Reyes, Charlyn D.

October 24, 2021

JD-2A LTD-Case Digests
Indefeasibility of title
Caraan v. CA, G.R. No. 140752. Nov. 11, 2005
Facts:
Respondents Spouses Salcedo R. Cosme and Nora Linda S. Cosme filed a complaint with
damages against petitioner Dionisio Caraan before the RTC. Spouses are registered owners
of the real property located in Quezon City. They discovered that the land was being occupied
by Caraan who had built his residential house. Such occupancy by Caraan was effected
through fraud, strategy and stealth without the spouses’ knowledge and consent. Caraan
alleged that he had acquired the land in question through extraordinary prescription of thirty
years of continuous, public, open and uninterrupted possession. From this, he also contends
that he has a better right since respondents’ TCT was derived from OCT that was declared
null and void by the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of Caraan is correct?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court cited from Eduarte vs. Court of Appeals, which reiterated the hornbook
principle that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein.
It should be borne in mind, however, that Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1529, provides
that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified,
or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
In the present case, the attack on the title is merely collateral as the relief being sought by
private respondents in their action was recovery of possession. The attack on the validity of
private respondents’ certificate of title was merely raised as a defense in petitioners’ Answer
filed with the trial court. Such defense is prohibited under PD 1529. The defense of
prescription of Caraan cannot stand against the Certificate of Title of Spouses Cosme
because under section 47, PD 1529, no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
De Guzman v. Agbagala, G.R. No. 163566. Feb. 19, 2008
Facts:
Spouses Elias P. Javier and Maria Sison died which survived by their six children, namely
namely: Conrado Javier, respondent Praxides Javier Agbagala, Nicasio Javier, Carmen
Javier, Encarnacion Javier Ongnoy and Juana Javier. Carmen Javier inherited five parcel of
lands but died and survived by her siblings; Juana, Encarnacion, Praxides, and Nicasio.
According to Praxides and her daughter, Milagros Agbagala Gutierrez, Rosing Cruz, sister-in-
law of Juana’s daughter went to borrow P30,000 to Milagros and offered as collateral the
deed of donation signed by Carmen in favor of Madelene, daughter of Juana. Praxides prayed
that the deed of donation be nullified because it was spurious. The signature of Carmen was
verified by NBI to be forged. RTC declared the donation null and void, which affirmed by the
CA. Petitioners argued that they already registered the land through a patent and the same
cannot be collaterally attacked pursuant to Section 48 of PD 1529. Petitioners Raymundo and
Perla De Guzman argued that they already registered the land through a patent and the same
cannot be collaterally attacked pursuant to Section 48 of PD 1529. Petitioners De Guzman
argue that at the time of the filing of the amended complaint, the OCT had already been
issued in their name. Thus this certificate of title can only be nullified in an action directly
attacking its validity. Respondent counters that at the time the amended complaint was filed,
OCT was not yet indefeasible since less than one year had lapsed. Furthermore, she asserts
that the doctrine of indefeasibility does not apply if the free patent is null and void ab initio.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of indefeasibility apply in this case.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agreed with respondent Agbagala. A decree of registration or patent and
the certificate of title issued may be attacked on the ground of falsification or fraud within one
year from the date of their issuance. Such an attack must be direct and not by a collateral
proceeding.
In this case, the attack on the subject OCT was merely collateral because the action was
principally for the declaration of nullity of the deed of donation and the other deeds of
conveyance which followed.
The principle of indefeasibility does not apply when the patent and title based thereon are null
and void. An action to declare the title null and void is imprescriptible and may be subject to
direct or collateral attack.
Curtain Principle
Alfonso v. Domingo, G.R. No. 195825, February 27, 2013
Facts:
The subject property was a vacant unfenced lot covered by TCT issued in the name of
respondent Lilia V. Domingo by the Registry of Deeds. After some time, Domingo learned that
construction activities were being undertaken on her property without her consent. Radella Sy
was able to execute a deed of sale and acquired a valid title to the property. Thereafter, Sy
divided the property into two and sold each half to spouses De Vera and spouses Cusi, and
were able to have valid titles to the property on their names. These transactions is without the
knowledge of Domingo. Domingo then filed a case before the RTC seeking annulment or
cancellation of the titles issued. The RTC ruled in favor of Domingo, which affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not purchasers was an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith.
Ruling:
Under the Torrens system of land registration, the State is required to maintain a register of
landholdings that guarantees indefeasible title to those included in the register. The State
issues an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named is the owner of
the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or
what the law warrants or reserves
One of the guiding tenets underlying the Torrens system is the curtain principle, in that one
does not need to go behind the certificate of title because it contains all the information about
the title of its holder. This principle dispenses with the need of proving ownership by long
complicated documents kept by the registered owner, which may be necessary under a
private conveyancing system, and assures that all the necessary information regarding
ownership is on the certificate of title.
The petitioners were shown to have been deficient in their vigilance as buyers of the property.
It was not enough for them to show that the property was unfenced and vacant; otherwise, it
would be too easy for any registered owner to lose her property, including its possession,
through illegal occupation.
Nawaan Community Rural Bank v. CA, G.R. No. 128573, January 13, 2003
Facts:
Guillermo Comayas offered to sell to private respondent-spouses Alfredo and Annabelle
Lumo, a house and lot located somewhere in Cagayan de Oro City. The spouses found out
that the property was mortgaged for Php8,000 to Mrs. Galupo and that the owners copy of the
Certificate of Title to said property was in her possession. Spouses directed Guillermo
Comayas to redeem the property from Galupo at their expense, giving the amount of
Php10,000 to Comayas for that purpose. Thereafter, a release of the adverse claim of Galupo
was annotated on TCT No. T-41499 which covered the subject property. Spouses and
Guillermo Comayas, executed a deed of absolute sale. Spouses requested the issuance of a
new tax declaration certificate in their names. However, they were surprised to learn from the
City Assessor's Office that the property was also declared for tax purposes in the name of
petitioner Naawan Community Rural Bank Inc. The mortgage was foreclosed and the subject
property sold at a public auction to the mortgagee Naawan Community Rural Bank.
Thereafter, the sheriff's certificate of sale was issued and registered under Act 3344 in the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Misamis Oriental.
Issue/s: 1. Whether the earlier registration of the sheriff's deed of final conveyance (Act
3344) should prevail over the later registration of respondents' deed of absolute sale (Act 496,
as amended by PD 1529)
2. Whether Private Respondents Lumo are Purchasers in Good Faith.
Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the registration of the deed of final conveyance cannot
prevail over the deed of absolute sale. It has been held that, where a person claims to have
superior proprietary rights over another on the ground that he derived his title from a sheriffs
sale registered in the Registry of Property, Article 1473 (Article 1544) of the Civil Code will
apply only if said execution sale of real estate is registered under Act 496. The subject
property, in this case, was still untitled when it was acquired by petitioner bank by virtue of a
final deed of conveyance. On the other hand, when private respondents purchased the same
property, it was already covered by the Torrens System. Under the said system, registration is
the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.
2. Spouses Lumo bought the subject property from Guillermo Comayas, inquiries were made
with the Registry of Deeds and the Bureau of Lands regarding the status of the vendors title.
No liens or encumbrances were found to have been annotated on the certificate of title.
Neither were private respondents aware of any adverse claim or lien. Having made the
necessary inquiries, private respondents did not have to go beyond the certificate of title.
Otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the Torrens Certificate of Title would be
rendered futile and nugatory.
Prescription and Laches (Section 47, PD No. 1529)
Jakosalem v. Barangan, G.R. No. 175025, February 2012
Facts:
Respondent Col. Roberto S. Barangan entered into a Land Purchase Agreement with Ireneo
S. Labsilica of Citadel Realty Corporation whereby respondent Barangan agreed to purchase
on installment a 300 square meter parcel of land, covered by a TCT. He has been paying real
property taxes for the said property, but was not able to physically occupy the subject property
because as a member of the Philippine Air Force, he was often assigned to various stations in
the Philippines. When he was about to retire, Barangan went to visit his property and
discovered that it was being occupied by petitioner Godofredo Dulfo and his family. Atty.
Rogelio J. Jakosalem, the son-in-law of petitioner Dulfo, sent a letter claiming ownership over
the subject property. Barangan commissioned a geodetic engineer to conduct a relocation
survey of the subject property and revealed that the property occupied by Dulfo and his family
is the same property covered by Barangan’s title. Barangan filed a Complaint for Recovery of
Possession.
Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the property occupied by Dulfo is the same property claimed by
Barangan.
2. Whether or not laches and prescription barred the filing of the case.
Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Barangan and that he was entitled to recover subject
property. In order to recover possession, a person must prove (1) the identity of the land
claimed, and (2) his title. Barangan was able to prove the identity of the property and his title.
He presented in evidence the following documents: (1) Land Purchase Agreement; (2) Deed
of Absolute Sale; (3) and a Torrens title registered under his name. To prove the identity of
the property, he offered the testimonies of Engr. Jonco, who conducted the relocation survey,
and Estardo, the caretaker of the subdivision, who showed respondent Barangan the exact
location of the subject property. He likewise submitted as evidence the Verification Survey
Plan, which was plotted based on the technical description appearing on respondent
Barangan’s title.
2. The Court ruled that prescription and laches cannot apply to registered land covered by the
Torrens system because under the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.
Pangasinan v. Almazora, G.R. No. 200558, July 1, 2015
Facts:
The subject property is a parcel of land as registered in the name of Aquilina Martinez under
TCT No. T-18729 by the Register of Deeds of Laguna. After the liberation of Manila from the
Japanese military occupation in 1945, Aquilina and her maternal grandmother, Leoncia
Almendral, learned that their house in Manila, was ruined by the war. To rebuild their house,
they borrowed money from their relative, Conrado Almazora. Thus, their house was
reconstructed. In return, Leoncia entrusted to Contrado the owner's duplicate copy of the
TCT, covering the subject property in Binan, Laguna. Consequently, Conrado and his family
remained in the said property. Following the death of Aquilina on July 19, 1949, the title of the
subject property was transferred to Aurora Morales-Vivar, as her sole heir. Accordingly, TCT
No. T-35280 was issued in the name of Aurora after TCT No. T-18729 was cancelled. On
February 7, 1972, Conrado passed away. Aurora learned from Cristina Almazora, Conrado’s
widow, that the subject property has been sold to Fullway Development Corporation for
Php.4,000,000. Prior to the sale, the title has already been transferred in the name of
Conrado. Aurora demanded from the heirs of Conrado the payment they received for the sale,
without avail.
Issue: Whether or not Aurora is barred by virtue of laches.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. The four (4) elements of laches, as first prescribed by
this Court in Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which the
complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that
the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice
to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred.
In this case, it has complied with the cited elements. First, Aurora and her family entrusted to
Conrado the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title of the subject property in 1945. In their
complaint, petitioners even admitted that Conrado's family had been staying in the subject
property since 1912. Second, it took five decades, from 1945 to 1996, before Aurora and
petitioners decided to enforce their right thereon. Third, respondents who lived all their lives in
the disputed property apparently were not aware that Aurora would one day come out and
claim ownership thereon. Fourth, there was no question that respondents would be prejudiced
in the event that the suit would be allowed to prosper.

Sps. Aboitiz v. Sps. Po, G.R. No. 208450, June 5 2017

Facts:
A parcel of land initially registered as OCT No. 0-887, and titled under the name of Roberto
Aboitiz. It was originally belonged to the late Mariano Seno. Mariano executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno. Sometime in 1990, Peter Po discovered that
Ciriaco had executed a quitclaim renouncing his interest over the lot under the said OCT in
favor of Aboitiz. In the quitclaim, Ciriaco stated that he was the declared owner of Lot Nos.
2835 and 2807. The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco. By way of remedy, Ciriaco and the
Spouses Po executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated June 28, 1990 in which Ciriaco
agreed to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by the Spouses Po as
consideration for the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses Po were left with
after the quitclaim. In its Decision dated October 28, 1993, the trial court granted the issuance
of OCT No. 0-887 in the name of Roberto. The lot was immediately subdivided with portions
sold to Ernesto and Jose.
Issue/s: 1. Whether the action is barred by prescription.
2. Whether the doctrines of estoppel and laches apply.
Ruling:
1. In an action for reconveyance, the right of action accrues from the time the property is
registered. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title does not seek to question the
contract which allowed the adverse party to obtain the title to the property. What is put on
issue in an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is the ownership of the property
and its registration. It does not question any fraudulent contract. Should that be the case, the
applicable provisions are Articles 1390 and 1391 of the Civil Code. Thus, an action for
reconveyance and cancellation of title prescribes in 10 years from the time of the issuance of
the Torrens title over the property. Considering that the Spouses Po's complaint was filed on
November 19, 1996, less than three years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the
property on April 6, 1994, it is well within the 10-year prescriptive period.
2. The elements of laches are clearly lacking in this case. In the case of Ignacio v. Basilio
which enumerated the elements of laches: (1) the conduct of the defendant or one under
whom he claims, gave rise to the situation complained of; (2) there was delay in asserting a
right after knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after an opportunity to sue; (3) defendant
had no knowledge or notice that the complainant would assert his right; (4) there is injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant. When they
discovered that the property was registered in the name of the Spouses Aboitiz in 1993,
Spouses Po then filed the instant complaint to recover the property sold to them by Ciriaco,
alleging that it was done without their knowledge, through evident bad faith and fraud. The
Spouses Po filed this case in less than three (3) years from the time of registration. From the
stated circumstances, there was no delay in asserting their right over the property, and the
Spouses Aboitiz had knowledge that the Spouses Po would assert their right. Thus, it cannot
be said that they are barred by laches.
Direct and Collateral Attack (Section 48, PD No. 1529)
Melencio Berboso and Conception Berboso v. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141593.
July 12, 2006
Facts:
Private respondents Belen and Corazon Carlos, together with Manuel, Alberto, Antonio and
Rafaelito, all surnamed Carlos, filed a joint request for the conversion of their parcel of land
covered by TCTs No. 48182 and No. 48183 issued by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan,
Bulacan before Bureau of Land Acquisition, Distribution and Development of the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR). DAR Secretary Conrado F. Estrella issued an Order declaring the
said parcels of land suitable for residential, commercial, industrial and other urban purposes.
The Carloses effected the payment of the compensation due their agricultural tenants.
However, petitioners Melencio and Concepcion Berboso, successors-in-interest of one of their
original tenants, Macario Berboso, refused to vacate their landholdings.
Issue: Whether or not there was a direct attack on the validity of the TCTs No. EP-149-M and
No. EP-150-M of the petitioners Berbosos by private respondents Carloses and JKM thus
allowing for the cancellation of said titles
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. A Torrens title, as a rule, is conclusive and
indefeasible. Proceeding from this, P.D. No. 1529, Section 48, provides that a certificate of
title shall not be subject to collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding. There is no doubt from the foregoing that the Carloses and JKM
have attacked and challenged the Order of DAR Secretary Garilao which directed the
issuance of emancipation patents in favor of petitioners Berbosos. In fact, in its Manifestation
and Motion filed with the Court of Appeals, private respondent JKM specifically prayed that an
order be included in its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 41568, directing the Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, to cancel TCTs No. EP-149-M and No. EP-150-M, and to reinstate
cancelled TCTs No. T-114000 (M), No. 120510 (M), No. 102513 (M), No. 120514 (M), No.
120516 (M), and No. 120517 (M) in its name, as well TCTs No. 122924 (M) and No. 122925
(M) in the name of Wong Lee Lee, the person who subsequently bought a parcel of the
subject land from private respondent JKM. Hence, petitioners Berbosos cannot validly claim
that there was no direct attack on their titles thus barring the Court of Appeals from canceling
TCTs No. EP-149-M and No. EP-150-M.
Lacbayan v.Samoy, G.R. 165427, March 21, 2011
Facts:
Betty Lacbayan and Bayani Samoy together with three more incorporators, were able to
establish a manpower services company. They have acquired 5 parcels of land, registered in
their names, ostensibly as husband and wife. Seperated eventually, both of them agreed to
divide these properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition
Agreement. Samoy agreed to Lacbayan’s proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don
Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties
will go to Lacbayan. However, when Samoy wanted additional demands to be included in the
partition agreement, Lacbayan refused. From this, Lacbayan filed a complaint for judicial
partition of the said properties before the RTC.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the action for partition preclude a settlement on the issue of
ownership.
2. Whether or the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in
the action for partition.
Ruling:
1. The Court held in the negative. The complaint involved here is one for partition, but the
same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties.
Until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. The complaint will not even lie if the
claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject
properties.
2. The Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked. However, such rule is not
material in this case. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the
title itself. The certificate referred to is the TCT. The title referred to by law is ownership which
is represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of
title.
Republic v. Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 187677, April 17, 2013
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), filed a Complaint against several defendants, including private
respondents, spouses Genato, for expropriation of several parcels of land affected by the
construction of the EDSA-Quezon Avenue Flyover. Spouses Genato are registered owners of
a piece of land covered by a TCT. While petitioner was presenting evidence to show that the
subject property actually belonged to the Government, private respondents interposed
objections saying that petitioner was barred from presenting the evidence, as it constituted a
collateral attack on the validity of their TCT.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner may be barred from presenting evidence to assail the validity
of respondents’ title under TCT.
Ruling:
Private respondents invoked Sec 48 of PD 1529:
Section 48: Certificate Not Subject to Collateral Attack. — A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
The Supreme ruled that Section 48 of PD 1529 is inapplicable. As explained by the Court, an
action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title,
thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct
when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the
other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
In this case , the attempt of petitioner to present evidence cannot be characterized as an
"attack." It must be emphasized that the objective of the case is to appropriate private
property, and the contest on private respondents' title arose only as an incident to the issue of
whom should be rightly compensated. Furthermore, the Complaint and Amended Complaint
cannot also be considered as a direct attack. The amendment merely limited the coverage of
the expropriation proceedings to the uncontested portion of the subject property.
Constructive Notice (Section 52, PD No. 1529)
Macadangdang v. Martinez, G.R. No. 158682, January 31, 2005
Facts:
The case involves a house and lot located in Muntinlupa covered by a TCT under the name of
Emma Omalin. Spouses Macadangdang offered to buy the subject property from Omalin for
Php 380,000 of installment basis. Omalin executed a deed of sale with mortgage, provided
also a payment of the balance of ₱200,000 in three installments. Spouses Macadangdang
took possession of the house and lot and agreed with Omalin that the balance of ₱110,000
was to be paid upon delivery of the TCT. Omalin failed to deliver the TCT. It turned out that
the property was mortgaged to private respondent spouses Martinez. Spouses
Macadangdang file a criminal case of estafa against Omalin and an action for specific
performance, annulment of contract and damages against the spouses Martinez and Omalin.
Issue: Whether or not the transaction of Spouses Macadangdang with Omalin prevails over
the transaction of Spouses Martinez.
Ruling:
Between two transactions concerning the same parcel of land, the registered transaction
prevails over the earlier unregistered right. The act of registration operates to convey and
affect the registered land so that a bonafide purchaser of such land acquires good title as
against a prior transferee, if such prior transfer was unrecorded.
The Court cited Section 51 and 52 of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree.
Section 52 - Constructive Notice upon registration - Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien
attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered,
filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to
which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering,
filing or entering.
It is clear from the foregoing that the registration of the deed is the effectual act which binds
the land insofar as third persons are concerned. Prior registration of a lien creates a
preference as the act of registration is the operative act that conveys and affects the land.
Considering that the prior sale of the subject property to the Macadangdang spouses was not
registered, it was the registered mortgage to the spouses Martinez that was valid and
effective. For sure, it was binding on Omalin and, for that matter, even on the Macadangdang
spouses, the parties to the prior sale. The rule on prior registration is subject only to one
exception, that is, when a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is
unregistered at the time he acquires a right The Martinez spouses claimed they had never
met the Macadangdang spouses and were unaware that Omalin had already sold the
property to them. Thus, Spouses Martinez are in good faith and innocent purchasers.

Uy v. Medina, G.R. No. 172541, August 8, 2010

Facts:
Respondent spouses Medina in favor of petitioner Jay Hidalgo Uy a Deed of Conditional Sale
over a parcel of land covered by a TCT of the Register of Deeds of Ilagan, Isabela.
Subsequently, on Spouses Medina executed a deed of absolute sale over the same parcel of
land in favor of the petitioner in view of the full payment of the agreed selling price.
Respondent Swift Foods, Inc. filed an action for sum of money against the Medinas before the
RTC. Respondent Sheriff Antonio Managuelod came out with the corresponding Amended
Sheriff’s Notice of Levy and Auction Sale. The notice was inscribed at the back of TCT. TCT
No. T-252042 in the name of the Medinas was cancelled and TCT No. T-286432 was issued
in the name of Jay Hidalgo Uy. The annotation of the levy of execution was carried over in the
new title as an encumbrance. Respondent Sheriff proceeded with the auction sale and
awarded the property with Swift, as the only bidder. Petitioner Uy filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Sale with damages against the Medinas, Sheriff Managuelod and Swift.
Issue: Whether or not a levy on execution is superior to the subsequent registration of a deed
of sale.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court stated that even if the the sale of the land to petitioner took place before
the judgment of the trial court in favor of Swift and the issuance of the writ of execution over
the property in question, failure to register it with the Register of Deeds negated any priority
which he may have acquired by virtue of the earlier sale. Elementary is the rule that it is the
act of registration which gives validity to transfer or liens created upon land registered under
the Torrens System. The Court cited Section 51 and 52 of PD 1529 (Property Registration
Decree)
The settled rule is that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference over a prior
unregistered sale. Registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or
creates a lien upon the land. The preference created by the levy on attachment is not
diminished even by the subsequent registration of the prior sale. This is so because an
attachment is a proceeding in rem. It is against the particular property, enforceable against
the whole world.
Double Sales (Article 1544, Civil Code)
Rosaroso v. Soria, G.R. No. 194846, June 19, 2013
Facts:
Spouses Luis Rosaroso and Honorata Duazo acquired several real properties in Cebu City,
including the subject properties. The couple had nine children namely: Hospicio, Arturo,
Florita, Lucila, Eduardo, Manuel, Cleofe, Antonio, and Angelica. Honorata died which later on,
Luis married Lourdes Pastor Rosaroso. A complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents
with Damages was filed by Luis, as one of the plaintiffs, against his daughter, Lucila R. Soria;
Laila S. Solutan, Lucia's daughter; and Meridian Realty Corporation. An amended complaint
was filed due to Luis’ untimely death. Ham Solutan, Laila's spouse; and Lourdes, included as
defendants. Petitioners Hospicio, Antonio, Angelica, and Cleofe alleged that Luis with consent
of Lourdes executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of some properties in their favor. Despite such
sale, a second sale took place when respondents, unscrupulous made Luis sign a Deed of
Aboslute Sale conveying to Meridian three parcels of residential lands. RTC ruled in favor of
the petitioners which declared the first sale valid and binding. However, CA reversed and set
aside RTC's decision.
Issue: Whether or not the first sale of properties enjoys the presumption that there was
sufficient consideration.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court rule in the affirmative. The first deed of sale was executed was never
contested by respondents. Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, embodies the
presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of
business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract. The
burden of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has the burden is
relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the
presumption stands in place of evidence unless rebutted.
In this case, respondents failed to overcome the presumption. they failed to supply clear and
convincing proof to back the sale was made without consideration. Bare allegations are not
equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court.
Beatingo vs. Gasis, G.R. No. 179641, February 9, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Dolorita Beatingo bought the subject property registered in the name of Flora’s
predecessor-in-interest. The sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.
Beatingo went to the Register of Deeds to have the sale registered. However, she, failed to
obtain registration as she could not produce the owner’s duplicate certificate of title. She filed
a petition for the issuance of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title but was opposed by
respondent, claiming that she was in possession of the OCT as she purchased the subject
property from Flora.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent in this case has better right over the subject property.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court stated that this is a clear case of double sale, where the seller sold one
property to different buyers. In determining who has a better right over the subject property
Article 1544 of the Civil Code apply, which states:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall
be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it
should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith
was first in possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good faith.
In this case, there is no inscription, since two sales were not registered with the Registry of
Property. As aptly held by the trial court, it was respondent who took possession of the
subject property and, therefore, has a better right. The execution of a public instrument shall
be equivalent to the delivery of the thing that is the object of the contract. However, the Court
has held that the execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption
of delivery.
Respondent, on the other hand, showed that she purchased the subject property without
knowledge that it had been earlier sold by Flora to petitioner. She had reason to believe that
there was no defect in her title since the owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT was delivered to
her by the seller upon full payment of the purchase price.

The Mirror Principle

Rufloe v. Burgos, G.R. No. 143573, January 30, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Adoracion Rufloe is the wife of Angel Rufloe, now deceased, while co-petitioners
Alfredo and Rodrigo are their children. During the marriage of Adoracion and Angel, they
acquired a parcel of land covered by a TCT which is the subject property in this case.
Respondent Elvira Delos Reyes forged the signature of Adoracion and Angel in a Deed of
Sale to make it appear that it was sold to her by the said spouses. Elvira succeeded and
obtained a TCT under her name. A complaint was then filed against Elvira by the Rufloes.
During the pendency thereof, Elvira sold the subject property to respondent siblings, the
Burgos and in turn sold the same to their aunt Leonarda Burgos. Failure to register under the
aunt's name, the subject property remained under the name of the Burgos siblings.
Issue/s: 1. Whether the sale of the subject property by Delos Reyes to the Burgos siblings
and the subsequent sale by the siblings to Leonarda were valid and binding.
2. Whether respondents were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value despite
the forged deed of sale of their transferor Delos Reyes.
Ruling:
1. It is undisputed that the forged deed of sale was null and void and conveyed no title. It
is a well-settled principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod
non habet. One can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can
acquire no more right than what the seller can transfer legally. In this case, all the
transactions subsequent to the falsified sale between the spouses Rufloe and Delos
Reyes are likewise void, including the sale made by the Burgos siblings to their aunt,
Leonarda.
2. There is absolute lack of good faith on the part of the respondents. As a general rule,
every person dealing with registered land, as in this case, may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and will in no way oblige him to go
beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. However, this rule
admits of an unchallenged exception: When the party has actual knowledge of a defect
 or lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to
inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything
which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said
certificate. The evidence shows that the Rufloes caused a notice of adverse claim to be
annotated on the title of Delos Reyes as early as November 5, 1979 Despite the notice
of adverse claim, the Burgos siblings still purchased the property in question.

Francisco H. Lu v. Sps. Manipon, G.R. No. 147072, May 7, 2002

Facts:
Juan Peralta executed a Deed of Sale in favor of respondent spouses Orlando and Rosita
Manipon. The said deed was not registered with the Registry of Deeds. Thereafter, Peralta
mortgaged the aforesaid lot to Thrift Savings and Loan Association, Inc. He then failed to pay
the loan he obtained for which the mortgage was constituted and so the same was judicially
foreclosed and sold to TSLAI. Petitioner filed the present action alleging therein that he is the
owner of the lot in question including that which was being occupied by respondents. RTC
ruled that petitioner was not a buyer in good faith despite his registration for he admitted that
he knew that respondents had constructed a house on the subject lot. CA affirmed the RTC
decision.
Issue/s: 1. Who has a better right.
2. Whether the purchaser in bad faith has a better right?
Ruling:
1. The Court is not convinced that the petitioner has a better right in this case. Petitioner,
before acquiring the mother lot from the bank, knew of respondents’ claim of ownership
and occupation. He cannot now pretend to be an innocent buyer in good faith.
Registration is not the equivalent of title. Under the Torrens system, registration only
gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. It was not established as a
means of acquiring title to private land because it merely confirms, but does not confer,
ownership.
2. It untenable that petitioner denies being a purchaser in bad faith. A purchaser in good
faith or an innocent purchaser for value is one who buys property and pays a full and
fair price for it, at the time of the purchase or before any notice of some other person’s
claim on or interest in it. The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in
time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat
the first buyer’s rights except when the second buyer first registers in good faith the
second sale.
Sps. Cusi v. Domingo, G.R. No. 195825, February 27, 2013
Facts:
The subject property was a vacant unfenced lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. N-165606 issued in the name of respondent Lilia V. Domingo by the Registry of Deeds.
After some time, Domingo learned that construction activities were being undertaken on her
property without her consent. Radella Sy was able to execute a deed of sale and acquired a
valid title to the property. Thereafter, Sy divided the property into two and sold each half to
spouses De Vera and Spouses Cusi, and were able to have valid titles to the property on their
names. These transactions is without the knowledge of Domingo. Domingo then filed a case
before the RTC seeking annulment or cancellation of the titles issued. The RTC ruled in favor
of Domingo, which affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not purchasers was an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith.
Ruling:
Under the Torrens system of land registration, the State is required to maintain a register of
landholdings that guarantees indefeasible title to those included in the register. The State
issues an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named is the owner of
the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or
what the law warrants or reserves
One of the guiding tenets underlying the Torrens system is the curtain principle, in that one
does not need to go behind the certificate of title because it contains all the information about
the title of its holder. This principle dispenses with the need of proving ownership by long
complicated documents kept by the registered owner, which may be necessary under a
private conveyancing system, and assures that all the necessary information regarding
ownership is on the certificate of title.
The petitioners were shown to have been deficient in their vigilance as buyers of the property.
It was not enough for them to show that the property was unfenced and vacant; otherwise, it
would be too easy for any registered owner to lose her property, including its possession,
through illegal occupation.
Mirror Principle: The general rule is that a purchaser may be considered a purchaser in
good faith when he has examined the latest certificate of title. An exception to this rule is
when there exist important facts that would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man
to go beyond the present title and to investigate those that preceded it. Thus, it has been said
that a person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which would create suspicion in an
otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value.

Uy v. Fule, G.R. No. 164961, June 30, 2014

Facts:
The disputed land involved is covered by TCT No. 30111 which is part of the vast tract of land
covered by TCT No. 1128 registered under the name of the late Conrado Garcia. Upon his
death, his heirs entered into an extrajudicial settlement of his estate, including the vast track
of land. Thereafter, his heirs caused the registration. The Department of Agrarian Reform
engaged Geodetic Engr. Rolando A. Sales to conduct a survey of the disputed land. It was
found to be an untitled property. As a result, the disputed land was included in the Operation
Land Transfer (OLT) program of the DAR pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. An
Emancipation Patents and Original Certificate of Titles was issued to farmer-beneficiaries like
Mariano Ronda, who sold his portion to Chisan Uy. The heirs of Chisan sold it then to Hector
Uy. The TCT of Conrado was cancelled and issued in the names of his heirs. However,
Conrado’s TCT was already in the name of Hector UY. From this, heirs of Conrado fied a
complaint assailing the certificates of titles issued to the Uys. RTC ruled in favor of
respondents, which affirmed by CA.
Issue:Whether or not Hector Uy is a innocent purchaser in this case.
Ruling:
Petitioner Uy entered into the Deed of Sale without having been able to inspect the TCTs. He
anchored his basis from the OCTs and such were entered pursuant to the issued
Emancipation Patent (Operation Land Transfer). It was provided that it shall not be transferred
except by hereditary succession or to the government.
As a general rule, a buyer is not required to look or inquire beyond the title if the requisites of
good faith are present. In the absence of one or two of such requisites, the law put the
petitioner on notice and obliged him to exercise higher degree of diligence by scrutinizing the
certificate of title and examining all the factual circumstances in order to determine the seller's
title as well as the capacity to transfer any interest in the property.
In this case, it negated the third element of good faith: that "at the time of sale, the buyer was
not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of any defect or
restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the property."
The petitioner was not an innocent purchaser for value; hence, he cannot be awarded the
disputed land.

Rules Governing Builders, Planters, Sowers on the land of another

Rosales v. Castlefort, et. al., G.R. No. 157044, October 5, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner spouses Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily Rosqueta-Rosales are registered owners of a
parcel of land covered by a TCT located in Laguna. Sometime in August 1995, they
discovered that a house was being constructed on their lot, without their knowledge and
consent, by respondent Miguel Castelltort. Castelltort had purchased the subject lot from
respondent Lina Lopez-Villegas through her son-attorney-in-fact Rene Villegas but that after a
survey thereof by geodetic engineer Augusto Rivera, he pointed to Lot 17 as the Lot 16 the
Castelltorts purchased. Petitioners subsequently filed a complaint for recovery of possession
with damages against the spouses Castelltort before the RTC. Castelltort filed their Answer
with Counterclaim that they were builders in good faith. Lina alleged that the Castelltorts acted
in good faith in constructing the house on petitioners' lot as they in fact consulted her before
commencing any construction and spouses Castelltort relied on the technical description
provided for them. RTC ruled in favor of spouses Rosales. CA set aside the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether or not Castelltort is a builder in good faith.
Ruling:
A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, or
that by some title one has the right to build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his
title. Cited Article 527 of the Civil Code, good faith is always presumed, and upon him who
alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.
In this case, as evidence of Lina's ownership of the property, Castelltort was presented by a
photocopy of Lina's TCT, explaining that the owner's duplicate of the title was lost and that
judicial reconstitution thereof was ongoing. Castelltort acted in the manner of a prudent man
and went to the Registry of Deeds of Laguna to procure a certified true copy of the TCT. The
certified true copy bore no annotation indicating any prior adverse claim on Lot 16. The
records indicate that at the time Castelltort began constructing his house on petitioners' lot, he
believed that it was the Lot 16 he bought and delivered to him by Villegas.
Applied in this case is Article 448 of the Civil Code which, under this provision; the landowner
can choose between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the
builder to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the
structures, in which case the builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent. If the parties
cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof.
The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the
building to remove it from the land. In the case at bar, Castelltort's good faith ceased, when
petitioners personally apprised him of their title over the questioned lot. As held by the CA,
should petitioners then opt to appropriate the house, they should only be made to pay for that
part of the improvement built by Castelltort on the questioned property at the time good faith
still existed on his part or until August 21, 1995.
Implied Lease (1670, Civil Code)
Tan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. September 9, 1998
Facts:
The subject properties in this case involves two parcels of land situated in Manila owned by
Alejandro Tan Keh, covered by a TCT. Private respondent Fernando Tan Kiat filed a
complaint, claiming that he bought the subject properties from Mr. Tan Keh in 1954 for
P98,065.35, built his house thereon, but was unable to effect immediate transfer of title in his
favor in view of his foreign nationality at the time of the sale. Mr. Tan Keh turned over to Tan
Kiat the owners duplicate copy of TCT and executed a lease contract in favor of Tan Kiat for
40 years. However, Tan Keh sold the subject properties to Remigio Tan, his brother. Remigio
was killed in 1968. At his wake, petitioners were reminded of private respondents ownership
of the subject properties and they promised to transfer the subject properties to private
respondent who by then had already acquired Filipino citizenship by naturalization. Despite
repeated demands by private respondent, the promise was never fulfilled. It turned out that
the petitioners had the subject properties fraudulently transferred to their names under TCT
No. 117898. Thus, the filing of the complaint for recovery of property.
Issue: Whether or not the trust theory being espoused by private respondent be applied.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court answered in the negative. The execution of a lease contract between
Remigio Tan as lessor and private respondent as lessee over the subject properties, the
existence of which is established by private respondent's own admission reflected in
paragraph 6 of the complaint, already belies private respondent's claim of ownership. This is
so because Article 1436 of the Civil Code, Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court and
settled jurisprudence consistently instruct that a lessee is estopped or prevented from
disputing the title of his landlord. Furthermore, There being no trust, express or implied,
established in favor of private respondent, the only transaction that can be gleaned from the
allegations in the complaint is a double sale, the controlling provision for which is Article 1544
of the Civil Code.
In this case, however, private respondent's occupation of the subject properties was never in
the concept of an owner since he was a mere lessee who, as hereinbefore discussed, is
estopped from denying the title of Remigio Tan as owner-lessor.
Private respondent is guilty of Laches. As alleged by private respondent in his complaint, he
was not able to effect the transfer of title over the subject properties in his favor upon his
purchase thereof from Alejandro Tan Keh in 1954 because he was still a foreigner at that
time. Later on claimed by private respondent that he was already a Filipino national when he
reminded petitioners of his ownership of the subject properties during Remigio Tan's wake
sometime in 1968. Deduced from these allegations that private respondent acquired Filipino
citizenship by naturalization, thus entitling him to own properties in the 1960's.

The Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141, as amended)

Homestead (Chapter IV, CA No. 141)
Heirs of Tengco v. Heirs of Aliwalas, G.R. No. 77541. Nov. 29, 1988
Facts:
The subject lot of Arayat Cadastre was originally part of public domain. Jose Aliwalas was
applied for the issuance of homestead patent before the Bureau if Lands over the subject lot.
It was granted and duly registered in the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. As Jose Aliwalas
died leaving the properties to his heirs. The subject lot was alloted in favor of Victoria Aliwalas
and transferred to her name. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco filed also an application for homestead
patent before the Bureau of Lands and alleged that the parcel of land had been occupied and
cultivated continuously by Gregorio Tengco. It was also granted. From this, an action to quiet
title instituted by the late Victoria Aliwalas was agasint the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco, Director
of Lands and Register of Deeds of Pampanga.
Issue: Whether or not the Victoria Aliwalas is the true owner? Or Heirs of Gregorio Tengco.
Ruling:
As a rule, an OCT issued on the strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a
certificate of title issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as it is part of the disposable land of
public domain. It becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon expiration of 1 year from the
date of promulgation of the order of Director of Lands for the issuance of patent. A homestead
patent, once registered, becomes indefeasible as a Torrens Title. From this, a homestead
patent registered under the Land Registration Act is imprescriptible. Therefore cannot operate
against the registered owner.
Administrative Legalization (Free Patent)
Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 73002. December 29, 1986
Facts:
Rodolfo Nazario, representative of Acme Plywood & Venner Co., Inc., acquired five parcels of
land from Mariano and Acer Infiel, who are members of the Dumagat Tribe. The constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29,
1962;The Infiels has been in possession of the subject lands for over before Magellan
discovered the Philippines. The land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA
3872 which grants absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land
occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public
land or within the public domain. Acme introduced more than 45 Million Pesos worth of
improvements. The government then recognized the ownership and possession of the land
sought to be registered, when officials from the municipal of Maconacon, Isabela donated part
of the land. Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the
applicability of the 1935 Constitution
Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the subject land is already a private land?
2. Whether or not constitutional prohibition applies to Acme?
Ruling:
1. The Court ruled in the affirmative. The subject property already ceased to be of the
public domain and become private property by presumption. It was already acquired by
the grant of the government. The certificate if title is not necessary to be issued in order
the grant to be sanctioned. An application is served to be sufficient.
2. It was ruled that such prohibition does not apply. When Acme acquired it from the
owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such
acquisition. Nothing in the 1935 Constitution in force prohibits corporations from
 acquiring private lands. The only limitation is that corporations could not acquire, hold
or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. Enforcement of the 1973
Constitution, which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain,
cannot overcome the right already vested before such law came into effect.
In this case, right of the corporation to purchase the land had become fixed and no
longer open to doubt. In compliance with the requirements of the Public Land law for
the issuance of a patent had an effect to segregate the subject property from public
domain.

Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-48321. August 31, 1946

Facts:
Oh Cho applied for the registration of a residential lot located in the municipality of
Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant. The opposition of the
Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on his disqualification,
as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain. Oh Cho and his predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to
filing of the application for registration on January 17, 1940. OSG reiterates the second
objection of the opponent and adds that the lower court, committed an error in not declaring
null and void the sale of the lot to the applicant. Oh Cho invokes the Land Registration Act
(Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits
of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141).
Issue/s: 1. Whether or not Oh Cho has the right to claim a title.
2. Whether or not he is entitled to decree or registration of the lot, because he is alien
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the
lot that may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or
any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrease promulgated by the
Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information under the
Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant belong to the public domain. An exception
is that a land should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
 predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been
a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
2. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate predecessors in
interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The
condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in
possession at least since July 26, 1894. This applicant's immediate predecessors in
interest failed to do. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot
which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified
person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is
disqualified.

Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994

Facts:
Respondent spouses Mario Lapina and Flor De Vega bought subject lots as their residence
from Cristeta Dazo Belen. At the time of the purchase, spouses were then natural-born
Filipino citizens. Spouses then filed an application for registration of title of the two subject
parcel of lands before the RTC. This time, they were no longer Filipino citizens and are now
Canadian citizens. The Republic filed an opposition against the spouses. RTC ruled that both
applicants were still Filipino citizens when they bought the land in controversy from its former
owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by aliens could
not apply. CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether or not a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land
which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has
complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the title and ownership over subject lots, within the meaning
and for the purpose of constitutional prohibition dates back to spouses' purchase. What is
important is that at the time the spouses purchased and registered the subject lots in 1978,
both of them were Filipino citizens and that ownership over the land in dispute had already
passed to them. Private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the
contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapiña's mother.
Limitations on lands acquired under the Public Land Act
Filinvest Land Inc. v. Backy et. al., G.R. No. 174715, October 11, 2012
Facts:
Respondents were grantees of agricultural public lands located in General Santos City.
Filinvest Land, Inc. and respondents executed undated deeds of conditional sale of the
properties covered by the Homestead and Free patents. Few days after the execution of said
sale, respondents learned that the sale of their properties was null and void, because it was
done within a period that they were not allowed to do so and that the sale did not have
approval of DENR. This prompts them to file a case for the declaration of nullity of the deeds
of conditional sale. RTC ruled the validity of the sale which reversed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not such sale violated the prohibition against alienation of homesteads
under the Public Land Act.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that it is unmeritorious. The law was enacted to give the
homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the
State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labour in cleaning and cultivating it. It is
to promote public policy by providing home and decent living for destitute. Therefore, removal
of property subject of the patent from the hands of the grantee is violative of the said law.
Applying the five-year prohibition, the properties covered by the patent issued on November
24, 1991 could only be alienated after November 24, 1996. Therefore, the sale, having been
consummated on October 28, 1995, or within the five-year prohibition, is as ruled by the CA,
void.
Such prohibition does not mention the difference between consummated and executory sale.
As cited by the Court from the Ortega v. Tan:
Even assuming that the disputed sale was not yet perfected or consummated, still, the
transaction cannot be validated. The prohibition of the law on the sale or encumbrance of the
homestead within five years after the grant is MANDATORY...Where the sale of a homestead
was perfected within the prohibitory period of five years, the fact that the formal deed of sale
was executed after the expiration of the staid period DID NOT and COULD NOT legalize a
contract that was void from its inception.

Right to Repurchase (Section 119)

Morla v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 171146, December 7, 2011
Facts:
Spouses Alfredo Nisperos and Esperanza Urbano were the original homesteaders of the
subject lot located in Isabela covered by an OCT. Spouses Nisperos executed a Deed of
Absolute Slae in favor of brothers Ramon and Rodolfo Morla worth Php 250,000. Morla
brothers acknowledged and confirmed in writing that they had bought from the Nisperos
spouses the subject land and agreed to give the Nisperos spouses a period of ten years
within which to repurchase the subject land worth Php275,000. The 1988 contract was
written in Ilocano. Spouses Nisperos filed a Complaint for Repurchase and/or Recovery of
Ownership Plus Damages against the Morla brothers, alleging that the deed of sale was
registered by the Morla brothers only when they had signified their intention to repurchase
their property.
Issue:
Whether or not the repurchase of spouses Nisperos of the subject lot within period of ten
years is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court stated that nothing in Commonwealth Act No. 141 does it say that the
right to repurchase under Section 119 thereof could not be extended by mutual agreement of
the parties involved. Nothing would extend the period in Section 119 be against public policy
as the evident purpose of the Public Land Act, especially the provisions thereof in relation to
homesteads, is to conserve ownership of lands acquired as homesteads in the homesteader
or his heirs. What cannot be bartered away is the homesteader's right to repurchase the
homestead within five years from its conveyance, as this is what public policy by law seeks to
preserve.
In this case, the petitioner does not dispute that the 1988 contract was executed freely and
willingly between him and his late brother, and the Nisperos spouses. The freedom of contract
is both a constitutional and statutory right, and the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. The said contract
gives the Nisperos spouses more time to reacquire the land that the State gratuitously gave
them. Therefore, it is not contrary to law but keeping with the purpose of the homestead law.