Article

Strength and Journal of National

Law University Delhi
Challenges of 6(1) 65–77, 2019
2019 National Law
OBOR Initiative: University Delhi
Reprints and permissions:
Indian Perspective in.sagepub.com/journals-permissions-india
DOI: 10.1177/2277401719857865
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Kanwal Deepinder Pal Singh1

Abstract
The One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative of China is an attempt to ‘remake’ or
recreate the ancient Silk Road or Silk Route, symbolising not only trade network
but more importantly cultural interaction. It is an ambitious Eurasian strategy
with large financial support, which aims to draw linkages from China to vari-
ous regions of the world. The connectivity and cooperation presented by China
between itself and the rest of Eurasia has two main components: the land-based
‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ (SREB) and ocean-going ‘Maritime Silk Road’ (MSR).
The ‘Belt’ includes countries geographically situated on the original Silk Road
through Central Asia, West Asia, Russia and Europe and has six main corri-
dors. Countries on the Belt and Road—especially those with underdeveloped
infrastructure, low investment rates and per capita income—could experience a
boost in trade flow and benefit from infrastructure development.
  The main challenge for China and for the initiative is the potential for conflicts
or geopolitical tensions that could emerge with other powers. This project will
increase United States’ attention on Central Asia and South Asian region. This
will have consequences for the smooth implementation of the strategy. There
is an expected resistance from Russia and Russian-led Eurasian Union (EU) that
may divide the relevant countries along the route, leaving them torn between
choosing to pursue stronger ties with Russia or with China.
  India also remains cautious of the project and still has not expressed its full
support. It sees the initiative not as an opportunity, but as a threat or a form of
competition. India’s objections are rooted in issues of sovereignty and territorial
integrity. For instance, India opposes the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC), a pilot project of the trade initiative, due to its route passing through

Professor & Dean, University School of Law and Legal Studies, Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha
1 

University, New Delhi, India.

Corresponding author:
Kanwal Deepinder Pal Singh, University School of Law and Legal Studies, Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha
University, Sector 16C, Dwarka, New Delhi 110078, India.
E-mail: kdps@ipu.ac.in
66 Journal of National Law University Delhi 6(1)

Gilgit-Baltistan, which is a disputed area between Pakistan and India. India has its
own agenda of connectivity and cooperation.
  This article shall first discuss the strengths and challenges of this project and
analyse the regional, national and international situations. The Chinese initiative
will be discussed, focusing on China’s domestic constraints along with regional
economic situation and political tensions in neighbourhood. The Indian perspec-
tive related to this initiative shall be discussed in detail, including the ‘Look East-
Act East’ policy. Planning and implementation of the project and its impact on
bilateral relations shall be discussed. The author shall also analyse the South
Asian perspective as a whole, which is plagued by territorial conflicts, bad gov-
ernance, security threats, impaired transparency, energy crisis, poor infrastruc-
ture, fragile institutions and limping economies.

Keywords
China, OBOR, India, silk road, connectivity, challenges

Introduction to Evolution of OBOR

The One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative of China is an effort to revive the
ancient Silk Road, symbolising not only trade network but more importantly cul-
tural interaction.1 President Xi Jinping introduced OBOR in 2013 as a land and
sea version of the silk trading route from sixteenth to eighteenth century. It is an
ambitious Eurasian strategy with large financial support, which aims to draw link-
ages from China to various regions of the world. The OBOR tries to present con-
nectivity and cooperation by evolving a land-based ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’
(SREB) and an ocean-going ‘Maritime Silk Road’ (MSR). The word ‘Belt’ is used
for the 65 countries geographically situated on the original Silk Road. There are
six corridors of OBOR and that have been proposed for probable economic
reasons.
China has shown amazing economic development in the last 40 years. The
Chinese economy has different dynamics.2 The massive GDP growth pattern of
China is due to mass production strategy and increased productivity. The improved
scientific production system in agriculture has connected rural and urban markets.
Investment in the infrastructure projects has created employment opportunities.3
Foreign policy of China is characterised by economic cooperation.4
China may want to correct regional imbalances of its landlocked provinces by
connecting these regions with neighbouring countries; for instance, a province
like Xinjiang can be developed by improving infrastructure and trade via Pakistan
1
  Research presented in International Conference on The Belt and Road Initiative and Global Governance
on 31 August 2018, in Royal Academy, Brussels.
2
  Yubaraj Sangroula, China South Asia Connectivity: Reflections on Benefits of OBOR in Nepal from
International Law Perspective, 5(1) Kathmandu Sch. L. Rev. 1 (2017).
3
  Wang Chen, Preface to Scientific Development in China: Volume Summary, China in the last Ten
Years (Wang Guoliang et al. eds., People’s Publishing House 2012).
4
  Xi Jinping, The Governance of China 315–319 (Foreign Language Press 2014).
Singh 67

CPEC. Moreover, the low-cost manufacturing base of China is facing rise in

wages and problems of excess capacity and overproduction. Since there is no
market for this surplus, China wants to make its industry qualitative and use this
surplus to provide foreign direct investment. It wants to give this surplus equip-
ment in steel, cement, etc., to Southeast Asian countries. This strategy was used
by China itself in the 1980s. It had also imported second-hand production lines
from countries such as Germany and Japan.5
This plan has three important components. First, it was thought to revive the
Silk Road trade system,6 which had earlier connected Asia with Europe. Second,
it was felt that the Silk Road could be extended to the Indian Ocean,7 South Pacific
Ocean and Arabian Sea. Third, it aimed to link world connectivity and economic
activity. This led to the concept of OBOR,8 which had the following characteris-
tics: (a) peace and prosperity of a region should be based on sovereign inequality
rather than its size or economic situation, (b) all regions should contribute to
the development, (c) there should be integration of the different states,9 (d) there
should be connectivity of nations in the region for mutual development, (e) there
should be mutual interdependence and (f) every nation should avoid conflicts.

Evolution of Indian Strategy: Look East-Act East

Globalisation has promoted international competition.10 Growth of the Indian
economy has led Indian leaders to form a policy to bring the Asian countries
together.11 Strategic analysts have discussed the importance of Southeast Asia,
and many a time India12 has supported foreign policy affairs in Southeast Asia.13
The Look East Policy (LEP) took shape in 199114 and the second phase of this
5
 Yong Deng, Chinas struggle for status: Realignment of International Relations (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2008).
6
 Sangroula, supra note 2.
7
  Wang Yiwei, The Belt and Road Initiative: What will China Offer the World in Its Rise 83 (New
World Press 2016).
8
  M.R. Dahlan, Dimensions of the New Belt & Road International Order: An Analysis of the Emerging
Legal Norms and a Conceptionalisation of the Regulation of Disputes 9(1) Beijing L. Rev. 87 (2018).
9
  ‘The Belt and Road Initiative will transcend the Marshal Plan. As early as 5 January 2009, The
New York Times tagged China’s going global strategy as the Marshal Plan for Beijing. This rhetoric
has become more popular after the Belt and Road Initiative was proposed. As a matter of fact, the
initiative, while not being a Chinese Marshal Plan, has gone beyond the level of Marshal Plan.
10
  Ministry of External Affairs Government of India, Annual Report 1995–96, New Delhi, 7, 118
(1996).
11
 Rajen Harshe, South Asian Regional Co-operation: Problems and Prospects 34 Econ. & Pol.
Wkly. 1100–1105 (1999).
12
  Dhrubjyoti Bhattacharjee, ‘India’s Vision on Act East Policy’, paper presented at national seminar
on ‘India’s Act East Policy: Problems and Prospects in North East India’ Indian Council of World
Affairs at Imphal, Manipur, 28–29 January 2016.
13
  ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference, Statement by His Excellency Mr. I.K. Gujral, Minister of External
Affairs of India (Jakarta, 20–21 July 1996), http://www.asean.org/?static_post<hig>=</hig>joint-press-
release-the-first-asean-india-joint-cooperation-committee-meeting-new-delhi-14–16-november-1996
14
  Vinod Anand & Rahul Mishra, India’s ‘Act East’ Policy: A Perspective, Vivekananda Int’l. Found., 20
November 2014. http://www.vifindia.org/article/2014/november/20/india-s-act-east-policy-a-perspective
68 Journal of National Law University Delhi 6(1)

policy began in 2003. The first phase15 emphasised political relationships, improv-
ing connectivity and enhancing trade, whereas the second phase stressed upon
economic relations and defence. In the second phase, LEP acquired strategic ori-
entation. After 2012, the Indian government moved towards the third phase called
‘Enhanced LEP’. This phase stressed on regional integration, reform and develop-
ment of the northeastern region. It adopted focus on cooperation and gave impor-
tance to free trade agreements (FTAs).

Indian Efforts to Connectivity

Northeast states of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura are known as Natural
Economic Zone (NEZ). India’s infrastructure in the northeastern states has been
weak. The Northeast region was strategically left underdeveloped so that it
became inaccessible to China after the 1962 border war. This also made the mar-
kets of Southeast Asia inaccessible to India.
The Indian government approved US$256 million to upgrade a 1,360 km-long
road from northeastern India to link the Northeast states with Thailand. This high-
way is proposed to run from Moreh in Manipur through Tamu in Myanmar to Mae
Sot in Thailand. It is planned to be linked to Cambodia and Vietnam. This shall
also reduce travel from Mekong River to India.16
Another project Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project aims to
connect the Kolkata seaport with the Sittwe seaport and Lashio in Myanmar.
This is planned to be linked to Mizoram in India by road, but the progress on
this project is slow.17 There is also a proposed Asian Highway from Imphal
(India) to Mandalay (Myanmar) via Tamu (Myanmar). A four-lane highway
between New Delhi and Singapore, through Kuala Lumpur and Kolkata, is
also being considered. There is also a trilateral highway proposed from Moreh
(India) to Mae Sot (Thailand) that goes through Bagan (Myanmar). There are
also recent culture and educational developments in the Northeast region of
India. These projects are aimed towards connecting regions socially, cultur-
ally, economically and politically.
The Modi government has opened a 9.2 km-long bridge across the Brahmaputra
River in order to move troops to the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, as
this region has been claimed by China. Northeastern states cannot be made acces-
sible without cooperation from Bangladesh.18 India has been proposing the ‘Look

15
  Seminar Report, Indian Council of World Affairs, Integrating Northeast in India’s Act East Policy
(23 February 2015), http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/creports/2014/seminarreport23022015.pdf
16
  Sebastian Biba, ‘Desecuritisation in China Behavior Towards Its Transbound River: The Mekong
river, The Brahmaputra River and the Irytish and ILI Rivers, 23 J. Contemp. China 21–43 (2014).
17
 Modi government plans venture fund to promote start-ups in Northeast, The Econ. Times, 20
January 2016, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016–01-
18
  J. Chaisse, D. Chakraborty & B. Nag, The Three-Pronged Strategy of India’s Preferential Trade
Policy, 26 Conn. J. Int’l. L. 415 (2011).
Singh 69

East, Link West’ policy since 2016, aimed at cooperation amongst South Asian
countries. India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed
the FTA in services and investments in 2014, but ASEAN members have not been
able to expedite the pact. Countries such as Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand
needed to improve domestic laws. These countries also have an apprehension of
Indian domination.19

Northeast Challenge
The above-discussed efforts have brought India closer to the ASEAN nations,
but India has not been able to exploit these opportunities. Northeastern states
still remain deprived of the benefits.20 The change in policy has benefited trad-
ers and industrialists to some extent, but has not met the expectations of employ-
ment generation. The present government has given priority to strengthening
relations within neighbours. The foreign policy has been upgraded to the ‘Act
East Policy’ (AEP).21
Despite all these efforts, there remain many challenges before the people of the
Northeast before they can integrate with Southeast Asia. The area has an uneven
political and economic playing field. The nascent democratic set-up of Indonesia,
two party semi-democratic structure of Malaysia and military rule in Thailand
reflect the same. Some challenges continue even after the shift from LEP to AEP,
namely China’s assertive posture, the South China Sea issue and fragile govern-
ance structures.
To counter the aforementioned challenges and to make the most of opportuni-
ties, there should be a comprehensive plan for rail and air connectivity in Northeast
India. This shall facilitate trade and integration.22 India, Myanmar, Bangladesh,
Bhutan and Nepal need to be modernised as border trade points.23 The Northeast
should be a point of convergence of trade.24 Opportunities need to be created in
the whole region.25

19
 A. Kawharu & L. Nottage, Models for Investment Treaties in the Asia–Pacific Region: An
Underview, 34 Ariz. J. Int’l. & Comp. L. 461 (2017).
20
  J. Mohan Malik, China–India Relations in the Post-Soviet Era: The Continuing Rivalry, 142 China
Q. 317 (1995).
21
 Jyoti, India’s Look East Policy: In Its Second Phase, 2 Global J. of Pharmaceutical Sci. & Educ.
1–14 (2013).
22
 Yaduvendra Mathur, India’s Look East-Act East Policy: A Bridge to the Asian Neighbourhood,
Symbiosis Institute of International Studies, International Relations Conference (2014). http://www.
irconference.in/assets/IRC_conference_proceedings.pdf
23
 Supra note 10.
24
  Indo-Asian News Service (IANS), India Needs Policy to Look East, Link West: Narendra Modi,
Deccan Herald, 25 September 2014, http://www.deccanherald.com/content/432698/india-needs-
policy-look-east.htm
25
  Namrata Goswami, Act East Policy: Northeast India as a Strategic Catalyst, CLAWS J. 70, 74
(2015), http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1548193442_NamrataGoswami.pdf
70 Journal of National Law University Delhi 6(1)

Chinese Perspective of OBOR: Prospects and Challenges

The Chinese feel that OBOR plans to link countries through infrastructure and
trade. The countries that are situated along the belt account for 63 per cent of the
world’s population and 29 per cent of global GDP. Countries on the Belt and Road
with underdeveloped infrastructure and low per capita income could benefit from
infrastructure development. It is felt that this project will have a positive impact
on the South Asian region. The project shall provide employment opportunities in
there and help South Asia to emerge as a leading economic power. The European
connection is the key to development since high-end products need a rich market.
This is why China wants to invest in its neighbours. China has presented an idea
of cooperation amongst more than 60 countries. This would also end United
States’ monopoly in world affairs and strengthen the Asian region. China feels
that South Asian countries have become saturated with regard to investment in
their own country. The bottlenecks in this region include financial infrastructure
and production with brain drain. Infrastructure bottleneck in turn causes proce-
dural bottleneck.26 This makes the initiative favourable for developing countries,
as the region will become self-sufficient without having to look West for financial
support.27
The growth of China has been quite uneven, and it seems that Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) is aimed at removing these regional imbalances too. Investment
in transportation infrastructure outside China is a way of boosting state-owned
enterprises.28
Apart from these prospects, there are problems and challenges to integrate the
South Asian region. BRI is a very Sino-centric strategy, which may benefit small
countries, but not larger countries.29 The member states face controversies and are
suspicious of each other. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) has not been able to remove deadlocks. There is a need to develop and
build consensus. This situation requires more communication and dialogue
between the countries. Chinese economic development can reshape the interna-
tional economic order, but can also be unjust towards smaller and developing
nations.30 The main challenge to this initiative is the conflict or geopolitical ten-
sion with other powers31 like the USA. This might affect smooth implementation
and the countries along the belt will face division. The most important challenge

26
  J. Huang, Silk Road Economic Belt: Can Old BITs Fulfill China’s New Initiative, 50 J. World
Trade 746–750 (2016).
27
 X. L. Han & Y. M. Zhai, Investor-State Arbitration Mechanism in Sino-Foreign Investment
Agreement under the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative, Chinese Rev. Int’l. Law 5, 32 (2017).
28
  Lu, Yang, The Establishment of ‘Belt and Road’ International Investment Disputes Settlement
Institution, 37(1) J. Law Commerce (2019).
29
  Lim Tai Wei, Lim Wen Xin, & Chan Henry Hing Lee, China’s One belt one Road Initiative 311–
326 (Imperial College Press 2016).
30
 J. Hanson & D. Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical
Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152(1) U. Pa. L. Rev. 129 (2003).
31
  Ivan Krastev & Mark Leonard, New World Order: The Balance of Soft Power and the Rise of
Herbivorous Powers, Eur. Council on Foreign Relations, 24 October 2007, http://www.ecfr.eu/
publications/summary/one_belt_one_road_chinas_great leap_ outward3055
Singh 71

is that most countries view China’s aims and strategies as an aspiration to domi-
nate its neighbouring regions. Another challenge is the existing disputes and ter-
ritorial issues with neighbours in the region. Countries involved in the OBOR are
in economic transition.32 Economic growth will influence the internal politics in
these countries. Chinese companies may not understand political undercurrents,
and there may be unintended consequences.
Underdeveloped market economies face problems of corruption and adminis-
trative inefficiency that can negatively impact Chinese firms. Threat of terrorism
is also an important challenge. Big countries such as the USA, Russia and India
will also contribute to challenging situations.
China urgently needs to articulate OBOR better to the world. There are differ-
ent interpretations. Some feel that it is giving a geographical opening to western
or southern regions and also developing countries. Some feel that it is economic
cooperation, while others think it to be cultural exchange. It is also debated
whether Silk Road would work in today’s times.

Indian Perspective on South Asian and Chinese Synergy

India considers synergy-based cooperation with its regional countries on a case-
by-case basis. Here, the country has not expressed support and the Indian govern-
ment has come up with a counter proposal in the form of Project ‘Mausam’.33
India has the potential to rise to position of the biggest economy, but has always
been hesitant to ride the bandwagon due to its non-aligned approach. It believes
in self-confidence and regional independence. The ‘informal meeting’ between
the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping at
Wuhan has raised hopes for improvement in Sino-Indian relations. This summit
was preceded by a military stand-off between Chinese and Indian troops in
Doklam in 2017. However, the strong Indian Prime Minister stuck to his decision
to visit China before elections, and the Summit concluded with the intention to
work towards territorial disputes. The Chinese attempt to build an alternative
international system is facing resistance from the USA, Tokyo and Hanoi. The
world is looking at India’s reaction. Indian and Chinese counterparts have also
agreed to undertake capacity building projects in Afghanistan. Recently, news
surfaced that the Indo-Pacific policy will also be discussed at the India–China
Maritime Affairs dialogue to be held in Beijing.

32
  P. Soja, Integration of the CLMV Countries with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 26(4)
Pol Q Int’l. Aff. 44 (2017).
33
  ‘Project Mausam’ is an initiative announced by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to increase
India’s links with countries impacted by the MSR. Characterised in the Indian press as a ‘transnational
initiative meant to revive [India’s] ancient maritime routes and cultural linkages with countries in the
region’, the project is seen as a direct response to China’s OBOR. See Sachin Parashar, Narendra
Modi’s ‘Mausam’ Manoeuvre to Check China’s Maritime Might, The Times of India, 16 September
2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Narendra-Modis-Mausam-manoeuvre-to-check-
Chinas maritimemight/articleshow/42562085.cms
72 Journal of National Law University Delhi 6(1)

The relationship between Beijing and Delhi is complex and difficult to man-
age. There are issues such as territorial dispute, China’s influence in the neigh-
bouring areas, its expansion over the Indian Ocean, the China–Pakistan axis and
military differences that cause inflexibility and uncertainty. Deployment of 30,000
‘security personnel’ along the CPEC route reflects China as an active player in the
politics of the Indian subcontinent. The negotiations on the territorial dispute have
made little progress. Agreements in 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012 and 2013 to stabilise
the border have not yielded results. There were tensions in 2013, 2014 and 2017.
Talks about economic progress have not mitigated disagreements, but have cre-
ated new tensions like trade deficit. The Wuhan summit has halted the deteriora-
tion of relations due to Doklam and has initiated a process of rethinking relations
and negotiating.34

Indian Perspective on OBOR

India has stayed away from the OBOR citing sovereignty, procedural and leader-
ship issues. CPEC, which passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), is
the main reason for India’s non-participation. It is felt that China must be sensitive
to India’s claims over PoK. India has also expressed concern about agreements on
infrastructure projects and debt repayment method that should be transparent.
China’s claim to usher ‘new type of international relations’ and build partnerships
over alliances opens the door for manoeuvrability. Maritime understanding with
Sri Lanka, the sale of eight submarines to Pakistan, increase of facilities at Gwadar
port and building of a base in Djibouti in Africa are certain decisions that impact
India35 and are interpreted as China’s unconcealed ambition for hegemony.
India has doubts regarding an initiative that appears rather glorious on paper.
The funding of BRI remains largely undefined, while Chinese foreign banks such
as Exim Bank of China and China Development Bank now anticipate default
when certain countries have financially overextended themselves. It also appears
to be a sort of utopian vision, for it requires cooperation between governments,
businesses and civil society. Chinese financial institutions may not want to take a
risk, as the rates of return are still unclear.
India has two main objections. The first objection is with respect to the
CPEC—a flagship project under OBOR between Xinjiang in China and Gwadar
in Balochistan that goes through PoK and Gilgit-Baltistan. Second, India looks at

34
  Ivan Lidarev, Is a China–India ‘Reset’ in the Cards? The Diplomat, 8 June 2018, https://thediplomat.
com/2018/06/is-a-china-india-reset-in-the-cards/
Ivan Lidarev is a doctoral candidate at King’s College London who specialises in China–India
relations and a former Visiting Fellow at New Delhi’s Observer Research Foundation. His research
has been featured in The Diplomat, The National Interest, East Asia Forum and The China Brief,
among other publications.
35
  ‘The dragon is spitting repeated streaks of fire. How long can the elephant be left behind?’ see
Srikanth Kondapalli, Why India is Not Part of the Belt and Road Initiative Summit, The Indian
Express, 15 May 2017, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/why-india-is-not-part-of-the-belt-
and-road-initiative-summit-4656150/
Singh 73

it as a unilateral Chinese initiative. India also takes it as an attack on its sover-

eignty. India supports regional cooperation, but it also has hegemonic ambitions.
It fears that Gwadar could become a Chinese naval base. India expects China to
promote constructive participation of all countries and organisations. It looks
towards an environment-friendly, stable and sustainable global economy. Many in
the Indian establishment view OBOR as a unilateral national initiative by China
rather than Asian economic development.36
India looks to China to define stakeholders, goals and projects better. Continuity
of economic growth is not certain, therefore the investment risks also need to be
discussed. India also wants China to resolve existing disputes with neighbours so
that economic development can be pursued as a common goal. India wants the
pursuance of economic goal with a focus on cooperation.37 India feels that the
promise of loans and development partnerships is being used over political inde-
pendence and sovereignty. India may not succumb to this lure, but many neigh-
bours have bad loans and India fears that it will be used for strategic leverage.
India views China’s investments in Kashmir as a violation of its sovereignty and
sees other projects as ways to limit India’s rise as a global power. India argues that
connectivity in Asia must be consultative, financially transparent and respectful
towards sovereignty. It feels that China aims to use trade investments politically
and expects that norms of connectivity and security should abide by the well-
established principles of international law to promote the free and open Indo-
Pacific region.38

Challenges before India

New Delhi has been promoting Japanese investment in the Iranian port of
Chabahar. Indian efforts towards joint India–Japan Asia–Africa Growth Corridor
are aimed at checking China’s OBOR initiative, though it is no match to BRI.39
The latter has secured wide recognition/acceptance. The West is also developing
a positive attitude towards China’s initiative. OBOR has already achieved a lot of
results, and the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor is still at the ‘blueprint’ stage.
OBOR is a development initiative, whereas the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor
finds roots in geopolitics. This counter strategy will have no negative effect for
two reasons. First, because the small nations favour BRI, and second because

36
  Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative: Mapping the World Trade
Normative and Strategic Implications, 52 J. World Trade 63–185 (2018).
37
  Irina Ionela Pop, Strengths and Challenges of China’s ‘One Belt, One Road Initiative’, CGSRS, 9
February 2016, http://www.cgsrs.org/publicationDetail.php?id<hig>=</hig>46
38
 Samira Saran, India Sees the Belt and Road Initiative for What It Is: Evidence of China’s
Unconcealed Ambitition for Hegemony, ORF, 19 February 2018, https://www.orfonline.org/research/
india-sees-the-belt-and-road-initiative-for-what-it-is-evidence-of-chinas-unconcealed-ambition-for-
hegemony/
39
 Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger et al., Far Eastern Governments and Politics: China and Japan
(2nd ed., Von Nostrand 1956).
74 Journal of National Law University Delhi 6(1)

India’s GDP is less than one-fourth of China’s and cannot influence competition.
Both China and India have a funding gap with respect to infrastructure.
India has to step up foreign diplomacy. It has to highlight that it anticipates a
debt trap in some OBOR projects, for example, Chinese investment in Pakistan
and Sri Lanka is showing poor returns and countries are in debt trap.40
China plans to do projects in Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand, but cur-
rently its projects are in economically backward countries such as Cambodia,
Myanmar, Nepal and Vietnam. This holds true for Africa, Central and Eastern
Europe and Greece as well, but European Union (EU) laws limit China’s oppor-
tunities. In Southern Asia, China is promoting projects in Pakistan, Sri Lanka
and Bangladesh. India, along with Japan, the USA and Australia, has to firmly
push back against China.

Analysis of Indian Strategy

More than two millennia ago, Kautilya wrote a political treatise called the
Arthashastra. It gave a notion of Rajamandala or the ‘circle of states’. It classified
kingdoms in four different categories. A kingdom that wished to expand was
called Vijigishu. A neighbouring enemy state of Vijigishu was called Ari. Any
strong state adjoining Vijigishu and Ari was called Madhyama. The neutral king-
dom that held strong influence on all three states above was called the Udasina.
The theory is premised on the hypothesis that for Vijigishu to expand its kingdom,
it needs to partner with its neighbour’s neighbour.
This theory is very relevant in the current geopolitical relationships between
India, China, Pakistan and other entities such as the USA, Japan, the EU and
Russia. These relationships are interchangeable depending upon which country is
Vijigishu. These relations become more relevant in the context of China’s OBOR
initiative. India (Vijigishu), finds itself trapped in the circle of states—Pakistan
(Ari) and China (Madhyama)—as it raises concerns about the CPEC.
In the treatise, Kautilya has also laid key principles that a state could employ
when trapped within this circle of states. India’s strategy towards the CPEC
and OBOR, when viewed from the lens of Chanakya is sound, but it can defi-
nitely be improved.
India must continue to build trading ports and routes in circle of states that
foster its geopolitical sovereignty. India’s investment in the Chabahar port of Iran
is about 75 km away from the Gwadar port. It should be seen that there are no
delays. Similarly, for Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar (BCIM) Economic
Corridor as well, India needs to build infrastructure in its eastern and northeastern
regions. Although India lags behind China in terms of economic strength and
infrastructure, it is forging closer ties in the Indian Ocean region, the USA and
Japan. India is working on a four-way dialogue with the USA, Japan and
Australia to develop an alternative strategy to BRI that would appeal to Asia.

40
  Spencer Sheehan, The Problem With China’s One Belt, One Road Strategy, The Diplomat, 24 May
2017, http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/theproblemwithchinasonebeltoneroadstrategy/ed
Singh 75

Closer cooperation among these four nations would help Southeast Asian coun-
tries that are exploring trade ties with China, but have political and military ties
with the USA. China is conducting strong intervention and forays into the Indian
Ocean. Though India is better positioned in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and
Myanmar than it was three years ago, deployment of warships is a cause of worry.
It is possible that this region could become a conflict zone.41
India can negotiate with the Chinese government to drop the CPEC projects in
PoK from OBOR. India could also negotiate to expand trade with Tibet. Border
trade through the Nathu La pass can be negotiated in the form of an established
Kolkata–Siliguri–Gangtok–Lhasa corridor.
Japan experienced a lukewarm approach from the USA and is therefore explor-
ing opportunities with China. Japan and China have expressed desire to explore
economic and strategic issues like high tariffs in North Korea and the USA, along
with the possibility of cooperation in infrastructure projects in third countries.42
They have also discussed the possibility of Japanese participation in the BRI,
provided China ensures that the projects are transparent. Japan’s openness towards
the BRI is interesting because it has also put forward alternatives like Partnership
for Quality Infrastructure (PQI) with India. India and Japan are also working on
the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor.43 India may take lessons from the Japanese
government and should not be completely closed towards the OBOR concept.
Similarly, the Sino-Indian differences should not be allowed to affect the BCIM
Corridor. This project could benefit eastern India and complement the AEP.44
Indo-China relations are important for the world in context of Washington’s ideas
on trade. This reflects that there is a need to rebalance Beijing, Moscow and
Washington. India has signalled to the world that it is a strategically independent
country both for OBOR and Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). India is
justified in staying out of the initiative until its concerns are addressed. The border
dispute should be settled and China should use its immense leverage with Pakistan
over the Kashmir issue.45 Coordination between China and India is the key to suc-
cessful implementation of the project.46
India has to think wisely about its geoeconomics, and not only its geopolitics.
We may negotiate for the return of Gilgit-Baltistan, to make LOC an international
boundary or to share the benefit in joining OBOR. India’s geographical location
is a huge advantage, especially for the maritime linkage. Silk route and economic

41
  D.H. Brooks, Connectivity in East Asia, 11 Asian Econ. Policy Rev. 176–94 (2016).
42
  S. Kim & J.W. Lee, Real and Financial Integration in East Asia, 20 Rev. of Int’l. Econ. 332–349
(2012).
43
 L. Chunhao, The Asia–Africa Growth Corridor: Content, Motivation and Prospects, 69 China
Int’l. Stud. 131 (2018).
44
  Ankita Panda, If India Won’t Put Up With the Belt and Road, Why Is It The Largest Recipient of AIIB
Funds? The Diplomat, 19 March 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/if-india-wont-put-up-with-
the-belt-and-road-why-is-it-the-largest-recipient-of-aiib-funds/
45
 Times of India Editorial. India Shouldn’t Join China’s BRI Until Its Reasonable Demands are Met,
25 April 2018, https://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-editorials/india-shouldnt-join-chinas-bri-
until-its-reasonable-demands-are-met/
46
  R. Sapkota, Nepal in the Belt and Road: New Vista on Building a China–India–Nepal Economic
Corridor, 67 China Int’l. Stud. 105 (2017).
76 Journal of National Law University Delhi 6(1)

belt connectivity is too big and complex to be done on by a single country, so both
countries need to be open to work together and with other willing South Asian
countries.47 From the Indian side, stalled dialogue is being revived and the gov-
ernment is going an extra mile. We also need to see how we can take advantage
without compromising on our identity, integrity and existence. Reiteration of the
claim to PoK is politically useful, but it does not in any way help in getting the
territory back. The Government of India may like to go by the policy of erstwhile
prime minister that ‘borders cannot be changed, but they can be made irrelevant’.
India’ role should reflect the idea of an integrated region that will protect national
interest. There is a need for peaceful coexistence. Indian participation will open
the space for creative participation and guarantee win–win for entire regime.

Conclusion
It would not be unwise to say that India is the country that holds everything
together. It is an important intersection of overland and maritime silk route. It
might be time for us to take a fresh look—it can be the genesis of better coordina-
tion and cooperation between governments of the region. It depends on how India
will use it for its own advantage. India definitely needs to stand for its own sover-
eignty, but detachment will be difficult if the project materialises.48
CPEC shall benefit landlocked states of Central Asia. It will provide a new
short trade route for the oil-rich Gulf region. It shall supplement the sea route. The
viability of this route does not depend upon Indian cooperation. Therefore, deci-
sions on OBOR remain a conundrum. Afghanistan’s projects and talks on the
Pacific Ocean are not isolated decisions. India’s views seem to change and a con-
sensus is replacing confrontation. Both countries are realising that economic
cooperation is the key to promoting growth in the South Asian region.49 It is high
time to abandon association with geopolitics and look forward to a different
world.50
The project, rather than being used for political supremacy, should be used for
the greater good of political and social causes and be large enough to accommo-
date ideologies. India and China need to take a holistic view of the situation. India
is currently ignoring the initiative of OBOR. China is attempting to integrate
South Asia with Eurasia, and Indian participation is necessary. This is not to say
that India should not seek clarification from Beijing about its plans. India should
stake its claim in this transformation. India and China should ensure that their
political differences do not affect economic cooperation. The sense of bonhomie
and positivity does not mean that the problems have dissolved. The border dispute
stays, and so does Dalai Lama in India.

47
  S. Hongyuan, The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government, 69 China Int’l. Stud. 86 (2018).
48
  Ben Hillman, Silk Road Blocks: The Problem with China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Policy, https://
crawford.anu.edu.au/files/uploads/crawford01_cap_anu_edu_au/2015–11/silk_road_blocks.pdf
49
  G.V.C. Naidu, India and Southeast Asia, 17 World Focus 82–84 (1996).
50
  The New Silk Road, 2 Econ. & Pol. Wkly. (2017).
Singh 77

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or pub-
lication of this article.