Chavez vs.

Romulo (2004)

Summary Cases:

● Chavez vs Romulo 431 SCRA 534

Subject: Doctrine of hierarchy of courts may be set aside in cases involving national interest; Authority
of the PNP Chief to issues the Guidelines; Executive power of control; The right to bear arms is a mere
statutory privilege, not a constitutional right; No vested property right: a license authorizing a person to
enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right; Police power justifies impairment of
property rights; Guidelines cannot be considered as an ex post facto law because it is prospective in its
application

Facts:

In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP
stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She
directed the then PNP Chief Ebdane to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of
Residence (PTCFOR).

PNP Chief Ebdane thereafter issued the "Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of
Firearms Outside of Residence" (Guidelines)

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the implementation of the
assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition raising five
points: (1) whether Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines; (2) whether the citizens' right
to bear arms is a constitutional right; (3) whether the revocation of petitioner's PTCFOR pursuant to the
assailed Guidelines is a violation of his right to property; (4) whether the issuance of the assailed
Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power; and (5) whether the assailed Guidelines constitute an ex
post facto law

The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Held:

Doctrine of hierarchy of courts may be set aside in cases involving national interest

1. On the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that the doctrine is not an
iron-clad dictum. In several instances where this Court was confronted with cases of national interest
and of serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial
determination of the cases. The case at bar is of similar import as it involves the citizens' right to bear
arms.

Authority of the PNP Chief to issues the Guidelines

2. Relying on the principle of separation of powers, petitioner Chavez argues that only Congress can
withhold his right to bear arms. In revoking all existing PTCFOR, President Arroyo and PNP Chief
Ebdane transgressed the settled principle and arrogated upon themselves a power they do not possess.

3. The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the legislative body to delegate its
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licensing power to certain persons, municipal corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions,
commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors. Such licensing power includes the power to promulgate
necessary rules and regulations.

4. By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the Philippine National Police (PNP) absorbed the Philippine
Constabulary (PC). Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and,
therefore, assumed the latter's licensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of PNP's powers,
the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives in accordance with law.

5. Contrary to petitioner's contention, R.A. No. 8294 does not divest the Chief of the Constabulary (now
the PNP Chief) of his authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation of
P.D. No. 1866. For one, R.A. No. 8294 did not repeal entirely P.D. No. 1866. It merely provides for the
reduction of penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Thus, the provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting to
the Chief of the Constabulary the authority to issue rules and regulations regarding firearms remains
effective. Clearly, both P.D. No. 1866 and R.A. No. 6975 authorize the PNP Chief to issue the assailed
guidelines.

Executive power of control

6. Petitioner Chavez disputes President Arroyo's declaration of a nationwide gun ban, arguing that "she
has no authority to alter, modify, or amend the law on firearms through a mere speech."

7. First, it must be emphasized that President Arroyo's speech was just an expression of her policy and a
directive to her subordinate. It cannot, therefore, be argued that President Arroyo enacted a law through
a mere speech.

8. Second, at the apex of the entire executive officialdom is the President. Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution specifies his power as Chief Executive, thus: "The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." As
Chief Executive, President Arroyo holds the steering wheel that controls the course of her government.
She lays down policies in the execution of her plans and programs. Whatever policy she chooses, she
has her subordinates to implement them. In short, she has the power of control. Whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to her subordinate, she may act directly or merely direct the
performance of a duty. Thus, when President Arroyo directed respondent Ebdane to suspend the
issuance of PTCFOR, she was just directing a subordinate to perform an assigned duty. Such act is well
within the prerogative of her office.

The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right.

(a) American jurisdiction

9. It is erroneous to assume that the US Constitution grants upon the American people the right to bear
arms. In the landmark case of United States vs. Miller, the US Supreme Court interpreted the right to
bear arms under the Second Amendment as referring to the collective right of those comprising the
Militia - a body of citizens enrolled for military discipline. It does not pertain to the individual right of
citizen to bear arm.

10. In United States vs. Cruikshank, it was decreed: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms is
not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any way dependent upon that instrument." Likewise,
in People vs. Persce, the Court of Appeals said: "Neither is there any constitutional provision securing
the right to bear arms which prohibits legislation with reference to such weapons as are specifically
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before us for consideration. The provision in the Constitution of the United States that the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed is not designed to control legislation by the state."

(b) Philippine jurisdiction

11. With more reason, the right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under the 1987
Philippine Constitution. Our Constitution contains no provision similar to the Second Amendment.

12. Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the rule. The
right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is a mere statutory
creation. Being a mere statutory creation, the right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or
absolute right.

13. The first real firearm law is Act No. 1780 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 12, 1907.
It was passed to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use and transfer of firearms. Act No.
2711 then integrated the firearm laws. Thereafter, President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1866. It codified the
laws on illegal possession, manufacture, dealing in, acquisition of firearms, ammunitions or explosives
and imposed stiffer penalties for their violation. R.A. No. 8294 amended some of the provisions of P.D.
No. 1866 by reducing the imposable penalties.

No vested property right: a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a
property nor property right

14. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." Petitioner Chavez asserts that the revocation of his PTCFOR
pursuant to the assailed Guidelines deprived him of his "vested property right" without due process of
law and in violation of the equal protection of law.

15. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither
a property nor property right. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not
a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. (Oposa
vs. Factoran)

16. Petitioner, in arguing that his PTCFOR is a constitutionally protected property right, relied heavily on
Bell vs. Burson wherein the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "once a license is issued, continued
possession may become essential in the pursuit of livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus
involves state action that adjudicates important interest of the licensees." Petitioner's reliance on Bell is
misplaced. This case involves a driver's license, not a license to bear arms. The catena of American
jurisprudence involving license to bear arms is perfectly in accord with our ruling that a PTCFOR is
neither a property nor a property right.

17. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any
time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing
restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to
such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is
that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a
revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the
meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights.

Police power justifies impairment of property rights

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18. Assuming that the PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution, the same
cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of the State's police power. All
property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and
general welfare.

19. The test to determine the validity of a police measure, thus: (i) The interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power; and (ii) The
means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.

20. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and
order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by the New
People's Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of the community, President Arroyo deemed it
best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed
Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.

21. As to the reasonableness of the measure, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession
of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those
who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we
believe is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents
will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of
their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with
their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them.

Guidelines cannot be considered as an ex post facto law because it is prospective in its

application

22. In Mekin vs. Wolfe, an ex post facto law has been defined as one - (a) which makes an action done
before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed;
or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.

23. Ex post facto law prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. The assailed Guidelines cannot be
considered as an ex post facto law because it is prospective in its application. Contrary to petitioner's
argument, it would not result in the punishment of acts previously committed.

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