LLNL-TR-758734

Response Risk Assessment

Process for Chemical Incidents

C. G. Campbell, B. Greenwalt, E. Raber, S. Mancieri,

M. Dillon, P. Roy, H. Byrnes, S. Harris, K. Heidecker

September 24, 2018

Disclaimer

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States
government. Neither the United States government nor Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC,
nor any of their employees makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or
responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or
process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein
to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the
United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. The views and opinions of
authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or
Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, and shall not be used for advertising or product
endorsement purposes.

This work performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344.
LLNL-TR-758734

LLNL-TR-758734
 LLNL-TR-758734

Disclaimer

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United
States government. Neither the United States government nor Lawrence Livermore National
Security, LLC, nor any of their employees makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes
any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any
information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not
infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process,
or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily
constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States
government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. The views and opinions of authors
expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or
Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, and shall not be used for advertising or product
endorsement purposes.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is operated by Lawrence Livermore National Security,

LLC, for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration under
Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344.

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Department of Homeland Security

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
CONTRIBUTORS
Dr. Mark Kirk

Dev Jani

Puneet Khan

CAPT Michael Schwartz

Bobby Baker

CAPT Joselito Ignacio

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

CONTRIBUTORS
Chris G. Campbell

Robert Greenwalt

Ellen Raber

Sav Mancieri

Michael Dillon

Kamalpal (Paul) Roy

Heather Byrnes

Steve Harris

Kelly Heidecker

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................... 1

1.0 Introduction 1
1.1 Background .............................................................................................................................. 1
1.2 How to Use This Document ...................................................................................................... 3
2.0 The Response Risk Assessment (RRA) Process ................................................................. 5
2.1 Overview .................................................................................................................................. 5
3.0 Planning and Preparation ................................................................................................ 8
3.1 Identify Critical Stakeholders/Partners .................................................................................... 8
3.2 Scoping Meeting....................................................................................................................... 8
3.3 Kick-off Meeting ....................................................................................................................... 9
3.4 Establishing the Scenario ....................................................................................................... 10
3.5 Information Gathering ........................................................................................................... 13
4.0 Facilitated Focus Groups ............................................................................................... 14
4.1 Overview ................................................................................................................................ 14
4.2 Establish Meetings Required for Information Gathering ....................................................... 14
4.3 Define Objectives for Specific Meetings ................................................................................. 14
4.4 Engaging/Scheduling Meetings ............................................................................................. 15
4.5 Facilitator Teams.................................................................................................................... 15
................................................................................. 16
4.6 Discussion Format .................................................................................................................. 16
4.7 Initial Research Validation ..................................................................................................... 16
4.8 Documentation....................................................................................................................... 17
5.0 Collecting Information .................................................................................................. 18
5.1 Overview ................................................................................................................................ 18
5.2 Handling Sensitive Information .............................................................................................. 18
5.3 GatherING Information .......................................................................................................... 19
5.4 Resources Used to Gather Data ............................................................................................. 23
5.5 Information Required from Geographical Areas or Venues ................................................... 25
6.0 Using the RRA Dashboard to Input GATHEREd Information ............................................ 27
6.1 Overview ................................................................................................................................ 27
6.2 How to use the RRA Dashboard ............................................................................................. 27
7.0 Informational Workshop ............................................................................................... 39
7.1 Overview ................................................................................................................................ 39
7.2 Present Results of Initial RRA ................................................................................................. 39
7.3 Capabilities Analysis ............................................................................................................... 39
7.4 Initial Response Action Validation ......................................................................................... 39
7.5 Additional Documentation ..................................................................................................... 39

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7.6 Initial Workshop After-Action Report..................................................................................... 40

8.0 Discussion-Based Tabletop Exercise Planning ................................................................ 42
8.1 Overview ................................................................................................................................ 42
8.2 Structure of Tabletop Exercise ................................................................................................ 42
8.3 Facilitator/Moderator Roles and Responsibilities .................................................................. 43
8.4 After-Action Report (AAR) & Lessons Learned ....................................................................... 44
8.5 Identify Action Items, Priority, & Responsible Owner(s) ........................................................ 44
9.0 Enhancements .............................................................................................................. 45
10.0 References ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 47
11.0 Glossary of Terms and Acronyms ................................................................................. 49
Attachment A: Example Partners/Stakeholders List ............................................................ 53
Attachment B: Leverage Areas and Critical Actions .............................................................. 54
Attachment C: Kick-Off Meeting Agenda ............................................................................. 57
Attachment D: Kick-Off Meeting Example Presentation....................................................... 58
Attachment E: Pre-Questionnaire Library ............................................................................ 62
Attachment F: RRA Dashboard Information Requirements .................................................. 67
Attachment G: Sample Stakeholder R&R Data Request Form .............................................. 71
Attachment H: Sample Informational Workshop Presentation ............................................ 73
Attachment I: Template for Informational Workshop After-Action Report ......................... 83
Attachment J: Template for Tabletop Exercise After-Action Report ...................................103

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TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure ES-1. RRA Operational Framework and Overarching Critical Tasks ................................................... 1
Figure 1-1. Components of the Nationals Preparedness System diagram from the DHS Threat and Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) Guide -
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201, illustrating the emergency response planning cycle
(2012). ........................................................................................................................................................... 2
Figure 1-2. The three steps of the THIRA process (CPG 201, 2018).............................................................. 3
Figure 2-1. Timeline/Flow of RRA Meetings Related to Seven Key RRA Process Actions ............................. 6
Figure 2-2. The Response Risk Assessment process is comprised of seven key actions .............................. 7
Figure 5-1. RRA information needs illustrated as the intersection of time, resources, and conditions in
the area. ...................................................................................................................................................... 19
Figure 6-1. RRA Dashboard concept of gathering inputs to produce standardized outputs for discussion.
.................................................................................................................................................................... 27
Figure 6-2. RRA Dashboard initial startup worksheet page ........................................................................ 28
Figure 6-3. RRA Dashboard Specific Scenario data entry page for internal scenario ................................. 29
Figure 6-4. RRA Dashboard Specific Scenario data entry page for external scenario ................................ 30
Figure 6-5. RRA Dashboard Community Capabilities data entry page ....................................................... 31
Figure 6-6. RRA Dashboard Community Capabilities data entry page (continued) .................................... 32
Figure 6-7. RRA Dashboard Emergency Warning data entry page for internal scenarios .......................... 33
Figure 6-8. RRA Dashboard Emergency Warning data entry page for external scenarios ......................... 33
Figure 6-9. RRA Dashboard Fire Assignments data entry page .................................................................. 34
Figure 6-10. RRA Dashboard HAZMAT Capabilities data entry page .......................................................... 35
Figure 6-11. RRA Dashboard Medical Assignments data entry page.......................................................... 35
Figure 6-12. RRA Dashboard Transportation Assignments data entry page .............................................. 36
Figure 6-13. RRA Dashboard Output - Critical Task Timing/Resource Summary ........................................ 37
Figure 6-14. RRA Dashboard Output - Summary Plots ............................................................................... 38

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TABLE OF TABLES
Table 3-1. Summary of Select Modeling Systems ....................................................................................... 13
Table 4-1. Facilitator Team Roles and Responsibilities ............................................................................... 15
Table 5-1. Timing of Critical Actions and Decisions .................................................................................... 21
Table 5-2. Information to be Gathered During Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Response Periods........ 22
Table 5-3. Example Planning and Response Agencies ................................................................................ 24
Table 5-4. Potential Resources for Background Research and Information Gathering .............................. 25
Table 8-1: Possible Meeting Attendees ...................................................................................................... 42
Table 8-2: Facilitator Teams for Tabletop Exercise ..................................................................................... 43

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has invested significant effort to assess whether cities and
communities across the nation have the capabilities to respond effectively in the event of a potential
chemical hazard release, terrorist attack, or natural disaster. The DHS strategy per Presidential Policy
Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8) is articulated in the National Preparedness Goal (2015) and
efforts to achieve that goal require a capabilities-based planning approach.
In an effort to assess these capabilities, Lawrence Livermore National Lab (LLNL) received funding from
DHS to develop a Response Risk Assessment (RRA) process for potential chemical hazard events. The
objective of the RRA process is to gather the essential information and data to evaluate limitations in
overall response capabilities using rigorous quantitative analyses that focus on minimizing casualties. At
the end of the process, a city or venue should be equipped with the actions it needs to take to meet
capability standards articulated under the DHS national preparedness strategy.
The RRA process uses the operational framework displayed in Figure ES-1 as a model to examine the
emergency response system in detail, from initiation of an incident through definitive medical care. This
operational framework is consistent with DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA)
National Response Frameworks, particularly the core capabilities, Emergency Support Functions (ESF)
(DHS, 2016) and National Incident Management System (NIMS)/Incident Command System (ICS) (DHS,
2017). The process framework is also consistent with the mission of the Department of Homeland
Security Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office (DHS, 2018).

Figure ES-1. RRA Operational Framework and Overarching Critical Tasks

Five municipalities across the nation worked with LLNL and DHS to implement demonstration projects
that took place in partnership with local agencies, organizations, and other key stakeholders at the state
and federal levels. Following the conclusion of the demonstration projects, LLNL prepared this
document as a manual to guide users in implementing a Response Risk Assessment (RRA) for potential
chemical hazard events.

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In addition to providing the background and foundation of the RRA approach, this document takes the
reader through each part of the entire RRA process. Key timelines, meetings, and analysis actions are
discussed and summarized in tables and figures.
Critical information requirements to establish response timelines, assess population exposure, and
consider capacity limitations that could increase casualties are presented in a manner that the RRA
facilitator may employ to guide discussions with partners. Community partners may then establish
actions for continual improvement in emergency response planning.
To get facilitators off to a running start, examples of materials, tools, questionnaires, presentations, and
templates used in an RRA are provided in the Attachments. They are encouraged to freely use and
duplicate these materials.
Finally, the document includes a summary of RRA enhancement areas and improvement opportunities
identified by individuals, agencies, municipalities, and organizations involved in the demonstration
projects. These nine enhancements are highlighted in Section 9.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION
To ensure that the United States is prepared to respond effectively to a potential chemical hazard
release, terrorist attack, or natural disaster, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established a
set of National Preparedness Priorities that focuses on a capabilities-based planning approach (DHS,
2006). Capabilities-based planning focuses on planning under uncertainty, since the next danger or
disaster can never be forecast with complete accuracy. As a result, the nation has been engaged in
planning and preparing for the full spectrum of existing hazards—a process which builds capabilities that
can be applied to a wide variety of incidents.
Capabilities-based planning is used to identify a baseline assessment of homeland security efforts by
comparing current capabilities against the Core Capabilities List defined in the DHS National Response
Framework (DHS, 2013) and the critical tasks associated with those Core Capabilities. This approach
identifies gaps in current capabilities and focuses efforts on identifying and developing priority
capabilities and tasks. These priority capabilities are articulated in a homeland security strategy and
Multi-year Training and Exercise Plan outlined in the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation
Program (HSEEP) (DHS, 2013). The 2013 HSEEP report defines the Core Capabilities as “distinct critical
elements necessary to achieve the specific mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation,
response, and recovery.”
In 2012, Congress appropriated DHS funding to conduct demonstration projects (as part of HSEEP) to
analyze community-level response capabilities during an emergency chemical hazard release. Lawrence
Livermore National Lab (LLNL) was tasked with developing a DHS Response Risk Assessment (RRA)
process (with objectives linked to the Core Capabilities), develop a Chemical Defense Framework, and
team up with local jurisdictions to carry out these projects in the field. As a result, LLNL and DHS
established partnerships with five cities chosen from a competitive field of municipal applicants as the
demonstration project locations.
Each of these projects had a slightly different focus. Three out of the five (Baltimore, Houston, and
Boise) included a comprehensive risk assessment, which included a threat, vulnerability, and
consequence analysis. Each demonstration project concluded the project by implementing a Tabletop
Exercise (TTX). These exercises, designed to test community response capabilities based on a chemical
hazard release scenario, provided the nation’s community emergency managers and first responders
with additional knowledge, skills, and tools to act swiftly and competently, protect lives, and restore
peace of mind in response to a large-scale chemical incident. This document has been developed as a
follow-up effort to those demonstration projects. It summarizes the necessary steps to analyze response
capabilities in a user-friendly format that includes templates and guidance tools.
The RRA process is also consistent with the mission of the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
(CWMD) Office, which it describes as “to counter attempts by terrorists or other threat actors to carry
out an attack against the United States or its interests using a weapon of mass destruction.” In
particular, the RRA process meets the CWMD strategic goals to enhance national capabilities, support
partnerships and close capability gaps, and to develop innovative technologies to meet partner
requirement and improve operations (DHS, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2018).

1.1 BACKGROUND
The strategic foundation for the RRA was established through the National Preparedness Goal (DHS,
2015), an initiative that established the National Preparedness System aimed at achieving community-
wide preparedness throughout the country.
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Response planning in the National Preparedness System must be viewed as a continuous cycle as
illustrated in Figure 1-1. Identifying potential
risk and hazards in combination with
scenario-based analysis leads to estimating
capacity requirements. Estimating those
requirements is followed by building and
planning for the resources required to
implement an effective response. Then, the
capabilities must be tested and validated.
That involves not only assessing current
needs and capabilities, but also challenging
and continuously improving upon core
capacities. The improvement opportunities
may then be incorporated into risk
identification and capability planning to
strengthen emergency response.
The RRA process is most closely associated
with the Identifying & Assessing Risk,
Estimating Capability Requirements, and
Validating Capabilities components of the Figure 1-1. Components of the National Preparedness System
National Preparedness System (Figure 1-1). diagram from the DHS Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk
Its focus is to examine response capabilities Assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR)
and perform a detailed review to generate Guide - Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201,
illustrating the emergency response planning cycle (2012).
requirements, thereby informing the
development of solutions throughout all five mission areas of the DHS National Preparedness Goal (DHS,
2015), but particularly in prevention, protection, and response.
The specific approach of the RRA process evolved from the DHS Threat and Hazard Identification and
Risk Assessment (THIRA) process (Figure 1-2), a guidance that was developed to implement the
Identifying & Assessing Risk section of the National Prevention System. [THIRA is fully outlined in the
agency’s third edition of the THIRA and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) Guide, Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201 (DHS, 2018)].
Consequently, the approach driving the RRA process is most easily described using the THIRA flow
diagram in Figure 1-2 below. It has three major steps:

◼ Identify threats and hazards of concern

◼ Give threats and hazards context
◼ Establish capability targets

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Figure 1-2. The three steps of the THIRA process (CPG 201, 2018)

Step 1 is a data gathering step focused on the unique factors of the community. It is broken into three
subcategories identifying sources, possible agents, and possible community areas of concern (“targets”).
Step 2 combines the data into a set of realistic scenarios.
Step 3 examines the community’s response system and compares against the scenarios to select those
that will challenge critical parts of the system to allow analysis and gap identification. For this reason,
the scenarios selected may not be those considered the most likely, but instead are those possible
scenarios that pose the most difficulty.
Pre-incident planning is critical for an effective RRA and must be based upon credible scenarios and
information that has the appropriate level of confidence, such as quantities of deployable resources
associated with an implementable emergency response plan. Exercising response plans help to identify
opportunities for continual improvements that enhance the plan’s effectiveness. As established in the
Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG)
201 (2018), response planning must be viewed as a continuous cycle as illustrated in Figure 1-1.

1.2 HOW TO USE THIS DOCUMENT

This document is organized as a manual to train facilitators how to implement a comprehensive RRA for
a given geographical area or venue. It was developed as a follow-up effort to the RRA demonstration
projects conducted by LLNL in five cities across the United States. The document summarizes the
necessary steps a team needs to take to analyze a geographical area or venue’s response capabilities. In
addition, the document includes many of the materials (such as templates, guidance tools, and
checklists) used in the process. It also trains the user how to input gathered information into the RRA
dashboard tool by showing a series of screenshots of the dashboard and data entry points.
The facilitator should follow all the steps outlined in this process to ensure that the RRA is both
complete and consistent with the standard procedures of conducting RRAs across diverse range of
geographical areas, communities, specific venues, and/or specific threats. However, simply following
procedures alone will not ensure a successful completion of the RRA. A thorough effort by the facilitator
to gather the required information is essential to establish a credible scenario and execute a rigorous
RRA for discussion with key partners/stakeholders.
Following the introductory section, this document presents the RRA process in the following sections:
The RRA Process, Planning and Preparation, Facilitated Focus Group Implementation, Collecting
Information, Entering Data into the RRA Dashboard, Informational Workshop, and Tabletop Exercise

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Planning. Instructions on implementing the tabletop exercise—the last event in the RRA process—is not
covered in full, as it is beyond the scope of this document’s focus.
Because the RRA process involves several key actions taking place concurrently, the document includes
cross-references in order to provide facilitators with a “big picture” look at what needs to take place
during each stage of the process.

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2.0 THE RESPONSE RISK ASSESSMENT (RRA) PROCESS

2.1 OVERVIEW
The RRA process is designed to evaluate the capacity and the capabilities of venues and geographical
areas to respond to a chemical spill or release. The evaluation is implemented through gathering
information using research, direct interaction, and facilitated focus group discussions with partners and
stakeholders. Next, that information is entered into a RRA dashboard tool that the assessment team can
use to conduct specific analyses in a range of areas. These analyses identify a venue or geographical
area’s capacity limitations by measuring to what degree it could properly respond to the spill/release
(based on current capabilities) in the event of a hypothetical yet realistic scenario developed by the
facilitators.
As illustrated in Figure 2-1 below, various meetings with different purposes and objectives are required
to implement the RRA process. These include the scoping meeting, kick-off meeting, facilitated focus
groups, and informational workshop, all of which lead to a tabletop exercise that uses a scenario to test
a venue or geographical area’s response capabilities. In addition, there are seven actions that are key to
completing RRAs: Initial Research, Partner Engagement, Problem Definition, Information Gathering,
Information Vetting, Capabilities Analysis, and Capabilities Testing. The “Seven Key Actions” row in
Figure 2-1 shows that many actions overlap with one another, meaning that at many points in the RRA
process, up to four actions may be taking place concurrently (such as during the kick-off meeting and
facilitated focus group sessions).
The RRA project team will engage the partners/stakeholders through a series of structured meetings
summarized in Figure 2-1. The partners/stakeholders that attend the scoping meeting will suggest
additional attendees for each of the subsequent meetings (See Attachment A for a list of possible
partners/stakeholders). The meetings should accomplish the following tasks: 1) establish the focus of
the project, 2) gather the critical information required for the RRA, and 3) analyze capability limitations.
The RRA process starts with a scoping meeting (convened by the host entity) and is followed by a kick-
off meeting. Other key activities taking place in these early stages include conducting initial research,
defining the problem, and gathering information to prepare for the facilitated focus groups. Note that
the information gathering stage (which takes place from the scoping period all the way through to the
conclusion of the informational workshop) is by far the largest and serves as the foundation for all work
that follows.
One major part of the information gathering period is the facilitated focus groups. They provide the
opportunity for additional information gathering, validation of current knowledge, assessment of
existing capabilities, and the continued building of cooperation and trust among key
partners/stakeholders. These facilitated focus group discussions will be followed by informational
workshops that bring together all key partners/stakeholders to review potential system-wide response
limitations.

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Facilitated Informational Tabletop

Meetings Scoping Kick-Off Focus Groups Workshop Exercise

Meet with project Establish rapport and Meet in focused Validate gathered Test response
sponsor and initially project acceptance groups of decision information by capabilities using a
identified partners/ with community/ makers and boots-on- discussing inputs and predefined scenario.
stakeholders to focus venue leaders and the-ground type results of a prepared Scenario is given to
the RRA process and decision makers. professionals initial RRA. Analyze attendees at
identify additional Agree on RRA project organized by ESF or resource beginning of meeting
partners/ needs and scope. type of contribution to interdependencies and RRA is
Objective(s) stakeholders. response efforts. and identify conducted through
Gather information on opportunities to discussion of
response capabilities. expand capabilities. response actions.
Identify response
limitations and
establish
improvement actions.

• Core RRA Team • Core RRA Team • Larger RRA • Larger RRA • Larger RRA
Team Team Team
• Project Sponsor • Expanded
Partners & • Decision makers • Expanded • Expanded
• Initially Identified
Stakeholders Partners/ Partners/
Partners / • Boots-on-the-
Stakeholders Stakeholders
Attendees Stakeholders • Community/ ground
Venue Leaders professionals • Community/ • Community/
Venue Leaders Venue Leaders
• Decision Makers
• Decision Makers • Decision Makers

Initial Research

Partner Engagement

Problem Definition
Seven Key Information Gathering
Actions
Information Vetting

Capabilities Analysis

Capabilities Testing

Figure 2-1. Timeline/Flow of RRA Meetings Related to Seven Key RRA Process Actions

The process depicted in Figure 2-1 supports gathering the information required for the outputs
summarized in the seven key actions of the RRA process. Figure 2-2 below illustrates the structure of the
process through the seven key actions, which are listed in blue boxes across the top of the figure. The
main activities that must be accomplished for each key action are listed in the underlying columns.

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RESPONSE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Initial Partner Problem Information Information Capability Capability

Research Engagement Definition Gathering Vetting Analysis Testing

Identify Key Invite Decision Define Potential Identify ID Critical Vet & Refine Identify Response Test Response
Aspects of Makers & Chemical Infrastructure, Potential Scenarios With Limitations Capacity/
City/Venue Stakeholders Incident(s) Targets, Supporting Stakeholders Capability
Infrastructure, & Vulnerable Limitations
Identify Engage Partners Initial Populations Establish Analyze
Scenario for Project Assessment of Response Resources Establish
Options Acceptance Available Plans, Collect Capacity/Capability Capacities/ Interdependencies Improvement
Capacities/ Targets & Estimates Capabilities Actions
Prepare Initial Agree on Project capabilities, & Challenge
Questionnaire Needs and Resources Review Regulatory & Explore Response Prioritize
Scope Emergency Management Response Capacities/ Improvement
Identify Local Identify Key Jurisdiction Limitations Capabilities Actions
Chemical Decision Makers (choke points)
Inventories & Stakeholders Assess proximity to Identify Capacity/ Agreements &
potentially hazardous Capability Improvement
exposure Limitations Plans

Establish Scenario(s)

Perform Modeling &

Calculations for Exposure
Footprint for Scenarios

Figure 2-2. The Response Risk Assessment process is comprised of seven key actions

Specifically, RRA is a process that examines the emergency response systems in a community that are
called upon when responding to a mass casualty chemical incident. It assumes an incident has occurred
and identifies those functions which will be overwhelmed, a dynamic that causes additional risk to the
impacted population. The RRA procedure addresses the four overarching leverage areas highlighted in
Figure ES-1 (Prime the Pump, Early Recognition, Stop the Exposure, and Treat the Wounded) through an
operational framework (also featured in Figure ES-1) that assists in defining agency roles, critical actions,
and associated tasks.
The Operational Framework is a model to examine the emergency response system in detail, from
initiation of an incident through definitive medical care. This framework is consistent with DHS/Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)’s National Response Frameworks, particularly the core
capabilities, Emergency Support Functions (ESF) (National Response Frameworks, 2013) and National
Incident Management System (NIMS)/Incident Command System (ICS) (NIMS, 2017). (See Attachment B
for a cross-reference between critical actions of the RRA Operational Framework, FEMA Core
Capabilities, and primary ESF).
This manual presents the RRA process in the following sections: Planning and Preparation, Focus Group
Implementation, Collecting Information, Entering Data Into the RRA Dashboard, Informational
Workshop, and Tabletop Exercise Planning. Instructions on how to implement the tabletop exercise—
the last event in the process—is not covered as it is beyond the scope of this manual’s focus.

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3.0 PLANNING AND PREPARATION

The project team begins the RRA process by convening a series of meetings with the project sponsor,
project team, and project coordinators for the geographical area or venue as necessary. This sets the
stage, establishes rapport, and builds effective working relationships. However, even before the first
meeting takes place, the facilitator and core team must take stock of the greater community that have
overlapping or similar mandates concerning chemical risk planning and emergency response.

3.1 IDENTIFY CRITICAL STAKEHOLDERS/PARTNERS

As a first step, the project team should craft a contact list for key partners and stakeholders, including
participants from applicable federal, state, and local agencies. Regional and multi-agency commissions,
task groups, and non-governmental entities should also be included if their participation is key to
addressing resource or knowledge gaps. This “whole community” approach ensures all aspects of a
community’s response network are included and addressed. Based on stakeholder input, the project
team develops an initial Roles, Responsibilities, and Resources (R&R) matrix for the participating
agencies, which will be vetted by the stakeholders/partners (at the informational workshop) prior to the
final Tabletop Exercise (TTX).
At the conclusion of the kick-off meeting (detailed in Section 3.3), the project team will have a more
complete list of partners/stakeholders to contact for follow-up focus group meetings (detailed in Section
4). These partners/stakeholders will include applicable federal, state, regional, and local government
agencies, private sector partners (e.g., large venue management, industrial facilities) and relevant non-
profit organizations. Regional and multi-agency commissions or task groups should also be included if
their participation is key to addressing resource or knowledge gaps among the other partner agencies.

3.2 SCOPING MEETING

The scoping meeting is the initial gathering of the sponsor, RRA project team, and project coordinators.
It is the first opportunity for the project sponsor to meet face-to-face with key identified project
coordinators for the geographical area or venue hosting the project. During this meeting, the project
sponsor will work with the project coordinators to define the RRA objectives, develop a list of potential
additional participating agencies based on the scope of the project [i.e., Office of Emergency Services
(OES), Fire/Hazardous Materials, Emergency Medical Service (EMS), law enforcement, etc.], and identify
the high-level agency participants that should be invited to the kick-off meeting. Additionally, the
project coordinators will work with the project sponsor during the scoping meeting to establish the
project schedule and develop the format for the kick-off meeting.
The facilitator, working on behalf of the project sponsor, will schedule a brief (1-2 hour) meeting
between the project sponsor, the RRA project team, and the pre-identified key project coordinators for
the geographical area or venue. These key project coordinators should include program leads from the
geographical area or venue (i.e., local OES Preparedness program lead, local Emergency Management
Agency planning lead, and the geographical area/venue’s general manager). The facilitator guides the
flow of the meeting and ensures that the following goals are accomplished or scheduled for further
discussion via additional meetings, teleconferences, or email.

3.2.1 Scoping Meeting Goals

1. Introduce the project and overall objectives to the project coordinators
2. Define the objectives for the planning meeting (which can be collaborative between federal and
city-level agencies)
3. Collectively identify local, regional, state, and federal agencies relevant to the project scope. If

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available, identify point of contacts (POCs) for the kick-off meeting.
4. Establish a project schedule
5. Develop the format for the kick-off meeting (including when, where, length, presentation style,
possible presenters, etc.)

3.3 KICK-OFF MEETING

The kick-off meeting is the initial contact and first official engagement for the various officials and
stakeholders involved in the RRA. Goals of this meeting include establishing credibility, agreeing on the
needs and scope of the analyses, obtaining acceptance with decisionmakers and stakeholders, and
making contacts to identify technical stakeholders who will provide information in the following phases
of the RRA. This is a meeting to decide how the RRA procedure will be performed, as well as to set the
stage for improving the geographical area or venue’s response capabilities by implementing the RRA
itself. It is not a place to provide analyses or solutions.

3.3.1 Kick-off Meeting Goals

1. Introduce the project and overall objectives to the partners and stakeholders
2. Employ transparency and integrity to build rapport and trust
3. Establish typical roles and responsibilities for groups and individuals involved in an RRA
4. Continue to identify local, regional, state, and federal agency POCs
5. Ensure partner resources are available for facilitated focus groups

3.3.2 Format/Participants
The kick-off meeting is typically a short (1-2 hour) meeting between the project sponsor, the core team
[e.g., facilitator, technical specialist(s), logistics team lead, and any additional support personnel deemed
necessary], the project coordinators, and key partners/stakeholders identified during or subsequent to
the scoping meeting. At the conclusion of the kick-off meeting, the project team will have a more
complete list of partners/stakeholders (agencies and/or POCs) to contact for follow-up facilitated focus
group meetings. Presentations for the kick-off meeting should include, at a minimum, a welcome
presentation (which would include at least one slide on the meeting objectives), and a presentation by
the project sponsor. A list of the typical meeting participants is provided in Attachment A.

3.3.3 Review of Objective and Process

During the kick-off meeting, participants review the objectives of the project and the process that the
RRA project team (now made up of the project sponsor, project coordinators, and the core team) has
developed for accomplishing the RRA objectives. It is essential that the partners/stakeholders
understand and agree to the objectives, and that they are in alignment regarding the operations plan for
implementing the entire process.
When reviewing the objectives, participants discuss the internal incident management communication
processes. They also assess and discuss the information-sharing capabilities between the public, private
sector partners, and federal, state, regional, and local government agencies. Additionally, participants
share their agency’s roles, responsibilities, and resource capabilities. It is imperative—both throughout
the meeting and during all interactions—that the project sponsor and facilitator emphasize to the
participants that cross-agency collaboration will be necessary. Such collaboration will ensure the
project’s success, as well as generate subsequent benefits to the community as a whole.

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 LLNL-TR-758734
The facilitator guides the agenda and flow of the meeting,
following the format for the kick-off meeting established
during the scoping meeting. (A kick-off meeting agenda
template and example presentation template are included
in Attachments C and D. The presentation can be modified
to meet the needs of the specific RRA and kick-off meeting).
At a minimum, the presentation should include project
goals and objectives, local/venue maps and pictures, and
current demographic information.

3.3.4 Agenda
Kick-off meetings should include the following topics:
1. Welcome and introductions (project sponsor, RRA
project team, project coordinators,
partners/stakeholders)
2. Operational security [classification of project
materials, how to handle Federal For Official Use Only
(FOUO) information, protecting shared information]
3. Meeting objectives
4. Project introduction and objectives (presented by
project sponsor)
5. Review of roles, responsibilities, and resource
capabilities of relevant agencies
6. Discussion of key concerns from participants, as well
as what they hope to gain from participation in the
project
7. Identification of a wider selection of key participants
and agency POC
Based on input (given from partners/stakeholders) during
the kick-off meeting regarding roles, responsibilities, and
resources, the project team develops an initial R&R matrix
for the partners/ stakeholders. This matrix will be vetted
during facilitiated focus groups that are held prior to the
informational workshop.

3.4 ESTABLISHING THE SCENARIO

Prior to collecting information from the facilitated focus
groups, an initial scenario is developed. This initial scenario
will determine the relevant RRA participants, as well as the
nature of the information that will be needed from each
participant. A credible initial scenario is developed with a
sophisticated understanding and knowledge of the
geographical area or venue involved, potential chemical
hazards in the area, established emergency response
scenarios in existing plans, general weather conditions, and
major population areas nearby. When facilitators have the
proper security clearances, it is recommended to engage the Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC), a

10
 LLNL-TR-758734
DHS facility that may be able to provide relevant Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment (CTRA) materials.
While specific CTRA results are classified, a Subject Matter Expert (SME) may review the material and
assist in determining if initial generalized scenarios could be credible.
The facilitator gathers the information required for the RRA based on the initial draft scenario. For
example, required information will be different depending on whether the exercise is planned for an
incident occurring at an outdoor venue versus inside a building or facility. The necessary data and
information will also depend on the chemical(s) of concern and exposure pathway(s). This document has
been prepared to facilitate the collection of information required to complete a rigorous RRA.
Prior to the facilitated focus groups, simple scenario modeling is required to display a contamination
plume and assess population exposure. ALOHA (Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres), an EPA
hazard modeling program commonly used to plan for and respond to chemical emergencies, can be
used for this purpose. This document discusses model selection and compares some of the more
common approaches used to generate plots, as well as the information required for the selected
scenario. Model inputs will include the release location, chemical hazard(s), wind speed and direction,
weather conditions, and other pertinent details associated with the release. Output plots, overlaid on
maps, should show an example of the extent of potentially impacted population(s) and exposure levels.
This information will help facilitate discussion with partners and stakeholders (USEPA, 2017).

3.4.1 Initial Scenario Modeling

To help gather information needed to conduct a meaningful RRA, the RRA project team prepares a set of
draft scenarios to review during the facilitated focus group discussions. Developing an initial scenario is
an effective tool to drive discussions with partners/stakeholders on how a geographical area or venue
can improve its emergency response procedures. By working through the scenario and reflecting upon
lessons learned from the emergency response effort, partners/stakeholders will identify pertinent
information for the RRA on potential areas of improvement. The example to the right (Scenario #1)
illustrates the benefits of this exercise.
As capability-based planning requires a collection of diverse scenarios, the draft scenarios should reflect
a range of chemicals (and their release amounts/rates), locations, weather conditions (such as wind
direction), times of day, seasons, and/or special events (such as major sporting events)—as well as hone
in on specific chemicals, locations, and release scenarios.
Using one or more modeling systems (see next paragraph), visual aids and other products should be
created. The specific aids that are developed should be determined from needs that are identified from
the focus groups. These could include:

◼ plots that show the chemical exposure (in the form of a plume) on a map (commonly used)
◼ videos showing how the chemical plume evolves over time
◼ maps of casualty risks (the likelihood that an injury or fatality will occur at a given location)
◼ casualty maps (expected number of people injured or killed at various locations)
It can be helpful to integrate these aids into a geographic display system (such as Esri [Earth Science
Research Institute] Geographic Information Mapping system software or the Google Earth online tool)
so focus group participants can examine the potential impacts in particular areas. Other modeling
analyses (in the form of data/information/presentations) that may be of interest include the total
number of people potentially affected, locations in which sensors are expected to be triggered, the
expected number of casualties, and the response and medical system loads (e.g., 911 calls, hospital
beds, emergency room visits). Finally, it can be helpful to develop aids that show the potential outcomes
for various critical decisions (e.g., sheltering).

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 LLNL-TR-758734
Develop the visual aids using one or more modeling systems and modelers. As there is no single
modeling system that is best for all scenarios and product types, care should be taken to select the most
appropriate resources to use based on the nature of the draft scenarios and desired products. The next
few paragraphs briefly summarize some important considerations when selecting the modeling
system/modeler. Table 3-1 below provides a brief summary of select modeling systems and tools. This
summary is not comprehensive; other modeling systems can also be used.
Physics-based modeling uses mathematical relationships to predict the consequences of a given
scenario. These systems commonly contain the following:

◼ Source term submodel (predicts how much, how fast, and in what form the chemical is released
into the environment)
◼ Fate and transport submodel (predicts where the released chemical goes, how it is transformed
and diluted)
◼ Human exposure submodel (predicts how many people are expected to receive a chemical
exposure)
◼ Health effect submodel (predicts the consequences of a chemical exposure)
Even within a given modeling system, these submodels can vary greatly in complexity and realism. As a
general rule, the more complex and/or realistic a submodel is, the more closely its results will reflect the
scenario being modeled. However, these systems require more input information and user expertise to
run and correctly interpret the results. To reduce the user/modeler burden, these systems commonly
rely on default information and in-house databases.
Since no model can predict the consequences of an event with complete accuracy, trade-offs are
inherently built into every system. Therefore, the model’s intended purpose should be considered when
evaluating the modeling system output. One important distinction is the difference between modeling
“at risk” areas where consequences might occur vs. “affected” areas where consequences are likely to
occur. Due to the challenge of obtaining reliable information during an emergency, many submodels
intended for response are designed to predict the areas and populations that are “at risk” so that
protective actions can be applied to as many potentially affected people as possible. Consequently,
systems using such submodels often overpredict the size of the geographical areas and number of
people who would potentially be affected.

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 LLNL-TR-758734

The Orange Book ALOHA HPAC

Modeling
(Emergency Response (Areal Locations of (Hazard Prediction Aeolus
System
Guidebook) Hazardous Atmospheres) and Assessment Capability)

Developer U.S. Department of U.S. Environmental U.S. Department of Defense Lawrence Livermore
Transportation (DOT) Protection Agency (EPA) / Defense Threat Reductions National Laboratory (LLNL)
and Agency

National Oceanic and (DOD/DTRA)

Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA)
Availability Publicly available Publicly available Not publicly available Not publicly available
Request support from the
https://www.phmsa.dot.go https://www.epa.gov/cameo/ Request support from DTRA U.S. Federal Emergency
v/hazmat/erg/emergency- aloha-software Management Agency
response-guidebook-erg
Intended First responders, Advanced first responders, Advanced first responders, LLNL modelers
User planners advanced planners, advanced planners,
modelers advanced modelers

Description The widely used Orange The ALOHA model provides The HPAC model can The Aeolus model can
Book provides guidance scenario-specific estimates provide scenario-specific provide scenario-specific
on potential (at risk) of potential (at risk) impact estimates of population at estimates of populations at
impact areas and initial areas. When combined with risk (common) or affected risk (common) or affected
response actions. a separate exposure (unusual). (unusual).
submodel, ALOHA can
Orange Book guidance is estimate the number of HPAC has a large variety of Aeolus uses an advanced
based on detailed people at risk. submodels that range in fate and transport submodel
modeling of transportation capability, realism, and to provide highly detailed
accidents, historical ALOHA has moderately complexity. estimates in complex urban
weather, chemical realistic (a) source term and areas.
transportation patterns, (b) fate and transport HPAC typically requires a
and predictions of submodels. significant amount of To provide high-fidelity
impacted areas for scenario information results, Aeolus requires
thousands of scenarios. ALOHA requires a moderate (depends on the submodels highly detailed input
amount of scenario used). information.
The Orange Book requires information and user
minimal scenario expertise. To reduce input To reduce input
information and user requirements, HPAC requirements, Aeolus
expertise. commonly uses previously commonly uses previously
developed default developed default
information (e.g., urban information (e.g., urban
terrain) and in-house terrain) and in-house
databases (e.g., weather). databases (e.g., weather).

Table 3-1. Summary of Select Modeling Systems

3.5 INFORMATION GATHERING

Although it is presented in a later section of this document, gathering the information required to
complete an RRA takes place throughout the majority of the assessment process. It begins in the pre-
planning (Scoping) phase and is only complete once the informational workshop has concluded (see
bottom of Figure 2-1).

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 LLNL-TR-758734

4.0 FACILITATED FOCUS GROUPS

4.1 OVERVIEW
As a key part of the RRA process, the project team will convene several facilitated focus group meetings
(each with a specific set of partner/stakeholder participants). The purpose of the facilitated focus groups
is to gather information that can help develop the draft scenario (which is in the form of a chemical
incident) used in the RRA. Meeting preparation requires the following steps:
1. Decide which groups of partners/stakeholders you want represented at each meeting. For
example, EMS Response and Transportation may be invited to one meeting.
2. Contact partner/stakeholder organizations and find which people have “boots-on-the-ground”
type of knowledge. Maintain a list of contacts and update them continually.
3. Find a convenient place and time for participants
4. Ensure that each partner/stakeholder group receives a copy of the Pre-Questionnaire specifically
created for the given audience prior to the facilitated focus group meeting. Ensure ample time is
provided to consider the questions. A sample library of questions has been provided in
Attachment E.

4.2 ESTABLISH MEETINGS REQUIRED FOR INFORMATION GATHERING

One facilitated focus group meeting should be conducted for each of the key agencies. At a minimum,
the project team should meet with the following local agencies:

◼ law enforcement

◼ fire department/hazardous materials (HAZMAT) response unit

◼ public health

◼ Emergency Medical Service (EMS)

◼ Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

◼ Venue management (if a public venue is included in the scenario)

The facilitated focus group meetings are no longer than one to two hours each. In general, no more than
10 individuals (including both the RRA project team and invited partner/stakeholder representatives)
should participate in each focus group. Meetings are structured and facilitated by the RRA project team.
Team preparation for the meetings includes becoming familiar with the available information resources
gathered during the information gathering phase.

4.3 DEFINE OBJECTIVES FOR SPECIFIC MEETINGS

The facilitated focus groups will be the second set of meetings with partners/stakeholders. The goal of
this set of meetings is two-fold. The first goal is to verify the information gathered up to this point,
which has been obtained through the scoping meeting, the kickoff meeting, online searches, phone
calls, and other methods. The second goal of these meetings is to gather additional information from
stakeholder representatives who work in field operations.
Setting meeting objectives are important for ensuring that the facilitated focus groups are productive
for all parties. Typical objectives include:
1. Validating and expanding key agency contacts

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 LLNL-TR-758734
2. Developing lines of inquiry and key questions to define responder roles, responsibilities, and
resources
3. Coordinating additional information-gathering teleconferences and meetings with project
partners
Partner/stakeholder representatives will come to this meeting prepared to answer questions based on
the pre-questionnaires they have reviewed ahead of time.

4.4 ENGAGING/SCHEDULING MEETINGS

The key agency contacts identified during the information gathering phase should be engaged in
determining a common date and local venue for the facilitated focus groups. The meeting place can be a
conference or meeting room in the agency facility to make it more convenient for the agency to ensure
the appropriate personnel are in attendance.
Once a date and location is selected, the project team emails a formal letter of to the agency contacts.
The invitation letter should include a brief description of the project and purpose for the meeting,
logistical information (date, time, location), agenda, pre-questionnaire, and a blank or partially
completed summary of roles and responsibilities. The invitees are requested to complete the forms
prior to the scheduled meeting and to be prepared to discuss them.

4.5 FACILITATOR TEAMS

Planning team members selected to attend the facilitated focus group meetings will have clear roles and
responsibilities during these meetings. Teams should be limited to no more than four individuals,
including the project sponsor (optional), a facilitator, a moderator or project SME, and a notetaker.
These roles are described in more detail in Table 4-1 below.

Table 4-1. Facilitator Team Roles and Responsibilities

Project Sponsor The Federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) POC provides funding and direction for the
(optional) overall project. During meetings, the project sponsor presents the project background and context
within a national framework.

Facilitator The facilitator plans and manages the progress of meetings. They moderate the flow of discussions
and provide additional information and clarification when needed by being knowledgeable of the project
and familiar with the pre-defined questions. The facilitator must be prepared to keep the meeting
moving forward when discussions stall.

Moderator/Subject The moderator/SME assists the facilitator by presenting and discussing material at a more detailed
Matter Expert level. They support the facilitator in ensuring that the meeting objectives are addressed and that the
(SME) meetings stay on schedule.

Notetaker The notetaker records participant meeting responses and information documenting roles,
responsibilities, resources, and capabilities as they are provided by the various agencies. They record
the response and other pertinent information (e.g., questions, concerns, notes on path forward) on a
form where the pre-identified questions have been listed with space for notes. Following the meetings,
the notetaker compiles the notes along with those provided by planning team members and
participants (if available). The compiled information is distributed to key individuals and used to further
develop the project documents, scenario, and other related materials.

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 LLNL-TR-758734

4.6 DISCUSSION FORMAT

When engaging partners/stakeholders during meetings,
they need to feel relaxed yet dialed in to the task at hand.
A level of trust needs to be established that allows for
honest exchange of ideas and information in a judgement-
free environment. The discussion format must reflect
these conditions.
The draft scenario, as well as documents reviewed prior to
informational meetings and R&R discussions, lead to the
development of the questions that will be used during
facilitated focus group meetings.
Key considerations include:
◼ Setting the right tone
◼ Scheduling the location and time for discussions to
maximize participation
◼ Asking questions in a non-confrontational manner
◼ Moderating a discussion-based meeting
Resources may be provided to assist staff from related
facilities and agencies understand the planning and
preparation activities needed to respond rapidly and
effectively to a chemical weapon agent (CWA) or toxic
industrial chemical (TIC) contamination event from both
the public health and decontamination perspectives. The
goal is to:
◼ provide and share chemical-terrorist response and
cleanup background and lessons learned from federal
government subject matter experts in the public
health, environmental sampling, decontamination,
and facility clearance arenas
◼ develop outlines of plans and procedures of how to
respond to chemical contamination events in their
respective facilities
◼ evaluate the chemical terrorism scenario that highlights public health and decontamination issues
◼ develop further guidance for possible future workshops with other critical transportation
infrastructure facilities
◼ increase coordination among transportation facilities and relevant agencies with respect to
counterterrorism activities
Information for this project has been
handled and categorized per DHS
Chemical and Biological Defense
Security Guidelines (DHS SCG S&T-
005.2, July 2016). Per this guidance,
the information collected from cities
has typically been classified as For
Official Use Only (FOUO) level and
have been marked and handled
accordingly.
FOUO contains information that may
be exempt from public release under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
It is to be controlled, stored, handled,
transmitted, distributed, and disposed
of in accordance with DHS policy
relating to FOUO information.
The information is not to be
released to the public or other
personnel who do not have a valid
“need to know” without prior
approval from an authorized DHS
official.
Throughout the RRA process, it is
important to discuss how the gathered
information will be handled/protected
at the start of each meeting and
discussion-based workshop.

4.7 INITIAL RESEARCH VALIDATION

To ensure an RRA that is representative of true capabilities and expected actions, previously gathered
information must be verified during the facilitated focus groups. Some information can be verified by
asking the participants explicitly, while other kinds of information may be better verified through the
organic discussion process. Verify that all the required information in Table 5-2 has been collected for
the specific facilitated focus groups so that the RRA tool analyses can be completed.

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 LLNL-TR-758734

4.8 DOCUMENTATION
During each of the facilitated focus group meetings, notes should be taken on the various topics
discussed. Notes from each meeting should be compiled into a single document that can be checked by
each of the facilitator team members for accuracy. It should be verified that all of the information
required in Table 5-2 has been gathered and confirmed during the focus group meetings. Notes and
completed worksheets will be used to prepare for the Informational Workshop, the next meeting in the
RRA process. An explanation of the data input requirements for the RRA is provided in Attachment F.

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 LLNL-TR-758734

5.0 COLLECTING INFORMATION

5.1 OVERVIEW
Gathering the best available information from geographical areas (and venues) that focuses on the core
objectives of the RRA builds recognition of a community’s response capability, identifies critical
information requirements, and establishes cooperation between local community response institutions
with local, state, federal, nongovernmental, and private partners. The response capability information
gathered comprises the information that is the basis of the RRA.
It is important to note that this information has typically been classified as For Official Use Only (FOUO),
which is exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). (See highlight box on
previous page and Section 5.2 for more details).
There is a wide range of information that must be gathered, including:

◼ Background information on specific target

◼ Available emergency response plans and resources
◼ Established scenarios relevant to the project
◼ Specific response time information to establish timelines
◼ Areas of population in relation to the scenario to determine exposure
◼ Capacity targets and actual resources available that could be limiting response activities
Each of these information types will be discussed in the following section, along with resources that can
be used to assist with gathering the minimum information required.

5.2 HANDLING SENSITIVE INFORMATION

Information for this project has been handled and categorized per DHS Chemical and Biological Defense
Security Guidelines (DHS SCG S&T-005.2, July 2016). Per this guidance, the information collected from
cities has typically been classified as For Official Use Only (FOUO) level and have been marked and
handled accordingly.
FOUO is the designation applied by DHS to Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) Information not otherwise
governed by stature which may be exempt from mandatory release to the public under Section 552 of
Title 5, U.S.C., FOIA (1996). Such information may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed
of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. The information is not to be released
to the public or other personnel who do not have a valid “need to know” without prior approval from
an authorized DHS official.
A similar approach has been used to handle the material collected from the LLNL-funded Chemical
Defense program. Before any information has been released, it has been reviewed by an Authorized
Derivative Classifier (ADC), an LLNL employee who is trained in identifying the particular type of
information that cannot be included in public documents for national security reasons. The ADC review
has included the following:

◼ Information for transportation nodes: If not classified, most of this information is typically
Sensitive Security Information (SSI) or Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI). Any
information which reveals a potential vulnerability may be classified and requires further review by
an ADC. SSI is information obtained or developed which, if released publicly, would be detrimental
to transportation security (e.g., railcars, ships, etc.) containing toxic industrial material. More

18
 LLNL-TR-758734
information regarding this caveat is available through an appropriate ADC.
◼ Specific site, facility, or location characteristics: Such information incorporated into a model
directly or in the form of a database for private, public, state, or local facilities is considered FOUO
unless also designated Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII). Information is FOUO
when the information, or compilation of information, is not well-known or available from open
sources. The information is unclassified when derived totally from open sources. (For all federal
sites or facilities, classification is determined by the providing federal department/agency).
Therefore, the information used for RRAs has typically been classified as FOUO. Similarly,
information derived directly from the Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC) retains the FOUO
designation.
As project information has been collected and needs to be released for review and use, specific
markings with appropriate caveats have been utilized upon review by the appropriate ADC. If designated
FOUO, the information has been password protected when sent over email and identified as FOUO
category with the appropriate caveats and handling requirements. A separate email containing the
password is then supplied. LLNL has used the required Department of Energy Classification box
guidelines for marking documents which has the guidance identified, review date, and name of the
appropriate ADC. The Laboratory also holds a record of the topics used for the classification review. If
this information is initially collected, reviewed, and sent out from DHS/Office of Health Affairs (OHA)
directly, different procedures/types of markings may be required.
It is imperative to discuss how the information will be handled/protected at the start of each
informational meeting and discussion-based workshop. This is important to the facility, local, and state
level organizations/agencies, and is especially of concern if other federal agencies (in addition to DHS)
are involved. LLNL has typically communicated details about information protocol with an introductory
slide when presentations are being given. Otherwise, it has verbally discussed these matters up front.
There have also been times when specific facilities have requested that LLNL sign a nondisclosure
agreement regarding all collected information. Another option used has been to employ memorandums
of understanding (MOUs) for specific geographical areas and/or venues. This will be up to the
participants to decide at that time. Using MOUs has enabled more open communication with regards to
the geographical area/venue’s potential vulnerabilities, gaps, and overall preparedness.

5.3 GATHERING INFORMATION

Based on the initial scenario defined in meetings with partners/stakeholders (as discussed in the
previous sections), the information needed to evaluate the response system can now be defined and
collected. To perform capabilities analyses, the information must be used to identify critical paths that
limit overall response to a chemical hazard incident. This may be done manually using response
timelines and scenario modeling. Alternatively, a simplified RRA tool that provides a dashboard
summary can be used. The tool is discussed in this document in Section 5.
There will be minimum information requirements to complete the RRA. In addition, gathering
supplemental information will help clarify
issues and establish recommendations for
continual improvement. Critical types of
information required for the RRA may be
grouped into three main categories:
1. Population Exposure
2. Impact Mitigation
3. Response Capacities/Targets

19

Figure 5-1. RRA information needs illustrated as the intersection

of time, resources, and conditions in the area.
 LLNL-TR-758734
These three types of information may be thought of in a Venn diagram of time, resources, and specific
area/conditions as illustrated in Figure 5-1.
The ability to utilize resources in a timely manner (response capacities) occurs at the intersection of time
and resources, while population exposure occurs at the interception of time and the area/conditions.
The extent to which actions designed to mitigate exposure impacts (i.e., prevent/minimize exposure, or
the consequences of exposure) are deployed occur at the intersection of the resources available in a
certain area/condition. At the intersection of all these areas is the overall response capabilities that are
the focus of the RRA.
The absolute minimum amount of information needed to implement an RRA for capabilities analyses is
listed in Tables 5-1 and 5-2 below. These tables are organized to list the required information, decisions,
and actions that comprise an RRA over the total response time. Three response phases (primary,
secondary, and tertiary) have been identified. Separate colors represent each phase in the tables, and
show the group of actions that take place over time. The information, decisions, and actions correspond
to multiple Emergency Support Functions (EFSs) as describes in the National Response Framework (DHS,
2016).
Table 5-2 provides a relative comparison of how actions and decisions from a range of capability targets
are executed among the primary, secondary, and tertiary response timelines. With the three time
periods laid out on the horizontal axis of the table, one can see when certain decisions and actions takes
place relative to other key decisions and actions that need to take place. For example, if the time
required to make a decision to shelter-in-place is too long, the exposure may already have occurred, and
the late decision provides no protection. Similarly, if individual decontamination of the exposed
population required too much time, the total exposure could increase casualties before individuals can
be cleaned. This points to the importance of understanding the locations of populations of areas or
buildings involved in a scenario.
Exposure assessment is based on the chemical, extent of the plume, and the number of individuals in
the area where hazardous concentrations are present. This information will be required to assess the
total population exposed during an incident. Finally, there may be response capacities in time, space, or
resources that are limiting the response effectiveness.

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 LLNL-TR-758734
Table 5-1. Timing of Critical Actions and Decisions

Capability Targets Relative Timing for Key Decisions and Actions

(CGP 201) Total Response Time
Early Recognition

First Response

Warning Systems

Fire Response

HAZMAT

Medical

Transportation

Primary Response Secondary Response Tertiary Response

Note: Boxes are organized as a relational time scale, with primary response actions occurring over a short
initial period, followed by secondary response, and the longer tertiary response actions. The size of the
individual boxes relate to the timing of the specific response actions.

In combination with the timing and exposure information mentioned, data that needs to be gathered
include available transportation, hospital beds, emergency triage capacity, or similar limitations as listed
in Table 5-2 below. This table specifies the critical information on timeline and resources related to
those decisions.
The first step in collecting this information is requesting documents from partners/stakeholders. The
facilitator will need to continue to gather and validate that information during the facilitated focus
groups. (A bank of possible questions to include in the information-gathering documents is provided in
Attachment E and F. The selected questions will vary depending on the initial draft scenario).
The specific information required will depend upon the scenarios being discussed. The questions in
Attachment E have been developed to be inclusive for most potential scenarios. The questions need to
be reviewed by the facilitator in advance to select the appropriate questions for the scenarios to be
discussed with the specific facilitated focus group (e.g., fire department, medical community,
transportation department). Attachment F outlines the specific information required by the RRA
Dashboard and clarifies the terms used. Facilitators should refer to Attachment F to understand the
information required to be collected during the facilitated focus group discussions.

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Table 5-2. Information to be Gathered During Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Response Periods

Capability Timing & Resources for Key Decisions and Actions

Targets
(CGP 201)
Request ranges for time (in minutes) and resources (quantity) from facilitated focus groups
Primary Response Secondary Response Tertiary Response
Situational Detection & Initial Notify dispatch Mitigation actions Immediate
Early awareness sensor identification (time) [HVAC, shutdown, actions to
Recognition (on-scene capabilities (ID) of threat self-care stop
crowd- (type/number) agent (to decontamination exposure
sourcing, 911 include (decon), clothing (time)
calls,..) symptomatic/ removal]
(time) clinical (type/time)
recognition)
(time)
Emergency Incident IC to decide IC to implement Plan rescue/ Establish Prepare for Rescue/
First Response Commander on actions/ extraction perimeter rescue/extra extraction
Response (ER) units on (IC) to assess evacuation/sh decisions (time) control/ site ction (time) throughput
scene the situation elter-in-place evacuation/SIP security (quantity/time)
following and ID threat (SIP) options (time) (time)
dispatch agent (time) (time)
(quantity)
Initiate Identify critical Adapt pre- Distribute Distribute ER
Warning emergency resources/ scripted emergency directions
Systems warning sensitive messages warning [evacuation/SIP,
system targets (time) (time) gross
(time) (time) decontamination
(gross decon),
etc.]
(time)
First firefighter Firefighters Firefighters Fire Chief Firefighters Initiate Arrival of Firefighters Decide on Gross
Fire on scene initially available for assess situation conducting source source additional determine gross decon decon
Response following responding call-up including suppression suppression resources specific options throughput
dispatch (quantity First (quantity) personal (quantity) (time) (time to actions for (time) (quantity/
(time) Due) protective activate site-specific time)
equipment Second Due) scenario
(PPE) (time)
requirements
(time)
HAZMAT to Identify Identify Determine PPE Unit dons Level A Operational Develop a Implement a Decide on Technical
HAZMAT arrive on hot/warm chemical requirements PPE (if needed) teams in sampling/ sampling/ additional decon
scene zones released (time) (time) chemical analysis plan analysis plan decon throughput
(time) (time) (time) protective (hand-held/ (time) options (quantity/
clothing laboratory) (technical time)
(quantity) (time) decon)
(time)
Emergency Assess Decision to Notify hospitals Available medical Deploy Initiate Available Patient
Medical Medical medical needs trigger mutual of medical counter-measures medical triage, medical capacity of
Technicians (time) aid needs (quantity, type) counter- staffed facilities medical
(EMTs) (time) (time) measures staging area, (quantity) facilities
available for (time) initial (quantity of
dispatch medical beds)
(quantity) treatment
(time)
Ambulances Additional Additional Available other Passengers per Deploy other Load and Average Unload and
Transporta- available ambulances ambulances modes of other modes of modes of mobilize transport initiate return
tion (quantity) are available (quantity) transportation transportation transport- ambulances/ speed (mph) with
(time) (quantity) (quantity) ation other modes transport-
(time) of ation (time)
transportatio
n (time)

The next level of information gathering will take place during the facilitated focus groups. During these
discussions, specific information required to run the tool must be collected. (For more information on
this topic, see Section 4). Table 5-2 may be used when gathering information to ensure all required

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information is collected. The discussion facilitator will enter information into Microsoft Word
documents. The information from these documents will then be pulled into the RRA tool automatically
when the analysis is run.

5.4 RESOURCES USED TO GATHER DATA

The objective in gathering data is to understand what the local responders have available as resources
and timing to address large chemical emergency events. When gathering information, the planning
team must understand that every community is different and that it is important to engage in a positive
way regardless of the level of preparedness of the particular community. Information gathered is used
to further develop the network of contacts and background data that will be used to refine the scenario
and RRA. It is recognized that the first few hours of response are managed locally and the RRA process
is designed to understand the local capabilities. The objective is to learn and understand, not critique.
The RRA Process is designed to allow the community to analyze and reach their own conclusions. The
RRA facilitators should drive discussion to assist the community, as needed. If the application of the RRA
is to a local or community event, then State and Federal partners are valued as observers in these initial
discussions and may be invited to participate with that perspective.

5.4.1 People
Using initial contacts provided by the project coordinators, the planning team conducts internet
research, cold calls, and emails, focusing on key staff from federal, state, and local regulatory response
and recovery agencies based on the initial scenario parameters. Discussions are preferably via phone
calls, but email is acceptable, particularly when the contact is difficult to reach. The following questions
are usually covered:
1. Briefly describe the project as it relates to the geographical area/venue.
2. Is the agency contact the appropriate person to participate? If not, which person should receive
authorization to participate in this project? Confirm the contact person’s information.
3. What project-related issues, questions, or concerns does the agency have that can assist the
planning team to prepare and prioritize content for subsequent meetings?
4. Is the agency contact aware of peers in related agencies that should be contacted for the same
purpose?
This process continues until the planning team and project coordinators feel that the database of
potential participants includes sufficient staff from key response and recovery agencies appropriate to
participate in planning and informational meetings. Examples of relevant response and recovery
agencies are presented in Table 5-3 below.

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Table 5-3. Example Planning and Response Agencies

Local Regional State Federal

Emergency Management Regional Transportation Emergency Management Environmental Protection

Agency (EMA) Authority Agency (EMA) Agency (EPA)

Health Department Regional Railroads Health Department Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC)

Police Department/ Homeland Urban Area Security Initiative Environmental Protection Federal Bureau of
Security Office (UASI) Dept. Investigation (FBI)

Fire Department/ Hazardous State Law Enforcement Federal Emergency

Materials Unit Agencies Management Agency (FEMA)

Emergency Medical Service Emergency Medical Service Federal Transit Administration

(EMS) (EMS) (FTA)

Local Transportation Authority National Guard/Civil Support Agency for Toxic Substances
Team (CST) and Disease Registry
City/County Management (ATSDR)

Venue Management U.S. Coast Guard

5.4.2 Data
Data collected for the project includes both documentation and demographics. For the specific
information required in the RRA dashboard, see Table 5-2.
Documentation should include:

◼ Incident response/management plans, including Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear

(CBRN)/Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-specific plans and annexes
◼ Technology studies
◼ Characterization/clearance/ sampling/analysis plans
◼ Environmental plans
◼ Waste management plans
◼ Health and safety plans (HASPs)
◼ After action reports (AARs) and lessons learned from previous chemical incident drills or actual
events
◼ Shutdown protocols for key systems
◼ Evacuation procedures
◼ Service restoration planning documents
◼ Demographic information includes:
─ Population numbers
◼ Maps of:
─ Populated/unpopulated areas
─ Railroads

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─ Ports
─ Airports
─ Mass transportation terminals
─ Schools
─ Large indoor and/or outdoor venues
─ Hospitals
The collected data is used by the planning team to further develop the scenario and guidance
documents. The project team uses a data request form (refer to Attachment G) as a means of gathering
input from the agency contacts. This form is sent to the contacts along with a blank R&R matrix prior to
the facilitated focus groups. The agency contacts are requested to come to the facilitated focus groups
prepared to discuss the information. Discussions of the gathered data during these meetings will ensure
that information (roles, responsibilities, resources, and capabilities) is shared between participants,
interagency communication is improved, planning for preparation and response is coordinated, and key
or “hot topics” (that can be resolved through partnerships, training, or other efforts) is identified by
participants.

5.5 INFORMATION REQUIRED FROM GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS OR VENUES

The facilitator will need to understand the physical layout of the geographical area or venue where the
scenario takes place. To do this, he/she should collect (but not be limited to) the information listed in
Table 5-4 (such as the internet, maps and emergency management plans provided by contacts or
through websites, online databases like the EPA Toxic Release Inventory, local hazard inventories, EPA
Risk Management Plans required for facilities that store larger quantities of hazardous materials,
material inventories in business plans typically managed by local agencies, and other reference sources).
Request all related and appropriate plans from the geographical area or venue ahead of time.
Table 5-4 lists potential online resources that may be available to research and gather information
requirements for the RRA. Many of these resources are summarized in the Threat and Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment Guide, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201 Supplement 1:
Toolkit (DHS, 2012b). However, the table is not an exhaustive list of available resources. Rather, it is a
starting list of suggested resources to focus one’s initial research. Refer to the CPG 201 Toolkit for links
to many of these resources.
Table 5-4. Potential Resources for Background Research and Information Gathering

Information Required Potential Sources

Topography of the area
Building sizes and geometry1
Chemical inventories for relevant local
facilities
Transported chemicals or regional
transportation statistics
Potential planning scenarios
Information on chemical hazards
Online mapping tools, U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) maps, EPA city plans
Facility plans or “As-Builts,” USGS digital elevation models, city/local
Geographic Information Systems or maps
EPA Toxic Release Inventory (online), Facility risk management plans
(where available), emergency management or RCRA contingency plans,
Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures plans, facility business plans,
other local inventories
DOT inventories, bills of lading, shipping manifests, Bureau of Transportation
statistics, Research and Innovative Technology Administration, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers Waterborne Commerce Statistics Center, USA Trade
Online – Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of
Commerce
Emergency management plans, emergency response drill after action reports
Areal Locations for Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA), safety data sheets,
Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

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Information Required Potential Sources

Infrastructure and key resources US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DHS OneView, U.S.
Department of Defense Base Structure Report, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Population distributions LandScan USA, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S.
Department of Commerce
Local weather conditions National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) – National Weather
Service, regional airport weather stations.
1 –Building size and geometry information is necessary for a scenario that involves a specific venue such as a stadium,
arena, or like structure.

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6.0 USING THE RRA DASHBOARD TO INPUT GATHERED

INFORMATION
6.1 OVERVIEW
The RRA Dashboard is a spreadsheet-based tool
that allows the user to input information gathered
from the focus groups (as described in Section 4)
and the geographical area/venue (as described in
Section 5) in combination with a specific scenario
or a general community scenario. Once the data
has been entered, the dashboard can analyze
different types of data (i.e., timelines, conditions,
and resources) and provide output (in a dashboard
format) that helps the facilitator identify where the
timelines or resources available may increase or
reduce casualties (see Figure 6-1). The facilitator
can run analyses on the dashboard based on
capabilities of organizations/agencies. Ranging
from basic to advanced, the analyses can give
insight on particular outcomes, such as an
estimated number of casualties that would result
from the scenario over time. Figure 6-1. RRA Dashboard concept of gathering inputs to produce
standardized outputs for discussion.
Conceptually, the dashboard may be thought of as
an information filter that analyzes timeline, condition, and resource data, summarizing key results that
assist the facilitator in framing a discussion on response capabilities. Key concepts to understand for the
RRA Dashboard include:
• The objective is to learn and understand, as a self-assessment.
• The output provides insight and is not meant to be absolute or model predictions.
• The tool is illustrative to compare results and allow participants to analyze and compare
scenarios.
• The range of capabilities and timing to include “likely” as well as a “least” favorable and “best”
(most favorable) inputs that may be analyzed for further improvement.
• The overall goal is to identify those actions that would have the greatest impact for optimization.

6.2 HOW TO USE THE RRA DASHBOARD

The RRA Dashboard is a series of Microsoft Excel spreadsheets (organized in workbooks) that have been
simplified to allow the user to input the necessary data and use the dashboard as the output. The
starting page directs the user to either a workbook designed for whether a specific scenario is being
employed, or a workbook designed for an RRA using a general community scenario.
Opening the “StartUp” worksheet will reveal the worksheet below (Figure 6-2). Selecting the “Start a
Specific Scenario” button will open multiple workbooks used for the analysis and direct the user to the
“AnalysisPrePlans” workbook, defaulting on the “Specific_Scenario_Definition” tab (Figure 6-3). This tab
should be used for specific events and threats, such as when there are established planning scenarios

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with a defined chemical threat and release location. The “General_Community_Scenarios” tab should be
used for scenarios involving larger areas (including locations that could be impacted by a potential
chemical), with known population groups. Since these areas are larger and exposure of the population
depends on specific conditions (chemical type, weather, time of day, etc.), the tool may be employed to
focus the scenario on the areas of greatest risk/threat.

Figure 6-2. RRA Dashboard initial startup worksheet page

For example, when “Start a Specific Scenario” is selected, the user will be directed to the
“Specific_Scenario_Definition” tab in the “AnalysisPrePlans” workbook to identify if the incident is
internal or external. Figure 6-3 shows the worksheet for an internal release. The user needs to enter the
following information:

◼ Scenario Name: Any relevant name the user prefers

◼ Source: Label/name the source of the release
◼ Location: Digital latitude and longitude (if latitude/longitude are only available in degrees, minutes,
and seconds there is a calculator tool to establish digital values)
◼ Chemical: Specific type of chemical released and potential exposure [the tool contains a database
of common chemical properties and groups many chemicals to similar categories related to their
behavior in the environment (decay, dispersion, etc.)]
◼ Quantity of release: Total estimated quantity of release in liters (internal) or gallons (external)
◼ Length of release: Time over which the release occurred in minutes

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◼ Building diameter: For internal scenarios, the longest linear diameter of the room in which the
release scenario would occur in meters
◼ Clothing type: Select either “hot” or “temperate” from drop down menu. This is used as a proxy of
amount of skin exposure for individuals with a chemical plume, where “hot” assumes clothing as
shorts and T-shirt and “temperate” assumes long pants and long sleeve shirt.
◼ Population: Total population in the geographical area/venue potentially exposed
◼ Security level: Whether a venue has basic security like metal detectors or backpack searches (as
opposed to uncontrolled entry).
If the scenario is external instead of internal, additional information is required for areas of potential
population exposure, the estimated population, and the percent of that population likely to be outside
at the time of the scenario (Figure 6-4). As data entry continues, separate information for each scenario
may be entered as appropriate. The output for each scenario will then be provided in a separate
“Analysis” worksheet.

Figure 6-3. RRA Dashboard Specific Scenario data entry page for internal scenario

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Figure 6-4. RRA Dashboard Specific Scenario data entry page for external scenario

Once the scenario information is filled out, continue adding gathered information to the remaining
worksheet tabs. Figures 6-5 & 6-6 show the “Community_Capabilities” tab where the information
gathered as described in Section 5 may be entered. These inputs relate to key timelines and resources
that impact overall response timing and effectiveness. They have been grouped by topic areas which
include firefighting capabilities, site operations, suppression operations, rescue and extraction,
decontamination, and community hospital data. The hospital data is required to determine available
patient capacities, travel times to and from the nearest hospital, and available medical
countermeasures.
The RRA Facilitator will input the “likely” or “initial” inputs in the white cells. This input should be
considered the planned or typical community or venue capabilities. The next two cells (blue and green)
may be used to demonstrate a range in response timing or resources as a “least” favorable or “best”
(most favorable) range of capabilities. These cells may also be used to illustrate alternative options to
compare different outcomes. The following figures include mock example data in the cells, to illustrate
implementation.

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Figure 6-5. RRA Dashboard Community Capabilities data entry page

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Figure 6-6. RRA Dashboard Community Capabilities data entry page (continued)

The “Emergency_Warning” worksheet is different for internal versus external incidents. Figure 6-7
shows the entry page for internal and Figure 6-8 for external scenarios. The data required for internal or
external scenarios are similar, including the typical times in minutes required for the specific task listed
to occur. If external areas have been identified, for example, they can each be given a different average
time to shelter-in-place.

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Figure 6-7. RRA Dashboard Emergency Warning data entry page for internal scenarios

Figure 6-8. RRA Dashboard Emergency Warning data entry page for external scenarios

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Then, the user can enter how the firefighters will be deployed in the “Fire_Assignments” worksheet.
Figure 6-9 displays an example where the number of firefighters are assigned to specific roles such as:
command, rescue, hasty decontamination, technical decontamination, non-ambulatory
decontamination, and medical support for each specific area. The total firefighters available and the
total assignment in this worksheet are listed at the top of the page.

Figure 6-9. RRA Dashboard Fire Assignments data entry page

Figure 6-10 displays the “HAZMAT_Capabilities” worksheet to enter time estimates and resources
available related to HAZMAT activities during the scenario. Similar spreadsheets for medical assignments
and transportation assignments are shown in Figures 6-11 and 6-12, respectively.

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Figure 6-10. RRA Dashboard HAZMAT Capabilities data entry page

Figure 6-11. RRA Dashboard Medical Assignments data entry page

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Figure 6-12. RRA Dashboard Transportation Assignments data entry page

Once all the data entry has been completed, the RRA Dashboard may be reviewed in the “Analysis”
workbook.
In the “Analysis” workbook in the “Outcomes” worksheet, the dashboard has two main components: a
critical task timing/resource summary and summary plots. The critical task timing/resource summary
lists response actions/decisions along with the time required to make those decisions (Figure 6-13). If
any of the columns are highlighted in red with the word “critical” above it, the actions/decisions are
identified as important to the overall response capability in the specific scenario. Below each column is a

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list of those tasks that were critical in producing the result summarized. For example, the “Evacuation
(Execute)” column is red with a total of 4 minutes for the action and 10.25 minutes cumulatively since
the start of the incident. Beneath that column, the box “Evacuated” is listed as critical, meaning this
decision time was the most critical contributor to the total time required to complete this
action/decision.

Figure 6-13. RRA Dashboard Output - Critical Task Timing/Resource Summary

The summary plots are further down on the “Outcomes” worksheet and include population exposure
(over time and total), onsite conditions (which details the number of deceased, individuals transported,
and casualties), and hospital conditions (including available beds and countermeasures) (Figure 6-14).
These plots add information to help clarify the consequences of the scenario with the timelines and
resources summarized in the critical task summary in Figure 6-13. The cumulative time for each action
(e.g., detection, warning, evacuation) is plotted. The on-site conditions display the number of individuals
that are deceased, have been transported, or remain as casualties onsite over time. Finally, the available
hospital beds over time are shown along with emergency medical countermeasures including
ventilators, bag valve masks (BVM), and oxygen used for casualties.

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Figure 6-14. RRA Dashboard Output - Summary Plots

The RRA Dashboard is designed to provide summary information to stimulate discussions regarding
opportunities to improve overall response capabilities. By thoroughly identifying the critical tasks that
may limit the effectiveness of response actions, the dashboard output may prompt a group to re-
examine a scenario and develop alternative assumptions for timing and actions.
Additional resources are available describing the technical details related to the RRA tool (Greenwalt
and Hibbard, 2017).

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7.0 INFORMATIONAL WORKSHOP

7.1 OVERVIEW
The informational workshop is held after the initial RRA is completed (which is finished after the data is
entered in the dashboard and analyses are run). The workshop brings all the partner/stakeholder
representatives together in one meeting to review and discuss the results of the initial RRA; vet the draft
RRA input; address any remaining information gaps, questions, and concerns; and introduce the
participants to one another. Attendees include both decisionmakers and field operations personnel.

7.2 PRESENT RESULTS OF INITIAL RRA

The goal of sharing the results of the initial RRA is to verify organization capabilities so that a scenario
can be developed for the Tabletop Exercise which will adequately stress the weakest parts of the
response network. After learning about the results, the workshop attendees will engage in a discussion
of these results. This allows each organization to both 1) see where the gaps in capabilities are expected
to lie and 2) to offer more information so that a more accurate RRA can be run.

7.3 CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS

The initial RRA will identify potential capability limitations in an emergency response community.
Consistent with CPG 201 (2012), capability targets are established by defining desired outcomes and
timeframes for achieving a certain outcome. Targets for core capabilities are then used to establish
capability estimation of resource types and need under tiered NIMS-typed resources (NIMS, 2017). The
RRA process can take the established resource requirements and analyze where interacting or
interconnected resource limitations may be developed for established scenarios.
During the informational workshop, the results of the draft RRA are presented to meeting attendees.
Attendees have the opportunity to see where the apparent shortfalls are in the emergency response
network. Some of these shortfalls may lie within the responsibilities of a certain organization. It may also
happen that the shortfall arises from the insufficient communication of information between
organizations or between steps in the response network. The gaps in response will be described by the
facilitator according to the timeline of events in the draft scenario.

7.4 INITIAL RESPONSE ACTION VALIDATION

After the result of the draft RRA is explained, the meeting attendees will validate the information that
was used to complete the draft RRA. A gap in the expected response may be due to a
miscommunication of resources. Validating the information input to the RRA will allow for a more
realistic assessment of the response network. The corrected/validated input information for the RRA will
be used to produce a final RRA that is used in the Tabletop Exercise.

7.5 ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION

During the informational workshop it is helpful to have the following prepared documentation:

◼ Informational Workshop Presentation

─ Guides the meeting and discussion, lays out the ground rules and assumptions
◼ Modeling scenarios
◼ Notetaking Worksheets
─ To be completed during meeting
◼ RRA Tool Input Worksheets

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─ To be reviewed and completed during meeting
The workshop presentation is used to guide the meeting. (An example is attached in Attachment H). It
should have the following components:

◼ Introduction of meeting purpose

◼ Introduction of facilitator team
◼ Introduction of meeting attendees
◼ Meeting agenda
─ Description of draft scenario
─ Explanation of how information was gathered up to this point from various
organizations
─ Discussion on RRA tool
─ Discussion on results of RRA tool using draft scenario and gathered information
─ Attendee discussion on tool results and information validation
─ Hot Wash
─ Next steps
During the informational workshop, notes are taken to use later in a finalized RRA and After-Action
Report (AAR). The facilitator team will come to the meeting with prepared notetaking worksheets. These
can be in both hard copy and electronic format. In addition to the designated notetaker and other
members of the facilitator team, any of the meeting attendees may be given the prepared notetaking
sheets. Notetaking sheets are collected at the end of the meeting and will be compiled by the facilitator
team’s notetaker.
In addition to notetaking worksheets, the RRA tool’s input worksheets should be available. As these
worksheets are directly input to the RRA tool, the facilitator team and meeting attendees can see
exactly what information is needed for a robust assessment. Meeting attendees can also see the default
values on the tool input worksheets that are used when information is not provided.

7.6 INITIAL WORKSHOP AFTER-ACTION REPORT

After the informational workshop, an AAR will be compiled drawing from the notes taken during the
meeting. (A template for this AAR is available in Attachment I). This report will be distributed to the
project sponsor and partners/stakeholders. The intention of the AAR is to summarize what was learned
during the informational workshop.
The informational workshop’s AAR should contain the following sections:

◼ Handling of Sensitive Program Information

◼ Planning Team
◼ RRA Design Summary
─ RRA Background, Purpose and Design
─ Scenario Summary
─ Exercise Capabilities, Objectives, Activities, and Analysis
◼ Core Capabilities Tested
◼ Overview
◼ Major Strengths Demonstrated

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◼ Primary Areas for Improvement Identified

◼ Conclusion
◼ Appendices
─ Agenda
─ Improvement Plan
─ Participating Agencies and Organizations
─ Acronyms

PATH FORWARD
The Improvement Plan will include specific actions for optimization that the local partners have
committed to track and implement. Following the Workshop and prior to a formal Table-Top Exercise,
there should be sufficient time allowed for the local partners to address opportunities and implement
action plans.

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8.0 DISCUSSION-BASED TABLETOP EXERCISE PLANNING

8.1 OVERVIEW
The Discussion-Based Tabletop exercise (TTX) is optional as the final meeting in the RRA process to test
the improved capabilities. This meeting may take place over one or two days, and involves a discussion-
based approach to exercising one or more scenarios. As a result of the TTX, a final RRA is generated from
the gathered information. The key component of the TTX is a discussion of the theoretical responses to
the scenario(s), which is guided by the facilitator team. This discussion helps identify areas for
improvement and potential chokepoints, which will be identified in the AAR.

8.2 STRUCTURE OF TABLETOP EXERCISE

The format of the TTX generally follows Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
guidance (DHS, April 2013). The TTX structure is linear, following a timeline of discussion points
developed by the project team and presented by the facilitator. The TTX is discussion-based, allowing all
participants to work through the scenario(s) in an open, no wrong-answer format.

8.2.1 Participants
In addition to the project sponsor and planning team (including the facilitator, any SMEs, and
notetakers). TTX attendees will include the partner/stakeholder representatives from the informational
workshop, plus any additional individuals that were identified as being necessary participants, or others
who would benefit from observation of the proceedings. TTX attendees can range from 50 to 70
individuals. The possible attendees are shown in Table 8-1.

Table 8-1: Possible Meeting Attendees

Organization Organization
Fire department Federal, state, and local emergency response
organizations
Hazmat (if different than fire department) Public transportation representative(s)
Law enforcement Hospital(s) representative(s)
Facility personnel (if applicable) Coroner
The facilitator/moderator team (moderators are typically pulled from the pool of SMEs) exercises the
RRA scenario(s) by engaging the participants in a discussion of the response process using one or more
of these scenarios (covered one at a time). The participants discuss the response actions that will be
take place as the scenario unfolds. These actions will be entered into the RRA tool to produce an
assessment of the response network based on information given during the exercise.

8.2.2 Documentation
The format of the TTX is provided to the facilitators and project team in a TTX Exercise Plan (ExPlan)
following HSEEP guidance (DHS, April 2013). The ExPlan consists of the following sections:

◼ Exercise Overview
◼ Handling of Sensitive Program Information
◼ Purpose

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◼ Exercise Assumptions and Artificialities

◼ Exercise Guidelines
◼ Exercise Objectives and Core Capabilities
◼ Participant Roles and Responsibilities
─ Information and Guidance
─ Player Instructions
◼ Exercise Structure
◼ Post Exercise and Evaluation Activities
─ Lessons Learned
─ Participant-based Hot Wash (including collection of Participant Feedback Forms)
conducted at the end of the TTX
◼ Appendices
─ Agenda
─ TTX Planning Team
─ Participating Agencies
─ Acronyms
─ Scenario 1
─ Scenario 2

8.2.3 Hot Wash

At the conclusion of the TTX, a hot wash—which is a debrief of an agency’s performance immediately
following an exercise, training, or major real-life event—is conducted by the facilitator/moderator team
for a first-run evaluation of the exercise from the perspective of the participants. During the hot wash,
comments are collected on participant feedback forms. Input is requested for all parts of the TTX
including logistics such as location, length, and accommodations, as well as the content and
effectiveness of the exercise. Participant feedback forms can be included as an appendix to the AAR.

8.3 FACILITATOR/MODERATOR ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The roles of the facilitator team will be similar to that during the focus group discussions and
informational workshop. The facilitator team is detailed in Table 8.2.
Table 8-2: Facilitator Teams for Tabletop Exercise

Project sponsor (optional) The federal DHS point of contact provides funding and direction for
the overall project. During meetings, the project sponsor presents
project background and context within a national framework.

Facilitator The facilitator plans and manages the progress of meetings and acts
in the role of response individuals and agencies not participating in
the meetings. They moderate the flow of discussions and provide
additional information and clarification when needed by being
knowledgeable of the project and familiar with the pre-defined
questions. The facilitator must be prepared with leading questions
when discussions stall.

Moderator/Subject Matter Expert (SME) The moderator/SME assists the facilitator by presenting and

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discussing material at a more detailed level. They support the
facilitator to ensure that the meeting objectives are addressed and
that the meetings stay on schedule.

Notetaker The notetaker records responses and information. They document

roles, responsibilities, resources, and capabilities as they are
provided by the various agency contacts during discussions. The
notetaker records the response and other pertinent information (e.g.,
questions, concerns, notes on path forward, etc.) on a form where the
pre-identified questions have been listed (with space for notes).
Following the meetings, the notetaker compiles the notes along with
those provided by planning team members and participants (if
available). The compiled information is distributed to key individuals
and used to further develop the project documents, scenario, and any
other related materials.

8.4 AFTER-ACTION REPORT (AAR) & LESSONS LEARNED

A template for the Tabletop Exercise AAR is provided in Attachment J. The purpose of the AAR is to
summarize the Tabletop Exercise details, identify the demonstrated strengths of Emergency Response
Networks, and flag possible areas for improvement. The AAR may include the following sections:

◼ Handling of Sensitive Program Information

◼ Exercise Planning Team
◼ Exercise Design Summary
─ TTX Background, Purpose, and Design
─ Scenario Summary
─ Exercise Capabilities, Objectives, Activities, and Analysis
◼ Core Capabilities Tested
◼ Overview
◼ Major Strengths Demonstrated
◼ Primary Areas for Improvement Identified
◼ Conclusion
◼ Appendices
─ Agenda
─ Improvement Plan
─ Participating Agencies and Organizations
─ Acronyms

8.5 IDENTIFY ACTION ITEMS, PRIORITY, & RESPONSIBLE OWNER(S)

During the TTX, action items and responsible parties should be identified. This will give participating
organizations a clear understanding of which part of the emergency response network can be improved
upon. The action items and responsible parties will be outlined and identified in the AAR.

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9.0 ENHANCEMENTS
This document has discussed the current RRA process as developed and applied by LLNL and DHS during
previous projects and tabletop exercises. As this process is piloted, tested, and refined new
enhancements will be documented. For example, an additional focus of this document was to
summarize the RRA process in a manner that enables new facilitators to train others in implementing
the process. Various enhancements beyond the originally developed RRA process were therefore
included in this document to meet the goal of establishing a “train the trainers” approach. It is expected
that more enhancements will be added over time (with future implementation at more geographical
areas/venues) based on the experience gained by facilitators. The RRA process may then be revised and
improved with new lessons learned. The enhancements added to the RRA process in this document
include the following:
Enhancement 1 – Enhanced process diagrams and explanatory figures
The RRA process includes many key steps and components, so diagrams and figures have been prepared
to assist facilitators in implementing the necessary actions to ensure a defendable analysis. Many of the
key concepts may now be reviewed with an illustration as well as discussion in the document text.
Enhancement 2 – Clarification of critical information needs
Information gathering is the most critical component of an effective RRA, as scenarios, local response
capabilities, specific location conditions, and available resources will be different in every analysis. This
document was designed to provide background for new RRA facilitators, so it provides a more explicit
summary of critical information requirements.
Enhancement 3 – RRA Dashboard improvements
The RRA Dashboard was modified and simplified for this document to allow the facilitator to easily
visualize results once the critical information gathered has been input into the tool. The dashboard
summarizes curves for subtasks versus casualties (RRA Dashboard) to understand outcomes in a manner
that encourages participants to discuss limitations to response capabilities.
Enhancement 4 – Clarification of alignment with National Response Framework (NRF)
In order to better communicate the RRA process to emergency response communities, it is necessary to
clearly identify how the process is consistent with and fits within the structure of the NRF. Specifically,
the interconnections have been clarified between the RRA process and Emergency Support Functions
(ESFs), as well as the Comprehensive Preparedness Guides (CPGs)—specifically CGP 201, Threat and
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA).
Enhancement 5 – Elaboration of potential information resources
As information gathering is critical, a summary of available resources that may potentially be used by a
new facilitator is included in this document. The goal is to ensure the best available information is
identified and used, as the quality of the RRA output is only as good as the input.
Enhancement 6 – Summary of available plume modeling systems
Chemical plume modeling is critical to assessing population exposures. However, a detailed discussion
on how to implement that modeling is beyond the scope of this document. At the same time, an RRA
facilitator needs to understand available modeling resources and where to get that assistance. A
discussion on this topic has been included in this document.
Enhancement 7 – Sample questions for use during facilitated focus group meetings
The RRA process has used a list of key questions designed to promote discussions that help gather the
necessary information to complete the RRA analysis. These questions have been organized as a resource
in the document attachments.

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Enhancement 8 – Template materials to assist with RRA implementation
Various templates have been added in the attachments to assist new facilitators with implementing the
meetings used to gather information. These templates aid the facilitators and improve consistency in
the application of the RRA process. Such consistency is critical, so that lessons from different
geographical areas/venues can be compared (and ultimately used to develop a process that will make
improvements).
Enhancement 9 – Enhanced glossary to clarify terms employed
The terms used in the RRA process must be clear to the facilitators. They must also be standardized to
allow comparison of results. A glossary has been included in this document along with an attachment
addressing terms used in the RRA Dashboard.

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10.0 REFERENCES

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (May 2018). Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. Link:
https://www.dhs.gov/countering-weapons-mass-destruction-office

DHS (May 2018). Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholder
Preparedness Review (SPR) Guide. Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201.
Link: https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/165308

DHS (October 2017). National Incident Management System. Link: https://www.fema.gov/media-library-

data/1508151197225-ced8c60378c3936adb92c1a3ee6f6564/FINAL_NIMS_2017.pdf

DHS (May 2016). National Response Framework, Third Edition. Link: https://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/1466014682982-
9bcf8245ba4c60c120aa915abe74e15d/National_Response_Framework3rd.pdf

DHS (September 2015). National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition. Link:

https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1443799615171-
2aae90be55041740f97e8532fc680d40/National_Preparedness_Goal_2nd_Edition.pdf

DHS (March 2015). National Preparedness Report. Link: https://www.fema.gov/media-library-

data/1432751954859-fcaf2acc365b5a7213a38bbeb5cd1d61/2015_NPR_508c_20150527_Final.pdf

DHS (April 2013). Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). Link:
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-8890/hseep_apr13_.pdf

DHS (April 2012). Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide: Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201.

DHS (April 2012). Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide: Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201 – Supplement 1: Toolkit. Link: https://www.fema.gov/media-
library/assets/documents/26338

DHS (March 2006). National Planning Scenarios. Link: https://publicintelligence.net/national-planning-

scenarios-version-21-3-2006-final-draft/

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Greenwalt, R., and Hibbard, W. (2016). Mass Casualty Chemical Incident Operational Framework,
Assessment and Best Practices: How to Assess a Community’s Response Risk along with
Recommendations and Best Practices. Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, LLNL-
TR-701202. Link: https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/832745.pdf

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (October 2017). ALOHA Software. Link:

https://www.epa.gov/cameo/aloha-software

U.S. Department of Transportation (2016). Emergency Response Guidebook (The Orange Book). Link:
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/ERG2016.pdf

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11.0 GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS

The following section defines common acronyms and terms used in this report and throughout the RRA
discussions.

ADC: Authorized Derivative Classifier

After Action Report (AAR): Summarizes key exercise-related evaluation information, including the
exercise overview and analysis of objectives and core capabilities.

CBRN: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Capability: Qualitative measure of the available response type for an emergency (e.g., the ability to
extract non-ambulatory casualties from a hot zone while wearing Level A personal protective
equipment)

Capacity: Quantitative measure of the available response for an emergency (e.g., the number of
personnel equipped with Level A personal protective equipment).

Capability targets: The performance threshold(s) for each core capability.

Crowdsourcing: Gathering information from or communicating with members of the public who are
either on scene or in contact with those on scene via social media, SMS messaging, email, and/or other
electronic media.

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP): A partnership program between FEMA
and the U.S. Department of the Army (Army) that provides emergency preparedness assistance and
resources to communities surrounding the Army’s chemical warfare agent stockpiles.

Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC): DHS center supporting the homeland security community by
providing a repository of crucial knowledge comprised of chemical threat information, the design and
execution of laboratory and field tests, and a science-based threat and risk analysis capability, among
other services.

Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment (CTRA): Assessments implemented by CSAC to help the federal
government manage its resources and priorities to the appropriate level of risk. CTRA ranks chemicals by
risk based on impact of exposure, intelligence information, and modeling techniques.

Chemical Stockpile: Refers to Army chemical warfare agent stockpiles previously stored in 10 states, 40
counties, and one tribal nation.

Clinical Recognition: Identifying potentially affected individuals by a medical expert by various means
including, but not limited to education, experience, and analytical testing.

Cold Zone: The area of the site that is free from contamination. It may be safely used as a planning and
staging area. Often referred to as the support zone.

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Concept of Operations (CONOPS): A representation, usually in broad outline, of key assumptions or
intent in performing emergency management operations. A CONOPS typically includes a series of
related operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession and is designed to give an overall
picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose.

Countermeasures: Actions taken to mitigate the damage or harm during emergency response

Critical Resources: Personnel, equipment, and supplies which allow for the ability to save lives, prevent
harm, or provide response to an emergency.

Cross-cutting: The potential for a particular emergency response to be applicable for multiple chemicals
and/or venues, locations, or geographical areas

Department of Transportation (DOT): The U.S. Department of Transportation regulates and tracks the
transport of hazardous materials on roadways, railways, and other shipping methods. DOT shipping
papers and manifests can be used by emergency responders to identify the source (sender), hazards,
and emergency actions to address an unplanned release of hazardous materials.

Discussion-Based Meetings: Methodology employed to solicit and develop realistic emergency exercise
and response scenarios based on input and feedback from emergency management personnel, first-
responders, and other key stakeholders.

Diverse (communities): Concept that various geographical areas (including but not limited to regions,
states, counties, cities, and towns) will likely have different levels of emergency response capabilities
and capacities, as will partners/stakeholders.

ERG: Emergency Response Guidebook

Emergency Support Function (ESF): The grouping of governmental and certain private sector capabilities
into an organizational structure to provide support, resources, program implementation, and services
that are most likely needed to save lives, protect property and the environment, restore essential
services and critical infrastructure, and help victims and communities return to normal following
domestic incidents.

Emergency Warning: Communication for potential harm, steps to take, and additional information
services due to a given scenario

Emergency Warning System: Means of communication used to provide information to relevant

partners/stakeholders

Facilitator Team: A subset of a planning team that is comprised of the following individuals:

Facilitator – Liaison that guides partners/stakeholders through various discussions and exercises
during the RRA process

Technical Specialists – SMEs that will provide additional information as needed during the RRA
process

Logistics Team Lead – Person responsible for ensuring non-technical related details/needs for
various meetings, events, discussions, exercises, etc. are addressed. These details/needs
include, but are not limited to booking venues, food, lodging, supplies, notetaking, etc.

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First Due (firefighters): The first firefighter(s) arriving on scene. Generally, they are the first to assess the
scenario and make initial recommendations about the response.

Gross Decontamination: Physical process of immediately reducing contamination on patients in

potentially life-threatening situations without a formally established decontamination zone/corridor
(e.g. removing clothing, use of an eyewash, and/or taking a shower)

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP): A FEMA document providing a set of
guiding principles for exercise programs, as well as a common approach to exercise program
management, design and development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning.

Hot Wash: Debrief of an agency’s performance immediately following an exercise, training, or major
real-life event.

Hot Zone: The area with actual or potential contamination and the highest potential for exposure to
hazardous substances. Often referred to as the exclusion zone.

Key Decisions: Choice points along the emergency response that can directly influence the ability to
save lives, prevent harm, or damage

National Special Security Event (NSSE): Event that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has
classified as being particularly vulnerable to or a target of various criminal or terroristic activities.

Pre-Incident Planning: Critical details that are gathered from partners/stakeholders on all aspects of
emergency response, potential threats, and other scenario specific details for use in during the RRA
process.

Pre-scripted Messages: Prepared communications from information gathered during the risk
assessment that provides information to address specific needs for each partner/stakeholder.

Protective Actions: Actions taken to reduce or eliminate human exposure to radiation, biological,
chemical, or other hazards following an unplanned incident. Initial protective actions may be undertaken
based on models rather than actual measurements and may change over the course of an incident.

Response Risk Assessment (RRA): A process to identify where shortfalls in emergency and recovery
response capacity may increase consequences of a hazardous material incident.

Second Due (firefighters): The second firefighter(s) arriving on scene. Generally, they offer support to
the first due by providing additional man power, equipment, and/or related emergency response
capabilities.

Shelter-in-Place: Typically refers to selecting a small, interior room or other location with no or few
windows for refuge; ventilation may be limited or shut-down to reduce danger of exposure to hazardous
conditions. Actions include: closing all doors, windows, and vents (if applicable) of the currently
occupied location and remaining in a readily accessible location that puts as much
indoor/uncontaminated air between the individual and the hazardous air, such as a basement or
centrally located medium to small room; and trying to make it as airtight as possible by shutting off all

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ventilation/HVAC systems and extensively sealing the shelter's doors and windows from all outside air
contaminants with damp towels, or if available, plastic sheeting and adhesive tape.

Source Suppression: Reducing or eliminating the chemical threat vector

Symptomatic Recognition: Identifying potentially affected individuals by means of observing physical

responses including, but not limited to itching, burning, and/or boils of/on skin; itching, burning, and/or
watering eyes, and difficulty breathing. Often done on scene, but not necessarily by a medical
professional.

Technical Decontamination: Physical process of reducing contamination on patients in potentially life-

threatening situations with a formally established decontamination zone/corridor

Threat vs. Hazard vs. Risk: For this document these terms will be employed as follows:

Threat – an agent or means by which damage, harm, or adverse effect may be obtained

Hazard – the potential for damage, harm, or adverse effect

Risk – the chance or probability, high or low, that any hazard will cause damage, harm, or
adverse effect

Toxic Release Inventory (TRI): A federal environmental protection program and related database
detailing select hazardous material inventory and release reporting data for regulated industrial facilities
(based on Standard Industrial Classification codes) that use listed hazardous materials above specified
threshold quantities.

Warm Zone: The transition area between the hot and cold zones. This area is where responders enter
and exit the exclusion zone and where decontamination activities take place. Often referred to the
contamination reduction zone.

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction

Whole Community: Involving people in the development of national preparedness documents and
ensuring their roles and responsibilities are reflected in the content of the materials. Whole community
includes individuals and families (including those with access and functional needs), business, faith-
based and community organizations, nonprofit groups, schools and academia, media outlets, and all
levels of government, including state, local, tribal, territorial, and federal partners.

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ATTACHMENT A:
EXAMPLE PARTNERS/STAKEHOLDERS LIST
POTENTIAL STAKEHOLDERS TO ENGAGE:
◼ Venue
─ Venue management
─ Venue public interaction staff (ushers, etc.)
─ Venue security
─ Venue first aid office
─ Facility engineer
◼ Community/County/State
─ Dispatch/911
─ Fire/HAZMAT
─ Law Enforcement
─ Public Health
─ Area Emergency Medical System
─ Community/County/State Emergency Management Staff
─ Trauma Center/Hospitals
─ Coroner
─ Local Emergency Planning Committee
─ State Bureau of Homeland Security
─ State Emergency Management Department
─ National Guard Civil Support Team (CST)
─ Regional Poison Control Center

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ATTACHMENT B:
LEVERAGE AREAS AND CRITICAL ACTIONS
LEVERAGE AREAS AND CRITICAL ACTIONS
Updated 06 February 2018

LEVERAGE AREAS / CRITICAL ACTIONS PRE-INCIDENT

PRIME THE PUMP
Critical Action FEMA Core Capabilities Primary ESF
Identify critical infrastructure Planning; Risk and Disaster
/ key resource (CI/KR) that Resilience Assessment; All
are vulnerable to chemical Threat and Hazard
incidents Identification
Identify sources of chemical Planning; Risk and Disaster
threats (such as factories, Resilience Assessment; All
pipelines, railways, etc.) Threat and Hazard
Identification; Supply Chain
Integrity and Security
Identify likely chemical All
threats (based on inventory Planning; Threat and Hazard
volumes, terrorism risks, etc.) Identification
Identify EMS and hospital
capabilities and capacity Planning ESF-8
(preparing mass casualty
incident plans)
Identify medical
countermeasure capabilities Planning ESF-8
and capacity
Identify and establish how
detectors, sensors, and Planning ESF-5
situational awareness may be
employed
Develop the plans,
procedures and CONOPS to Planning All
guide chemical response
activities
Exercise and evaluate the plans, Planning All
procedures and CONOPS that
guide chemical response
activities

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LEVERAGE AREAS / CRITICAL ACTIONS POST-INCIDENT (RESPONSE)
Critical Action
Analyzing Toxidrome
Recognition Data (i.e. from
first responders, 911/PSAP
calls, etc.)
Analyzing Detector/Sensor
Data
Analyzing Social Media/Open
Source Media Data
Dispatch and Pre-Arrival
Instructions to First
Responders
Maintain Situational
Awareness and Provide
Information to Decision-
Makers
Critical Action
Protective Action Guidance
(SIP or Evacuation for
population at risk)
Emergency Public
Information (for population
at large)
Decontamination
Source Reduction
Pick the right Responder PPE
Establish Buffer Zones (hot,
warm, cold)
Secure the Scene (including
traffic control, access control,
LLNL-TR-758734
EARLY RECOGNITION
FEMA Core Capabilities Primary ESF
Intelligence and Information ESF-2; ESF-5
Sharing
Screening, Search and ESF-5; ESF-4; ESF-10
Detection
Intelligence and Information ESF-5; ESF-15
Sharing
Intelligence and Information ESF-2
Sharing
Situational Assessment; ESF-5
Intelligence and Information
Sharing; Planning
STOP THE EXPOSURE
FEMA Core Capabilities Primary ESF
Public Information and ESF-15; ESF-7
Warning; Critical
Transportation
Public Information and ESF-15
Warning
Environmental Response, ESF-8; ESF-10
Health and Safety
Environmental Response, ESF-10
Health and Safety
Environmental Response, ESF-8; ESF-10
Health and Safety
Environmental Response, ESF-10; ESF-13
Health and Safety; On-Scene
Security, Protection and Law
Enforcement
On-Scene Security, ESF-13
Protection and Law
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etc.) Enforcement
Model the Release (if Environmental Response, ESF-4; EFS-5
applicable) Health and Safety

TREAT THE WOUNDED

Critical Action FEMA Core Capability Primary ESF
Emergency Triage and Pre- Public Health, Healthcare and ESF-8
Hospital Treatment Emergency Medical Services
Medical Countermeasures Public Health, Healthcare and ESF-8; ESF-7
Administration/Coordination Emergency Medical Services
Transport to First Receivers Critical Transportation ESF-8; ESF-7
Managing Fatalities Fatality Management ESF-8
Services
Managing Mass Care Mass Care Services ESF-6
(sheltering, feeding, etc.)
Managing Medical Surge/MCI Public Health, Healthcare and ESF-8
Emergency Medical Services

◼ Leverage Areas are made up of several Critical Actions

◼ Critical Actions are made up of many tasks and decisions

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ATTACHMENT C:
KICK-OFF MEETING AGENDA

<Project Name> Agenda

Pre-Planning Meeting Agency
Logo
<Date>

Introductions <Facilitator or Location Lead> 5 mins

Classification of Information/Information <Facilitator or Location Lead> 5 mins

Sharing

<Project Title> Project Overview <Sponsor Project Lead> 15 mins

Goals & Objectives <Project Team Lead> 5 mins

Roles, Responsibilities, and Resource <Project Team Member> 30 mins

Capabilities

Open Discussion – Questions & Concerns <Project Team Member> 15 mins

Identification of Additional Participants <Facilitator or Location Lead> 15 mins

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ATTACHMENT D:
KICK-OFF MEETING EXAMPLE PRESENTATION

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ATTACHMENT E:
QUESTIONNAIRE LIBRARY
A. Venue
1. How many air changes/hour, what is fan normal flow rate?
2. What is the average airflow rate in the populated areas?
3. How is the heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC) system controlled? How long does it
take to shut it down?
4. Can the smoke extraction system be manually controlled?
5. Can the fire sprinkler system be manually controlled?
6. What are the major populated areas of the venue and what are their capacities?
7. What is the security camera coverage? How are they monitored?
8. Are pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) cameras available?
9. What are the venue emergency services? How large and where are they?
10. How many community law enforcement and medical service units are normally staged at
this venue?
11. For what types of venue events does the CST pre-deploy?
12. Do you have chemical detection/identification means?
13. How would a warning of a chemical release be disseminated? Who would get the warning?
14. How much training do ushers and security staff have to recognize unusual situations?
15. What would happen if the detection came from: usher, first aid office, 911 dispatch, etc.?
16. How would you verify a chemical incident is occurring?
17. What decision process/system is used to initiate actions? How do you make the decision to
evacuate or shelter in place?
18. Who makes the decision to evacuate?
19. How do you evacuate people?
20. How do you handle special populations, panic, blockages during evacuation?
21. How long would evacuation take?
22. How would evacuation be controlled?
23. Do you have a shelter-in-place plan?
24. How long does it take to close off your facility (doors, etc.)?
25. How do you communicate with your staff?
26. Do you have coded announcements that alert staff to a problem?
27. How do you communicate with venue visitors?
28. Do you have prewritten announcements for the general public?
29. How do you identify visitor problems during evacuation?
30. How do you communicate with first responders?
31. Chemical hazard/threat?
32. Release characteristics? (mechanism/dispersal) (from Table 5-2)
33. Exposure pathway? (inhalation, dermal, ingestion, etc.) (from Table 5-2)

B. City
1. What population density would you have during significant events?

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2. Does the arena have big events during times that are large numbers outside on campus?
3. What type of chemical detection/identification means do you have currently?
4. What hazardous chemicals are on campus and how are they controlled?
5. How would a warning of a chemical release be disseminated? Who would get the warning?
6. What is the campus notification system?
7. What are your procedures for handling emergency situations such as fire, earthquake, bomb
threat?
8. What would you do if there were a threatening chemical release?
9. How do you implement a shelter-in-place response? With students outside?
10. What kind of emergency notification system do you have?
11. What are the City’s emergency support capabilities (medical, law enforcement, fire)?
12. What are the linkages to the local community for emergency support (fire, HAZMAT, Law
Enforcement, medical)?

C. Fire/HAZMAT
1. Describe the Fire/HAZMAT structure.
2. Who would be the initial incident commander? How would this position change as the
incident progresses?
3. Who would respond first to a reported chemical incident at the venue? (Venue &
Community)
4. What is the response time for the first fire team? The HAZMAT team?
5. Do you have the ability to generate a plume model? What do you use?
6. How would you establish and mark zones?
7. What kind of chemical detection equipment do responders have? How much?
8. How many responders have appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) to enter the
hot zone?
9. What means do you have to decontaminate people? How much capacity? How fast can it be
setup and put into operation?
10. What toxic chemicals are shipped through the community? Are there any time restrictions?
11. Do you have a linkage to the railroad?
12. What toxic chemicals cause the most concern?
13. Number of available emergency response units on scene following dispatch? (from Table 5-
2)
14. Number of firefighters initially responding? (from Table 5-2)
15. Number of firefighters available for callup? (from Table 5-2)
16. Time for additional resources to arrive? (from Table 5-2)
17. Number of firefighters conducting source suppression? (from Table 5-2)
18. Time until first firefighter on scene following dispatch? (from Table 5-2)
19. Time for Fire Chief to assess situation? (from Table 5-2)
20. Time for firefighters to develop a plan? (from Table 5-2)
21. Time for fire fighters to implement a plan? (from Table 5-2)
22. Time for HAZMAT to arrive on scene? (from Table 5-2)
23. Time to identify hot/warm zones? (from Table 5-2)
24. Time to identify chemical released? (from Table 5-2)

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25. Time to determine PPE requirements? (from Table 5-2)
26. Time for unit to don Level A PPE? (if needed) (from Table 5-2)
27. Number of Operational teams in CPC? (from Table 5-2)
28. Time to develop a ground survey plan? (from Table 5-2)
29. Time to implement a ground survey plan? (from Table 5-2)

D. Law Enforcement
1. How would evacuation be controlled in a panic situation?
2. How would population after evacuation be controlled?
3. How is the affected area isolated to prevent additional casualties?
4. Do law enforcement officers have PPE?
5. Does law enforcement do search and rescue?
6. Is law enforcement involved in providing warning, shelter-in-place information?
7. Time to establish perimeter control/site security? (from Table 5-2)

E. Emergency Management
1. What chemical detection/identification resources do you have currently?
2. What are your procedures for standing up an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in an
emergency – how long does it take?
3. How would a warning of a chemical release be disseminated to the emergency management
agencies? Who would get the warning?
4. How do you communicate shelter-in-place or evacuation warnings to the local area? How
long does it take?
5. How do you determine who to warn? Who makes the decision?
6. How do you communicate from the incident site with the hospitals in the area?
7. What chemicals are located in your jurisdiction and how do you keep track of their
locations?
8. Do you have the ability to generate a plume model? What do you use?
9. Who would be the initial incident commander? How would this position change as the
incident progresses?
10. Do you have access to antidotes (atropine)? How much? Where? Who can administer?
11. What mutual aid agreements are in place and what additional resources do they cover?
12. What special resources are available in the area [Civil Support Team, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) On-Scene Coordinator (OSC), state emergency response forces,
etc.]?
13. How do the City/County emergency plans connect to the other plans?
14. How would an affected area be searched and possible victims found and treated?
15. Time for IC to assess the situation? (from Table 5-2)
16. Time for IC to develop initial plan (Evacuation/SIP)? (from Table 5-2)
17. Time for IC to implement initial plan? (from Table 5-2)
18. Time to plan (rescue/extraction)? (from Table 5-2)
19. Time to prepare for rescue/extraction? (from Table 5-2)
20. Rescue/extraction throughput? (from Table 5-2)
21. Time to develop decontamination plan (hasty and technical decon)? (from Table 5-2)

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22. Hasty decon throughput rate? (from Table 5-2)
23. Technical decon throughput rate? (from Table 5-2)
24. Time to initiate emergency warning system? (from Table 5-2)
25. Time to identify critical resources/ sensitive targets? (from Table 5-2)
26. Time to adapt pre-scripted messages? (from Table 5-2)
27. Time to distribute emergency warning? (from Table 5-2)
28. Time to distribute ER directions (Evac/SIP, hasty decon, etc.)? (from Table 5-2)

F. Public Health/Emergency Medical System

1. For venue events, is there normally an on-scene medical presence?
2. Does venue first aid/nurses station have a direct connection to 911?
3. When does your office (Emergency Medical Service [EMS], Public Health, etc.) become
involved? What triggers it? What is your role?
4. Describe the escalation of medical support.
5. What role does the regional poison control center play in a chemical incident? Where are
they?
6. Can you describe the flow of medical support to the incident?
7. Who is on-scene medical lead – what is relationship with the Incident Command (IC)?
8. How are medical forces organized at the incident?
9. Do you have access to antidotes (atropine)? How much? Where? Who can administer?
10. How would you transport large numbers of patients?
11. How do you get information from the incident?
12. How do you interact with county assets, and other mutual aid assets?
13. What is the process to handle a large number (greater than 100) of time-critical casualties?
14. What types and numbers of medical treatment equipment do you have to support a
chemical mass casualty incident?
15. How do you get access to additional medical equipment (e.g., ventilators)?
16. How would you transport potentially contaminated people?
17. How does contamination impact medical operations?
18. What hospitals would be used in a mass casualty chemical incident?
19. Would a hospital treat contaminated casualties?
20. How would hospitals handle walk-ins that may be contaminated?
21. How do hospitals determine patients are not contaminated?
22. What means do you have to decontaminate people arriving at the hospital?
23. Would medical teams go to the incident for on-scene treatment?
24. Are there surge plans to establish extra treatment areas in non-traditional facilities?
25. What happens when patient load exceeds capacity in your city?
26. Number of available EMTs? (from Table 5-2)
27. Time to assess medical needs? (from Table 5-2)
28. Time to develop EMS plan? (from Table 5-2)
29. Time to initiate EMS plan? (from Table 5-2)
30. Time to initiate triage? (from Table 5-2)
31. Quantities of medical countermeasures? (from Table 5-2)

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32. Time to deploy medical countermeasures? (from Table 5-2)
33. Number of regional medical facilities? (from Table 5-2)
34. Medical facility available capacities? (from Table 5-2)
35. Number of available ambulances? (from Table 5-2)
36. Time until additional ambulances are available? (from Table 5-2)
37. Number of additional ambulances? (from Table 5-2)
38. Number of available buses? (from Table 5-2)
39. Typical bus capacities? (from Table 5-2)
40. Time to deploy buses? (from Table 5-2)
41. Time to load and mobilize ambulances/buses for transport? (from Table 5-2)
42. Average transport speed (mph)? (from Table 5-2)
43. Time to unload and initiate return with transportation? (from Table 5-2)

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ATTACHMENT F:
RRA DASHBOARD INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

Select Weather Data

- Wind speed (dropdown menu) – in ranges of miles per hour (mph) in the dominant direction

- Wind direction – dominant direction of the wind (N, S, E, etc.), typically indicated by windows

- Typical clothes (dropdown menu) – used to determine skin exposure to chemicals, limited to a
pull-down menu of “temperate” (indicating typical clothing of pants and long-sleeved shirt) or
“hot” (indicating shorts and a t-shirt)

Emergency Management Identification and Warning (complete this section or Venue Management
Recognition and Immediate Actions)
- Time for observer report to reach 911 dispatch – time in minutes from initial recognition to initial
emergency report phone call

- Time for 911 dispatch to recognize major problem – time in minutes for dispatch to acknowledge
an emergency and verify the appropriate callout to emergency responders

- Time to dispatch responders – time in minutes from the call to first responders to arrival on scene

- Time to decide to Shelter-In-Place (SIP)/Evacuate (EVAC) – minutes required for Incident

Commander to assess the situation and make a decision on whether to shelter-in-place or
evacuate populations in the area

- Time to develop warning area [from Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG)] – time in minutes to
identify potentially impacted populations/areas requiring emergency warnings

- Time to develop warning message – time in minutes to prepare and approve required warning
message(s)

- Time to get warning message out –time in minutes required to distribute warning messages

- SIP Response Time by Population Group/Venue – time required in minutes to actually implement
SIP actions
o Complete table of Time to SIP by population group

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Venue Management Recognition and Immediate Actions (complete this section or Emergency
Management Identification and Warning)
- Typical Clothes (see above)

- Time until observer report to staff (see above)

- Time to notify 911 (see above)

- Time until Security Office notified – minutes between 911 dispatch notification and security
organization notification

- Time until Security Office recognizes problem – time in minutes for security organization to
recognize an actual chemical incident is occurring

- Time to dispatch (see above)

- Time to decide to EVAC – time in minutes required for Incident Commander to assess the situation
and make a decision to evacuate populations in the area

- Time to get warning message out (see above)

- Time to evacuate – time required in minutes to actually implement evacuation

- Time to decide to shut down HVAC fans – minute required to make the decision to shut down
HVAC systems following notification and recognition of a chemical incident by the Security
Office

- Time for fans to spin down – time required in minutes for the facility HVAC system to spin down
and stop external air draw and internal distribution

General Response System Data

- Firefighter tasks – estimate the number of firefighters that will be assigned to various activities
such as:
o Command
o Suppression

- Firefighter assignments to population group locations – assign the number of firefighters that

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would be assigned to each population area identified in the scenario

- HAZMAT response estimates – list the time in minutes for the following HAZMAT activities:
o Time to size-up medical requirements – time to determine first aide actions and needs

o Time to develop EMS site plan – time to decide how to stage, segregate, and manage
casualties based on situation
o Time to initiate EMS plan – time to implement that EMS site plan

o Triage throughput/15 minutes – time required to transition a patient in and out of triage

- EMS Response Capacity – list the number and timing of resources/assets related to EMS response
including:

o Available EMS personal initially – number of EMTs initially on scene

o EMS personnel after augmentation – number of EMTs that can be called up and added
to response as needed
o Emergency Medical Personnel Assignments to Population Group Locations – assign the
available EMS/EMT staff to the various medical assignments in this section
o Exposure Chemical – time required to confirm chemical release and identify appropriate
medical countermeasures
▪ Release Stockpile: Decision Time – time required to decide to use and deploy
medical countermeasures
▪ Medical Countermeasures Available – number of devices or doses (total
quantity and dose requirements) that may be used either at the hospital or on
site, including:
• Ventilator – number of ventilators available, with clarified:
o Application time
o Treatments/medic
• BVM – number of bag valve masks available, with clarified:
o Application time
o Treatments/medic
• Oxygen – number of oxygen tanks/masks summarized to the number of
patients that may be served, with clarified:
o Application time
o Treatments/medic

• Available On-Site for population groups - complete table to clarify which

medical countermeasures are available or may be deployed to the site

- Transportation Assignments – number of ambulance equivalents and number of patients per

ambulance

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 LLNL-TR-758734
o Time until initial ambulances available – time in minutes to initial arrival on scene
o Initial number of ambulances available – number of ambulances in the first dispatch
o Time until augmented ambulances arrive – time in minutes required for additionally
dispatched ambulances to arrive on scene
o Number of additional augmented ambulances – number of additional ambulances in the
later ambulance dispatch(es)
o Number of alternative modes of transportation – number of other transport vehicles
(buses, cars, etc.) that may be deployed to transport patients to hospitals
o Patient capacity in alternative modes of transportation – number of patients that may
be transported in the alternative modes of transportation (or seats available)
o Time until alternative modes of transportation available – time in minutes from request
to arrival of alternative modes of transportation on scene
o Time to load ambulance and begin travel – time in minutes to load and mobilize a
typical ambulance
o Average ambulance speed (mph) – typical speed achievable in the route to the hospital
in miles per hour
o Time to offload ambulance and start return – time in minutes required to remove
patient from ambulance and prepare the ambulance to return depart again to return to
the site
o Transportation assignments to Population Group Locations – assign the number of each
different transportation option in the tables provided as discussed below:
▪ Complete table, each of the following by population group
• Initial ambulance numbers
• Augmented ambulance numbers
• Alternative modes of transport options

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ATTACHMENT G:
SAMPLE STAKEHOLDER R&R DATA REQUEST FORM
Sample Stakeholder Roles & Responsibilities Data Request Form
(Option 1 – Response Capabilities)

Participant Questionnaire

Name

Name of Agency

Phone/E-Mail

Try to keep your responses brief. You may use additional pages if necessary. This information will be
made available to other participants during subsequent meetings.

What Organization under Incident

Command System do you sit in (NIMS, NRP,
etc. )?

Briefly describe the structure of your

organization.

What act, directive, or other legislation

provides your response authority?

What role does your organization play? Check all that apply.

Preplanning

Detection/Notification

Emergency Dispatch

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First Responder

Firefighting & HAZMAT

Incident Commander or On-Scene Coordinator

Medical Countermeasures

EMT and Emergency Transportation

Hospital Operations

Law Enforcement

Other

What response assets are available through

your organization (people, equipment,
expertise, guidance, funding, other)?

Resource deployment process

(authorization process and deployment
mechanics).

Response time frame. How soon can your

organization respond: hours, days?

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 ATTACHMENT H:
SAMPLE INFORMATIONAL WORKSHOP PRESENTATION

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ATTACHMENT I:
TEMPLATE FOR INFORMATIONAL WORKSHOP
AFTER-ACTION REPORT

[image]

[Community/Venue/Threat]
Response Risk Assessment
Workshop
After-Action Report (AAR)
[date]

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[document disclaimer, ex.

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States
government. Neither the United States government nor Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, nor
any of their employees makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or
responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or
process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein
to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by
the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. The views and opinions of
authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or
Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, and shall not be used for advertising or product
endorsement purposes.]

[auspices, ex. This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344.]

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RRA Workshop After-Action Report (AAR)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Handling Instructions............................................................................................................. 1
Confidentiality ................................................................................................................................. 1
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................... 2
Workshop Planning Team ............................................................................................................... 2
Brief Scenario .................................................................................................................................. 2
Core Capabilities Tested .................................................................................................................. 2
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 3
Major Strengths Demonstrated ...................................................................................................... 3
Primary Areas for Improvement Identified ..................................................................................... 4
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 4
Workshop Overview .............................................................................................................. 4
Workshop Design Summary and Analysis of Capabilities ........................................................ 6
Workshop Background, Purpose, and Design ................................................................................. 6
Scenario Summary .......................................................................................................................... 6
Workshop Capabilities, Objectives, Activities, and Analysis ........................................................... 7
Conclusion ……………………………………… .................................................................................... 8
Appendix A: Agenda ........................................................................................................... 1
Appendix B: Improvement Plan (IP)................................................................................... 1
Appendix C: Participating Agencies and Organizations ..................................................... 1
Appendix D: Acronyms ....................................................................................................... 2

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RRA Workshop After-Action Report (AAR)

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS
The title of this document is the [Community/Venue/Threat] Response Risk Assessment
Workshop After-Action Report (AAR). The information gathered in this report is classified as
[document classification, ex. For Official Use Only (FOUO)] and should be handled as sensitive
information not to be disclosed. This document should be safeguarded, handled, transmitted, and
stored in accordance with appropriate security directives. Reproduction of this document, in
whole or in part, without prior approval is prohibited.

CONFIDENTIALITY
The [Community/Venue/Threat] Response Risk Assessment is an Unclassified workshop. The
control of information is based more on public sensitivity regarding the nature of the workshop
rather than the actual workshop content. Some workshop material is intended for the exclusive
use of the Planning Team, Facilitators, and Moderators, while other content is intended for
workshop participants. The AAR may be viewed by all participants.

All workshop participants should use appropriate guidelines to ensure the proper control of
information within their areas and protect this material in accordance with current United States
(US) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or their own organization’s directives.

Workshop After-Action Report/Point of Contact

Organization: [POC organization name]

Name of Person Submitting: [POC name]

Title: [POC person submitting Title]

Address: [POC address]

Telephone Number: [POC telephone number]

Fax Number: [POC fax number]

E-mail Address: [POC email]

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Workshop Detail

AAR for: Workshop Actual Event/Incident

Workshop Date: [date]

Workshop Type: Training Informational

Workshop Geographical Scope: Local Regional State Multi-State

International

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of the Response Risk Assessment Workshop was to workshop and validate the
[Community/Venue/Threat] Response Risk Assessment (RRA) Approach to analyze, assess, and
identify improvements opportunities in response capabilities developed in accordance with the
National-level Framework for application to other cities across the country. The workshop
allowed participants to identify and examine best practices, issues, and gaps likely to be
encountered in responding to a large-scale chemical incident by testing the emergency response
capabilities.

WORKSHOP PLANNING TEAM

Name Organization

BRIEF SCENARIO
THE SCENARIO INVOLVED [COMMUNITY/VENUE/THREAT]. THE SCENARIO
BEGAN WITH RELEASE OF A TOXIC CHEMICAL AND EXTENDED THROUGH ALL
OF THE RESPONSE TASKS, ENDING WITH HOSPITAL CARE.

CORE CAPABILITIES TESTED

• Operational Coordination
• Public Information and Warning

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• Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities

• Community Resilience
• Operational Communications
• Environmental Response/Health and Safety
• Public Health and Medical Services
• Mass Care Services
• Fatality Management Services

OVERVIEW
The [Community/Venue/Threat] Response Risk Assessment Workshop held [date], at the
[location]. A copy of the Agenda is included as Appendix A. The workshop was a one-scenario,
multimedia-based workshop held during a one-day event. The moderated, discussion-based
workshop format allowed participants to interact in accordance with their respective
responsibilities and expertise to coordinate the response to, and recovery from, a large-scale
chemical incident.

The workshop began with introductions by the DHS Sponsor and [Community/Venue/Threat]
Emergency Management, followed by a presentation on the chemical properties and health
effects of the chemical to be discussed during the workshop. Prior to beginning the scenario,
review and training on the [Community/Venue/Threat] RRA processes was provided to the
participants. The remainder of the day was devoted to the scenario that involved [scenario
description] at [scenario location] and validating response capacity information gathered during
facilitated focus group meetings. Questions were asked of the participants that focused on the
actions each agency would take in response to this incident related to alert, notification, initial
response, containment, and consequence mitigation. The workshop ended with all attendees
participating in the development of a consolidated best practices and gaps table which included
assigning action owners to actions (i.e., next steps). The consolidated table is included in this
AAR as an Improvement Plan (IP) (Appendix B). The Planning Team closed the day by
conducting an internal hot wash to share their thoughts regarding the progress of the workshop.

Prior to being released for the day, participants were invited to complete a Participant Feedback
form designed to give each person an opportunity to suggest recommendations and identify
action steps for addressing areas needing improvement.

MAJOR STRENGTHS DEMONSTRATED

The following are major strengths (S) identified during the workshop.

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• Observation 1.1(S): [example: Participants demonstrated a good understanding of primary

and supporting agencies roles and responsibilities in internal incident management
communication processes.]

o Recommendation 1.1.1(S): [example: None.]

PRIMARY AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT IDENTIFIED

The following are the primary areas for improvement (AFIs) and their associated
recommendations.

• Observation 2.1(AFI): [example: Participants indicated that accurate recognition of a

chemical agent and its properties may take hours, slowing the alert and assessment process,
and thus potentially increasing casualties. Participants also indicated that the threshold for a
Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) event and decontamination decision processes were not clear.]

o Recommendation 2.1.1(AFI): [example: Emergency Management should evaluate the

linkage between the MCI and HazMat plans to develop a functional checklist and
training. The threshold for an MCI should also be clarified.]

o Recommendation 2.1.2(AFI): [example: The Fire Department and Venue should

identify the resources available for decontamination.]

CONCLUSION
The [Community/Venue/Threat] RRA Workshop provided participants the opportunity to interact
with each other in accordance with their respective responsibilities and expertise under
controlled conditions. The workshop addressed RRA objectives and provided participants with
the opportunity to discuss information gathered during facilitated focus group meetings, best
practices, gaps, and issues related to responding to a large-scale chemical incident at
[Community/Venue/Threat]. The workshop also highlighted areas where further refinements are
needed. By addressing the recommendations contained within this report,
[Community/Venue/Threat] will be better prepared to respond to a large-scale chemical incident
occurs.

WORKSHOP OVERVIEW
The [Community/Venue/Threat] RRA Workshop focused on facility/organizational response and
coordination between the involved organizations following a large-scale chemical incident. It
was not a test of detailed response and recovery procedures, but rather a validation of the
[Community/Venue/Threat] RRA process and identification of best practices and improvement
opportunities.
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Workshop Name [Community/Venue/Threat] Response Risk Assessment

Workshop Dates [date (start time – end time)]

Location [location]

Sponsor [sponsor]

Funding Source [funding source]

Program
Requirements [program requirements addressed]
Addressed
The workshop involved a wide-range of participants from Federal, State, and
Participating
local jurisdictional levels as well as private sector partners. The full list of
Organizations
participating agencies can be found in Appendix C.
• Prevention
• Protection
Mission Area(s) • Mitigation
• Response
• Recovery
• Operational Coordination
• Public Information and Warning
• Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities
• Community Resilience
Core Capabilities • Operational Communications
• Environmental Response/Health and Safety
• Public Health and Medical Services
• Mass Care Services
• Fatality Management Services

Threat or Hazard Chemical release

The scenario involves a chemical release that results in a surge of patients and
Scenario
fatalities.

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WORKSHOP DESIGN SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

WORKSHOP BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND DESIGN
The DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA) Chemical Defense Program (CDP) is currently
developing a National Chemical Defense Framework, premised on the principles of US
Domestic Chemical Defense Policy and Guidance outlined in the Homeland Security
Presidential Directive (HSPD)-22, Domestic Chemical Defense. HSPD-22 lists four pillars of
domestic chemical defense; Threat Awareness, Prevention and Protection, Detection and
Identification, and Response and Recovery.

The purpose of the [Community/Venue/Threat] RRA Workshop was to test and validate
information gathered and results presented in the [Community/Venue/Threat] RRA Dashboard.
The goals were to:
• Validate RRA results based on information and analyses prepared following facilitated focus
group discussions.
• Define best practices to prepare and respond to high consequence chemical events – whether
caused by accident or terrorism.
• Use a system viewpoint to examine the problem, beginning with incident initiation and
continuing through definitive hospital care.
• Examine overlapping areas of information flow and communication, decision-making,
actions, and resources.
• Summarize improvement opportunities in critical areas, with a focus on saving lives.

SCENARIO SUMMARY
The scenario for the [Community/Venue/Threat] RRA Workshop was selected based on two basic
criteria: it had to be plausible in the [Community/Venue/Threat] environment, and it had to
challenge the different emergency response processes. Issues included:
• It had to be an [indoor/outdoor] release at the [Community/Venue/Threat].
• It had to potentially affect a large portion of the population inside the [Community/Venue/Threat].
• The chemical released had to provide early observable symptoms.
• The chemical released had to potentially result in challenges to many portions of the response system,
including decontamination processes.

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The scenario that was chosen was:

1. [explain scenario].

WORKSHOP CAPABILITIES, OBJECTIVES, ACTIVITIES, AND ANALYSIS

The Core Capabilities listed below were selected by the RRA Workshop Planning Team and
provide the foundation for development of the workshop objectives and scenarios. The workshop
objectives describe the expected outcomes for the Workshop. The objectives are linked to the
Core Capabilities, which are distinct critical elements necessary to achieve the specific Mission
Areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery.

Core Capability Workshop Objectives

• Operational Coordination
• Public Information and Warning
• Risk Management for Protection Programs
and Activities
• Community Resilience
• Operational Communications
• Environmental Response/Health and Safety
• Public Health and Medical Services
Review and workshop the draft Response Risk
Assessment as a means of transitioning the
information into application.
1. Discuss internal incident management
communication processes.
2. Assess information-sharing capabilities
with the public, private sector partners,
and Federal, State, and local government
departments and agencies.

• Mass Care Services 3. Assess the ability to identify

vulnerabilities, and consequences to
• Fatality Management Services manage risk.
4. Assess the effectiveness of incident
management functions in directing and
controlling response and recovery
activities.
5. Identify gaps, redundancies,
developmental activities, and best
practices in the event of a large-scale
incident.
6. Identify and review recommendations to
improve overall response system
capabilities.

Below are key observations from workshop play as they relate to the main objective: “Review
and workshop the draft Response Risk Assessment work as a means of transitioning the

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information into application.” Observations are labeled as a strength (S) and/or as an area for
improvement (AFI).
Objective 1: Discuss internal incident management communication processes.
1.1 Observation (S): [example: Participants demonstrated a good understanding of
primary and supporting agencies roles and responsibilities in internal incident
management communication processes.]
Analysis: [example: During the workshop, participants demonstrated a good
understanding of the role of the Fire Department, as the primary agency with overall
Incident Command responsibilities, and those of supporting organizations (e.g. venue,
particularly the Command Post) and agencies (e.g. Emergency Management, Police
Department, and the HazMat Unit of the Fire Department) in operational areas such as
alert, notification, initial response, containment and consequence mitigation, including
means of chemical identification, suppression, rescue and recovery, decontamination,
transport, and medical services.]
1.1.1 Recommendation: [example: None.]

Objective 2: Assess information-sharing capabilities with the public, private sector partners,
and Federal, State, and local government departments and agencies.
2.1 Observation (AFI): [example: The venue Command Post can be in immediate
radio communication with Central (911) Dispatch simply by changing to a different
radio channel. Additionally, StateComm and the Bridge Call are means by which the
Participants share information with, and request additional support from, other
agencies. However, having clear, pre-scripted messages to inform the public was
identified as a gap.]
Analysis: [example: During the workshop, participants discussed several methods for
informing the public, particularly those in attendance at the venue at the time of the
incident, that a large-scale chemical incident had occurred and what to do, (e.g.
assembling outside, disrobing, rinsing with water).]
• 2.1.1 Recommendation: [example: The venue should develop customized messages for
quicker evacuation response.]

CONCLUSION
The [Community/Venue/Threat] RRA Workshop provided the [Community/Venue], stakeholder
agencies, and local jurisdictions the opportunity to review and apply the RRA process in
[Community/Venue/Threat] as a means of identifying opportunities in critical areas that focus on
saving lives in a chemical release emergency.
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Participants in the workshop included several City of [Community/Venue] departments,

including Emergency Management, the Coroner’s Office, and the Police and Fire departments,
including the Hazardous Materials Team. Also in attendance were local and Federal (Veteran’s
Administration) hospitals and private-sector partners (see Appendix C for a full list of
participating agencies and organizations).
The workshop addressed the objectives and provided an opportunity for the participating
agencies and organizations with a role in alert, notification, initial response, containment and
consequence mitigation, suppression, rescue and recovery, decontamination, transport, and
medical services processes to identify potential pitfalls and examine ways to improve
collaboration. Strengths and areas for improvement identified during the workshop have been
used to develop the IP presented in Appendix B.

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APPENDIX A: AGENDA

Registration begins at 7:30 am.

Introduction and Background

Introduction Name of presenter 8:00am – 8:20am

Workshop Ground Rules and Name of presenter 8:20am – 8:25am

Objectives

Chemical Properties/Health Effects Name of presenter 8:25am – 9:10am

DHS Guidance for Chemical Incident Name of presenter 9:10am – 9:35am

Response

Break 9:35am – 9:45am

Scenario Description & Review Name of presenter 9:45am – 10:30am

RRA Validation

Introduction to RRA Process & Name of presenter 10:30am – 10:50am

Dashboard

Review Information Gathered during Name of presenter 10:50am – 12:00pm

Facilitated Focus Groups

Lunch 12:00pm – 12:45pm

Review Initial Response Risk Name of presenter 12:45pm – 1:15pm

Assessment

Information Needs & Gaps Name of presenter 1:15pm – 2:45pm

Break 2:45pm – 2:55pm

Opportunities in Overall Response Name of presenter 2:55pm – 3:30pm

Capabilities

Break 3:30pm – 3:45pm

[document number] A-1 [Community/Venue/Threat] RRA Workshop

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RRA Workshop After-Action Report (AAR)

Response Best Practices & Gaps Name of presenter 3:45pm – 4:30pm

Summary and Wrap-up

Wrap-up & Next Steps Name of presenter 4:30pm – 4:45pm

Note: Facilitators, Moderators, and Note-takers will also meet for about one hour after the
workshop for a debriefing.

[document number] A-2 [Community/Venue/Threat] RRA Workshop

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RRA Workshop After-Action Report (AAR)

APPENDIX B: IMPROVEMENT PLAN (IP)

This Improvement Plan (IP) was developed as an outcome of the [Community/Venue/Threat] RRA Workshop conducted [date]. The
recommendations included in this IP draw on planning team member observations and recommendations as well as on workshop
participants’ recommendations documented during the best practices and gaps sessions following each scenario.

Phase/Shortfall Solution Action Action Owner

Alert & Assessment

1. Early Recognition
Early identification of mass
casualty incident (MCI) event
and initiation of MCI/HazMat
protocols.
Evaluate the linkage between Emergency Management
the two plans: MCI and
HazMat (functional checklist/
training). Clarification of
threshold.

Early detection of the

chemical. (Best Practice)
Prior to each event develop an
incident action plan. (Best
Practice)

[document number] B-1[Community/Venue/Threat] RRA Workshop

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RRA Workshop After-Action Report (AAR)

Immediate Actions

2. Minimize spread Immediate heating, Understand delayed air

ventilation, and air movement after shutting off
conditioning (HVAC) shut- HVAC.
down. (Best Practice)

Emergency Response

3. Evacuate persons needing Responders in rescue personal Additional training and

help protective equipment (PPE) exercising/operational-based.
guide and extract HazMed to
provide life-saving care.

4. Decontamination Disrobing and hasty flushing. Evaluate decontamination Fire Department

decision processes.

[document number] B-2[Community/Venue/Threat] RRA Workshop

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RRA Workshop After-Action Report (AAR)

Medical Treatment

5. Time to transport Augment ambulance Evaluate transport.

transport with buses. (Best
Practice)

[document number] B-3[Community/Venue/Threat] RRA Workshop

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RRA Workshop After-Action Report (AAR)

APPENDIX C: PARTICIPATING AGENCIES AND

ORGANIZATIONS

Agency
Civil Support Team
Coroner’s Office
Emergency Management
Paramedics
Sheriff’s Office
Fire Department
Fire Department/Hazardous Materials Team
Police Department
State University
State University Emergency Operations Center
Central District Health Department
Bureau of Homeland Security
State Emergency Medical Services Communications Center
State Police
Regional Medical Center
Emergency Operations Center
US Department of Homeland Security/Office of Health Affairs/Chemical Defense Program
US Department of Veterans Affairs, Medical Center
Veterans’ Health Administration Office of Emergency Management

[document number] C-1 [Community/Venue/Threat] RRA Workshop

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RRA Workshop After-Action Report (AAR)

APPENDIX D: ACRONYMS

Acronym Term
AAR After-Action Report
AFI Area for Improvement
CDHD Central District Health Department
CDP Chemical Defense Project
CONOPS Concept of Operations
DHS United States Department of Homeland Security
ESF Emergency Support Function
FOUO For Official Use Only
HSEEP Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive
HVAC Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
ICU Intensive Care Unit
IP Improvement Plan
MCI Mass Casualty Incident
NIMS National Incident Management System
NIFC National Interagency Fire Center
OHA Office of Health Affairs
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
RRA Response Risk Assessment
S Strength
US United States

[document number] C-2 [Community/Venue/Threat] RRA Workshop

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 [document classification, ex. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)]

ATTACHMENT J:
TEMPLATE FOR TABLETOP EXERCISE
AFTER-ACTION REPORT

[image]

[Community/Venue/Threat]
Chemical Defense
Demonstration Project
Tabletop Exercise (TTX)
After-Action Report (AAR)
[date]

103
 [document classification, ex. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)]

[document disclaimer, ex.

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States
government. Neither the United States government nor Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, nor
any of their employees makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or
responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or
process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein
to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by
the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. The views and opinions of
authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or
Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, and shall not be used for advertising or product
endorsement purposes.]

[auspices, ex. This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344.]

104
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Handling Instructions............................................................................................................. 1
Confidentiality ................................................................................................................................. 1
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................... 2
Exercise Planning Team .................................................................................................................. 2
Missions Tested ............................................................................................................................... 2
Core Capabilities Tested .................................................................................................................. 3
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 3
Major Strengths Demonstrated ...................................................................................................... 3
Primary Areas for Improvement Identified ..................................................................................... 4
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 4
Exercise Overview ................................................................................................................. 4
Exercise Design Summary and Analysis of Capabilities ........................................................... 6
TTX Background, Purpose, and Design ........................................................................................... 6
Scenario Summary .......................................................................................................................... 6
Exercise Capabilities, Objectives, Activities, and Analysis .............................................................. 7
Conclusion ……………… ............................................................................................................ 8
Appendix A: Agenda ........................................................................................................ A-1
Appendix B: Improvement Plan (IP)................................................................................ B-1
Appendix C: Participating Agencies and Organizations .................................................. C-1
Appendix D: Acronyms .................................................................................................... D-2

[document number] i[Community/Venue/Threat] Chem Defense Project TTX

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HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS
The title of this document is the [Community/Venue/Threat] Chemical Defense Demonstration
Project Tabletop Exercise (TTX) After-Action Report (AAR). The information gathered in this
report is classified as [document classification, ex. For Official Use Only (FOUO)] and should be
handled as sensitive information not to be disclosed. This document should be safeguarded,
handled, transmitted, and stored in accordance with appropriate security directives. Reproduction
of this document, in whole or in part, without prior approval is prohibited.

CONFIDENTIALITY
The [Community/Venue/Threat] Chemical Defense Demonstration Project TTX is an
Unclassified exercise. The control of information is based more on public sensitivity regarding
the nature of the exercise rather than the actual exercise content. Some exercise material is
intended for the exclusive use of the Planning Team, Facilitators, and Moderators, while other
content is intended for exercise participants. The AAR may be viewed by all participants.

All exercise participants should use appropriate guidelines to ensure the proper control of
information within their areas and protect this material in accordance with current United States
(US) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or their own organization’s directives.

Exercise After-Action Report/Point of Contact

Organization: [POC organization name]

Name of Person Submitting: [POC name]

Title: [POC person submitting Title]

Address: [POC address]

Telephone Number: [POC telephone number]

Fax Number: [POC fax number]

E-mail Address: [POC email]

[document number] 1[Community/Venue/Threat] Chem Defense Project TTX

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Exercise Detail

AAR for: Exercise Actual Event/Incident

Exercise Date: [date]

Exercise Type: Drill Tabletop Functional Full-Scale

Exercise Geographical Scope: Local Regional State Multi-State

International

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of the Chemical Defense Project TTX was to exercise and validate the
[Community/Venue/Threat] Operational Framework for Chemical Defense (the “Chemical
Defense Framework”) for developing a National-level Framework for application to other cities
across the country. The TTX allowed participants to identify and examine best practices, issues,
and gaps likely to be encountered in responding to a large-scale chemical incident by testing the
emergency response capabilities. The scenario involved [Community/Venue/Threat]. The
scenario began with release of a toxic chemical and extended through all of the response tasks,
ending with hospital care.

EXERCISE PLANNING TEAM

Name Organization

MISSIONS TESTED
• Prevention
• Protection
• Mitigation
• Response
• Recovery

[document number] 2[Community/Venue/Threat] Chem Defense Project TTX

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CORE CAPABILITIES TESTED
• Operational Coordination
• Public Information and Warning
• Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities
• Community Resilience
• Operational Communications
• Environmental Response/Health and Safety
• Public Health and Medical Services
• Mass Care Services
• Fatality Management Services

OVERVIEW
The [Community/Venue/Threat] Chemical Defense Demonstration Project TTX was held [date],
at the [TTX location]. A copy of the Agenda is included as Appendix A. The TTX was a one-
scenario, multimedia-based exercise held during a one-day event. The moderated, discussion-
based TTX allowed participants to interact in accordance with their respective responsibilities
and expertise to coordinate the response to, and recovery from, a large-scale chemical incident.
This report adheres to Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) guidelines.

The TTX began with introductions by the DHS Sponsor and [Community/Venue/Threat]
Emergency Management, followed by a presentation on the chemical properties and health
effects of the chemical to be discussed during the TTX. Prior to beginning the scenario, review
and training on the [Community/Venue/Threat] Response Risk Assessment processes was
provided to the participants. The remainder of the day was devoted to the scenario that involved
[scenario description] at [scenario location]. Questions were asked of the participants that
focused on the actions each agency would take in response to this incident related to alert,
notification, initial response, containment, and consequence mitigation. The TTX ended with all
attendees participating in the development of a consolidated best practices and gaps table which
included assigning action owners to actions (i.e., next steps). The consolidated table is included
in this AAR as an Improvement Plan (IP) (Appendix B). The Planning Team closed the day by
conducting an internal hot wash to share their thoughts regarding the progress of the TTX.

Prior to being released for the day, participants were invited to complete a Participant Feedback
form designed to give each person an opportunity to suggest recommendations and identify
action steps for addressing areas needing improvement.

MAJOR STRENGTHS DEMONSTRATED

The following are major strengths (S) identified during the TTX.
[document number] 3[Community/Venue/Threat] Chem Defense Project TTX

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• Observation 1.1(S): [example: Participants demonstrated a good understanding of primary and
supporting agencies roles and responsibilities in internal incident management communication
processes.]

o Recommendation 1.1.1(S): [example: None.]

PRIMARY AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT IDENTIFIED

The following are the primary areas for improvement (AFIs) and their associated
recommendations.

• Observation 2.1(AFI): [example: Participants indicated that accurate recognition of a chemical agent
and its properties may take hours, slowing the alert and assessment process, and thus potentially
increasing casualties. Participants also indicated that the threshold for a Mass Casualty Incident
(MCI) event and decontamination decision processes were not clear.]

o Recommendation 2.1.1(AFI): [example: Emergency Management should evaluate the linkage

between the MCI and HazMat plans to develop a functional checklist and training. The threshold
for an MCI should also be clarified.]

o Recommendation 2.1.2(AFI): [example: The Fire Department and Venue should identify the
resources available for decontamination.]

CONCLUSION
The [Community/Venue/Threat] Chemical Defense Demonstration Project TTX provided
participants the opportunity to interact with each other in accordance with their respective
responsibilities and expertise under controlled conditions. The TTX addressed exercise
objectives and provided participants with the opportunity to discuss regional response best
practices, gaps, and issues related to responding to a large-scale chemical incident at
[Community/Venue/Threat]. The exercise also highlighted areas where further refinements are
needed. By addressing the recommendations contained within this report,
[Community/Venue/Threat] will be better prepared to respond to a large-scale chemical incident
occurs.

EXERCISE OVERVIEW
The [Community/Venue/Threat] Chemical Defense Demonstration Project TTX focused on
facility/organizational response and coordination between the involved organizations following a
large-scale chemical incident. It was not a test of detailed response and recovery procedures, but
rather a validation of the [Community/Venue/Threat] Chemical Defense Framework and
identification of best practices and gaps.

[document number] 4[Community/Venue/Threat] Chem Defense Project TTX

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 [Community/Venue/Threat] Chemical Defense Demonstration Project Tabletop
Exercise Name
Exercise (TTX)

Exercise Dates [date (start time – end time)]

Location [location]

Sponsor [sponsor]

Funding Source [funding source]

Program
Requirements [program requirements addressed]
Addressed
The TTX involved a wide-range of participants from Federal, State, and local
Participating
jurisdictional levels as well as private sector partners. The full list of
Organizations
participating agencies can be found in Appendix C.
• Prevention
• Protection
Mission Area(s) • Mitigation
• Response
• Recovery
• Operational Coordination
• Public Information and Warning
• Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities
• Community Resilience
Core Capabilities • Operational Communications
• Environmental Response/Health and Safety
• Public Health and Medical Services
• Mass Care Services
• Fatality Management Services

Threat or Hazard Chemical release

The scenario involves a chemical release that results in a surge of patients and
Scenario
fatalities.

[document number] 5[Community/Venue/Threat] Chem Defense Project TTX

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EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES
TTX BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND DESIGN
The DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA) Chemical Defense Program (CDP) is currently
developing a National Chemical Defense Framework, premised on the principles of US
Domestic Chemical Defense Policy and Guidance outlined in the Homeland Security
Presidential Directive (HSPD)-22, Domestic Chemical Defense. HSPD-22 lists four pillars of
domestic chemical defense; Threat Awareness, Prevention and Protection, Detection and
Identification, and Response and Recovery.
The purpose of the [Community/Venue/Threat] Chemical Defense Demonstration Project TTX
was to exercise and validate the [Community/Venue/Threat] Chemical Defense Framework. The
goals were to:
• Define best practices to prepare and respond to high consequence chemical events – whether
caused by accident or terrorism.
• Use a system viewpoint to examine the problem, beginning with incident initiation and
continuing through definitive hospital care.
• Examine overlapping areas of information flow and communication, decision-making,
actions, and resources.

SCENARIO SUMMARY
The scenario for the [Community/Venue/Threat] Chemical Defense Project TTX was selected
based on two basic criteria: it had to be plausible in the [Community/Venue/Threat]
environment, and it had to challenge the different emergency response processes. Issues
included:
• It had to be an [indoor/outdoor] release at the [Community/Venue/Threat].
• It had to potentially affect a large portion of the population inside the [Community/Venue/Threat].
• The chemical released had to provide early observable symptoms.
• The chemical released had to potentially result in challenges to many portions of the response system,
including decontamination processes.

The scenario that was chosen was:

1. [explain scenario].

[document number] 6[Community/Venue/Threat] Chem Defense Project TTX

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EXERCISE CAPABILITIES, OBJECTIVES, ACTIVITIES, AND ANALYSIS
The Core Capabilities listed below were selected by the Chemical Defense Project TTX Planning
Team and provide the foundation for development of the exercise objectives and scenarios. The
exercise objectives describe the expected outcomes for the TTX. The objectives are linked to the
Core Capabilities, which are distinct critical elements necessary to achieve the specific Mission
Areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery.

Core Capability Exercise Objective

• Operational Coordination
• Public Information and Warning
• Risk Management for Protection Programs
and Activities
• Community Resilience
• Operational Communications
• Environmental Response/Health and Safety
• Public Health and Medical Services
Review and exercise the draft Chemical Defense
Framework as a means of transitioning the
information into application.
7. Discuss internal incident management
communication processes.
8. Assess information-sharing capabilities
with the public, private sector partners,
and Federal, State, and local government
departments and agencies.

• Mass Care Services 9. Assess the ability to identify

vulnerabilities, and consequences to
• Fatality Management Services manage risk.
10. Assess the effectiveness of incident
management functions in directing and
controlling response and recovery
activities.
11. Identify gaps, redundancies,
developmental activities, and best
practices in the event of a large-scale
incident.
12. Identify and review recommendations to
improve overall response system
capabilities.

Below are key observations from exercise play as they relate to the main objective: “Review and
exercise the draft Chemical Defense Framework as a means of transitioning the information into
application.” Observations are labeled as a strength (S) and/or as an area for improvement (AFI).
Objective 1: Discuss internal incident management communication processes.
1.1 Observation (S): [example: Participants demonstrated a good understanding of primary
and supporting agencies roles and responsibilities in internal incident management
communication processes.]
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 Analysis: [example: During the TTX, participants demonstrated a good understanding of
the role of the Fire Department, as the primary agency with overall Incident Command
responsibilities, and those of supporting organizations (e.g. venue, particularly the
Command Post) and agencies (e.g. Emergency Management, Police Department, and the
HazMat Unit of the Fire Department) in operational areas such as alert, notification,
initial response, containment and consequence mitigation, … transport, and medical
services.]
1.1.1 Recommendation: [example: None.]

Objective 2: Assess information-sharing capabilities with the public, private sector partners, and
Federal, State, and local government departments and agencies.
2.1 Observation (AFI): [example: The venue Command Post can be in immediate radio
communication with Central (911) Dispatch simply by changing to a different radio channel.
Additionally, StateComm and the Bridge Call are means by which the Participants share
information with, and request additional support from, other agencies. However, having clear,
pre-scripted messages to inform the public was identified as a gap.]
Analysis: [example: During the TTX, participants discussed several methods for
informing the public, particularly those in attendance at the venue at the time of the
incident, that a large-scale chemical incident had occurred and what to do, (e.g.
assembling outside, disrobing, rinsing with water).]
• 2.1.1 Recommendation: [example: The venue should develop customized messages for
quicker evacuation response.]

CONCLUSION
The [Community/Venue/Threat] Chemical Defense Demonstration Project TTX provided the
[Community/Venue], stakeholder agencies, and local jurisdictions the opportunity to review and
exercise the draft [Community/Venue/Threat] Chemical Defense Framework as a means of
transitioning the information into application.
Participants in the TTX included several City of [Community/Venue] departments, including
Emergency Management, the Coroner’s Office, and the Police and Fire departments, including
the Hazardous Materials Team. Also in attendance were local and Federal (Veteran’s
Administration) hospitals and private-sector partners (see Appendix C for a full list of
participating agencies and organizations).
The TTX addressed the objectives and provided an opportunity for the participating agencies and
organizations with a role in alert, notification, initial response, containment and consequence
mitigation, suppression, rescue and recovery, decontamination, transport, and medical services
processes to identify potential pitfalls and examine ways to improve collaboration. Strengths and
areas for improvement identified during the TTX have been used to develop the IP presented in
Appendix B.

[document number] 8[Community/Venue/Threat] Chem Defense Project TTX

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APPENDIX A: AGENDA

Registration begins at 7:30 am.

Introduction and Background

Introduction Name of presenter 8:00am – 8:20am

TTX Ground Rules and Objectives Name of presenter 8:20am – 8:25am

Chemical Properties/Health Effects Name of presenter 8:25am – 9:10am

DHS Guidance for Chemical Incident Name of presenter 9:10am – 9:35am

Response

Break 9:35am – 9:45am

Review & Training on Response Name of presenter 9:45am – 10:30am

Assessment Document/Processes

Scenario Discussion

Scenario Description Name of presenter 10:30am – 10:50am

Scenario Alert, Notification, & Initial Name of presenter 10:50am – 12:00pm

Response

Lunch 12:00pm – 12:45pm

Scenario Alert, Notification, & Initial Name of presenter 12:45pm – 1:15pm

Response continued

Scenario Containment/ Consequence Name of presenter 1:15pm – 2:45pm

Mitigation

Break 2:45pm – 2:55pm

Scenario Containment/ Consequence Name of presenter 2:55pm – 3:30pm

Mitigation continued

Break 3:30pm – 3:45pm

Scenario Best Practices and Gaps Name of presenter 3:45pm – 4:30pm

[document number] A-1[Community/Venue/Threat] Chem Defense Project TTX

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Summary and Wrap-up

Wrap-up & Next Steps Name of presenter 4:30pm – 4:45pm

Note: Facilitators, Moderators, and Note-takers will also meet for about one hour after the
exercise for a debriefing.

[document number] A-2[Community/Venue/Threat] Chem Defense Project TTX

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APPENDIX B: IMPROVEMENT PLAN (IP)
This Improvement Plan (IP) was developed as an outcome of the [Community/Venue/Threat] Chemical Defense Demonstration
Project TTX conducted [date]. The recommendations included in this IP draw on planning team member observations and
recommendations as well as on exercise participants’ recommendations documented during the best practices and gaps sessions
following each scenario.

Phase/Shortfall Solution Action Action Owner

Alert & Assessment

6. Early Recognition
Early identification of mass
casualty incident (MCI) event
and initiation of MCI/HazMat
protocols.
Evaluate the linkage between Emergency Management
the two plans: MCI and
HazMat (functional checklist/
training). Clarification of
threshold.

Early detection of the

chemical. (Best Practice)
Prior to each event develop an
incident action plan. (Best
Practice)

[document number] B-1[Community/Venue/Threat] Chem Defense Project TTX

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 Immediate Actions

7. Minimize spread Immediate heating, Understand delayed air

ventilation, and air movement after shutting off
conditioning (HVAC) shut- HVAC.
down. (Best Practice)

Emergency Response

8. Evacuate persons needing Responders in rescue personal Additional training and

help protective equipment (PPE) exercising/operational-based.
guide and extract HazMed to
provide life-saving care.

9. Decontamination Disrobing and hasty flushing. Evaluate decontamination Fire Department

decision processes.

[document number] B-2[Community/Venue/Threat] Chem Defense Project TTX

[document classification, ex. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)]

 Medical Treatment

10. Time to transport Augment ambulance Evaluate transport.

transport with buses. (Best
Practice)

[document number] B-3[Community/Venue/Threat] Chem Defense Project TTX

[document classification, ex. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)]

APPENDIX C: PARTICIPATING AGENCIES AND
ORGANIZATIONS

Agency
Civil Support Team
Coroner’s Office
Emergency Management
Paramedics
Sheriff’s Office
Fire Department
Fire Department/Hazardous Materials Team
Police Department
State University
State University Emergency Operations Center
Central District Health Department
Bureau of Homeland Security
State Emergency Medical Services Communications Center
State Police
Regional Medical Center
Emergency Operations Center
US Department of Homeland Security/Office of Health Affairs/Chemical Defense Program
US Department of Veterans Affairs, Medical Center
Veterans’ Health Administration Office of Emergency Management
APPENDIX D: ACRONYMS

Acronym Term
AAR After-Action Report
AFI Area for Improvement
CDHD Central District Health Department
CDP Chemical Defense Project
CONOPS Concept of Operations
DHS United States Department of Homeland Security
ESF Emergency Support Function
FOUO For Official Use Only
HSEEP Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive
HVAC Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
ICU Intensive Care Unit
IP Improvement Plan
MCI Mass Casualty Incident
NIMS National Incident Management System
NIFC National Interagency Fire Center
OHA Office of Health Affairs
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
S Strength
TTX Tabletop Exercise
US United States