256 Chapter? - Risk Management Case Study 7.2 Nicoll Highway Collapse On April 20, 2004, part of the Nicoll Highway in Singapore collapsed. Six lanes of the highway disappeared into a 100-foot hole when a tunnd being constructed underneath the highway collapsed. Incredibly, no one was driving on the usually congested highway. The tunnel was part of the underground Circle MRT (Mass Rapid Transport) Line, and the supporting structure for the excavation work had file, Four workers were killed in the incident and three others were injured. Rescuers hunted in vain for survivors for three days before efforts were called off. By this stage, it was clear that the danger to the rescue teams far out- weighed the likelihood of finding any survivors. The other concern was the fact that the ground around the collapse had to be stabilized in order to ensure that no further col- lapses would occur. ‘The immediate reason for the collapse was that the retaining wall hokling up the evacuation work was insut- ficient to hold up the tunnel. Two construction cranes had fallen into the hole and there was evidence of twisted steel ‘support beams. Initial Response ‘Authorities in Singapore instituted an inquiry into the incident. They also suspended 20 other excavation pro}- ‘ects that were ongoing atthe time. These were shut down at great expense and delay as new best-practice codes were put in place, Meanwhile, exper from across the world ‘were brought in to investigate the accident and determine exactly what had happened. It became clear that a number of factors hed con- tributed to the collapse. Most significant was the fact that the geological findings had been misinterpreted. ‘The structure of the tunnel had been wnder-designed as a direct result ofthe fact that the engineers had assumed that the soil’s shear strength was greater than it actually ‘was. There were also issues with the structural bracingsystem being used. The collapse had taken place ata point where the bracing was overloaded, and the system lacked the capacity to redistribute the load between the other supports if this part of the bracing failed. The engineers hhad underestimated the strut loads. Apportioning Blame A Committee of Inquiry in May 2005 was told that the disaster was caused by a failure of a connection between horizontal struts and waling beams. The struts and beams supported the diaphragm walls. The general causes of the collapse had already been agreed upon by the Land ‘Transport Authority (LTA) and Nishimatsu-Lum Chang (NLC), who were the main contractorsin the joint venture, the NLClead designer Maunsell Asia; the project engineer Paul Broome; and L&M and Kori (subcontractors). LEA's View Ithad been found that Nishimatsu-Lum Chang (NLC) was negligentful, reckless, and dishonest during design and.con- struction, according to the LTA. LTA cited that the design errors had begun with the soil analysis at the earliest stages of the project. According to KShanmugam, LTA’s counsel + Analysis of the ground conditions had been based ‘on the use of Method A, which looked at the mechanical properties of drained sol. + The soil encountered in the deep excavation was in fact highly plastic marine clay, and NLC should have used data for undtained soils. + Inusing the wrong method, NLC under predicted the forces that would act on the works being carried out. + This led 1o an under-design in the temporary works, + Asa result ofthis, the system being installed did not have the capacity required. + The incorrect soil analysis also meant that as the excavations got deeper, the errors and potential failures became more acute. + The strut connections were under-strength by a factor of two. + NL.Calso substituted C channel shaped sted sections for plate stifieners in an attempt to strengthen the connections. + However, NLC had tried to cut costs by using serap material to replace the stiffener plates when they hhad run out of supplies. LTA went on to claim that NLC had ignored its own risk assessments. Some of the stiffener plates were already buckling, but NIC had hidden this from LTA in order to keep them from insisting on additional works. NLC was already behind schedule in April 2004 and had incurred late penalties of some $25 million. LTA would have undoubtedly ordered NLC to cease work had it known Case Study 7.2. 257 about the problems, and NLC would have had to bear the ‘cost ofthe extra delaysto the work schedule. Similar struts had failed on two other NLC sites, but NLC had insisted that the problem was in hand and pressured the LT'A to allow works to continue. It wes therefore LTA’s conten- tion that NLC had failed to reveal sufficient information for LITA to make an informed judgment. NICs View NLC was certain that the reason for the collapse wes unforeseen downward movement of the diaphragm walls. ‘According to NLC: + There was a sudden drop in the height of the all relative to the posts that were supporting the temporary struts, + ‘This changed the angle at which the struts were connected. + In turn, this caused the walls to deform and fail, NLC called this “sway failure,” which occurs when violent forces act on the diaphrogm walls. The phenom- ‘enon had been seen in other parts of the Cirele Line, but notat the Nicoll Highway. NLC maintained that the collapse of the tunnel was not inevitable, but was probably caused because the forced sway mechanism accelerated the failure. NLC admitted thatthe struts were close to the limit oftheir performance, but maintained that the loads did not exceed the capacity of the temporary works they had carried out. Furthermore, NLC expressly countered LTA’s sug- gestion that the soil analysis was the root cause of the disaster, contending: + It was appropriate to use drained soil data, as it provides a more conservative analysis. + Although Method A had nét béen used for deeper ‘excavations in Singapore before, LITA was aware of the method being used and generally agreed with the findings + LTA had been specifically briefed about the soil analysis as early as May 2002. + At that time, LITA’s own engineer had stated that other soll analysis types were too conservative. NIC Admissions ‘The failure took place at the ninth-level strut connections, ‘which was around 30 meters below the ground and just 3 meters above formation level. As the connections failed, the diaphragm wall deformed. This overloaded the struts which caused them to buckle. In turn, this triggered a gradual and progressive collapse of the tunnel walls, In the event, just one hour elapsed between the failure of the first strut connection and the complete collapse, which {triggered devastating damage to the highway. (continued)258 Chapter? + Risk Management NLC admitted that there had been a failure in the temporary works, They put this down to under-design and inappropriate detail of the connections. They also admitted that their own engineers had misinterpreted the relevant building code, which had resulted in the use of smaller stels than were actually needed forthe struts, The Greatest Engineering Disaster ofthe Past Decade? Although the general causes for the collapse of the high way were agreed upon between all parties in 2005, as of May 2012, just one person had been prosecuted for their part in the disaster. Nonetheless, many lessons had been learned. Work on the MRT has commenced once more, but this time far more heavy-duty temporary works are being demanded. Additional robustness in design is now demanded of contractors. From the outset, braced excavations were used for ‘transport construction projects in Singapore, and each ‘ofthe MRT stations were constructed using the “bottom: up” method. This meant excavating and propping up the excavations with steel struts. These were supported at their micl-span by king posts and beams across the face of the diaparagm walls Thestruts were placed at 3-meter intervals Todlay, the “top-down” method is preferred. This involves constructing the station with a permanent rein- forced concrete rout sab. The slab operates rathe: like 4 huge strut, which means that struts are not necessary. Ata stroke, the time-consuming installation of struts has been eliminated, and the safety risks are farlower. Government Response In the immediate aftermath of the inquiry, the Singapore government accepted the findings in fll and was quick to announce a series of new legislation that would improve safety standards in the construction industry. The Joint Review Committee IRC), made up from various government departments, announced that there would be far stiffer penalties for professionals who had shown dere- liction of duty anclcare. A new licensing scheme was intro: duced for specialist contractors; additional training and the development of a code of practice for deep excavation ‘work were all part ofa raft of new legislation, ‘The Singapore government was convinced that the failures that led to the collapse of the highway and the deaths had been entirely avoidable and were unacceptable, From this point, all major construction projects would be auclted in terms of their safety. The government was determined to point out that smal, incremental improve: ments would not bring about the level of safety that is ‘expected of such projects. As a result, it was necessary for several government departments to prioritize the safety isoues end bring in sweeping reforms ‘Today, with the reformsin place the pace of work to extend the MRT system is as rapid as before, but fer safer. ‘The Downtown Line is seen as the key to the development of the Marina Bay area. The Bayfront Station will be under- neath theleisureand entertainment complex the Intagrated Resort. Here the excavations will be at 24 meters. In order to counter the weak soil, thick diaphragm walls have been ‘used, and these have been stiffened by cross walls and slabs. yen the cut and cover tunnels (just ke the one that eaused the collapse at Nicholl Highway) have up to seven levels Of strutting to support them. Lessons were learned, and legislation has been enacted to back them up.'* Questions. 1, In wht ways were the project’s planning and scope ‘management appropriate? When did the planners begin knowingly taking unnecessary sisks? Discuss the {sue of project constraints and other unique aspects of the tunnel in the risk management process. Were these {sues taken into consideration? Why or why not? 2, Conduct either « qualitative or quantitative risk assessment on this project. Identify the risk factors that you consider most important for underground tunnel construction. How would you assess the riskiness ofthis project? Why? ‘What forms of risk mitigation would you consider appropriate for this project? 3.