th of
March strong winds and continuous waves caused the stern of the ship
to break and settle at about 25° from upright. Almost at the same time,
two 30-ton cabin covers fell onto the cargo hold damaging several cargo
containers and fuel tanks which had yet to be drained. This hull and
fuel tank damage led to more oil escaping into the hull and surrounding
waters.
On March 27th after the rough seas had subsided, the owner's
emergency response team continued the clean-up operation.
Containment booms were deployed on both sides of the leaking hull,
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Marine Pollution Bulletin 136 (2018) 84–91
particularly on the right side of the stern where leaking was most se-
vere. Since the oil in the hull had already mixed with escaped goods
from damaged cargo containers, these goods needed removing from the
hull manually before oil pumping could commence. On the 31st of
March, the hull oil recovery operation, which removed 41.9 m3 of
diesel, 295.1 m3 of fuel oil and 1 m3 of lubricant oil, terminated and the
next stage of Wreckage Removal Emergency Response Stage began.
3.2.2. Coastal clean-up operation
After the T.S. Taipei ran aground, the major source of pollution was
lubricant oil from the engine room. The emergency response center first
dispatched the government emergency response team to mitigate pol-
lution and prevent contaminants from reaching the coast, and the
proprietor emergency response team subsequently undertook the clean-
up operation. After the hull of the T.S. Taipei sustained more damage,
the fuel oil leaked and covered 2 km of coastline. In these areas, oil
coated the majority of rocks and crevices, making quick clean-up ex-
tremely difficult. Other areas experienced less severe pollution, such as
oil-covered garbage and contaminated sand that formed oily con-
glomerates.
In an effort to compensate the locals, the owner's emergency re-
sponse team mainly employed local people and fishermen for coastline
clean-up after an initial training program. The clean-up operation was
divided into 3 stages. The first stage consisted of cleaning the sources of
pollution that were still leaking or had the potential to disperse to other
areas, such as floating oil that could be directly skimmed off the surface,
garbage that had been coated in oil, and sand that had been con-
taminated with oil. The second stage employed pressurized washing
with three different water jet treatments, including high pressure jetting
for larger rocks, low pressure jetting for gravel and high pressure high
temperature jetting for stubborn surface contamination. The third stage
was the rehabilitation stage involving the return of rocks and gravel to
the intertidal zone after thorough cleaning, scouring and bioremedia-
tion using microbial decomposition treatments. In total, 11,937 shifts
were deployed, resulting in the removal of 66,402 l of oil contaminant
and 128,039 kg of oil coated garbage.
C. Fan et al.
3.2.3. Marine monitoring and cargo container removal operation
In order to stop the spread of pollutants, the EPA utilized dispersal
modeling systems, UAS, satellite imagery and coastal radar to monitor
and forecast the dynamic behavior of pollution in the surrounding
waters. The CGA also dispatched patrol boats to assist in the monitoring
operation. The emergency response center requested the assistance of
the ship owner's emergency response team to employ local fishermen to
assist in the clean-up and surveillance operations.
After the oil and pollutant recovery operation, the cargo container
removal operation commenced on the 1st of April. The first part of this
operation aimed to remove cargo containers from the deck and the front
of the hull where water had not entered. The cargo containers were
removed in the following order: 8 cargo containers with hazardous
goods on the front deck, heavy cargo containers on the front deck,
empty cargo containers on the back deck and heavy cargo containers in
the hull area where water had not entered. Since the stern of the ship
was tilted 25° to the right, the removal of empty cargo containers at the
back was considered dangerous. The first part of the cargo container
removal operation finished on the 7th of April with the successful re-
moval of 198 containers.
On April 8th, the second part of the cargo removal operation com-
menced, which involved the removal of content in the third cargo hold.
This hold contained a large amount of oil and water as well as a number
of items that seriously obstructed the mechanical clean-up operation.
The majority of the goods included backpacks and large rolls of plastic
that were unrolled and trailing in the water. They intertwined with
other goods and prevented the use of pumps and other mechanical
devices. Therefore, skilled personnel cut up and removed the debris
manually. After removing debris, pumps were used to drain the mixture
of water and oil from the container. The final stage was the removal of
additional garbage and residual oil using high-pressure jets, cotton
absorbent mats, balls, and sawdust. The clean-up of this cargo hold was
completed on the 5th of May.
After the completion of all of the pollution mitigation tasks, the
EPA-directed emergency response center reached a consensus that the
Marine Pollution Emergency Response Stage was complete. A third
party consisting of academics, local people, the media and the emer-
gency response team confirmed the completion of the pollution clean-
up task by on-site visit investigation. On the 11th of May the salvage
operation was brought to next stage, in which the MOTC took command
of the emergency response center to begin the “Wreckage Removal
Emergency Response Stage”.
3.3. The wreckage removal emergency response stage
In order to remove the shipwreck quickly and avoid further en-
vironmental pollution, the emergency response center employed the
floating salvage method to remove the shipwreck, which was chosen as
the best removal method while the Marine Pollution Emergency
Response Stage was still in progress. During the tender evaluation and
selection process, managed by the owner's emergency response team
and the insurers P&I club, two professional companies were selected
and formed the wreckage removal task force. An overseas specialist
rescue tug was dispatched to Taiwan for the removal operation.
While preparing for the removal operation, a northeastern monsoon
struck causing the stern of the T.S. Taipei to tilt even more to 32°,
thereby increasing the risk of capsizing. After an assessment conducted
by the professional contractor, the emergency response center agreed
the order of operations: raising the cargo cover, removing containers
that were immersed in water, cutting off the cargo cover, using the
floating salvage method to remove the stern and using the floating
salvage method to remove the bow of the ship.
3.3.1. Immersed cargo container, main cabin and engine removal
On the 25th of May, the emergency response team began to remove
the cargo cover. After confirming the stability of wreck, the team
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Marine Pollution Bulletin 136 (2018) 84–91
started to remove the immersed cargo containers. While draining the
containers, personnel used oil absorbing equipment to prevent the re-
lease of residual oil. By the 10th of June, all of the immersed cargo
containers were successfully removed.
To stabilize the stern of the ship, and facilitate floating salvage
towing operations by reducing the total weight, the team began the
removal of the main cabin on the 11th of June, using a method that
involved cutting torches and chains to remove the 650 ton main cabin
by cutting through the hull. The cabin was finally removed on the 22nd
of June and moved to the semi-submersible deck barge.
Since the main cabin was severely damaged, engine removal was
undertaken with great care as a lot of pollutants remained in and
around the engine. The pollution prevention measures included
pumping, plugging, and the deployment of containment booms. On the
1st of July, the engine was removed, and placed on the semi-sub-
mersible deck barge on the following day.
3.3.2. Stern and bow removal operations and event closure
After removing the main cabin and engine, the remaining stern of
the ship weighed around 3000 tons that exceeded the maximum capa-
city of the crane by 1000 tons. As noted before, the stern sustained
severe damage, making a complete stoppage of leaks impossible.
Therefore, water pumping from the hull needed to operate continuously
and the removal task had to be completed at high tide with the help of
seawater buoyancy, using a crane to suspend the stern. After the marine
crane had lifted the stern and the hull had been patched to prevent
water from re-entering the hull, two tug boats began the floating sal-
vage operation in concert with high tide on the 22nd of July. After
experiencing a number of difficulties, such as the secondary damage to
the hull and additional water intake, the hull getting caught on coral
and the breakage of towing cables, the ship was eventually removed
from the wreck location on the 25th of July. The stern of the wreckage
was placed on the semi-submersible deck barge on the 27th of July, and
the team spent four additional days securing the stern on the barge. On
the 1st of August the wreckage began transit to Keelung Harbor for
dismantling.
After pumping the water out, the bow was towed away from the
wreckage site on the 5th of August since it was still watertight. In the
evening of the 7th of August, it was removed from Shimen waterways,
and arrived at the Keelung Harbor dock, ready for further dismantling
in the morning of the following day. After the main pieces of wreckage
had been removed, the team successively removed the remainder of the
wreckage on the sea floor, and the T.S. Taipei removal operation was
formally brought to a close on the 15th of August.
After the emergency response has been officially terminated, the
EPA and the local government continued to inspect the area and clean
up the surrounding coastline. Despite a number of unexpected accidents
and difficulties, the T.S. Taipei incident was successfully resolved in a
little over 5 months from when the initial grounding. In this response
operation, 338 m3 of on-board oil (i.e., 295 of fuel, 42 of diesel and 1 of
lubricant) has been pumped out and recovered. For the rest 167 m3 of
oil, 36 m3 of lubricant and 25 m3 of heavy oil were contained within the
wreckage with the subsequent treatment properly. It was estimated that
60 m3 of oil ran ashore and was removed by the coastline cleanup task
force. The other 46 m3 were either dissolved, diffused, emulsified or
vaporized. The detail monetary expenses were considered confidential
according to the agreement among governing agencies, the ship owner
and the insurance company.
4. Review and evaluation of marine oil pollution response
mechanism
From the response to the T.S. Taipei event, it can be observed that
personnel, resources and technologies were provided in a timely way
with integrated coordination by a wide range of different government
agencies and private companies. The major factor for a successful
C. Fan et al.
response is the ability to command government resources by following
the existing marine pollution prevention and control system (Janeiro
et al., 2017; Chung and Lee, 2016; Al-Majed et al., 2012). The success of
the emergency response can be attributed to five important points: (1)
integrated inter-departmental systems, (2) prompt and decisive actions
at critical times, (3) the use of cutting edge technologies, (4) appro-
priate allocation of tasks by the emergency response center, and (5)
regulations, penalties and flexibility.
The emergency response operation can be separated into two stages,
the Marine Pollution Emergency Response Stage that went forward in
accordance with the existing marine pollution control mechanism, and
the Wreckage Removal Emergency Response Stage that went forward in
accordance with the Commercial Port Law. At certain points the two
stages overlapped. Therefore, the emergency response is best thought of
as a compound system that deals with both aspects of shipwreck in-
cidents.
According to the Plan, the personnel from the local authority im-
mediately sent out a notification when an incident occurred, informing
the relevant personnel of all levels of government in a timely fashion. At
the same time, the local authorities immediately dispatched ships and
personnel and governing authorities began the deployment of oil con-
tainment booms and other oil absorbing equipment, providing a prompt
response to limit the dispersal of pollutants. By using the notification
system of the marine pollution prevention and control mechanism, not
only were all personnel notified of event details in the shortest possible
time, the system also synchronized information for all emergency re-
sponse participants. Another important feature of the emergency re-
sponse plan was to act quickly, well before the environmental gov-
erning authority had time to set up the emergency response center. In
this way, prompt and decisive actions and measures were taken at
critical times, thereby effectively preventing the pollution from
spreading.
To establish a sound marine response system, the EPA used diverse
technologies, including an environmental background database (to es-
timate and model pollution dynamics), an aerial monitoring system (to
assess the incident over a wide area of ocean), a high frequency coastal
radar system (to detect the spread of sea surface oil) and the existing
legal marine pollution control mechanism (to facilitate communication
across departments and levels of government).
Since the emergency response plan outlines the responsibilities of
all members, each department was able to initiate actions and give
regular progress reports after the shipwreck occurred quickly. To be
more specific, the EPA was mainly responsible for monitoring and su-
pervising the coastal clean-up efforts conducted by the ship owner
while the MOTC supervised wreckage removal and clean-up, and the
CGA was involved in facilitating open water monitoring and clean-up.
In this way, the tasks assigned to the departments reflected their re-
spective expertise, maximizing the effectiveness of collective efforts.
The pollution response involved four agency-based task forces, with the
EPA-managed response center as the main actor. The other three actors
were the CGA onsite command center, responsible for open water tasks,
the owner's onsite center responsible for coastal clean-up, and the
MOTC emergency response team, responsible for coordinating the re-
moval of the shipwreck. Each team dispatched personnel to the emer-
gency response center to attend regular meetings, to share experiences
and opinions, and to report on progress. The teams displayed a bottom-
up organization, producing a flexible response to the emergency, which
increased the efficiency of the whole response.
After the EPA established the oil emergency response center, an
initial meeting was convened with all the relevant government de-
partments and the ship owner's emergency response team. The EPA
asked the ship owner's emergency response team to undertake measures
to mitigate pollution in a prescribed timeline. In the case of non-com-
pliance, a fine would be levied on a daily basis, which is in accordance
with the relevant penalties outlined in the Marine Pollution Control Act.
Therefore, the ship owner's team began implementing the coastal and
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Marine Pollution Bulletin 136 (2018) 84–91
open water pollution projects and shipwreck removal plan. Since the
EPA-driven initiative removed most of the pollution in the first stage
operation, the focus of the Wreckage Removal Emergency Response
Stage shifted to disposal of the source of pollution, namely the ship-
wreck. The Commercial Port Law has clear stipulations for the removal
of shipwrecks and carries a high degree of liability. It requires the ship
owners to pay all of the relevant expenses, provides details of fines for
those who do not provide relevant plans or complete relevant tasks.
Therefore, the owner's team proposed several wreckage removal plans
to the MOTC while the Marine Pollution Emergency Response Stage
was still underway. The MOTC constantly updated these proposals in
accordance with varying conditions. In this way the MOTC and relevant
teams were able to begin the wreckage removal operation immediately
after the pollution emergency response had concluded.
In the light of all of the above, we can see both the effectiveness and
significance of the integrated national system for marine pollution
prevention, and government departments may look to such systems as a
template for effective allocation of tasks and distribution of resources. It
is important that experience should inform the development of the
guidelines, so as to improve responses, thereby safeguarding important
marine environments when marine pollution events occur.
To reach an even more soundness of marine pollution prevention
system, a government should continuously review and modify these
guidelines to make them more comprehensive and systematic. After a
careful review of the response to the T.S. Taipei event, members of the
response team suggested a revision to the Major Marine Oil Pollution
Emergency Response Plan, classifying marine pollution incidents into
two categories (as introduced in Section 2, Legal Response Framework
in Marine Environment Protection of Taiwan). Under the newly-
amended plan, the MOTC is responsible for managing the pollution
events caused by ship malfunctions. In order to strengthen the response
capacity for marine pollution, the government increased investment in
equipment procurement, and attracted more talented and experienced
experts to contribute to marine environment conservation. The gov-
ernment also cooperated with relevant international organizations and
created more diverse exchanges and collaborative opportunities fol-
lowing the existing national marine pollution emergency plan.
The rules and regulations governing marine pollution prevention
and contingency planning provide an effective and flexible mechanism
for governing ministries and the private sector to avert and counter
pollution events. The extensive collaboration and communication be-
tween government agencies, private companies and professional con-
sultants were the key factors that led to the success of the operation,
which demonstrated the effectiveness of the Taiwan marine pollution
management system. The event opened a new chapter in national
marine pollution response by ushering in greater cooperation and
concerted efforts, as revealed by the successful protection and re-
storation of the Shimen marine area.
5. Concluding remarks
Taiwan is an island whose marine environment constitutes an im-
portant natural resource. Therefore, the protection of marine environ-
mental and ecological biodiversity is a long-term national goal.
However, there are many shipwreck hotspots in the waters around
Taiwan due to the geography, economy and climatic conditions, as well
as the development of international maritime traffic flows. The oil spills
that ensue after such events can be devastating for the surrounding seas
and coastal areas. Environmental damage may be irreversible if timely
and effective action is not taken.
The government of Taiwan realized the importance of marine pol-
lution prevention and drafted national legislation to deal with marine
pollution management – the Marine Pollution Control Act. This Act also
stipulated and defined penalties for activities that cause or have the
potential to cause a variety of marine pollution. The EPA also published
the Major Marine Oil Pollution Emergency Response Plan, which sets
C. Fan et al.
out principles for responding to oil pollution as well as the detailed
allocation of tasks and responsibilities for all parties concerned.
The T.S. Taipei cargo shipwreck occurred on March 8th 2016 and
tested the effectiveness of the national marine pollution prevention
system in Taiwan. During the integrated emergency response, inter-
departmental cooperation and collaboration with private sectors were
seamless, including task allocation, scheduling and dispatch and follow-
up activities such as the removal of the shipwreck. After the event oc-
curred, each team reviewed the integrated emergency response work-
flow and modified the emergency response strategy accordingly.
In the response of T.S. Taipei event, the EPA assessed the severity of
the marine pollution incident, and modified the emergency response
workflow, and took responsibility for all administrative tasks, such as
integrated notification, allocation of tasks and many emergency re-
sponse tasks. In this case, subsequent damage sustained by the hull of
the ship increased the likelihood of the wreckage capsizing and the
possible escape of additional pollution. Fortunately, most of the oil spill
from the T.S. Taipei was successfully recovered. Oil residues were re-
moved and the wreckage salvaged, coordinated by instructions from the
emergency response center following the guidance of Major Marine Oil
Pollution Emergency Response Plan. With enforcement of all the related
regulation, the capacities of the national marine pollution prevention
system of Taiwan have been improved and the mechanism was deemed
capable of dealing with oil spill incidents.
Despite the fact that Taiwan is not a UN member state, Taiwan es-
tablishes a sound legal framework for marine pollution prevention and
mitigation in compliance with the international conventions proposed
by International Maritime Organization. As an active member of the
global community, the determination of Taiwan authorities to protect
the marine environment cannot be doubted, and the efforts to prevent
marine pollution are apparent. This experience-sharing article makes
available the experience of the people in Taiwan and their intention to
protect the marine environment and to collaborate with other states to
make a significant contribution to marine environment conservation
and sustainability.
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2018.09.005.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by Environmental Protection
Administration of Taiwan (project title: management project for im-
provement and response capacities of marine pollution prevention in-
formation system; project numbers: EPA-105-G106-02-A101).
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