Michael Houseman

2015 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 5 (1): 251–269
TRANSLATION
The hierarchical relation

A particular ideology or a general model?
Michael Houseman, École Practique

des Hautes Études
Translated by Eléonore Rimbault
The hierarchical relationship introduced by Louis Dumont has yet to receive the attention it
deserves. Drawing on Dumont’s own remarks, this text sets out to present the hierarchical
model in a systematic fashion. After dealing with a number of definitional issues (the notions
of encompassment, value, levels, ideology, etc.), it highlights the theoretical originality of
this model and considers some of the questions it raises: What possible forms can it take?
How does it relate to empirical facts? What mental processes does it presuppose?
Keywords: Louis Dumont, hierarchy, hierarchical relationship, encompassment, represen-
tations
I believe that hierarchy is not, essentially, a chain of super-im-

posed commands, nor even a chain of beings of decreasing dig-
nity, nor yet a taxonomic tree, but a relation that can succinctly
be called “the encompassing of the contrary.”
(Dumont 1980: 239)
The currently emerging debate on the idea of hierarchy encounters from the start
an all too frequent problem in the social sciences, and in particular in anthropology,
Editors’ Note: This article is a translation of Houseman, Michael. 1984. “La relation hiérar-
chique: Idéologie particulière ou modèle général?” In Différences, valeurs, hiérarchie:
Textes présentés à Louis Dumont, edited by Jean-Claude Galey, 299–318. Paris: Éditions
de l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. We are grateful to the publisher for
permission to publish this translation and to Philippe Descola and Anne-Christine
Taylor for suggesting this seminal article for translation in Hau.
his work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Michael Houseman.

T
ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau5.1.012
Michael Houseman 252
namely, that of propositions which, in spite of their theoretical implications, have

not been subjected to rigorous scrutiny. My aim here is to address this problem.
The principle of hierarchical relationship was introduced by Louis Dumont in
1966 by an innovative analysis drawing both on Talcott Parsons’ ideas on structural
affinities between subsystems of the social system, and on the organizational fea-
tures of Indian castes. Yet this idea has not been met with the substantial debate one
might have expected, and has encountered numerous resistances—among which
the strongest has certainly been the tendency to reduce hierarchy to a particular
form of social stratification. It is therefore difficult to assess the relevance of this
principle without scrutinizing it further, so as to assess its advantages and limita-
tions. Either the notion has little validity, which requires demonstration, or it pos-
sesses merits and virtues, in which case they should be put to use. Neither of these
two possibilities have been pursued thus far.1
Some may argue that in the absence of a more precise and expanded formulation,
this principle remains difficult to use. In this perspective, it is regrettable that, aside
from a few pages of a Postface entirely devoted to it, the hierarchical relationship has
yet to have been presented in a systematic fashion, and has thus remained the implicit
generalization of a comparative sociology based on Indian material. The necessity of
such a presentation as a stage prior to any discussion justifies the internal organization
of the following pages. Drawing on Dumont’s remarks, I will first try to specify what,
exactly, a hierarchical model might be. Then, by considering some of its aspects—and
some of the questions it raises—more closely, I will foreground its originality.
*
The principle of hierarchy as put forward by Dumont essentially rests on the follow-
ing proposition: most of the time, if not always, the terms of a given opposition are
related in different ways to the whole they compose; it follows that any relationship
that distinguishes between them is inseparable from a reference to the whole that
orders them with respect to each other. It is nevertheless useful, for the sake of clarity,
to discriminate between two versions of this principle. The first, which I will call the
“restricted” version, specifies the nature of this difference: one of the terms is identi-
cal to the whole, and as a consequence, encompasses the other term, its contrary. This
is a “hierarchical opposition” proper. The other version of the principle, which I will
call the “general” version, and of which hierarchical opposition is but a special case,
does not specify the nature of this difference; it simply calls attention to its existence
and draws consequences from this, among which the most important is the taking
into account of differences of value. Let us consider these two versions in order.
1. We may nevertheless mention the series of articles responding to the publication of the
translation of Homo hierarchicus (Madan 1971). Unfortunately, these comments suffer
from a confusion as to the meaning of the term “hierarchy” as it is used by Dumont.
It is interpreted, in particular, as akin to social stratification. I shall come back to this
point. Concerning the exploitation of the principle of hierarchy based on reliable and
extensive ethnographic materials, it is more or less limited to recent works by the mem-
bers of the Eramse (CNRS, France) and of the Groupe de Travail d’Anthropologie So-
ciale (Barraud 1979; Tcherkezoff 1987; Iteanu 1980; Galey 1983). I would like to thank
the members of this Group for their comments on an early draft of this paper.

253 The hierarchical relation
The restricted version of the principle of hierarchy proposes that just as a dis-
tinctive opposition (positing a relationship of contrariety between two terms) is
recognized, a hiearchical opposition (defined as an encompassing-encompassed
relationship between these terms) should be recognized as well. As an example,
Dumont invites us to consider sexual differentiation as presented in the Biblical
narrative, that is, the creation of Eve from Adam’s rib. In this case, Adam is two
things at once, and the relationship between him and Eve is consequently dual:
on the one hand, as a prototype of the human species’ male individuals, Adam is
opposed to Eve; on the other, as the original representative of this species from
which Eve was extracted, he encompasses her. The English word “man,” by signify-
ing both the category of male human beings and that of human beings in general,
has a similar bivalence. In both of these examples, one mythical, the other linguis-
tic, we can distinguish two levels: on a higher level, there is unity, on a lower level,
distinction. These two relations taken together—i.e., the conjunction of identity
and contrariety—constitute the hierarchical relationship.
Thus, hierarchical ordering does not derive directly from the intrinsic qualities
of the entities concerned, but from the interrelation of the categories these entities
represent. More specifically, it refers to a relation between a whole (or a set) and
one element of this whole (or set) where:
the element [e.g.: Eve, “woman”] belongs to the set and is in this sense
consubstantial or identical with it; at the same time, the element is
distinct from the set or stands in opposition to it. This is what I mean by
the expression “the encompassing of the contrary.” (Dumont 1980: 240)
Easily lending itself to formalization (e.g., Euler diagrams), the hierarchical relation
not only constitutes a clarifying alternative to the simple binary opposition, but
also provides a powerful and rigorous tool for intercultural comparison. In order
to better appreciate these two benefits of hierarchy, one must consider the general
version of this principle.
The general version of the principle of hierarchy proposes that most opposi-
tions, if not all, have a hierarchical aspect. To the extent that the terms of an opposi-
tion do not stand in the same relationship with respect to the whole they comprise,
their differentiation is inseparable from a reference to this whole that orders one in
relation to the other. And it is this reference to a totality, which, by ordering these
elements, establishes a difference of value between them. Hence, the relative value
of a pair of terms,
determined by their relation to the whole of which they are a part, is
inherent in their distinction; it . . . cannot be dissociated from their
distinction as if there were, on the one side, an idea of simple polarity,
and on the other, a value that would be superadded to it. (Dumont 1980:
243–44)
The classical problem of lateral symbolism (the preeminence of the right hand)
may serve to illustrate the usefulness of this principle. As a rule, this question has
been approached by assuming a symmetry between the two hands, such that one
goes about accounting for the preeminence of one hand over the other by linking
the left-right dichotomy to other oppositions that are deemed homologous (man/

woman, day/night, tribal moieties, etc.). The perspective offered here sheds a new
light on this question. The terms left and right cannot be defined in and of them-
selves, but necessarily refer to a whole, the body, which defines and organizes these
terms, and to which they relate differently. In any situation therefore, it is clear
that hands cannot be equal: “The implicit reference to the whole of our body has
as its necessary consequence the preeminence of one of the hands over the other”
(Dumont 1980: 243).
Hence the preeminence of the right hand turns out to be a false problem, at
least to a certain extent. It is a problem which arises when one forgets to refer to
a totality, and when an unfounded separation between facts (such as a presumed
symmetry) and values (a specified asymmetry) is introduced. This separation is
illegitimate: hands, Dumont notes, are different in value and nature at the same
time. The preeminence of one over the other is therefore not contingent but neces-
sary. The same is most probably true of other oppositions raised in relation to the
right-left couple.2
Recognizing the hierarchical aspect of oppositions does not, of course, resolve
the problem of their explanation. For instance, one still needs to account for why
the right hand is generally favored over the left, although not always. But it does
give us a more realistic framework to work with: “by substituting an asymmetrical
or ordered opposition for a symmetrical or equi-statutory opposition that does not
exist, we are drawing closer to the thought we are studying” (Dumont 1979: 811).
Considering values forces us to take into account specific situations, particular
points of view, and it introduces a new rigor in the study of the relationship be-
tween cultural elements.
Indeed, a hierarchical account of oppositions requires us to distinguish between
the situations and contexts in which these oppositions arise. Some more classical
approaches, in particular those that seek to carry out binary classifications, may of
course take such situations into account. However, most often, by introducing an
artificial separation between the facts (or ideas) and the way they interact within a
system of values, they tend to generalize the relations they establish without con-
textual reference. The construction of tables of equivalence that frequently accom-
panies such efforts exemplifies this mode of reasoning.
In short, the distinction of situations ceases to be considered as pertinent
at the moment we pass from elements to the set as a whole, as though each
situation were in itself independent of the “mentality” as a whole, though
it should be evident that the very distinction of situations depends on the
mentality in question. (Dumont 1979: 808)
By contrast, in a hierarchical perspective, given that the relative value of a couple
of terms, which is seen as constitutive of their distinction, relates to specific situa-
tions, defining the context is crucial to assess both particular oppositions and the
way they relate to each other.
In this manner, a hierarchical perspective forces us to differentiate situations
both with regard to their nature and to their relative importance in relation to the
2. For a classical approach to this question, see Needham 1973; for a detailed reassess-
ment of lateral symbolism in a hierarchical perspective, see Tcherkezoff 1983.

system of cultural representations of which they are a part. What should one un-
derstand, then, by situation? The value of a series of terms, it has been previously
noted, derives from their relation to the totality they constitute. If we further assert
that distinguishing between situations requires an attention to values as well, it is
because doing so involves distinguishing between different totalities. In this way,
paying systematic attention to situations or contexts entails making a distinction
between the different ordered sub-sets, or, more exactly, the sub-systems that com-
pose a system of cultural representations. Dumont calls these sub-systems “levels,”
and he calls the sum of levels or sub-systems that comprise a given system of cul-
tural ideas and values (he speaks of “value-ideas” [idées-valeurs]) an “ideology”
(Dumont 1979: 808).
Here, a new problem arises: how can such sub-systems (or levels) be delineated?
The principle of hierarchy itself provides an answer: by changes, or, more precisely,
reversals of value.
By definition, a symmetrical opposition may be reversed at will: its reversal
produces nothing. On the contrary, the reversal of an asymmetrical
opposition is significant, for the reversed opposition is not the same as
the initial opposition. If the reversed opposition is encountered in the
same whole in which the direct opposition was present, it is evidence of
a change of level. (Dumont 1979: 811)
Value reversals—for instance when the left is favored over the right, when “woman”
is presented as encompassing “man” rather than the opposite, etc.—occur in situa-
tions or contexts associated with identifiable levels or sub-systems within an ideol-
ogy. Taking the existence of such sub-systems into account as an essential feature
of an ideology allows us to give a simple structural explanation for these inversions
that might otherwise—considering the trouble they introduce in interpretive at-
tempts based on binary classification—be brushed aside.
Nevertheless, we have yet to determine how these sub-systems or levels are orga-
nized among themselves. Dumont’s hypothesis is implicit in his two-fold use of the
word “level,” which he adopts to designate both the different dimensions of a given
hierarchical opposition (identity and contrariety), and the different sub-systems in
which this opposition and its reversal arise. The unitary integration of these sub-
systems, as well as their distinction, follow a hierarchical ordering: one level is
contained in another according to the principle of encompassment of the contrary
(hierarchy in the restricted sense). Thus, the elements of a sub-system are distin-
guished in terms of value with respect to the totality this sub-system represents, and
furthermore, the sub-systems themselves are also distinguished in value with respect
to the totality of which they form a part, that is, ultimately, the ideology as a whole.
When dealing with an opposition between a pair of terms, it is thus important,
while taking into account a relation of superiority/inferiority between them, to also
specify the ideological level at which this hierarchical relation itself is situated. One
tribal moiety, for instance, may be represented as superior to the other in some
situations, and inferior in others; this is because their interrelationship pertains
to two different levels or sub-systems, themselves hierarchically ordered within a
system of representation according to the principle of encompassment and not just
by virtue of being attributed different ranks.

Note, finally, that in the light of this hypothesis, the presence of a plurality of
sub-systems or levels (indexed by value reversals) is a quality inherent to the or-
ganization of ideological systems. Indeed, a given hierarchical opposition, a rela-
tion of superiority/inferiority between two terms, “cannot be true from one end of
experience to the other (only artificial hierarchies make this claim), for this would
be to deny the hierarchical dimension itself, which requires situations to be dis-
tinguished by value” (Dumont 1980: 244). Value differences sustained by the hier-
archical principle are thus not unilateral but “bidimensional”: the occurrence of a
hierarchical relation between a pair of terms in itself implies its reversal—i.e., the
realization of an ordering that is both “contrary” to the first and encompassed by it
(and therefore subordinated to it). In this way,
The reversal is built-in: the moment the second function [that of the
inferior term of the couple] is defined, it entails the reversal for the
situations belonging to it. That is to say, hierarchy is bidimensional, it
bears not only the entities considered but also on the corresponding
situation, and this bidimensionality entails the reversal (ibid.: 225)
We can now see that underlying this first overview of the “restricted” and “general-
ized” versions of the principle of hierarchy is a particular overall understanding of
ideological systems which includes the encompassing-encompassed relationship,
a taking into account of value differences, the bidimensional nature of superior/
inferior relations, and so forth. This view nonetheless remains implicit to a great
extent. To make it more explicit, let us look further into the nature of a general
model based on the hierarchical principle.
*
Hierarchy is considered here to be a general principle governing the organization of
ideological systems. The latter relate not to the world, but to representations of the
world. It seems unlikely, however, that the global structure of these systems is present
as such, as a kind of road map to the ideology concerned, in the minds of each of its
actors. Thus, in the perspective considered here, systems of representation founded
on the principle of hierarchy do not reproduce the thinking of particular partici-
pants. Rather, they are interpretations constructed by observers to account for the
ordered, collective integration of such thinking—an integration (and hence, the rel-
evance of these interpretations) which is attested by the systematic quality revealed
in the study of social phenomena. The use of these constructions is primarily ana-
lytical: they provide structural models allowing for accounts of such phenomena as
integrated into overall arrangements determined by a limited number of principles.
From this point of view, hierarchy is hardly unique: other principles, such as those of
dialectics or structuralism, allow for the elaboration of other types of models.
Dumont himself noted on several occasions the formal homology existing be-
tween hierarchy and dialectic, that consists in there being two levels, one of which
transcends the other. But this is their only common feature. Indeed, whereas for
dialectics the distinctive opposition between a pair of terms is a relation of contra-
diction, for hierarchy it is a relation of complementarity. While the former stems
from a substantialist conceptualization and primarily deals with the terms them-
selves and their logical relations with another, the latter is grounded in structural

thought and is concerned with the “universe of discourse” formed by these terms
and the internal relations that constitute it. Indeed, it is in light of this difference
that we can understand the two-dimensional character of hierarchical oppositions.
It is because the hierarchical relation establishes a relation of complementarity, not
contradiction, that a superior/inferior relationship between a pair of term can en-
compass its opposite, entailing an inversion of these values. Such an inversion does
not neutralize the relation between the elements concerned, but, on the contrary,
enriches the discursive universe they comprise.
Contrasting these two principles from the point of view of the dynamics they
bring into play only reinforces this fundamental divergence:
If we try to imagine a diachronic aspect, a process, corresponding to
[complementarity], it will be differentiation, by which what was our
“universe of discourse,” supposed to be at first unified, splits into two
[complementary] opposites. Contradiction on the contrary has been
used as a principle of process of development in time. (Dumont 1971: 77)
Hierarchy and dialectic are mirror images; they are, in this sense, true opposites:
[D]ifferentiation does not change the global setting, given once and for
all; in a hierarchical schema the parts that nest one side the other may
increase in number without changing the law.
The Hegelian schema based on the contradiction works quite differ-
ently. By the negation and the negation of the negation, a totality without
precedent can be produced synthetically. In fact, in Hegel’s thought the
deepest motive is to produce . . . a totality from a substance. In the hi-
erarchical schema, in the contrary, the totality preexists and there is no
substance. (Dumont 1980: 243)
These remarks allow us to emphasize, in passing, how important it is to distinguish
between hierarchy and social stratification. While the latter denotes a relation of
unilateral subordination between elements, hierarchy denotes a bidimensional
(implicitly reversible) subordination between them that is based on a reference to
a totality. In this manner, stratification and simple subordination, on the one hand,
and hierarchy, on the other, represent inverse perspectives: in one, the sum of par-
ticular inferior/superior relations, taken as primary units, are aggregated to form
a whole, whereas in the other, a differential reference to this whole determines the
constitution of the relations between the elements it assembles.
At the same time, the hierarchical principle contrasts sharply with the underly-
ing principle of the French structuralist approach:
Now, while in binary opposition the distinctive opposition used in its
pure form both atomizes the data and renders it uniform, the hierarchical
distinction unifies the data by welding together two dimensions of
distinction—between levels and within a single level. (Dumont 1979: 813)
Developing this idea further, we may say that according to the hierarchical model, the
ideological system, far from being monolithic is, on the contrary, both composite and
contextual: its integration depends not on a commutative logic, based on permutation
and analogy, and applied to homogeneous entities, but to an oriented logic, that of
asymmetrical encompassment, which preserves the heterogeneity of the elements it

brings together. In short, the hierarchical principle differs from the structuralist per-
spective in that it takes the complex nature of cultural phenomena into consideration.
Indeed, recognizing hierarchy is to place oneself in the field of complexity that
lies to either side of structuralism’s implicit assumption, which is that the whole
can be reduced to the sum of the relations between its constitutive parts. With the
restricted version of the principle of hierarchy, that is, the hierarchical opposition
per se, the whole is taken as equal to one of its parts; in the general version of this
principle, it is held to be more than their sum. Now, it is precisely this complex qual-
ity of the hierarchical model that underlies the integrative capacity of the systems
it determines. Thus hierarchy produces, by definition, configurations that cannot
be exhausted by their taxonomic interpretation. The latter, which systematically
results in inconsistencies—“among men, there are men and women” is such an
example—is necessarily partial. In other words, the principle of hierarchy acts not
so much to register observable differences, but rather to establish relevant distinc-
tions by incorporating them into global schemes—wholes—that cannot be reduced
to simple classificatory principles. In sum, the hierarchical relation, as a source of
complexity, generates structure.
We will come back to this, but let us note here that, by virtue of this complex-
ity, a hierarchical model is also radically different from the normative models ad-
vanced by British structural functionalism: contrarily to the latter, a model based
on the principle of hierarchy cannot define unilateral rules of organization based
on the absolute value of particular concepts (e.g., unilineal descent, exogamy, etc.).
In the perspective outlined here, not only does a given value-idea (concerning, for
instance, group membership, residence, matrimonial prescription or proscription,
etc.) encompass its “contrary,” but it is also integrated with the latter in a relation-
ship of subordination which can similarly encompass its own reversal.
What sets hierarchical models apart from those founded on dialectics or (French
or British) structuralism, that is, that which distinguishes the hierarchical opposi-
tion from contradiction, simple binary opposition, or unilateral subordination is
its dependence on a reference to a whole. The hierarchical model rests on this ho-
listic proposition: the integration of a system (or a relationship) is determined pri-
marily by its incorporation in a larger system. Now, this raises a new problem: what
about the system of cultural representations as a whole, the ideology itself? If we
take the above-mentioned proposition seriously, an ideology’s integration requires
that it also must be incorporated in a totality of a higher order. And for the latter
to be truly ultimate, it must remain, at least in part, inaccessible. In other words,
it must exceed or transcend ordinary experience. Thus, if the hierarchical relation
depends on a holistic principle, this principle in turn requires a logical legitimation
of a transcendental order. To partake of an ideology is to recognize a relation to a
transcendental whole which, following the hierarchical scheme, at once encom-
passes the social order per se and, at another level, is distinct from it. This ultimate
reference, in that it is presupposed by the very coherence of the ideological system,
permeates it and animates it in its most minute details. This is surely how we must
understand what Dumont calls the cardinal value of an ideology.
Based on the preceding comparisons, we may conclude that an ideological model
based on the principle of hierarchy can be identified as having three interdepen-
dent characteristics: (1) refusing to separate ideas from values, and consequently

requiring an attention to contexts and situations, it is made up of elements (value-

ideas) connected by relations of bidimensional subordination (hierarchical oppo-
sitions) whose constitutive aspects are complementary; (2) by combining different
levels, and combining identity and contrariety both within a hierarchical opposition
and between the latter and its implicit reversal, it engenders complex configurations
and sub-systems, that is, ones that cannot be reduced to simple classificatory schemes
(e.g., taxonomies) or unilateral normative rules; (3) positing a holistic perspective,
it makes a transcendental reference, that is, the recognition of a relation with some-
thing inaccessible (ancestors, spirits, deities, God, etc.) a necessary condition for the
cohesion of these sub-systems and for the integration of the ideology as a whole.
*
Having outlined the hierarchical model, it should be clear that it raises a host of
questions. I will now try to provide some answers, considering first the diversity
and the significance of the hierarchical relation, and then the relationship between
the hierarchical model and empirical facts. Finally, I will consider how the model
might be justified on the level of the mental processes it supposes.
Our first problem has to do with the possible diversity of hierarchical arrange-
ments and, more generally, the overall organization of an ideology. Since Dumont
asserts that most oppositions have a hierarchical dimension, we should wonder
how many distinct types of hierarchical relations can exist. Considering another
of Dumont’s affirmations, that hierarchy is essentially the presence of an “encom-
passing of the contrary” (Dumont 1980: 239), we may also ask: how many kinds of
“encompassing of the contrary” can be distinguished, and how are these different
types aggregated?
Let us first consider two of these types of hierarchical relations. One, which I
call the “extensive” type, is the hierarchical opposition per se (the case of the word
“man,” for instance), that is, the case in which the extension of a set or category
includes, at another level, its anti-extension (“woman”). The other, which I will call
the “anti-extensive” type, is simply the reverse: the case of a set or category whose
anti-extension contains, at a different level, the set or category itself. The distinc-
tion between the initiated and the uninitiated mediated by male initiation rites
provides an especially rich example of the latter type. At one level, this dichotomy
corresponds to the masculine/feminine opposition, where the (feminine) category
of the uninitiated includes male individuals (boys) as well as female ones (women
and girls). At a different level and similarly, it corresponds to the opposition be-
tween adults and children where the category of the uninitiated (children) includes
both adults (women) and children (boys and girls).
From a dynamic perspective, this second type of hierarchy is a development of
the first: while the hierarchical opposition properly speaking underlies—as it does
in the Genesis narrative—the emergence of a duality from a singularity, in this case
a duality, the initiated/uninitiated opposition, gives rise to a tripartite division that
distinguishes between individuals having undergone initiation, those having yet to
undergo it, and those who will never undergo it. And this three-fold distinction in
turn leads to the emergence of a new dichotomy between, on one hand, persons
naturally destined to undergo initiation and, on the other, those who, by their very
nature, are excluded from it. This of course is but a confirmation, in cultural terms,

of the biological sexual difference, and, in that respect, initiation does not create
new categories. Rather, it imposes a (culturally) reconfigured way of understanding
preexisting (natural) ones. Indeed, by incorporating a distinction between the sex-
es, as well as that between adults and children into a unitary hierarchical scheme,
it institutes these discriminations. In other words, by combining the categories of
age and sex in a hierarchical relationship, it orients the taxonomic interpretations
that can be elaborated with regards to them, thereby legitimating the emergence of
genuinely new ideological propositions, such as: “among male individuals, some
(initiated men) are more masculine than others (uninitiated men, boys),” “among
adults, some (women, uninitiated men) are less adult than others (initiated men),”
“among children, some (boys) are more childlike than others (girls),” and so forth.
From a synchronic point of view, the two types of hierarchies described above
can be combined in what we might call a “modular” hierarchical relation: a hierar-
chical relationship than encompasses its own reversal. Such is the case of the left/
right opposition where one of the hands, the one that usually dominates, is subor-
dinated to the other in situations that are associated to specific functions of the lat-
ter. We thus arrive at the definition of three elementary hierarchical configurations.
They all include, in different ways, two elements or value-ideas: (1) the hierarchical
opposition proper, which is an “extensive” hierarchy (that can be extended recur-
sively through the addition of supplementary terms where A encompasses B, B
encompasses C, etc.); (2) the inverse of this opposition, that is, an “anti-extensive”
hierarchy; and (3) a “modular” hierarchy which is a possible aggregation of form
(1) and (2), with specific properties (e.g., reversal) (see Figure 1).
a a
A B A B A B
a b a b
“man” / “woman” “initiated” / “uninitiated” “right” / “left”
Figure 1.
This typology leads to the following hypothesis: an ideology’s structure, though it

may vary from one case to the next, is always founded on an articulation of these
three modes of elementary hierarchical relation. Some features of the Biblical nar-
rative of the Genesis illustrate such an articulation. In Figure 2, the story of the
Genesis appears as a series of hierarchically ordered separations or differentia-
tions, where various elements (sky, earth, man, etc.) are simultaneously arranged

at different levels so as to form sub-systems which encompass each other (e.g.,

creation/procreation). The “cardinal value” of this ideology, the divine, intervenes
as a recurrent reference, underlying at once the constitution of these different sub-
systems and their overall cohesion. As the example suggests, from the perspective I
have laid out, the hierarchical organization of a system of representations does not
correspond to a fixed ordering of interrelations into a set layering of levels. Rather,
it corresponds to an “open” articulation of hierarchical relations whose global inte-
gration is based, in the end, on an ultimate reference (the cardinal value) which, to
a variable extent, is common to all of them.3
God
God Creation
(sky) (earth)
breath dust
(sky) (earth)
Adam Garden
(man) (earth)
Adam Eve
(man) (woman)
man woman
Figure 2.
3. The problem of the number of levels or sub-systems that can be incorporated into a
system of representations is worth raising here. Dumont tacitly refers to a configura-
tion with only two levels: an opposition and its reversal. Besides, with the caste sys-
tem in mind, and not excluding the possibility that there may be more levels, he cites
“the sophism of Zeno concerning Achilles and the tortoise: the hierarchical disposi-
tion entails that the successive distinctions [of levels] possible are of rapidly decreasing
global significance; in fact, as we know, Achilles catches up with the tortoise.” (Dumont
1979: 808). If we consider the problem somewhat differently, we can say that given that
a reference to a totality is taken as constitutive of the relations between the elements it
contains, and given that this reference is ultimately—in the case of an ideology’s cardi-
nal value—the same for all of these relations, the question of the number of levels loses
its significance and becomes essentially a formal, methodological consideration.

A second problem concerns the limits of the hierarchical model and, in con-
nection with this, what we might call its general symbolic productivity. If we
state that most oppositions have a hierarchical dimension, does “most,” in this
case, correspond to an empirical assessment? A theoretical necessity? In other
words, is the presence or absence of hierarchical relations determined by par-
ticular conditions? By specific classes of phenomena? Even if we accept (Dumont
[1980] 2013) that any opposition is implicitly hierarchical—that the recognition
of difference is ipso facto discriminatory, that distinction and equality are anti-
thetical—this does not mean that hierarchy is similarly relevant everywhere and
at all times. Thus Dumont notes, on several occasions, that modern ideology
seems to work against an awareness of hierarchical relations. It remains to be
elucidated whether there exists domains or conditions of knowledge in which hi-
erarchy is systematically favored, and others where it is systematically minimized
or concealed.
The development of the hierarchical principle itself suggests a possible answer
to this question: while this model was inspired by a classificatory system of social
categories (Indian castes), it does not generally fit well with indigenous systems of
classification of natural species. Might this be an invariant for which totemism—in
which natural distinctions provide templates for thinking about social differentia-
tion—would be the exception that proves the rule? The hypothesis entertained here
is that in a given system of cultural representations, hierarchy is privileged to order
elements considered to be specifically human. Resorting or not resorting to hier-
archical configurations draws as it were the boundary between a properly human
world, Society or Culture, and the rest, Nature. For instance, by incorporating age
and gender differences into a hierarchical scheme, initiation culturalizes or human-
izes these discriminations. Having thereby become the legitimate objects of social
determination, they are radically distinguished from analogous differences visible
in the animal world.
If we accept this hypothesis, modern ideology, which minimizes hierarchy,
does not move towards a humanization of the natural world; on the contrary,
it aims towards a naturalization of the human world, all the way to the ultimate
limit imposed by the individual subject, raised to the rank of cardinal value.4
Now, by proceeding in this way, modern society is confronted with a paradox: it
strives to deny that which allows it to define itself. As a result, a determination
of the social sphere can only be accomplished either by valorizing contradictions
explicitly, or by hierarchical relations expressed in the absence of hierarchy, that
is, as skewed relations of equality. Pushed to its extreme, this tendency leads to
the totalitarian double-talk described by George Orwell: “war is peace,” “freedom
is slavery,” “ignorance is strength,” the Ministry of Truth tells us in 1984; “All
animals are equal,” affirms the pig-dictator of Animal farm, “but some are more
equal than others.”
4. In this perspective, the importance of hierarchical opposition within the individual

proper in modern ideology should not surprise us: mind/body, will/desire, reason/
emotion, etc. On this question, we may refer to current studies on the functional later-
alization of cerebral hemispheres.

*
Until now, the hierarchical model has been envisaged essentially in relation to sys-
tems of representations. Now, I would like to consider briefly the connection be-
tween this ideological model and empirical forms of social organization. Indeed,
the principle of hierarchy may offer an original solution to the current anthropo-
logical dilemma regarding the relationship between ideology and observable social
reality.
The most common approach to this problem was developed on the basis of
African material by British structuralists. It posits a direct link between ideological
models and social forms. Ideology defines a number of clear-cut structural prin-
ciples governing norms of organization; those principles, expressed by (morally
connoted) juridical rules concerning, in particular, group composition (recruit-
ment criteria, rights and duties of group members, etc.), are deemed to determine
actual social forms. The most important limitation to this otherwise fruitful ap-
proach is its presentation of an idealized image of the social morphology, which,
all too often, conceals the variations of actual behavior: direct observation reveals
significant divergences between the structural model which foregrounds ideology
and the empirical reality it is supposed to account for.5
The other attempt to solve this problem is the outcome of the disillusion which
emerged in particular when the first approach was confronted with Papua New
Guinea societies that seemed to present an even wider gap between theory and
practice. In this alternative perspective, the link between ideology and social form
is held to be minimal if not non-existent. In short, it stipulates that society or at
least some societies are intrinsically disordered; they are, as the expression has
it, “loosely structured.” In such cases, an overall ideological model is held to be
largely irrelevant; empirical facts, deemed elusive to structural analysis, are to be
accounted for with models of individual decision-making based on the circum-
stantial intervention of factors external to social organization itself such as ecologi-
cal, demographic, or war-related conditions.
Very schematically, we could say that anthropological research is faced with
the following problem: either it accepts a structural model that does not entirely
account for the facts, or it takes these facts into account, but in the absence of such
a model. A structural model of the hierarchical type, by postulating an indirect re-
lationship between ideology and social forms, provides a possible solution to this
dilemma.
In such a model, structural principles, which relate to value-ideas in hierarchi-
cal relationships, do not define unilateral normative rules. As we have seen, not
only does a given organizational principle encompass its opposite (or is encom-
passed by it), but furthermore, the relationship of subordination between these two
“complementary” principles is implicitly reversible. The preeminence of one or the
other will depend on the context.
From an abstract point of view concerned with the system of representations it-
self, defining organizational principles in terms of general situations favoring their
5. The case of the “Nuer paradox” (Evans-Pritchard 1951: 28) has become a classic ex-
ample of such a divergence between practice and norm.

respective preeminence is fairly straight-forward; this is what allows for the elabo-
ration of “ideal” indigenous models entailing absolute organizational prescriptions.
However, from an empirical point of view that attempts to define particular, con-
crete situations with regards to the relative preeminence of these principles, the task
is more complicated. Such a definition, which invariably involves circumstances
specific to each case being considered, is necessarily more ambiguous. Of course it
may happen that the evaluation of all participants concur, in which case the situa-
tion will be determined automatically, so to speak. However, more frequently, this
determination emerges out of the confrontation of divergent evaluations, whose
resolution—a “consensus” of value judgments (often imperfect)—is mediated
through transactions (of words, of goods, etc.) among the actors involved. Either
way, in both cases, the choice is the same: either one or the other of the principles
of a “complementary” pair of principles will be applied; which one it is will depend
on the definition of the situation the participants arrive at. Therefore, at the empiri-
cal level, the actualization of a hierarchical model, because it requires a contextual
evaluation to determine the preeminence of the principles it incorporates, relies on
particular choices. It is the aggregation of such particular choices that constitutes
the social forms one can empirically observe; in turn, these forms provide a con-
textual reference which is of great importance in the determination of subsequent
choices.
The relation between ideology and social forms, thus meditated by particular
choices, does not, however, lead to an inherently disordered social organization.
This is because the value-ideas organizational principles point to, but also the
contextual situations that correspond to their relative preeminence, are hierarchi-
cally ordered among themselves. Consequently, for every situation considered, the
majority of choices will point in one of the directions possible. Thus, (statistical)
norms of organization are effectively realized; ideal models are indeed justified
(both by anthropologists and by those they study) by the existence of these overall
regularities. However, there remains a minority of choices, concealed by these ide-
alized constructions, that run counter to these norms. The model proposed here
also accounts for these; they also contribute, just like normative choices, to the
ongoing elaboration of social structure.
In this manner, the hierarchical model takes into account the existence of
(statistical) norms of organization, the elaboration of indigenous ideal models, and
incorporates all actual behaviors—including those that run counter to these norms
and models—into a structural analysis. Thus it solves the (false) problem of the
disjunction between ideology and empirical facts. By doing so, it eliminates the
unsatisfying notion of “loosely structured” societies.
The model proposed here is not less structural because it is not reducible to
unilateral prescriptions, nor are the hierarchical configurations described above
less classificatory because they cannot be reduced to taxonomies. However, it may
be better indicated to qualify this model as “structuring” rather than “structural”: it
does not describe a form of organization, rather—and this might be a superior level
of explanation—it describes the conditions that determine the emergence of this
form. Therefore it would be useless to attempt to draw from it generalizable rules of
behavior: these are necessarily either contradictory (incorporating the encompass-
ing of a contrary), or false (considering only one level). However, when combined

with knowledge of the diverse factors that can intervene in individual choices, it
can help determine, and thereby explain certain overall systems of behavior. Earlier
we saw how, in the case of initiation, hierarchy intervenes not to define categories
of age and sex in a univocal fashion, but rather to orient thinking about them.
Likewise, hierarchy intervenes here not by defining, in an absolute fashion, a set of
norms for action, but by structuring behavior in reference to these norms. In the
case of initiation, this results in a “system of thought” whose emerging properties
cannot be deduced from the categories themselves: “among adults, some (initiated
men) are more adult than others (women, non-initiated men).” The same is surely
true of social systems.6
*
Now that we have considered the usefulness of a hierarchical model for the analy-
sis of representations as for that of empirical facts, we must, finally, question the
admissibility of this model at the level of cognition. We may ask ourselves: what
do we have to assume about mental processes in order to affirm the relevance of
an ideological system based on the hierarchical model? The more substantial these
prerequisites are, the less relevant the model will be: the economy of the ideological
constructions it proposes would be contradicted by the weight of the presupposi-
tions regarding the mental processes it requires.
A possible answer to this question, offered as an hypothesis, consists in only
admitting one thing: thought is discriminatory, it inherently establishes superior/
inferior relations. This amounts to assuming that, by virtue of certain imperatives
and criteria, some of which may be of a non-conceptual order, the mind effectively
differentiates at once in value and in nature. Along with this assumption, which
does not seem unreasonable (it matches what we know about the process of social-
ization for instance), we must also add the observation that an individual can make
value judgments that are logically incompatible; he or she can affirm, at different
moments and in different situations that A>B and B<A. The global accommoda-
tion of such judgments corresponds to what the hierarchical model implies. First,
the coexistence in the mind of contradictory discriminations gives rise to a distinc-
tion between contexts, that is, between different wholes or “levels.” Then, given that
the discriminated entities are in different relationships with respect to these con-
texts, they acquire a truly “hierarchical” value according to Dumont’s definition.
Finally, in that these contexts are themselves differentiated from each other, they
themselves become the object of a valued discrimination. It is thus sufficient to as-
sume that the mind produces discriminations that are logically incompatible in a
more or less systematic manner—discriminations that also apply to the contexts in
which these valued distinctions occur—in order to arrive at the overall structure
described by this model.
6. Such a complex model has yet to be established; I have only tried to show here how the
principle of hierarchy may contribute to its elaboration. Nonetheless, I would like to
mention two attempts which, in different ways, are in keeping with the propositions
I have laid out: on the one hand, Raymond Kelly’s model of “structural contradiction”
(1977) and, on the other, Fredrik Barth’s generative approach (1981).

Here we have merely tried to sketch a minimal hypothesis. What matters is not
whether it is true or not, only whether or not it is possible. What does it reveal?
Contrarily to what we may have expected, the cognitive prerequisites of the hi-
erarchical model can be very light, lighter, in any case, than those assumed by a
(structuralist) model in which facts and values are treated separately. Indeed, while
the latter requires a set of distinct operations to establish a relation between ele-
ments, to assign these elements or relations to contexts, and to grant values to these
elements and contexts, the hierarchical model integrates values from the start and
thereby collapses these three operations into one. This simplicity speaks strongly in
its favor. But let us consider the other implications of our hypothesis.
It suggests that it is possible, even likely, that the mental processes involved in
the elaboration of a hierarchical system are qualitatively different from the dy-
namic that animates the system itself. Thus, according to our speculations, the
hierarchical relation of complementarity stems indirectly from a relation of con-
tradiction, and the “whole,” far from preexisting, actually results from a certain
treatment of the elements that eventually come to compose it. Our tentative hy-
pothesis also proposes that hierarchical value difference derives indirectly from
a preceding, nonhierarchical discrimination. In this manner, the hierarchical
model allows us to envision in a new way the connection between the ideology of
a society and the individual minds of its members, not as a direct relationship in
which the structure of one reflects the functioning of the other, but as an indirect
relationship between two radically different forms of organization. This model
suggests in short that the relation between these two planes is discontinuous and
therefore complex: that the passage from particularized functioning (individual
thought) to overall construction (a collective system of representations) is not
based on an extrapolation of elementary principles, but on the emergence of a
new synthetic logic. But let us describe further the divergence between these two
levels.
The ideological system’s structure as described by the hierarchical model cor-
responds to a global integration of the various contradictory discriminations made
by individual actors. Now, as we have already said, there is no reason to assume
that this structure exists as such in the minds of these actors. In this sense, the hi-
erarchical organization of an ideology represents a virtuality of individual thought,
not its actual functioning. Individuals have in mind, more or less systematically,
a multitude of contradictory discriminations, not their overall integration into a
hierarchical ideological system. The latter, as potentially present in the minds of
individuals, can of course find expression in the constructions of observers, and
in the words of the actors’ themselves. However, it remains that the elaboration of
such “indigenous models,” of such systematic ventures in self-interpretation, are
not at all necessary for individuals to participate effectively in their culture. An
analytical appraisal of cultural activities may demand a hierarchical perspective;
but the activities themselves do not depend on it; while a hierarchical outlook may
be necessary for the analysis of systems of representations, it is not required to
inhabit them.7
7. I have suggested that at the level of thought, discrimination may be realized without
referring to a totality. Such a (contextual) reference can be seen as the consequence

One of the limitations of the (French) structuralist model based on the prin-
ciple of binary opposition is that it is sufficiently simple to allow unwarranted slips
between mental processes and systems of representation, thereby eluding what
distinguishes these two very different registers. While the first refers to a universal
mode of individual functioning, the second refers to an overarching construction
that varies from one culture to the next. From this point of view, the hierarchi-
cal model has the advantage of being sufficiently complex to dissuade from such
illicit confusions, to effectively prevent them or at least greatly limit them. It is
indeed easier to imagine that individuals have in mind binary oppositions and
their transformations, than configurations of hierarchically ordered levels. By dis-
tinguishing clearly these two (cognitive and ideological) registers, the hierarchical
model poses the problem of the relationship that links them. In doing so, it raises
fundamental, unavoidable, yet all-too-neglected questions pertaining to the men-
tal integration of cultural systems, the relations between individual minds and
ideology.
*
This article considers the principle of hierarchy proposed by Louis Dumont from
a particular angle, as the foundation for a general model of ideological systems.
Once outlined, this model has been briefly evaluated in the way it treats cultural
representations, in how it relates to empirical facts, and with respect to the type of
mental processing it implies. To conclude, we should note that although this prin-
ciple remains marginal in anthropology, this is less so in other disciplines. More
and more, in fields as diverse as analytical philosophy, physics, psychology, biol-
ogy, or cybernetics, do we find a growing concern with the mechanics of paradox,
part-whole relationships, encompassment, an interplay of levels, holistic integra-
tion, and so forth. From this point of view, the hierarchical principle partakes in a
general movement that seeks to elaborate complex models. This is why it is worthy
of attention: as a possible and properly anthropological approach to this new and
far-reaching concern.
References
Barraud, Cecile. 1979. Tanabar-Evav: Une société de maisons tournée vers le large. Paris: Édi-
tions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme.
of the simultaneous presence of contradictory discriminations, where such value “re-

versals” give rise to distinctions between contexts. Alternatively, we may assume that
thought is contextual by nature, and that discriminations, which always occur in rela-
tion to a whole (a context), are therefore hierarchical from the start; they are by nature
bidimensional, implying their own reversal. In both cases, however, the same problem
remains: as long as we assume that the global structure of an ideology does not exist
as a general map in the minds of every participant, the overall hierarchical ordering
revealed by analysis can only be but a virtual one.

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La relation hiérarchique: Idéologie particulière ou modèle général?

Résumé : La relation hiérarchique telle qu’elle fut pensée par Louis Dumont attend
toujours de recevoir l’attention qu’elle mérite. En s’appuyant sur des passages de
l’oeuvre de L. Dumont, ce texte se propose de présenter le modèle hiérarchique
de façon systématique. Clarifiant d’abord certains problèmes de définition (les no-
tions d’englobement, de valeur, de niveau, d’ideologie, etc.), cet article souligne
l’originalité théorique du modèle et considère certaines questions qu’il soulève:
Quelles formes cette relation peut-elle prendre? Comment peut-elle être identifiée
au niveau des faits? Quels processus mentaux présuppose-t-elle?
Michael Houseman, a French-trained anthropologist, is a Directeur d’Études at

the École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris (chair of African religions) and mem-
ber of the African Worlds Institute (IMAf). Author of numerous articles on kin-
ship, social organization and ritual practice, his publications include Naven or the
other self: A relational approach to ritual action (Brill 1998, with Carlo Severi) and

Le rouge est le noir: Essais sur le rituel (PUM 2012). He is currently working on New
Age and Contemporary Pagan ceremonial and ritual dance.
Michael Houseman
Institut des Mondes Africains (IMAf)
27 rue Paul Bert
94204 Ivry-sur Seine
France
michael.houseman@cnrs.fr

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2015 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 5 (1): 251–269

The hierarchical relation