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A Philosophical Discussion of Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Research in Social Science
A Philosophical Discussion of Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Research in Social Science
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Philosophy of
A philosophical discussion of social science
qualitative, quantitative, and
mixed methods research in
social science
Saša Baškarada and Andy Koronios Received 9 March 2017
Revised 20 October 2017
University of South Australia, Adelaide, Australia Accepted 22 October 2017
Abstract
Purpose – Much of the contemporary methodological literature tends to be self-referential and frequently
ignorant of the breadth and depth of philosophical assumptions underpinning various methodological
positions. Without a clear understanding of the philosophical underpinnings, logically deriving applicable
validity criteria becomes very difficult (if not impossible). As a result, the purpose of this paper is to present a
critical review of historical and more recent philosophical arguments for qualitative, quantitative, and mixed
methods research in social science.
Design/methodology/approach – A targeted review of seminal philosophy of science papers dealing with
ontological and epistemological assumptions of, and relation between, natural and social science.
Findings – The paper highlights the link between ontological/epistemological assumptions and
methodological choices in social science. Key differences between the natural and social science are
discussed and situated within the main paradigms.
Originality/value – The paper draws attention to a range of difficulties associated with the adoption of the
natural sciences and the related positivist approaches as a role model for work in the social sciences. Unique
contributions of interpretive and critical approaches are highlighted. The paper may be of value to scholars
who are interested in the historical context of the still-ongoing qualitative-quantitative debate.
Keywords Quantitative, Qualitative, Positivism, Paradigm, Mixed methods research, Interpretivism
Paper type General review
1. Introduction
Natural sciences are generally viewed as being descriptive because physical behaviors are
explained through mathematical formulae, empirical because relevant variables denote
observables, functional because each input is related to exactly one output, and deterministic
because the future is in principle predictable (Brodbeck, 1954). The epistemological status of
social sciences may be viewed either as a factual question that could in principle be answered
scientifically, or as a normative question that cannot be answered empirically (Gewirth, 1954).
Nevertheless, positivism, which views physics as science par excellence (Kincaid, 1990b),
maintains that social sciences are in essence no different from natural sciences
(Føllesdal, 1979), and that, as such, they should also principally aim for nomological
prediction and explanation (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948). Scholars argue that “There are
numerous valid reasons for positivists to follow the natural sciences as a role model for work
in the social sciences” (Hasan, 2014, p. 4). It may be assumed that few practicing social
scientists disagree since quantitative research methods, which originate in the positivistic
natural sciences, have also been dominating the social and the behavioral sciences (Alise and
Teddlie, 2010; Lopez-Fernandez and Molina-Azorin, 2011; Yang, 2013; Rod, 2009; Black, 2006;
Kapoulas and Mitic, 2012). Moreover, “Qualitative scholars struggle to obtain tenure, their
research is often underfunded, the journals they publish in are given low impact scores”
(Denzin, 2017, p. 15).
However, critics have argued that due to their distinct problem domains the social and Qualitative Research Journal
the natural sciences cannot be regarded as alternatives and, thus, should not be directly © Emerald Publishing Limited
1443-9883
compared (Machlup, 1961). In contrast to natural sciences, which largely deal with DOI 10.1108/QRJ-D-17-00042
QRJ quantitative aspects, it may be maintained that social sciences are primarily interested in
qualitative characteristics (Weber, 1949). Viewed as such, social sciences should principally
aim for hermeneutical understanding (Verstehen) (Taylor, 1974). Others have reasoned that
natural sciences are analytic, whereas the social sciences are synthetic in nature
(Hayek, 1952). In addition to being much more heterogeneous than natural sciences
(Gewirth, 1954), social sciences are also largely context dependent (Faber and Scheper,
2003). For instance, it has been argued that results of quantitative marketing research have
a “limited lifetime and applicability because background contexts and consumer behaviours
are in perpetual flux” (Robertshaw, 2007, p. 11).
Reflecting on the ongoing quantitative-qualitative debate conducted in the marketing
“crisis literature,” Rod (2009) concludes that the relevant philosophical issues have not been
resolved and argues for a pragmatic approach in which “academics should be free to
subscribe to whatever guiding epistemological and ontological philosophy they choose”
(p. 128). This is the same position as adopted by proponents of mixed methods research
(MMR), a rapidly emerging social science research paradigm that aims to bridge the
quantitative-qualitative (positivist-interpretivist) divide.
Given that many mixed methods researchers are indifferent to the underlying
epistemological and ontological assumptions (Bryman, 2007; Alise and Teddlie, 2010), it is
unsurprising that many MMR studies do not state any rationale for choosing a mixed
approach (Bryman, 2006). Some proponents of MMR claim that philosophical assumptions
do not dictate methodological choices ( Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004), while others
argue that, given their metaphysical nature, epistemology and ontology are not relevant to
the research process (Giddings, 2006). While admitting that qualitative and quantitative
approaches may be appropriate in different situations, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) do
not specify the nature of such situations. Critics have noted that this lack of concern
for epistemological and ontological issues may have to do with a tacit adoption of the
traditional positivist consensus (Denzin, 2012; Giddings, 2006).
Without a clear understanding of the philosophical underpinnings, logically deriving
applicable validity criteria becomes difficult (if not impossible), which potentially makes
MMR study design and evaluation a highly subjective affair. Following Charles Sanders
Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) argue that MMR
should be judged based on its empirical and practical consequences. While pragmatism
allows mixed method researchers to adopt a multitude of research methods and sidestep the
contentious issues of truth and reality (Feilzer, 2010), given that empirical and practical
consequences are not always immediately obvious, judging the value of any conclusions
reached would have to be deferred until real-world outcomes can be observed (Rod, 2009).
As a consequence, basic research may receive less attention than applied research
( Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004).
Synthesizing various reviews of MMR, Denscombe (2008) shows that some researchers
primarily use mixed methods in order to improve data accuracy, produce a more complete
picture, and mitigate against single-method biases, while others may simply use questionnaires
as a tool for interviewee selection, or interviews to help explain quantitative findings. He argues
that justifying the use of MMR because it provides “fusion of approaches,” “a third alternative,”
or because it desirable or pragmatic is insufficient (Denscombe, 2008). Others have argued
that MMR may have more to do with pleasing research funding authorities, than with a
genuine integration of research approaches (Giddings, 2006). Without a clear understanding of
the underlying paradigm, MMR is arguably nothing more than triangulation (Denzin, 2012;
Flick, 2017).
Based on the concerns highlighted above, a number of scholars have called for more
theoretical research on the philosophical underpinnings of qualitative, quantitative, and MMR
(Denzin, 2012; Creswell and Tashakkori, 2007; Giddings, 2006; Johnson et al., 2007; Greene, 2008).
This paper answers such calls by identifying the main ontological and epistemological Philosophy of
assumptions from the philosophy of social science literature and discussing how they drive social science
methodological choices. Key differences between the natural and social science are
discussed and situated within the main paradigms. The paper draws attention to a range
of difficulties associated with the adoption of the natural sciences and the related positivist
approaches as a role model for work in the social sciences, and highlights the value of
interpretive and critical approaches.
2. MMR
It has been argued that MMR is a third research paradigm that aims to transcend the
traditional dichotomy between quantitative (positivist) and qualitative (interpretivist)
research ( Johnson et al., 2007; Denscombe, 2008; Morgan, 2007). A general definition
synthesized from leading methodologists defines it as “the type of research in which a
researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative
research approaches […] for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and
corroboration” ( Johnson et al., 2007, p. 123). Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) define MMR
as “the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and
qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single
study” (p. 17). Although it is argued that MMR is a synthesis that includes ideas from
qualitative and quantitative approaches, what exactly is synthesized or how precisely that
is done remains ambiguous.
Some scholars advocate using qualitative and quantitative methods in parallel, while
others argue that MMR research should aim for integration. However, exactly how
qualitative and quantitative methods may best be integrated is not always clear.
For instance, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) present six mixed-model designs, for which
they do not provide detailed explanations. One of the designs starts with quantitative
research objectives, collects quantitative data, but performs qualitative analysis. Exactly
how one is supposed to qualitatively analyze quantitative data, and relate a presumably
qualitative finding to a quantitative research objective is not made clear. Another popular
three-dimensional typology of MMR identifies eight designs that differ on the level of
mixing (partial vs full), time orientation (concurrent vs sequential), and emphasis of
approaches (equal vs unequal) (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2009). Others have proposed
guidelines for MMR at the synthesis level; that is, synthesizing research evidence from
published qualitative and quantitative studies (Heyvaert, Maes, and Onghena, 2013).
If MMR is to effectively integrate qualitative and quantitative methods, it needs to be
able to blend compatible axiomatic elements of interpretivism and positivism into another
“so that one is engaging in research that represents the best of both worldviews” (Guba and
Lincoln, 2005, p. 201). Although, this is well understood and accepted by MMR scholars,
relevant discussions have so far been undertaken at a relatively high level of abstraction,
and MMR largely ignores “epistemology, and ontology, in favor of a brute methodology”
(Pierre, 2014, p. 9). As such, specific axiomatic elements and the degree of potential
compatibility have received limited attention. As a result of the ontological and
epistemological ambiguity “we are still in the infant stages of understanding how to judge
the quality of mixed methods practice” (Greene, 2008, p. 18). Based on a comprehensive
review of critical appraisal frameworks for evaluating the methodological quality of MMR
studies, Heyvaert, Hannes, Maes and Onghena (2013) agree that “consensus on the critical
appraisal of MM studies is lacking” (p. 303).
Arguments that mixed methods researchers should design their studies “based on
consideration of the types of ‘validity’ presented in the qualitative research literature […] the
quantitative research literature […] and the mixed methods research literature” ( Johnson
et al., 2007, p. 128) assume inter-paradigm commensurability, which this paper argues is
QRJ largely unjustified. Pierre (2014) observes that “Confusion and contradiction are not
uncommon in mixed methods when a researcher claims to enact positivist and interpretive
social science at the same time in the same “mixed” methods study” (p. 9). Some of the
arguments put forward by the proponents of inter-paradigm commensurability are not
particularly convincing. For instance, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) support their view
by noting that “both quantitative and qualitative researchers use empirical observations to
address research questions” (p. 15). While Onwuegbuzie et al. (2011) argue that mixed
methods researchers need to be able to effectively integrate the philosophical assumptions
that underlie both positivist and interpretivist paradigms, relevant discussions have so far
been undertaken at a relatively high level of abstraction. For instance, they note that
“the mixed researcher has to make ‘Gestalt switches’ (Kuhn, 1996) from a quantitative lens
to a qualitative lens and vice versa, going back and forth, multiple times” (p. 1261).
This process is supposed to lead to “a new or consolidated viewpoint emerging” (p. 1261) that
“is informed by, is separate from, and goes beyond what is provided by either a pure
qualitative viewpoint or a pure quantitative viewpoint” (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2006, p. 59).
The assumption that multi-paradigm research teams may organically integrate potentially
incommensurable paradigms in a MMR approach (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2011) is unsupported
by empirical evidence. MMR scholars who accept the paradigm incommensurability thesis
instead argue for the parallel use of qualitative and quantitative methods.
While qualitative and quantitative social science research methods have found their
justifications in metaphysical arguments, MMR has been advocated on pragmatic grounds
(Morgan, 2007; Johnson et al., 2007). However, as a philosophy of science, pragmatism
(or instrumentalism) is essentially relativistic in the sense that it does not offer normative
advice, but instead reserves its judgment until resulting utilities may be compared
(Denzin, 2012; Russell, 1967). This, of course, may create difficulties with evaluating
research designs and outputs proactively, and in isolation from comparable studies
(Kuhn, 2012; Feyerabend, 1993). Given that pragmatist philosophies may range from realism
and weak pluralism to anti-realism and strong pluralism (neo-pragmatism), arguing for
“pragmatism of the middle” ( Johnson et al., 2007, p. 125) as the philosophical foundation of
MMR may be too much of a compromise. In any case, Denzin (2012) observes that most
MMR proponents adopt traditional as opposed to neo-pragmatism.
Given that the pragmatist approach to MMR rejects “the top-down privileging of
ontological assumptions” (Morgan, 2007, p. 68), MMR may be dominated by the qualitative
component and the corresponding interpretivist paradigm, the quantitative component and
the corresponding positivist paradigm, or it may be balanced by admitting equal status to
both components ( Johnson et al., 2007). Nevertheless, it is claimed that successful mixed
methods studies need to be able to integrate the qualitative and quantitative components, thus
producing novel insights that are not apparent when the individual components are
considered in isolation (Creswell and Tashakkori, 2007). It has been suggested that this may
be ensured by having at least one mixed research question (e.g. “what and how?,” “what and
why?”) (Tashakkori and Creswell, 2007). However, given that quantitative methods and the
underlying positivism still dominate top social/behavioral science journals (Lopez-Fernandez
and Molina-Azorin, 2011), and considering that a high proportion of MMR is quasi-mixed in
nature (Alise and Teddlie, 2010), it is perhaps unsurprising that some qualitative researchers
have referred to MMR as “positivism dressed in drag” (Giddings, 2006, p. 195). Such a view
gains a particular strength if qualitative approaches are largely used to inform subsequent
quantitative investigations (Lee, 1991).
5. Complexity
If we define complexity in terms of the number of independent variables comprising a model
(Hayek, 1964; Scriven, 1994), we may expect that theories in the social sciences would be
more complex than theories in the natural sciences (Machlup, 1961). Post qualitative social
scholars talk about a “mangle of people, discourse, matter, and nature” that leads to a
“dynamic space and time of becoming, emerging, unfolding, and of moving, connecting,
diverging” (Greene, 2013, p. 751). However, critics have argued that social phenomena are
QRJ not complex as such, because the level of complexity is a function of the level of description
(McIntyre, 1993). This view, which maintains that social phenomena are in principle are no
different from physical phenomena, also claims that a priori arguments against nomological
laws in any possible descriptive framework are invalid. However, given that social sciences
deal with socially constructed phenomena, any radical redescription (e.g. in terms of
psychological, biological, or physical phenomena) is bound to change the subject matter and
lead to semantic attenuation, or even incommensurability. For instance, even if complex
(higher-level) constructs could be mapped to causally connected underlying (lower-level)
elements, given their different levels of description, it does not necessarily follow that
complex constructs could also be nomologically reduced to their underlying elements
(Davidson, 1994). In other words, in the context of social science, any general laws may not
be statable using the conceptual system used in the explanation, since “Phenomena as such
are never explained, but only phenomena as described in some way” (Fay, 1994, p. 97).
Accordingly, we may accept token-physicalism without accepting type-physicalism
(Fodor, 1974).
Others have argued that complexity does not necessarily exclude social scientific laws
(Fodor, 1974). For instance, when aggregated, some level of psychological indeterminacy
may by the means of the law of averages nevertheless lead to predictable social patterns
(Nelson, 1990). Accordingly, while social sciences that deal with organized complexity
(e.g. organization science) may not be able to accurately predict the evolution of a specific
complex system (e.g. the future performance of an organization), they may nevertheless still
be able to provide contextual probabilistic predictions pertaining to a collection of a large
number of such complex systems (e.g. the average success rate of an organization of a
particular type). This is because complexity leads to the emergence of new abstract patterns
that are independent of the particular values of the underlying elements (Fodor, 1974);
complex wholes are defined through such self-maintaining recurrent patterns (Simon, 1991).
As such, complex phenomena may not lend themselves to predictions of specific
configurations (Searle, 1984). Instead, one may only be able to predict the occurrence of
certain types of phenomena (abstract patterns), which may be compatible with a potentially
large number of specific configurations (Hayek, 1964). As a result, such theories may not be
easily falsifiable. A consequence of this is that intentional discourse may only lend itself to
temporary heteronomic generalizations (Davidson, 1980) instead of precise causal general
laws (Fay, 1994; Searle, 1984). Arguments from analogy that attack this view by
equating social constructs with computer science (logical) and/or biological constructs
(Kincaid, 1990b) may be making a category-mistake (Ryle, 1949).
Another reason why nomological theories that have proven so successful in the realm of
the natural phenomena are not applicable to organized complexity (Weaver, 1948)
underpinning social phenomena (Weber, 1949) is because, in contrast to controlled
laboratory experiments in the natural sciences, a complete and accurate specification of all
relevant initial conditions is not practically feasible in the context of uncontrolled social
(Machlup, 1961; Hayek, 1964) or psychological (Davidson, 1994) phenomena. For instance, it
has been argued that almost any event in a person’s life can have an effect on almost any
other event (Hayek, 1964). Additionally, social sciences lack the sort of constants that
underpin some natural sciences (Machlup, 1961). Nevertheless, the distinction based on the
ability to control experimental conditions is somewhat idealized, since that ability is a
matter of degree (Friedman, 1953). For instance, some natural sciences (e.g. astronomy) do
not make use of controlled experiments at all.
Social scientists usually artificially reduce complexity by discounting independent
variables through simplifying assumptions. Generally speaking, the more abstract the
theoretical construct the more suitable it may be for the formulation of social scientific
“laws.” However, given that such highly abstract constructs by necessity exclude much
relevant detail, their predictive power is severely limited (Weber, 1949). While, generally Philosophy of
speaking, continual progress in the explanatory and predictive power in various social social science
sciences should be possible, this may not equally apply to every case and to an indefinitely
high degree of approximation (Scriven, 1994; Davidson, 1994).
As such, critical approaches embrace free-will and are progressive in outlook. As a result, it has
been argued that research methods as used in positivist social sciences and/or natural sciences
are unsuitable for critical approaches (Comstock, 1982). Instead, the argument goes, critical
methods should treat social reality as a social construction. On the other hand, one may argue
that presupposing social construction does not necessarily entirely invalidate positivistic
approaches to research, since it does not diminish the reality of the constructed world.
Compared to natural sciences, social construction at most lays some constraints on the validity
of findings in the social sphere; i.e., they are not expected to be invariable. While interpretive
approaches are required in order to reinterpret reality, positivist (empirical-analytic)
approaches may be required to justify the need for change. Critical MMR may “be used in
the service of transformative social justice projects” to inspire “generative politics and dialogic
democracy” and help “shape realistic utopian dreams” (Denzin, 2012, p. 80).
In any case, the progressive nature of critical social science suggests partiality. In other
words, critical findings by definition cannot be value neutral. It quickly becomes obvious
that critical approaches are not equally applicable to all contemporary social sciences.
Most applicable are those disciplines with the strongest ethical component and most scope
for emancipation (e.g. political and cultural sciences), while least applicable are the more
instrumental sciences with a negligible ethical element (e.g. management and organization
science). Or putting it differently, critical approaches presuppose an oppressed class with
progressive tendencies. As such, the overall outlook of critical social science is clearly
different from the outlook positivist approaches inherited from the natural sciences.
One of the most frequent criticisms of critical social science is that value judgments have
a strong influence on problem selection, identification of facts, assessment of evidence, and
the forming of conclusions (Nagel, 1994; Kuhn, 2012; Wylie, 1994). This point may be
particularly obvious with reference to feminist research (Wylie, 1992), but it equally applies
to any other social science. For instance, it has been argued that explanatory frameworks in
political science invariably presuppose normative positions (Taylor, 1967). With respect to
problem selection, it is difficult to argue with the fact that social scientists focus on problems
they deem socially important and/or culturally significant. Thus, given the infinite
complexity of the socio-historical context, it must be admitted that value judgments
determine which phenomena (problems and facts) are singled out (Weber, 1949; Roth, 1988).
However, the same argument can be directed at natural scientists, since they also
presumably predominantly focus on problems they find interesting. No scientist randomly
selects problems and relevant facts. Having accepted the premise that all scientists use
value judgments of one sort or another to select relevant problems and facts, it does not
QRJ necessarily follow that the resulting findings are entirely subjective. It may be argued that
any subjective elements, which play a part in natural as well as social sciences, “through the
self-corrective mechanisms of science as a social enterprise” (Nagel, 1994) eventually
converge on something that may be called objective, or intersubjective (Gewirth, 1954).
9. Conclusion
As evidenced by the continuing dominance of positivism and quantitative research
methods, many, perhaps most, practicing social scientists tacitly accept unqualified
adoption of natural science as a role model for social science. A consequence of this state of
affairs is the paradoxical tacit denial of human agency and the capacity for critical
self-reflection, the very denial of our humanity and arguably our special status in the
universe. Social sciences can and ought to do more.
Although positivistic natural sciences have been used as a model for the still dominant
quantitative research in the social sciences, in contrast to natural sciences, social sciences
have arguably failed to produce almost any universally valid theories/explanations
(Faber and Scheper, 2003). This theoretical paper explored a range of potential reasons for
that “failure.”
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