CIVIL PROCEDURE – 1ST EXAM a.
Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner : This is acquired by
Xandredg Sumpt L. Latog
I by the voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or
JURISDICTION IN GENERAL
Jurisdiction is defined as the power of the court to hear
and decide cases [Herrera v. Barreto] and to execute the
judgement thereon [Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice].
Jurisdiction v. Exercise of Jurisdiction
"Jurisdiction" should be distinguished from the "exercise
of jurisdiction." Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case,
not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where
a court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, as in
the instant case, the decision on all questions arising from the case
is but an exercise of such jurisdiction.   Any error that the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error
of judgment which does not affect its authority to decide the case,
much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.
Types of Jurisdiction
The types of jurisdiction are:
1) General and Special Jurisdiction;
2) Original and Appellate Jurisdiction;
3) Exclusive or Concurrent Jurisdiction.
General jurisdiction refers to the authority of the court to
hear and determine all actions and suits. For example, the Supreme
Court has general jurisdiction because it can review all kinds of
cases. RTC is also a court with general jurisdiction because it is
practically the catch-all court. Special jurisdiction or limited
jurisdiction is the authority of the court to hear and determine
particular cases only. For example, the Sandiganbayan has a
limited jurisdiction.
Original jurisdiction is the power of the court to take
cognizance of a case at its inception or commencement. Appellate
jurisdiction, on the other hand, refers to the power vested in a
superior court to review and revise the judicial action of a lower
court.
Exclusive Jurisdiction is that jurisdiction possessed by
the court to the exclusion of all others. For example, MTC has
exclusive jurisdiction over BP 22 cases, forcible entry, and
unlawful detainer cases. On the other hand, Concurrent jurisdiction
is that possessed by the court together with another court or other
courts over the same subject matter, the court obtaining jurisdiction
first retaining it to the exclusion of the others, but the choice of
court is lodged in those persons duly authorized to file the action.
Lack of Jurisdiction vs. Excess of Jurisdiction
Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of
jurisdiction means that an act, though within the general power of a
tribunal, board or officer is not authorized, and invalid with respect
to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone
authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are
wanting. Without jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power,
right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes,
considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter.
It means lack of power to exercise authority [Equitable PCI Bank
v. Apurillo].
A. ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION
Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the
court acquires such jurisdiction:
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the filing of the complaint, petition or initiatory pleading before
the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired
respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court
to him, generally by the service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter : This is conferred by law
and, unlike jurisdiction over the parties, cannot be conferred on
the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and
conferred by the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by
their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by
their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to
evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in
Sec. 5, Rule 10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the
subject of the litigation). This is acquired by the actual or
constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus
placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by
provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal
with the property or subject matter within its territorial
jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or suits involving
civil status or real property in the Philippines of a non-resident
defendant.
B. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
statute in force at the time of commencement of the action [Dela
Cruz v. Moya].
In Perez Cardenas vs. Camus, it was held that
jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined by the allegations
of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein --
a matter that can be resolved only after and as a result of the
trial.  Nor may the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss,
for, were we to be governed by such rule, the
question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the
defendant.
C. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
Jurisdiction over the parties refers to the power of the
court to make decisions that are binding on persons.  The courts
acquire jurisdiction over complainants or petitioners as soon as
they file their complaints or petitions.  Over the persons of
defendants or respondents, courts acquire jurisdiction by a valid
service of summons or through their voluntary submission.
Generally, a person voluntarily submits to the court’s jurisdiction
when he or she participates in the trial despite improper service of
summons [De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp.].
On this score, Philippine Commercial International Bank
v. Spouses Day instructs that:
As a general proposition, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had
occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit
answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of
a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the
court's jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered only by the
concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes
a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's
jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have
submitted to its authority. Prescinding from the foregoing, it is
thus clear that:
 (1) Special appearance operates as an exception to
the general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made,
i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a
pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and
submitted to the court for resolution.
Time and again, it has been held that the filing of a
motion for additional time to file answer is considered voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court. If the defendant
knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the
lack of personal jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in
the action, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. Seeking an affirmative relief is
inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had
been made, and to ask for such relief, without the proper objection,
necessitates submission to the Court's jurisdiction [Carson Realty
v. Red Robin Security Agency].
Carson Realty v. Red Robin Security Agency
Held: Carson voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
RTC when it filed, through Atty. Roxas, the Appearance and Motion dated
April 25, 2007 acknowledging Carson's receipt of the Summons dated April
11, 2007 and seeking additional time to file its responsive pleading. As
noted by the CA, Carson failed to indicate therein that the Appearance and
Motion was being filed by way of a conditional appearance to question the
regularity of the service of summons. Thus, by securing the affirmative
relief of additional time to file its responsive pleading, Carson effectively
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
D. JURISDICTION OVER THE RES
Jurisdiction over the Res is acquired by the actual or
constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus
placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by
provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal
with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction,
as in land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or
real property in the Philippines of a non-resident defendant.
Jurisdiction over the parties is required regardless of
the type of action — whether the action is in personam, in
rem, or quasi in rem.
An action in personam is an action against a person on
the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an action
against the thing itself instead of against the person. An
action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. 
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction
on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over
the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought
into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of
legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized
and made effective [Biaco v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank].
In De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, it
was held:
In actions in personam, the judgment is for or against
a person directly. Jurisdiction over the parties is required in
actions in personam because they seek to impose personal
responsibility or liability upon a person.
Courts need not acquire jurisdiction over parties on
this basis in in rem and quasi in rem actions.  Actions in
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rem or quasi in rem are not directed against the person based on
his or her personal liability.
Actions in rem are actions against the thing itself. 
They are binding upon the whole world. Quasi in rem actions
are actions involving the status of a property over which a party
has interest. Quasi in rem actions are not binding upon the
whole world.  They affect only the interests of the particular
parties.
However, to satisfy the requirements of due process,
jurisdiction over the parties in in rem and quasi in rem actions is
required.
The phrase, “against the thing,” to describe in
rem actions is metaphor.  It is not the “thing” that is the party to
an in rem action; only legal or natural persons may be parties
even in in rem actions.  “Against the thing” means that
resolution of the case affects interests of others whether direct or
indirect.  It also assumes that the interests — in the form of
rights or duties — attach to the thing which is the subject matter
of litigation.  In actions in rem, our procedure assumes an active
vinculum over those with interests to the thing subject of
litigation.
Due process requires that those with interest to the
thing in litigation be notified and given an opportunity to defend
those interests.  Courts, as guardians of constitutional rights,
cannot be expected to deny persons their due process rights
while at the same time be considered as acting within their
jurisdiction.
Violation of due process rights is a jurisdictional
defect.  This court recognized this principle in Aducayen v.
Flores. In the same case, this court further ruled that this
jurisdictional defect is remedied by a petition for certiorari.
De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation
Held: An action for annulment of certificate of title is quasi in
rem.  It is not an action “against a person on the basis of his personal
liability,” but an action that subjects a person’s interest over a property to a
burden.  The action for annulment of a certificate of title threatens
petitioner’s interest in the property.  Petitioner is entitled to due process
with respect to that interest.  The court does not have competence or
authority to proceed with an action for annulment of certificate of title
without giving the person, in whose name the certificate was issued all the
opportunities to be heard.’
Hence, regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of
summons is imperative.  A decision rendered without proper service of
summons suffers a defect in jurisdiction.  Respondent’s institution of a
proceeding for annulment of petitioner’s certificate of title is sufficient to
vest the court with jurisdiction over the res, but it is not sufficient for the
court to proceed with the case with authority and competence.
Biaco v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank
Held: The Court explained, citing El Banco Español-Filipino v.
Palanca, that foreclosure and attachment proceedings are both actions quasi
in rem.  As such, jurisdiction over the person of the (non-resident)
defendant is not essential.  Service of summons on a non-resident defendant
who is not found in the country is required, not for purposes of physically
acquiring jurisdiction over his person but simply in pursuance of the
requirements of fair play, so that he may be informed of the pendency of
the action against him and the possibility that property belonging to him or
in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of a
resident, and that he may thereby be accorded an opportunity to defend in
the action, should he be so minded.
Significantly, the Court went on to rule, citing De Midgely v.
Ferandos, et. al. and Perkins v. Dizon, et al. that in a proceeding
in rem or quasi in rem, the only relief that may be granted by the court
against a defendant over whose person it has not acquired jurisdiction
either by valid service of summons or by voluntary submission to its
jurisdiction, is limited to the res.
Similarly, in this case, while the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over the res, its jurisdiction is limited to a rendition of judgment on the res. 
It cannot extend its jurisdiction beyond the res and issue a judgment
enforcing petitioner's personal liability.  In doing so without first having
acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, as it did, the trial court
 violated her constitutional right to due process, warranting the annulment of 5.
the judgment rendered in the case.
E. JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUES 6.
Jurisdiction over the issue is determined and conferred by 7.
the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement
in a pre-trial or stipulation, or at times, by their implied consent as
by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not
covered by the pleadings, as provided in Section 5, Rule 10 [Lazo
v. Republic Surety].
This jurisdiction means that the court must only pass
upon issues raised by the pleadings of the parties. Hence, if the
issue raised by the parties is possession, the court has no
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of ownership because it is not an
issue in the case. Conversely, if the issue in the case is ownership
and no issue of possession is found in the pleadings of the parties,
the court has no authority to adjudicate on the possession of the
property. Thus, it is not correct for the court to order the lessee to
vacate the premises where the lessor did not include in his
pleadings a claim for restoration of possession [Buce v. Court of
Appeals].
F. DOCTRINE OF CONTINUITY OF JURISDICTION
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction, once acquired,
continues until the case is finally terminated [Marino, Jr. v.
Gamilla].
Jurisdiction is referred to as "continuing" in view of the
general principle that once a court has acquired jurisdiction, that
jurisdiction continues until the court has done all that it can do in
the exercise of that jurisdiction. This principle also means that once
jurisdiction has attached, it cannot be ousted by subsequent
happenings or events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. The
court, once jurisdiction has been acquired, retains that jurisdiction
until it finally disposes of the case [Bantua v. Mercader].
As a consequence of this principle, jurisdiction is not
affected by a new law placing a proceeding under the jurisdiction
of another tribunal except when otherwise provided in the statute or
if the statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending even
before its enactment [People v. Cawaling].
If the court has jurisdiction to act on a motion at the time
it was filed, that jurisdiction to resolve the motion continues until
the matter is resolved and is not lost by the subsequent filing of a
notice of appeal [Asmala v. COMELEC].
Even the finality of the judgment does not totally deprive
the court of jurisdiction over the case. What the court loses is the
power to amend, modify or alter the judgment. Even after the
judgment has become final, the court retains jurisdiction to enforce
and execute it [Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice].
Instances when a court may lose jurisdiction even if it
has been attached to it
1. When a subsequent law provides a prohibition for the continued
exercise of jurisdiction;
2. Where the law penalizing an act which is punishable is repealed by
a subsequent law. The reason is that, the State loses the power to
prosecute when the law is repealed, hence, the court has no more
power to decide [People v. Pastor].
3. When accused is deprived of his constitutional right such as where
the court fails to provide counsel for the accused who is unable to
obtain one and does not intelligently waive his constitutional right
[Chavez vs. Court of Appeals].
4. When the proceedings in the court acquiring jurisdiction is
terminated, abandoned or declared void [Seven vs. Pichay].
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When the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect
that it intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment
[Bengzon vs. Inciong].
Once appeal has been perfected [Alma vs. Abbas].
When the law is curative [Garcia v. Martinez].
G. DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in
the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an
elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can
interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another
court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the
relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded
on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction
over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over Its
judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its
execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting
in connection with this judgment.
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an
execution order has been issued is considered as still pending, so
that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the
suit. A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent
power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its
ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold
otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate
forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution
proceedings-Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice [Barroso v. Omelio].
Barroso v. Omelio
Held: Applying the foregoing ruling, it is quite clear that, in this
case, the issuance of the subject writ of preliminary injunction was
improper and, thus, correctible by certiorari. Herein respondent judge does
not have jurisdiction to hinder the enforcement of an order of a co-equal
court. He must be aware that said co-equal court had the exclusive
jurisdiction or authority to correct its own issuances if ever there was,
indeed, a mistake. There is no question, therefore, that subject writ of
preliminary injunction is null and void.
Further, had Judge Omelio not been dismissed from the service
in 2013 for gross ignorance of the law and violation of judicial conduct, he
could have been subjected to an investigation again for gross ignorance due
to his unprecedented acts in the case at bar.
H. HIERARCHY OF COURTS
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on
the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be
ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy
is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes
that are also well within the competence of the lower courts,
and thus leave time for the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has
assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely
necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an
exception to the policy [Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC].
However, in the same case, it was acknowledged that for
exceptionally compelling reasons, the Court may exercise its
discretion to act on special civil actions for certiorari filed directly
with it. Examples of cases that present compelling reasons are: (1)
those involving genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time; (2) those where the issues
are of transcendental importance, and the threat to fundamental
constitutional rights are so great as to outweigh the necessity for
prudence; (3) cases of first impression, where no jurisprudence yet
exists that will guide the lower courts on such issues; (4) where the
constitutional issues raised are better decided after a thorough
deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the
majority of those who participated in its discussion; (5) where time
is of the essence; (6) where the act being questioned was that of a
constitutional body; (7) where there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free
petitioner from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in
violation of their constitutional rights; and (8) the issues involve
public welfare, the advancement of public policy, the broader
interest of justice, or where the orders complained of are patent
nullities, or where appeal can be considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy [Barroso v. Omelio].
I. DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not
determine a controversy involving a question within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact
[Baviera v. Paglinawan].
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based
on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not
inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a)
where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is
relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due
process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is
involved; and, (1) in quo warranto proceedings [San Miguel
Properties v. BF Homes].
II
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Section 5 of the same Article provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
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(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity
of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax,
impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower
court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is  reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of
law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to
other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary
assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of
the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid
a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
 (6) Appoint all officials and employees of the
Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Cases that the Supreme Court may Hear En Banc
Section 4 (2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Section 4. (2) All cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court
en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential
decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and
other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
B. EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against
judgement, final order, and resolutions of the
following:
a. Court of Appeals;
b. Sandiganbayan;
c. Court of Tax Appeals
d. Commission on Elections;
e. Commission on Audit;
f. Ombudsman in criminal cases.
Although the Constitution mentions the Civil Service
Commission as one of the Constitutional Commissions, the CSC,
when it comes to that, it’s not direct to the Supreme Court. Under
R.A. No. 7902, jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of
Appeals.
Second Paragraph of Section 14 or Republic Act No.
6770 (Ombudsman Act) is Unconstitutional:
The provision reads:
 Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall
be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted
by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside
the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for
remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,
except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 also increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a
showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The
provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section
27, RA 6770 (as above-cited), which was invalidated in the case
of Fabian v. Desierto. The second paragraph of Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 6770 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL,
while the policy against the issuance of provisional injunctive writs
by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the first
paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED ineffective until
the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through
an administrative circular duly issued therefor [Carpio-Morales v.
Ombudsman].
2. Exclusive Original Jurisdiction in Election Contests
involving the position of the President and the Vice-
President
Section 4 Paragraph 7, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
3. Exclusive original jurisdiction in cases questioning the
factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus
Section 18 paragraph 3, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides:
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
4. Exclusive original jurisdiction over disciplinary
proceedings members of the judiciary and attorneys
That would be under Rule 56-A of the Rules of Court.
So, it should be filed before the Supreme Court.
5. Injunction in agrarian cases
Republic Act No. 9700
SECTION 20. Section 55 of Republic Act No. 6657, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 55. No Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction. —
Except for the Supreme Court, no court in the Philippines shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
against the PARC, the DAR, or any of its duly authorized or designated
agencies in any case, dispute or controversy arising from, necessary to, or
in connection with the application, implementation, enforcement, or
interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform."
SECTION 23. Section 68 of Republic Act No. 6657, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue
Interference. — In cases falling within their jurisdiction, no injunction,
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restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the regional
trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial courts, and
metropolitan trial courts against the DAR, the DA, the DENR, and the
Department of Justice in their implementation of the Program."
C. CONCURRENT ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
1. Concurrent original jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals in petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus against the following;
a. Regional Trial Court (Sec. 21, BP 129);
b. Civil Service Commission (R.A. No. 7902);
c. Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CTA);
d. National Labor Relations Commission;
2. Concurrent Original Jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and Regional Trial Courts
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
habeas corpus, amparo and data.
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher
court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given,
through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors
imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when
the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is
involved, or (3) in case of urgency. As a fourth exception, the Court
has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before
availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when
the questions raised are the same as those that have already been
squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court
[Gov. of United States v. Purganan].
While the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the
Court of Appeals in certain cases, we emphasized in Liga ng mga
Barangay National v. Atienza, Jr., that such concurrence does not
allow an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, thus –
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to
be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefore will be directed.  There is after all a
hierarchy of courts.  That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.  A
becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court
of Appeals.  A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. It is a policy necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s
docket.
Lacson Hermanas, Inc. v. Heirs of Ignacio
Held: In the present case, petitioner adduced no special and
important reason why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed. 
Thus, we reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain a
direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify the resort to the extraordinary remedy of writ
of certiorari.
Although the invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction  is available
to petitioner on the ground that this case raises a pure question of law,
specifically, the issue of jurisdiction, the proper recourse is not a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 but an appeal via a petition for review on
certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, which should have been filed within 15 days from notice of the
denial of its motion for reconsideration on October 22, 2004.  Even if we
treat the instant petition as an appeal under Rule 45, the same will not
prosper having been filed only on November 30, 2004, way beyond the 15
day reglementary period.
Heirs of Hinog v. Melicor
Held; In this case, no special and important reason or
exceptional and compelling circumstance analogous to any of the above
cases has been adduced by the petitioners so as to justify direct recourse to
this Court. The present petition should have been initially filed in the Court
of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.
Failure to do so is sufficient cause for the dismissal of the petition at bar.
In any event, even if the Court disregards such procedural flaw,
the petitioners' contentions on the substantive aspect of the case fail to
invite judgment in their favor.
The unavailability of the writ of certiorari and prohibition in
this case is borne out of the fact that petitioners principally assail the Order
dated March 22, 1999 which they never sought reconsideration of, in due
time, despite receipt thereof on March 26, 1999. Instead, petitioners went
through the motion of filing a supplemental pleading and only when the
latter was denied, or after more than three months have passed, did they
raise the issue that the complaint should not have been reinstated in the first
place because the trial court had no jurisdiction to do so, having already
ruled that the complaint shall be expunged.
After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking
affirmative relief in their motion to serve supplemental pleading upon
private respondents, petitioners are effectively barred by estoppel from
challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. If a party invokes the jurisdiction
of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the court's jurisdiction in the same
case. To rule otherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of
litigation, which is against the policy of the Court.
Nevertheless, there is a need to correct the erroneous impression
of the trial court as well as the private respondents that petitioners are
barred from assailing the Order dated March 22, 1999 which reinstated the
case because it was not objected to within the reglementary period or even
thereafter via a motion for reconsideration despite receipt thereof on March
26, 1999.
It must be clarified that the said order is but a resolution on an
incidental matter which does not touch on the merits of the case or put an
end to the proceedings.[41] It is an interlocutory order since there leaves
something else to be done by the trial court with respect to the merits of the
case. As such, it is not subject to a reglementary period. Reglementary
period refers to the period set by the rules for appeal or further review of a
final judgment or order, i.e., one that ends the litigation in the trial court.
Moreover, the remedy against an interlocutory order is generally
not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due
course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal
in the manner authorized by law. Only when the court issued such order
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy
of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief
will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an
interlocutory order. Such special circumstances are absolutely wanting in
the present case.
RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over Habeas Corpus cases
involving custody of minor
The provisions of RA8369 reveal no manifest intent to
revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
to issue the said writ. So the law should be read in harmony with
RA7092 expanding the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and
BP129. Thus, Family Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for Habeas
Page 6 of 37
Corpus when the custody of minors is an issue. This is affirmed by
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 03-03-04-SC dated
April 22, 2004 [Madrinan v. Madrinan].
The Supreme Court has allowed a direct invocation of
its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are
special and important reasons therefor
The Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that
of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas
corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us in cases where special
and important reasons or exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify the same. In the interest of justice and to
settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present
case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over
which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts
[Gov. of United States v. Purganan].
COMELEC v. Quijano-Padilla
Held: Here, the primordial question to be resolved is -- may a
successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with
it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress
for the project?
Anent the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts,
suffice it to say that it is not an iron-clad dictum. On several instances
where this Court was confronted with cases of national interest and of
serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with
the judicial determination of the case. The case at bar is of similar import. It
is in the interest of the State that questions relating to government contracts
be settled without delay. This is more so when the contract, as in this case,
involves the disbursement of public funds and the modernization of our
country’s election process, a project that has long been overdue.
Morales v. Court of Appeals
Held: The Court of Appeals erred in holding that it had no
jurisdiction over petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals has
concurrent original jurisdiction with the Supreme Court pursuant to Section
5(1) of Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 17(1) of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, and with the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 21(1) of
B.P. Blg. 129 to issue writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto. These are original actions, not modes of appeals.
Since what the petitioner filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670 was a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, the original jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals thereon is beyond doubt.
This error of the Court of Appeals was due to its misapplication
of Section 5(2)(c) of Article VIII of the Constitution and of that portion of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 vesting upon the Supreme Court
exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which the jurisdiction of any
inferior court is in issue. It forgot that this constitutional and statutory
provisions pertain to the appellate -- not original -- jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, as correctly maintained by the petitioner. An appellate
jurisdiction refers to a process which is but a continuation of the original
suit, not a commencement of a new action, such as that of a special civil
action for certiorari. The general rule is that a denial of a motion to dismiss
or to quash in criminal cases is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of an
appeal or of a special civil action for certiorari. Nevertheless, this Court
has allowed a special civil action for certiorari where a lower court has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
in denying a motion to dismiss or to quash. The petitioner believed that the
RTC below did so; hence, the special civil action for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals appeared to be the proper remedy.
The next most logical step then is for us to simply set aside the
challenged resolutions and to direct the Court of Appeals to resolve on the
merits the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670. But, that would further delay
the case. Considering the special importance of the lone legal issue raised,
which can be resolved on the basis of the pleadings heretofore filed, and the
fact that this Court has concurrent jurisdiction over petitioner’s special
action in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670, we deem it more practical and in the
greater interest of justice not to remand the case to the Court of Appeals
but, instead, to take direct cognizance thereof and resolve it once and for
all.
3. Concurrent Original Jurisdiction with the Regional
Trial Court over actions involving ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls.
4. Concurrent Original Jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals over petition for writ of Kalikasan.
5. Concurrent Original Jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals and Regional Trial Court over petitions for
writ of continuing Mandamus.
D. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Section 5 Paragraph 2, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity
of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax,
impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower
court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of
law is involved.
xxx
Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over
decisions, final orders and resolutions of the lower courts. It states
that:
Sec.1. Filing of the Petition with Supreme Court. – A
party desiring to appeal from a judgement, final order of
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts authorized by law, may file
with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on
certiorari. The petition shall only raise question of law.
Cases Falling under the Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over
judgement, final orders and resolutions of the following courts:
1. The Court of Appeals under Rule 45;
2. Sandiganbayan under PD 1606, as amended by RA 7975,
RA 8249, and RA 10660 in relation to Rule 45;
3. Court of Tax Appeals en banc pursuant to Section 11 of
RA 9282 in relation to Rule 45.
4. Regional Trial Court under Rule 45 on the ground of
purely questions of law;
5. Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and Regional Trial
Court in petition for Writ of Amparo (Sec. 19 of A.M. No.
08-1-16-SC, October 24, 2007);
Page 7 of 37
6. Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and Regional Trial
Court in a petition for habeas data (Sec. 19 of A.M. No.
08-1-16-SC, February 2, 2008);
7. Court of Appeals in case of petition for writ of Kalikasan
(A.M. No. 09-6-7-SC, April 13, 2010);
8. Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court in a petition
for continuing mandamus.
As a general rule, the decision, final order and resolution
of the above-mentioned courts are based on pure questions of law
under Rule 45 by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts
There is a "question of fact" when "the doubt or
controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts." This is distinguished from a question of law when the doubt
or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
and which does not call for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants [De Los Santos v.
Elizalde].
Furthermore, in Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, this
Court ruled, thus:
Settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and
does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence
adduced by the parties during trial. Of course, the rule admits of
exceptions. So it is that in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.
vs. CA, we wrote:
"[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the
Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts
and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties' during the trial of
the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are
conclusive and binding on the Court. 
Undeniably, the foregoing issues can be resolved only
after certain facts have been established. Although it is settled that
in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and
binding on the Supreme Court, there are recognized exceptions to
this rule, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making the findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the
findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. Since exceptions
(4) and (11) are present in the case at bar, this Court shall make its
own determination of the facts relevant for the resolution of the
case [Cruz v. Cristobal].
NPC v. Dela Cruz
Held: It is beyond question that petitions for review may only
raise questions of law which must be distinctly set forth; thus, this Court is
mandated to only consider purely legal questions in this petition, unless
called for by extraordinary circumstances.
 In this case, petitioner raises the issue of denial of due process
because it was allegedly deprived of the opportunity to present its evidence
on the just compensation of properties it wanted to expropriate, and the
sufficiency of the legal basis or bases for the trial court's Order on the
matter of just compensation.  Unquestionably, a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the proper vehicle to raise the issues in
question before this Court.
In view of the significance of the issues raised in this petition,
because this case involves the expenditure of public funds for a clear public
purpose, this Court will overlook the fact that petitioner did not file a
Motion for Reconsideration of the CA November 18, 2002 Decision, and
brush aside this technicality in favor of resolving this case on the merits.
III
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an
appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law
made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature
ensures standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court.
But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most
special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a
nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and ideally,
should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be
novel unless there are factual questions to determine [Diocese of
Bacolod v. COMELEC].
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases
and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling
within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to
grant and conduct new trials or Appeals must be continuous and
must be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the
Chief Justice [Section 9, BP 129].
B.
A. EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Under BP 129, there is only one. It provides:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals shall
exercise:
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of judgements of Regional Trial Courts
Miscellaneous Jurisdiction
There is another jurisdiction – the Miscellaneous
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, which is also original and
exclusive. This is not found in B.P. Blg. 129. This is under a
special law. The Human Security Act (Republic Act No. 9372)
which took effect March 6, 2007.
1. Issuance of Order to Conduct Surveillance of
Terrorists
Section 7 of RA 9372 provides:
Section 7. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception
and Recording of Communications. – The provisions of
Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) to the contrary
notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and the
members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of
Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any
mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance
equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use
of any other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any
communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or
written words between members of a judicially declared and
outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons
or of any person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.
Page 8 of 37
Provided, That surveillance, interception and
recording of communications between lawyers and clients,
doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and
confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized.
2. Issuance of order for opening of bank accounts
Section 27 of the same law provides:
Section 27. Judicial Authorization Required to
Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. – The
provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 as amended, to the
contrary notwithstanding, the justices of the Court of Appeals
designated as a special court to handle anti-terrorism cases after
satisfying themselves of the existence of probable cause in a
hearing called for that purpose that:
(1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime
of terrorism or, conspiracy to commit terrorism,
(2) of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of persons; and
(3) of a member of such judicially declared and
outlawed organization, association, or group of persons, may
authorize in writing any police or law enforcement officer and
the members of his/her team duly authorized in writing by the
anti-terrorism council to:
(a) examine, or cause the examination of, the
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records in a bank
or financial institution; and
(b) gather or cause the gathering of any relevant
information about such deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets, and records from a bank or financial institution.
The bank or financial institution concerned, shall not
refuse to allow such examination or to provide the desired
information, when so, ordered by and served with the written
order of the Court of Appeals.
CONCURRENT ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Under Section 9(1) of BP 129, as amended by RA 7902,
the Court of Appeals shall Exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction;
The other cases falling under the concurrent original
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under special rules are as
follows, to wit:
a. Concurrent and original jurisdiction with the
Supreme Court to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against Regional Trial
Court, Civil Service Commission, Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, other quasi-judicial agencies
mentioned in Rule 43 and the NLRC;
b. Concurrent and original jurisdiction with the
Supreme Court, the Regional Trial Court and the
Sandiganbayan to issue Writs of Amparo;
c. Concurrent original jurisdiction also to issue writs
of Kalikasan; and
d. Writ of continuing mandamus with the Supreme
Court, Sandiganbayan, and Regional Trial Court.
Cano v. Chief of PNP
Held: Under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, an
appeal by certiorari to this Court should raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth in the petition. It is elementary that a review is
not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons therefor. As the error
raised herein includes one of fact and law, and not a proper subject for a
 petition for review on certiorari, we are constrained to decline exercise of
our equity jurisdiction in this case.
At any rate, petitioner also failed without justifiable cause to
observe due regard for the hierarchy of courts. Even on this reason alone,
we are constrained to deny the petition. The policy of this Court respecting
the hierarchy of courts and, consequently, prohibiting the filing of a petition
in this Court in view of the concurrent jurisdiction with the lower courts has
been consistently observed in the absence of any compelling reason for
departing from such policy. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, petitioner should have taken his appeal to the Court of Appeals.
C. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Section 9(3) of BP 129, as amended provides for the
exclusive and appellate power of the Court of Appeals:
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgements, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commission, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission,
Except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor
Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of
the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph
of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The court of Appeals shall have the power to try
cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any
and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases
falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including
the power to grant and conduct new trials or Appeals must be
continuous and must be completed within three (3) months,
unless extended by the Chief Justice.
Cases falling under the Exclusive Appellate
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
1. Decision and final orders of the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction (Section 2[a], Rule
41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure);
2. Decision and final orders of the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction (Section 1, Rule
42);
3. Decision and final orders of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
delegated jurisdiction over land registration and cadastral
cases (Section 34, BP 129);
4. All decisions and final orders rendered by the Regional
Trial Court in case of violation of Intellectual Property
Code shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals through
a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
(A.M. No. 10-3-10-SC);
5. Awards, judgement, final orders or resolution of quasi-
judicial bodies (Section 1, Rule 43) such as:
a. Civil Service Commission;
b. Securities and Exchange Commission;
c. Office of the President;
d. Land Registration Authority;
e. Social Security Commission;
f. Civil Aeronautics Board;
g. Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and Technology
Transfer;
h. National Electrification Administration;
i. Energy Regulatory Board;
j. National Telecommunications Commission;
k. Department of Agrarian Reform;
l. Government Service Insurance System;
m. Employees Compensation Commission;
n. Agricultural Inventions Board;
Page 9 of 37
o. Insurance Commission;
p. Philippine Atomic Energy Commission;
q. Board of Investments;
r. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission;
s. Voluntary Arbitration;
t. Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
Administrative cases [Ombudsman v. Liggayu].
The Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-judicial
agency covered by the procedure outlined in Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. As a rule, appeals from decisions of
quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, in
administrative disciplinary cases, should be taken to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43. The rule was formulated precisely to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial
agencies. Thus, certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie, as appeal
under Rule 43 is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
[Gonzales v. Rosas].
The Court of Appeals, under Rule 42 and 44 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, is authorized to determine "errors of
fact, of law, or both."
Neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Criminal
Procedure exclusively vests in the Supreme Court the power to
hear cases on appeal in which only an error of law is involved.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals, under Rule 42 and 44 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, is authorized to determine "errors of fact, of law,
or both." These rules are expressly adopted to apply to appeals in
criminal cases, and they do not thereby divest the Supreme Court
of its ultimate jurisdiction over such questions [Tan v. People].
Tan v. People
Held: Anent the argument that petitioner should have filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, it might be pointed out that this
remedy can only be resorted to when there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Appeal, being a
remedy still available to petitioner, a petition for certiorari would have
been premature.
In fine, petitioner had taken an appropriate legal step in filing a
notice of appeal with the trial court.  Ordinarily, the Court should have the
case remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. The clear
impingement upon petitioner’s basic right against double
jeopardy, however, should here warrant the exercise of the prerogative by
this Court to relax the stringent application of the rules on the matter. 
When the trial court increased the penalty on petitioner for his crime of
bigamy after it had already pronounced judgment and on which basis he
then, in fact, applied for probation, the previous verdict could only be
deemed to have lapsed into finality.
However, evidence necessary in regards to factual issues
raised in cases falling within the Appellate Court's original and
appellate jurisdiction contemplates "incidental" facts which were
not touched upon, or fully heard by the trial or respondent Court.
The law could not have intended that the Appellate Court would
hold an original and full trial of a main factual issue in a case,
which properly pertains to Trial Courts [Lingner & Fisher v. IAC].
Windows & Orphans Association v. Court of Appeals
Held: Furthermore, the unilateral action of respondent court in
substituting its own findings regarding the extent of the coverage of the
land included in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653, ostensibly to correct the error
in, and conform with, the technical description found in OCT 351 based on
the plan and other evidence submitted by respondent Ortigas cannot be
sustained.  That function is properly lodged with the office of the trial court
sitting as a land registration court and only after a full-dress investigation of
the matter on the merits.  It is before the land registration court that private
respondent must adduce the proof that the disputed parcels of land is legally
registered in its favor.
 In Dioquino v. Intermediate Appellate Court (179 SCRA 163
[1989], this Court held that “(w)hile it is true that the Court of Appeals is
vested with the ‘power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence
and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised x x
x’ (Sec. 9 [3], BP 129), there was not even a request for evidentiary hearing
filed in this case.  The Court of Appeals therefore should not have admitted
said evidence without giving the adverse party opportunity to present
counter evidence, if any.  Besides, “evidence necessary in regards to factual
issues raised in cases falling within the Appellate Court’s original and
appellate jurisdiction contemplates incidental facts which were not touched
upon, or fully heard by the trial or respondent Court.  The law could not
have intended that the Appellate Court would hold an original and full trial
of a main factual issue in a case, which properly pertains to trial courts”
(citing Lingner & Fisher GMBH v. IAC, 125 SCRA 522 [1983]).  In the
case at bar, it appears that the parties have yet to fully present their
respective evidence in support of their claims before the trial court.  As a
matter of fact, the trial court had set the case for hearing on the merits in its
order dated May 19, 1989.  What is more, the case involves a vast tract of
land consisting of 156 hectares, separately situated in two outlying
localities (i.e., Quezon City and Sta. Ana, Manila).  The resolution of this
controversy calls for a full-blown trial on the merits if only to afford the
contending parties their respective days in court.  Further, a ground for
dismissal based on disputed facts, as in this case, is not proper in a motion
to dismiss (Spouses Jayme and Solidarios v. Alampay, 62 SCRA 131
[1975]).
In the case at bar, respondent Ortigas alleges that Decree 1425
embraces the lots covered by its TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 which are
identical to the lots applied for by petitioner.  On the other hand, petitioner
maintains that Decree 1425 covers a 17-hectare lot located at Sta. Ana,
Manila while the lot applied for is alienable and disposable as certified by
the Bureau of Lands and by the Bureau of Forestry and has an area of 156
hectares located in Quezon City four (4) kilometers away from Sta. Ana,
Manila.  Hence, the necessity of a trial on the merits to ascertain the
disputed facts, i.e., whether the lot applied for is covered by Decree No.
1425 or is alienable and disposable.  Under Act 496, it is the decree of
registration issued by the Land Registration Commission which is the basis
for the subsequent issuance of the certificate of title by the corresponding
Register of Deeds that quiets the title to and binds the land (De la Merced
v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 240 [1962].  Consequently, if no decree of
registration had been issued covering the parcel of land applied for, then the
certificate of title issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet the title
to nor bind the land and is null and void.
Besides, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely
interlocutory and, unless it constitutes clearly a grave abuse of discretion or
was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, the error, if any, should be
corrected by appeal in due time, after trial and judgment on the merits and
not by the extraordinary writ of prohibition (Moreno v. Macadaeg, 7 SCRA
700 [1963]; National Investment and Development Corporation v. Aquino,
163 SCRA 53 [1988]).
Furthermore, on grounds of pre-maturity, interlocutory orders
cannot be decided by the appellate courts until the lower court shall have
decided the merit of the case.  Thus, in Villegas v. Fernando (27 SCRA
1119 [1969]), this Court held:
“This first assigned error (assailing the personality of the
appellees to ask for a review of the decision and decree in the registration
case) is actually directed at an earlier order dated 26 April 1961 denying
appellants heirs’ motion to dismiss the petitions for review filed by the
present appellees.  And inasmuch as said order of 26 April 1961 is
interlocutory, there being as yet no trial and decision on the merits of the
petition for review, it is premature to raise said assigned error in
appellants heirs’ instant appeal.  We shall rule thereon only when the
proper time comes, i.e., after the lower court shall have settled not only the
still unresolved status and rights of the parties, particularly those of
petitioners (sic) for review, now appellees herein, almost all of whom are
claiming that they are not mere homestead or free patent applicants but
patent or title holders, but also whether the original decision should be
maintained or not.  For the court below, after receiving and hearing the
parties, may still conclude in favor of appellants herein.  (Italics supplied)
IV
JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT
Page 10 of 37
The regional trial court is a court of general jurisdiction.
All cases, the jurisdiction over which is not specifically provided
for by law to be within the jurisdiction of any other court, fall
under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. But the regional
trial court is also a court of limited jurisdiction over, among others,
cadastral and land registration cases. All proceedings involving
title to real property, or specifically land registration cases,
including its incidents such as the issuance of owner’s duplicate
certificate of title, are matters cognizable by the regional trial
courts. It has been ruled that the regional trial courts have
jurisdiction over all actions involving possession of land, except
forcible entry and illegal detainer [Durisol Philippines v. Court of
Appeals].
The RTC has jurisdiction to resolve questions of
constitutionality and validity of laws (deemed to include local
ordinances) in the first instance, without deciding questions
which pertain to legislative policy
Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution, expressly establishes the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court, and impliedly recognizes the original jurisdiction of lower
courts over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an
ordinance:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers: x x x x
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.” 
In J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Ynot v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, and Commissioner of Internal
Revenue vs. Santos, the Court has affirmed the jurisdiction of the
RTC to resolve questions of constitutionality and validity of
laws (deemed to include local ordinances) in the first instance,
without deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. 
A. EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Section 19 of BP 129, as amended by RA 7691,
enumerates the cases falling under the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court:
“SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
“(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
“(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
“(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds Three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such
demand or claim exceeds Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00);
“(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and
intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or, in probate matters in
 Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Four Hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00);
“(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage
and marital relations;
“(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction
of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions;
“(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian
Relations as now provided by law; and
“(8) In all other cases in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where
the demand exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds
Four Hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).”
1. Civil Action in which the Subject Matter is
Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation
In determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation is to
ascertain the nature of the principal action and the remedy sought.
In determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the Court
has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount
of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, the Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
and are cognizable exclusively by courts of Regional Trial Courts
[Russel v. Vestil].
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation
are those for specific performance, support, or foreclosure of
mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the
validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and
to recover the price paid and for rescission, which is a counterpart
of specific performance.
What must be determined to be capable or incapable of
pecuniary estimation is not the cause of action, but the subject
matter of the action
 cause of action  - "the delict or wrongful act or omission
committed by the defendant in violation of the primary
rights of the plaintiff
 "subject matter of the action" - "the physical facts, the
thing real or personal, the money, lands, chattels, and the
like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, and not
the delict or wrong committed by the defendant.
Iniego v. Purganan
Held: Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are
primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the
damages suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts. The
damages claimed in such actions represent the monetary equivalent of the
injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant, which are thus sought to be
recovered by the plaintiff. This money claim is the principal relief sought,
and is not merely incidental thereto or a consequence thereof. It bears to
point out that the complaint filed by private respondent before the RTC
actually bears the caption "for DAMAGES."
Fault or negligence, which the Court of Appeals claims is not
capable of pecuniary estimation, is not actionable by itself. For such fault or
Page 11 of 37
negligence to be actionable, there must be a resulting damage to a third
person. The relief available to the offended party in such cases is for the
reparation, restitution, or payment of such damage, without which any
alleged offended party has no cause of action or relief. The fault or
negligence of the defendant, therefore, is inextricably intertwined with the
claim for damages, and there can be no action based on quasi-delict without
a claim for damages THEREFORE, the subject matter of actions for
damages based on quasi-delict is capable of pecuniary estimation.
Whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a particular action is determined by the plaintiffs allegations
in the complaint and the principal relief he seeks in the light of
the law that apportions the jurisdiction of courts
The nature of an action is not determined by what is
stated in the caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the
complaint and the reliefs prayed for [Sps. Huguete v. Sps.
Amarillo]. It is well settled that jurisdiction of the court is
determined on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint
and the character of the relief prayed for irrespective of whether
plaintiff is entitled to such relief [Polomolok Water District v.
Polomolok Water District Consumers].
Polomolok Water District v. Polomolok Water
District Consumers Association
Held: From respondent’s allegations and relief prayed for in its
complaint, the issue raised is whether PWD Resolution No. 94-023, S. 1994
is valid. Respondent alleged that petitioner did not comply with the
requisites of notice, publication and public hearing. Verily, the Court of
Appeals did not err in holding that the subject of litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides
that the Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in “all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.”
Thus, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not apply.
Heirs of Sebe v. Heirs of Sevilla
Held: Heirs of Sebes claim that their action is for the declaration
of nullity of the documents of conveyance that Heirs of Sevilla tricked them
into signing; and for the reconveyance of the certificate of title for the 2 lots
that the Sevillas’ succeeded in getting. The subject of their action is, they
conclude, incapable of pecuniary estimation.
An action “involving title to real property” means that the
plaintiff’s action is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he
has the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or
disposition of the same.
Title is the “legal link between:
1. A person who owns the property ; and
2. The property itself.
Title is different from a certificate of title which is the
document of ownership under the Torrens system of registration
issued by the government through the Register of Deeds. While title is the
claim, right or interest in real property, a certificate of title is the evidence
of such claim.
The present action is, therefore, not about the declaration of the
nullity of the documents or the reconveyance to the Sebes of the certificates
of title covering the two lots. These would merely follow after the trial
court shall have first resolved the issue of which between the contending
parties is the lawful owner of such lots, the one also entitled to their
possession.
Based on the pleadings, the ultimate issue is whether or not
defendant Sevilla defrauded the Sebes of their property by making them
sign documents of conveyance rather than just a deed of real mortgage to
secure their debt to him.
The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of these
parties is the lawful owner of the subject lots, jurisdiction over which is
determined by the assessed value of such lots.
Here, the total assessed value of the two lots subject of the suit
is P9,910.00. Clearly, this amount does not exceed the jurisdictional
threshold value of P20,000.00 fixed by law. (MTC)
 The other damages that the Sebes claim are merely incidental to
their main action and, therefore, are excluded in the computation of the
jurisdictional amount.
Sps. Huguete v. Sps. Amarillo
Held: Petitioners cause of action is based on their right as
purchaser of the 50-square meter portion of the land from respondents.
They pray that they be declared owners of the property sold.
Thus, their complaint involved title to real property or any
interest therein. The alleged value of the land which they purchased was
P15,000.00, which was within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Court.
The annulment of the deed of sale between Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo
and respondents, as well as of TCT No. 99694, were prayed for in the
complaint because they were necessary before the lot may be partitioned
and the 50-square meter portion subject thereof may be conveyed to
petitioners.
Petitioners argument that the present action is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation considering that it is for annulment of deed of sale and
partition is not well-taken.
As stated above, the nature of an action is not determined by
what is stated in the caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the
complaint and the reliefs prayed for.
Where, as in this case, the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is
to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper court having
jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.
The following actions are considered as one subject
matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation, to wit:
a. Action for revival of judgement.
As an action to revive judgement raises issues of whether
the petitioner has a right to have the final and executory judgement
revived and to have the judgement enforced and does not involve
recovery of a sum of money, jurisdiction over a petition to revive
judgement is properly with the RTCs. Thus, the CA is correct in
holding that it does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide
Anama’s action for revival of judgement [Anama v. Citibank].
b. Action for specific performance.
In an action for specific performance, the payment of a
sum of money is only incidental which can only be ordered after a
determination of certain acts, the performance of which being the
more basic issue to be inquired into [Ortigas & Company v.
Herrera].
An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s
suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to
this species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to
the right court [Dacasin v. Dacasin].
SSS v. Atlantic Gulf
Held: At the outset, it is well to restate the rule that what
determines the nature of the action as well as the tribunal or body which has
jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint.
The pertinent provision of law detailing the jurisdiction of the
Commission is Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No.
8282, otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997, to wit:
SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes.- (a) Any dispute arising under
this Act with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties
thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the
Commission, and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by the
Commission, or any of its members, or by hearing officers duly authorized
by the Commission and decided within the mandatory period of twenty (20)
days after the submission of the evidence. The filing, determination and
settlement of disputes shall be governed by the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission.
The law clearly vests upon the Commission jurisdiction over
"disputes arising under this Act with respect to coverage, benefits,
contributions and penalties thereon or any matter related thereto..." Dispute
is defined as "a conflict or controversy."
Page 12 of 37
From the allegations of respondents' complaint, it readily
appears that there is no longer any dispute with respect to respondents'
accountability to the SSS. 
The controversy, instead, lies in the non-implementation of the
approved and agreed dacion en pago on the part of the SSS. As such,
respondents filed a suit to obtain its enforcement which is, doubtless, a suit
for specific performance and one incapable of pecuniary estimation beyond
the competence of the Commission.
Ortigas & Company v. Herrera
Held: The action involved in this case is one for specific
performance and not for a sum of money and therefore incapable of
pecuniary estimation because what private respondent seeks is the
performance of petitioner's obligation under a written contract to make a
refund but under certain specific conditions still to be proven or established.
In a case for the recovery of a sum of money, as the collection of a debt, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation (Lapitan vs. Scandia,
Inc., 24 SCRA 479) because the obligation to pay the debt is not
conditioned upon any specific fact or matter. But when a party to a contract
has agreed to refund to the other party a sum of money upon compliance by
the latter of certain conditions and only upon compliance therewith may
what is legally due him under the written contract be demanded, the action
is one not capable of pecuniary estimation. The payment of a sum of money
is only incidental which can only be ordered after a determination of certain
acts, the performance of which being the more basic issue to be inquired
into.
Although private respondent's complaint in the court a quo is
designated as one for a sum of money and damages, an analysis of all the
factual allegations of the complaint patently shows that what private
respondent seeks is the performance of petitioner's obligation under the
written contract to make the refund of the rate of P10.00 per square meter
or in the total amount of P4,820.00, but only after proof of having himself
fulfilled the conditions that will give rise to petitioner's obligation, a matter
clearly incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Specific performance or damages in the alternative
In an action for specific performance OR damages, being
one in the alternative, to determine jurisdiction one must refer to
the amount of damages sought for, If the amount of damages
claimed falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC, then said court
has jurisdiction, otherwise RTC has jurisdiction. This is an instance
where the damages shall be considered [Cruz v. Tan]. Bu an action
for specific performance alone or an action for specific
performance AND damages shall be filed with the RTC.
c. Action for judicial partition with
annulment of title and recovery of
possession.
The action is no merely for partition and recovery of
ownership but also for annulment of title and documents, the action
is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the
RTC. Petitioner’s argument that the trial court acted without
jurisdiction in entertaining the action of settlement of estate and
annulment of title in a single proceeding is clearly erroneous for
the instant complaint is precisely one for judicial partition with
annulment of title and recovery of possession, filed within the
confines of applicable law and jurisprudence. Since the action
herein was not merely for partition and recovery of ownership but
also for annulment of title and documents, the action is incapable
of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Petition
for annulment of judgement must necessarily fail [Sps. Butiong v.
Plazo].
Russel v. Vestil
Held: The complaint filed by petitioners before the RTC is
one incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the
jurisdiction of said court.
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to
declare null and void the document in which private respondents declared
themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and
Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among themselves to the exclusion
of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the property.  assessed value of the property involved exceeds 20,000 pesos or
While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property,
this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity
of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted therein.
d. Complaint for nullity of corporation’s
board resolution
The regional trial court has exclusive original jurisdiction
over complaint for nullity of corporation’s board resolution since
the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Dee v. Harvest All Investment Ltd.
Held: This  case  is  a  precise illustration as  to  how  an  intra-
corporate controversy may be classified as an action whose subject matter
is incapable of pecuniary  estimation.  A  cursory perusal  of  Harvest
All,  et  al.'s Complaint  and  Amended  Complaint  reveals  that  its  main
purpose is  to have Alliance  hold its 2015 ASM on the date   set in the
corporation's  by laws, or at the time when Alliance's SRO has yet to fully
materialize, so that their  voting  interest  with  the corporation  would 
somehow  be  preserved. Thus,  Harvest  All,  et  al.  sought  for  the 
nullity  of the  Alliance  Board Resolution passed on May 29, 2015 which
indefinitely postponed the corporation's 2015 ASM pending completion  of
subscription  to the SR0.[37]  Certainly, Harvest All, et al.'s prayer for
nullity, as well as the concomitant relief of holding the 2015 ASM as
scheduled in the by-laws, do not involve the recovery of sum of money.
The mere mention of Alliance's  impending SRO valued at P1 Billion
cannot transform the nature of Harvest All, et al.'s action to one capable of
pecuniary estimation, considering  that: (a) Harvest All, et al. do not claim
ownership of, or much less entitlement to, the shares subject of  the SRO;
and (b) such mention was  merely narrative or descriptive in order to
emphasize the severe dilution that their voting interest as minority
shareholders would suffer if the 2015 ASM were to be held after the SRO
was completed. If, in the end, a sum of money or anything capable of
pecuniary estimation would be recovered by virtue of Harvest All, et al.'s
complaint, then it would simply be the consequence of their principal
action. Clearly therefore, Harvest All, et al.'s action was one incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
e. Action for declaratory relief.
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court governs actions for
declaratory relief. The court with jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief is the RTC, the subject matter of the litigation in
an action being incapable of pecuniary estimation under Section 19
of BP 129 [City of Lapu-Lapu v. PEZA].
f. Action for support
Since the subject matter fo the litigation is the right of the
applicant to ask for support under the provision of law.
g. Expropriation
The subject matter of which is the right of the State to
expropriate a private property upon payment of just compensation,
which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
An expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the
RTC regardless of the value of the land, because the subject of the
action is the government’s exercise of eminent domain—a matter
that is incapable of pecuniary estimation [Bardillon v. Brgy Masili,
Laguna]. True, the value of the property to be expropriated is
estimated in monetary terms, but this is merely incidental to the
expropriation suit [Brgy. San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor].
2. Civil Actions involving Title to, Possession or
Interest over a Real Property
Page 13 of 37
In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property or any interest therein, where the
for civil actions in Metro Manila, where the value exceeds 50,000
pesos; except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer
of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the MTC.
An action involving title to real property means that the
plaintiff’s cause of action is based on a claim that he owns such
property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive control,
possession, enjoyment, or dispassion of the same [Heirs of Ramiro
v. Sps. Bacaron].
In a number of cases, the Court has held that actions for
reconveyance of or for cancellation of title to or to quiet title over
real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases
that involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein. Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, or one involving title to property
under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes
became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691
in 1994, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to,
or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs." Thus, under the
present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of
which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest
therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the
first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real
property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was
introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which
would result in the speedier administration of justice" [San Pedro
v. Asdala].
Mendoza v. Teh
Held: The above law is clear. An action for reconveyance, which
involves title to property worth millions of pesos, such as the lots subject of
this case, is cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling within its jurisdiction
are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, such as the appointment of
an administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on venue of estate
proceedings (Section 1 of Rule 73) implicitly recognizes the jurisdiction of
the RTC over petitions for granting of letters of administration. On the
other hand, probate proceedings for the settlement of estate are within the
ambit of either the RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the estate.
By arguing that the allegation seeking such appointment as administratrix
ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction, both public and private respondents
confuses jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular
13-95 provides that actions involving title to property shall be tried in the
province where the property is located, in this case, - Batangas. The mere
fact that petitioner's deceased husband resides in Quezon City at the time of
his death affects only the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court.
Effect of failure to allege the assessed value of the
property
If the assessed value is not alleged in the complaint, the
court cannot take judicial notice of the same and therefore it cannot
determine which between the RTC or the MTC had original and
exclusive jurisdiction, and the case shall be dismissed.
Heirs of Ramiro v. Sps. Bacaron
Held: The ultimate relief sought by respondents is for the
recovery of the property through the enforcement of its sale in their favor
by the late spouses Ramiro. Their other causes of action for the cancellation
of the original title and the issuance of a new one in their name, as well as
'for injunction and damages, are merely incidental to the recovery of the
property. Before any of the other reliefs respondents prayed for in their
complaint can be granted, the issue of who between them and petitioners
has the valid title to the lot must first be determined.
Similarly in Gochan v. Gochan, we ruled that where a complaint
is entitled as one for specific performance but nonetheless prays for the
issuance of a deed of sale for a parcel of land, its primary objective and
nature is one to recover the parcel of land itself and is, thus, deemed a real
action. Accordingly, under these circumstances, the court which has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is determined by the
assessed value of the subject property.
Here, respondents neither alleged the assessed value of the
property. The Court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market
value of lands. Thus, absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed
value of the property, it cannot be determined which between the RTC or
the Municipal Trial Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over
respondents' action. Consequently, the complaint filed before the RTC
should be dismissed.
3. Actions in Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction
Actions in Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction:
a. Those involving acts committed on the high seas or
over navigable waters;
b. Those involving contracts and transactions connected
to shipping employed overseas or navigable waters.
4. Matters of Probate, Both testate and Intestate
Probate is a proceeding intended to determine the
genuineness and due execution of the will. The jurisdiction of the
probate will depend on the gross value of the estate. The gross
value is the value of the estate before the expenses.
A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate
proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not
the properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima
facie to the deceased although such a determination is not final or
ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right of the
interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing
on the ownership or existence of the right or credit [Bolisay v.
Alcid].
It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in
charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate
or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and
which are equally (claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the
said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or
list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is
no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims
of title because the probate court cannot do so [Cuzon v. Ramolete].
When a question arises as to ownership of property
alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but
claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of
any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to
that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be
determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings.
The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such
contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court [Pacioles. Jr. v.
Ching].
Cuzon v. Ramolete
Held: Having been apprised of the fact that the property in
question was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered
by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the
respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent
administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of
the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons
of their possession and ownership of the property. Respondent court was
clearly without jurisdiction to issue the order of June 27, 1979. Thus, it was
Page 14 of 37
unnecessary for the petitioners to first apply for relief with the intestate
court.
Even assuming the truth of the private respondents' allegations
that the sale of December 29, 1971 was effected under suspicious
circumstances and tainted with fraud and that the right of Rufina as alleged
half-sister and sole heir of Irene remains open to question, these issues may
only be threshed out in a separate civil action filed by the respondent
administrator against the petitioners and not in the intestate proceedings.
Bolisay v. Alcid
Held: As we see the situation before Us, Spouses Bolisay are not
after a final resolution of their claim of ownership by the probate court. All
that they are asking is that a prima facie determination be made on that
score as a basis for their prayer that the property in dispute be excluded
from the inventory, prepared and filed by Angela. Indeed, We perceive
merit in the spouses’ contention that in effect His Honor's (respondent
judge) order denying the motion for exclusion is somehow inconsistent,
since it is in itself a determination that for the purposes of Special
Proceedings No. 4560-II, and accordingly, until the question of ownership
between petitioners and private respondent has been finally determined in
appropriate ordinary action, the disputed property must be deemed part of
the intestate estate of Luciana, hence the order to allow the administratrix to
collect the rentals due therefrom. Considering that as aforestated the said
property is titled under the Torrens System in the names of the petitioners,
it does appear strange, in the light of the probate court's own ruling that it
has no jurisdiction to pass on the issue of ownership, that the same court
deemed the same as part of the estate under administration just because the
administratrix, alleges it is still owned by the estate and has in fact listed it
in the inventory submitted by her to the court.
The mere inclusion in the inventory submitted by the
administrator of the estate of a deceased person of a given property does not
of itself deprive the probate court of authority to inquire into the propriety
of such inclusion in case an heir or a third party claims adverse title thereto.
To hold otherwise would render inutile the power of that court to make a
prima facie determination of the issue of ownership recognized in the
above-quoted precedents. The correct rule is that the probate court should
resolve the issue before it provisionally, as basis for its inclusion in or
exclusion from the inventory.
As such, the property should be excluded from the inventory,
considering the presumptive conclusiveness of the Torrens title in favor of
the spouses Bolisay. In the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the
holder of the title should be considered as the owner of the property until
his title is nullified in a separate action.
Coca v. Borromeo
Held: It should be clarified that whether a particular matter
should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a
jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a
mode of practice “which may be waived” (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil.
227, 232. Cf. Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re jurisdiction over the issue).
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not
be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should
be ventilated in a separate action. (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14,
1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266). That general rule has qualifications or
exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an
intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion
from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action (Lachenal vs. Salas, supra).
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question
of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership (Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Alvarez vs.
Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892; Cunanan vs. Amparo,
supra; 3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 473).
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to
the general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate
action.
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the
ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion
for its exclusion from the inventory. The only interested parties are the heirs
who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.
5. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction
of any court, tribunal, person or body
An example is an annulment of judgement of the MTC
which is brought under Rule 47.
In Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, it was held that orders
or resolutions of the Professional Regulations Commission fall
within the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court;
Absence of provision in the law creating the Commission that its
orders and resolutions are appealable either to the Court of Appeals
or to the Supreme Court.
6. Civil Actions where the Demand, Exclusive of
Interest, Damages of Whatever Kind, Attorney's
Fees, Litigation Expenses, and Costs
Two factors or cases mentioned:
a. cases where the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, etc., (Money claims); and
b. the cost or the value of the property exceeds
P300,000.00 (So this would cover actions involving personal
properties, like replevin.)
The value of the property mentioned in the second part is
personal property. “(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to,
or possession of, real property x x x”. The basis is the assessed
value of the property.
RULES REGARDING ACTIONS UNDER THIS
PROVISION
1. If the claim for damages is merely incidental or
ancillary to the main cause of action, we do not include the amount
of damages in determining jurisdiction.
2. When claim for damages is main cause of action, or
one of the causes of action, the amount of the claim shall be
included as basis in determining jurisdiction.
The exclusion of the term “Damages of whatever kind”
in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and
Section 33(1) of BP 129 applies to cases where the damages are
merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.
However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause
of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim
shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court
[Sante v. Claravall].
In Sps. Pajares v. Remarkable Laundry, it was held that a
breach of contract may give rise to an action for specific
performance or rescission of contract. It may also be the cause of
action in a complaint for damages filed pursuant to Art. 1170 of the
Civil Code. In the specific performance and rescission of contract
cases, the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
hence jurisdiction belongs to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In
the case for damages, however, the court that has jurisdiction
depends upon the total amount of the damages claimed.
Action for damages
In Mendoza v. Soriano, it was held that in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the
causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court. The Court therein held
that the total amount of monetary claims including the claims for
damages was the basis to determine the jurisdictional amount.
Also, in Iniego v. Purganan, the Court has held: “The amount of
damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is
the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining
Page 15 of 37
the jurisdiction of the courts, whether the claims for damages arise
from the same or from different causes of action.
Sps. Pajares v. Remarkable Laundry
Held: An analysis of the factual and material allegations in the
Complaint shows that there is nothing therein which would support a
conclusion that respondent's Complaint is one for specific performance or
rescission of contract. It should be recalled that the principal obligation of
petitioners under the Remarkable Laundry Dealership Contract is to act as
respondent's dealer outlet. 
Respondent, however, neither asked the RTC to compel
petitioners to perform such obligation as contemplated in said contract
nor sought the rescission thereof. The Complaint's body, heading, and
relief are bereft of such allegation.
In fact, neither phrase appeared on or was used in the Complaint
when, for purposes of clarity, respondent's counsels, who are presumed to
be learned in law, could and should have used any of those phrases to
indicate the proper designation of the Complaint.
To the contrary, respondent's counsels designated the
Complaint as one for "Breach of Contract & Damages," which is a
misnomer and inaccurate. This erroneous notion was reiterated in
respondent's Memorandum wherein it was stated that "the main action of
CEB 39025 is one for a breach of contract." There is no such thing as an
"action for breach of contract." 
Rather, "[b]reach of contract is a cause of action, but not the
action or relief itself" Breach of contract may be the cause of action in a
complaint for specific performance or rescission of contract, both of which
are incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, cognizable by the
RTC. However, as will be discussed below, breach of contract may also be
the cause of action in a complaint for damages.
The respondent primarily seeks to enforce the penal clause
contained in Article IV of the Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract,
which reads:
Article IV: STANDARD REQUIRED QUOTA & PENALTIES
In consideration [sic] for such renewal of franchise-dealership
rights, the dealer outlet must have a minimum 200 kilos on a six-day or per
week pick-up for the entire duration of the contract to FREE the dealer
outlet from being charge [sic] Php200/week on falling below required
minimum kilos per week of laundry materials. Automatic charging shall
become part of the billing on the services of the dealer outlet on cases
where the minimum requirements on required kilos are not met.
The RL Main Operator has the option to cancel, terminate this
dealership outlet contract, at its option should [sic] in the event that there
are unpaid services equivalent to a two-week minimum required number of
kilos of laundry materials but not ₱8,000 worth of collectibles, for services
performed by the RL Main Operator or its assigned Franchise Outlet,
unpaid bills on ordered and delivered support products, falling below
required monthly minimum number of kilos.
Ten [percent] (10%) interest charge per month will be collected
on all unpaid obligations but should not be more than 45 days or an
additional 10% on top of uncollected amount shall be imposed and shall
earn additional 10% on the next succeeding months if it still remains
unpaid. However, if the cause of default is due to issuance of a bouncing
check the amount of such check shall earn same penalty charge with
additional 5% for the first two weeks and 10% for the next two weeks and
its succeeding two weeks thereafter from the date of dishonor until fully
paid without prejudice to the filling of appropriate cases before the courts
of justice. Violation of this provision if remained unsettled for two months
shall be considered as violation [wherein] Article XV of this agreement
shall be applied. 
To Our mind, petitioners' responsibility under the above penal
clause involves the payment of liquidated damages because under Article
2226 of the Civil Code the amount the parties stipulated to pay in case of
breach are liquidated damages. "It is attached to an obligation in order to
ensure performance and has a double function: (1) to provide for liquidated
damages, and (2) to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation by the
threat of greater responsibility in the event of breach."
In sum, after juxtaposing Article IV of the Remarkable Dealer
Outlet Contract vis-a-vis the prayer sought in respondent's Complaint, this
Court is convinced that said Complaint is one for damages. 
True, breach of contract may give rise to a complaint for specific
performance or rescission of contract. In which case, the subject matter is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, jurisdiction is lodged with
the RTC. 
 However, breach of contract may also be the cause of action in a
complaint for damages capable of pecuniary estimation.  At the outset, it must be emphasized that pursuant to
Thus, it is not correct to immediately conclude, as the CA
erroneously did, that since the cause of action is breach of contract, the case
would only either be specific performance or rescission of contract because
it may happen, as in this case, that the complaint is one for damages. 
Having thus determined the nature of respondent's principal
action, the next question brought to fore is whether it is the RTC which has
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Paragraph 8, Section 1938 of BP 129, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7691,39 provides that where the amount of the demand exceeds
₱100,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs, exclusive jurisdiction is lodged with the
RTC. Otherwise, jurisdiction belongs to the Municipal Trial Court.
The above jurisdictional amount had been increased to
₱200,000.00 on March 20, 1999 and further raised to ₱300,000.00 on
February 22, 2004 pursuant to Section 5 of RA 7691.
Since the total amount of the damages claimed by the
respondent in its Complaint filed with the RTC on September 3, 2012
amounted only to ₱280,000.00, said court was correct in refusing to take
cognizance of the case.
Totality Rule
Where there are several claims or causes of actions
between the same or different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes
of action arose out of the same or different transactions [Section
5[d], Rule 2].
Iniego v. Purganan
Held: Rule 2, Section 5, of the Rules of Court allows a party to
assert as many causes of action as he may have against the opposing party.
Subsection (d) of said section provides that where the claims in all such
joined causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction
Hence, whether or not the different claims for damages are
based on a single cause of action or different causes of action, it is the
total amount thereof which shall govern. Jurisdiction in the case at bar
remains with the RTC, considering that the total amount claimed,
inclusive of the moral and exemplary damages claimed, is P490,000.00
CONCLUSION:
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are actions that are
capable of pecuniary estimation. As such, they fall within the jurisdiction of
either the RTC or the municipal courts, depending on the amount of
damages claimed. In this case, the amount of damages claimed is within the
jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of damages that is
the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for
damages arise from the same or from different causes of action.
7. Cases under Securities and Regulation Code
The RTC has exclusive and original jurisdiction over
cases or controversies under the provisions of Section 5.2 of the
Securities and Regulation Code (RA 8799) such as:
a. Cases involving devices and schemes employed by or any
acts, of the board of directors, business associations, its
officers or partnership, amounting to fraud or
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest
of the public, and/or of the stockholders, partners,
members of associations, organizations registered with the
Commission;
b. Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership
relations, between and among stockholders members or
associates, between any or all of them and the corporation
or partnership or associations of which they are
stockholders, members or associations, respectively; and
between such corporation, partnership or association and
the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or
right to exist as such entity.
Page 16 of 37
Section 5.2 of RA 8700, the SEC’s jurisdiction over intra-corporate
controversies has been transferred to the RTC as Special
Commercial Courts (SCC) designated by the Court pursuant to
A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC promulgated on 21 November 2000 [GD
Express v. Court of Appeals].
In intra-corporate dispute involving a corporation under
sequestration of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC, not the
Sandiganbayan [Philippine Overseas Telecommunication Corp. v.
Victor Africa].
c. Controversies in the elections and appointments of
directors, trustees, officers or managers of such
corporations, partnerships or associations;
d. Petitions of corporations, partnership or associations to be
declared in the state of suspension of payments in case
where the corporation, partnership or associations,
possesses sufficient property to cover all debts but
foresees the impossibility of meeting them when they
respectively fall due or in case where the corporation,
partnership or associations has no sufficient assets to
cover liabilities, but is under the management of the
Rehabilitation Receiver or Management Committee;
e. Over petition for annulment of judgement over decisions
and final orders of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(Section 10, Rule 47);
f. Petition for civil forfeiture of monetary instrument,
property, or proceeds representing, involving, or relating
to an unlawful activity, or to money laundering offenses.
Can the RTC designated as a Special Commercial
Court exercise general jurisdiction?
Yes. Even if the RTC is designated as a Special
Commercial Court still it has general jurisdiction and can entertain
all actions/issues not withheld from its plenary powers and its
designation is only a matter of procedure.
The matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a
special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do
with the question if jurisdiction. Moreover, it should be noted that
Special Commercial Courts (SCCs) are still considered courts of
general jurisdiction [Majestic Plus v. Bullion Investment].
8. Cases under the Special Rules on Alternative
Dispute Resolution (A.M. No. 07-1-08-SC)
The Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over the following:
a. Petition questioning the existence, validity, and
enforceability of an arbitration agreement;
b. Petition for judicial relief from the ruling of arbitral
tribunal on a preliminary question upholding or
declining jurisdiction;
c. Petition for Interim Measure Protection;
d. Petition or appointment of Arbitrator;
e. Petition challenging the appointment of an arbitrator;
f. Petition for assistance in taking an evidence;
g. Petition for Protective Order;
h. Petition for confirmation, correction/modification, or
vacation of a domestic arbitral award;
i. Petition to recognize and enforce, set aside an arbitral
award;
j. Petition to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral
award.

9. Other Special Laws and Rules
a. Petitions for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Data which does
not involve Public Data Files of Government Offices
(A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC);
b. Criminal and Civil cases involving violations of the
Philippine Competition Act and other competition-related
laws (RA 10667);
c. Under PD 1529 with regard to: (1) application for land
registration; (2) petition for reopening and review of the
decree of registration not later than one year from and
after the date of the entry of such decree of registration;
(3) cadastral registration; (4) adverse claims; (5) alteration
and amendments of certificates.
Durisol Philippines v. Court of Appeals
Held: The regional trial court, formerly the court of first
instance, is a court of general jurisdiction. All cases, the jurisdiction over
which is not specifically provided for by law to be within the jurisdiction of
any other court, fall under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. But the
regional trial court is also a court of limited jurisdiction over, among others,
cadastral and land registration cases. All proceedings involving title to real
property, or specifically land registration cases, including its incidents such
as the issuance of owner’s duplicate certificate of title, are matters
cognizable by the regional trial courts. It has been ruled that the regional
trial courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving possession of land,
except forcible entry and illegal detainer.
Respondent DBP, after Durisol’s president unjustly refused to
comply with the directive of the trial court to surrender the seven
certificates of title, filed a petition under Section 107 of the Property
Registration Decree (P.D 1529), to wit:
Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. --- Where it is
necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary
instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against his
consent of where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of
the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel
the surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing,
may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate
certificate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate or
memorandum upon such surrender. x x x
The term "court" in the above-quoted section refers to Courts of
First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, as provided in Section 2 of the
Property Registration Decree.
Even assuming arguendo that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the surrender of duplicate title, Durisol can no longer raise this ground after
having actively participated in the prosecution of the case. A judgment
rendered by a trial court for alleged lack of jurisdiction cannot be
considered void where the party who has the right to challenge it failed to
do so at the first instance. In the case at bar, Dursol did not raise the defense
of lack of jurisdiction in its answer to DBP’s petition for surrender of
owner’s duplicate certificate. Neither did Durisol file any motion to dismiss
on this ground. On the contrary, petitioner raised the affirmative defenses of
failure to state a cause of action and payment. To be sure, a court’s lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the failure of the complaint to state
a cause of action are distinct and separate grounds for dismissal of a case.
B. SPECIAL JURISDICTION
Section 23 of BP 129 provides:
Section 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. – The
Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial
Courts to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic
relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do not
fall under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or
such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the
interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice.
1. Cases under the RTC Acting as Family Court
The Regional Trial Court acting as Family Court has
exclusive original jurisdiction over:
Page 17 of 37
a. Petitions for guardianship, custody of minor, habeas
corpus in relation to minor (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC);
b. Petition for custody of minor, habeas corpus in relation to
the latter (A.M. No. 03-02-05);
c. Petition for adoption of children and revocation of
adoption (A.M. No. 02-6-02);
d. Complaints for annulment of marriage and declaration of
nullity of marriage and those relating to marital status and
property relations of husband and wife or those living
together under different status and agreements, and
dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC);
e. Petition for support and/or acknowledgement;
f. Summary Judicial proceedings brought under the
provision of EO 209, otherwise known as the Family
Code of the Philippines;
g. Petition for constitution of family home (RA 8369);
h. Petition for declaration of status of children as abandoned,
dependent, or neglected children;
i. Petition for involuntary commitment of a child, or
removal of custody against child placement, or child
caring agency or individual or commitment of disabled
child (A.M. No. 02-1-19-SC).
2. Regional Trial Court Acting as Special Commercial
Court
Regional Trail Court acting as Special Commercial Court
shall exercise jurisdiction over the following:
a. All civil actions for violations of intellectual
property rights provided for in RA 8293.
b. Civil actions for infringement of Patent, utility
Model and Industrial Design;
c. Trademark infringement;
d. Unfair Competition;
e. Actions concerning trademark license contracts;
f. Actions concerning imported merchandise or goods
bearing infringing marks or trade names;
g. Actions for cancellation of the registration of a
collective mark, False Designations of Origin; False
Description or Representation, Breach of Contract;
h. Civil actions for infringement of copyright, moral
rights, performers’ rights, producers’ rights, and
broadcasting rights; and
i. Other violations of intellectual property rights as
may be defined by law.
3. Determination of Just Compensation in Agrarian
Reform Cases
The RTC as Special Agrarian Court has exclusive
original jurisdiction over determination of just compensation.
A branch of an RTC designated as a Special Agrarian
Court for a province has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all petitions for the determination of just compensation in that
province. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
ruled that Special Agrarian Courts have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over two categories of cases: (1) all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners, and (2) the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA 6657 [Land Bank v.
Villegas].
C. CONCURRENT ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Section 21 of BP 129 provides:
Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. –
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
 (1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which
may be enforced in any part of their respective regions; and
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public
ministers and consuls.
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent original
jurisdiction:
a. With the Supreme Court in actions affecting ambassadors,
or other public ministers and consults;
b. With the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals in petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus against lower courts
and bodies and in petitions for quo warranto and habeas
corpus;
c. With the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the
Sandiganbayan to issue Writs of Amparo; and
d. With the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals to issue
Writs of Continuing Mandamus.
e. With the MTC in petitions for indirect contempt under
Rule 71, Section 5, where such contempt has been
committed against the MTC. Where filed with the MTC,
appeal shall be made with the RTC.
f. With the MTC in the issuance of Temporary Protection
Orders (TPOs) or Permanent Protection Orders (PPOs)
pursuant to RA 9262.
Can the RTC pass upon the validity or regularity of
forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs?
No. Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to review
the validity or regularity or forfeiture proceedings conducted by the
BOC even through petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus. Regional trial courts are precluded from assuming
cognizance over such matters [Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v.
Rodriguez].
D. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Section 22 of BP 129, as amended, provides:
Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. – Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the
entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and
such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the
parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of
the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by
petition for review to the Court of Appeals which may give it
due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the
lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will
warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgement
sought to be reviewed.
E. MODES OF REVIEW OF RTC DECISIONS
Original Jurisdiction Ordinary Appeal under Rule
41
Appellate Jurisdiction Petition for Review under
Rule 42
Special Jurisdiction (SAC) Petition for Review under
Rule 42
Special Jurisdiction (Family Ordinary Appeal under Rule
Court) 41.
Pure Questions of Law Petition for Review under
Rule 45.
V occupation thereof [De Gano v. Lacaba].
Page 18 of 37
JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT
A. EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
1. Ordinary Civil Actions
Section 33 of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691
enumerates the cases falling under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. It states that:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
civil cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions
and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the
grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of
the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not
exceed three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or, in Metro
Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the
demand does not exceed Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of
which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That where there
are several claims or causes of action between the same or
different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of
the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of
action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of
the same or different transactions;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in
such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership
shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions
which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That
value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value
of the adjacent lots.
Also, the MTC/MCTC exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction over ordinary civil actions in all actions in admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim does not
exceed Three Hundred Thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or, in Metro
Manila, where such demand or claim does not exceed Four
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00).
Forcible Entry
For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the complainant must
allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the
property and that he was deprived of such possession by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. A party who can
prove prior possession can recover such possession even against
the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has
the security that entitles him to remain in the property until a
person with a better right lawfully ejects him. Here, respondent’s
evidence fails to make out a prima facie case of forcible entry as it
does not satisfactorily establish that respondent has been in
physical possession of the subject property prior to petitioner’s
Unlawful Detainer
 In Cabrera v. Getaruela, it was held that a complaint
sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it
recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was
by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon
notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s
right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of
the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof;
and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to
vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.  certification to file action. As gleaned from the petitory portion of the
Cabrera v. Getaruela
Held: In this case, the complaint alleged that petitioners were
occupying the property, with agreement that should respondents need the
property, petitioners would relinquish possession of the lots and demolish
their houses at their expense.
Respondents personally notified petitioners to vacate the
premises and to demolish their houses but petitioners refused to vacate the
lots. The complaint established that petitioners’ possession was by
tolerance of respondents, and their possession became illegal when they
refused to vacate the premises upon demand by respondents. Here, the
possession became illegal not from the time petitioners started occupying
the property but from the time demand was made for them to vacate the
premises. In short, the complaint sufficiently established a case for
unlawful detainer. Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the issue in this case
is not the ownership of the lots. It should be stressed that the allegations in
the complaint and the character of the relief sought determine the nature of
the action and the court with jurisdiction over it.
The defenses set up in an answer are not determinative of
jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend on the
exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties. Thus:
In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent
of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. However, where the
issue of ownership is raised, the courts may pass upon the issue of
ownership in order to determine who has the right to possess the property.
We stress, however, that this adjudication is only an initial
determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of
possession, the issue of ownership being inseparably linked thereto. The
lower court’s adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely
provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the property. It is, therefore, not conclusive as
to the issue of ownership.
The MTCC, the RTC, and the Court of Appeals all held that the
Repartition Project superseded the "Kasabutan nga Hinigala." We sustain
their factual finding as this Court gives substantial weight to the factual
finding of the trial court, particularly if this factual finding is sustained by
appellate courts. However, we also reiterate that this resolution on the issue
of ownership is only provisional for the purpose of settling the issue of
possession.
Dela Rosa v. Roldan
Held: It is settled jurisprudence that what determines the nature
of an action as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought, whether
or not plaintiff is entitled to any and all of the reliefs prayed for. The
jurisdiction over the nature of an action and the subject matter thereof is not
affected by the theories set up by defendant in an answer or motion to
dismiss.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691, amending Section 33(2) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which was the law in effect when respondents
filed their complaint against petitioners, provides that "Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer; provided that, when, in such cases, defendant raises the
questions of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
Page 19 of 37
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issues of possession."
As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, respondents, as
plaintiffs below, alleged that they were the owners of parcels of land
covered by TCT Nos. 29040 and 29041, hence, entitled to the possession of
the property; petitioners (defendants therein) and their predecessors-in-
interest had occupied the said parcels of land since 1957 without paying
any rent; their possession over the property continued even after the
spouses Dulay purchased the property; and that their occupation of the
property was by mere tolerance of the spouses Dulay and, after Asuncion
died on June 26, 1995, by respondents; petitioners promised to vacate the
premises when respondents needed the property; demands were made by
respondents on October 2, 1995 for petitioners to vacate the property but
the latter refused, prompting an action to be filed in the Office of the
Pangkat; and, on December 1, 1995, the Pangkat Secretary issued a
complaint, respondents likewise prayed for the eviction of petitioners from
the property with a plea for judgment for reasonable compensation for
petitioners' occupation of the premises. Respondents filed their complaint
on January 29, 1996 in the MTC, within the period of one year from the
final demand made against petitioners to vacate the property.
It is true that during the pre-trial, the MTC issued an order
defining the issue to be litigated by the parties – whether or not unlawful
detainer is proper in the premises considering defendants' claim of
ownership from 1982; otherwise stated, whether petitioners' occupation of
the land in dispute was by mere tolerance of respondents. As framed by the
MTC, the issue before it was basically one of physical or material
possession of the property, although petitioners raised ownership as an
issue. Thus, the MTC erred when it declared that, since defendants claimed
ownership over the property, it was divested of its jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and decide the case on its merits.
Real actions falling within the jurisdiction of the
MTC/MCTC
a. Recovery of ownership of land. A complaint for the recovery
of ownership of parcel of land with a value of P5,240.00 is
within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court [Duero v.
Court of Appeals].
b. Reconveyance of real property, removal of cloud in a title
of real property, cancellation of title of real property. The
MTC can now have jurisdiction over cases involving
ownership of land. Under the former law, these cases were
under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Hence, an action for
reconveyance of real property, removal of a cloud in a title of
real property, cancellation of title to real property and similar
actions shall fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC or the
RTC depending upon the assessed value of the land involved.
Before the amendments introduced by RA 7691, they were
within the jurisdiction of the RTC because of express
provision of the old law and also because they were
considered also as actions incapable of pecuniary estimation
[Heirs of Concha v. Sps. Lumucso].
c. Accion Publiciana. Jurisdiction over a case of accion
publiciana also depends upon the assessed value of the
property involved [Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals].
However, even if the case of accion publiciana is cognizable
by the MTC because of its assessed value, the case will not be
covered by a summary proceeding because is no longer a case
of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.
d. Accion Reinvindicatoria. Jurisdiction over an accion
reinvindicatoria also depends upon the assessed value of the
land or property [Hilario v Salvador].
e. Action for Interpleader in case the subject matter of the
action is a real property.
i) If the assessed value if the real property exceeds
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) outside Metro
Manila or fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) within
Metro Manila jurisdiction lies with the Regional Trial
Court.
 ii) If the assessed value of the real property does not
exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) outside of
Metro Manila or fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
within metro Manila jurisdiction lies with the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
f. Action for quieting title or removal of cloud.
Action for Damages
The requirement that the amount of damages claimed has
to be specified not only in the body of the pleading but also in
its prayer portion came about to put an end to the then prevailing
practice by counsels of reciting the damages prayed for only in the
body of the complaint to evade payment of the correct filing fees.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints,
petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record. [Siapno v. Manalo].
The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fee." Hence, the payment of
docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.
In Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, it was held that the
payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional
requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is
paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period,
more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to
abide by the rules prescribing such payment.
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fees
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action [Serrano v. Delica].
Heirs of Hinog v. Melicor
Held: Furthermore, while the payment of the prescribed docket
fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of
filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the
fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more
so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules
prescribing such payment.
Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the reinstatement
of the complaint was just and proper considering that the cause of action of
private respondents, being a real action, prescribes in thirty years, and
private respondents did not really intend to evade the payment of the
prescribed docket fee but simply contend that they could not be faulted for
inadequate assessment because the clerk of court made no notice of demand
or reassessment. They were in good faith and simply relied on the
assessment of the clerk of court.
Furthermore, the fact that private respondents prayed for
payment of damages "in amounts justified by the evidence" does not call
for the dismissal of the complaint for violation of SC Circular No. 7, dated
March 24, 1988 which required that all complaints must specify the amount
of damages sought not only in the body of the pleadings but also in the
prayer in order to be accepted and admitted for filing. Sun Insurance
effectively modified SC Circular No. 7 by providing that filing fees for
damages and awards that cannot be estimated constitute liens on the awards
finally granted by the trial court.
Thus, while the docket fees were based only on the real property
valuation, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the action, and judgment
awards which were left for determination by the court or as may be proven
during trial would still be subject to additional filing fees which shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It would then be the responsibility of the
Clerk of Court of the trial court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce
said lien and assess and collect the additional fees.
Page 20 of 37
2. Cases under the Rules of Summary Procedure
Section 1, A(1) of the 1991 Rules on Summary
Procedure enumerates the cases falling under the summary
proceedings. It states that:
Section 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the
summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and
the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling
within their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases:
1. All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer
irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought
to be recovered. Where attorney’s fees are awarded, the same
shall not exceed 20 thousand pesos.
2. All other cases, except probate proceedings, where
the total amount of the plaintiff's claim does not exceed one
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) in Metropolitan Manila, exclusive of
interest and costs (As amended by A.M. No. 02-11-09-SC).
Section 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The
following pleadings, motions or petitions shall not be allowed in
the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the
complaint or information except on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the
preceding section;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a
judgment, or for opening of trial;
(d) Petition for relief from judgment;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings,
affidavits or any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k) Third party complaints;
(l) Interventions
Section 21. Appeal. — The judgment or final order
shall be appealable to the appropriate regional trial court which
shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the regional trial court in
civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory, without
prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed.
3. Small Claims Cases
Section 2 of the Revised 2016 Rules of Procedure on
Small Claims Cases (A.M. No. 08-8-7, as amended) provides for
the rule on small claims cases. It states that –
Section 2. These rules shall govern the procedure in
actions before the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs),
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCCs), Municipal Trial
Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs)
for payment of money where the value of the claim does not
exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive
of interest and costs.
Section 5. Applicability. - The Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall apply this Rule in all
actions that are:
A. Purely civil in nature where the claim or relief
prayed for by the plaintiff is solely for payment or
reimbursement of sum of money.
B. Civil aspect of Criminal Action.
C. Liability arising from delict.
 Section 24. Decision. - After the hearing, the court
shall render its decision based on the facts established by the
evidence (Form 11-SCC), within twenty-four (24) hours from
termination of the hearing. The decision shall immediately be
entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases
and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.
The decision shall be final, executory and
unappealable.
Amendment to 2016 Revised Rules on Small Claims
Cases
OCA Circular No. 45-2019 provides:
Pursuant to Section 24 of the 2016 Revised Rules on
Small Claims Cases, the decision is final, unappealable and
immediately executory. Therefore, in the absence of any plain,
adequate and speedy remedy or appeal in the ordinary course of
law, the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under Section 1,
Rule 65 with application for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of injunction in order to restrain the execution of the decision.
The proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar
to other proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does
not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court [A.L. Network v. Mondejar].

In accordance with the 26 February 2019 Resolution Distinction between Summary Procedure and Small
in A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC or The Revised Rules of Procedure for Claims
Small Claims Cases, the Court En SUMMARY SMALL CLAIMS
Banc RESOLVED to AMEND Sections 2 and 8 of the Revised PROCEDURE
Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, the full text of
Jurisdictional Applies if the total The value of the
which is reproduced as follows: 
Parameter amount of the claim does not
Section 2. Scope.  - These Rules shall govern
plaintiff’s claim exceed 300
procedure in actions before the Metropolitan Trial Courts
(MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCCs), Municipal
does not exceed thousand pesos.
Trial Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts 100 thousand
(MTCTs) for payment of money where the value of the claim pesos, outside
does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of these courts Metro Manila. Or
under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7691 (Four Hundred 200 thousand
Thousand Pesos [P400,000.00] for the MeTCs and pesos in Metro
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos [P300,000.00] for Manila. Exclusive
the MTCCs, MTCs, and MCTCs), exclusive of interest and of interest and cost
costs. Value of the claim There is a If it is outside
xxxx distinction. If it is Metro Manila, 100
Section 8. Joinder of Claims. Plaintiff may join in a outside Metro thousand. If within
single statement of claim one or more separate small claims Manila, 100 Metro Manila, 200
against a defendant provided that the total amount claimed, thousand. If within thousand. Without
exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed Metro Manila, 200 any distinction,
the jurisdictional amount of the concerned court under R.A. thousand. 300 thousand
7691 (Four Hundred Thousand Pesos [P400,000.00] for the pesos.
MeTCs and Three Hundred Thousand Pesos [P300,000.00] Remedy Available Appeal. The The decision shall
for the MTCCs, MTCs, and MCTCs). (Amendments in bold)
decision is be final and
The appropriate Small Claims Forms are likewise
appealable to the unappealable.
amended to reflect the increased threshold amount of
RTC under sec. 22 Although the
P400,000.00 for the MeTCs.
of BP 129. remedy of
certiorari is
Purpose of Small Claims Case available in case of
The small claims process is designed to function quickly grave abuse of
and informally. There are no lawyers, no formal pleadings, and no discretion
strict legal rules of evidence. Thus, the intention of the law is clear amounting to lack
when it provided a period of five (5) days from receipt of the order or excess of
of re-assignment to hear and decide cases, if a motion for re- jurisdiction.
assignment of a case has been granted by the Executive Judge Applicability Civil and Criminal Apply only to
[Orbe v. Gumarang]. cases. cases purely civil
in nature and civil
So what are the claims or demands covered by the small aspect of a
claims? The claim or demand may be: criminal action.
(a) For money owed under any of the following: Parties allowed A lawyer may Lawyer may not
1. Contract of Lease; appear. appear unless he,
himself is a party
2. Contract of Loan;
litigant.
3. Contract of Services;
Main Features Use of affidavits Use of pre-
4. Contract of Sale; or and position paper prepared forms as
5. Contract of Mortgage; as substitutes for substitute for
testimony, a pleadings for the
Or for (b) For damages arising from any of the speedy resolution purpose of
following: of cases. avoiding cost in
1. fault or negligence resolving as small
2. quasi-contract, or claim as
3. contract expeditiously as
possible.
What is the remedy in case of a decision in Small
Claims Case? B. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION

Page 21 of 37
 1. Cases of indirect contempt committed against a
lower court
Section 5, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 5. Where charge to be filed. — Where the
charge for indirect contempt has been committed against a
Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or
against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with
such court. Where such contempt has been committed against a
lower court, the charge may be filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the place in which the lower court is sitting; but the
proceedings may also be instituted in such lower court subject to
appeal to the Regional Trial Court of such place in the same
manner as provided in section 11 of this Rule. (4a; Bar Matter
No. 803, 21 July 1998)
2. Protection Orders under RA 9262
Section 10 of RA 9262 provides:
SECTION 10. Where to Apply for a Protection
Order. – Applications for BPOs shall follow the rules on venue
under Section 409 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and
its implementing rules and regulations. An application for a
TPO or PPO may be filed in the regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, municipal circuit
trial court with territorial jurisdiction over the place of residence
of the petitioner: Provided, however, That if a family court
exists in the place of residence of the petitioner, the application
shall be filed with that court.
C. SPECIAL JURISDICTION
Section 35 of BP 129, as amended, provides for the
special jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court in certain cases. It states
that:
Section 35. Special jurisdiction in certain cases. – IN
the absence of all the Regional Trial Judges in a province or
city, any Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge,
Municipal Circuit Trial judge may hear and decide petitions for
a writ of habeas corpus or applications for bail in criminal cases
in the province or city where the absent Regional Trial Judges
sit.
Cases falling under the special jurisdiction of the
MTC are:
(a) Petition for habeas corpus; and
(b) Application for bail in criminal cases in the province
or the city where the absent RTC Judge sit.
D. DELEGATED JURISDICTION
Section 34 of BP 129, as amended, provides for the
delegated jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court over
cadastral and land registration cases. It states that:
Section 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and
land registration cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be
assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral
or land registration cases covering lots where there is no
controversy or opposition, or contested lots the where the value
of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of
the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there
are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of
the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be
appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional
Trial Courts. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)
1. Uncontested Lots
Page 22 of 37
To hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases
covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition.
2. Contested Lots
Contested lots where the value of which does not exceed
P100,000.00. The value of the land shall be ascertained by the
affidavit of the claimant or by the claimants if there are several, or
from the tax declaration of the real property.
The MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land
registration cases in two instances: first, where there is no
controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value
of which does not exceed P100,000.00. The case at bar does not
fall under the first instance, because petitioner opposed respondent
Corporation’s application for registration on January 8, 1998
[Republic v. Bantigue Point Development].
Basis for determining the value of the property
a. By the affidavit of the claimant;
b. By agreement of the respective claimants, if there
are more than one; or,
c. From the corresponding tax declaration of the real
property.
Republic v. Bantigue Point Development
Held: Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the value of the land
should not be determined with reference to its selling price. Rather, Section
34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the
property sought to be registered may be ascertained in three ways: first, by
the affidavit of the claimant; second, by agreement of the respective
claimants, if there are more than one; or,  third, from the corresponding tax
declaration of the real property.
In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined
using the first method, because the records are bereft of any affidavit
executed by respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise, valuation
cannot be done through the second method, because this method finds
application only where there are multiple claimants who agree on and make
a joint submission as to the value of the property. Here, only respondent
Bantigue Point Development Corporation claims the property.
The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with
reference to the corresponding Tax Declarations submitted by respondent
Corporation together with its application for registration. From the records,
we find that the assessed value of the property is P4,330, P1,920 and
P8,670, or a total assessed value of P14,920 for the entire property.
[43]
 Based on these Tax Declarations, it is evident that the total value of the
land in question does not exceed P100,000. Clearly, the MTC may exercise
its delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as
amended.
Remedy in case of adverse decision of the MTC/MCTC
in cadastral and land registration cases in the exercise of its
delegated jurisdiction
Under Section 34 of BP 129, as amended, the decisions
of the MTC/MCTC in cadastral and land registration cases “shall
be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the regional trial
courts” which is an implied reference to Rule 41 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure on appeals from the decisions of the RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals by way
of notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of the judgement or
the order denying the motion for reconsideration or new trial.
VI
RULE 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
The procedural rules under the Rules of Court are not
laws- The Rules of Court as a whole, constitutes the body of rules
governing pleading, practice and procedure. As they do not
originate from the legislature, they cannot be called laws in the
strict sense of the word. However, since they are promulgated by It only applies to Municipal Trial Courts and in relation
authority of law, they have the force and effect of law if not in to the cases mentioned under the Revised Rules on Summary
conflict with positive law. The Rules are subordinate to statute, and Procedure
in case of conflict, the statute will prevail.
2. The Rules on Procedure on Small Claims Cases
Substantive Law vs. Remedial Law This rule also applies only to the Municipal Trial Court.
Substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights and It does not apply to the Regional Trial Court, Court of Appeals and
duties concerning life, liberty or property which when violated the Supreme Court.
gives rise to a cause of action.
Remedial law prescribes the methods of enforcing those 3. The Rule on examination of Child witnesses
rights and obligations created by substantive law by providing a
procedural system for obtaining redress for the invasion of rights 4. Cases related to Rule 1 of Section 4
and violations of duties and by prescribing rules as to how suits are In general, what are these cases where the rules of court
filed, tried and decided upon by the courts. do not apply?
a. Election Cases
Section 1. Title of the Rules. – These Rule shall be known and b. Land registration
cited as the Rules of Court. c. Cadastral
d. Naturalization
The Rules of court is actually based on the provision e. Insolvency proceedings
under Art. VIII, Sec. 5 of the Constitution. It provides: f. and all other cases not herein provided.

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following Distinction between the Court and the Judge
powers:
xxx Court Judge
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and a. A court is a tribunal clothed A judge is a public officer who
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and with the power and authority exercises the power of the court in
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the to entertain and resolve legal the dispensation of justice.
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such disputes between the parties
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for and carry out the
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of dispensation of justice in
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase or modify accordance with law.
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and b. A court is more of a A judge is merely temporary.
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved permanent status or
by court. existence
c. A court is established by law A judge is appointed by the
or the Constitution. President of the Philippines upon
Scope of the Rules of Court the recommendation of the
1. The protection and enforcement of constitutional Judicial and Bar Council.
rights;
2. Pleading, practice and procedure in all courts; B. CASES GOVERNED BY THE RULES
3. The admission to the practice of law;
4. The integrated Bar; and Section 3. Cases governed. — These Rules shall govern the
5. Legal assistance to the under-privileged. procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and special
proceedings.
A. APPLICATION TO THE RULES (a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.
Section 2. In what courts applicable. — These Rules shall
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are
apply in all the courts, except as otherwise provided by the Supreme
governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to the specific
Court. (n)
rules prescribed for a special civil action.
(b) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a
Based on Sec. 2, “in all the courts except as otherwise person for an act or omission punishable by law.
provided by the Supreme Court”, the basis of this is Art. VIII, Sec. (c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks
5 which says that the rules shall be uniform for all courts of the to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
same grade.
However, “shall apply in all courts” meaning we’re A civil action is one by which a party sues another for
talking of regular courts. And then “except as otherwise provided the enforcement or a protection of a right or the prevention or
by the Supreme Court”. redress of a wrong.
The Rules of Court is the collective term to describe all A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a
the rules from Rule 1 to Rule 144. Technically speaking, Civil person for an act or omission punishable by law.
Procedure actually begins at Rule 2 because Rule 1 relates to A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks
General Provisions. to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
The doctrine here is the GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS
NON DEROGANT or that “universal things do not detract from Distinctions between Civil Action, Criminal Action, and
specific things.” The special provision will always prevail. Rule Special Proceeding (Bar Examination)
110 to 127 will always govern Criminal Procedure and Rules 1 to
71 will always govern Civil Procedure. Civil Action Criminal Action Special
Specific rules which are not uniform in all the courts Proceeding
1. As to One by which the A remedy by which a
1. Rules on Summary Procedure definition: State prosecutes a party seeks to

Page 23 of 37
 One by which a party person for an act or establish a status, a As to which court An ordinary civil Specific types of
sues another for the omission punishable right, or a particular has jurisdiction action may be filed special civil actions
enforcement or by law. (Sec. 1[b] of fact. (Sec, 1[c], Rule before the MTC or must be filed before
protection of a right, Rule 1). 1). the RTC, depending either the MTC or the
or the prevention or on the jurisdictional RTC.
redress of a wrong amount or nature of
(Sec. 3, Rule 1). the action involved.
2. As to It is governed by It is governed by As to the Every ordinary civil The requirement of a
governing Rules 110-127 of the Rules 72-109 of the applicability of the action must be based cause of action finds
rules: Revised Rules of Rules of Court, and elements of a cause on a cause of action. no application to
Civil action is Criminal Procedure, rules on ordinary of action A cause of action is certain special civil
governed by Rules 1- and rules on ordinary civil actions only the act or omission actions where the
71. civil actions only applies in suppletory by which a party violation of the
applies in suppletory character. violates a right of plaintiff’s rights is
character. another. not a prerequisite for
3. As to basis: It is based on acts or It is based on filing such actions.
A civil action is omission in violation particular fact, or As to how initiated An ordinary civil Special civil actions
based on a cause of of penal laws. status, or a right action is initiated by may be initiated by
action. sought to be the filing of a the filing of a
established. complaint. complaint or a
4. As to the It is adversarial and As a rule, it is non- petition.
nature: prosecutorial in adversarial, except As to the Under Rule 7, Pleadings in many
The proceeding is nature. when there is an requirement of Section 4, except special civil actions
adversarial since it oppositor/respondent. verification when otherwise must be verified,
involves two (2) specifically required such as a complaint
contending parties. by law or rule, for expropriation
5. As to parties: Parties in a criminal Party in special pleadings in an (Rule 67), petitions
Parties in a civil action are the State proceeding is the ordinary civil action for certiorari,
action are the and the accused, and petitioner, except need not be under prohibition, and
plaintiff and the in case of preliminary when opposed, the oath or verified. mandamus (Rule 65),
defendant. In case of investigation, the oppositor or petitions for quo
special civil action is complainant and the respondent. warranto (Rule 66),
commenced by respondent. petitions under Rule
petition, parties are 64, pleadings in
the petitioner and the accion interdictal
respondent. (Rule 70), and
petitions for indirect
1. Classification of Actions in Relation to the Kinds contempt (Rule 71).
As to whether Under Rule 14, The rule on the
of Actions summons are served Section 1, the court issuances of
shall within 5 summons does not
a. As to its nature: calendar days direct apply to certain
i. Ordinary Civil Action the clerk of court to special civil actions.
ii. Special Civil Action issue the
corresponding
summons to the
Special Civil Actions defendant.
Rules 62 to 71 are the Rules classified as Special Civil As to whether the Under Rule 9, While default may be
Actions. defendant can be Section 3, if the declared if a party
declared in default defending party fails fails to plead (i.e.,
 Interpleader
to answer within the claimant in
 Declaratory relief and similar remedies time allowed, the interpleader under
 Review of Judgements and Final Orders or court shall, upon the Rule 62, Section 5),
Resolutions of the COMELEC and COA motion of the failure to answer
claiming party with does not lead to a
 Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus notice to the default declaration
 Quo Warranto defending party, and under Rule 70, where
 Expropriation proof of such failure, a default motion is a
declare the defending prohibited motion.
 Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
party in default.
 Partition As to the remedy of The remedy of a There are special
 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer appeal defeated party is civil actions where
 Contempt appeal. The remedy multiple appeals are
of a party aggrieved allowed, namely: (a)
by a judgement Expropriation, (b)
So primarily, those rules govern the special civil actions. rendered on appeal is Foreclosure of
In absence of any of or any applicable rule, then we follow the a petition for review. Mortgage, (c)
rules on ordinary civil actions. In case of conflict, the special rules In other words, there Partition.
governing these actions shall prevail. can only be one
appeal.
As to venue The venue depends The venue does not
ORDINARY SPECIAL CIVIL on whether the action necessarily depend
CIVIL ACTION ACTION is a real or personal on the real or
As to what rules An ordinary civil A special civil action action personal nature of the
govern it action is governed by is governed by the action.
the rules for ordinary rules for ordinary As to the An ordinary civil A special civil action
civil actions and civil actions, subject availability of action cannot be for declaratory relief
never the specific to the specific rules special civil action converted into a may be converted
rules prescribed for a prescribed for a as corrective relief special civil action. into an ordinary civil
special civil action. special civil action. and conversion In exceptional cases, action under Rule 63,
Page 24 of 37
 a party aggrieved by Section 6. land; For the purpose of venue determination, the action is a real
a judgement in an A party aggrieved by action and must be filed in the place where the property is situated
ordinary civil action, a judgement in a
regardless of the residence of the parties [Emergency Loan
when there is no special civil action
appeal or other plain, may file a special Pawnshop v. Court of Appeals].
speedy or adequate civil action for Where several or alternative reliefs are prayed for in the
remedy in the certiorari on the complaint, the nature of the action as real or personal is determined
ordinary course of ground that the by the primary object of the suit or by the nature of the principal
law, may file a tribunal acted without
special civil action or in excess of its or
claim. Thus, where the purpose is to nullify the title to real
for certiorari on the his jurisdiction, or property, the venue of the action is in the province where the
ground that the with grave abuse of property lies, notwithstanding the alternative relief sought,
tribunal acted without discretion amounting recovery of damages, which is predicated upon a declaration of
or in excess of its or to lack or excess of nullity of the title [Navarro v. Lucero].
his jurisdiction, or jurisdiction, if there
with grave abuse of is no appeal or other
discretion amounting plain, speedy, or This is the guide:
to lack or excess of adequate remedy in To be a real action, it is not enough that the action must
jurisdiction. the ordinary course be with real property. It is important that the matter in litigation
of law. must also involve any of the following issues relating to real
property. These are the enumerated issues:
• Title • Ownership
b. As to the Cause or Foundation:
• Possession
i. Real Action • Partition (although we discussed that there are cases
ii. Personal Action
that even though there is a partition prayed, it’s not actually a real
action)
Real Action
• Foreclosure Mortgage (although in the case of Russel
A real action is one brought for the protection of real vs. Vestil, an action for foreclosure of mortgage is one incapable of
rights, lands, tenements, or hereditaments or one founded on privity
pecuniary estimation.)
of estate only [Paper Industries v. Samson].
• Any interest in real property
Example: An action for recovery of possession of real
property, quieting of title or removal of clouds, action for specific Significance
performance for the delivery of real property.
A real action is ‘local,’ i.e., its venue depends upon the
An action for specific performance is a personal action as location of the property involved in the litigation. Actions affecting
long as it does not involve a claim of or recovery of ownership of a
title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
real property. Where the allegations as well as the prayer of the commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction
complaint do not claim ownership or possession of the lots but
over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
instead seeks for the execution of a deed of sale by the defendants thereof is situated (Sec.1, Rule 4, Rules of Court).
in favor of the plaintiff, the action is a personal action [Adamos v.
On the other hand, a personal action is ‘transitory,’ i.e.,
J.M. Tuason]. its venue depends upon the residence of the plaintiff or the
However, where a complaint s denominated as one for
defendant at the option of the plaintiff. A personal action may be
specific performance but nonetheless prays for the issuance of a commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
deed of sale for a parcel of land for the plaintiff to acquire
plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of the principal
ownership of the land, its primary objective and nature is one to defendants reside, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where
recover the parcel of land itself and thus, is deemed a real action
he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff (Sec.2, Rule 4,
[Gochan v Gochan]. Rules of Court).
The test is that if the trial court cannot decide the case
without ruling on title over real property, it is a real action.
Hernandez v. DBP
Otherwise, it is a personal action.
Held: The only issue in this petition is whether the action of the
petitioner was properly filed in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. It is
Personal Action a well settled rule that venue of actions or, more appropriately, the county
A personal action is one which is not founded upon the where the action is triable  depends to a great extent on the nature of the
privity of real rights or real property. An action for specific action to be filed, whether it is real or personal. A real action is one brought
performance is a personal action [Siosoco v. Court of Appeals]. for the specific recovery of land, tenements, or hereditaments. A personal
Example: An action which seeks to recover personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the
property, enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages. enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for
the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or
An action for damages to real property, while involving
property. Under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, "actions affecting
realty is a personal action because although it involves real title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition, or condemnation of ,
property, it does not involve any of the issues mentioned. However, or foreclosure of mortgage in real property, shall be commenced and tried
an action to recover possession of real property plus damages is a where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or
real action. The aspect of damages is merely an incidental part of where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
the main action. plaintiff".
An action to recover possession of a personal property is A close scrutiny of the essence of the petitioner's complaint in
a personal action. An action for a declaration of nullity of marriage the court a quo would readily show that he seeks the annulment of the
cancellation of the award of the Quezon City lot and house in his favor
is also a personal action [Tamano v. Ortiz].
originally given him by respondent DBP in recognition of his twenty-one
years of service in its Legal Department, in pursuance of his contention that
Mixed Action he had acquired a vested right to the award which cannot be unilaterally
When the plaintiff joins two or more causes of actions cancelled by respondent without his consent.
based on the same act or occurrence, one of which is a real action;
For instance, in an action to annul a sale of a land to recover the
Page 25 of 37
 The Court agrees that petitioner's action is not a real but a
personal action. As correctly insisted by petitioner, his action is one to
declare null and void the cancellation of the lot and house in his favor
which does not involve title and ownership over said properties but seeks to
compel respondent to recognize that the award is a valid and subsisting one
which it cannot arbitrarily and unilaterally cancel and accordingly to accept
the proffered payment in full which it had rejected and returned to
petitioner.
Such an action is a personal action which may be properly
brought by petitioner in his residence, as held in the case of Adamus vs.
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.  where this Court speaking through former Chief
Justice Querube C. Makalintal distinguished the case from an earlier line of
J.M. Tuaxon & Co., Inc. cases involving lot purchasers from the Deudors,
as follows:
... All the allegations as well as the prayer in the complaint show
that this is not a real but a personal action — to compel the defendants to
execute the corresponding purchase contracts in favor of the plaintiffs and
to pay damages. The plaintiffs do not claim ownership of the lots in
question: they recognize the title of the defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
They do not ask that possession be delivered to them, for they allege to be
in possession. The case cited by the defendants (Abao, et al. vs. J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. G.R. No. L-16796, Jan. 30, 1962) is therefore not in
point. In that case, as stated by this Court in its decision, the 'plaintiffs'
action is predicated on the theory that they are 'occupants, landholders,' and
'most' of them owners by purchase' of the residential lots in question; that,
in consequence of the compromise agreement adverted to above, between
the Deudors; and defendant corporations, the latter had acknowledged the
right and title of the Deudors in and to said lots; and hence, the right and
title of the plaintiffs, as successors-in-interest of the Deudors; that, by
entering into said agreement, defendant corporations had, also, waived their
right to invoke the indefeasibility of the Torrens title in favor of J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc.; and that defendants have no right, therefore, to oust
plaintiffs from the lots respectively occupied by them and which they claim
to be entitled to hold. Obviously, this action affects, therefore, not only the
possession of real property, but, also, the title thereto. Accordingly, it
should have been instituted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Rizal in which said property is situated (Section 3, Rule 5 of the Rules of
Court).
Real Actions v. Actions Incapable of Pecuniary
Estimation
The RTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in civil
actions where the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
The RTC also has jurisdiction in civil cases involving
title to, or possession of, real property or any interest in it where
the assessed value of the property involved exceeds 20,000.
If it is below 20,000, it is the first level court or MTC
which has jurisdiction.
A real action or an action involving real property means
that the plaintiff’s cause of action is based on a claim that he owns
such property or that he has the legal right to have exclusive
control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same.
c. As to object of the action:
i. In Rem
ii. In Personam
iii. Quasi in Rem
An action in personam is directed against specific
persons on the basis of their personal liabilities and seeks personal
judgements. In an action strictly in personam, personal service of
summons on the defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is,
by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person
[Ejercito v. M.R. Vargas Construction].
The purpose of this proceeding is to impose, through the
judgement of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon
the person of the defendant, An action for specific performance
praying for the execution of a deed of sale in connection with an
undertaking in a contract is an action in personam. [Sps. Yu v.
Page 26 of 37
Pacleb]. A judgement in personam is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded therein and dulty heard or given an opportunity
to be heard.
An ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein the
judgement is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and
given the opportunity to be heard. For the exceptions, court hearing
is a must to determine the character of such possession. If the
execution court finds that they are mere successors-in-interest,
guests, or agents of the defendant, the order of execution shall be
enforced against them [Floyd v. Gonzales].
Salandanan v. Sps. Mendez
Held: A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a
property to another is in personam. x x x  Any judgment therein is binding
only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an
opportunity to be heard.  However, this rule admits of the exception, such
that even a non-party may be bound by the judgment in an ejectment
suit where he is any of the following: (a) trespasser, squatter or agent of
the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the
judgment; (b) guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the
defendant; (c) transferee pendente lite; (d) sublessee; (e) co-lessee; or
(f) member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant
An action in rem is directed against the thing or property
or status of a person and seeks judgements with respect thereto as
against the whole world.
An action for the declaration for the nullity of a marriage
is a personal action because it is not founded on real estate. It is
also an action in rem because the issue fo the status of a person is
one directed against the whole world. One’s status is a matter that
can be set up against anyone in the world [Tamano v. Ortiz].
An action quasi in rem names a person as defendant,
but its object is to subject that person’s interest in a property to a
corresponding lien or obligation. Examples are Foreclosure of
mortgage (Rule 68); Partition under Rule 69; attachment under
Rule 57; or any other action the purpose of which is to exclude the
defendant’s interest over the property.
Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or
liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate
on tehse questions only as between the particular parties to the
proceedings and not to ascertain or cut-off the rights or interests of
all possible claimants [Domagas v. Jensen].
The object of an action quasi in rem is the sale or
disposition of the property whether by attachment, foreclosure or
any other form of remedy [Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca].
Judicial Foreclosure is an action quasi in rem
This is a special civil action under Rule 68. It is an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation [Russel v. Vestil]. However, it is
also a real action. Thus, the determination of jurisdiction is subject
to the assessed value of the property [Roldan v. Sps. Barrrios].
Significance of characterization
The distinction is important to determine whether or not
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is required and
consequently to determine the type of summons to be employed.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the
court to validly try and decide a case against said defendant where
the action is one in personam but not where the action is in rem or
quasi in rem. In an action strictly in personam, personal service of
summons on the defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is,
by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person
[Ejercito v. M.R. Vargas Construction].
A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce
personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is
based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may invoke his
right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek
to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the of due process.
mandate of the court. Requires Jurisdiction is Jurisdiction is
In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over personal service acquired either: acquired either:
the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer of summons to (1) Seizure of (1) Seizure
jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires the defendant to the of the
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either acquire property property
(1) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is jurisdiction. (2) Institution Institution of legal
of legal proceedings
brought into the actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the
proceedings
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is
A foreign A foreign judgement Same treatment as
recognized and made effective [Biaco v. Countryside Rural Bank].
judgement in an in an action in rem is action in
However, summons must still be served upon the defendant not for action in deemed conclusive personam.
the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely to personam is upon the title to the
satisfy the requirements of due process. presumptive, not thing.
conclusive, of a
Acosta v. Salazar right as between
Held: It is true that the registration of land under the Torrens the parties and
system is  a proceeding in rem and not in personam. Such a proceeding in their successors
rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment by subsequent
without personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice by title.
mail to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is acquired by virtue of the power of
the court over the res. Such a proceeding would be impossible were this not It is essential that there should be an opportunity to
so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between constitutional challenge the foreign judgement, in order for the court in this
rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the
jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction,
plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all.
Interestingly, however, the proceedings instituted by the the Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in
Salazars - both in Branch 63 of the RTC of Tarlac for the cancellation of personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign
entries in OCT No. 40287 and later in Branch 64 of the RTC of Tarlac for judgement merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness
quieting of title - can hardly be classified as actions in rem. The petition for of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the
cancellation of entries annotated at the back of OCT No. 40287 ought to contrary [Bayot v. Bayot].
have been directed against specific persons: namely, the heirs of Juan
Soriano as appearing in Entry No. 20102 and, indubitably, against their
2. Special Proceedings
successors-in-interest who have acquired different portions of the property
Section 1 of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides:
over the years because it is in the nature of an action quasi in
rem. Accordingly, the Salazars should have impleaded as party defendants
the heirs of Juan Soriano and/or Vicenta Macaraeg as well as those Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. —
claiming ownership over the property under their names because they are Rules of special proceedings are provided for in the following
indispensable parties. This was not done in this case. Since no cases:
indispensable party was  ever impleaded by the Salazars in their petition for (a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
cancellation of entry filed before Branch 63 of the RTC of Tarlac, herein (b) Escheat;
petitioners are not bound by the dispositions of the said (c) Guardianship and custody of children;
court. Consequently, the judgment or order of the said court never even (d) Trustees;
acquired finality. (e) Adoption;
(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;
(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;
Distinctions between Actions in Personam, In Rem, (h) Habeas corpus;
and Quasi in Rem (i) Change of name;
(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
IN IN REM QUASI IN REM (k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of
PERSONAM minor natural children;
An action in An action in rem is An action quasi in (l) Constitution of family home;
personam is directed against the rem is one brought (m) Declaration of absence and death;
directed against thing or property or against persons (n) Cancellation of correction of entries in the civil
specific persons status of a person. seeking to subject registry.
on the basis of the property of
their personal such persons to the Distinctions between ordinary civil actions and special
liabilities and discharge of the proceedings
seeks personal claims assailed. An ordinary civil action is an action by which one sues
judgements another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection fo a
Binds only the Binds the whole Binds only the right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Special proceeding is
parties to the world. parties to the the act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of a party,
action action or a particular fact. Hence, an action is distinguished from special
Requires Requires jurisdiction Requires only proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by one
jurisdiction over over the res jurisdiction over against another, while the latter is but a petition or declaration of a
the person the res to bind the status, right or fact.
person.
Service of Service of summons Service of
ORDIANRY CIVIL SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
summons is is not required to summons is not
ACTIONS
jurisdictional obtain jurisdiction but required to obtain
merely to satisfy the jurisdiction but It is a formal demand of one’s A special proceeding is an
right in ac ourt of justice in application or proceeding to
requirements of due merely to satisfy
process. the requirements the manner prescribed by the establish the status or right of
court or by the law. a party, or a particular fact.
Page 27 of 37
 Pleadings are required No formal pleadings are
required unless the statute
expressly so provides. In
special proceedings, the
remedy is granted generally
upon an application or motion
Can be tried by courts of Can only be tried by courts of
general jurisdiction special or limited jurisdiction
There are two (2) definite While there is a definite party
adverse parties: the party who petitioner, there is no definite
demands a right, called a adverse party as the
plaintiff, and the other whom proceeding is usually
the right is sought, called a considered to be against the
defendant. whole world.
A complaint is filed. A petition is filed
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property
made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. Clearly,
matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of
the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court
in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction [Natcher v. Court of
Appeals].
A petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation
should be classified as a special proceeding and not an ordinary
action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of
a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It
does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party’s
wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be
enforced against any person [Natcher v. Court of Appeals].
Ching v. Rodriguez
Held: Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be
effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be
specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the
respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the
disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the
disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the
prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not
partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the
probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Manalo v. Court of Appeals
Held: Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the
provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the
invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the
dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio
Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough, to wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members
of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the
limitations in Article 2035 (underscoring supplied).
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to
ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term "suit" that it refers to an
action by one person or persons against another or others in a court of
justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him
for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or
in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby
a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong. Besides, an excerpt from the Report of the Code
Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to
make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are
essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are
not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in
fact no defendant was impleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of
Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP.
Page 28 of 37
PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy
whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact.[26] The petitioners therein (private respondents herein)
merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to
be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can
validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of
the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction
of the probate court.
Republic v. Court of Appeals
Held: The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption
of death provides:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall
be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which
the trial court anchored its grant of the petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief
that the absent spouses was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions
of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under th
e preceding paragraph,the spouses present must institute a summary procee
ding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of th
e absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of
Appeal, invoked by the trial court in disapproving petitioner's Notice of
Appeal, provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. –
(a) Ordinary appeal.  - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the
adverseparty. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proce
edings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or 
these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed
and served in like manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxx
By the trial court's citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is
gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse
declared presumptively
dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. 
Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary proceeding," following
above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the
following provision,  inter alia:
xxx
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural
rules in this Title shall
apply in all cases provided for in this Codes requiring summary court pro
ceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without
regard to technical rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x,
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required,
and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a
special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls
for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary
proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court's order
sufficed.

C. CASES NOT DIRECTLY GOVERNED BY THE RULES
Section 4. In what case not applicable. — These Rules shall
not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization
and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for,
except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. 
“Suppletory character” means that the provision in the
Rules of Court will be made to apply only where there is an
insufficiency in the applicable rule [GSIS v. Villaviza].
Ong Chia v. Republic
Held: Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of
evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not
applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The
only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in
such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case
here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first
time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient
course of action considering that decision in naturalization proceedings are
not covered by the rule on res judicata.[14] Consequently, a final favorable
judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation
of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.
D. COMMENCEMENT OF CIVIL ACTION
Section 5. Commencement of action. — A civil action is
commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court. If an
additional defendant is impleaded in a later pleading, the action is
commenced with regard to him on the dated of the filing of such later
pleading, irrespective of whether the motion for its admission, if
necessary, is denied by the court.  period [Tacay v. RTC].
A civil action is commenced before the court by:
1. Filing of the original complaint in court;
2. If an additional defendant is impleaded in a latter
pleading, the action is commenced with regard to
him on the date of the filing of such pleading,
Page 29 of 37
irrespective whether a motion for its admission, if
necessary is denied by the court.
A civil action is commenced by the filing of the original
complaint in court plus the payment of a corresponding docket and
other legal fees.
The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fee." Hence, the payment of
docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional
The Supreme Court provided the following guidelines in
the case of Sunshine Development v. Asuncion
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing
of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,
third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a
claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of
the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards
a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
fee.
Where the action involves real property and a related
claim for damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the
basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total amount
of related damages sought.  The Court acquires jurisdiction over
the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by
the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the
time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of
the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless,
of course, prescription has set in in the meantime.  But where -- as
in the case at bar -- the fees prescribed for an action involving real
property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related
damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are
unspecified, the action may not be dismissed.  The Court
undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real
property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading and payment of the prescribed fee.  And it is not divested
of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired
jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages because of
lack of specification thereof.  What should be done is simply to
expunge those claims for damages as to which no amounts are
stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or allow, on
motion, a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints so
as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages and accept
payment of the requisite fees therefor within relevant prescriptive
Ayala Corp v. Madayag
Held: Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of
the above ruling of this Court wherein it is stated that "where the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has
been left for the determination of the court, the additional filing fee therefor
shall constitute a lien on the judgment" by considering it to mean that where
in the body and prayer of the complaint there is a prayer, say for exemplary
or corrective damages, the amount of which is left to the discretion of the
Court, there is no need to specify the amount being sought, and that any
award thereafter shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
In the latest case of Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum,[3] 
this Court had occasion to make the clarification that the phrase "awards of
claims not specified in the pleading" refers only to "damages arising after
the filing of the complaint or similar pleading x x x x as to which the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment." The
amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing
of the complaint or any pleading should be specified. While it is true that
the determination of certain damages as exemplary or corrective damages is
left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming
such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court
may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the
appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not
specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the
court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the
claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case,
therefore, suffers from the material defect in failing to state the amount of
exemplary damages prayed for.
As ruled in  Tacay  the trial court may either order said claim to
be expunged from the record as it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same
or on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time, the amendment of the
amended and supplemental complaint so as to state the precise amount of
the exemplary damages sought and require the payment of the requisite fees
therefor within the relevant prescriptive period.
Proton Pilipinas Corp. v. Banque National de Paris
Held: With respect to the interest accruing after the filing of the
complaint, the same can only be determined after a final judgment has been
handed down. Respondent cannot thus be made to pay the corresponding
docket fee therefor. Pursuant, however, to Section 2, Rule 141, as amended
by Administrative Circular No. 11-94, respondent should be made to pay
additional fees which shall constitute a lien in the event the trial court
adjudges that it is entitled to interest accruing after the filing of the
complaint.
Sec. 2. Fees as lien. – Where the court in its final judgment
awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different or more than that claimed in
the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall
constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of
court shall assess and collect the corresponding fees.
In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag, in interpreting the third rule
laid down in Sun Insurance regarding awards of claims not specified in the
pleading, this Court held that the same refers only to damages arising
after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading as to which the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
… The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on
or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading should be specified.
While it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or
corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty
of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the
basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and for the
proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception
contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified
are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages
that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for
then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as
to the amount thereof.
E. INTERPRETATION OF RULES
‘ which a party violates a right of another. It is the delict or the
Section 6. Construction. — These Rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.  Human Resources]. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of
Litigation is not a game of technicality, in which one
more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and
position entraps and destroys the other. It is rather a contest in
which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court
Page 30 of 37
the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and
indecisive all imperfection of forms and technicalities of
procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits,
unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality,
when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its
great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration
from courts. the rules of procedure may not be misused and abused
as instruments for the denial of substantial justice. Here is another
demonstrative instance of how some members of the bar, availing
themselves of their proficiency in invoking the letter of the rules
without regard to their real spirit and intent, succeed in inducing
courts to act contrary to the dictates of justice and equity, and, in
some instances, to wittingly or unwittingly abet unfair advantage
by ironically camouflaging their actuations as earnest efforts to
satisfy the public clamor for speedy disposition of litigations,
forgetting all the while that the plain injunction of Section 2 of
Rule 1 is that the "rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining" not only
"speedy" but more imperatively, "just ... and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding" [Anson Trade
Center v. Pacific Banking].
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed
simply because their non-observance may have resulted in
prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are
required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness
in not complying with the procedure prescribed [Tagabi v.
Tanque].
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to
defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, they should not be applied
in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that, while the
Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the
rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly
applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have
sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in some
cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal
perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules
would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the
demands of substantial justice, and in the exercise of equity
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court [Jose v. Court of Appeals].
VII
RULE 2
CAUSE OF ACTION
A. BASIS OF CIVIL ACTION
Section 1. Ordinary civil actions,  basis of. — Every ordinary
civil action must be based on a cause of action. (n)
B. DEFINITION AND ELEMENTS OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
Section 2. Cause of action, defined. — A cause of action is the
act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by
wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation
of the primary right of the plaintiff [Universal Aquarius v. Q.C.
action is determined by the allegations in the complaint [Ubas, Sr.
v. Chan].
The Supreme Court provided the three (3) essential
elements of a cause of action in the case of Sps. Fernandez v.
Smart Communications, to wit:

a. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created;
b. An obligation on the part of the defendant to respect
or not to violate such right; and
c. An act or omission on the part of the named
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages or other
relief.
It is only upon the occurrence of the last element that a
cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an
action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief
[Universal Aquarius v. QC Human Resources]. Only ultimate facts,
not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, are considered for
purposes of applying the test [Butan Development v. Court of
Appeals].
The term “cause of action” applies only to civil actions.
Strictly speaking, it is only in civil actions that one
speaks of a cause of action. The term does not apply to special
proceedings which seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact. Rehabilitation proceedings seeks to establish the inability of
the corporate debtor to pay its debts when they fall due so that a
rehabilitation plan is necessary. It does not seek a relief from an
injury caused by another party. Thus, a petition for rehabilitation
need not state a cause of action [Rombe v. Asiatrust Development
Bank].
Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a
special proceeding has no definite adverse party. A special
proceeding has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a
declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite
adverse party. In a case for settlement of estate, the estate of the
decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special
proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the
decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its
liabilities, and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same
[Montaner Shariah District Court].
Right of Action
The term "right of action" is the right to commence and
maintain an action. The right of action springs from the cause of
action, but does not accrue until all the facts which constitute the
cause of action have occurred [Sps. Borbe v. Calalo].
A right of action is the right to presently enforce a cause
of action, while a cause of action consists of the operative facts
which give rise to such right of action. The right of action does not
arise until the performance of all conditions precedent to the action
and may be taken away by the running of the statute of limitations,
through estoppel, or by other circumstances which do not affect the
cause of action. Performance or fulfillment of all conditions
precedent upon which a right of action depends must be
sufficiently alleged, considering that the burden of proof to show
that a party has a right of action is upon the person initiating the
suit [PhilAmGen v. Sweet Lines].
RIGHT OF ACTION CAUSE OF ACTION
The right to presently enforce The act or omission by which
a cause of action. a party violates a right of
another.
A remedial right belonging A formal statement of the
to some person. operative facts that give rise to
such remedial right.
A matter of right and depends A matter of statement and is
on the substantive law governed by the law of
Page 31 of 37
procedure (i.e., whether or not
a cause of action exists is
determined by examining the
allegations in the complaint)
There is a right of action if the There is a cause of action if
same is allowed by remedial the same arises from
law. If there is no remedy substantive law.
provided, there can be no
redress.
Arises after the performance Arises the moment a right is
or fulfillment of all conditions violated.
precedent.
Affected by the statute of Affected by the statute of
limitations. limitations.
1. Damnum Absque Injuria
This means a loss or damage for which there is no legal
remedy. In other words, even if there is violation of a right but the
law does not consider it as an actionable injury, the plaintiff cannot
file a claim.
BPI Express Card v. Court of Appeals
Held: We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that
private respondent suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of his
credit card. However, there is a material distinction between damages and
injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt,
or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be
borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action
for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff - a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the
premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there
must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that
breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should
be the proximate cause of the injury.
2. Test to Determine Sufficiency of Cause of Action
The test of sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not
admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in
accordance with the prayer of said complaint. Stated differently, if
the allegation in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed
regardless of the defense that may be asserted by the defendant
[Juana Complex I Homeowners Association v. Fil-Estate Land].
Admitting hypothetically, the truth of the allegations of fact made
in the complaint, may a judge validly grant the relief demanded in
the complaint [Asia Brewery v. Equitable PCI Bank]?
To be taken into account are only the material allegations
in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other
matters aliunde are not considered. The court may consider in
addition to the complaint the appended annexes or documents,
other pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records [Sps.
Zepeda v. China Banking]. In determining whether the elements of
a cause of action are present or whether they have been sufficiently
alleged, the inquiry is therefore confined to the four corners of the
complaint [Asia Brewery v. Equitable PCI Bank].
A cause of action must exist at the time of filing of a
complaint
Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of
action at the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be
cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while the
action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or an amendment
setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not permissible
[Surigao Mine Exploration v. Harris].

3. Cause of Action v. Subject Matter

The commonalities between the two are that only
allegations of the complaint will be examined in determining
whether there is a cause of action and whether the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and both are used in
determining whether or not res judicata exists.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another. It is the delict or the wrongful act or
omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary Tegimenta Chemical v. Buensalida
right of the plaintiff. The subject matter is the item with respect to Held: The Court of Appeals correctly relied not only on the face
which the controversy has arisen, or concerning which the wrong of the complaints, but also on the position papers submitted by respondent
in determining the causes of action raised in the two cases. It correctly
has been done, and it is ordinarily the right, the thing, or the
observed that a complaint in a case filed before the NLRC consists only of
contract under dispute [Bachrach Corp. v. Court of Appeals]. a blank form which provides a checklist of possible causes of action that the
employee may have against the employer. The check list was designed to
Iniego v. Purganan facilitate the filing of complaints by employees and laborers even without
Held: Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are the intervention of counsel. It allows the complainant to expediently set
primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the forth his grievance in a general manner, but is not solely determinative of
damages suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts. The the ultimate cause of action that he may have against the employer.
damages claimed in such actions represent the monetary equivalent of the Thus, the complaint is not the only document from which the
injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant, which are thus sought to be complainant's cause of action is determined in a labor case. Any cause of
recovered by the plaintiff. This money claim is the principal relief sought, action that may not have been included in the complaint or position paper,
and is not merely incidental thereto or a consequence thereof. It bears to can no longer be alleged after the position paper is submitted by the parties.
point out that the complaint filed by private respondent before the RTC In other words, the filing of the position paper is the operative act which
actually bears the caption "for DAMAGES." forecloses the raising of other matters constitutive of the cause of action.
Fault or negligence, which the Court of Appeals claims is not This necessarily implies that the cause of action is finally ascertained only
capable of pecuniary estimation, is not actionable by itself. For such fault or after both the complaint and position paper are properly evaluated.
negligence to be actionable, there must be a resulting damage to a third A cause of action is the delict or wrongful act or omission
person. The relief available to the offended party in such cases is for the committed by the defendant in violation of the primary right of the
reparation, restitution, or payment of such damage, without which any plaintiff. A complaint before the NLRC does not contain specific
alleged offended party has no cause of action or relief. The fault or allegations of these wrongful acts or omissions which constitute the cause
negligence of the defendant, therefore, is inextricably intertwined with the of action. All that it contains is the term by which such acts or omissions
claim for damages, and there can be no action based on quasi-delict without complained of are generally known. It cannot therefore be considered as the
a claim for damages THEREFORE, the subject matter of actions for final determinant of the cause of action.
damages based on quasi-delict is capable of pecuniary estimation.
C. ONE SUIT FOR A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION
CAUSE OF ACTION SUBJECT MATTER
It is the basis of a civil action It is the basis of jurisdiction Section 3. One suit for a single cause of action. — A party
It does not matter if the cause of If the subject matter is incapable may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.
action is capable or incapable of of pecuniary estimation,
pecuniary estimation. jurisdiction is lodged with the
RTC. For a single cause of action or violation of a right, the
A cause of action need only exist Every action or proceeding has a plaintiff may be entitled to several reliefs. It is the filing of the
in a civil action [Rombe v. subject matter separate complaint or these several reliefs that constitutes splitting
Asiatrust].
of the cause of action. This is what is prohibited by the rule. When
It is the “why” of the action [Arba It is the “what” of an action or
v. Nicolas] proceeding. there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of
Whether one has a cause of action To determine subject matter, action regardless of the number of rights violated belonging to one
depends on law, contract and reference is made to law. person. All such rights should be alleged in a single complaint,
other sources of obligations. otherwise they are barred forever [Private v. Magada].
When a court takes cognizance of When a court takes cognizance of Illustration: In an action based on a quasi-delict, the act
a cause of action when none a subject matter not conferred
actually exists, it commits an error upon it by law, it commits an
or omission is the failure of the defendant to exercise due diligence
of judgement. error of jurisdiction. required by the circumstances. It may lead to personal bodily injury
Where a cause of action does not Where jurisdiction over the requiring hospitalization expenses, professional fees and to a claim
exist, a complaint was vulnerable subject matter does not exist, a for other damages. These claims cannot be prosecuted individually.
to dismissal on the ground of complaint is vulnerable to Rather, because there is only one delict (the negligence of the
failure to state a cause of action dismissal on the ground that the
under the old incarnation of the court has no jurisdiction over the defendant), there is only one cause of action.
rules. At present, lack of or failure subject matter of the claim under If the plaintiff files separate cases to prosecute his several
to state a cause of action are both the old and current claims individually, he violates the rule against splitting a cause of
considered affirmative defenses incarnation of the Rules. action.
only.
Under the unamended Rules, a A dismissal on the ground that the
dismissal on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the Marilag v. Fernandez
complaint fails to state a cause of subject matter bars the refiling of Held: For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the
action is without prejudice to the complaint in the same court. creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause
filing in the same court. of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the
security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands,

Page 32 of 37
the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both
demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for
that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and
the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to
the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation.
Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach
of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated,
cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for
payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of
the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the
subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate
complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and
another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him
plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts
and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor. 
As petitioner had already instituted judicial foreclosure
proceedings over the mortgaged property, she is now barred from
availing herself of an ordinary action for collection, regardless of whether
or not the decision in the foreclosure case had attained finality. In fine, the
dismissal of the collection case is in order. Considering, however, that
respondent's claim for return of excess payment partakes of the nature of a
compulsory counterclaim and, thus, survives the dismissal of petitioner's
collection suit, the same should be resolved based on its own merits and
evidentiary support.
D. SPLITTING OF CAUSE OF ACTION
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of.  — If
two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action,
the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available
as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Splitting a cause of action is the act of dividing a single
or indivisible cause of action, claim or demand into two or more
parts, and bringing suit for one of such parts only, intending to
reserve the rest for another separate action. The purpose of the rule
is to avoid harassment and vexation to the defendant and avoid
multiplicity of suits [Quadra v. Court of Appeals].
1. Nature of Splitting a Cause of Action
Splitting of a cause of action is a mode of forum
shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action, but with different prayers. Forum shopping is the institution
of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties
for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,
on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition [Yap v. Chua].
Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil
action, refers to a situation where two actions are pending between
the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them
becomes unnecessary and vexatious.
The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory
that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding
the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This
theory is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter
should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once,
in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the
sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons, and also to
avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits.
Consequently, a party will not be permitted to split up a single
cause of action and make it a basis for several suits as the whole
cause must be determined in one action [Lajave Agricultural v.
Sps. Javellana].
Splitting of a cause of action amounts to res judicata,
which is another ground for the dismissal of a civil action. It holds
that a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties in all later suits
on points and matters determined in the former suit. It rests on the
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principle that parties should not to be permitted to litigate the same
issue more than once.
Collantes v. Court of Appeals
Held: More particularly, the elements of forum shopping are: (a)
identity of parties or at least such parties as represent the same interests in
both actions; (b) identity of the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer,
the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for
dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally
resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers
(splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also
either litis pendentia or res judicata). If the forum shopping is not
considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be
dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above.
However, if the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if
there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice.
2. Effect of Splitting of Cause of Action
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the
same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgement on the merits
in any one is a ground for the dismissal of the others. Generally, a
suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action [Umale v.
Canoga Park Development].
3. Same Evidence Test Rule
It must be ascertained whether the same evidence which
is necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been
sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first. Several tests exist to
ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of
action, such as whether the same evidence would support and
sustain both the first and second causes of action (also known as
the “same evidence” test), or whether the defenses in one case may
be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also
fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of action
in the second phase existed at the time of the filing of the first
complaint [Umale v. Canoga Park Development].
4. Rules to Determine Singleness of a Cause of
Action
(a) A contract embraces only one cause of action because it may
be violated only once, even if it contains several stipulations
(ONE CONTRACT-ONE CAUSE).
(b) A contract which provides for several stipulations to be
performed at different times gives rise to as many causes of
action as there are violations (ONE VIOLATION-ONE
CAUSE).
(c) Do not apply (b) if there is STIPULATION or
REPUDIATION.
(d) All obligations which have matured at the time of the suit
must be integrated as one cause of action in one complaint.
Those not so included would be barred.
(a) ONE CONTRACT-ONE CAUSE
Non-payment of a loan secured by mortgage constitutes a
single cause of action. The creditor cannot split up this single cause
of action into two separate complaints, one for payment of the debt
and another for the foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the
filing of the first complaint will bar the second complaint [Quioque
v. Bautista].
 (b) ONE VIOLATION-ONE CAUSE
Where a contract is to be performed periodically, as by
installments, each failure to pay an installment constitutes a cause
of action and can be subject of a separate suit as the installment
falls due, or can be included in the pending or supplemental
pleading.
Example: Maja borrowed money from Sarah in
theamount of P750,000. The amount, as per contract, is payable in
three equal annual installments or P250,000 each from 2019 to
2021. Maja did not pay in 2019. Sarah can sue Maja for such
breach. Subsequently, in 2020, Maja also did not pay so Sarah can
again sue Maja in 2020.
Can Sarah sue Maja for the whole amount in 2019?
No. Sarah cannot, in 2019, sue for an anticipated default
in 2020 or 2021. The action will be dismissed on the ground of
prematurity inasmuch as the obligations to pay in 2020 and 2021
are still not due and demandable.
(c) No application if there is repudiation or
stipulation
An acceleration clause is a stipulation stating that, on the
occasion of the debtor’s default, the whole sum remaining unpaid
automatically becomes due and payable [Luzon Development v.
Conquilla]. Based on the example, If there is an acceleration
clause, and Maja defaults in the payment of the installment due in
2019, Sarah should include in the suit the due and demandable
installments for year 2020 and 2021.
Repudiation
An unqualified and positive refusal to perform a contract,
though the performance thereof is not yet due, may, if the
renunciation goes to the whole contract, be treated as a complete
breach which will entitle the injured party to bring his action at
once [Blossom & Company v. Manila Gas].
If there is a denial of the existence of the debt, Maja is
repudiating the existence of the debt. Sarah should not wait
anymore for 2020 or 2021 to sue on these installments. She has the
right to expect that Maja will raise the same defense in 2020 or
2021.
d. All obligations which have matured at the time of
the suit must be integrated as one cause of action
in one complaint. Those not so included would be
barred.
Maja borrowed money from Sarah in the amount of
P750,000. The amount, as per contract, is payable in three equal
annual installments or P250,000 each from 2019 to 2021. Maja did
not pay in 2019. Sarah did not sue then. Maja did not also pay in
2020. Sarah can sue Maja in 2020 for the failure to pay for two
years. If Sarah sues only for the second installment in 2020, the
claim for 2019 is barred.
E. JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one
pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of
action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the
following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with
the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or
actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties
but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be
allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of
action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies
therein; and
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(d) Where the claims in all the causes action are principally
for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test
of jurisdiction. 
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of
causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more demands or
rights of action in one action; the statement of more than one cause
of action in one complaint. It is the union of two or more civil
causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a
separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition.
The rule on joinder of causes of action under this Section
requires that the joinder shall not include special civil actions
governed by special rules. Section 6 of Rule 2 explicitly provides
that misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for the dismissal
of the action [Roman Catholic v. Soriano].
1. Permissive in Nature
A party is generally not required to join in one suit
several distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of
action, where allowable, is PERMISSIVE and NOT
MANDATORY in the absence of a contrary statutory provision,
even though the causes of action arose from the same factual
setting and might under applicable joinder rules be joined.
Unlimited joinder is not allowed
While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate
claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in
the problem presented and a common question of law and fact
involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties.
Unlimited joinder is not authorized. Our rule on
permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting
it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of
parties and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented,
effectively disallows unlimited joinder.
2. Types of Joinder
There may be:
ALTERNATIVE JOINDER; or
CUMULATIVE JOINDER.
a. Alternative Joinder
Maja rode on the bus operated by Sarah. The bus collided
with the jeepney operated by Pia. Maja sustained minor injuries.
In this case, Maja has two possible causes of action: one
for culpa contractual (breach of contract of carriage) against Sarah
and one for culpa aquiliana (quasi-delict against Sarah and Pia
under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code). However, Maja is
not certain who among the drivers or operators were actually
negligent.
In this example, Maja may, in one complaint, sue both
Sarah and Pia and recover damages from either Sarah or Pia or
both. Take note that the plaintiff is seeking relief from whoever
was negligent. This may be related to Rule 3, Section 13, which
states that:
Section 13. Alternative defendants. — Where the
plaintiff is uncertain against who of several persons he is
entitled to relief, he may join any or all of them as defendants in
the alternative, although a right to relief against one may be
inconsistent with a right of relief against the other. (13a)
b. Cumulative Joinder
Maja’s son sues Nestor for compulsory recognition as
illegitimate child and support. There are two causes of action: one
for recognition AND one for support.
 Note that these causes of action are pursued
cumulatively. It can even be said that the pronouncement in the
action for recognition is a condition precedent to the grant of relief
in the action for support.
3. Requisites of Joinder
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the
option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules
allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned
upon the requisites in Section 5.
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall
comply with the rules on joinder of parties
Section 6 of Rule 3 provides:
Section 6. Permissive joinder of parties. — All
persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect
to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions
is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules,
join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint,
where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs
or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court
may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or
defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in
connection with any proceedings in which he may have no
interest.
It is well to remember that the joinder of causes of action
may involve the same parties or different parties. If the joinder
involves different parties, as in this case, there must be a question
of fact or of law common to both parties joined, arising out of the
same transaction or series of transaction [Sps. Perez v. Hermano].
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions
or actions governed by special rules
The reasons for this prohibition may be summed up as
follows:
 TO AVOID CONFUSION. Rules of procedure
for special civil actions and actions governed
by special rules are peculiar to the latter. The
same cannot be applied to an ordinary civil
action.
 TO AVOID JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES.
Actions governed by special rules are, more
often than not, cognizable by quasi-judicial
tribunals. There can be no joinder where one of
the issues to be tried pertains to a tribunal of
special jurisdiction.
Interpleader cannot be joined with declaratory relief.
They are both special civil actions [Belo Medical Group v. Santos].
In forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only
damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased
property. The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue
raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the
damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff
could have sustained as a mere possessor , or those caused by
the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the
damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct
relation to his loss of material possession.
An action for reimbursement or for recovery of damages
may not be properly joined with the action for ejectment. The
former is an ordinary civil action requiring a full-blown trial, while
an action for unlawful detainer is a special civil action which
requires a summary procedure. The joinder of the two actions is
Page 35 of 37
specifically enjoined by Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court
[Terana v. De Sagun].
Caballes v. Court of Appeals
Held: A petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be joined
with the special civil action for certiorari because the two remedies are
governed by a different set of rules. Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the Rules of
Court mandates that the joinder of causes of action shall not include special
actions or actions governed by special rules, thus proscribing the joinder of
a special proceeding with a special civil action.
Peyer v. Martinez
Held: By section 4 of Rule 3, supra, applications to pronounce
the husband an absentee and to place the management of the conjugal assets
in the hands of the wife may, in our opinion, be combined and adjudicated
in one and the same proceeding.
We therefore conclude that Robert C. Peyer was not an
indispensable or necessary party and that the court below properly
proceeded in trying and deciding the case without him being joined. It
likewise follows that the lower court did not err in disallowing his motion
to intervene. Allowance of a motion to intervene rests in the sound
discretion of the court where the proposed intervenor is not an
indispensable party. In the exercise of that discretion, the court "shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the
intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. (Sec. 3,
Rule113.) In the light of this provision and of the circumstances of the case,
and putting aside the fact that the judgment had become final when the
husband's1 motion to intervene was registered, the court did not abuse its
discretion. There was no possible injury to the husband's interest flowing
from his omission for which he could not obtain redress in other ways; nor
was there any valid objection to the proceeding which he could make. (The
nature of his objection and what he intended to do are not disclosed.) As
long as he stays away we can not see any substitute for the wife's
management which he could offer. Upon the principles set out in the
decisions hereinbefore quoted, nothing short of his physical presence in the
country or his ready availability personally to administer the conjugal
property should stop the wife from replacing him in the administration. It is
only upon these conditions that he can keep the management under the
Civil Code. Managing the conjugal property by remote control over the
opposition of his wife who has an equal share in the property would not do.
(See Davis vs. Davis, supra, and Webster vs. Isbell, supra.)
The husband's management of the conjugal estate is not a
natural right like his right to do as he pleases with his private affairs. It is a
mere privilege or preference given him by law on the assumption that he is
better able to handle the administration. It results that when his supposed
superiority over the woman in this regard; when indeed, as in this case, his
ability as manager totally disappears, the raison d' etre  of the privilege
vanishes, and it is only just and proper that his co-partner should take
control.
Upon the facts of this case, the petitioner should be content with
instituting, if he so desires, an independent action to liquidate the
partnership or contest the right of his wife to take over its management. Not
being a party to his wife's action he is not barred from pursuing this course.
If such procedure would, as he claims, entail delay, he can afford to wait
better than his wife and his child. After all, he himself has created the
emergency and is estopped from complaining against its consequences.
While, as a general proposition, multiplicity of suits is abhorrent, this is one
case which should operate as an exemption to the rule. The case demands
prompt and resolute action to cope with an existing emergency—to enable
the plaintiff to tide over her plight, to meet her and her child's necessities,
and to meet conjugal obligations long overdue. As Mr. Chief Justice
Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals, later Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, has said, "The law does not stand
upon punctilible if there is a starving wife at home."
Briz v. Briz
Held: The question whether a person in the position of the
present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to compel
recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in
the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be
answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying
the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular
case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action
to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks
additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so
peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule
should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other
cases. For instance, if the plaintiff had in this action impleaded all of the
persons who would be necessary parties defendant to an action to compel
acknowledgment, and had asked for relief of that character, it would have
been permissible for the court to make the judicial pronouncement
declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to be recognized as the natural child of
Maximo Briz, and at the same time to grant the additional relief sought in
this case against the present defendants; that is, a decree compelling them to
surrender to the plaintiff the parcel of land sued for and to pay her the
damages awarded in the appealed decision.
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly
formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our
prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine
must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to
compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally
acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the
inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil., 5; Tiamson
vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62); and the same person may intervene in
proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father,
or mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8 Phil, 135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil.,
249; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855). In neither of these situations has it
been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and
distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance
are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such
proceedings.
Board of Liquidators v. Banco Filipino
Held: Specifically, before causes of action and parties can be
joined in a complaint involving multiple parties, (1) the right to relief must
arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and (2) there must
be a question of law or fact common to all the parties.
In the instant case, Banco Filipino is seeking to join the BSP and
its MB as parties to the complaint. However, they have different legal
personalities from those of the defunct CB and its MB: firstly, because the
CB was abolished by R.A. 7653, and the BSP created in its stead; and
secondly, because the members of each MB are natural persons. These
factors make the BSP and its MB different from the CB and its MB. Since
there are multiple parties involved, the two requirements mentioned in the
previous paragraph must be present before the causes of action and parties
can be joined. Neither of the two requirements for the joinder of causes of
action and parties was met.
First, the reliefs for damages prayed for by respondent did not
arise from the same transaction or series of transactions. While the damages
prayed for in the first Amended/Supplemental Complaint arose from the
closure of Banco Filipino by the defunct CB and its MB, the damages
prayed for in the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint arose from the
alleged acts of oppression committed by the BSP and its MB against
respondent.
Second, there is no common question of fact or law between the
parties involved. The acts attributed by Banco Filipino to the BSP and its
MB pertain to events that transpired after this Court ordered the respondent
bank's reopening in 1994. These acts bear no relation to those alleged in the
original Complaint, which related to the propriety of the closure and
liquidation of respondent as a banking institution way back in 1985.
The only common factor in all these allegations is respondent
bank itself as the alleged aggrieved party. Since the BSP and its MB cannot
be joined as parties, then neither can the causes of action against them be
joined.
Salvador v. Patricia, Inc.
Held: The joinder of the action for injunction and the action to
quiet title is disallowed by the Rules of Court, the first being an ordinary
suit and the latter a special civil action under Rule 63. Under Section 5(b),
Rule 2, “the joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions
governed by special rules.”
Consequently, the RTC should have severed the causes of
action, either upon motion or motu proprio, and tried them separately,
Page 36 of 37
assuming it had jurisdiction over both. Such severance is pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same
parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the
Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes
of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court
and the venue lies therein
Under Rule 2, Section 5(c), the causes of action between
the same parties but pertaining to different jurisdictions can be
joined in the RTC because one of the causes of action falls within
the jurisdiction of the same.
There must be at least one cause of action the jurisdiction
of which falls within the RTC. If both are MTCs, there can be no
joinder. In the latter case, two separate actions must be filed. Take
note also that the causes of action of the same plaintiff must be
against the same defendant.
NOTE: The joinder shall not include special civil actions
or actions governed by special rules.
(d) Where the claims in all the causes action are
principally for recovery of money, the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction
This paragraph embodies the TOTALITY RULE as
exemplified by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 which states, among
others, that "where there are several claims or causes of action
between the same or different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes
of action arose out of the same or different transactions."
F. MISJOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION
Section 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. — Misjoinder of
causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined
cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the
court, be severed and proceeded with separately.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve
a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the
case. They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof.
Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of
action and parties involve an implied admission of the court's
jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon
the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order
the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded
with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or
the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said
misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of
misjoinder of parties) [Republic v. Herbierto].
It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only
applies if the court trying the case has jurisdiction over all of the
causes of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the
same. If the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a
misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined cause of action has
to be severed from the other causes of action, and if not so severed,
any adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the same
would be a nullity [Ada v. Baylon].
Ada v. Baylon
Held: Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The
action for partition could not be joined with the action for the rescission of
a donation inter vivos. An action for partition is a special civil action
governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is
an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure.
The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in
the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one
complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in
determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as well
as in the determination of the presence of requisite elements of each
particular cause of action.
Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for
dismissal. Indeed, the courts have th power, acting upon the motion of a
party to the case or sua sponte, to order the severance of the misjoined
cause of action to be proceeded with separately. However, if there is no
objection to the improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a
severance, then there exists no bar in th simultaneous adjudication of all the
erroneously joined causes of action.

Related Rules
Rule 3 Section 11 provides:

Section 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.

— Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for
dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order
of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at
any stage the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with
separately. 

Rule 31 also provides:

Section 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving

a common question of law or fact are pending before the court,
it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated,
and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as
may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. (1)
Section 2. Separate trials. — The court, in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a
separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-
party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of
claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or
issues.

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