Principal-Agent Theory and the Centralization vs.

Decentralization paradigm
in Uganda. A Historical Perspective
Francis Patrick Omia*

Uganda Management Institute (UMI), Kampala

*Corresponding author email:omiafp@yahoo.com

“Decentralization demands more centralization and more sophisticated political skills at the
national level.” Rudolf Hommes (cited in Tendler, 1997).

Abstract

Any debate on local government is not complete without a discourse on the centralization versus
decentralization paradigm. In all local government knowledge, right from the orthodox theories
of decentralization to typology of decentralization, advantages and disadvantages of
decentralization, Oates decentralization theorem, to the decision space approach and the
functional approach to local governance, it has always been about the relationship between
centralization and decentralization—that is, central and local government. This relationship is
contractual as is in the Principal Agent Theory which examines the contractual relationship
between the Principal and the Agent at the different levels. This is the shared character between
the Principle-Agent theory and the centralization versus decentralization paradigm. This paper is
which seeks to illuminate and explain the dynamic relationships and interactions between the
local governments and national government in Uganda using the Principle Agent Theory is an
exploratory study based on documents review.

Key Words: Local Government, Centralization, Decentralization, Principal Agent Theory,

Uganda.

Background

Decentralization was considered in the early 1950s as one of a wide range of institutional reform
programs of government. The emphasis on decentralization is attributed to the economic and
political failings of the centralization model of the period between 1940s and 1970s which
emphasized state led development characterized by highly centralized, insulated and often
ineffective political systems that produced inferior government services and a citizenry that was
largely discouraged from playing an active role in their political system.
Many of the early governance reforms never got beyond the stage of creating local authorities
with democratic legitimacy, genuine decision making powers and self-governance. Later,
decentralization gained favor because it was seen as a means to; 1) improving allocative
efficiency by allowing the mix of services and expenditures to be shaped by local user
preferences, 2) improving technical efficiency through greater cost consciousness at the local
level, 3) enhancing service delivery innovation through experimentation and adaptation to local
conditions, 4) improving quality, transparency, accountability and legitimacy owing to user
oversight and participation in decision making, and 5) ensuring greater equity through
distribution of resources towards traditionally marginalized regions and groups (Bossert &
Beuvais, 2002). Bossuyt, Hauck & Keijzer (2007) note that the current wave of decentralization
is more qualitatively enhanced and broadened to encompass; 1) devolution of power to elected
local governments as a distinct set of state actors, 2) local governance (based on principles of
participation, transparency and accountability), 3) a new paradigm of local economic
development, 4) a rediscovery of the importance of territorial (regional) planning, and 5) the
overall modernization of the state. Implying that decentralization is a means to achieve end-
values such as democracy, accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness, equality
and equity amongst others as opposed to centralization which is considered as a means for
maximizing values chosen by one or a few powerful persons. Decentralization is therefore seen
as a remedy for ineffective and overly centralized government performance (cf. Hiskey, 2006).

However, this notion is challenged by Hirotsune (2011) who suggests that some countries such
as Japan have used the central government system effectively to promote modernization. This is
because public administration specialists in Japan appreciate the bureaucratic state as the most
effective system for modernization. The criticism of decentralization in developing countries is
that it sometimes creates many “local fiefdoms”—that is too much local autonomy thereby
threatening the authority of the central government.

Bossuyt, Hauck & Keijzer (Ibid) contend that decentralization may not be supported thus in a
way justifying centralization for the following reasons; 1) the governance conditions are such
that it will only create another layer of state inefficiency, 2) decentralization is too costly a
process (including a risk of fiscal indiscipline), so most countries (especially small ones) cannot
afford it, 3) decentralization should not take place before the necessary capacity exists at central
level, 4) decentralization will lead to a clash between different sources of power and
legitimacies, 5) there is not enough social capital at local level to promote effective engagement
in local affairs, and 6) decentralization has uncertain impact on poverty reduction.

Hence, decentralization requires an appropriate mix of relations between the center and local
authorities for desired outcomes to be achieved—that is, as Enemark (2006) espouses, “to solve
the tasks at the lowest possible level so as to combine responsibility for decision-making with
accountability for financial, social, and environmental consequences.” However this has not been
the practice in many decentralization reforms which are either flawed in design or in the amount
of resources, functions and power decentralized for effective service delivery. For example,
Uganda has over decentralized with an increase in the number of districts as functional
administrative units from 34 in 1990 to 112 to date. The Government of Uganda is constrained in
terms of resources to ensure viability of local governments and by 2013 the continued
partitioning of administrative units was halted by government (cf. Kyohairwe & Karyeija, 2012).

Uganda’s governance reforms and policies have over the years become a battle field between
those vouching for the centralization and decentralization tendencies. There are situations where
a certain degree of centralization has been used to control decentralization or decentralization
used to foster the interests of the central government. It’s important to note that in most such
situations it has been in the interest of the principal (central government) considering that the
decentralization process in Uganda is more of a supply driven process than demand driven, thus
more or less a unilateral decision of the central government. A case in point is the change in the
status of Kampala City Council to Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) in December 2010.
This can be seen as an attempt by the central government to control the local governance
situation and recentralize the administration of Kampala City. The Kampala Capital City Act,
2010 bestows powers to the Minister for Kampala to veto certain decisions of the Authority. An
Executive Director was appointed by the central government as the administrative head of
KCCA.

Local government can be referred to as institutions or structures which exercise authority or

carry out governmental functions at the local level (Miller, 2002). Local governments are: 1)
miniatures of central government 2) function administratively as arms of the higher levels of
government. For purposes of this discussion the centralization versus decentralization debate
takes place within the realm of local governance. Conyers (1983) argues that centralization is
frequently regarded as the antonym of decentralization, in the sense that it is the transfer of
powers or functions from sub-national levels of government to the national levels. While Bossert
& Beuvais (Ibid) assert that decentralization involves a variety of mechanisms to transfer fiscal,
administrative, ownership or political authority to alternate institutions. This transference of
power is best understood through the lens of the Principal-Agent theory because inherent in a
transference of power is a change in the responsibilities of the relevant Principals and Agents
(Hiskey, Ibid). Bossert & Beuvais (loc.cit) further highlight a four category typology which
classifies decentralization as deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatization.

Dafflon & Madies (2011) define the decentralization typology in the following manner; 1)
Deconcentration as consisting of giving power over certain decisions to agents that exercise their
functions in a given territorial district while remaining under the hierarchical authority of the
central government. 2) Delegation which is also called an agency relationship designates the
transfer of power and responsibility from the central government to often semi-autonomous
entities within a clearly defined field of responsibility in a frame work of “functional
decentralization”. These entities, with independent legal status and autonomous budgets, are
generally obliged to report to the central government or next level governments. 3) Devolution is
a form of decentralization where powers and responsibilities are transferred to public bodies
elected by their constituencies. Responsibilities and resources are transferred to local powers
(often local governments) that have considerable autonomy of decision as to how to use these
resources in their area(s) of responsibility and in a legally acknowledged administrative
jurisdiction. Devolution goes hand-in-hand with political decentralization when the local powers
must account for their decisions before elected assemblies, and 4) privatization is a form where
management of state enterprises and provision of certain public goods and services are
relinquished to the private sector. Privatization creates a contractual relationship between public
entities and private providers of service.

In each of these forms of decentralization significant authority and responsibility usually remains
at the center. In some cases this shift redefines the functional responsibilities so that the center
retains policy making and monitoring roles and the periphery gains operational responsibility for
day to day administration. In others, the relationship is redefined in terms of a contract so that the
center and periphery negotiate what is expected from each party in the contract (Bossert, 2005;
cf. Mills, 1994).

According to Oates (1972), the decision to centralized or decentralized is dependent on trade off
between public goods and services that can be offered by the center and those by the local
governments with each system seeking to maximize the aggregate surplus of their constituents.
He argues that where there is danger of spillovers of provided public goods to other jurisdictions
with heterogeneity of preferences, the centralized service delivery mechanisms are preferred to
curb the under provision of goods and services in these local jurisdictions. This is because
spillovers are shaped by considerations such as allocative and cost responsibility. It is therefore
assumed that the centralized system uses a uniform level of public spending/distribution of
resources for each district, a ‘one size fits all’ policy that does not reflect local needs.
Decentralization is preferred when the services offered by the local governments are definite and
meet the local needs and reflect preferences (cf. Besley& Coate, 2002).

Bossert & Beuvais (Ibid) argue that although the typologies are useful for identifying the
institutional location of the newly transferred power, they tells us little about the crucial aspect of
decentralization –namely the range of choice that is granted to the decision makers at the
decentralized levels. Thus, it does not account for variations and changes that occur over time in
the process of decentralization. Typologies view decentralization as one event that transfers
power at one time and in one quantity to the new institutional location and yet it is dynamic
involving power changes between the center and the periphery.

Decentralization refers to wide range of institutional arrangements and the process varies with
countries thereby making it difficult to define. Ebel & Yilmaz (2002) state that, “developing
countries have turned to decentralization as an escape from the traps of ineffective and inefficient
governance, macroeconomic instability, and inadequate economic growth.” It is also true that in
Africa, attempts at decentralization have grown from the desire to preserve national unity by
taking into account tribal and local peculiarities. Dafflon & Madies (Ibid) assert that
decentralization is the result of a more or less unilateral decision by the central government; they
spelt out two ways to look at decentralization as either a top-down or a bottom-up model. The
top-down model gives the central government’s preferences a “strategic” advantage. It is usually
implemented in unitary systems of government in which the central government always retains
ultimate control of arbitration powers. The top-down model of decentralization is characterized
by the following: 1) the objectives include; a) shift fiscal constraints to the local level (transfer of
costs rather than devolution of powers), b) increase national wellbeing (better match of supply to
demand) by maintaining the minimal standards of available decentralized public policies
(supervisory standards), c) increase allocative efficiency (better adapt the supply of public goods
to local preferences), d) ensure good “governance”. 2) It is assessed or evaluated against
objectives set by the center. 3) It manifests itself as deconcentration, delegation and devolution.
4) It is modelled according to; a) vertical relations between the center and the regions (center and
communes, or regions and communes) and the former dominates, b) the center’s preferences
dominate; the Principal (center) – Agent (the regions or communes) model , and c) information
gap favors the center.

The bottom-up decentralization model is prominent in federal local governments where they
have substantial autonomy and priority is given to local preferences. This model is characterized
by the following: 1) its objectives are to; a) increase local-level innovation potential, b) maintain
the diversity of local public goods (LPGs)/local financing (taxes or user charges) combinations
allowing one to “vote with one’s feet”, c) increase allocative efficiency (better adapt the supply
of public goods to local preferences), d) ensure good “governance”. 2) It is assessed or evaluated
by its ability to offer protection of local governments from the center and maximization of local
decisions. 3) It manifests itself as; local autonomy, subsidiarity, decentralized cooperation,
horizontal and vertical competition. 4) it is modelled according to; a) central/local conflict (if
society is heterogeneous, local decisions differ from those preferred by the center), b) local
autonomy dominates, c) subsidiarity , d) cooperation and competition, and e) local preferences
dominate.

Decentralization is not an alternative to centralization; both are needed and are complementary in
achieving national or local/sub-national objectives. Therefore, no system of government can be
completely centralized or decentralized. Centralization and decentralization can best be regarded
as processes or movement in opposite directions along a continuum which has no clearly
definable ends or, more accurately, a series of continuums representing the different criteria
which can be used to measure centralization and decentralization (Conyers, Ibid). Therefore, the
relationship between centralization and decentralization is rather complex because many changes
in the organization structure of government involve some elements of both that are sometimes
hard to classify.

Even within the decentralized there is centralization and where there is a Principal and an Agent,
there is always a center and a periphery. Kumar& Chowdhury (n.d) explains that the Principal-
Agent relationship in a centralized setting is when the Principal directly contracts with all Agents
and under decentralization the Principal contracts with few Agents, giving them rights to contract
with other Agents implying more decision making powers in a decentralized setting. Principal
Agent analysis in this study is derived from the Principal Agent theory and is built on the notion
that a contractual relationship exists between two parties; the Principal and Agent, the Principal
gives the Agent power and mandate to execute some tasks on behalf of the principal and
therefore should account to the principal. Moe (1984) defines the Principal-Agent model as, “an
analytic expression of the agency relationship, in which one party, the Principal, considers
entering into a contractual agreement with another, the Agent, in the expectation that the Agent
will subsequently choose actions that produce outcomes desired by the Principal” (cited in
Hodson, 2009). The Principal-Agent approach was developed to analyze how central decision
makers in firms (Principals) use incentives and rules to encourage other managers (Agents) to
achieve their objectives. While they may share some of the Principal’s objectives, these Agents
also have their own interests, such as increasing their own income or shirking.

The Principal-Agent model presents three important asymmetries; 1) Adverse selection where
the Agent has privileged information before the contract is signed and the Principal knows about
it but cannot evaluate the asymmetric information so a menu of contracts is offered to the Agent
so that the information advantage is revealed (cf. Macho-Standles, 2002). 2) Signaling is when
the Agent deliberately sends information to the principal regarding his type so that an appropriate
contract is offered to him. 3) Moral Hazard, where the Agent is in possession of privileged
information after the contract has been signed (action hidden) and the Agent (informed player)
takes action that affects both parties while the Principal(uninformed player) only observes the
output which is an imperfect signal of the action that is “hidden” (cf. Nóbrega, n.d.)
Principal-Agent approach provides a promising way to analyze how decentralization might
facilitate the achievement of broader governance objectives because it assumes that Agents are
likely to have other objectives and better information about local conditions than central
authorities (cf. Bossert, Ibid). Local authorities may make innovative or selfish decisions that are
different or modified from those stipulated. The performance of these localities can be assessed
on how much they diverge from the principal to make decisions within the narrow decision space
that is controlled and monitored by the central government through its oversight role in the
decentralized governance. The Principal-Agent analysis therefore looks at the relationship
between the center and periphery objectively and however it is important to envisage this
relationship as dynamic and evolving.

Principal-Agent theory has been criticized for its primary focus on the vertical relationship
between the Principal and the Agent, making it difficult to analyze multiple Principals, especially
if they are of different administrative levels. In the devolution type of decentralization, for
example there are usually more than two Principals that the Agent/local government officials are
accountable to: the local voting population, local politicians, national politicians, national
bureaucrats, central governments, regional and international governments and civil society
groups sometimes representing the interests of the donors and the central government. These
may all be having differing objectives and interests. Some analysts have taken this problem as a
crucial weakness in the Principal-Agent theory (cf. Hedge, Scicchitano & Metz. 1991). However,
according to Chubb (1985), the Principal-Agent theory can accommodate multiple Principals. He
concurs with Moe (1991) that much as multiple agent analysis focuses on vertical relationships
—that is-- the electorate (local population) who is, the Principal elects the national politicians
(the Agent) who in turn act as principals (for instance when exercising government oversight)
over the government bureaucracy (Agent) who in turn acts as Principal (when monitoring and
supervising) to the respective local governments (Agents) who are also agents of the voting
population (who demand for service delivery). Thus, the theory can still inform multiple
relationships. Hiskey (2010) sums it up that analyzing decentralization reforms from the
Principal-Agent perspective helps to explain the trade-offs between different actors and the
changes that decentralization may bring, given the new responsibilities of the actors involved ( in
Masanyiwa, Niehof & Termeer 2013). However, it’s important not to ignore the power of the
central government especially as regards the control and use of financial resources. Even when
the local Principal acquires the powers to appoint the Agents, the control of financial resources
by the central government can be used to distort any Principal-Agent relation. This can create an
asymmetric situation [“fiscal illusion”] where the citizens make wrong assumptions on the
financial situation in local governments to base their expectations.

Bossert (Op.cit) posits that the Principal-Agent analysis does have a specific blind spot when
used to analyze decentralization because it does not have an easy conceptual means of defining
the process were a range of choices are by law and regulation transferred from one authority (the
Principal) to another (the Agent). He further weighs in that Principal-Agent theory can be used to
analyze both centralized and decentralized systems. The Agents in a centralized bureaucracy are
subject to a Principal’s control through incentives, punishments and monitoring which may be
different from those in a decentralized system. He goes on to vouch for a system that would
make the Principal-Agent theory analyze the effects of decentralization with emphasis on
describing the shift in the range of control that the Principal can exercise over the Agent thereby
creating the “decision space map”.

The centralization versus decentralization paradigm of local government is complex because of

the different assessment criteria, and in this lays the crucial questions as to what powers are
transferred and to which local institutions. The answers to this question determine the extent to
which local institutions, as recipients of decentralized powers, can effectively plan and
implement development activities including service provision. The outcomes of decentralization,
therefore, depend on the type of public services involved, the institutional design, the
implementation, the capacity of institutions involved, and the wider economic, social and
political environment (Conyers, 1990; 2007) in Masanyiwa, Niehof & Termeer (2013).

Principal -Agent analysis and Local Governance

Hiskey (2006) acknowledges that the Principal-Agent analysis provides a framework to

effectively design, implement and evaluate decentralization reforms. He lists three critical
features that affect decentralization which the Principal-Agent analysis can interrogate, these are;
1) the local social-political environment that shapes motivations, abilities, “playing field” and
behaviors of Principals and Agents with a community, 2) Information flow that will affect
effective Agent selection, and 3) Effective and direct participation which will affect the
effectiveness of decision making by the Principals. Local governance through decentralization is
a means of changing Principal-Agent relationships through local democracy (citizens’ power to
select their Agents) and autonomy to local authorities by the central government in decision and
policy making. The Principal-Agent analysis places special attention on the duties and
responsibilities of citizens and legislators in a centralized and decentralized setting querying if
they can fulfill the duties required of them. At the center of the relationship between the
Principals and Agents is the issue of accountability and efficient service delivery.
Decentralization seeks to minimize agency loss and maximize benefits to the principal by
improving Agent performance through greater oversight. The Principal-Agent analysis helps to
provide an understanding that out of the asymmetries in the relationships between Agents and
Principals there is bound to be tensions and conflicts between Agent accountability and
independence, and the costs and benefits at different levels of Principal oversight and discretion.
This therefore informs policy of the potential trade-offs that should influence the designs of
governance programs in such a way that cons are minimized and pros maximized.

The Principal-Agent analysis further helps to deepen the understanding of the first and second
generation theory of decentralization (Oates decentralization theorem) and its explanation of the
dynamic situations that influences the functioning of decentralization. According to Qian &
Weingast (1997), the first generation theory treated government decision- makers (Principals) as
benevolent social planners, albeit often with limited information, thereby placing them in a state
of adverse selection. It emphasized two mechanisms where decentralization could bring benefits
and are in line with the Principal-Agent theory, these mechanisms categorized as; 1) local
governments were assumed to have better information on the preferences of their local
populations. Thus in the central-local relation where the center is the Principal, there is always
information asymmetry in favor of the local government who have more information about the
local needs therefore justifying the need for more autonomy in decision making at the local
levels (shift Principal status to the citizens). 2) With inter-jurisdictional mobility, people and
firms (Agents) can move to match their preferences to the array of public goods offered by local
governments. This is related to the signaling asymmetry where Agents seek to match their type
with the appropriate contract offered by the principal. The degree of externality across
jurisdiction determines which Principal (center or local government) can best offer the type of
public good, thus the central government responds to national “signals” by internalizing the
externalities so as to offer public services such as defense and security, infrastructure, education
amongst others while the local governments will offer services such cleaning, garbage collection,
street lighting, markets management amongst others.

The second generation theory treats governments, politicians and other actors as Agents pursuing
objectives that may be imperfectly aligned with the preferences of the local electorate
(Principals) who appoint them to office thereby portraying a situation of Moral Hazard. This also
concurs with the public choice theory where the incentives for the Agents are shaped by the
institutional structures under the bureaucratic control. Bardhan & Mookherjee (2005a) explain
that this scenario develops into a situation of a corrupt central government bureaucrat working at
the local level with informational advantage vis-à-vis his superiors, and the political capture of
local governments by the local elites. They further note that in the centralized and decentralized
systems the incentive problem occurs in different qualities attributed to the differing patterns of
accountability arising from different information and incentive systems. Along the
centralization–decentralization continuum, authority shifts away from unsupervised central
bureaucrats who seek to maximize bribe incomes towards elected officials of local governments
whose objective is to maximize the chances of staying in power. Consequently, economic
corruption is replaced by political corruption (in the form of diversion of services to local elites,
hence elite capture of local government [termed “monopolistic equilibrium”]. This leads to
agency loss, a situation attributed to the imperfect alignment and failed contractual obligations
between the Principal and Agent.

Governance and Centralization versus Decentralization Paradigm in Pre-Colonial and

Colonial Uganda

During the pre-colonial times, the governance of the kingdoms of Ankole, Buganda, Bunyoro
and Toro were centralized with chiefs of various hierarchies appointed by the kings as
governance agents. In other societies such as the Acholi, Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango and Teso,
chiefs or clan leaders exercised a range of administrative functions over their clans and reported
to the main chief who presided over other chiefs and clan leaders. This represented a more
decentralized system where the individual clan chiefs were more or else independent of the
Paramount Chief regarding decision making powers. However, the Paramount Chief was elected
by the other clan chiefs, representing a form of contractual relationship between the electorate
/council of elders or chiefs (principals) and the Paramount Chief (Agent). The Paramount Chief
provided accountability to the Principals (clan chiefs on behalf of their nationalities) in terms of
leadership such as the ability to mobilize for war and self defence, amongst others. Yet these
were the times when the Paramount Chief also became the Principal when leading to war and
sharing of the war bounty among the chiefs.

The Buganda Kingdom was structured in a hierarchical manner where decisions and information
that informed government management flowed from the top -- that is the king (Kabaka) as the
head who appointed the Prime Minister (Katikiro) who was in charge of the administrative and
judicial functions in the kingdom. The Katikiro and other ministers such as the treasurer formed
the council of advisors followed by a hierarchy of chiefs who would administrate at different
levels in the kingdom (Twaddle, 1974). In this way the King was able to rule over vast
jurisdictions and command the local communities through the chiefs to participate in community
and kingdom development activities. However, the king was the centre of power and his council
of advisors who acted as the Principals and appointed the chiefs (Agents) who were contracted to
collect taxes and dues on behalf of the king and mobilize labour for execution of projects at the
local and center levels. The asymmetries in the relationship between the king and his subordinate
chiefs were that of adverse selection nature. These chiefs were more accountable to the King
than the local populace and were rewarded for their allegiance by the King. The early systems of
administration were personal – based on loyalty to a particular individual such as a king or Chief,
as opposed to the normative that was based on the legal-rationale conceived in the modern
governance principles. This socio- political behaviour shaped the conduct of the Principal and
Agent in that the accountability of the Agent was to the King and not the governed population.
Even in modern Uganda, Basheka (2012) informs us that patronage employment in state
functions is a very common occurrence whereby people are employed on the basis of nepotism,
reliance on friends and relatives or paying bribes to be recruited. This implies that the Principal-
Agent relation is governed by other “invisible” informal on top of the formal contracts. This also
relates well to the theory of rational ignorance where the contract between the electorate
(Principals) and the politicians (Agents) is based on false assumptions thereby leading to a
situation of Moral Hazard where the Agent is incapacitated to deliver to the expectations of the
principals. Along the centralization-decentralization continuum, the pre-colonial kingdoms were
more centralized than decentralized in that the socio-political environment did not permit
democracy and selection of the Agents directly through elections. The Agents were selected by
the King and his council of advisors.

Uganda became a British Protectorate in 1894. By then, the British had noticed the level of
sophistication of the system of administration in Buganda based on the hierarchy of chiefs. With
the signing of the 1900 Uganda/Buganda agreement which placed Uganda under British rule, the
British decided to maintain this system of governance in Buganda under the principle of indirect
rule and introduced it in other areas of the country. It is worth noting that Buganda was the only
province at the time administered as a single unit (Lule, 1995). The British (Principals) were able
to govern Uganda through their Agents (kings and chiefs) using the indigenous institutions.
Thus, the Kings and chiefs (themselves Principals to the citizenry) became the Agents of the
colonial principal but under a centralized arrangement. Mamdani (1996) describes this
arrangement as a “separate but subordinate state structure for natives”. The African Native
Authority Ordinance of 1919 is seen as the first attempt by the colonial authorities to set up local
administrations. This ordinance spelt out the powers and duties of the African chief and the
enforcement of African authority. In a way, the ordinance laid out the contractual terms for the
Agent (Chiefs) who was answerable to the principal (District Commissioner--DC) acting as an
Agent of the Governor. The Governor wielded executive and legislative powers and was the
country’s administrative head. It is notable that the duties of the chiefs included collecting taxes,
presiding over native courts, maintenance of law and order, and enforcing laws. The introduction
of the monetary tax created a Moral Hazard in that the chiefs (Agents) started “rent seeking”
whereby they used their offices for private gain. Mulinge & Lesetedi (1998) correctly argue the
introduction of a monetary tax -- the hut and later poll tax-- was a very significant way by which
colonial governments fostered the growth of corruption. The DC had responsibility over a
hierarchy of appointed chiefs at village, parish, sub-county and county levels. These appointed
chiefs were directly accountable to the central authorities in a deconcentration type of
decentralized setting. Councils consisting of the appointed chiefs were created in the 1930s at
each level. The enactment of the Local Government Ordinance in 1949 established the district as
another local government tier and as the basis for a separate district administration. However in
the 1950s, elections to these councils were introduced and the councils were mandated with
district administration powers. This time the Principals (electorate) could appoint the Agents.
This brings to question the issue of accountability and contractual relationship to deliver that is
so crucial to the Principal-Agent relationship. In numerous situations the ownership or control of
resources and power seems to shift the balance of forces in the Principal-Agent relationship to a
third party in the contract or other Principal (Central government). As has already witnessed in
the numerous recentralization ventures of the Government of Uganda today, the colonial central
government retained the power to control most district council decisions. Chiefs were salaried
local government officials but responsible to the central government through the DC for the
proper administration of their areas (cf. African Local Governments Ordinance and District
Council Proclamations and Regulations, 1949; Karugire, 1980; Kyohairwe & Karyeija, op.cit.;
Tumushabe, et.al.2010).

Governance and Centralization versus Decentralization Paradigm in Independent Uganda

(1962 –2014)

At independence Uganda consisted of ten districts, four kingdoms, and one special district
(Karamoja). The 1962 independence constitution granted a substantial degree of autonomy to
federal and semi-federal kingdoms. Thus this form of decentralized governance allowed the
kingdom governments and district councils considerable authority to set their priorities and
execute decisions. The socio-political situation therefore permitted the electorate (Principals 1) to
select the councils (Agents 1 and Principal 2) who had contractual obligations to the citizens to
provide services and public goods used their knowledge of local preferences and needs to
account for set priorities and executed them by supervision of the local government bureaucrats
(Agents 2) in order to achieve the desired outcomes.

With this autonomy, the local governments were able to raise revenue through taxes, draw up
and implement budgets and provide services. Therefore, the central government was unable to
effectively use the power and resource leverage to maintain its grip on the local governments.
This and the fact that the local governments in Uganda were demarcated on the basis of
ethnicity, left the central government threaten by the possibility of secession. There was also the
temptation to adopt the centralized administered one-party socialist state that was fashionable
across independent African countries during this period. This possibility reared its ugly head in
1966 when the Buganda government asked the then Executive Prime Minister Milton Obote to
remove his central government from her soils. Hence, a situation of Moral Hazard occurred
where the Agent (Buganda government) was pursuing its own objectives contrary to the
contractual obligations with the central government. These events culminated into the 1966 crisis
which led to the replacement of the 1962 pro-decentralize constitution with the 1967 pro-
centralize constitution marking the point of departure from federalism (decentralization) to
republicanism (centralization) in Uganda. The 1967 Constitution abolished kingdoms and
increased the number of districts from 11 in 1962 to 18.

The 1967 Constitution made the local government a mere extension of the central government
and the Local Administrative Act (1967) changed the term local government to local
administration. The 1967 Constitution also gave the parliament the power to establish district
councils and their offices, decide whether some or all of their members would be elected or
nominated, and empowered a minister to suspend a district council or undertake any of its duties.
This rendered the citizens powerless with reduced autonomy because the district councils had to
account to the central government (now the Principal). This shifted the contractual obligation
between the parties in local governance from the citizens (formerly Principals) to the central
government (current Principals) and local governments (Agents). This is in contrast with the
1962 constitution that required nine out of ten district council members to be directly elected. In
an effort to strengthen this central government control, the 1967 Local Administrations Act and
the 1964 Urban Authorities Act created a uniform set of regulations that gave the central
government direct control over local administration in each district. When district heads (DC)
were appointed, the locals felt powerless in taking decisions, and permission had to be sought
before any project could be undertaken in any locality. Mamdani (1995) asserts, that the central
government which was represented by “the chief”/DC who singularly held all powers that is--
executive, legislative, judiciary and administrative. District councils were limited to specified
areas of responsibility—particularly primary education, road construction, land allocation,
community development, law and order, and local tax collection. With such an arrangement in
place, one can conclude that local governance--as designed by the 1967 Constitution--did not
promote citizen’s empowerment, devolution and accountability. This situation created a huge
problem of agency loss with Agents maximizing their benefits at the expense of the population
given that there were undemocratic tendencies and marginalization of certain groups of the
populace thereby creating instability. This problem was further compounded by the
Nationalization policy with its accompanying 1968 Act giving the government monopoly over
the supply, processing and transportation of produce thus creating a situation where the “the
rulers became the ‘spring of wealth’, the benefactors from whom material benefits and prestige
flowed” (Kasozi,1996),also (cf.Kyohairwe & Karyeija, op.cit; Tumushabe, et.al. Ibid).

In 1971, Idd Amin came to power in Uganda through a military coup. The Military regime
suspended the constitution, abolished parliament, dissolved district councils and proceeded to
rule by decree. In 1974, President Amin increased the number of districts to 38 and grouped
them into 10 provinces. The provincial governors were military men who were accountable to
the country’s military rulers. These provinces, which lasted up to 1979, worked as additional
administrative tiers to the existing local council set-up and were basically decreed to ease the
supervision of district operations (Kyohairwe & Karyeija, et passim; cf. Mutibwa, 2009). During
Amin’s regime, many of the well educated people were either killed or went into exile out of
fear. The few who remained could not research and write critically about governance issues,
thereby hindering a comprehensive analysis of local governance at the time. As such, the socio-
political environment at the time, the issue of effective agent selection, the minimum level of
participation of the citizens in decision making coupled by lack of insider publications on
governance operations constrain the Principal-Agent analysis of this period.

In 1979, the Uganda National Liberation Front transition government reduced the number of
districts to 33 and introduced a local administrative system of “mayumba kumi” (ten house cells).
This was an adaptation of the Tanzanian system at the village level to mobilize communities,
handle security matters, and distribute essential commodities such as salt, soap, and sugar.
Following the election of the Uganda Peoples’ Congress into government in 1980, local
governments were reorganized in accordance with the 1967 constitution and the 1967 Local
Administration Act. By 1981, District councils were revived and their members nominated by
the central government. Chiefs and local officials continued to be appointed on the basis of the
1967 act until 1986.

During the civil war (1981- 1986), the National Resistance Movement (NRM) introduced a
system of administration in areas of Uganda under their control. The Resistance Councils (RC)
system were a semblance of the ancient administrative structure found in Buganda, complete
with councils that were abolished in 1966. On his ascension to power in 1986, Yoweri Museveni
formalized the channels of NRM administration in order to promote local participation and
established a unique ‘no-party-system’ (Azfar et al. 2007; Francis and James, 2003). The
government commissioned an inquiry into local governments and in 1987, enacted the
Resistance Councils and Committees Statute (RC Statute), which repealed Part 1 of the Local
Administration Act of 1967 and the Urban Authorities Act of 1964. The statute introduced the
RC system, in effect transferring authority to plan, make decisions, administer local justice and
provide services to the communities.

Along the centralization-decentralization continuum, the country was tending towards a

decentralized system of governance thereby setting appropriate socio-political conditions to
allow for interaction of the Principal and Agent. Uganda’s desire for decentralized governance
structure and participatory local democracy emanated from its tumultuous past of civil war and
brutal dictatorship under Idi Amin (1971-1979) and Obote II (1981-1986). During the period
after 1986, effective decentralization did not take place immediately as the DC was replaced by
the District Administrator (DA) who was a presidential appointee to act as the district political
head. Another position of the District Executive Secretary (DES) was created as the district
accounting officer responsible for supervision of government departments, implementation of
policy and bridging district and central government administration. These officials were Agents
of the central government handling its functions and controlled financial and human resources at
District RC levels while the councillors were vested with policy making and watchdog functions.

Almost all powers were centralized until 1993 when parliament enacted the Local Governments
(Resistance Councils) statute which provided a legal framework for the transfer of political,
administrative and fiscal powers to local government. However, it was until the the promulgation
of the Constitution in 1995 and the enactment of the Local Government Act in 1997 that the
decentralization policy became fully operational. The decentralization principles enshrined in the
1995 Constitution envisions a fairly autonomous local government system with wide ranging
political, legislative and administrative powers and responsibilities. The system of regular
elections is intended to give citizens and the electorate control over their leaders hence creating a
system of demand and accountability with regard to governance and service delivery. In theory,
local councils have powers to make local development plans based on locally determined
priorities, raise revenue, approve and implement own budgets and appoint statutory organs such
as district tender boards, district service commissions or local accountability committees. Thus
the 1995 constitution creates the right socio-political atmosphere which makes the citizen the
Principal with powers to select the Agent, ensure access to information and accountability of the
Agent.

This represents an ideal situation as regards the Principal-Agent theory --where there is
minimum agency loss. It should be realized that the ideal standards set by the 1995 constitution
may not be seen in practice. The central government still controls the fiscal resources, many of
the districts are not economically viable, nepotistic and tribal tendencies override the selection of
Agents—a process which is supposed to be on merit, corruption, global trends and the role of
Civil service/private sector, and threat of opposition capture amongst others are some of the
situations that cause asymmetries in Uganda’s local governance. This has caused the central
government to recentralize some of the local governance functions such as the Kampala City
Council now an agency; Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) and the office of the Chief
Administrative Officers (CAO). The control of resource and protection of the central government
interests marks the convergence point where the Principal-Agent theory explains why there will
always be asymmetries in the relationships between the various Principals and Agents and why
governance will always oscillate along the centralization- decentralization continuum.

Kyohairwe & Karyeija, (op.cit) evaluate that for an entire decade after the promulgation of the
1995 Constitution and enactment of the Local Government Act 1997, Uganda underwent
tremendous development in the actual local governance practice. With the adoption of the New
Public Management (NPM) in the early 1990s, strong local governments were seen as effective
instruments of service delivery and local autonomy. Tumushabe et.al. (op.cit) trace the quality of
public service delivery almost two decades later as less than desirable, district local governments
with no financial resources of their own have become mere agents of the center while
accountability mechanisms for good governance and public service delivery are either non-
existent or malfunctional. The fiscal decentralization strategy has been abandoned in favor of a
complex system of conditional grants. Local government councils have inevitably evolved into
the frontline of patronage politics where local political leaders pay more allegiance to national
politicians rather than their electorate who continue to suffer from a breakdown in the public
service delivery system. This explains the asymmetries that come to the fore in the Principal-
Agent relation when the contractual obligations are not fulfilled. The government was not
prepared for full decentralization and retained some of the powers and responsibilities thereby
causing design and implementation problems. This situation has created two competing power
centers (citizens and central government) both with powers to select the Agents but one (the
government) with power over resources thereby able to pay the Agents. The citizens preferring
decentralization where there is supposed to be accountability, services provided according to
preferences are losing out to the central government’s preference for central control which leads
to greater agency loss due to information asymmetries, Agent preferences, less supervision and
accountability. Mikelsons (2007) helps us to understand that the Principal-Agent theory used to
explain the success of decentralization holds a promise for better (accountable, transparent)
delivery of public services. However, whether decentralization actually improves service
delivery depends on the institutional arrangements governing its implementation.
Decentralization must be accompanied by corresponding measures to increase accountability and
transparency of local governments before full benefits can be realized.

It is pertinent to state that the central government has usurped the role and position of the citizen
as the Principal. In response to the glaring deficiencies in public service delivery, the government
has instituted top-down monitoring program through the ministries, parliament, statutory bodies,
local accounting committees, civil society and the barazas task forces which report to the central
government. The whole process of decentralization in Uganda can be considered as supply
driven (top-down) therefore negating certain “demand driven” crucial ingredients that would
make decentralization a success such as federalism. (During the constitutional review process,
the majority of Ugandans were in favour of federalism). This might explain the indifference of
the citizens to decentralization, but it should be noted that the government -- for historical
reasons -- feared a repeat of the 1960s secessionist tendencies. At the end of the day, local
governments are considered mere instruments of the central governments since they lack real
decision making power, autonomy and resources. Even economically viable districts such as
Bushenyi have been fragmented into smaller units allowing central government more control.
The tenets of effective local governments and decentralization against which evaluation can be
done are as follows; 1) local governments need to have the authority to respond to local demand
with adequate mechanisms for accountability, 2) The devolution of functions needs to be granted
to the lowest level of government (closest to citizens) in order to increase allocative efficiency.
3) Citizens should have available means of participation and expression of their preferences to
government at all levels, but especially to local government. 4) Citizens need to have information
about government and its activities (Mikelsons, Ibid). Adopting these tenets implies a shift from
the centralized to decentralize paradigm or government system. This would guarantee the
citizens positions as the Principals to whom the central and local governments are accountable
to.

Conclusion
This is an attempt to explain Uganda’s governance systems especially the relationship between
the central and local governments and the competition between the central and local government
over the control of power and influence using the Principal-Agent analysis. From this, one can
learn that where governance systems are adopted without incorporating compromises into the
contractual obligations between citizens and government. There is bound to be Agency loss
attributed to the Agents at all levels committing Moral Hazards in pursuit of their interests at the
expense of the agreed positions. The Principal-Agent analysis can ably be used to explain and
understand the trends in Uganda’s governance situation. It has been criticized by the decision
space choice approach that it cannot be used to show how much leverage the Agent deserves or
can use in execution of the principal’s interest—that is--the range of choice allowed along a
series of functional dimensions in the decentralization process. This could be attributed to its
contractual nature and the fact that any deviation would be interpreted as an asymmetry and not
an innovation. Nonetheless, the Principal-Agent analysis is compatible with other methods of
analysis in the sense that other methods can be used together with it.
References

Adedeji, A. (1992). “Institutional Dimensions in the Policy Process” in Mutahaba, G, and

Balogum, M.J (Eds) Enhancing Policy Management Capacity in Africa, West Hartford:
CT: Kumarian Press

Aghón, G., & Krause-Junk, G. (2013). Fiscal Decentralization: Conceptual Framework

http://www.asip.org.ar/en/revistas/36/aghon_krause-junk/aghon_krause-junk_02.php

Antlov, H., & Sumarto, H. Sj. (2004). Innovation, participation with Good Governance, Jakarta:
Yayasan Obor,

Antlov, H. (2002). The Making of Democratic Local Governance in Indonesia, International

Workshop on Participatory Planning. Approaches for Local Governance, 20- 27 Bandung,
Indonesia.

Ayee,J. R.A. (2008). Reforming the African Public Sector: Retrospect and Prospects Council for
the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, Senegal, CODESRIA Green Book.

Azfor O, Livingston,J & Meagher,P. (2007). “Decentralization in Uganda.” In P. Bardhan and

D. Mukherjee (Eds), Decentralization and local Governance in Developing countries: A
comparative perspective. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Bardhan,P.,& Mookherjee,D.(2005a). “Decentralization, Corruption and Government

Accountability: An Overview” in Rose-Ackerman,s., & Elgar, E.(Eds). “Handbook of Economic
Corruption”

Bardhan, P.,& Mookherjee,D. (2005b). “Decentralizing Antipoverty Program Delivery in

Developing Countries.” Journal of Public Economics 89, pps. 675-704

Barron,D.J.(2001). A Localist Critique of the New Federalism. An Essay in response to papers

presented at the Constitution in Exile conference hosted by the Program in Public Law at Duke
University School of Law on October 5–7, 2000

Basheka B.C. (2012). The Paradigms of Public Administration Re-Examined: a Reflection:

Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 47 Number 1, South African Association of Public
Administration and Management,

Besley,T.,& Coate,S.(2002). Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a

political economy approach. Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 2611– 2637 April.
Bjørn Olsen, H. (2007).Decentralization and Local Governance module 1: Definitions and
Concepts, Concept Paper on Decentralization and Local Governance.

Bossuyt, J., Hauck,V., & Keijzer,N. (2007). Supporting Decentralization and Local Governance
in Third Countries. Tools and Methods series. Reference Document 2. European Centre for
Development Policy Management (www.ecdpm.org)- European Commission Luxemburg:
European Communities

Bossert, T.J. (2005). Decentralization of Health Systems: Decision Space, Innovation and
Performance.

Bossert, T.J., & Beauvais, J.C. (2002). Decentralization of Health Systems in Ghana, Zambia,
Uganda and the Philippines: a Comparative analysis of decision space. Health Policy and
Planning: 17 (1): 14-31.Oxford University Press

Chai, Yew-Ming. (1995): “The Interaction Effect of Information Asymmetry and

Decentralization on Managers’ Job Satisfaction: A Research Note.” Human Relations.
Vol 48, No. 6.

Cheema, S. G., & Rondinelli , D. A., (eds). (2007). Decentralizing Governance, Emerging
Concepts and practices. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institutional press.

Chubb, J. E. (1985): “The Political Economy of Federalism,” American Political

Science Review Vol. 79, pp. 994-1015.

Cooke B. (2001). From Colonial Administration to Development Management, IDPM

Discussion Paper Series, Working Paper No. 63, Institute for Development Policy and
Management. University of Manchester Precinct Centre.

Conyers, D. (1983). Decentralization for development: a select annotated bibliography. London:

Commonwealth Secretariat.

Dafflon,B.,& Madies,T.(2011). Decentralization: A Few Principles from the Theory of Fiscal

Federalism. Agence Française de Développement, Paris Notes and Documents No. 42
Davenport, C. (2007).State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace. NY: Cambridge
University Press

Deininger K, Mpuga P. (2005). Does greater accountability improve the quality of Public service
delivery? Evidence from Uganda. World Development 33(1): 171-191

Devas, N. (2005). The Challenges of Decentralization. Global Forum on Fighting Corruption:

Brasília
Diamond, L. (1997). Is The Third Wave of Democratization over? An Empirical Assessment,
Working Paper #236 – March https://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/236.pdf

Enemark, S. (2006). Land Management and Means of Planning Control: Centralized versus
decentralized, and planning led versus market led approaches - A global European overview and
the case of Denmark. Land Administration between Regulation and Freedom, 38th National
Congress of Licensed Surveyors. Sanit-Malo, 14-16 June.

Esman. M.J. (1988). “The Maturing of Development Administration”, Public Administration

and Development, Vol 8, No. 2.

Fisman,R., & Gatti, R.(1999). Decentralization and Corruption: Cross-Country and Cross-State
Evidence•

Francis, P. & James. R. (2003). Balancing Rural poverty reduction and citizens’ participation:
the contradictions of Uganda’s Decentralization program. World Development. 31(2), 325-337.

Golooba-Mutebi F. (1999). Decentralization, democracy and development administration in

Uganda: limits to popular participation. London School of
Economics: London

The African Local governments Ordinance and District Council Proclamations and Regulations.
(1949), Entebbe Archives.

Hedge, D. M., Scicchitano M. J., & Metz, P. (1991): “The Principal-Agent Model and
Regulatory Federalism,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 44,
no. 4, December, pp. 1055-1080.

Hiskey,J.T.(2006). Principals, Agents and Decentralized Democratic Development. A conceptual

framework for Democratic local governance. United States Agency for International
Development Contract No. DFD-I-00-05-00129-00, Order No. 02

Hirotsune.K. (2011). Ideal and Reality of Local Governance Limits of Good Governance in
Decentralization and Local Autonomy in Hirotsune,K.,Suharko, Javier,A.B and Tangsupvattan,
A (Eds) Limits of Good Governance in Developing Countries.Yogyakarta: Gadjah mada
University press

Hodson,D.(2009). Reforming EU economic governance: A view from (and on) the principal-
agent approach. 2009 Palgrave Macmillan 1472-4790 Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 4,
455–475 www.palgrave-journals.com/cep/
Hurley, J. et al. (1995): “Geographically-Decentralized Planning and Management in Health
Care: Some Informational Issues and Their Implications for Efficiency,” Social Science and
Medicine. Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 3-11.

Hutchcroft, P. D. (2001). Centralization and Decentralization in Administration and Politics:

Assessing Territorial Dimensions of Authority and Power. Governance, 14(1).

Ichimura, S.,& Bahl, R. (eds.).(2009). Decentralization Policies in Asian Development, World

Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Inyang, B. J. (2008). The Challenges of Evolving and Developing Management Indigenous

Theories and Practices in Africa, International Journal of Business and Management, Vol 3.
No.12,.www.ccsenet.org/journal.html

Kakai, L. (2013). Good Governance versus Good Government in Local Government in Hungary.
ISSN 1392-3110Socialiniai tyrimai / Social Research. Nr. 1 (30), 5–15

Karugire, S. R. (1980). A Political History of Uganda, Nairobi, London: Heinemann Educational

Books

Kasozi, A.B.K. (1996). Governance and Social Reconstruction in war torn societies in Africa
Decentralization and Social reconciliation in Uganda since 1986: A study of Four District, The
United Nations Development Programme, Kampala Office.

Kiggundu, M.N. (1991). The challenge of management development in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Journal of Management Development, 10(6):32-47.

Kritika, S., Sohili, P.,& Pooja, R. G. (2010). Decentralization in Uganda. National Council of
Applied Economic Research. Kampala, Uganda.

Kumar,D.,& Chowdhury,P.R.(nd) Centralization vs. Delegation: A Principal-Agent Analysis

(Preliminary Draft)

Kyohairwe,S.B.,& Karyeija,G.(2012).Reinventing Local Governance In Uganda: Current

Governance Perspectives and Future Trends.

Lugard, F. (1965). The Dual Mandate of the British in Tropical Africa, London: Thomas Nelson,
fifth edition

Lule, G. S. (1995). The Role of traditional Rulers in the 21st Century. The paper presented at
Sheraton hotel Kampala, 28 July 1995. Federo for all Uganda

Mamdani, M. (1995). And fire does not always beget ash: Critical reflections on the NRM.
Kampala: Monitor Publications.
Maphunye, Kealeboga. J. (2009). Public Administration for a Democratic Developmental State
in Africa: Prospects and Possibilities, Research report 114, Centre for Policy Studies
Johannesburg

Masanyiwa,Z.S., Niehof, A., & Termeer, C.J.A.M. (2013). Institutional arrangements for
decentralized water and health services delivery in rural Tanzania: differences and constraints.
Basic Research Journal of Social and Political Sciences Vol. 1(4) pp. 77-88 December
.Available online http//www.basicresearchjournals.org

Mikelsons,M. (2007). A Decentralization Paradigm and the Legacy of USAID’s Local

Government Reform Project in Croatia. HRVATSKA JAVNA UPRAVA, god. 7. br. 3., str. 595–
604
Miller, K.L. (2002). Advantages and Disadvantages of Local Government Decentralization; A
Presentation to the Caribbean Conference on Local Government and Decentralization at the
Ocean View International Hotel Georgetown, Guyana.

Mills, A. (1994): “Decentralization and Accountability in the Health Sector from an

International Perspective: What are the Choices?” Public Administration and Development, Vol.
14, pp. 281-292.
Moe, T. M. (1991) “Politics and the Theory of Organization,” Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization. pp. 106-129.

Moncrieffe, J. (2004). Uganda’s Political Economy: a Synthesis of Major Thought, Report

prepared for DFID Uganda. Overseas Development Institute. London. http://www.gsdrc.org/do

Mookherjee, D. (2005). Decentralization, Hierarchies and Incentives: A Mechanism Design

Perspective

Mulinge, M. M., & Lesetedi, G. N. (1998). Interrogating Our Past: Colonialism and Corruption
in Sub-Saharan Africa, African journal of Political Science (1998), Vol. 3 No. 2, 15-28

Nóbrega,M.(nd). Fiscal Decentralization and the Control of Public Expenditure: Improvement in

the Performance of governmental programs by Principal-Agent Model: The Bolsa Familia Case.

Oates, W.E. (2005). Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism, International

Tax and Public Finance, 12, 349–373, 2005

Prud'homme,R.(1995).The Dangers of Decentralization. The World Bank Research Observer,

vol. 10, no. 2 (August 1995), pp. 201-20. The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development/THE WORLD BANK
Qian, Y., & Weingast,B.R.( 1997) “Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market
Incentives.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(4) pps. 83-92.

Ruta,M.(2006).Lobbying for Decentralization. Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European

University Institute, Villa La Fonte,

Sasaki, N. (1984). Atarashii Chiho Seihu (The New Local Government). Ashi Shobo.

Schafer, A. (n.d). Citizen Participation, Department of Philosophy. The University of Manitoba.

http://www.umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/departments/philosophy/ethics/media/Expressive

Schumpeter, J. (1947). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, (2nd ed). New York: Harper.

Severinov,S.(2003). Optimal Organization: Centralization, Decentralization or Delegation?

Sjamsuddin,S., & Noor, I. (2012). Decentralization: a Question for Developing Countries. Public
policy and Administration, T. 11, Nr. 1 / 2012, Vol. 11, No 1, p. 9–22

Smith, B.C. (1998). Local Government and the Transition to Democracy: A review article.
Public Administration and Development, No. 18.

Tendler, J. (1997). Good Government in the Tropics. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins
University Press.

The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995.

Tommasi, M., & Weinschelbaum,F.(1999). “A Principal-Agent Building Block for the Study of
Decentralization and Integration” Departmento de Economia, Documento de Trabajo. D.T.: N°
20. Noviembre. Buenos Aires,

Tumushabe, G., et.al. (2010). Monitoring and Assessing the Performance of Local Government
Councils in Uganda: Background, Methodology and Score Card. ACODE Policy Research
Series, No. 31. Kampala.

Twaddle, M. (1974). On Ganda Historiography. History in Africa, Vol 1. PP.85-100

UNDP. (2003). “Citizens, Businesses, and Governments: Dialogue and Partnerships for
Development and Democracy”, Report of the Fourth Global Forum on Reinventing Government.
NewYork.

UNDP. (1999).Decentralization: A Sampling of Definitions, Joint UNDP-Government of

Germany Evaluation Working Paper of the UNDP Role in Decentralization and Local
Governance October 1999