G.R. Nos.

154470-71               September 24, 2012 On April 20, 1994, according to the BOC, it "sold back"11 to the PDB three of the seven CB bills.
In turn, the PDB transferred these three CB bills to Bancapital Development Corporation
(Bancap). On April 25, 1994, the BOC bought the three CB bills from Bancap – so, ultimately,
BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner, the BOC reacquired these three CB bills,12 particularly described as follows:
vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Respondent.
Serial No.: 2BB XM 045351
x-----------------------x 2BB XM 045352
2BB XM 045353

G.R. Nos. 154589-90

Quantity: Three (3)

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner, Denomination: Php 10 million

vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent. Total Face Value: Php 30 million

DECISION
ii. CB bill nos. 45347-50

BRION, J.:
On April 20, 1994, the BOC sold the remaining four (4) CB bills to Capital One Equities
Corporation13 which transferred them to All-Asia Capital and Trust Corporation (All Asia). On
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, on pure
1 
September 30, 1994, All Asia further transferred the four CB bills back to the RCBC.14
questions of law, filed by the petitioners Bank of Commerce (BOC) and the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP). They assail the January 10, 2002 and July 23, 2002 Orders (assailed orders) of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case Nos. 94-3233 and 94- On November 16, 1994, the RCBC sold back to All Asia one of these 4 CB bills. When the BSP
3254. These orders dismissed (i) the petition filed by the Planters Development Bank (PDB), (ii) refused to release the amount of this CB bill on maturity, the BOC purchased from All Asia this
the "counterclaim" filed by the BOC, and (iii) the counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader lone CB bill,15 particularly described as follows: 16
filed bythe BSP; and denied the BOC’s and the BSP’s motions for reconsideration.

Serial No.: 2BB XM 045348

THE ANTECEDENTS
Quantity: One (1)
The Central Bank bills
Denomination: Php 10 million
I. First set of CB bills
Total Face Value: Php 10 million

The Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) was the registered owner of seven Central
Bank (CB) bills with a total face value of ₱ 70 million, issued on January 2, 1994 and would
mature on January 2, 1995.2 As evidenced by a "Detached Assignment" dated April 8, 1994,3 the
RCBC sold these CB bills to the BOC.4 As evidenced by another "Detached Assignment"5 of even
date, the BOC, in turn, sold these CB bills to the PDB.6 The BOC delivered the Detached
Assignments to the PDB.7
As the registered owner of the remaining three CB bills, the RCBC sold them to IVI Capital and
Insular Savings Bank. Again, when the BSP refused to release the amount of this CB bill on
maturity, the RCBC paid back its transferees, reacquired these three CB bills and sold them to
the BOC – ultimately, the BOC acquired these three CB bills.

All in all, the BOC acquired the first set of seven CB bills.
On April 15, 1994 (April 15 transaction), the PDB, in turn, sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth ₱
70 million, with maturity date of June 29, 1994, as evidenced by a Trading Order8 and a
Confirmation of Sale.9 However, instead of delivering the Treasury Bills, the PDB delivered the II. Second set of CB bills
seven CB bills to the BOC, as evidenced by a PDB Security Delivery Receipt, bearing a
"note: ** substitution in lieu of 06-29-94" – referring to the Treasury Bills.10 Nevertheless, the
On April 19, 1994, the RCBC, as registered owner, (i) sold two CB bills with a total face value of
PDB retained possession of the Detached Assignments. It is basically the nature of this April 15
₱ 20 million to the PDB and (ii) delivered to the PDB the corresponding Detached
transaction that the PDB and the BOC cannot agree on.
Assignment.17 The two CB bills were particularly described as follows:

The transfer of the first set of seven CB bills

Serial No.: BB XM 045373
BB XM 045374
i. CB bill nos. 45351-53
Issue date: January 3, 1994

1

Maturity date: January 2, 1995
Denomination: Php 10 million
Total Face value: Php 20 million
On even date, the PDB delivered to Bancap the two CB bills18 (April 19 transaction). In turn,
Bancap sold the CB bills to Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines, which in turn
sold it to the BOC.19
PDB’s move against the transfer of
the first and second sets of CB bills
On June 30, 1994, upon learning of the transfers involving the CB bills, the PDB informed20 the
Officer-in-Charge of the BSP’s Government Securities Department,21 Lagrimas Nuqui, of the
PDB’s claim over these CB bills, based on the Detached Assignments in its possession. The PDB
requested the BSP22 to record its claim in the BSP’s books, explaining that its non-possession of
the CB bills is "on account of imperfect negotiations thereof and/or subsequent setoff or
transfer."23
Nuqui denied the request, invoking Section 8 of CB Circular No. 28 (Regulations Governing Open
Market Operations, Stabilization of the Securities Market, Issue, Servicing and Redemption of
the Public Debt)24 which requires the presentation of the bond before a registered bond may be
transferred on the books of the BSP.25
In a July 25, 1994 letter, the PDB clarified to Nuqui that it was not "asking for the transfer of the
CB Bills…. rather it intends to put the BSP on formal notice that whoever is in possession of said
bills is not a holder in due course," and, therefore the BSP should not make payment upon the
presentation of the CB bills on maturity.26 Nuqui responded that the BSP was "not in a position
at that point in time to determine who is and who is not the holder in due course since it is not
privy to all acts and time involving the transfers or negotiation" of the CB bills. Nuqui added that
the BSP’s action shall be governed by CB Circular No. 28, as amended.27
On November 17, 1994, the PDB also asked BSP Deputy Governor Edgardo Zialcita that (i) a
notation in the BSP’s books be made against the transfer, exchange, or payment of the bonds
and the payment of interest thereon; and (ii) the presenter of the bonds upon maturity be
required to submit proof as a holder in due course (of the first set of CB bills). The PDB relied on
Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28.28 This provision reads:
(4) Assignments effected by fraud – Where the assignment of a registered bond is secured by
fraudulent representations, the Central Bank can grant no relief if the assignment has been
honored without notice of fraud. Otherwise, the Central Bank, upon receipt of notice that the
assignment is claimed to have been secured by fraudulent representations, or payment of the
bond the payment of interest thereon, and when the bond is presented, will call upon the owner
and the person presenting the bond to substantiate their respective claims.If it then appears
that the person presenting the bond stands in the position of bonafide holder for value, the
Central Bank, after giving the owner an opportunity to assert his claim, will pass the bond for
transfer, exchange or payments, as the case may be, without further question.
In a December 29, 1994 letter, Nuqui again denied the request, reiterating the BSP’s previous
stand.
In light of these BSP responses and the impending maturity of the CB bills, the PDB filed29 with
the RTC two separate petitions for Mandamus, Prohibition and Injunction with prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3233
(covering the first set of CB bills) and Civil Case 94-3254 (covering the second set of CB bills)
against Nuqui, the BSP and the RCBC.30
The PDB essentially claims that in both the April 15 transaction (involving the first set of CB
bills) and the April 19 transaction (involving the second set of CB bills), there was no intent on
its part to transfer title of the CB bills, as shown by its non-issuance of a detached assignment
in favor of the BOC and Bancap, respectively. The PDB particularly alleges that it merely
"warehoused"31 the first set of CB bills with the BOC, as security collateral.
On December 28, 1994, the RTC temporarily enjoined Nuqui and the BSP from paying the face
value of the CB bills on maturity.32 On January 10, 1995, the PDB filed an Amended Petition,
additionally impleading the BOC and All Asia.33 In a January 13, 1995 Order, the cases were
consolidated.34 On January 17, 1995, the RTC granted the PDB’s application for a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction.35 In both petitions, the PDB identically prayed:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed x x x that, after due notice and hearing, the Writs of
Mandamus, Prohibition and Injunction, be issued; (i) commanding the BSP and Nuqui, or
whoever may take her place -
(a) to record forthwith in the books of BSP the claim of x x x PDB on the [two sets of] CB Bills in
accordance with Section 10 (d) (4) of revised C.B. Circular No. 28; and
(b) also pursuant thereto, when the bills are presented on maturity date for payment, to call (i)
x x x PDB, (ii) x x x RCBC x x x, (iii) x x x BOC x x x, and (iv) x x x ALL-ASIA x x x; or whoever
will present the [first and second sets of] CB Bills for payment, to submit proof as to who stands
as the holder in due course of said bills, and, thereafter, act accordingly;
and (ii) ordering the BSP and Nuqui to pay jointly and severally to x x x PDB the following:
(a) the sum of ₱ 100,000.00, as and for exemplary damages;
(b) the sum of at least ₱ 500,000.00, or such amount as shall be proved at the trial,
as and for attorney’s fees;
(c) the legal rate of interest from the filing of this Petition until full payment of the
sums mentioned in this Petition; and
(d) the costs of suit.36
After the petitions were filed, the BOC acquired/reacquired all the nine CB bills – the first and
second sets of CB bills (collectively, subject CB bills).
Defenses of the BSP and of the BOC37
The BOC filed its Answer, praying for the dismissal of the petition. It argued that the PDB has no
cause of action against it since the PDB is no longer the owner of the CB bills. Contrary to the
PDB’s "warehousing theory," 38 the BOC asserted that the (i) April 15 transaction and the (ii) April
19 transaction – covering both sets of CB bills - were valid contracts of sale, followed by a
transfer of title (i) to the BOC (in the April 15 transaction) upon the PDB’s delivery of the 1st set
of CB bills in substitution of the Treasury Bills the PDB originally intended to sell, and (ii) to
Bancap (in the April 19 transaction) upon the PDB’s delivery of the 2nd set of CB bills to Bancap,
likewise by way of substitution.
2
The BOC adds that Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 cannot apply to the PDB’s case
because (i) the PDB is not in possession of the CB bills and (ii) the BOC acquired these bills from
the PDB, as to the 1st set of CB bills, and from Bancap, as to the 2nd set of CB bills, in good
faith and for value. The BOC also asserted a compulsory counterclaim for damages and
attorney’s fees.
On the other hand, the BSP countered that the PDB cannot invoke Section 10 (d) 4 of CB
Circular No. 28 because this section applies only to an "owner" and a "person presenting the
bond," of which the PDB is neither. The PDB has not presented to the BSP any assignment of
the subject CB bills, duly recorded in the BSP’s books, in its favor to clothe it with the status of
an "owner."39 According to the BSP –
Section 10 d. (4) applies only to a registered bond which is assigned. And the issuance of CB
Bills x x x are required to be recorded/registered in BSP’s books. In this regard, Section 4 a. (1)
of CB Circular 28 provides that registered bonds "may be transferred only by an assignment
thereon duly executed by the registered owner or his duly authorized representative x x x and
duly recorded on the books of the Central Bank."
xxxx
The alleged assignment of subject CB Bills in PDB’s favor is not recorded/registered in BSP’s
books.40 (underscoring supplied)
Consequently, when Nuqui and the BSP refused the PDB’s request (to record its claim), they
were merely performing their duties in accordance with CB Circular No. 28.
Alternatively, the BSP asked that an interpleader suit be allowed between and among the
claimants to the subject CB bills on the position that while it is able and willing to pay the
subject CB bills’ face value, it is duty bound to ensure that payment is made to the rightful
owner. The BSP prayed that judgment be rendered:
a. Ordering the dismissal of the PDB’s petition for lack of merit;
b. Determining which between/among [PDB] and the other claimants is/are lawfully
entitled to the ownership of the subject CB bills and the proceeds thereof;
c. x x x;
d. Ordering PDB to pay BSP and Nuqui such actual/compensatory and exemplary
damages… as the RTC may deem warranted; and
e. Ordering PDB to pay Nuqui moral damages… and to pay the costs of the suit.41
Subsequent events
The PDB agreed with the BSP’s alternative response for an interpleader –
4. PDB agrees that the various claimants should now interplead and substantiate their
respective claims on the subject CB bills. However, the total face value of the subject CB bills
should be deposited in escrow with a private bank to be disposed of only upon order of the
RTC.42
Accordingly, on June 9, 199543 and August 4, 1995,44 the BOC and the PDB entered into two
separate Escrow Agreements.45 The first agreement covered the first set of CB bills, while the
second agreement covered the second set of CB bills. The parties agreed to jointly collect from
the BSP the maturity proceeds of these CB bills and to deposit said amount in escrow, "pending
final determination by Court judgment, or amicable settlement as to who shall be eventually
entitled thereto." 46 The BOC and the PDB filed a Joint Motion,47 submitting these Escrow
Agreements for court approval. The RTC gave its approval to the parties’ Joint
Motion.48 Accordingly, the BSP released the maturity proceeds of the CB bills by crediting the
Demand Deposit Account of the PDB and of the BOC with 50% each of the maturity proceeds of
the amount in escrow.49
In view of the BOC’s acquisition of all the CB bills, All Asia50 moved to be dropped as a
respondent (with the PDB’s conformity51 ), which the RTC granted.52 The RCBC subsequently
followed suit.53
In light of the developments, on May 4, 1998, the RTC required the parties to manifest their
intention regarding the case and to inform the court of any amicable settlement; "otherwise,
th[e] case shall be dismissed for lack of interest."54 Complying with the RTC’s order, the BOC
moved (i) that the case be set for pre-trial and (ii) for further proceeding to resolve the
remaining issues between the BOC and the PDB, particularly on "who has a better right over the
subject CB bills."55 The PDB joined the BOC in its motion.56
On September 28, 2000, the RTC granted the BSP’s motion to interplead and, accordingly,
required the BOC to amend its Answer and for the conflicting claimants to comment
thereon.57 In October 2000, the BOC filed its Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim, reiterating its earlier arguments asserting ownership over the subject CB bills.58
In the alternative, the BOC added that even assuming that there was no effective transfer of the
nine CB bills ultimately to the BOC, the PDB remains obligated to deliver to the BOC, as buyer in
the April 15 transaction and ultimate successor-in-interest of the buyer (Bancap) in the April 19
transaction, either the original subjects of the sales or the value thereof, plus whatever income
that may have been earned during the pendency of the case.59
That BOC prayed:
1. To declare BOC as the rightful owner of the nine (9) CB bills and as the party
entitled to the proceeds thereof as well as all income earned pursuant to the two (2)
Escrow Agreements entered into by BOC and PDB.
2. In the alternative, ordering PDB to deliver the original subject of the sales
transactions or the value thereof and whatever income earned by way of interest at
prevailing rate.
Without any opposition or objection from the PDB, on February 23, 2001, the RTC admitted60 the
BOC’s Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims.
In May 2001, the PDB filed an Omnibus Motion,61 questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction over the
BOC’s "additional counterclaims." The PDB argues that its petitions pray for the BSP (not the
RTC) to determine who among the conflicting claimants to the CB bills stands in the position of
the bona fide holder for value. The RTC cannot entertain the BOC’s counterclaim, regardless of
its nature, because it is the BSP which has jurisdiction to determine who is entitled to receive
the proceeds of the CB bills.
The BOC opposed62 the PDB’s Omnibus Motion. The PDB filed its Reply.63
3
In a January 10, 2002 Order, the RTC dismissed the PDB’s petition, the BOC’s counterclaim and
the BSP’s counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader, holding that under CB Circular No. 28,
it has no jurisdiction (i) over the BOC’s "counterclaims" and (ii) to resolve the issue of ownership
of the CB bills.64 With the denial of their separate motions for Reconsideration,65 the BOC and the
BSP separately filed the present petitions for review on certiorari.66
THE BOC’S and THE BSP’S PETITIONS
The BOC argues that the present cases do not fall within the limited provision of Section 10 (d)
4 of CB Circular No. 28, which contemplates only of three situations: first, where the fraudulent
assignment is not coupled with a notice to the BSP, it can grant no relief; second, where the
fraudulent assignment is coupled with a notice of fraud to the BSP, it will make a notation
against the assignment and require the owner and the holder to substantiate their claims; and
third, where the case does not fall on either of the first two situations, the BSP will have to await
action on the assignment pending settlement of the case, whether by agreement or by court
order.
The PDB’s case cannot fall under the first two situations. With particular regard to the second
situation, CB Circular No. 28 requires that the conflict must be between an "owner" and a
"holder," for the BSP to exercise its limited jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims; and the
word "owner" here refers to the registered owner giving notice of the fraud to the BSP. The PDB,
however, is not the registered owner nor is it in possession (holder) of the CB
bills.67 Consequently, the PDB’s case can only falls under the third situation which leaves the
RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, with the authority to resolve the issue of ownership of a
registered bond (the CB bills) not falling in either of the first two situations.
The BOC asserts that the policy consideration supportive of its interpretation of CB Circular No.
28 is to have a reliable system to protect the registered owner; should he file a notice with the
BSP about a fraudulent assignment of certain CB bills, the BSP simply has to look at its books to
determine who is the owner of the CB bills fraudulently assigned. Since it is only the registered
owner who complied with the BSP’s requirement of recording an assignment in the BSP’s books,
then "the protective mantle of administrative proceedings" should necessarily benefit him only,
without extending the same benefit to those who chose to ignore the Circular’s requirement, like
the PDB.68
Assuming arguendo that the PDB’s case falls under the second situation – i.e., the BSP has
jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership of the CB bills – the more recent CB Circular No.
769-80 (Rules and Regulations Governing Central Bank Certificates of Indebtedness) already
superseded CB Circular No. 28, and, in particular, effectively amended Section 10 (d) 4 of CB
Circular No. 28. The pertinent provisions of CB Circular No. 769-80 read:
Assignment Affected by Fraud. – Any assignment for transfer of ownership of registered
certificate obtained through fraudulent representation if honored by the Central Bank or any of
its authorized service agencies shall not make the Central Bank or agency liable therefore unless
it has previous formal notice of the fraud. The Central Bank, upon notice under oath that the
assignment was secured through fraudulent means, shall immediately issue and circularize a
"stop order" against the transfer, exchange, redemption of the Certificate including the payment
of interest coupons. The Central Bank or service agency concerned shall continue to withhold
action on the certificate until such time that the conflicting claims have been finally settled
either by amicable settlement between the parties or by order of the Court.
Unlike CB Circular No. 28, CB Circular No. 769-80 limited the BSP’s authority to the mere
issuance and circularization of a "stop order" against the transfer, exchange and redemption
upon sworn notice of a fraudulent assignment. Under this Circular, the BSP shall only continue
to withhold action until the dispute is ended by an amicable settlement or by judicial
determination. Given the more passive stance of the BSP – the very agency tasked to enforce
the circulars involved - under CB Circular No. 769-80, the RTC’s dismissal of the BOC’s
counterclaims is palpably erroneous.
Lastly, since Nuqui’s office (Government Securities Department) had already been abolished,69 it
can no longer adjudicate the dispute under the second situation covered by CB Circular No. 28.
The abolition of Nuqui’s office is not only consistent with the BSP’s Charter but, more
importantly, with CB Circular No. 769-80, which removed the BSP’s adjudicative authority over
fraudulent assignments.
THE PDB’S COMMENT
The PDB claims that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint/petition and
not by the defenses set up in the answer.70 In filing the petition with the RTC, the PDB merely
seeks to compel the BSP to determine, pursuant to CB Circular No. 28, the party legally entitled
to the proceeds of the subject CB bills, which, as the PDB alleged, have been transferred
through fraudulent representations – an allegation which properly recognized the BSP’s
jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of ownership over the CB bills.
The PDB adds that under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts should refrain from
determining a controversy involving a question whose resolution demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion. In the present case, the BSP’s special knowledge and experience in
resolving disputes on securities, whose assignment and trading are governed by the BSP’s rules,
should be upheld.
The PDB counters that the BOC’s tri-fold interpretation of Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28
sanctions split jurisdiction which is not favored;but even this tri-fold interpretation which, in the
second situation, limits the meaning of the "owner" to the registered owner is flawed. Section 10
(d) 4 aims to protect not just the registered owner but anyone who has been deprived of his
bond by fraudulent representation in order to deter fraud in the secondary trading of
government securities.
The PDB asserts that the existence of CB Circular No. 769-80 or the abolition of Nuqui’s office
does not result in depriving the BSP of its jurisdiction: first, CB Circular No. 769-80 expressly
provides that CB Circular No. 28 shall have suppletory application to CB Circular No. 769-80;
and second, the BSP can always designate an office to resolve the PDB’s claim over the CB bills.
Lastly, the PDB argues that even assuming that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of
ownership of the CB bills, the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over the BOC’s so-called
"compulsory" counterclaims (which in truth is merely "permissive") because of the BOC’s failure
to pay the appropriate docket fees. These counterclaims should, therefore, be dismissed and
expunged from the record.
THE COURT’S RULING
We grant the petitions.
At the outset, we note that the parties have not raised the validity of either CB Circular No. 28
or CB Circular No. 769-80 as an issue. What the parties largely contest is the applicable circular
in case of an allegedly fraudulently assigned CB bill. The applicable circular, in turn, is
determinative of the proper remedy available to the PDB and/or the BOC as claimants to the
proceeds of the subject CB bills.
Indisputably, at the time the PDB supposedly invoked the jurisdiction of the BSP in 1994 (by
requesting for the annotation of its claim over the subject CB bills in the BSP’s books), CB
4
Circular No. 769-80 has long been in effect. Therefore, the parties’ respective interpretations of
the provision of Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 do not have any significance unless it is
first established that that Circular governs the resolution of their conflicting claims of ownership.
This conclusion is important, given the supposed repeal or modification of Section 10 (d) 4 of CB
Circular No. 28 by the following provisions of CB Circular No. 769-80:
ARTICLE XI
SUPPLEMENTAL RULES
Section 1. Central Bank Circular No. 28 – The provisions of Central Bank Circular No. 28 shall
have suppletory application to matters not specially covered by these Rules.
ARTICLE XII
EFFECTIVITY
Effectivity – The rules and regulations herein prescribed shall take effect upon approval by the
Monetary Board, Central Bank of the Philippines, and all circulars, memoranda, or office orders
inconsistent herewith are revoked or modified accordingly. (Emphases added)
We agree with the PDB that in view of CB Circular No. 28’s suppletory application, an attempt to
harmonize the apparently conflicting provisions is a prerequisite before one may possibly
conclude that an amendment or a repeal exists.71 Interestingly, however, even the PDB itself
failed to submit an interpretation based on its own position of harmonization.
The repealing clause of CB Circular No. 769-80 obviously did not expressly repeal CB Circular
No. 28; in fact, it even provided for the suppletory application of CB Circular No. 28 on "matters
not specially covered by" CB Circular No. 769-80. While no express repeal exists, the intent of
CB Circular No. 769-80 to operate as an implied repeal,72 or at least to amend earlier CB
circulars, is supported by its text "revoking" or "modif[ying" "all circulars" which are inconsistent
with its terms.
At the outset, we stress that none of the parties disputes that the subject CB bills fall within the
category of a certificate or evidence of indebtedness and that these were issued by the Central
Bank, now the BSP. Thus, even without resorting to statutory construction aids, matters
involving the subject CB bills should necessarily be governed by CB Circular No. 769-80. Even
granting, however, that reliance on CB Circular No. 769-80 alone is not enough, we find that CB
Circular No. 769-80 impliedly repeals CB Circular No. 28.
An implied repeal transpires when a substantial conflict exists between the new and the prior
laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a
prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new
and the old laws.73 Repeal by implication is not favored, unless manifestly intended by the
legislature, or unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated, that the laws or
orders are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent with one another so that they cannot co-
exist; the legislature is presumed to know the existing law and would express a repeal if one is
intended.74
There are two instances of implied repeal. One takes place when the provisions in the two acts
on the same subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, in which case, the later act, to the
extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The other occurs when the
later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute; thus,
it will operate to repeal the earlier law.75
A general reading of the two circulars shows that the second instance of implied repeal is
present in this case. CB Circular No. 28, entitled "Regulations Governing Open Market
Operations, Stabilization of Securities Market, Issue, Servicing and Redemption of Public Debt,"
is a regulation governing the servicing and redemption of public debt, including the issue,
inscription, registration, transfer, payment and replacement of bonds and securities
representing the public debt.76 On the other hand, CB Circular No. 769-80, entitled "Rules and
Regulations Governing Central Bank Certificate of Indebtedness," is the governing regulation on
matters77 (i) involving certificate of indebtedness78 issued by the Central Bank itself and (ii)
which are similarly covered by CB Circular No. 28.
The CB Monetary Board issued CB Circular No. 28 to regulate the servicing and redemption of
public debt, pursuant to Section 124 (now Section 119 of Republic Act R.A. No. 7653) of the old
Central Bank law79 which provides that "the servicing and redemption of the public debt shall
also be effected through the Bangko Sentral." However, even as R.A. No. 7653 continued to
recognize this role by the BSP, the law required a phase-out of all fiscal agency functions by the
BSP, including Section 119 of R.A. No. 7653.
In other words, even if CB Circular No. 28 applies broadly to both government-issued bonds and
securities and Central Bank-issued evidence of indebtedness, given the present state of law, CB
Circular No. 28 and CB Circular No. 769-80 now operate on the same subject – Central Bank-
issued evidence of indebtedness. Under Section 1, Article XI of CB Circular No. 769-80, the
continued relevance and application of CB Circular No. 28 would depend on the need to
supplement any deficiency or silence in CB Circular No. 769-80 on a particular matter.
In the present case, both CB Circular No. 28 and CB Circular No. 769-80 provide the BSP with a
course of action in case of an allegedly fraudulently assigned certificate of indebtedness. Under
CB Circular No. 28, in case of fraudulent assignments, the BSP would have to "call upon the
owner and the person presenting the bond to substantiate their respective claims" and, from
there, determine who has a better right over the registered bond. On the other hand, under CB
Circular No. 769-80, the BSP shall merely "issue and circularize a ‘stop order’ against the
transfer, exchange, redemption of the [registered] certificate" without any adjudicative function
(which is the precise root of the present controversy). As the two circulars stand, the patent
irreconcilability of these two provisions does not require elaboration. Section 5, Article V of CB
Circular No. 769-80 inescapably repealed Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28.
The issue of BSP’s jurisdiction, lay hidden
On that note, the Court could have written finis to the present controversy by simply sustaining
the BSP’s hands-off approach to the PDB’s problem under CB Circular No. 769-80. However, the
jurisdictional provision of CB Circular No. 769-80 itself, in relation to CB Circular No. 28, on the
matter of fraudulent assignment, has given rise to a question of jurisdiction - the core question
of law involved in these petitions - which the Court cannot just treat sub-silencio.
Broadly speaking, jurisdiction is the legal power or authority to hear and determine a cause.80 In
the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power, it refers to the authority of a court to hear and
decide a case.81 In the context of these petitions, we hark back to the basic principles governing
the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
First, jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined only by the Constitution and by law.82 As
a matter of substantive law, procedural rules alone can confer no jurisdiction to courts or
administrative agencies.83 In fact, an administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity,
is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such powers that are
specifically granted to it by the enabling statutes. In contrast, an RTC is a court of general
jurisdiction, i.e., it has jurisdiction over cases whose subject matter does not fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.84
5
Second, jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined not by the pleas set up by the
defendant in his answer85 but by the allegations in the complaint,86 irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to favorable judgment on the basis of his assertions.87 The reason is that the
complaint is supposed to contain a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff's causes of action.88
Third, jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the filing of the complaint.89
Parenthetically, the Court observes that none of the parties ever raised the issue of whether the
BSP can simply disown its jurisdiction, assuming it has, by the simple expedient of promulgating
a new circular (specially applicable to a certificate of indebtedness issued by the BSP itself),
inconsistent with an old circular, assertive of its limited jurisdiction over ownership issues arising
from fraudulent assignments of a certificate of indebtedness. The PDB, in particular, relied solely
and heavily on CB Circular No. 28.
In light of the above principles pointing to jurisdiction as a matter of substantive law, the
provisions of the law itself that gave CB Circular 769-80 its life and jurisdiction must be
examined.
The Philippine Central Bank
On January 3, 1949, Congress created the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank) as a
corporate body with the primary objective of (i) maintaining the internal and external monetary
stability in the Philippines; and (ii) preserving the international value and the convertibility of
the peso.90 In line with these broad objectives, the Central Bank was empowered to issue rules
and regulations "necessary for the effective discharge of the responsibilities and exercise of the
powers assigned to the Monetary Board and to the Central Bank."91 Specifically, the Central Bank
is authorized to organize (other) departments for the efficient conduct of its business and whose
powers and duties "shall be determined by the Monetary Board, within the authority granted to
the Board and the Central Bank"92 under its original charter.
With the 1973 Constitution, the then Central Bank was constitutionally made as the country’s
central monetary authority until such time that Congress93 shall have established a central bank.
The 1987 Constitution continued to recognize this function of the then Central Bank until
Congress, pursuant to the Constitution, created a new central monetary authority which later
came to be known as the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Under the New Central Bank Act (R.A. No. 7653),94 the BSP is given the responsibility of
providing policy directions in the areas of money, banking and credit; it is given, too, the
primary objective of maintaining price stability, conducive to a balanced and sustainable growth
of the economy, and of promoting and maintaining monetary stability and convertibility of the
peso.95
The Constitution expressly grants the BSP, as the country’s central monetary authority, the
power of supervision over the operation of banks, while leaving with Congress the authority to
define the BSP’s regulatory powers over the operations of finance companies and other
institutions performing similar functions. Under R.A. No. 7653, the BSP’s powers and functions
include (i) supervision over the operation of banks; (ii) regulation of operations of finance
companies and non-bank financial institutions performing quasi banking functions; (iii) sole
power and authority to issue currency within the Philippine territory; (iv) engaging in foreign
exchange transactions; (v) making rediscounts, discounts, loans and advances to banking and
other financial institutions to influence the volume of credit consistent with the objective of
achieving price stability; (vi) engaging in open market operations; and (vii) acting as banker
and financial advisor of the government.1âwphi1
On the BSP’s power of supervision over the operation of banks, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8791 (The
General Banking Law of 2000) elaborates as follows:
CHAPTER II
AUTHORITY OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL
SECTION 4. Supervisory Powers. — The operations and activities of banks shall be subject to
supervision of the Bangko Sentral. "Supervision" shall include the following:
4.1. The issuance of rules of conduct or the establishment of standards of operation
for uniform application to all institutions or functions covered, taking into
consideration the distinctive character of the operations of institutions and the
substantive similarities of specific functions to which such rules, modes or standards
are to be applied;
4.2. The conduct of examination to determine compliance with laws and regulations if
the circumstances so warrant as determined by the Monetary Board;
4.3. Overseeing to ascertain that laws and regulations are complied with;
4.4. Regular investigation which shall not be oftener than once a year from the last
date of examination to determine whether an institution is conducting its business on
a safe or sound basis: Provided, That the deficiencies/irregularities found by or
discovered by an audit shall be immediately addressed;
4.5. Inquiring into the solvency and liquidity of the institution (2-D); or
4.6. Enforcing prompt corrective action. (n)
The Bangko Sentral shall also have supervision over the operations of and exercise regulatory
powers over quasi-banks, trust entities and other financial institutions which under special laws
are subject to Bangko Sentral supervision. (2-Ca)
For the purposes of this Act, "quasi-banks" shall refer to entities engaged in the borrowing of
funds through the issuance, endorsement or assignment with recourse or acceptance of deposit
substitutes as defined in Section 95 of Republic Act No. 7653 (hereafter the "New Central Bank
Act") for purposes of relending or purchasing of receivables and other obligations. [emphasis
ours]
While this provision empowers the BSP to oversee the operations and activities of banks to
"ascertain that laws and regulations are complied with," the existence of the BSP’s jurisdiction in
the present dispute cannot rely on this provision. The fact remains that the BSP already made
known to the PDB its unfavorable position on the latter’s claim of fraudulent assignment due to
the latter’s own failure to comply96 with existing regulations:
In this connection, Section 10 (b) 2 also requires that a "Detached assignment will be
recognized or accepted only upon previous notice to the Central Bank x x x." In fact, in a memo
dated September 23, 1991 xxx then CB Governor Jose L. Cuisia advised all banks (including
PDB) xxx as follows:
In view recurring incidents ostensibly disregarding certain provisions of CB circular No. 28 (as
amended) covering assignments of registered bonds, all banks and all concerned are enjoined to
observe strictly the pertinent provisions of said CB Circular as hereunder quoted:
6
xxxx
Under Section 10.b. (2)
x x x Detached assignment will be recognized or accepted only upon previous notice to the
Central Bank and its use is authorized only under the following circumstances:
(a) x x x
(b) x x x
(c) assignments of treasury notes and certificates of indebtedness in registered form
which are not provided at the back thereof with assignment form.
(d) Assignment of securities which have changed ownership several times.
(e) x x x
Non-compliance herewith will constitute a basis for non-action or withholding of action on
redemption/payment of interest coupons/transfer transactions or denominational exchange that
may be directly affected thereby. [Boldfacing supplied]
Again, the books of the BSP do not show that the supposed assignment of subject CB Bills was
ever recorded in the BSP’s books. [Boldfacing supplied]
However, the PDB faults the BSP for not recording the assignment of the CB bills in the PDB’s
favor despite the fact that the PDB already requested the BSP to record its assignment in the
BSP’s books as early as June 30, 1994.97
The PDB’s claim is not accurate. What the PDB requested the BSP on that date was not the
recording of the assignment of the CB bills in its favor but the annotation of its claim over the
CB bills at the time when (i) it was no longer in possession of the CB bills, having been
transferred from one entity to another and (ii) all it has are the detached assignments, which
the PDB has not shown to be compliant with Section 10 (b) 2 above-quoted. Obviously, the PDB
cannot insist that the BSP take cognizance of its plaint when the basis of the BSP’s refusal under
existing regulation, which the PDB is bound to observe, is the PDB’s own failure to comply
therewith.
True, the BSP exercises supervisory powers (and regulatory powers) over banks (and quasi
banks). The issue presented before the Court, however, does not concern the BSP’s supervisory
power over banks as this power is understood under the General Banking Law. In fact, there is
nothing in the PDB’s petition (even including the letters it sent to the BSP) that would support
the BSP’s jurisdiction outside of CB Circular No. 28, under its power of supervision, over
conflicting claims to the proceeds of the CB bills.
BSP has quasi-judicial powers over a
class of cases which does not include
the adjudication of ownership of the
CB bills in question
In United Coconut Planters Bank v. E. Ganzon, Inc.,98 the Court considered the BSP as an
administrative agency,99 exercising quasi-judicial functions through its Monetary Board. It held:
A quasi-judicial agency or body is an organ of government other than a court and other than a
legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.
The very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial
powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies
recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for
technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by
regular courts. A "quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc.,
of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official
action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
Undoubtedly, the BSP Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial powers
or functions. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, the BSP Monetary Board is an
independent central monetary authority and a body corporate with fiscal and administrative
autonomy, mandated to provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking and credit. It
has power to issue subpoena, to sue for contempt those refusing to obey the subpoena without
justifiable reason, to administer oaths and compel presentation of books, records and others,
needed in its examination, to impose fines and other sanctions and to issue cease and desist
order. Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653, in particular, explicitly provides that the BSP
Monetary Board shall exercise its discretion in determining whether administrative sanctions
should be imposed on banks and quasi-banks, which necessarily implies that the BSP Monetary
Board must conduct some form of investigation or hearing regarding the same. [citations
omitted]
The BSP is not simply a corporate entity but qualifies as an administrative agency created,
pursuant to constitutional mandate,100 to carry out a particular governmental function.101 To be
able to perform its role as central monetary authority, the Constitution granted it fiscal and
administrative autonomy. In general, administrative agencies exercise powers and/or functions
which may be characterized as administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or
quasi-judicial, or a mix of these five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute.102
While the very nature of an administrative agency and the raison d'être for its creation103 and
proliferation dictate a grant of quasi-judicial power to it, the matters over which it may exercise
this power must find sufficient anchorage on its enabling law, either by express provision or by
necessary implication. Once found, the quasi-judicial power partakes of the nature of a limited
and special jurisdiction, that is, to hear and determine a class of cases within its peculiar
competence and expertise. In other words, the provisions of the enabling statute are the
yardsticks by which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers an
administrative agency may exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such agency.104
Scattered provisions in R.A. No. 7653 and R.A. No. 8791, inter alia, exist, conferring jurisdiction
on the BSP on certain matters.105 For instance, under the situations contemplated under Section
36, par. 2106 (where a bank or quasi bank persists in carrying on its business in an unlawful or
unsafe manner) and Section 37107 (where the bank or its officers willfully violate the bank’s
charter or by-laws, or the rules and regulations issued by the Monetary Board) of R.A. No. 7653,
the BSP may place an entity under receivership and/or liquidation or impose administrative
sanctions upon the entity or its officers or directors.
Among its several functions under R.A. No. 7653, the BSP is authorized to engage in open
market operations and thereby "issue, place, buy and sell freely negotiable evidences of
indebtedness of the Bangko Sentral" in the following manner.
SEC. 90. Principles of Open Market Operations. – The open market purchases and sales of
securities by the Bangko Sentral shall be made exclusively in accordance with its primary
objective of achieving price stability.
xxxx
7
SEC. 92. Issue and Negotiation of Bangko Sentral Obligations. – In order to provide the Bangko
Sentral with effective instruments for open market operations, the Bangko Sentral may, subject
to such rules and regulations as the Monetary Board may prescribe and in accordance with the
principles stated in Section 90 of this Act, issue, place, buy and sell freely negotiable evidences
of indebtedness of the Bangko Sentral: Provided, That issuance of such certificates of
indebtedness shall be made only in cases of extraordinary movement in price levels. Said
evidences of indebtedness may be issued directly against the international reserve of the
Bangko Sentral or against the securities which it has acquired under the provisions of Section 91
of this Act, or may be issued without relation to specific types of assets of the Bangko Sentral.
The Monetary Board shall determine the interest rates, maturities and other characteristics of
said obligations of the Bangko Sentral, and may, if it deems it advisable, denominate the
obligations in gold or foreign currencies.
Subject to the principles stated in Section 90 of this Act, the evidences of indebtedness of the
Bangko Sentral to which this section refers may be acquired by the Bangko Sentral before their
maturity, either through purchases in the open market or through redemptions at par and by lot
if the Bangko Sentral has reserved the right to make such redemptions. The evidences of
indebtedness acquired or redeemed by the Bangko Sentral shall not be included among its
assets, and shall be immediately retired and cancelled.108 (italics supplied; emphases ours)
The primary objective of the BSP is to maintain price stability.109 The BSP has a number of
monetary policy instruments at its disposal to promote price stability. To increase or reduce
liquidity in the financial system, the BSP uses open market operations, among others.110 Open
market operation is a monetary tool where the BSP publicly buys or sells government
securities111 from (or to) banks and financial institutions in order to expand or contract the
supply of money. By controlling the money supply, the BSP is able to exert some influence on
the prices of goods and services and achieve its inflation objectives.112
Once the issue and/or sale of a security is made, the BSP would necessarily make a
determination, in accordance with its own rules, of the entity entitled to receive the proceeds of
the security upon its maturity. This determination by the BSP is an exercise of its administrative
powers113 under the law as an incident to its power to prescribe rules and regulations governing
open market operations to achieve the "primary objective of achieving price stability."114 As a
matter of necessity, too, the same rules and regulations facilitate transaction with the BSP by
providing for an orderly manner of, among others, issuing, transferring, exchanging and paying
securities representing public debt.
Significantly, when competing claims of ownership over the proceeds of the securities it has
issued are brought before it, the law has not given the BSP the quasi-judicial power to resolve
these competing claims as part of its power to engage in open market operations. Nothing in the
BSP’s charter confers on the BSP the jurisdiction or authority to determine this kind of claims,
arising out of a subsequent transfer or assignment of evidence of indebtedness – a matter that
appropriately falls within the competence of courts of general jurisdiction. That the statute
withholds this power from the BSP is only consistent with the fundamental reasons for the
creation of a Philippine central bank, that is, to lay down stable monetary policy and exercise
bank supervisory functions. Thus, the BSP’s assumption of jurisdiction over competing claims
cannot find even a stretched-out justification under its corporate powers "to do and perform any
and all things that may be necessary or proper to carry out the purposes" of R.A. No. 7653. 115
To reiterate, open market operation is a monetary policy instrument that the BSP employs,
among others, to regulate the supply of money in the economy to influence the timing, cost and
availability of money and credit, as well as other financial factors, for the purpose of stabilizing
the price level.116 What the law grants the BSP is a continuing role to shape and carry out the
country’s monetary policy – not the authority to adjudicate competing claims of ownership over
the securities it has issued – since this authority would not fall under the BSP’s purposes under
its charter.
While R.A. No. 7653117 empowers the BSP to conduct administrative hearings and render
judgment for or against an entity under its supervisory and regulatory powers and even
authorizes the BSP Governor to "render decisions, or rulings x x x on matters regarding
application or enforcement of laws pertaining to institutions supervised by the BSP and laws
pertaining to quasi-banks, as well as regulations, policies or instructions issued by the Monetary
Board," it is precisely the text of the BSP’s own regulation (whose validity is not here raised as
an issue) that points to the BSP’s limited role in case of an allegedly fraudulent assignment to
simply (i) issuing and circularizing a ‘"stop order" against the transfer, exchange, redemption of
the certificate of indebtedness, including the payment of interest coupons, and (ii) withholding
action on the certificate.
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the BSP’s administrative adjudicatory power in cases of
"willful failure or refusal to comply with, or violation of, any banking law or any order,
instruction or regulation issued by the Monetary Board, or any order, instruction or ruling by the
Governor."118 The non-compliance with the pertinent requirements under CB Circular No. 28, as
amended, deprives a party from any right to demand payment from the BSP.
In other words, the grant of quasi-judicial authority to the BSP cannot possibly extend to
situations which do not call for the exercise by the BSP of its supervisory or regulatory functions
over entities within its jurisdiction.119
The fact alone that the parties involved are banking institutions does not necessarily call for the
exercise by the BSP of its quasi-judicial powers under the law.120
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
argues against BSP’s purported
authority to adjudicate ownership
issues over the disputed CB bills
Given the preceding discussions, even the PDB’s invocation of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is misplaced.
In the exercise of its plenary legislative power, Congress may create administrative agencies
endowed with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. Necessarily, Congress likewise defines
the limits of an agency’s jurisdiction in the same manner as it defines the jurisdiction of
courts.121 As a result, it may happen that either a court or an administrative agency has
exclusive jurisdiction over a specific matter or both have concurrent jurisdiction on the same. It
may happen, too, that courts and agencies may willingly relinquish adjudicatory power that is
rightfully theirs in favor of the other. One of the instances when a court may properly defer to
the adjudicatory authority of an agency is the applicability of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.122
As early as 1954, the Court applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction under the following
terms:
6. In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in administrative
commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized disputes xxx ruled that Congress in
requiring the Industrial Court's intervention in the resolution of labor-management controversies
xxx meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law.
The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction ...
the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of
ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered."123 (emphasis ours)
8
In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,124 the Court ruled that while an action for
rescission of a contract between coal developers appears to be an action cognizable by regular
courts, the trial court remains to be without jurisdiction to entertain the suit since the contract
sought to be rescinded is "inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and
the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal operating contract over the subject
coal blocks to [the plaintiff] would be in line with the country’s national program and objective
on coal-development and over-all coal-supply-demand balance." It then applied the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction –
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative
agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case,
which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such
that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then
relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by
the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts,
and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body."
Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of
what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal
operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the Bureau of Energy
Development as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on
the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning
activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral
resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. [emphases ours]
The absence of any express or implied statutory power to adjudicate conflicting claims of
ownership or entitlement to the proceeds of its certificates of indebtedness finds complement in
the similar absence of any technical matter that would call for the BSP’s special expertise or
competence.125 In fact, what the PDB’s petitions bear out is essentially the nature of the
transaction it had with the subsequent transferees of the subject CB bills (BOC and Bancap) and
not any matter more appropriate for special determination by the BSP or any administrative
agency.
In a similar vein, it is well-settled that the interpretation given to a rule or regulation by those
charged with its execution is entitled to the greatest weight by the courts construing such rule
or regulation.126 While there are exceptions127 to this rule, the PDB has not convinced us that a
departure is warranted in this case. Given the non-applicability of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the BSP’s own position, in light of Circular No. 769-80, deserves respect from the
Court.
Ordinarily, cases involving the application of doctrine of primary jurisdiction are initiated by an
action invoking the jurisdiction of a court or administrative agency to resolve the substantive
legal conflict between the parties. In this sense, the present case is quite unique since the
court’s jurisdiction was, originally, invoked to compel an administrative agency (the BSP) to
resolve the legal conflict of ownership over the CB bills - instead of obtaining a judicial
determination of the same dispute.
The remedy of interpleader
Based on the unique factual premise of the present case, the RTC acted correctly in initially
assuming jurisdiction over the PDB’s petition for mandamus, prohibition and injunction.128 While
the RTC agreed (albeit erroneously) with the PDB’s view (that the BSP has jurisdiction), it,
however, dismissed not only the BOC’s/the BSP’s counterclaims but the PDB’s petition itself as
well, on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction.
This is plain error.
Not only the parties themselves, but more so the courts, are bound by the rule on non-waiver of
jurisdiction.129 believes that jurisdiction over the BOC’s counterclaims and the BSP’s
counterclaim/crossclaim for interpleader calls for the application of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the allowance of the PDB’s petition even becomes imperative because courts may
raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte.130
Of the three possible options available to the RTC, the adoption of either of these two would
lead the trial court into serious legal error: first, if it granted the PDB’s petition, its decision
would have to be set aside on appeal because the BSP has no jurisdiction as previously
discussed; and second when it dismissed the PDB’s petitions and the BOC’s counterclaims on
the ground that it lacks jurisdiction, the trial court seriously erred because precisely, the
resolution of the conflicting claims over the CB bills falls within its general jurisdiction.
Without emasculating its jurisdiction, the RTC could have properly dismissed the PDB’s petition
but on the ground that mandamus does not lie against the BSP; but even this correct alternative
is no longer plausible since the BSP, as a respondent below, already properly brought before the
RTC the remaining conflicting claims over the subject CB bills by way of a
counterclaim/crossclaim for interpleader. Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides when
an interpleader is proper:
SECTION 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject
matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject
matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring
an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several
claims among themselves.
The remedy of an action of interpleader131 is designed to protect a person against double
vexation in respect of a single liability.7 It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting
claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the stakeholder (the
possessor of the subject matter) who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an
interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants.132
Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single proceeding to
determine conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having to pay
more than once on a single liability.133
When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, in reality a new action
arises,134 where the claims of the interpleaders themselves are brought to the fore, the
stakeholder as plaintiff is relegated merely to the role of initiating the suit. In short, the remedy
of interpleader, when proper, merely provides an avenue for the conflicting claims on the same
subject matter to be threshed out in an action. Section 2 of Rule 62 provides:
SEC. 2. Order. – Upon the filing of the complaint, the court shall issue an order requiring the
conflicting claimants to interplead with one another. If the interests of justice so require, the
court may direct in such order that the subject matter be paid or delivered to the court.
This is precisely what the RTC did by granting the BSP’s motion to interplead. The PDB itself
"agreed that the various claimants should now interplead." Thus, the PDB and the BOC
subsequently entered into two separate escrow agreements, covering the CB bills, and
submitted them to the RTC for approval.
9
In granting the BSP’s motion, the RTC acted on the correct premise that it has jurisdiction to
resolve the parties’ conflicting claims over the CB bills - consistent with the rules and the
parties’ conduct - and accordingly required the BOC to amend its answer and for the PDB to
comment thereon. Suddenly, however, the PDB made an about-face and questioned the
jurisdiction of the RTC. Swayed by the PDB’s argument, the RTC dismissed even the PDB’s
petition - which means that it did not actually compel the BSP to resolve the BOC’s and the
PDB’s claims.
Without the motion to interplead and the order granting it, the RTC could only dismiss the PDB’s
petition since it is the RTC which has jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ conflicting claims – not
the BSP. Given that the motion to interplead has been actually filed, the RTC could not have
really granted the relief originally sought in the PDB’s petition since the RTC’s order granting the
BSP’s motion to interplead - to which the PDB in fact acquiesced into - effectively resulted in the
dismissal of the PDB’s petition. This is not altered by the fact that the PDB additionally prayed in
its petition for damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit "against the public respondents"
because the grant of the order to interplead effectively sustained the propriety of the BSP’s
resort to this procedural device.
Interpleader
1. as a special civil action
What is quite unique in this case is that the BSP did not initiate the interpleader suit through an
original complaint but through its Answer. This circumstance becomes understandable if it is
considered that insofar as the BSP is concerned, the PDB does not possess any right to have its
claim recorded in the BSP’s books; consequently, the PDB cannot properly be considered even
as a potential claimant to the proceeds of the CB bills upon maturity. Thus, the interpleader was
only an alternative position, made only in the BSP’s Answer.135
The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is primarily governed by the specific
provisions in Rule 62 of the Rules of Court and secondarily by the provisions applicable to
ordinary civil actions.136 Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-
in-interpleader as part of, although separate and independent from, the answer. Similarly,
Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court137 does not include a
complaint-in-interpleader as a claim,138 a form of defense,139 or as an objection that a defendant
may be allowed to put up in his answer or in a motion to dismiss. This does not mean, however,
that the BSP’s "counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader" runs counter to general
procedures.
Apart from a pleading,140 the rules141 allow a party to seek an affirmative relief from the court
through the procedural device of a motion. While captioned "Answer with counter
complaint/cross-claim for interpleader," the RTC understood this as in the nature of a
motion,142 seeking relief which essentially consists in an order for the conflicting claimants to
litigate with each other so that "payment is made to the rightful or legitimate owner"143 of the
subject CB bills.
The rules define a "civil action" as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." Interpleader may be considered
as a stakeholder’s remedy to prevent a wrong, that is, from making payment to one not entitled
to it, thereby rendering itself vulnerable to lawsuit/s from those legally entitled to payment.
Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to govern the
uniqueness of its application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court,
governing ordinary civil actions, a party’s claim is asserted "in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-
claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention." In an interpleader suit,
however, a claim is not required to be contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-(of
the conflicting claimants)-in-interpleader. This claim is different from the counter-claim (or
cross-claim, third party-complaint) which is separately allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule
62.
2. the payment of docket fees covering BOC’s counterclaim
The PDB argues that, even assuming that the RTC has jurisdiction over the issue of ownership of
the CB bills, the BOC’s failure to pay the appropriate docket fees prevents the RTC from
acquiring jurisdiction over the BOC’s "counterclaims."
We disagree with the PDB.
To reiterate and recall, the order granting the "PDB’s motion to interplead," already resulted in
the dismissal of the PDB’s petition. The same order required the BOC to amend its answer and
for the conflicting claimants to comment, presumably to conform to the nature of an answer-in
interpleader. Perhaps, by reason of the BOC’s denomination of its claim as a "compulsory
counterclaim" and the PDB’s failure to fully appreciate the RTC’s order granting the "BSP’s
motion for interpleader" (with the PDB’s conformity), the PDB mistakenly treated the BOC’s
claim as a "permissive counterclaim" which necessitates the payment of docket fees.
As the preceding discussions would show, however, the BOC’s "claim" - i.e., its assertion of
ownership over the CB bills – is in reality just that, a "claim" against the stakeholder and not as
a "counterclaim," 144 whether compulsory145 or permissive. It is only the BOC’s alternative prayer
(for the PDB to deliver to the BOC, as the buyer in the April 15 transaction and the ultimate
successor-in-interest of the buyer in the April 19 transaction, either the original subjects of the
sales or the value thereof plus whatever income that may have been earned pendente lite) and
its prayer for damages that are obviously compulsory counterclaims against the PDB and,
therefore, does not require payment of docket fees.146
The PDB takes a contrary position through its insistence that a compulsory counterclaim should
be one where the presence of third parties, of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, is not
required. It reasons out that since the RCBC and All Asia (the intervening holders of the CB bills)
have already been dropped from the case, then the BOC’s counterclaim must only be permissive
in nature and the BOC should have paid the correct docket fees.
We see no reason to belabor this claim. Even if we gloss over the PDB’s own conformity to the
dropping of these entities as parties, the BOC correctly argues that a remedy is provided under
the Rules. Section 12, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 12. Bringing new parties. – When the presence of parties other than those to the original
action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or
cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them
can be obtained.
Even then, the strict characterization of the BOC’s counterclaim is no longer material in
disposing of the PDB’s argument based on non-payment of docket fees.
When an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the
requisite docket and filing fees by the party seeking affirmative relief from the court. It is the
filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, accompanied by the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the claim or the nature of the
action.147 However, the non-payment of the docket fee at the time of filing does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case, so long as the fee is paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, especially when the claimant demonstrates a willingness to
abide by the rules prescribing such payment.148
10
In the present case, considering the lack of a clear guideline on the payment of docket fee by
the claimants in an interpleader suit, compounded by the unusual manner in which the
interpleader suit was initiated and the circumstances surrounding it, we surely cannot deduce
from the BOC’s mere failure to specify in its prayer the total amount of the CB bills it lays claim
to (or the value of the subjects of the sales in the April 15 and April 19 transactions, in its
alternative prayer) an intention to defraud the government that would warrant the dismissal of
its claim.149
At any rate, regardless of the nature of the BOC’s "counterclaims," for purposes of payment of
filing fees, both the BOC and the PDB, properly as defendants-in-interpleader, must be assessed
the payment of the correct docket fee arising from their respective claims. The seminal case of
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion150 provides us guidance in the payment of docket
fees, to wit:
1. x x x Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but
in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable
time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
[underscoring ours]
This must be the rule considering that Section 7, Rule 62 of which reads:
SEC. 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and litigation expenses as liens. – The docket and
other lawful fees paid by the party who filed a complaint under this Rule, as well as the costs
and litigation expenses, shall constitute a lien or charge upon the subject matter of the action,
unless the court shall order otherwise.
only pertain to the docket and lawful fees to be paid by the one who initiated the interpleader
suit, and who, under the Rules, actually "claims no interest whatever in the subject matter." By
constituting a lien on the subject matter of the action, Section 7 in effect only aims to actually
compensate the complainant-in-interpleader, who happens to be the stakeholder unfortunate
enough to get caught in a legal crossfire between two or more conflicting claimants, for the
faultless trouble it found itself into. Since the defendants-in-interpleader are actually the ones
who make a claim - only that it was extraordinarily done through the procedural device of
interpleader - then to them devolves the duty to pay the docket fees prescribed under Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, as amended.151
The importance of paying the correct amount of docket fee cannot be overemphasized:
The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere triviality. These fees are necessary to defray
court expenses in the handling of cases. Consequently, in order to avoid tremendous losses to
the judiciary, and to the government as well, the payment of docket fees cannot be made
dependent on the outcome of the case, except when the claimant is a pauper-litigant.152
WHEREFORE, premises considered the consolidated PETITIONS are GRANTED. The Planters
Development Bank is hereby REQUIRED to file with the Regional Trial Court its comment or
answer-in-interpleader to Bank of Commerce’s Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim, as previously ordered by the Regional Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 143, is hereby ORDERED to assess the docket fees due from Planters
Development Bank and Bank of Commerce and order their payment, and to resolve with
DELIBERATE DISPATCH the parties’ conflicting claims of ownership over the proceeds of the
Central Bank bills.
The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, or his duly authorized
representative is hereby ORDERED to assess and collect the appropriate amount of docket fees
separately due the Bank of Commerce and Planters Development Bank as conflicting claimants
in Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas’ interpleader suit, in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 150806 - January 28, 2008]
EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA, Petitioners, v. BATHALA MARKETING
INDUSTRIES, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 3, 2001, in CA-G.R. CV No. 67784, and its
Resolution2 dated November 19, 2001. The assailed Decision affirmed with modification the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 136, dated May 9, 2000 in Civil
Case No. 98-411.
Sometime in May 1997, respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, represented
by its president Ramon H. Garcia, renewed its Contract of Lease4 with Ponciano L. Almeda
(Ponciano), as lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia and father of petitioner Romel Almeda.
Under the said contract, Ponciano agreed to lease a portion of the Almeda Compound, located at
2208 Pasong Tamo Street, Makati City, consisting of 7,348.25 square meters, for a monthly
rental of P1,107,348.69, for a term of four (4) years from May 1, 1997 unless sooner
terminated as provided in the contract.5 The contract of lease contained the following pertinent
provisions which gave rise to the instant case:
SIXTH - It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the rental rate stipulated is based
on the present rate of assessment on the property, and that in case the assessment should
hereafter be increased or any new tax, charge or burden be imposed by authorities on the lot
and building where the leased premises are located, LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein
provided becomes due, the additional rental or charge corresponding to the portion hereby
leased; provided, however, that in the event that the present assessment or tax on said
property should be reduced, LESSEE shall be entitled to reduction in the stipulated rental,
likewise in proportion to the portion leased by him;
SEVENTH - In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency should
supervene, the value of Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall
be the basis of payment;6
During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter, respondent dealt with
petitioners. In a letter7 dated December 29, 1997, petitioners advised respondent that the
former shall assess and collect Value Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly rentals. In response,
respondent contended that VAT may not be imposed as the rentals fixed in the contract of lease
were supposed to include the VAT therein, considering that their contract was executed on May
1, 1997 when the VAT law had long been in effect.8
11
On January 26, 1998, respondent received another letter from petitioners informing the former
that its monthly rental should be increased by 73% pursuant to condition No. 7 of the contract
and Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Respondent opposed petitioners' demand and insisted that
there was no extraordinary inflation to warrant the application of Article 1250 in light of the
pronouncement of this Court in various cases.9
Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as demanded by petitioners but
continued to pay the stipulated amount set forth in their contract.
On February 18, 1998, respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of
determining the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent
damage and prejudice.10 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-411 before the RTC of
Makati.
On March 10, 1998, petitioners in turn filed an action for ejectment, rescission and damages
against respondent for failure of the latter to vacate the premises after the demand made by the
former.11 Before respondent could file an answer, petitioners filed a Notice of Dismissal.12 They
subsequently refiled the complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati; the case was
raffled to Branch 139 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 53596.
Petitioners later moved for the dismissal of the declaratory relief case for being an improper
remedy considering that respondent was already in breach of the obligation and that the case
would not end the litigation and settle the rights of the parties. The trial court, however, was not
persuaded, and consequently, denied the motion.
After trial on the merits, on May 9, 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent and against
petitioners. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment on the case as follows:
1) declaring that plaintiff is not liable for the payment of Value-Added Tax (VAT) of 10% of the
rent for [the] use of the leased premises;
2) declaring that plaintiff is not liable for the payment of any rental adjustment, there being no
[extraordinary] inflation or devaluation, as provided in the Seventh Condition of the lease
contract, to justify the same;
3) holding defendants liable to plaintiff for the total amount of P1,119,102.19, said amount
representing payments erroneously made by plaintiff as VAT charges and rental adjustment for
the months of January, February and March, 1999; andcralawlibrary
4) holding defendants liable to plaintiff for the amount of P1,107,348.69, said amount
representing the balance of plaintiff's rental deposit still with defendants.
SO ORDERED.13
The trial court denied petitioners their right to pass on to respondent the burden of paying the
VAT since it was not a new tax that would call for the application of the sixth clause of the
contract. The court, likewise, denied their right to collect the demanded increase in rental, there
being no extraordinary inflation or devaluation as provided for in the seventh clause of the
contract. Because of the payment made by respondent of the rental adjustment demanded by
petitioners, the court ordered the restitution by the latter to the former of the amounts paid,
notwithstanding the well-established rule that in an action for declaratory relief, other than a
declaration of rights and obligations, affirmative reliefs are not sought by or awarded to the
parties.
Petitioners elevated the aforesaid case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification
the RTC decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision
in Civil Case No. 98-411 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the order for the
return of the balance of the rental deposits and of the amounts representing the 10% VAT and
rental adjustment, is hereby DELETED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.14
The appellate court agreed with the conclusions of law and the application of the decisional rules
on the matter made by the RTC. However, it found that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction
in granting affirmative relief to the respondent, particularly the restitution of its excess
payment.
Petitioners now come before this Court raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT ARTICLE 1250 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN FILIPINO PIPE AND FOUNDRY CORP. v.
NAWASA CASE, 161 SCRA 32 AND COMPANION CASES ARE (sic) APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT
BAR.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE IN THE CASE OF DEL ROSARIO v. THE
SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, 164 SCRA 562, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDING OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENT
IS NOT LIABLE TO PAY THE 10% VALUE ADDED TAX IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE
OF RA 7716.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER SINCE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE WAS IN
BREACH WHEN THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WAS FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT.
12
In fine, the issues for our resolution are as follows: 1) whether the action for declaratory relief is
proper; 2) whether respondent is liable to pay 10% VAT pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 7716;
and 3) whether the amount of rentals due the petitioners should be adjusted by reason of
extraordinary inflation or devaluation.
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute,
and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in
such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or
statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequate
relief or remedy is available under the circumstances.15
Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the
subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the
validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no
breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the
"ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe
for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other
forms of action or proceeding.16
It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that
petitioners insist that respondent was already in breach of the contract when the petition was
filed.
We do not agree.
After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed,
respondent complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying
the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even
during the pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that respondent committed an act
constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred from
instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory relief.
Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not proper because a separate action for rescission,
ejectment and damages had been commenced before another court; thus, the construction of
the subject contractual provisions should be ventilated in the same forum.
We are not convinced.
It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation17 we held that the petition
for declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for
unlawful detainer. However, we cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case.
In Panganiban, the unlawful detainer case had already been resolved by the trial court before
the dismissal of the declaratory relief case; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted that
the action for declaratory relief be preferred over the action for unlawful detainer. Conversely, in
the case at bench, the trial court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the
pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was
on appeal, itself initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the resolution of the action
for declaratory relief.
We are not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated in Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol 18 where the
declaratory relief action was dismissed because the issue therein could be threshed out in the
unlawful detainer suit. Yet, again, in that case, there was already a breach of contract at the
time of the filing of the declaratory relief petition. This dissimilar factual milieu proscribes the
Court from applying Teodoro to the instant case.
Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant
declaratory relief action instead of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency of the
ejectment/rescission case before the trial court. The resolution of the present petition would
write finis to the parties' dispute, as it would settle once and for all the question of the proper
interpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this controversy.
Now, on the substantive law issues.
Petitioners repeatedly made a demand on respondent for the payment of VAT and for rental
adjustment allegedly brought about by extraordinary inflation or devaluation. Both the trial
court and the appellate court found no merit in petitioners' claim. We see no reason to depart
from such findings.
As to the liability of respondent for the payment of VAT, we cite with approval the ratiocination
of the appellate court, viz.:
Clearly, the person primarily liable for the payment of VAT is the lessor who may choose to pass
it on to the lessee or absorb the same. Beginning January 1, 1996, the lease of real property in
the ordinary course of business, whether for commercial or residential use, when the gross
annual receipts exceed P500,000.00, is subject to 10% VAT. Notwithstanding the mandatory
payment of the 10% VAT by the lessor, the actual shifting of the said tax burden upon the
lessee is clearly optional on the part of the lessor, under the terms of the statute. The word
"may" in the statute, generally speaking, denotes that it is directory in nature. It is generally
permissive only and operates to confer discretion. In this case, despite the applicability of the
rule under Sec. 99 of the NIRC, as amended by R.A. 7716, granting the lessor the option to
pass on to the lessee the 10% VAT, to existing contracts of lease as of January 1, 1996, the
original lessor, Ponciano L. Almeda did not charge the lessee-appellee the 10% VAT nor
provided for its additional imposition when they renewed the contract of lease in May 1997.
More significantly, said lessor did not actually collect a 10% VAT on the monthly rental due from
the lessee-appellee after the execution of the May 1997 contract of lease. The inevitable
implication is that the lessor intended not to avail of the option granted him by law to shift the
10% VAT upon the lessee-appellee. x x x.19
In short, petitioners are estopped from shifting to respondent the burden of paying the VAT.
Petitioners' reliance on the sixth condition of the contract is, likewise, unavailing. This provision
clearly states that respondent can only be held liable for new taxes imposed after the effectivity
of the contract of lease, that is, after May 1997, and only if they pertain to the lot and the
building where the leased premises are located. Considering that RA 7716 took effect in 1994,
the VAT cannot be considered as a "new tax" in May 1997, as to fall within the coverage of the
sixth stipulation.
Neither can petitioners legitimately demand rental adjustment because of extraordinary inflation
or devaluation.
Petitioners contend that Article 1250 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case because the
contract stipulation speaks of extraordinary inflation or devaluation while the Code speaks of
extraordinary inflation or deflation. They insist that the doctrine pronounced in Del Rosario v.
The Shell Company, Phils. Limited20 should apply.
13
Essential to contract construction is the ascertainment of the intention of the contracting parties,
and such determination must take into account the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of
the parties. This intention, once ascertained, is deemed an integral part of the contract.21
While, indeed, condition No. 7 of the contract speaks of "extraordinary inflation or devaluation"
as compared to Article 1250's "extraordinary inflation or deflation," we find that when the
parties used the term "devaluation," they really did not intend to depart from Article 1250 of the
Civil Code. Condition No. 7 of the contract should, thus, be read in harmony with the Civil Code
provision.
That this is the intention of the parties is evident from petitioners' letter22 dated January 26,
1998, where, in demanding rental adjustment ostensibly based on condition No. 7, petitioners
made explicit reference to Article 1250 of the Civil Code, even quoting the law verbatim. Thus,
the application of Del Rosario is not warranted. Rather, jurisprudential rules on the application of
Article 1250 should be considered.
Article 1250 of the Civil Code states:
In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene, the
value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of
payment, unless there is an agreement to the contrary.
Inflation has been defined as the sharp increase of money or credit, or both, without a
corresponding increase in business transaction. There is inflation when there is an increase in
the volume of money and credit relative to available goods, resulting in a substantial and
continuing rise in the general price level.23 In a number of cases, this Court had provided a
discourse on what constitutes extraordinary inflation, thus:
[E]xtraordinary inflation exists when there is a decrease or increase in the purchasing power of
the Philippine currency which is unusual or beyond the common fluctuation in the value of said
currency, and such increase or decrease could not have been reasonably foreseen or was
manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of the
obligation.24
The factual circumstances obtaining in the present case do not make out a case of extraordinary
inflation or devaluation as would justify the application of Article 1250 of the Civil Code. We
would like to stress that the erosion of the value of the Philippine peso in the past three or four
decades, starting in the mid-sixties, is characteristic of most currencies. And while the Court
may take judicial notice of the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine currency in that
span of time, such downward trend of the peso cannot be considered as the extraordinary
phenomenon contemplated by Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, absent an official
pronouncement or declaration by competent authorities of the existence of extraordinary
inflation during a given period, the effects of extraordinary inflation are not to be applied.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67784, dated September 3, 2001, and its Resolution dated
November 19, 2001, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. NO. 185320, April 19, 2017
ROSENDO DE BORJA, Petitioner, v. PINALAKAS NA UGNAYAN NG MALILIIT NA
MANGINGISDA NG LUZON, MINDANAO AT VISAYAS ("PUMALU-MV"), PAMBANSANG
KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHAN SA KANAYUNAN ("PKSK") AND TAMBUYOG
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC. ("TDCI"), Respondents; REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
G.R. NO. 185348
TAMBUYOG DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., REPRESENTED BY DINNA L.
UMENGAN, Petitioner, v. ROSENDO DE BORJA, PINALAKAS NA UGNAYAN NG MALILIIT
NA MANGINGISDA NG LUZON, MINDANAO AT VISAYAS ("PUMALU-MV"),
REPRESENTED BY CESAR A. HAWAK, AND PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA
SAMAHAN SA KANAYUNAN ("PKSK"), REPRESENTED BY RUPERTO B.
ALEROZA,  Respondents; REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
JARDELEZA, J.:
Petitioners call upon us to disregard procedural rules on account of the alleged novelty and
transcendental importance of the issue involved here. However, the transcendental importance
doctrine cannot remedy the procedural defects that plague this petition. In the words of former
Supreme Court Chief Justice Reynato Puno, "no amount of exigency can make this Court
exercise a power where it is not proper."1 A petition for declaratory relief, like any other court
action, cannot prosper absent an actual controversy that is ripe for judicial determination.
In these consolidated petitions,2 petitioners Rosendo De Borja (De Borja) and Tambuyog
Development Center, Inc. (TDCI) seek to nullify the February 21, 2008 Decision3 and November
3, 2008 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87391. The CA reversed the
March 31, 2006 Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City-Branch 74 and
dismissed, on the ground of prematurity, the petition for declaratory relief filed by De Borja and
the petition-in-intervention filed by respondents Pinalakas na Ugnayan ng Maliiiit na
Mangingisda ng Luzon, Mindanao at Visayas (PUMALU-MV), Pambansang Katipunan ng mga
Samahan sa Kanayunan (PKSK), and TDCI.6
On February 16, 2004, De Borja, a commercial fishing operator, filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief7 (De Borja's petition) with the RTC of Malabon City. He asked the court to construe and
declare his rights under Section 4(58) of Republic Act No. 8550 or The Philippine Fisheries Code
of 1998 (1998 Fisheries Code). De Borja asked the court to determine the reckoning point of the
15-kilometer range of municipal waters, as provided under Section 4(58) of the 1998 Fisheries
Code, in relation with Rule 4.1 (a) of its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).8 Section
4(58) of the 1998 Fisheries Code and Rule 4.1 (a) of the IRR respectively read:
Sec. 4(58). Municipal waters –  include not only streams, lakes, inland bodies of water and tidal
waters within the municipality which are not included within the protected areas as defined
under Republic Act No. 7586 (The NIPAS Law), public forest, timber lands, forest reserves or
fishery reserves, but also marine waters included between two (2) lines drawn
perpendicular to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the
municipality touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with the general
coastline including offshore islands and fifteen (15) kilometers from such
coastline. Where two (2) municipalities are so situated on opposite shores that there is less
than thirty (30) kilometers of marine waters between them, the third line shall be equally
distant from opposite shore of the respective municipalities. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
14
Rule 4.1 (a) Coastline – refers to the outline of the mainland shore touching the sea at mean
lower low tide.
De Borja pleaded that the construction of the reckoning point of the 15-kilometer range affects
his rights because he is now exposed to apprehensions and possible harassments that may be
brought by conflicting interpretations of the 1998 Fisheries Code.9 He further claimed that
varying constructions of the law would spark conflict between fishermen and law enforcers, and
would ultimately affect food security and defeat the purpose of the 1998 Fisheries Code.10
De Borja, however, did not implead any party as respondent in his petition. The RTC, in an
Order11 dated March 9, 2004, directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file a
comment.
Meanwhile, the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA), through Engr.
Enrique A. Macaspac, Chief of Geodesy and Geophysics Division, filed a letter-request to
intervene and comment on the petition.12 In its Comment,13 NAMRIA stated that Rule 4.1 (a)
used the term "coastline," while Section 4(58) specified "general coastline." It thus concluded
that the definition of "coastline" in Rule 4.1 (a) is valid only for municipalities without any island.
NAMRIA explained that by definition, the "general coastline" of a municipality without any island
is simply the coastline of the mainland (or mainland shore) of that municipality. On the other
hand, a municipality with island/s has the coastline/s of its island/s; hence, its general coastline
consists of not only the coastline of its mainland (or mainland shore) but also the coastline/s of
its island/s.14 Thus, where the municipality is archipelagic, the archipelagic principle shall apply
in delineating municipal waters, i.e.,  the 15-kilometer range of the municipal waters of an
archipelagic municipality shall be reckoned not only from the coastline of the mainland but also
from the coastline/s of the island/s of that municipality, such coastline/s of the island/s being
part and parcel of the general coastline of that municipality.15
NAMRIA also gave their opinion as to whether the phrase "including offshore islands" in the
phrase "a third line parallel with the general coastline including offshore islands and fifteen (15)
kilometers from such coastline" refer to the "third line" (meaning, the third line includes or
encloses the islands) or to the "general coastline" (meaning, the general coastline includes the
coastline/s of the island/s). NAMRIA noted that "general coastline" precedes the word
"including;" thus, "including offshore islands" must be referring to the "general coastline."
NAMRIA also noted that the "third line" is qualified by two conditions: the third line is (1)
parallel with the general coastline including offshore islands and (2) 15 kilometers from such
coastline. NAMRIA concluded that to satisfy both conditions, the phrase "including offshore
islands" must refer to the "general coastline," or in other words, must use the archipelagic
principle.16 NAMRIA stated that "including offshore islands" appeared only in the 1998 Fisheries
Code. Earlier laws, which defined municipal waters, did not have it. NAMRIA then theorized that
its presence in Section 4(58) of the 1998 Fisheries Code does not rule out the applicability of the
archipelagic principle in delineating municipal waters. This interpretation is technically correct
and consistent with the procedure in delimiting maritime boundaries under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.17
In its Comment,18 the OSG narrated the events that led De Borja to file the petition. The OSG
averred that the root cause of the petition was the adoption of the archipelagic principle in
delineating and delimiting municipal waters of municipalities with offshore islands under
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 2001-
1719 (DAO 17).20 Specifically, Section 5(B)(l)(c) of DAO 17 provides:
Sec. 5. Systems and Procedures, x x x
B. Procedure for Delineation and Delimitation of Municipal Waters
1. Delineation of Municipal Waters
xxx
c) Use of Municipal archipelagic baselines
i. Where the territory of a municipality includes several islands, the outermost
points of such islands shall be used as basepoints and connected by municipal
archipelagic baselines, provided that the length of such baselines shall not exceed
thirty (30) kilometers.
ii. The municipal archipelagic baselines shall determine the general coastline of the
municipality for purposes of delineation and delimitation.
iii. Islands, isles, or islets located more than thirty (30) kilometers from the mainland of the
municipality shall have their own separate coastlines.
iv. Rocks, reefs, cays, shoals, sandbars, and other features which are submerged during high
tide shall not be used as basepoints for municipal archipelagic baselines. Neither shall they
have their own coastlines.
v. The outer limits of the municipal waters of the municipality shall be enclosed by a line
parallel to the municipal archipelagic baselines and fifteen (15) kilometers therefrom.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The OSG detailed that on September 21, 2001, the Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives adopted Committee Resolution No. 2001-01 (House Committee Resolution)
which recommended the revocation of DAO 17 for being tainted with legal infirmities.21 The
House Committee Resolution stated that the DENR has no jurisdiction to issue DAO 17 because
Section 12322 of the 1998 Fisheries Code clearly referred to the Department of Agriculture (DA)
as the department which shall determine the outer limits of municipal waters.23 More
importantly, the House Committee Resolution claimed that DAO 17 directly contravened the
1998 Fisheries Code and the Local Government Code (LGC). The House Committee Resolution
explained that the phrase "including offshore islands" in Section 4(58) of the 1998 Fisheries
Code means that offshore islands are deemed to be within 15 kilometers from the shorelines;
therefore, negating the applicability of the archipelagic principle.24 DAO 17, however, authorized
otherwise. The implementation of DAO 17, therefore, would vastly reduce the fishing grounds
already defined under the 1998 Fisheries Code and result in adverse effects to the fishing
industry and the nation's food security.25
The House Committee Resolution was also sent to the DENR for appropriate action. The DENR,
however, did not act on it. Thus, upon request of the House Committee on Appropriations, the
Legal Affairs Bureau (LAB) of the House of Representatives issued a legal opinion on the validity
of DAO 17. The LAB echoed the legal arguments contained in the House Committee Resolution.
It asserted that the employment of the phrase "including offshore islands" was intentional to
remove any doubt as to where the 15 kilometers should be reckoned from—that is, from the
general coastline of the actual mainland and not from the archipelagic baseline.26
The matter was also referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for opinion. On November 27,
2002, the DOJ issued Opinion No. 100, which stated that the DA, not the DENR, has jurisdiction
to authorize the delineation of municipal waters.27 The DOJ then dispensed with the
determination of whether DAO 17, which adopted the archipelagic principle in the delineation of
municipal waters, was consistent with the provisions of the 1998 Fisheries Code.28 As a result of
the DOJ Opinion, the DENR Secretary revoked DAO 17 through DENR Administrative Order No.
2003-07.29
The OSG stressed that the DA was in the process of formulating guidelines for the delineation
and delimitation of municipal waters. In fact, the DA conducted a Fisheries Summit on
November 12 to 13, 2003 to consult small fisherfolk and the commercial fishing sector on the
definition of municipal waters. However, these negotiations reached an impasse, which then
triggered De Borja's filing of the petition before the RTC.30
The OSG explained the two conflicting views on the delineation of municipal waters, namely: (1)
the archipelagic principle espoused by the Municipalities of the Philippines and small fisher folk;
15
and (2) the mainland principle favored by the commercial fishing sector.31 Under the mainland
principle, the 15-kilometer range shall be reckoned from the municipality's coastline including
offshore islands. The archipelagic principle, on the other hand, reckons the 15-kilometer range
of municipal waters from the outermost offshore islands, and not the mainland. The outer limits
of the municipal waters of the municipality shall be enclosed by a line parallel to the municipal
archipelagic baseline and 15 kilometers therefrom.32
The OSG argued that the mainland principle should be adopted. It stated that the adoption of
the archipelagic principle found in Article I of the 1987 Constitution, which is utilized in defining
the Philippine territory vis-a-vis  other states, is relevant only when the issue of intrusion into
Philippine territorial water arises—that is, when foreign fishing vessels enter Philippine territorial
waters.33
The OSG further explained that:
The phrase "including offshore islands" used to modify general coastline in Section 4(58) of
R.A. No. 8550 shows the legislative intent that the mainland shall be the reckoning point of the
fifteen kilometer range of municipal waters, and not the archipelagic municipal baseline. To
adopt the archipelagic municipal baseline as the reckoning point would be to render the phrase
"including offshore islands" redundant because offshore islands would be deemed already
included in drawing the archipelagic baseline.
A correct grammatical construction of the questioned provision would indicate that the word
"such" in the phrase "including offshore islands and fifteen kilometers from such coastline"
refers to the general coastline, and not to an archipelagic municipal baseline. Coastline as
defined under Rule 4.1 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 8550 "refers
to the outline of the mainland shore touching the sea at mean lower tide." x x x34
The OSG also cited the House of Representatives Committee Deliberations on the 1998 Fisheries
Code to show that the intent of the lawmakers is to reckon the 15-kilometer range of the
municipal waters from the "shoreline." 35
On August 16, 2004, PUMALU-MV, PKSK and TDCI (collectively, the intervenors) filed a Motion
for Leave to File Intervention,36 which the RTC granted. In their Petition-in-Intervention,37 the
intervenors claimed that, as small fisherfolk engaged in community-based coastal resource
management, they have substantial rights over the issue of delineation of municipal
waters.38 They maintained that Section 4(58) of the 1998 Fisheries Code should be construed in
a manner that would give effect to the intent of delineating and delimiting municipal waters of a
municipality with or without offshore islands. They posited that to apply the mainland principle
to municipalities with offshore islands would result in the latter's dismemberment of their own
islands or islets.39 The intervenors also contended that the application of the mainland principle
to municipalities with offshore islands would deny the local government units of their water and
territorial jurisdiction, which would not be in keeping with the principle of autonomy under the
LGC.40
As to municipalities with offshore islands, the intervenors averred that the archipelagic principle
should be applied for consistency and congruence of the legal framework, considering that
Article I of the 1987 Constitution adopts the archipelagic principle.41 They argued that the
application of the archipelagic principle in delimiting municipal waters is evident in the previous
administrative issuances of the DA through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR), namely: Fisheries Administrative Order No. (FAO) 164,42 and FAO 156.43 The
intervenors noted that in defining the municipal waters under the regime of Presidential Decree
No. 704,44 FAO 164 and FAO 156 reckoned municipal waters of municipalities with islands and
islets from the outer shorelines of such group of islands or islets.45
Finally, the intervenors revealed that after the revocation of DAO 17, the DA issued Department
Order No. 01-0446 (DAO 1) providing the guidelines for delineating municipal waters for
municipalities and cities without offshore islands.47 DAO 1, in effect, recognizes the need to
distinguish between municipalities with and without offshore islands.
In its Decision dated March 31, 2006, the RTC agreed with the position of the OSG. It noted that
the issuance of DAO 1 cited by the intervenors does not tacitly indicate that the archipelagic
principle must be adopted as a means of delimitation or delineation of municipal waters in
municipalities or cities with offshore islands. The RTC found an existing controversy regarding
the definition of municipal waters for municipalities and cities with offshore islands, which the
DA has yet to settle through an administrative directive. The RTC observed that the DA, through
the OSG, opted to leave the matter of interpretation to the court.48 Thus, the RTC disposed of
the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that in interpreting the phrase "and a third
line parallel with the general coastline including offshore islands and fifteen (15) kilometers from
such coastline,["] the "mainland principle] and not the "archipelagic principle" should be
applied.49
The intervenors appealed to the CA.
In its Decision dated February 21, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC.
According to the CA, De Borja's petition for declaratory relief and the request for intervention
should have been dismissed due to prematurity.50
The CA ruled that De Borja's petition did not meet the two requisites of a petition for declaratory
relief, namely: justiciable controversy and ripeness for judicial determination. It noted that there
is no actual case or controversy regarding the definition of municipal waters for municipalities
with offshore islands because the DA has yet to issue guidelines with respect to these.51
De Borja filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Clarification.52 He argued that Section
1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court allows any interested person to bring an action for declaratory
relief for the construction of a statute, such as the 1998 Fisheries Code. Hence, it may be the
subject of a petition for declaratory relief independent and regardless of the issuance of
implementing guidelines, since implementing rules only flow from the statute.53
De Borja further asserted that the controversy is ripe for judicial determination considering the
diverse interpretations of the parties on the scope of the phrase "and a third line parallel with
the general coastline including offshore islands and fifteen (15) kilometers from such
coastline." 54 He also claimed that the construction of the reckoning point of the 15-kilometer
range of municipal waters under the law is, in any case, of national importance with
transcendental implications because it affects the entire local fishing industry. He thus prayed
for the CA to relax procedural rules and take cognizance of the petition.55
TDCI also filed its Motion for Reconsideration56 of the CA Decision. It argued that the petition
should have been given due course because the issues in the case are not only novel, but are of
transcendental importance. They involve the protection of small and marginal fisherfolk, and the
delimitation of municipal waters throughout the country for fisheries or coastal resource
management and law enforcement. TDCI prayed for the CA to declare the archipelagic doctrine
as adopted in interpreting Section 4(58) of the 1998 Fisheries Code, with respect to
municipalities with offshore islands.57
PKSK, on the other hand, filed its Comment58 to De Borja's Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion for Clarification, praying that it be dismissed for lack of merit. PKSK insisted that there is
no actual case or controversy between the parties as to the provisions of the 1998 Fisheries
Code, and that De Borja simply wants an interpretation by the court.59 PKSK, however, argued
that the dismissal of the petition meant that the archipelagic doctrine is the prevailing
interpretation.60
In its Resolution61 dated November 3, 2008, the CA denied De Borja's and TDCI's motions. The
CA held:
x x x At present, the DA has yet to issue guidelines for delineating/delimiting municipal waters
for municipalities and cities with offshore islands. Since the DA still has to issue such guidelines
to carry into effect the requirement imposed by Rule 123.2 of the IRR of RA No. 8550, whatever
16
ramifications petitioner-appellee [De Borja] and intervenors-appellants fear may result from the
enforcement of the questioned provision of RA No. 8550 remain to be merely hypothetical.
While this Court acknowledges the importance of the issue raised by petitioner-appellee and
intervenors-appellants in SP Civil Action No. 04-007-MN as well as in the present case it must
be emphasized that this Court may not act upon a hypothetical issue that has not yet ripened
into a justiciable controversy.62 (Citations omitted.)
Thus, De Borja and TDCI filed their own petitions for review before us, which we consolidated in
our Resolution63 dated January 14, 2009. De Borja and TDCI both insist that the CA erred in
dismissing the petition for declaratory relief on the ground of prematurity. They assert that only
a judicial declaration will finally settle the different interpretations of Section 4(58) of the 1998
Fisheries Code. According to De Borja, a petition for declaratory relief is the proper remedy for
the construction of the provision regardless of the issuance of implementing guidelines. As for
TDCI, it maintains that all the requisites for a valid petition for declaratory relief are present.
De Borja and TDCI also both reiterate the issues' national significance and transcendental
implications to the entire local fishing industry. They, however, differ in the principle they want
the court to uphold in interpreting Section 4(58) of the 1998 Fisheries Code, respecting
municipalities of cities with offshore islands. De Borja opines that the provision unqualifiedly
adopts only the mainland principle in defining municipal waters.64 TDCI, on the other hand,
maintains that using the mainland principle in interpreting the provision would violate the
constitutional rights of simple fisherfolk to subsistence fishing, and of municipalities and cities
with offshore islands to meaningful autonomy in managing their resources.65
In its Comment66 dated June 10, 2009, the OSG concurs with the CA that De Borja's petition
before the RTC failed to allege a justiciable controversy. The OSG avers that the petition must
fail because it was based on mere speculations, contingent events, and hypothetical issues that
have not yet ripened into an actual controversy.67 Notwithstanding this position, the OSG still
submits that the mainland principle, and not the archipelagic principle, should be adopted in
defining municipal waters under the 1998 Fisheries Code.68
The sole issue presented is whether De Borja's petition for declaratory relief should prosper.
We deny the petition.
For a petition for declaratory relief69 to prosper, it must be shown that (a) there is a justiciable
controversy, (b) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse, (c) the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy, and (d) the issue invoked is ripe for
judicial determination.70 We agree with the CA when it dismissed De Borja's petition for being
premature as it lacks the first and fourth requisites. We hasten to add that the petition, in fact,
lacks all four requisites.
First, we find that De Borja's petition does not present a justiciable controversy or the "ripening
seeds" of one as to warrant a court's intervention. A justiciable controversy is a definite and
concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests, which
may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law.71 It must be appropriate or
ripe for judicial determination, admitting of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in
character. It must not be conjectural or merely anticipatory, which only seeks for an opinion
that advises what the law would be on a hypothetical state of facts.72
In his five-page petition for declaratory relief, De Borja failed to provide factual allegations
showing that his legal rights were the subject of an imminent or threatened violation that should
be prevented by the declaratory relief sought. He simply went on to conclude that the
construction or interpretation of the reckoning point of the 15-kilometer range of municipal
waters under the 1998 Fisheries Code would affect his rights as he is "now exposed to
apprehensions and possible harassments that may be  brought about by conflicting
interpretations of the said statute x x x."73 As to how these apprehensions and harassments
shall come about, De Borja did not elaborate. Clearly, therefore, there is no actual or imminent
threat to his rights which is ripe for judicial review. As we have explained in Republic v. Roque:74
A perusal of private respondents' petition for declaratory relief would show that they
have failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to
sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of
RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private
respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions
which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law
would remain untrammelled. As their petition would disclose, private respondents' fear of
prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were addressed
to the general public. They, however, failed to show how these remarks tended towards any
prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against
them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As held
in Southern Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by
"double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the
anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for
lack of ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the
present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility
is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be
abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step
in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.[75] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
De Borja neither established his legal interest in the controversy nor demonstrated the adverse
interests between him and others. He did not even implead any respondent and merely stated
that he was engaged in fishing operations in various fishing grounds within the internal waters
of the Philippines. He simply made a general statement that there are varying interpretations of
the reckoning point of the 15-kilometer range of municipal waters under the 1998 Fisheries
Code, without elaborating as to what these conflicting interpretations of the law were.
In the early case of Delumen v. Republic, 76 we concurred with the Solicitor General's contention
that a justiciable controversy is one involving an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on
one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real and not a merely theoretical
question or issue.77 We held that the petitioners in Delumen were not entitled to a declaratory
relief because their petition did not mention any specific person having or claiming adverse
interest in the matter. As such, they were invoking an action for declaratory judgment solely to
determine a hypothetical, abstract, theoretical, or uncertain claim, which we cannot allow.78
We stress that neither the OSG's filing of its Comment nor the petition-in-intervention of
PUMALU-MV, PKSK, and TDCI endowed De Borja's petition with an actual case or controversy.
The Comment, for one, did not contest the allegations in De Borja's petition. Its main role was
to supply De Borja's petition with the factual antecedents detailing how the alleged controversy
reached the court. It also enlightened the RTC as to the two views, the mainland principle
versus the archipelagic principle, on the definition of municipal waters. Even if the Comment did
oppose the petition, there would still be no justiciable controversy for lack of allegation that any
person has ever contested or threatened to contest De Borja's claim of fishing rights.79
The petition-in-intervention, on the other hand, also did not dispute or oppose any of the
allegations in De Borja's petition. While it did espouse the application of the archipelagic
principle in contrast to the mainland principle advocated by the OSG, it must be recalled that De
Borja did not advocate for any of these principles at that time. He only adopted the OSG's
position in his Memorandum before the RTC. Thus, the petition-in-intervention did not create an
actual controversy in this case as the cause of action for declaratory relief must be made out by
the allegations of the petition without the aid of on any other pleading.80
Simply put, De Borja's petition does not contain ultimate facts to support his cause of action. De
Borja merely wants the court to give him an opinion on the proper interpretation of the
17
definition of municipal waters. This is a prayer which we cannot grant. Our constitutional
mandate to settle only actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and
enforceable81 proscribes us from giving an advisory opinion.
Second, closely associated with the requirement of actual or justiciable controversy is the
requirement of ripeness for adjudication. In this regard, we cite our ruling
in Lozano  v. Nograles,82 viz.:
An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement' is the requisite of "ripeness." x x x In our
jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff.
Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken
would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a
branch of government before the courts may step in.83 (Emphasis and citations omitted.)
The requisite of ripeness has a two-fold aspect: fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the
hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration.84 The first aspect requires
that the issue tendered is a purely legal one and that the regulation subject of the case is a
"final agency action." The second aspect mandates that the effects of the regulation are felt in a
concrete way by the challenging parties.85 Applying these tests, we find that De Borja's petition
is not ripe for adjudication.
The question calling for the interpretation of the definition of municipal waters for municipalities
with offshore islands is not a purely legal question because the given set of facts from which our
interpretation will be based are not yet complete. In other words, the question demands an
agency action from the DA. An agency action is defined in Book VII, Chapter I, Section 2(15) of
the Administrative Code of 198786 as referring to the whole or part of every agency rule, order,
license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or denial thereof. As applied here, the action required
from the DA involves further factual determination of a kind that necessitates the application of
the Department's expertise and authority, both of which we do not have.
Under Section 123 of the 1998 Fisheries Code (now Section 157 of the 1998 Fisheries Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 1065487 [hereinafter, the Amended Fisheries Code]), the DA has
the mandate to authorize the NAMRIA to designate and chart navigational lanes in fisheries
areas and to delineate municipal waters. In the legitimate exercise of its power of subordinate
legislation, the DA issued the IRR of the Amended Fisheries Code.88 The IRR of the Amended
Fisheries Code, particularly Sections 157.1 to 157.4, echoes the mandate of the DA and NAMRIA
under Section 157 of the law. It provides the details and the process of delineation of municipal
waters, to wit:
Sec. 157. Charting of Navigational Lanes and Delineation of Municipal Waters. – The
Department shall authorize the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority
(NAMRIA) for the designation and charting of navigational lanes in fishery areas and
delineation of municipal waters. The Philippine Coast Guard shall exercise control and
supervision over such designated navigational lanes.
Rule 157.1. Delineation of Municipal Waters.  - Recognizing that all municipal waters
have not yet been delineated, the DA-BFAR shall issue guidelines for the delineation of
all municipal waters in the Philippines following the process stated in Rule 65.2.
Rule 157.2. Navigational Lanes. - The DA-BFAR, shall facilitate the designation and charting of
navigational lanes in fishery areas, by convening an Inter-Agency committee composed of
NAMRIA, PN, PCG, MARINA, other concerned agencies and the NFARMC.
Rule 157.3. Mapping.  – The DA-BFAR, in coordination with the NAMRIA and with the
participation of local government units concerned shall determine the outer limits of
the municipal waters. Overlapping boundaries in municipal waters shall be governed
by the Rules embodied in this law and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Rule 157.4. Navigational Charts. – Charts of navigational lane and outer limits of municipal
waters shall be produced, published and regularly updated by NAMRIA.
Rule 157.5. Funding. –  The Department, through DBM, shall allocate sufficient funds for these
purposes. (Emphasis supplied.)
Pertinently, Rule 65.2 provides:
Rule 65.2. Formulation of Rules and Regulations. - In formulating rules and regulations, the DA-
BFAR shall observe these principles:
a. The regulation shall be based on scientific studies. In the conduct of
scientific studies, stakeholders in the affected region shall be
informed of the conduct of the study, its duration and the expert/s
who will conduct the same. The stakeholders may nominate their own
scientist/s to participate in the study or will be given the chance to provide
comments on the scientist who will conduct the study;
b. The consultation shall be conducted in all affected regions as may be
practicable, taking into consideration the safety and accessibility of the
venue to the stakeholders;
c. Stakeholders shall be given at least fifteen (15) days prior notice of
the date and venue of the consultation including the subject matter
of the proposed regulation. The notice shall be published in a newspaper
of general circulation in the region, where feasible; and,
d. The proposed regulation shall be made publicly available at the BFAR
website and BFAR Regional Offices at least seven (7) days prior to the
consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
The DA, however, has not yet performed any of the above acts. The record shows that no rule,
regulation, or guidelines have been issued by the DA to date, in coordination with BFAR, as
regards municipalities with offshore islands. There are serious gaps in the implementation of the
law which the DA and the concerned agencies would still need to fill in. As it stands, therefore,
there is no agency action to speak of, much less a "final agency action" required under the
ripeness doctrine.
Equally significant, we find that if we were to grant the petition for declaratory relief, it would
mean an intrusion into the domain of the executive, preempting the actions of the DA and other
concerned government agencies and stakeholders. As clearly set out in the provisions of the
IRR, the primary duty of determining the reckoning point of the 15-kilometer range of municipal
waters of municipalities with offshore islands falls with the DA, NAMRIA, and the BFAR. They
shall do so through public consultation or with the participation of stakeholders, such as the
concerned municipalities, fishing operators, and fisherfolk.
Nonetheless, De Borja insists that a statute may be the subject of a petition for declaratory
relief regardless of the issuance of an implementing guideline. He pleads that the "persisting
and actual confusion brought about by the different interpretations of the interested groups in
the local fishing industry is ripe for judicial action."89 We disagree. In Garcia v. Executive
Secretary,90 we ruled that a petition assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7042 or
the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 is not ripe for adjudication, there being "no actual case or
controversy, particularly because of the absence of the implementing rules that are supposed to
carry the Act into effect."91
18
In Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. v. Republic, 92 we affirmed the ruling of the CA in dismissing
a petition for declaratory relief after we found that Bayantel's fear of sanction under Section 21
of Republic Act No. 792593 was merely hypothetical, as there are yet no implementing rules or
guidelines to carry into effect the requirement imposed by the said provision.94
Likewise, in Lozano,95 we noted that judicial intervention96 was premature because the House of
Representatives has yet to adopt rules of procedure in relation to Resolution No. 1109.97
Corollarily, since no implementing rule or agency action is involved in this case, no real hardship
may be felt by De Borja if we were to withhold judicial consideration. As earlier discussed, the
petition did not state any specific right to which De Borja was entitled, and which was
threatened to be violated, prejudiced or denied by the DA. We emphasize that court action is
discretionary in petitions for declaratory relief.98 We may refuse to construe the instrument, or
in this case, the statute involved, if the construction is not necessary and proper under the
circumstances and/or if the construction would not terminate the controversy.99 Here, the lack of
a purely legal question, the absence of agency action, and the nonexistence of a threatened
direct injury, make the construction of Section 4(58) of the 1998 Fisheries Code inappropriate
and unripe for judicial resolution at this time. We cannot give relief merely because De Borja has
a "real problem" and "a genuine need for legal advice."100 As aptly put in Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner:101
x x x Without undertaking to survey the intricacies of the ripeness doctrine, it is fair to say that
its basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to
protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. (Citation omitted.)
Considering the foregoing, the DA's decision, through the OSG, to submit the interpretation of
municipal waters to the court's wisdom and discretion was improper. The executive cannot
simply pass the buck to the judiciary. As we have explained in Tan v. Macapagal:102
x x x The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments being left alone to
discharge their duties as they see fit. The judiciary as Justice Laurel emphatically asserted "will
neither direct nor restrain executive [or legislative] action x x x." The legislative and
executive branches are not bound to seek its advice as to what to do or not to do.
Judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture, At such a time, it may pass on the validity of what was
done but only "when xxx properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding."103 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted.)
Finally, in their attempt to salvage the case, both De Borja and intervenor TDCI invoked
transcendental importance. However, their contention is misplaced. The transcendental
importance doctrine dispenses only with the requirement of locus standi.104 It cannot and does
not override the requirements of actual and justiciable controversy and ripeness for
adjudication, which are conditions sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The February 21, 2008 Decision and
November 3, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87391 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 181303 : September 17, 2009]
CARMEN DANAO MALANA, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, EVELYN DANAO, FERMINA DANAO,
LETICIA DANAO and LEONORA DANAO, the last two are represented herein by their
Attorney-in-Fact, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, Petitioners, v. BENIGNO TAPPA, JERRY
REYNA, SATURNINO CAMBRI and SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND MARIA
LIGUTAN, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Orders1 dated 4
May 2007, 30 May 2007, and 31 October 2007, rendered by Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tuguegarao City, which dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the Complaint of petitioners
Carmen Danao Malana, Leticia Danao, Maria Danao Accorda, Evelyn Danao, Fermina Danao, and
Leonora Danao, against respondents Benigno Tappa, Jerry Reyna, Saturnino Cambri, Francisco
Ligutan and Maria Ligutan, in Civil Case No. 6868.
Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and
Damages2 against respondents on 27 March 2007, docketed as Civil Case No. 6868. Petitioners
alleged in their Complaint that they are the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1279373 situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (subject
property). Petitioners inherited the subject property from Anastacio Danao (Anastacio), who
died intestate.4 During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who
was married to Joaquin Boncad, to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject
property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time
that Anastacio and his heirs might need it.5
Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelo's family members,6 continued to occupy the
subject property even after her death, already building their residences thereon using
permanent materials. Petitioners also learned that respondents were claiming ownership over
the subject property. Averring that they already needed it, petitioners demanded that
respondents vacate the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners' demand.7
Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Barangay Annafunan West for conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents
asserted that they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting
their claim of ownership.
According to petitioners, respondents' documents were highly dubious, falsified, and incapable
of proving the latter's claim of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they created
a cloud upon petitioners' title to the property. Thus, petitioners were compelled to file before the
RTC a Complaint to remove such cloud from their title.8 Petitioners additionally sought in their
Complaint an award against respondents for actual damages, in the amount of P50,000.00,
resulting from the latter's baseless claim over the subject property that did not actually belong
to them, in violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.9 Petitioners likewise
prayed for an award against respondents for exemplary damages, in the amount of P50,000.00,
since the latter had acted in bad faith and resorted to unlawful means to establish their claim
over the subject property. Finally, petitioners asked to recover from respondents P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees, because the latter's refusal to vacate the property constrained petitioners to
engage the services of a lawyer.10
Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an Order dated 4 May 2007
dismissing petitioners' Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC referred to
Republic Act No. 7691,11 amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the subject property
19
had a value of less than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners' action to recover the same was outside
the jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC decreed in its 4 May 2007 Order that:
The Court has no jurisdiction over the action, it being a real action involving a real property with
assessed value less than P20,000.00 and hereby dismisses the same without prejudice.12
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order dismissing their
Complaint. They argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion
reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents.
Petitioner's Complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court13 states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.14
In an Order dated 30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. It
reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where the
assessed value of real property does not exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of
subject property per Tax Declaration No, 02-48386 was P410.00, the real action involving the
same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.15
Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which they prayed that the
RTC Orders dated 4 May 2007 and 30 May 2007, dismissing their Complaint, be set aside. They
reiterated their earlier argument that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an
action to quiet title falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. They also contended that
there was no obstacle to their joining the two causes of action, i.e., quieting of title
and reivindicacion, in a single Complaint, citing Rumarate v. Hernandez.16 And even if the two
causes of action could not be joined, petitioners maintained that the misjoinder of said causes of
action was not a ground for the dismissal of their Complaint.17
The RTC issued an Order dated 31 October 2007 denying petitioners' Motion. It clarified that
their Complaint was dismissed, not on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action, but for lack
of jurisdiction. The RTC dissected Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds
therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought
under this Rule.
The RTC differentiated between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court. The first paragraph refers to an action for declaratory relief, which should be
brought before the RTC. The second paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies,
which includes an action to quiet title to real property. The second paragraph must be read in
relation to Republic Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where
the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila
and P20,000.00 in all other places.18 The dispositive part of the 31 October 2007 Order of the
RTC reads:
This Court maintains that an action to quiet title is a real action. [Herein petitioners] do not
dispute the assessed value of the property at P410.00 under Tax Declaration No. 02-48386.
Hence, it has no jurisdiction over the action.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Motion is hereby denied.19
Hence, the present Petition, where petitioners raise the sole issue of:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF THE PETITIONERS MOTU PROPRIO.20
Petitioners' statement of the issue is misleading. It would seem that they are only challenging
the fact that their Complaint was dismissed by the RTC motu proprio. Based on the facts and
arguments set forth in the instant Petition, however, the Court determines that the fundamental
issue for its resolution is whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioners' Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court rules in the negative.
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive
order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the
interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder.21
Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly
made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general
circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis ours.)
As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds
therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought
under this Rule. (Emphasis ours.)
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an
action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil
Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an
action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right
to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they
also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of
execution to carry the judgment into effect.22
20
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically
require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" -
that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory
relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in
the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the
provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.23
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended,
uses the word "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed
value does not exceed P20,000.00, thus:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such assessed value does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x (Emphasis
ours.)
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration
No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners' Complaint involving title to and possession
of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach
of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.24 Since the purpose of an action for
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be
entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it
refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that
have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need
for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of
obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.25
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words,
a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already
been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.26
In the present case, petitioners' Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already
demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was
filed only subsequent to the latter's express claim of ownership over the subject property before
the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners' title.
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the
possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the
recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for
its object one's recovery of possession over the real property as owner.27 Ï‚ηαñrοblεš
νιr†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
Petitioners' Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction
over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the subject
property herein is valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an
action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners' Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of
jurisdiction.
As for the RTC dismissing petitioners' Complaint motu proprio, the following pronouncements of
the Court in Laresma v. Abellana28 proves instructive:
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by
the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced.
Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by
law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or
the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by
express consent of the parties. If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it
may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Since the RTC, in dismissing petitioners' Complaint, acted in complete accord with law and
jurisprudence, it cannot be said to have done so with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been
committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment, which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility.29 No such circumstances exist herein as to justify the issuance of a writ
of certiorari.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated 4 May 2007,
30 May 2007 and 31 October 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3,
dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868, without prejudice, are AFFIRMED. The Regional
Trial Court is ordered to REMAND the records of this case to the Municipal Trial Court or the
court of proper jurisdiction for proper disposition. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202242               April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
21
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C.
TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration 1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
on behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C.
Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly opposed2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez (petitioner).
By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected departure of former
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his
potential successor. In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1]
whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than
one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2)
representatives from each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the
Constitution.
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the same in
the following manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and
Bar Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to
reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion for reconsideration and with due regard to
Senate Resolution Nos. 111,3 112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the Court set the subject motion for oral
arguments on August 2, 2012.7 On August 3, 2012, the Court discussed the merits of the
arguments and agreed, in the meantime, to suspend the effects of the second paragraph of the
dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision which decreed that it was immediately
executory. The decretal portion of the August 3, 2012 Resolution8 reads:
WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective MEMORANDA within ten
(10) days from notice. Until further orders, the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Court’s July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This
disposition is immediately executory."9
Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their respective memoranda.10
Brief Statement of the Antecedents
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise
of appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the
executive and legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American origins,
both the Malolos Constitution11 and the 1935 Constitution12 vested the power to appoint the
members of the Judiciary in the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. It was during these times that the country became witness to the deplorable
practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate
themselves with the members of the legislative body.13
Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the executive and legislative powers in
one body, the appointment of judges and justices ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another
body. The power became exclusive and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition
that the appointees must have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of
political pressure and partisan activities,15 the members of the Constitutional Commission saw it
wise to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the
President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment
process, and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section
8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit
in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that
Congress is entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to the JBC, not
together, but alternately or by rotation.
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered.1âwphi1 An eighth
member was added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting
simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.17
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House
of Representatives one full vote each.18 It has been the situation since then.
Grounds relied upon by Respondents
Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss
the petition on the following grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in
the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the
Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to
bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3] that two representatives from Congress would not
subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that
the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition would provide a solution
should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.
While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth
grounds listed by respondents, still, it finds itself unable to reverse the assailed decision on the
principal issues covered by the first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the
conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first and second grounds, carries greater bearing in the
final resolution of this case.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.
22
 Ruling of the Court
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the fundamental
powers of government are established, limited and defined and by which those powers are
distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of
the body politic.19 The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the
ultimate expression of the principles and the framework upon which government and society
were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly
relies on the basic postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The language used in the
Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word
employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be
maintained inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says,
according to its text, compels acceptance and bars modification even by the branch tasked to
interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify
constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular
letter "a" to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers
intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been
otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its
other provisions.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as
to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII, which
provides that a tie in the presidential election shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members
of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately."20 Another is Section 8 thereof which
requires the nominee to replace the Vice-President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately."21 Similarly, under Section 18, the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may
be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting separately, by a vote of at least a majority of
all its Members."22 In all these provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and,
clearly, the corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and
voted upon by its two Houses.
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer
inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the legislature, is not persuasive
enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to
them. It is very clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on
congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary function
– to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one
whole body, was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function.
The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. Congress has two
(2) Houses. The need to recognize the existence and the role of each House is essential
considering that the Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions which
particular House plays, regardless of whether the two Houses consummate an official act by
voting jointly or separately. Whether in the exercise of its legislative23 or its non-legislative
functions such as inter alia, the power of appropriation,24 the declaration of an existence of a
state of war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-President,26 and
impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House must be acknowledged and recognized considering
the interplay between these two Houses. In all these instances, each House is constitutionally
granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its
relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and
balances, as to the other branches of government.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their
participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of
the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members,
three (3) representatives from the major branches of government - the Chief Justice as ex-
officio Chairman (representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing
the Executive Department), and a representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative
Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing, the Framers simply gave
recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in
reverence to it as a major branch of government.
On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the Second District of
Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered position28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:
I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one representative of Congress in the
JBC in accordance with Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution x x x.
The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further interpretation.
Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that "construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
them."
Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to
negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in
the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council should adopt the rule of
single representation of Congress in the JBC in order to respect and give the right meaning to
the above-quoted provision of the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant,
submitted to the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC Chairman his opinion,29 which reads:
8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation of the JBC is
intended to curtail the influence of politics in Congress in the appointment of judges, and the
understanding is that seven (7) persons will compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of two
votes for Congress runs counter to the intendment of the framers. Such interpretation actually
gives Congress more influence in the appointment of judges. Also, two votes for Congress would
increase the number of JBC members to eight, which could lead to voting deadlock by reason of
even-numbered membership, and a clear violation of 7 enumerated members in the
Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera opined:
As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is composed of seven (7)
representatives coming from different sectors. From the enumeration it is patent that each
category of members pertained to a single individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight of
the bicameral nature of our legislative department, it is beyond dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8
(1) of the 1987 Constitution is explicit and specific that "Congress" shall have only "xxx a
representative." Thus, two (2) representatives from Congress would increase the number of JBC
members to eight (8), a number beyond what the Constitution has contemplated. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago, a former JBC consultant, is worth reiterating.31 Thus:
23
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the
JBC reflects the Commission’s desire "to have in the Council a representation for the major
elements of the community." xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of
representatives from the three main branches of government while the regular members are
composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII,
Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of
government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting members with the three ex-
officio members having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.
xxx
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise
by Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII
of the Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of government,
is constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the matter of its representative in the
JBC. On the other hand, the exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate
and the House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of
Congress’ role under our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and, in fact,
necessitates the separateness of the two Houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no such
dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the other two co-equal branches of
government.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign the
same weight to considerations that any of its representatives may have regarding aspiring
nominees to the judiciary. The representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives
act as such for one branch and should not have any more quantitative influence as the other
branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and
principle of equality among the three branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the
JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the
Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire
Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is entitled to one
full vote. This pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half
(1/2), between two representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause
disorder in the voting process, it is clearly against the essence of what the Constitution
authorized. After all, basic and reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done directly
cannot be done indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is
clearly a constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put,
when the Constitution envisioned one member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to
presume that this representation carries with him one full vote.
It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more influence over
the JBC simply because all of the regular members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle
of checks and balances is still safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular members
of the JBC is subject to a stringent process of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
which is composed of members of Congress.
Respondents’ contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should be accepted,
simply because it was only questioned for the first time through the present action, deserves
scant consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution no
matter how frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine
of estoppel or laches, because once an act is considered as an infringement of the Constitution it
is void from the very beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is
not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office;
it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the
doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the
doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:32
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality
will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to
a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double
jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating
it.33
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was ratified by the
direct action of the Filipino people, it cannot correct what respondents perceive as a mistake in
its mandate. Neither can the Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the
Constitution, read into the law something that is contrary to its express provisions and justify
the same as correcting a perceived inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction the Court
action of making amendment to the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.
In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus
omissus "a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted."34 "The principle proceeds from a
reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration." 35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the
omission even though the omission may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in
question was not foreseen or contemplated."36 "The Court cannot supply what it thinks the
legislature would have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be
judicial legislation." 37
Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the
Constitution against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers in the
sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed to become
judicial exuberance.38 In cases like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can
convince the Court to perform either an excision or an insertion that will change the manifest
intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is
tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in the provision as
enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional
provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the
proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.
The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17,
2012 Decision of the Court, which reads, "This disposition is immediately executory," is hereby
LIFTED.
24
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 181359               August 5, 2013
SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M. SABITSANA, Petitioners,
vs.
JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact DOMINGO A.
MUERTEGUI, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A lawyer may not, for his own personal interest and benefit, gamble on his client's word,
believing it at one time and disbelieving it the next. He owes his client his undivided loyalty.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the January 25, 2007 Decision2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) which denied the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 79250, and its January 11, 2008
Resolution3 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4
Factual Antecedents
On September 2, 1981, Alberto Garcia (Garcia) executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale5 in favor
of respondent Juanito Muertegui6 (Juanito) over a 7,500-square meter parcel of unregistered
land (the lot) located in Dalutan Island, Talahid, Almeira, Biliran, Leyte del Norte covered by Tax
Declaration (TD) No. 1996 issued in 1985 in Garcia’s name.7
Juanito’s father Domingo Muertegui, Sr. (Domingo Sr.) and brother Domingo Jr. took actual
possession of the lot and planted thereon coconut and ipil-ipil trees. They also paid the real
property taxes on the lot for the years 1980 up to 1998.
On October 17, 1991, Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, petitioner Atty.
Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. (Atty. Sabitsana), through a notarized deed of absolute sale.8 The
sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on February 6, 1992.9 TD No. 1996 was cancelled
and a new one, TD No. 5327,10 was issued in Atty. Sabitsana’s name. Although Domingo Jr. and
Sr. paid the real estate taxes, Atty. Sabitsana also paid real property taxes in 1992, 1993, and
1999. In 1996, he introduced concrete improvements on the property, which shortly thereafter
were destroyed by a typhoon.
When Domingo Sr. passed away, his heirs applied for registration and coverage of the lot under
the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Atty. Sabitsana, in a letter11 dated August
24, 1998 addressed to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources’ CENRO/PENRO
office in Naval, Biliran, opposed the application, claiming that he was the true owner of the lot.
He asked that the application for registration be held in abeyance until the issue of conflicting
ownership has been resolved.
On April 11, 2000, Juanito, through his attorney-in-fact Domingo Jr., filed Civil Case No. B-
109712 for quieting of title and preliminary injunction, against herein petitioners Atty. Sabitsana
and his wife, Rosario, claiming that they bought the lot in bad faith and are exercising acts of
possession and ownership over the same, which acts thus constitute a cloud over his title. The
Complaint13 prayed, among others, that the Sabitsana Deed of Sale, the August 24, 1998 letter,
and TD No. 5327 be declared null and void and of no effect; that petitioners be ordered to
respect and recognize Juanito’s title over the lot; and that moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses be awarded to him.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,14 petitioners asserted mainly that the sale to Juanito is null
and void absent the marital consent of Garcia’s wife, Soledad Corto (Soledad); that they
acquired the property in good faith and for value; and that the Complaint is barred by
prescription and laches. They likewise insisted that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naval,
Biliran did not have jurisdiction over the case, which involved title to or interest in a parcel of
land the assessed value of which is merely ₱1,230.00.
The evidence and testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses during trial reveal that petitioner
Atty. Sabitsana was the Muertegui family’s lawyer at the time Garcia sold the lot to Juanito, and
that as such, he was consulted by the family before the sale was executed; that after the sale to
Juanito, Domingo Sr. entered into actual, public, adverse and continuous possession of the lot,
and planted the same to coconut and ipil-ipil; and that after Domingo Sr.’s death, his wife
Caseldita, succeeded him in the possession and exercise of rights over the lot.
On the other hand, Atty. Sabitsana testified that before purchasing the lot, he was told by a
member of the Muertegui family, Carmen Muertegui Davies (Carmen), that the Muertegui family
had bought the lot, but she could not show the document of sale; that he then conducted an
investigation with the offices of the municipal and provincial assessors; that he failed to find any
document, record, or other proof of the sale by Garcia to Juanito, and instead discovered that
the lot was still in the name of Garcia; that given the foregoing revelations, he concluded that
the Muerteguis were merely bluffing, and that they probably did not want him to buy the
property because they were interested in buying it for themselves considering that it was
adjacent to a lot which they owned; that he then proceeded to purchase the lot from Garcia;
that after purchasing the lot, he wrote Caseldita in October 1991 to inform her of the sale; that
he then took possession of the lot and gathered ipil-ipil for firewood and harvested coconuts and
calamansi from the lot; and that he constructed a rip-rap on the property sometime in 1996 and
1997.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 28, 2002, the trial court issued its Decision15 which decrees as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants, hereby declaring the Deed of Sale dated 2 September 1981 as valid and
preferred while the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 17 October 1991 and Tax Declaration No. 5327
in the name of Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. are VOID and of no legal effect.
The Provincial Assessor and the Municipal Assessor of Naval are directed to cancel Tax
Declaration No. 5327 as void and done in bad faith.
Further, Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is ordered to pay plaintiff Juanito Muertigui,
represented by his attorney-in-fact Domingo Muertigui, Jr. the amounts of:
a) ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
b) ₱10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
c) Costs.
SO ORDERED.16
25
The trial court held that petitioners are not buyers in good faith. Petitioner Atty. Sabitsana was
the Muertegui family’s lawyer, and was informed beforehand by Carmen that her family had
purchased the lot; thus, he knew of the sale to Juanito. After conducting an investigation, he
found out that the sale was not registered. With this information in mind, Atty. Sabitsana went
on to purchase the same lot and raced to register the sale ahead of the Muerteguis, expecting
that his purchase and prior registration would prevail over that of his clients, the Muerteguis.
Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code,17 the trial court declared that even though petitioners
were first to register their sale, the same was not done in good faith. And because petitioners’
registration was not in good faith, preference should be given to the sale in favor of Juanito, as
he was the first to take possession of the lot in good faith, and the sale to petitioners must be
declared null and void for it casts a cloud upon the Muertegui title.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but the trial court denied19 the same.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners appealed to the CA20 asserting that the sale to Juanito was null and void for lack of
marital consent; that the sale to them is valid; that the lower court erred in applying Article
1544 of the Civil Code; that the Complaint should have been barred by prescription, laches and
estoppel; that respondent had no cause of action; that respondent was not entitled to an award
of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses; and that they should be the ones awarded attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses.
The CA, through its questioned January 25, 2007 Decision,  denied the appeal and affirmed the
21
trial court’s Decision in toto. It held that even though the lot admittedly was conjugal property,
the absence of Soledad’s signature and consent to the deed did not render the sale to Juanito
absolutely null and void, but merely voidable. Since Garcia and his wife were married prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 173 of the Civil Code22 should apply; and under the
said provision, the disposition of conjugal property without the wife’s consent is not void, but
merely voidable. In the absence of a decree annulling the deed of sale in favor of Juanito, the
same remains valid.
The CA added that the fact that the Deed of Sale in favor of Juanito was not notarized could not
affect its validity. As against the notarized deed of sale in favor of petitioners, the CA held that
the sale in favor of Juanito still prevails. Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code, the CA said that
the determining factor is petitioners’ good faith, or the lack of it. It held that even though
petitioners were first to register the sale in their favor, they did not do so in good faith, for they
already knew beforehand of Garcia’s prior sale to Juanito. By virtue of Atty. Sabitsana’s
professional and confidential relationship with the Muertegui family, petitioners came to know
about the prior sale to the Muerteguis and the latter’s possession of the lot, and yet they pushed
through with the second sale. Far from acting in good faith, petitioner Atty. Sabitsana used his
legal knowledge to take advantage of his clients by registering his purchase ahead of them.
Finally, the CA declared that Juanito, as the rightful owner of the lot, possessed the requisite
cause of action to institute the suit for quieting of title and obtain judgment in his favor, and is
entitled as well to an award for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, which the trial court
correctly held to be just and equitable under the circumstances.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED and the Decision dated
October 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran, is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.23
Issues
Petitioners now raise the following issues for resolution:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT
THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE SUBJECT LAND WAS ONLY ₱1,230.00 (AND STATED
MARKET VALUE OF ONLY ₱3,450.00).
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING ART. 1544 OF THE CIVIL CODE
INSTEAD OF THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (P.D. NO. 1529) CONSIDERING
THAT THE SUBJECT LAND WAS UNREGISTERED.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT WAS
ALREADY BARRED [BY] LACHES AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT ORDERING THE PETITIONERS TO PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES AND
LITIGATION EXPENSES TO THE RESPONDENT.24
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners assert that the RTC of Naval, Biliran did not have jurisdiction over the case. They
argue that since the assessed value of the lot was a mere ₱1,230.00, jurisdiction over the case
lies with the first level courts, pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691,25 which expanded their
exclusive original jurisdiction to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and
costs."26 Petitioners thus conclude that the Decision in Civil Case No. B-1097 is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners next insist that the lot, being unregistered land, is beyond the coverage of Article
1544 of the Civil Code, and instead, the provisions of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 should
apply. This being the case, the Deed of Sale in favor of Juanito is valid only as between him and
the seller Garcia, pursuant to Section 113 of PD 1529;27 it cannot affect petitioners who are not
parties thereto.
On the issue of estoppel, laches and prescription, petitioners insist that from the time they
informed the Muerteguis in writing about their purchase of the lot, or in October 1991, the latter
did not notify them of their prior purchase of the lot, nor did respondent interpose any objection
to the sale in their favor. It was only in 1998 that Domingo Jr. showed to petitioners the
unnotarized deed of sale. According to petitioners, this seven-year period of silence and inaction
on the Muerteguis’ part should be taken against them and construed as neglect on their part to
assert their rights for an unreasonable length of time. As such, their action to quiet title should
be deemed barred by laches and estoppel.
Lastly, petitioners take exception to the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses,
claiming that since there was no bad faith on their part, such award may not be considered just
and equitable under the circumstances. Still, an award of attorney’s fees should remain the
exception rather than the rule; and in awarding the same, there must have been an express
finding of facts and law justifying such award, a requirement that is absent in this case.
26
Petitioners thus pray for the reversal of the questioned CA Decision and Resolution; the
dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. B-1097; the deletion of the award of attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses in respondent’s favor; and a declaration that they are the true and
rightful owners of the lot.
Respondent’s Arguments
Respondent, on the other hand, counters that a suit for quieting of title is one whose subject
matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. He
likewise insists that Article 1544 applies to the case because there is a clear case of double sale
of the same property to different buyers, and the bottom line thereof lies in petitioners’ lack of
good faith in entering into the subsequent sale. On the issue of laches/estoppel, respondent
echoes the CA’s view that he was persistent in the exercise of his rights over the lot, having
previously filed a complaint for recovery of the lot, which unfortunately was dismissed based on
technicality.
On the issue of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, respondent finds refuge in Article 2208
of the Civil Code,28 citing three instances which fortify the award in his favor – petitioners’ acts
compelled him to litigate and incur expenses to protect his interests; their gross and evident
bad faith in refusing to recognize his ownership and possession over the lot; and the justness
and equitableness of his case.
Our Ruling
The Petition must be denied.
The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title.
On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may
be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,29 an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds
therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC.
It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners’ August
24, 1998 letter-opposition to respondent’s application for registration. Thus, in order to
prevent30 a cloud from being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No.
B-1097 to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief,
which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply to sales involving unregistered land.
Both the trial court and the CA are, however, wrong in applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
Both courts seem to have forgotten that the provision does not apply to sales involving
unregistered land. Suffice it to state that the issue of the buyer’s good or bad faith is relevant
only where the subject of the sale is registered land, and the purchaser is buying the same from
the registered owner whose title to the land is clean. In such case, the purchaser who relies on
the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value.31
Act No. 3344 applies to sale of unregistered lands.
What applies in this case is Act No. 3344,32 as amended, which provides for the system of
recording of transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares that
any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right. The
question to be resolved therefore is: who between petitioners and respondent has a better right
to the disputed lot?
Respondent has a better right to the lot.
The sale to respondent Juanito was executed on September 2, 1981 via an unnotarized deed of
sale, while the sale to petitioners was made via a notarized document only on October 17, 1991,
or ten years thereafter. Thus, Juanito who was the first buyer has a better right to the lot, while
the subsequent sale to petitioners is null and void, because when it was made, the seller Garcia
was no longer the owner of the lot. Nemo dat quod non habet.
The fact that the sale to Juanito was not notarized does not alter anything, since the sale
between him and Garcia remains valid nonetheless. Notarization, or the requirement of a public
document under the Civil Code,33 is only for convenience, and not for validity or
enforceability.34 And because it remained valid as between Juanito and Garcia, the latter no
longer had the right to sell the lot to petitioners, for his ownership thereof had ceased.
Nor can petitioners’ registration of their purchase have any effect on Juanito’s rights. The mere
registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was
no longer the owner of the land, having previously sold the same to another even if the earlier
sale was unrecorded.35 Neither could it validate the purchase thereof by petitioners, which is null
and void. Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land
registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.36
Specifically, we held in Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo37 that:
Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is ‘without
prejudice to a third party with a better right.’ The aforequoted phrase has been held by this
Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right
over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the
same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
Petitioners’ defense of prescription, laches and estoppel are unavailing since their claim is based
on a null and void deed of sale. The fact that the Muerteguis failed to interpose any objection to
the sale in petitioners’ favor does not change anything, nor could it give rise to a right in their
favor; their purchase remains void and ineffective as far as the Muerteguis are concerned.
The award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses is proper because of petitioners’ bad faith.
Petitioners’ actual and prior knowledge of the first sale to Juanito makes them purchasers in bad
faith. It also appears that petitioner Atty. Sabitsana was remiss in his duties as counsel to the
Muertegui family. Instead of advising the Muerteguis to register their purchase as soon as
possible to forestall any legal complications that accompany unregistered sales of real property,
he did exactly the opposite: taking advantage of the situation and the information he gathered
from his inquiries and investigation, he bought the very same lot and immediately caused the
registration thereof ahead of his clients, thinking that his purchase and prior registration would
prevail. The Court cannot tolerate this mercenary attitude. Instead of protecting his client’s
interest, Atty. Sabitsana practically preyed on him.
Petitioner Atty. Sabitsana took advantage of confidential information disclosed to him by his
client, using the same to defeat him and beat him to the draw, so to speak. He rushed the sale
and registration thereof ahead of his client. He may not be afforded the excuse that he
nonetheless proceeded to buy the lot because he believed or assumed that the Muerteguis were
simply bluffing when Carmen told him that they had already bought the same; this is too
convenient an excuse to be believed. As the Muertegui family lawyer, he had no right to take a
27
position, using information disclosed to him in confidence by his client, that would place him in
possible conflict with his duty. He may not, for his own personal interest and benefit, gamble on
his client’s word, believing it at one time and disbelieving it the next. He owed the Muerteguis
his undivided loyalty. He had the duty to protect the client, at all hazards and costs even to
himself.38
Petitioner Atty. Sabitsana is enjoined to "look at any representation situation from the point of
view that there are possible conflicts, and further to think in terms of impaired loyalty, that is,
to evaluate if his representation in any way will impair his loyalty to a client." 39
Moreover, as the Muertegui family’s lawyer, Atty. Sabitsana was under obligation to safeguard
his client's property, and not jeopardize it. Such is his duty as an attorney, and pursuant to his
general agency.40
Even granting that Atty. Sabitsana has ceased to act as the Muertegui family's lawyer, he still
owed them his loyalty.1âwphi1 The termination of attorney-client relation provides no
justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former
client on a matter involving confidential information which the lawyer acquired when he was
counsel. The client's confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of
professional employment.41 This is underscored by the fact that Atty. Sabitsana obtained
information from Carmen which he used to his advantage and to the detriment of his client.
from the foregoing disquisition, it can be seen that petitioners are guilty of bad faith in pursuing
the sale of the lot despite being apprised of the prior sale in respondent's favor. Moreover,
petitioner Atty. Sabitsana has exhibited a lack of loyalty toward his clients, the Muerteguis, and
by his acts, jeopardized their interests instead of protecting them. Over and above the trial
court's and the CA's findings, this provides further justification for the award of attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs in favor of the respondent.
Thus said, judgment must be rendered in favor of respondent to prevent the petitioners' void
sale from casting a cloud upon his valid title.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The January 25, 2007 Decision and
the January 11, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79250 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 209331, August 24, 2015
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, REPRESENTED BY HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY, AND THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, REPRESENTED
BY HON. ROZZANO RUFINO B. BIAZON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, Petitioners, v. HON. MARINO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, HON. FELICITAS
O. LARON-CACANINDIN, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 17, RONNIE C. SILVESTRE, EDWARD P. DELA CUESTA,
ROGEL C. GATCHALIAN, IMELDA D.CRUZ, LILIBETH S. SANDAG, RAYMOND P.
VENTURA, MA. LIZA S. TORRES, ARNEL C. ALCARAZ, MA. LOURDES V. MANGAOANG,
FRANCIS AGUSTIN Y. ERPE, CARLOS T. SO, MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, CARMELITA M.
TALUSAN,1] AREFILES H. CARREON,2] AND ROMALINO G. VALDEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Petitioners assail the Order dated 4 October 20133 issued by Judge Felicitas O. Laron-Cacanindin
(Judge Laron-Cacanindin) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17 (RTC Branch 17), in
Civil Case No. 13-130820. The Order extended the 72-hour Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
issued by Executive Judge Marino M. Dela Cruz, Jr. (Executive Judge Dela Cruz) in favor of
respondents Silvestre, et al.4 to 20 days or until 21 October 2013 without need of posting bond.
The Antecedent Facts
The case stemmed from the issuance of Executive Order No. 140 (EO 140) on 2 September
2013, which created the Customs Policy Research Office (CPRO) in the Department of Finance
(DOF). EO 140 states that the CPRO "shall be responsible for reviewing the customs
administration policies, rules and procedures, and thereafter providing sound recommendations
for the improvement of the same." Section 3 of EO 140 provides that "CPRO shall be composed
of its organic personnel, as approved by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
upon recommendation of the DOF Secretary, augmented and reinforced by DOF and BOC
personnel as well as those detailed or seconded from other agencies, whether attached to the
DOF or not. x x x." Section 9 of EO 140 states that it shall "take effect immediately upon
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." EO 140 was published in Manila
Bulletin and Philippine Star on 17 September 2013.
On the same day of the publication of EO 140, Bureau of Customs (BOC) Commissioner Rozzano
Rufino B. Biazon (Commissioner Biazon) issued Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 (CPO
189-2013) detailing 27 BOC personnel holding the positions of Collector of Customs V and VI,
including respondents in this case, to CPRO "effective immediately and valid until sooner
revoked." CPO 189-2013 was approved by DOF Secretary Cesar V. Purisima (Secretary
Purisima).
On 30 September 2013, respondents filed an action for Declaratory Relief with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila. On 1 October 2013, Executive Judge Dela Cruz issued a TRO for a period
of 72 hours enjoining petitioners or any person acting for and in their behalf from implementing
CPO 189-2013. Thereafter, the case was raffled to the sala of Judge Laron-Cacanindin.
In the assailed Order of 4 October 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin extended Executive Judge
Dela Cruz's 72-hour TRO for 20 days or until 21 October 2013. She then set the hearing for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction on 18 October 2013.
On 21 October 2013, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court,
with prayer for the issuance of a TRO or a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Petitioners
alleged that the case involves personnel action affecting public officers which is under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Petitioners also alleged that
respondents failed to exhaust all administrative remedies available to them before filing the
petition before the RTC. Petitioners also alleged that CPO 189-2013 is an internal personnel
order with application that is limited to and only within BOC and as such, it cannot be the
subject of an action for declaratory relief.
In their Comment, respondents alleged that the case involves the validity and constitutionality
of CPO 189-2013, and thus, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the CSC. Respondents further alleged
28
that EO 140 violated Article 2 of the Civil Code when it became effective immediately after its
publication.
In their Reply, petitioners alleged that respondents only assailed the validity of EO 140 to justify
their filing of an action for declaratory relief. As regards its effectivity, petitioners alleged that
EO 140 states that it shall "take effect immediately upon publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation."
In an Order dated 21 October 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin denied respondents' application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
In an Order dated 5 November 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin inhibited herself from further
hearing the case.
The Issues
The issues for determination by this Court are the following:cralawlawlibrary
1. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief filed by
respondents;
2. Whether respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies in filing the action
before the RTC;
3. Whether EO 140 violated Article 2 of the Civil Code when it became effective
immediately after its publication; and
4. Whether CPO 189-2013 was validly issued.
The Ruling of this Court
Jurisdiction over the Petition
The CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters.5 The CSC is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.6 The
rule is that disciplinary cases and cases involving personnel actions, including "appointment
through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment,
demotion, and separation," are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC.7 This rule is
embodied in Section 1, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order
No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus Rules) which states:cralawlawlibrary
SECTION 1. x x x.
As used in these Rules, any action denoting movement or progress of personnel in the civil
service shall be known as personnel action. Such action shall include promotion, transfer,
reinstatement, reemployment, detail, secondment, reassignment, demotion and separation, x x
x.
Under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules, "[a] detail is the movement of an employee
from one department or agency which is temporary in nature, which does not involve a
reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of another appointment."
CPO 189-2013 is an order detailing personnel from the BOC to CPRO under the DOF.
A reading of the petition filed before the RTC shows that respondents were questioning their
mass detail and reassignment to CPRO. According to respondents, their detail was carried out in
bad faith and was meant to remove them from their permanent positions in the BOC. The action
appears to be a personnel action under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
However, the petition went beyond questioning the detail of respondents. Respondents further
assailed the validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013. Respondents alleged that CPO 189-
2013 was issued even before EC) 140, pursuant to which CPO 189-2013 was issued, became
effective. Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013 was issued to beat the deadline of the
Commission on Elections' ban on personnel movement from 28 September 2013 to 20 October
2013 due to the scheduled barangay elections. When respondents raised the issue of validity
and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, the issue took the case beyond the scope of the CSC's
jurisdiction because the matter is no longer limited to personnel action. Thus, the RTC did not
abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of the action.
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Petitioners allege that respondents failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing
the case with the RTC.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies allows administrative agencies to carry
out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their
respective competence.8 The doctrine entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier
resolution of controversies.9 Therefore, direct recourse to the trial court, when administrative
remedies are available, is a ground for dismissal of the action.
The doctrine, however, is not without exceptions. Among the exceptions are: (1) where there is
estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (2) where the challenged administrative
act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (3) where there is unreasonable delay or
official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (4) where the amount involved
is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (5) where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (6) where
judicial intervention is urgent; (7) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and
irreparable damage; (8) where the controverted acts violate due process; (9) where the issue of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies had been rendered moot; (10) where there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) where strong public interest is involved; and
(12) in quo warranto proceedings.10cralawrednad
In this case, respondents allege that CPO 189-2013 is contrary to law and unconstitutional.
Respondents assail CPO 189-2013 as patently illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive. This case clearly
falls within the exceptions where exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be resorted to
by respondents.
Effectivity of EO 140
Respondents allege that EO 140 took effect only on 2 October 2013, fifteen days after its
publication in two newspapers of general circulation. Hence, respondents argue that when CPO
189-2013 was issued, EO 140 was not yet effective.
Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended by Executive Order No. 200,11 is clear
on this issue. It states:cralawlawlibrary
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it
is otherwise provided.
The proviso "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to an effectivity date other than after fifteen
days following the completion of the law's publication.12 Thus, it is within the discretion of the
legislature, or the Executive Department in this case, whether to shorten or extend the fifteen-
day period13 as long as there is compliance with the requirement of publication.
Here, Section 9 of EO 140 provides that the "order shall take effect immediately upon
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." EO 140 was published in Manila
Bulletin and Philippine Star on 17 September 2013. As such, EO 140 took effect on 17
September 2013.
In addition, the Court already ruled that "[interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public,
29
need not be published." 14 EO 140 is an internal regulation that affects primarily the personnel of
the DOF and the BOC. It remains valid even without publication. Petitioners assert, and we quote:cralawlawlibrary
There is a cancer of corruption we must extinguish. The drive to rid the government of graft and
corruption deserves the support of everyone.
Validity of CPO 189-2013
The principle of good governance cannot, should not, be trivialized nor oversimplified by
Respondents assail the validity of CPO 189-2013. Respondents allege that under EO 140, CPRO
tenuous whimpering and individualism intended to detract from the urgent need to cleanse the
shall be composed of its organic personnel, as approved by the DBM upon recommendation of
Republic from a mainstream culture of unabated corruption, perpetuated with impunity and
the DOF Secretary. The organic personnel was supposed to be augmented and reinforced by
sense of self-entitlement. The issue at hand is not about who, but what; it is not about
DOF and BOC personnel. Respondents allege that they were detailed to CPRO even before its
individual loss, but about national gain. Whether from the birth pains of reform, this nation can
organic personnel could be constituted.
gain a foothold, nay, a stride into restoring this nation into its prideful place from the clutches of
a "kleptocratic mafia" that had gained a strangehold into one of the nation's primary sources of
We rule for respondents.
revenue.17
Indeed, we commend and support the reforms being undertaken in the different agencies of the
Section 3 of EO 140 provides:cralawlawlibrary
government. However, we cannot allow department heads to take shortcuts that will undermine
SECTION 3. Personnel and Staffing Complement. The CPRO shall be composed of its organic
and disregard the basic procedures of the law.
personnel, as approved by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) upon
recommendation of the DOF Secretary, augmented and reinforced by DOF and BOC personnel
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We sustain the validity of Executive Order
as well as those detailed or seconded from other agencies, whether attached to the DOF or not.
No. 140. We rule that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory
In addition, the CPRO, upon approval of the DOF Secretary, may hire or engage technical
relief filed by respondents. We further rule that Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 was
consultants to provide necessary support in the performance of its mandate.
not validly issued.
Respondents were supposed to augment and reinforce the existing organic personnel of CPRO.
Yet, at the time of respondents' detail, CPRO had not been formally organized. CPRO had no
SO ORDERED
organic personnel that had been approved by the DBM upon recommendation of the DOF
Secretary. The DOF Secretary had yet to promulgate rules and regulations and to prescribe
procedures and processes to enable CPRO to effectively exercise its powers and duties, as
required by Section 4 of EO 140. A.M. No. RTJ-15-2407

In addition, under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules, a detail is temporary in nature. In
fact, detail of employees is only allowed for a maximum, period for those occupying
professional, technical, and scientific positions.15 Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules
provides:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 8. A detail is the movement of an employee from one department or agency to another
which is temporary in nature, which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and
does not require the issuance of another appointment.
The employee detailed receives his salary only from his mother unit/agency.
Detail shall be allowed only for a maximum period in the case of employees occupying
professional, technical and scientific position. If the employee believes that there is no
justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the Commission. Pending appeal, the
decision to detail the employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.
Section 2 of CSC Resolution No. 021181, dated 13 September 2002,16 clarified the maximum
period of detail of employees. It states:cralawlawlibrary
Section 2. Duration of the detail. The detail shall be allowed only for a maximum period of one
year. Details beyond one year may be allowed provided it is with the consent of the detailed
employee. The extension or renewal of the period of the detail shall be within the authority of
the mother agency.
If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he/she may appeal his/her
case to the proper Civil Service Commission Regional Office. Pending appeal, the detail shall be
executory unless otherwise ordered by said regional office. Decision of said regional office may
be further appealed to the Commission en banc.
In this case, CPO 189-2013 did not provide for the period of respondents' detail. It only
provided that the order "shall be effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked," making
the detail of respondents indefinite. There was nothing to show that respondents were
occupying professional, technical, and scientific positions that would have allowed their detail for
the maximum period provided under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules. Further, CSC
Resolution No. 021181 did not distinguish between an ordinary employee and an employee
occupying professional, technical, and scientific position. Hence, it should have been specified
that the maximum period of respondents' detail should not exceed one year.
EDGAR R. ERICE, Complainant
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE DIONISIO C. SISON, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 125,
CALOOCAN CITY, Respondent
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
This is an administrative matter1 filed by Edgar R. Erice (Erice) against the now-retired Judge
Dionisio C. Sison (Judge Sison) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 125, Caloocan City, for
violation of Section 8, paragraphs 3, 4 and 9 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,2 in particular: (i) gross
misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, (ii) knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding, and
(iii) gross ignorance of the law or procedure.3
BACKGROUND
The facts leading to the filing of the complaint are as follows:
Complainant Erice, then Vice Mayor of Caloocan City, filed a complaint against then Mayor
Enrico R. Echiverri, City Treasurer Evelina Garma, Budget Officer Jesusa Garcia and City
Accountant Edna Centeno (Echiverri, et al.) before the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged
violation of the Government Service Insurance System Act.4 Acting on the complaint, the
Ombudsman issued an Order5 of Preventive Suspension (Order of Suspension) on July 18, 2011
against Echiverri, et al., to last until the administrative adjudication is completed but not to
exceed six (6) months.6

30
Aggrieved by the Order of Suspension, Echiverri, et al. elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals (CA). While Echiverri, et al. were able to obtain a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and a writ of preliminary injunction from the CA Special 14th Division, nevertheless, in
its Decision7 dated January 2, 2012, the CA affirmed the Order of Suspension of the
Ombudsman and lifted and set aside the TRO. The decretal portion of the CA Decision of
January 2, 2012 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by this Court is
hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the assailed Order dated July 18, 2011 issued by
the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-11-0401-G is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.8
A week later, or on January 9, 2012, Echiverri, et al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with
Prayer for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction 9 with the RTC of Caloocan City, which was
docketed as Special Civil Action No. C-1060 (2012)10 Named as Respondents in the Petition/or
Declaratory Relief were Erice (Complainant in the present administrative matter) and the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Echiverri, et al. prayed that the RTC
"make a definite judicial declaration on the rights and obligations of the parties asserting
adverse legal interests with respect to the implementation of [their] suspension."11
On even date, RTC Executive Judge Eleanor R. Kwong issued a 72- hour ex-parte Order to
enjoin the DILG and Erice from implementing the Order of Suspension. Subsequently, the case
was raffled and assigned to Judge Lorenza R. Bordios.12
In the summary hearing held on January 10, 2012, Erice and the DILG questioned the
jurisdiction of the RTC to hear the matter, considering that the object of the Petition for
Declaratory Relief were the CA Decision and the Order of Suspension of the Ombudsman. They
also raised the matter of forum shopping, with Erice and the DILG pointing out that Echiverri, et
al. had a pending Motion for Reconsideration13 filed with the CA and a Motion to Hold in
Abeyance the Implementation of the Order of Preventive Suspension 14 with the Office of the
Ombudsman.15
However, Judge Bordios inhibited herself from proceeding with the case on January 11, 2012.
The case was subsequently re-raffled to herein Respondent Judge Sison.16
On the same day, January 11, 2012, with the case now pending before Judge Sison, Erice and
the DILG reiterated their Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Dissolve. That afternoon, Judge Sison
noted that the 72-hour TRO of the Order of Suspension would be expiring the next day, on
January 12, 2012, and that the parties ought to finish with the presentation of evidence before
noon of January 12, 2012. Counsel for the DILG informed Judge Sison that the OSG was not
informed that the summary hearing would proceed at 2:00 p.m. of January 11, 2012 before
Branch 125. Nevertheless, Judge Sison proceeded with the hearing and allowed Echiverri, et
al. to present their evidence until 5:00 p.m. that day.17
The next day, at 8:00 a.m., the summary hearing continued. The OSG invoked its right to cross-
examine the witnesses earlier presented by Echiverri, et al. but Judge Sison denied the same,
allegedly without consulting the records from Branch 126 that would indicate that the OSG had
made reservations to this effect on January 10, 2012. At 9:15 a.m., Judge Sison issued
an Order18 extending the TRO to 20 days, inclusive of the 72-hour TRO earlier granted by Judge
Kwong.19
On the day scheduled for the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, January 17, 2012, Judge Sison
stated that he would hear evidence in support of the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction. This compelled Erice to file an Urgent Motion to lnhibit. 20 Without ruling on
the Motion to Inhibit, Judge Sison issued the Order21 granting the writ of preliminary
injunction.22
For his part, in refuting the charges against him, Judge Sison denied any allegations of the
violation of the right to due process of Erice and the DILG in allowing the summary hearing to
proceed and Echiverri, et al. to present evidence even though the OSG was not informed of said
hearing.23 Judge Sison submitted that:
1. There is no basis for the claim of bias and partiality because the reason for the extension of
the 72-hour TRO to a 20-day TRO was to accord Echiverri, et al. due process in allowing them to
file their written comment and to argue against the Motion to Dissolve.24
2. There was no "deplorable haste" in issuing the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction because
"of the limited time provided by the Rules of Court," in particular, Rule 58, Section 5; and that
Erice' s counsel, "knowing this time constraint x x x should have made himself always ready to
go to trial and to present his testimonial and documentary evidences (sic)." 25
3. While admitting that the DILG's counsel appeared before him and that he denied the OSG's
claim of the right to cross-examine, Judge Sison claims that Erice failed to produce evidence
that he made such rulings and therefore "should not be believed."26
The Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) Report dated
November 4, 2014
In its Report27 dated November 4, 2014, the OCA recommended that:
x x x [R]espondent Judge be found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and FINED in the
amount equivalent to his one (1) month salary with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.28
The basis for the OCA's recommendation are as follows:
First, insofar as the alleged haste is concerned, indeed, this Court had ruled in Leviste v.
Alameda29 that "the pace in resolving incidents of the case is not per se an indication of
bias."30 Nevertheless, Judge Sison's act of issuing a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
against Erice and the DILG to enjoin the latter from enforcing the Ombudsman's Order
of Suspension constitutes a violation of Section 14 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770,31 which
provides:
SEC. 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima
facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office
of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
Second, in a similar case, Ogka Benito v. Balindong, 32 therein Respondent Judge Balindong
issued a 72-hour TRO and extended the same for 20 days, against the enforcement of a DILG
Department Order implementing a decision to suspend an official for nine months. This Court
found that Judge Balindong's act constituted gross ignorance of the law for violating Section 14
of RA 6770. Judge Balindong was fined ₱30,000.00.33
31
Third, the OCA observed that although denominated as a Petition for Declaratory Relief, it was
clear that Echiverri, et al. merely sought the injunction to prevent the implementation of the
Ombudsman's Order of Suspension. In this regard, it is the CA that has appellate jurisdiction
over the administrative cases resolved by the Ombudsman. Thus, Judge Sison cannot relax the
rules, take cognizance of the case, and issue a TRO and writ of injunction which are beyond his
authority.34
The OCA noted that this is Judge Sison's second offense. In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2050, he was
found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and was fined ₱l0,000.00. Considering that this is
Judge Sison's second offense, the penalty of suspension should have been imposed on him;
however, since he was due for compulsory retirement on December 9, 2014, the OCA
recommended that in lieu of suspension, Judge Sison should be meted a penalty of fine
equivalent to one (1) month's salary.35
This Court's Resolutions
In a Resolution dated February 23, 2015, this Court noted the OCA Report dated November 4,
2014 recommending that Judge Sison be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be fined
an amount equivalent to one (1) month's salary, with a warning that repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.36
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated August 5, 2015, this Court, acting on Judge Sison's request
for the payment of his terminal leave, resolved the same in his favor, and released the terminal
leave benefits after retaining the amount equivalent to his two (2) months' salary, to answer for
whatever penalty the Court may impose against him in his pending administrative cases.37
DISCUSSION
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, with a modification on the penalty imposed on
Judge Sison.1awp++i1
Gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC. It requires the judge to perform his/her duty to be
acquainted with the basic legal command of law and rules.38 Consequently, a judge becomes
liable for gross ignorance of the law when there is a patent disregard for well-known rules so as
to produce an inference of bad faith, dishonesty and corruption.39
Against these parameters, Judge Sison failed to perform his basic duty to be acquainted with the
fundamentals of the very law he was tasked to uphold, and this conclusion remains unchanged
notwithstanding the Court's supervening Decision in Carpio Morales v. Court of
Appeals.40 In Carpio Morales, the Court: (1) declared as unconstitutional Section 14(2)41 of RA
6770, and (2) declared as ineffective the policy in Section 14(1)42 of RA 6770 against the
issuance of a provisional injunctive writ by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman until the Court adopts the same as
part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.43
Be that as it may, the subsequent declaration of the policy in Section 14(1) of RA 6770 as
ineffective and of Section 14(2) as invalid, does not serve to exonerate Judge Sison from
administrative liability because he failed to consider and act in accordance with the basic
principle of judicial stability or non-interference.44 Pursuant to this principle, where decisions of
certain administrative bodies are appealable to the CA, these adjudicative bodies are co-equal
with the RTCs and their actions are logically beyond the control of the RTC.45
Notably, the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases are appealable to the CA under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, the RTC had no jurisdiction to interfere with or restrain
the execution of the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases,46 more so, because at the
time Judge Sison issued the TRO on January 10, 2012 and proceeded with the writ of
preliminary injunction on January 17, 2012 against the enforcement of the Ombudsman Order
of Suspension, the CA had already affirmed that very same Order of Suspension in
its Decision dated January 2, 2012.
In any event, Judge Sison should have, at the very least, been aware that court orders or
decisions cannot be the subject matter of a petition for declaratory relief.47 They are not
included within the purview of the words "other written instrument"48 in Rule 6349 of the Rules of
Court governing petitions for declaratory relief. The same principle applies
to orders, resolutions, or decisions of quasi-judicial bodies,50 and this is anchored on the
principle ofresjudicata.51 Consequently, a judgment rendered by a court or a quasi-judicial body
is conclusive on the parties, subject only to appellate authority.52 The losing party cannot modify
or escape the effects of judgment under the guise of an action for declaratory relief.53
Here, Echiverri, et al.'s Petition for Declaratory Relief specifically prayed that the RTC "make a
definite judicial declaration on the rights and obligations of the parties asserting adverse legal
interests with respect to the implementation of the [order of] preventive
suspension,"54 effectively putting into question the CA-affirmed Ombudsman Order of
Suspension - a matter clearly beyond the ambit of the RTC's jurisdiction. This, coupled with the
deference to the basic precepts of jurisdiction required of judges, leads to no other conclusion
than that Judge Sison acted in gross ignorance of the law in proceeding with the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction.1âwphi1
As a serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
the penalty for gross ignorance of the law or procedure ranges from a fine of more than
₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00 to dismissal.55 Inasmuch as Judge Sison had already
retired on December 9, 2014, the imposition of the penalty of suspension is no longer feasible.
In lieu of suspension, a fine may still be imposed.56 Considering that this is not Judge Sison's
first offense, the Court finds that the fine of Forty Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00) is justified
under the circumstances.57 In light of this Court's Resolution dated August 5, 2015, the fine shall
be charged against the retained amounts from Judge Sison.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds retired Judge Dionisio C. Sison GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No.
01-8-10-SC, and is hereby ordered to PAY A FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00), to be
deducted from his terminal leave benefits earlier retained pursuant to this Court's Resolution
dated August 5, 2015, with the remaining amount to be released to Judge Sison immediately.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206987               September 10, 2013
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Mandamus, seeking to compel the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to canvass the votes cast for petitioner Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
(ANAD) in the recently held 2013 Party-List Elections.
32
On 7 November 2012, the COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution canceling petitioner’s
Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation on three grounds, to wit:1
I.
Petitioner ANAD does not belong to, or come within the ambit of, the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors enumerated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 and
espoused in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.
II.
There is no proof showing that nominees Arthur J. Tariman and Julius D. Labandria
are actually nominated by ANAD itself. The Certificate of Nomination, subscribed and
sworn to by Mr. Domingo M.Balang, shows that ANAD submitted only the names of
Pastor Montero Alcover, Jr., Baltaire Q. Balangauan and Atty. Pedro Leslie B. Salva. It
necessarily follows, that having only three (3) nominees, ANAD failed to comply with
the procedural requirements set forth in Section 4, Rule 3 of Resolution No. 9366.
III.
ANAD failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 National
and Local Elections as required by Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 ("R.A. No. 7166").
ANAD went before this Court challenging the above-mentioned resolution. In Atong Paglaum,
Inc. v. Comelec,2 the Court remanded the case to the COMELEC for re-evaluation in accordance
with the parameters prescribed in the aforesaid decision.
In the assailed Resolution dated 11 May 2013,3 the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of
petitioner’s Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation and disqualified it from participating
in the 2013 Elections. The COMELEC held that while ANAD can be classified as a sectoral party
lacking in well-defined political constituencies, its disqualification still subsists for violation of
election laws and regulations, particularly for its failure to submit at least five nominees, and for
its failure to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 Elections.
Hence, the present petition raising the issues of whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in promulgating the assailed Resolution without the benefit of a summary evidentiary
hearing mandated by the due process clause, and whether or not the COMELEC erred in finding
that petitioner submitted only three nominees and that it failed to submit its Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures in the 2007Elections.4
We dismiss the petition.
The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Section 2, Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court is whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. For a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear
showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.5
"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or
despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical,
arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck
down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross.6
ANAD claims that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it promulgated the assailed
Resolution without giving ANAD the benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing, thus violating its
right to due process. It is to be noted, however, that ANAD was already afforded a summary
hearing on23 August 2013, during which Mr. Domingo M. Balang, ANAD’s president,
authenticated documents and answered questions from the members of the COMELEC pertinent
to ANAD’s qualifications.7
ANAD, nonetheless, insists that the COMELEC should have called for another summary hearing
after this Court remanded the case to the COMELEC for re-evaluation in accordance with the
parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Comelec . This is a superfluity.
ANAD was already given the opportunity to prove its qualifications during the summary hearing
of 23 August 2012, during which ANAD submitted documents and other pieces of evidence to
establish said qualifications. In re-evaluating ANAD’s qualifications in accordance with the
parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC , the COMELEC need not have called
another summary hearing. The Comelec could, as in fact it did,8 readily resort to documents and
other pieces of evidence previously submitted by petitioners in re-appraising ANAD’s
qualifications. After all, it can be presumed that the qualifications, or lack thereof, which were
established during the summary hearing of 23 August2012 continued until election day and
even there after.
As to ANAD’s averment that the COMELEC erred in finding that it violated election laws and
regulations, we hold that the COMELEC, being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision
of elections all over the country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered
on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in the absence
of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law.9
As found by the COMELEC, ANAD, for unknown reasons, submitted only three nominees instead
of five, in violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7941( An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List
Representatives through the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor).10 Such
factual finding of the COMELEC was based on the Certificate of Nomination presented and
marked by petitioner during the 22 and 23 August 2012summary hearings.11
Compliance with Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is essential as the said provision is a safeguard
against arbitrariness.1âwphi1 Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941rids a party-list organization of the
prerogative to substitute and replace its nominees, or even to switch the order of the nominees,
after submission of the list to the COMELEC.
In Lokin, Jr. v. Comelec,12 the Court discussed the importance of Sec.8 of R.A. No. 7941 in this
wise:
The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of
lawmakers. The COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list
reflects the true will of the party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with
whether or not the list contains the real intended nominees of the party-list organization, but
will only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements prescribed by the law and
whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers of general circulation.
Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of election,
not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any
particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in
newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make
intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list organization to change its
nominees through withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after
the submission of the list of nominees circumvents the voters’ demand for transparency. The
lawmakers’ exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such
circumvention.
33
Moreover, the COMELEC also noted ANAD’s failure to submit a proper Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 Elections, in violation of COMELEC Resolution No.
9476, viz:
Rule 8, Sec. 3. Form and contents of statements. – The statement required in next preceding
section shall be in writing, subscribed and sworn to by the candidate or by the treasurer of the
party. It shall set forth in detail the following:
a. The amount of contribution, the date of receipt, and the full name, profession,
business, taxpayer identification number (TIN) and exact home and business address
of the person or entity from whom the contribution was received; (See Schedule of
Contributions Received, Annex "G")
b. The amount of every expenditure, the date thereof, the full name and exact
address of the person or entity to whom payment was made, and the purpose of the
expenditure; (See Schedule of Expenditures, Annex "H")
A Summary Report of Lawful Expenditure categorized according to the list specified
above shall be submitted by the candidate or party treasurer within thirty (30) days
after the day of the election. The prescribed form for this Summary Report is hereby
attached to these Rules as Annex "H-1."
c. Any unpaid obligation, its nature and amount, the full name and exact home and
business address of the person or entity to whom said obligation is owing; and (See
Schedule of Unpaid Obligations, Annex "I")
d. If the candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no
expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact;
e. And such other information that the Commission may require.
The prescribed form for the Statement of Election Contributions and Expenses is attached to
these Rules as Annex "F." The Schedules of Contributions and Expenditures (Annexes "G" and
"H", respectively) should be supported and accompanied by certified true copies of official
receipts, invoices and other similar documents.
An incomplete statement, or a statement that does not contain all the required information and
attachments, or does not conform to the prescribed form, shall be considered as not filed and
shall subject the candidate or party treasurer to the penalties prescribed by law.
As found by the COMELEC, ANAD failed to comply with the above-mentioned requirements as
the exhibits submitted by ANAD consisted mainly of a list of total contributions from other
persons, a list of official receipts and amounts without corresponding receipts, and a list of
expenditures based on order slips and donations without distinction as to whether the amounts
listed were advanced subject to reimbursement or donated.13 This factual finding was neither
contested nor rebutted by ANAD.
We herein take the opportunity to reiterate the well-established principle that the rule that
factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts of justice except
when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings
should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the
Constitution intended to place the COMELEC – created and explicitly made independent by the
Constitution itself – on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has
broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the
attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.14
As empowered by law, the COMELEC may motu proprio cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections.15 Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC when it issued the assailed Resolution dated 11 May 2013.
In any event, the official tally results of the COMELEC show that ANAD garnered 200,972
votes.16 As such, even if petitioner is declared qualified and the votes cast for it are canvassed,
statistics show that it will still fail to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court Resolves to DISMISS the Petition, finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192685               July 31, 2013
OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN, Registrar,
Register of Deeds, Pasig City, FRANCIS SERRANO, YVONNE S. YUCHENGCO, and GEMA
O. CHENG, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 199115
OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner,
vs.
POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
No less than the Constitution maps out the wide grant of investigatory powers to the
Ombudsman.1 Hand in hand with this bestowal, the Ombudsman is mandated to investigate and
prosecute, for and in behalf of the people, criminal and administrative offenses committed by
government officers and employees, as well as private persons in conspiracy with the
former.2 There can be no equivocation about this power-and-duty function of the Ombudsman.
Before us are consolidated petitions separately filed by Oscar R. Ampil (Ampil): (1) one is for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as G.R. No. 192685; and (2) the other is
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court docketed as G.R. No. 199115.
Challenged in the petition for certiorari is the Resolution3 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-07-
0444-J, dismissing the criminal complaint filed by Ampil against respondents Policarpio L.
Espenesin (Espenesin), Francis Serrano (Serrano), Yvonne S. Yuchengco (Yuchengco) and Gema
O. Cheng (Cheng), and the Order4 denying Ampil’s motion for reconsideration thereof. Ampil’s
complaint charged respondents with Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of
34
the Revised Penal Code and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended.
The appeal by certiorari, on the other hand, assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. SP No. 113171, which affirmed the Order dated 13 July 2009 of the Ombudsman in OMB-
C-A-07-0474-J on the administrative aspect of the mentioned criminal complaint for Falsification
and violation of Republic Act No. 3019 against the Registrar of Deeds, respondent Espenesin.
Initially, the Ombudsman issued a Decision dated 30 April 2008, finding Espenesin guilty of
Simple Misconduct and meting on Espenesin the penalty of one (1) month suspension. On
motion for reconsideration of Ampil, the Ombudsman favored Espenesin’s arguments in his
Opposition, and recalled the one-month suspension the Ombudsman had imposed on the latter.
These consolidated cases arose from the following facts.
On 9 November 1995, ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company (MICO)
entered into a Joint Project Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of a
condominium building to be known as "The Malayan Tower." Under the JPDA, MICO shall provide
the real property located at the heart of the Ortigas Business District, Pasig City, while ASB
would construct, and shoulder the cost of construction and development of the condominium
building.
A year thereafter, on 20 November 1996, MICO and ASB entered into another contract, with
MICO selling to ASB the land it was contributing under the JPDA. Under the Contract to Sell,
ownership of the land will vest on ASB only upon full payment of the purchase price.
Sometime in 2000, ASB, as part of the ASB Group of Companies, filed a Petition for
Rehabilitation with Prayer for Suspension of Actions and Proceedings before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). As a result, the SEC issued a sixty (60) day Suspension Order (a)
suspending all actions for claims against the ASB Group of Companies pending or still to be filed
with any court, office, board, body, or tribunal; (b) enjoining the ASB Group of Companies from
disposing of their properties in any manner, except in the ordinary course of business, and from
paying their liabilities outstanding as of the date of the filing of the petition; and (c) appointing
Atty. Monico V. Jacob as interim receiver of the ASB Group of Companies.5 Subsequently, the
SEC, over the objections of creditors, approved the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by the ASB
Group of Companies, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the objections to the rehabilitation plan raised by the creditors are
hereby considered unreasonable.
Accordingly, the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by petitioners is hereby APPROVED, except those
pertaining to Mr. Roxas’ advances, and the ASB-Malayan Towers. Finally, Interim Receiver Mr.
Fortunato Cruz is appointed as Rehabilitation Receiver.6 (Emphasis supplied).
Because of the obvious financial difficulties, ASB was unable to perform its obligations to MICO
under the JPDA and the Contract to Sell. Thus, on 30 April 2002, MICO and ASB executed their
Third contract, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),7 allowing MICO to assume the entire
responsibility for the development and completion of The Malayan Tower. At the time of the
execution of the MOA, ASB had already paid MICO ₱427,231,952.32 out of the ₱640,847,928.48
purchase price of the realty.8
The MOA specifies the entitlement of both ASB and MICO to net saleable areas of The Malayan
Tower representing their investments. It provides, in pertinent part:
Section 4. Distribution and Disposition of Units. (a) As a return of its capital investment in the
Project, each party shall be entitled to such portion of all the net saleable area of the Building
that their respective contributions to the Project bear to the actual construction cost. As of the
date of the execution hereof, and on the basis of the total costs incurred to date in relation to
the Remaining Construction Costs (as defined in Section 9(a) hereof), the parties shall
respectively be entitled to the following (which entitlement shall be conditioned on, and subject
to, adjustments as provided in sub-paragraph (b) of Section 4 in the event that the actual
remaining cost of construction exceeds the Remaining Construction Cost):
(i) MICO – the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 2 hereof.
(ii) ASB – the following net saleable area:
(A) the net saleable area which ASB had pre-sold for an
aggregate purchase price of ₱640,085,267.30 as set forth in
Schedule 1 (including all paid and unpaid proceeds of said
presales);
(B) the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 3
hereof which shall be delivered to ASB upon completion of the
Project; and,
(C) provided that the actual remaining construction costs do not
exceed the Remaining Construction Cost, the net saleable area
particularly described in Schedule 4 hereof which shall be
delivered to ASB upon completion of the Project and
determination of its actual construction costs. If the actual
remaining construction costs exceed the Remaining Construction
Cost, sub-paragraph (b) of this Section 4 shall apply.
(b) In the event that the actual remaining construction costs exceed the Remaining
Construction Cost as represented and warranted by ASB to MICO under Section 9(a)
hereof, and MICO pays for such excess, the pro-rata sharing in the net saleable area
of the Building, as provided in sub-paragraph (a) of this Section 4 shall be adjusted
accordingly. In such event, MICO shall be entitled to such net saleable area in
Schedule 4 that corresponds to the excess of the actual remaining cost over the
Remaining Construction Cost.
(c) To ensure the viability of the Project, the parties agree on a single pricing system,
which MICO shall have the exclusive right to fix and periodically adjust based on
prevailing market conditions in consultation with, but without need of consent of, ASB,
for each party’s primary sale or other disposition of its share in the net saleable area
of the Building. In accordance with the immediately preceding provision, MICO hereby
adopts the selling prices set forth in Schedule 5 hereof. Each party or its officers,
employees, agents or representatives shall not sell or otherwise dispose any share of
said party in the net saleable area of the Building below the prices fixed by MICO in
accordance with this Section 4 (c). MICO shall have the exclusive right to adopt
financing and discounting schemes to enhance marketing and sales of units in the
Project and such right of MICO shall not be restricted or otherwise limited by the
foregoing single pricing system provision.
(d) Each party shall bear the profits earned and losses incurred as well as any and all
taxes and other expenses in connection with the allocation or sale of, or other
transaction relating to, the units allotted to each party.9
On 11 March 2005, Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) for 38 units10 and the allotted
parking spaces were issued in the name of ASB. On even date but prior to its release, another
set of CCTs covering the same subject units but with MICO as registered owner thereof, was
35
signed by Espenesin in his capacity as Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City. Notably, Espenesin had
likewise signed the CCTs which were originally issued in ASB’s name.
On 2 April 2006, counsel for ASB wrote Espenesin calling his attention to the supposed
amendment in the CCTs which he had originally issued in ASB’s name.11 Counsel for ASB
demanded that Espenesin effect in the second set of CCTs, the registration of the subject units
in The Malayan Tower back to ASB’s name.
On 17 May 2006, Espenesin replied and explained, thus:
The registration of the Malayan-ASB Realty transaction, from its inception up to the issuance of
titles, were all handled by respondent Atty. Francis Serrano. He therefore appeared and we have
considered him the legitimate representative of both parties (sic). His representation, we
gathered, covers the interest of both MICO and ASB in as far as the titling of the condominium
units are concerned.
Sometime ago Serrano requested that condominium titles over specified units be issued in
consonance with the sharing in the joint venture MOA. Titles were correspondingly issued as per
request, some in the name of MICO and some in the name of ASB. Before its release to the
parties, Atty. Serrano came back and requested that some titles issued in the name of ASB be
changed to MICO because allegedly there was error in the issuance.
Believing it was a simple error and on representation of the person we came to know and
considered the representative of both parties, we erased the name ASB Realty Corporation on
those specified titles and placed instead the name Malayan Insurance Company.
To our mind, the purpose was not to transfer ownership but merely to rectify an error
committed in the issuance of titles. And since they were well within our capacity to do, the titles
not having been released yet to its owner, we did what we believed was a simple act of
rectifying a simple mistake.12
After learning of the amendment in the CCTs issued in ASB’s name, Ampil, on 23 January 2007,
wrote respondents Yuchengco and Cheng, President and Chief Financial Officer of MICO,
respectively, introducing himself as an unsecured creditor of ASB Holdings, Inc., one of the
corporations forming part of the ASB Group of Companies.13 Ampil averred that MICO had
illegally registered in its name the subject units at The Malayan Tower which were reserved for
ASB under the MOA, and actually, already registered in ASB’s name with the Register of Deeds
of Pasig City. Ampil pointed out that the "condominium units should have benefited him and
other unsecured creditors of ASB because the latter had categorically informed them previously
that the same would be contributed to the Asset Pool created under the Rehabilitation Plan of
the ASB Group of Companies." Ultimately, Ampil demanded that Yuchengco and Cheng rectify
the resulting error in the CCTs, and facilitate the registration of the subject units back to ASB’s
name.
Respondents paid no heed to ASB’s and Ampil’s demands.
As previously adverted to, Ampil charged respondents with Falsification of Public Documents
under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic
Act No. 3019 before the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging the following:
1. Respondents, in conspiracy, erased the name of ASB, and intercalated and
substituted the name of MICO under the entry of registered owner in the questioned
CCTs covering the subject units of The Malayan Tower;
2. The alterations were done without the necessary order from the proper court, in
direct violation of Section 10814 of Presidential Decree No. 1529;
3. Respondents violated Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code by:
3.1 Altering the CCTs which are public documents;
3.2 Effecting the alterations on genuine documents;
3.3 Changing the meaning of the CCTs with MICO now appearing as
registered owner of the subject units in Malayan Tower; and
3.4 Effectively, making the documents speak something false when ASB is
the true owner of the subject units, and not MICO.
4. Ampil, as unsecured creditor of ASB, was unjustly prejudiced by the felonious acts
of respondents;
5. Respondents violated Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019:
5.1 Respondent Espenesin, as Registrar of the Pasig City Registry of Deeds,
committed an offense in connection with his official duties by allowing
himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced by respondent Serrano into
altering the questioned CCTs; and
5.2 The actions of respondent Espenesin demonstrate manifest partiality,
evident bad faith and/or, at the least, gross inexcusable negligence.
6. Respondents Yuchengco and Cheng, being responsible officers of MICO, as
principals by inducement and conspirators of Espenesin and Serrano, are likewise
liable for falsification of the CCTs and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019.15
As required by the Ombudsman, respondents filed their counter-affidavits: Espenesin and
Serrano filed individually, while Yuchengco and Cheng filed jointly. Respondents’ respective
counter-affidavits uniformly denied petitioner’s charges and explicated as follows:
Respondent Espenesin countered, among others, (i) that their intention was only to cause the
necessary rectification on certain errors made on the CCTs in issue; (ii) that since the CCTs were
not yet issued and released to the parties, it is still within his authority, as part of the
registration process, to make the necessary amendments or corrections thereon; (iii) that no
court order would be necessary to effect such changes, the CCTs still being within the control of
the Register of Deeds and have not yet been released to the respective owners; (iv) that the
amendments were made not for the purpose of falsifying the CCTs in issue but to make the
same reflect and declare the truth; and (v) that he merely made the corrections in accordance
with the representations of respondent Serrano who he believed to be guarding and
representing both the interests of MICO and ASB.
Respondent Serrano, on the other hand, argued: (i) that the units in issue are not yet owned by
ASB; (ii) that these units were specifically segregated and reserved for MICO in order to answer
for any excess in the estimated cost that it will expend in the completion of the Malayan Tower;
(iii) that ASB is only entitled to these reserved units only after the Malayan Tower is completed
and that the units are not utilized to cover for the increase in the cost expended by MICO
36
pursuant to Section 4(c) of the MOA; (iv) that the Malayan Tower was still incomplete at the
time when the alterations were made on the CCT, hence, the claim of ownership of ASB over the
reserved units is premature and totally baseless; (v) that prior to the fulfillment of the
resolutory condition, that is, after the completion of the Malayan Tower and there remains a
balance in the Remaining Construction Cost, the units still rightfully belongs to MICO; and (vi)
that the alteration was made merely for the purpose of correcting an error.
Respondents Cheng and Yuchengco, while adopting the foregoing arguments of Espenesin and
Serrano, further averred that: (i) Ampil has no legal personality to file this suit, he being merely
an unsecured creditor of ASB whose interest was not definitively shown to have been damaged
by the subject controversy; (ii) that their participation as respondents and alleged co-
conspirators of Serrano and Espenesin was not clearly shown and defined in the complaint; (iii)
the CCTs issued in the name of ASB have not yet been entered in the Registration Book at the
time when the alterations were effected, hence, the same could still be made subject of
appropriate amendments; (iv) that the CCTs in issue named in favor of ASB were mere drafts
and cannot legally be considered documents within the strict definition of the law; (v) that court
order authorizing to amend a title is necessary only if the deed or document sought to be
registered has already been entered in the registration book; and (vi) that MICO is the duly
registered owner of the land on which Malayan Tower stands and ASB was merely referred to as
the developer.16
Thereafter, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution in G.R. No. 192685 dismissing
Ampil’s complaint. For the Ombudsman, the resolution of whether respondents falsified the
CCTs must be prefaced by a determination of who, between MICO and ASB, is the rightful owner
of the subject units. The Ombudsman held that it had no authority to interpret the provisions of
the MOA and, thus, refrained from resolving the preliminary question of ownership. Given the
foregoing, the Ombudsman was hard pressed to make a categorical finding that the CCTs were
altered to speak something false. In short, the Ombudsman did not have probable cause to
indict respondents for falsification of the CCTs because the last element of the crime, i.e., that
the change made the document speak something false, had not been established.
Significantly, the Ombudsman did not dispose of whether probable cause exists to indict
respondents for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Ampil filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, in yet another setback, the Ombudsman
denied Ampil’s motion and affirmed the dismissal of his complaint.
On the administrative litigation front and as previously narrated, the Ombudsman found
Espenesin liable for Simple Misconduct. However, on motion for reconsideration of Ampil praying
for a finding of guilt against Espenesin for Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty, the Ombudsman
reconsidered its earlier resolution and recalled the one-month suspension meted on Espenesin.
Thereafter, Ampil filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the
appellate court. And as already stated, the appellate court affirmed the Ombudsman’s resolution
absolving Espenesin of not just Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty, but also of Simple
Misconduct.
Hence, this dual recourse by Ampil: first, alleging grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s
failure to find probable cause to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under
Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code, and for their commission of corrupt practices under
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019; and second, raising grievous error of the Court
of Appeals in affirming the Ombudsman’s absolution of Espenesin from administrative liability.
To obviate confusion, we shall dispose of the first issue, i.e., whether probable cause exists to
indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised
Penal Code and for their commission of corrupt practices under Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic
Act No. 3019.
Despite the Ombudsman’s categorical dismissal of his complaint, Ampil is adamant on the
existence of probable cause to bring respondents to trial for falsification of the CCTs, and for
violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. In fact, he argues that Espenesin
has been held administratively liable by the Ombudsman for altering the CCTs. At the time of
the filing of G.R. No. 192685, the Ombudsman had not yet reversed its previous resolution
finding Espenesin liable for simple misconduct. He insists that the admission by respondents
Espenesin and Serrano that they altered the CCTs should foreclose all questions on all
respondents’ (Espenesin’s, Serrano’s, Yuchengco’s and Cheng’s) liability for falsification and
their commission of corrupt practices, under the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 3019,
respectively. In all, Ampil maintains that the Ombudsman’s absolution of respondents is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
G.R. No. 192685 is partially impressed with merit. Accordingly, we find grave abuse of discretion
in the Ombudsman’s incomplete disposition of Ampil’s complaint.
That the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to "investigate on its own, or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient"17 brooks no
objection. The Ombudsman’s conduct of preliminary investigation is both power and duty. Thus,
the Ombudsman and his Deputies, are constitutionalized as protectors of the people, who "shall
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of
the government x x x, and shall, x x x notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof."18
The raison d'être for its creation and endowment of broad investigative authority is to insulate
the Office of the Ombudsman from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate
judges’ and fiscals’ offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and
through the execution of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations
into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers.19
Plainly, the Ombudsman has "full discretion," based on the attendant facts and circumstances,
to determine the existence of probable cause or the lack thereof.20 On this score, we have
consistently hewed to the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its
constitutionally mandated powers.21 The Ombudsman’s finding to proceed or desist in the
prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this
Court on the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion which
contemplates an abuse so grave and so patent equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.22
However, on several occasions, we have interfered with the Ombudsman’s discretion in
determining probable cause:
(a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions;
(c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
37
 (f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance.23 (Emphasis supplied).
The fourth circumstance is present in G.R. No. 192685.
While we agree with the Ombudsman’s disquisition that there is no probable cause to indict
respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal
Code, we are puzzled why the Ombudsman completely glossed over Ampil’s charge that
respondents committed prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Nowhere in the Resolution or in the Order denying reconsideration thereof did the Ombudsman
tackle and resolve the issue of whether respondents violated the particular provisions of
Republic Act No. 3019.
Curiously, the Ombudsman docketed Ampil’s complaint-affidavit as one "for: Falsification of
Public Documents and Violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended."24 The Ombudsman even prefaced the Resolution, thus: "this has reference to the
complaint filed by Oscar Ampil on 17 September 2007 against respondents, for Falsification of
Public Documents and Violation of Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended."25
The Ombudsman’s silence on the component anti-graft charges is pointed up by the specific
allegations in Ampil’s complaint-affidavit that:
18. The acts of ATTY. ESPENESIN and his co-conspirators are clear violations of Section 3
paragraph (a) and/or (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act x x x;
xxxx
19. On the basis of the evidence x x x and the admissions of the conspirators themselves, ATTY.
ESPENESIN is liable under both pars. (a) and (e) thereof or either of the two. By maliciously and
feloniously altering the subject CCT’s (sic), contrary to law and to the prejudice of ASB and
Ampil, ATTY. ESPENESIN committed an offense in connection with his official duties and he
admitted having done so in conspiracy with his co-respondents. x x x ATTY. ESPENESIN allowed
himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced into committing such violation or offense which
is the substance of par. (a) of RA 3019;
20. In committing such unauthorized and unlawful alterations on the subject CCT’s (sic), ATTY.
ESPENESIN caused undue injury to ASB and to AMPIL as an unsecured creditor, who is
ultimately one of the beneficiaries of said CCT from the ASSET POOL created by the SEC, and
gave MICO unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official duties
as Register of Deeds of Pasig City. Such acts were admitted by ATTY. ESPENESIN in his letter to
ASB x x x. Such acts, taken together with his admission, indubitably show ATTY. ESPENESIN’s
manifest partiality, evident bad faith and/or, at the least, his gross inexcusable negligence in
doing the same;
21. ATTY. ESPENESIN is liable under Section 3 pars. (a) and/or (e) of RA 3019, as well as under
Article 171 par. 6 of the RPC. ATTY. SERRANO, YVONNE S. YUCHENGCO and (sic) GEMMA O.
CHENG are also liable for violation of the said provisions of law in conspiracy with ATTY.
ESPENESIN, the latter as a principal via direct participation, ATTY. SERRANO, as principal by
inducement and YUCHENGCO and CHENG, also by inducement, who being responsible officers of
MICO ultimately benefited from said unlawful act.26 and the pith of the Resolution which
carefully and meticulously dissected the presence of the first three definitive elements of the
crime of falsification under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code:
The first three definitive elements of the crime, albeit present, are defeated by the absence of
the fourth.
The respondents readily admitted that an alteration was indeed made on the CCTs in issue
allegedly for the purpose of correcting a mistake in the name of the registered owner of the
condominium units involved. Said alteration had obviously changed the tenor of the CCTs
considering that ASB, the initially named owner, was changed into MICO. The first and third
elements are undeniably present.
Anent the second element, the respondents argued that the CCTs in issue were mere drafts and
are not legally considered "genuine documents" within the strict definition of the law. Albeit the
contention is partially true, no proof has been shown to prove that the CCTs issued in favor of
ASB were mere drafts.
The CCTs of ASB are obviously complete. If we are to compare it with the appearance and
contents of the CCTs issued in favor of MICO, one will notice no definitive difference between
the two except that one set was named in favor of ASB and the other set, in favor of MICO.
Nothing is shown that will clearly prove that the former were mere drafts and the latter are the
final copies. As far as the appearance of the CCTs of ASB is concerned, all appear to be
complete and genuine. Proof to the contrary must be shown to prove otherwise.
Delivery of the titles to the named owners is not a pre-requisite before all these CCTs can be
legally categorized as genuine documents. The fact that the same had already been signed by
respondent Espenesin in his capacity as Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City and the notations
imprinted thereon appeared to have been entered on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m. at the
Registry Books of Pasig City, the CCTs in issue are bound to be treated as genuine documents
drafted and signed in the regular performance of duties of the officer whose signature appears
thereon.27
On the whole, the Ombudsman’s discussion was straightforward and categorical, and ultimately
established that Espenesin, at the urging of Serrano, altered the CCTs issued in ASB’s name
resulting in these CCTs ostensibly declaring MICO as registered owner of the subject units at
The Malayan Tower.
Despite the admission by Espenesin that he had altered the CCTs and the Ombudsman’s
findings thereon, the Ombudsman abruptly dismissed Ampil’s complaint-affidavit, resolving only
one of the charges contained therein with nary a link regarding the other charge of violation of
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Indeed, as found by the Ombudsman, the 4th
element of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents is lacking, as the actual ownership of
the subject units at The Malayan Tower has yet to be resolved. Nonetheless, this circumstance
does not detract from, much less diminish, Ampil’s charge, and the evidence pointing to the
possible commission, of offenses under Sections 3(a) and (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 reads:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
38
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a
violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or
influenced to commit such violation or offense.
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
The elements of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 are:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the offender persuades, induces, or influences another public officer to perform an
act or the offender allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit
an act;
(3) the act performed by the other public officer or committed by the offender
constitutes a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duty of the latter. (Emphasis
supplied).
Whereas, paragraph (e) of the same section lists the following elements:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer’s official, administrative or
judicial functions;
(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.28
As Registrar of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, Espenesin is tasked, among others, to review
deeds and other documents for conformance with the legal requirements of
registration.29 Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, Amending and Codifying the Laws
Relative to Registration of Property and for Other Purposes provides:
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. – The office of the Register of Deeds
constitutes a public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered
lands and chattel mortgages in the province or city wherein such office is situated.
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for
registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary and science
stamps and that the same are properly cancelled. If the instrument is not registerable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the
ground or reason therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance
with Section 117 of the Decree.
Most importantly, a Registrar of the Registry of Deeds is charged with knowledge of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, specifically Sections 5730 and 108.31
In the instant case, the elements of the offenses under Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No.
3019, juxtaposed against the functions of a Registrar of the Registry of Deeds establish a prima
facie graft case against Espenesin and Serrano only. Under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No.
3019, there is a prima facie case that Espenesin, at the urging of Serrano, allowed himself to be
persuaded to alter the CCTs originally issued in ASB’s name, against the procedure provided by
law for the issuance of CCTs and registration of property. In addition, under Section 3(e) of the
same law, there is likewise a prima facie case that Espenesin, through gross inexcusable
negligence, by simply relying on the fact that all throughout the transaction to register the
subject units at The Malayan Tower he liaised with Serrano, gave MICO an unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference in the registration of the subject units.
In Sison v. People of the Philippines, we expounded on Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019:
The third element of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed in three ways, i.e., through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these
three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is enough to
convict.
Explaining what "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" mean, we held:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as
they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment
or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the
nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want
of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so
far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property."
In the instant case, petitioner was grossly negligent in all the purchases that were made under
his watch. Petitioner’s admission that the canvass sheets sent out by de Jesus to the suppliers
already contained his signatures because he pre-signed these forms only proved his utter
disregard of the consequences of his actions. Petitioner also admitted that he knew the
provisions of RA 7160 on personal canvass but he did not follow the law because he was merely
following the practice of his predecessors. This was an admission of a mindless disregard for the
law in a tradition of illegality. This is totally unacceptable, considering that as municipal mayor,
petitioner ought to implement the law to the letter. As local chief executive, he should have
been the first to follow the law and see to it that it was followed by his constituency. Sadly,
however, he was the first to break it.
Petitioner should have complied with the requirements laid down by RA 7160 on personal
canvass, no matter how strict they may have been. Dura lex sed lex. The law is difficult but it is
the law. These requirements are not empty words but were specifically crafted to ensure
transparency in the acquisition of government supplies, especially since no public bidding is
involved in personal canvass. Truly, the requirement that the canvass and awarding of supplies
be made by a collegial body assures the general public that despotic, irregular or unlawful
transactions do not occur. It also guarantees that no personal preference is given to any
supplier and that the government is given the best possible price for its procurements.
39
The fourth element is likewise present. While it is true that the prosecution was not able to
prove any undue injury to the government as a result of the purchases, it should be noted that
there are two ways by which Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be violated—the first, by causing
undue injury to any party, including the government, or the second, by giving any private party
any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. Although neither mode constitutes a distinct
offense, an accused may be charged under either mode or both. The use of the disjunctive "or’
connotes that the two modes need not be present at the same time. In other words, the
presence of one would suffice for conviction.
Aside from the allegation of undue injury to the government, petitioner was also charged with
having given unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to private suppliers. Under the
second mode, damage is not required.
The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized
or without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or improved
position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action.
"Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above
another.
In order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has given
unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial
functions. Petitioner did just that. The fact that he repeatedly failed to follow the requirements
of RA 7160 on personal canvass proves that unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference was
given to the winning suppliers. These suppliers were awarded the procurement contract without
the benefit of a fair system in determining the best possible price for the government. The
private suppliers, which were all personally chosen by respondent, were able to profit from the
transactions without showing proof that their prices were the most beneficial to the government.
For that, petitioner must now face the consequences of his acts.32 (Emphasis supplied).
We stress that the Ombudsman did not find probable cause to indict respondents for falsification
simply because the Ombudsman could not categorically declare that the alteration made the
CCT speak falsely as the ownership of the subject units at The Malayan Tower had yet to be
determined. However, its initial factual findings on the administrative complaint categorically
declared, thus:
x x x Espenesin justified his action by asseverating that since the CCTs were still under the
possession and control of the Register of Deeds and have not yet been distributed to the
owners, amendments can still be made thereon.
It is worthy to note that the CCTs of ASB, at the time when the amendment was made, were
obviously complete. From its face, we can infer that all have attained the character of a binding
public document. The signature of Espenesin is already affixed thereon, and on its face, it was
explicitly declared that the titles have already been entered in the Registration Book of the
Register of Deeds of Pasig City on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m. Allegations to the contrary
must be convincingly and positively proven, otherwise, the presumption holds that the CCTs
issued in the name of ASB were regular and the contents thereon binding.
Stated in a different light, delivery of the titles to the named owners is not a pre-requisite before
all these CCTs can be legally categorized as genuine documents. The fact that the same had
already been signed by x x x Espenesin in his capacity as Register of Deeds of Pasig City and
the notations imprinted thereon appeared to have been entered on March 11, 2005 at 11:55
a.m. at the Registry Books of Pasig City, the CCTs in issue are bound to be treated as genuine
documents drafted and signed in the regular performance of duties of the officer whose
signature appears thereon. The law has made it so clear that it is the entry of the title in the
Registration Book that controls the discretion of the Register of Deeds to effect the necessary
amendments and not the actual delivery of the titles to the named owners.
This being the case, strict compliance with the mandates of Section 108 of P.D. 1529 is strictly
called for. The provision is clear that upon entry of a certificate of title (which definitely includes
Condominium Certificate of Title) attested to by the Register of Deeds, no amendment shall be
effected thereon except upon lawful order of the court.
In the instant case, it became obvious that after the CCTs of ASB were entered in the
Registration Book on March 11, 2005 at exactly 11:55 a.m., the notations thereon were
thereafter amended by Espenesin when Atty. Serrano purportedly informed him of the alleged
error inscribed therein. The proper remedy that should have been undertaken by Espenesin
soon after he was informed of the error is to either initiate the appropriate petition himself or to
suggest to the parties to the MOA to file said petition in court for the amendment of the CCTs.
An amendment by way of a shortcut is not allowed after entry of the title in the Registration
Book.
xxxx
If the Regional Trial Court sitting as a land registration court is not legally authorized to
determine the respective rights of the parties to the MOA when deciding on the petition for
amendment and cancellation of title, all the more with the Registrar of Deeds who is legally not
empowered to make such determination and to cause an automatic amendment of entries in the
Registration Book on the basis of his unauthorized determination.
Espenesin’s liability is grounded on the untimely and unauthorized amendment of the CCTs in
issue. This is regardless of whether the amendment had made the CCTs speak of either a lie or
the truth. What defines his error is his inability to comply with the proper procedure set by
law.33 (Emphasis supplied).
We likewise stress that the determination of probable cause does not require certainty of guilt
for a crime. As the term itself implies, probable cause is concerned merely with probability and
not absolute or even moral certainty;34 it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.35 It
is sufficient that based on the preliminary investigation conducted, it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Well-settled in jurisprudence, as in
Raro v. Sandiganbayan,36 that:
x x x Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.37
Probable cause is a reasonable ground for presuming that a matter is or may be well-founded on
such state of facts in the prosecutor's mind as would lead a person of ordinary caution and
prudence to believe — or entertain an honest or strong suspicion — that it is so.38
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the
accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.39
A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence
to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the
prosecution in support of the charge.40
A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.
40
The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. x x x Probable cause does not require an inquiry
into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.41 (Emphasis and italics
supplied).
In this instance, Espenesin explains and categorically admits that he altered, nay corrected, 38
certificates of title which we again reproduce for easy reference:
Sometime ago Serrano requested that condominium titles over specified units be issued in
consonance with the sharing in the joint venture MOA. Titles were correspondingly issued as per
request, some in the name of MICO and some in the name of ASB. Before its release to the
parties, Atty. Serrano came back and requested that some titles issued in the name of ASB be
changed to MICO because allegedly there was error in the issuance.
Believing it was a simple error and on representation of the person we came to know and
considered the representative of both parties, we erased the name ASB Realty Corporation on
those specified titles and placed instead the name Malayan Insurance Company.
To our mind, the purpose was not to transfer ownership but merely to rectify an error
committed in the issuance of titles. And since they were well within our capacity to do, the titles
not having been released yet to its owner, we did what we believed was a simple act of
rectifying a simple mistake.42
The letter of Espenesin itself underscores the existence of a prima facie case of gross
negligence:
1. Serrano transacted the registration of the units in The Malayan Tower with the
Office of the Register of Deeds, Pasig City;
2. Serrano had previously presented a joint venture agreement, the MOA, which
Espenesin followed in the initial preparation and issuance of the titles;
3. Before some CCTs initially issued in ASB’s name were released, Serrano returned
and requested that some titles issued in the name of ASB be changed to MICO
because those titles were supposedly erroneously registered to ASB; and
4. Just on Serrano’s utterance and declaration which Espenesin readily believed
because he considered Serrano the representative of both parties, and without any
other documentation to base the amendment on, Espenesin erased the name of ASB
on those specified titles and replaced it with the name of MICO.
Espenesin, a Registrar of Deeds, relied on Serrano’s word alone that a supposed error has been
committed. Even if ownership of the units covered by the amended CCTs has not been
categorically declared as ASB’s given the ongoing dispute between the parties, the MOA which
Espenesin had previously referred to, allocates those units to ASB:
Section 4. Distribution and Disposition of Units. (a) As a return of its capital investment in the
Project, each party shall be entitled to such portion of all the net saleable area of the Building
that their respective contributions to the Project bear to the actual construction cost. As of the
date of the execution hereof, and on the basis of the total costs incurred to date in relation to
the Remaining Construction Costs (as defined in Section 9(a) hereof), the parties shall
respectively be entitled to the following (which entitlement shall be conditioned on, and subject
to, adjustments as provided in sub-paragraph (b) of Section 4 in the event that the actual
remaining cost of construction exceeds the Remaining Construction Cost):
(i) MICO – the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 2 hereof.
(ii) ASB – the following net saleable area:
(A) the net saleable area which ASB had pre-sold for an aggregate purchase price of
₱640,085,267.30 as set forth in Schedule 1 (including all paid and unpaid proceeds of
said pre-sales);
(B) the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 3 hereof which shall be
delivered to ASB upon completion of the Project; and,
(C) provided that the actual remaining construction costs do not exceed the
Remaining Construction Cost, the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule
4 hereof which shall be delivered to ASB upon completion of the Project and
determination of its actual construction costs. If the actual remaining construction
costs exceed the Remaining Construction Cost, sub-paragraph (b) of this Section 4
shall apply.43
The MOA even recognizes and specifies that:
E. ASB has pre-sold a number of condominium units in the Project to certain buyers as set forth
in Schedule 1 hereof, and in order to protect the interests of these buyers and preserve the
interest in the Project, the goodwill and business reputation of Malayan, Malayan has proposed
to complete the Project, and ASB has accepted such proposal, subject to the terms and
conditions contained herein, including the contribution to the Project (a) by Malayan of the Lot
and (b) by ASB of its interest as buyer under the Contract to Sell.
xxxx
Section 3. Recognition of ASB’s Investment. The parties confirm that as of the date hereof, ASB
invested in the Project an amount equivalent to its entitlement to the net saleable area of the
Building under Section 4 below, including ASB’s interest as buyer under the Contract to Sell.44
One fact deserves emphasis. The ownership of the condominium units remains in dispute and,
by necessary inference, does not lie as well in MICO. By his baseless reliance on Serrano’s word
and representation, Espenesin allowed MICO to gain an unwarranted advantage and benefit in
the titling of the 38 units in The Malayan Tower.
That a prima facie case for gross negligence amounting to violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 exists is amply supported by the fact that Espenesin disregarded the well-
established practice necessitating submission of required documents for registration of property
in the Philippines:
Documents Required for Registration of Real Property with the Register of Deeds:
1. Common Requirements
o Original copy of the Deed or Instrument (Original Copy + 2 duplicate copies)If the
original copy cannot be produced, the duplicate original or certified true copy shall be
presented accompanied with a sworn affidavit executed by the interested party why
the original copy cannot be presented.
41
 o Owner’s copy of the Certificate of Title or Co-owner’s copy if one has been issued.
(Original Copy + 2 duplicate copies)
o Latest Tax Declaration if the property is an unregistered land. (Original Copy + 2
duplicate copies)
2. Specific Requirements
1. Deed of Sale/Transfer
xxxx
 For Corporation
1. Secretary’s Certificate or Board Resolution to Sell or Purchase (Original
Copy + Duplicate Copy)
2. Articles of Incorporation (for transferee corporation) (1 Certified Copy of
the Original)
3. Certificate of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that the
Articles of Incorporation had been registered . (1 Certified Copy of the
Original)
4. For Condominium or Condominium Certificate of Transfer,
affidavit/certificate of the Condominium Corporation that the sale/transfer
does not violate the 60-40 rule.(Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
5. Subsequent transfer of CCT requires Certificate of the Condominium
Management. (Original Copy)
6. Sale by a Corporation Sole, court order is required.(Original copy of the
Court Order)
Additional Requirements
xxxx
11. Condominium Projects
 Master Deed (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
 Declaration of Restriction (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
 Diagrammatic Floor Plan (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
If the Condominium Certificate of Title is issued for the first time in the name of the
registered owner, require the following:
o Certificate of Registration with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
o Development Permit (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
o License to Sell (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)45
Espenesin, by his own explanation, relied on nothing more than Serrano, who he "came to know
and considered as representative of both parties," and Serrano’s interpretation of the MOA that
Serrano had brought with him.
On the whole, there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that respondents
Espenesin and Serrano committed prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019.
As regards Yuchengco and Cheng, apart from Ampil’s general assertions that the two, as officers
of MICO, benefited from the alteration of the CCTs, there is a dearth of evidence pointing to
their collective responsibility therefor. While the fact of alteration was admitted by respondents
and was affirmed in the Ombudsman’s finding of fact, there is nothing that directly links
Yuchengco and Cheng to the act.
We are aware that the calibration of evidence to assess whether a prima facie graft case exists
against respondents is a question of fact. We have consistently held that the Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where
neither questions of fact nor law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.46 In this case, however, certiorari will lie, given that the
Ombudsman made no finding at all on respondents possible liability for violation of Sections 3(a)
and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
We hasten to reiterate that we are only dealing herein with the preliminary investigation aspect
of this case. We do not adjudge respondents’ guilt or the lack thereof. The assertions of
Espenesin and Serrano on the former’s good faith in effecting the alteration and the pending
arbitration case before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission involving the correct
division of MICO’s and ASB’s net saleable areas in The Malayan Tower are matters of defense
which they should raise during trial of the criminal case.
As regards the administrative liability of Espenesin, the basic principle in the law of public
officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a
public officer, Espenesin in these cases, may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative
liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the others.47
On this point, we find that the appellate court erred when it affirmed the Ombudsman’s last
ruling that Espenesin is not administratively liable.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.48
In Grave Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple Misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rules, must be manifest49 and
established by substantial evidence. Grave Misconduct necessarily includes the lesser offense of
Simple Misconduct.50 Thus, a person charged with Grave Misconduct may be held liable for
Simple Misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of the elements to qualify the
misconduct as grave.51
42
In (G.R. No. 199115), the elements particular to Grave Misconduct are, by the Ombudsman’s
own finding, present. Corruption, as an element of Grave Misconduct, consists in the act of an
official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure
some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.52 This
has already been demonstrated as discussed above. And, there is here a manifest disregard for
established rules on land registration by a Register of Deeds himself. As he himself admits in his
letter, Espenesin erased the name of ASB on the specified CCTs because he believed that
Serrano’s request for the re-issuance thereof in MICO’s name constituted simple error.
Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides:
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment
shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a
memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same be Register of Deeds, except by order of
the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner of other person having an interest in
registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the
Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the
registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate
appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing
upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in
entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the
same or any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has
married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or
interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned
registered land and has been dissolved has not convened the same within three years after its
dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the
petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new
certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other
relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may
consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the court
authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or
ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a
certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written
consent. Where the owner's duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed
as provided in the preceding section.
The foregoing clearly speaks of a court order prior to any erasure, alteration or amendment
upon a certificate of title.
In reversing its prior ruling, the Ombudsman cavalierly dismisses the fact of Espenesin already
signing the CCTs issued in ASB’s name as "only a part of the issuance process because the final
step in the titling procedure is indeed the release of the certificate of title."53 The Ombudsman
further ruled:
Considering that prior to the release of titles, Espenesin merely rectified what was represented
to this office as error in the preparation of typing or the certificates, hence, it is wrong to
subject him to an administrative sanction. This is bolstered by the fact that, at the time of
release (and perhaps even up to the present time), there was no final determination yet from
the land registration court as to who has a better right to the property in question.54 (Emphasis
supplied).
This statement of the Ombudsman is virtually a declaration of Espenesin’s misconduct. It
highlights Espenesin’s awareness and knowledge that ASB and MICO are two different and
separate entities, albeit having entered into a joint venture for the building of "The Malayan
Tower."
As Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin was duty bound to inquire and ascertain the reason for
Serrano’s new instruction on those specific set of CCTs and not just heed Serrano’s bidding. He
heads the Office of Register of Deeds which is constituted by law as "a public repository of
records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands x x x in the province or city
wherein such office is situated." He should not have so easily taken Serrano’s word that the
amendment Serrano sought was to correct simple and innocuous error. Espenesin could have
then easily asked, as he is obliged to, for a contract or an authenticated writing to ascertain
which units and parking slots were really allotted for ASB and MICO. His actions would then be
based on what is documented and not merely by a lame claim of bona fides mistake.
Moreover, Espenesin was previously presented a MOA, and consulted this same MOA, in the
initial preparation and issuance of the 38 CCTs in ASB’s name. Certainly, a Registrar of Deeds
who is required by law to be a member of the legal profession,55 possesses common sense and
prudence to ask for documents on which to base his corrections. Reliance on the mere word of
even the point person for the transaction, smacks of gross negligence when all transactions with
the Office of the Register of Deeds, involving as it does registration of property, ought to be
properly recorded and documented.
That the Office of the Register of Deeds requires documentation in the registration of property,
whether as an original or a subsequent registration, brooks no argument. Again, and it cannot
be overlooked that, Espenesin initially referred to a MOA albeit Serrano worked on the
registration transaction for both ASB and MICO. Subsequently, Serrano returns, bearing
ostensible authority to transact even for ASB, and Espenesin fails to ask for documentation for
the correction Serrano sought to be made, and simply relies on Serrano’s word.
We are baffled by the Registrar of Deeds’ failure to require documentation which would serve as
his basis for the correction. The amendment sought by Serrano was not a mere clerical change
of registered name; it was a substantial one, changing ownership of 38 units in The Malayan
Tower from one entity, ASB, to another, MICO. Even just at Serrano’s initial request for
correction of the CCTs, a red flag should have gone up for a Registrar of Deeds.1âwphi1
Espenesin splits hairs when he claims that it is "in the Registration Book where the prohibition to
erase, alter, or amend, without court order, applies." We disagree with Espenesin. Chapter IV on
Certificate of Title of Presidential Decree No. 1529,56 specifically Sections 40, 42 and 43 belie the
claim of Espenesin:
Section 40. Entry of Original Certificate of Title. Upon receipt by the Register of Deeds of the
original and duplicate copies of the original certificate of title the same shall be entered in his
record book and shall be numbered, dated, signed and sealed by the Register of Deeds with the
seal of his office. Said certificate of title shall take effect upon the date of entry thereof. The
Register of Deeds shall forthwith send notice by mail to the registered owner that his owner's
duplicate is ready for delivery to him upon payment of legal fees.
Section 42. Registration Books. The original copy of the original certificate of title shall be filed
in the Registry of Deeds. The same shall be bound in consecutive order together with similar
certificates of title and shall constitute the registration book for titled properties.
Section 43. Transfer Certificate of Title. The subsequent certificate of title that may be issued by
the Register of Deeds pursuant to any voluntary or involuntary instrument relating to the same
land shall be in like form, entitled "Transfer Certificate of Title", and likewise issued in duplicate.
The certificate shall show the number of the next previous certificate covering the same land
and also the fact that it was originally registered, giving the record number, the number of the
original certificate of title, and the volume and page of the registration book in which the latter
is found.
43
Recording or entry of the titles, whether an original or a subsequent transfer certificate of title in
the record, is simultaneous with the signing by the Register of Deeds. The signature on the
certificate by the Registrar of Deeds is accompanied by the dating, numbering and sealing of the
certificate. All these are part of a single registration process. Where there has been a completed
entry in the Record Book, as in this case where the Ombudsman found that "the signature of
Espenesin is already affixed on the CCTs, and on its face, it was explicitly declared that the titles
have already been entered in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Pasig City on
March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m.," the Register of Deeds can no longer tamper with entries,
specially the very name of the titleholder. The law says that the certificate of title shall take
effect upon the date of entry thereof.
To further drive home the point, as Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin knew full well that "there is
no final determination yet from the land registration court as to who has a better right to the
property in question." Espenesin’s attempt to minimize the significance of a Registrar of Deed’s
signature on a CCT only aggravates the lack of prudence in his action. The change in the
titleholder in the CCTs from ASB to MICO was an official documentation of a change of
ownership. It definitely cannot be characterized as simple error.
Grave misconduct, of which Espenesin has been charged, consists in a public officer’s deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. It is regarded as grave when the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules are
present.57 In particular, corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the official’s
unlawful and wrongful use of his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for
another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.58
In sum, the actions of Espenesin clearly demonstrate a disregard of well-known legal
rules.59 The penalty for Grave Misconduct is dismissalfrom service with the accessory penalties
of forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of eligibility, and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service, including government-owned or controlled
corporation.60
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 192685 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution of the
Ombudsman dated 30 April 2008 in OMB-C-C-07-0444-J is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Ombudsman is hereby directed to file the necessary Information for violation of Sections 3(a)
and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against public respondent Policarpio L. Espenesin and private
respondent Francis Serrano.
The petition in G.R. No. 199115 is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28
September 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 113171 and the Order dated 13 July 2009 of the
Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-07-0474-J are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Policarpio L.
Espenesin is GUlLTY of Grave Misconduct and we, thus, impose the penalty of DIMISSAL from
service. However, due to his retirement from the service, we order forfeiture of all his
retirement pay and benefits.
G.R. No. 200804               January 22, 2014
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her husband, EFREN MONDEJAR, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse1 to the Court from the Decision2 dated November 23, 2011and
Order3 dated February 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 (RTC) in
RTC Case No. 11-13833 which dismissed, on the ground of improper remedy, petitioner A.L.
Ang Network, Inc.'s (petitioner) petition for certiorari from the Decision4 dated June 10, 2011 of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Bacolod City, Branch 4 (MTCC) in Civil Case No. SCC-1436,
a small claims case for sum of money against respondent Emma Mondejar (respondent).
The Facts
On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint5 for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure
for Small Claims Cases6 before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of
₱23,111.71 which represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to September
30, 2005.7
Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment therefor
from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom is respondent who owns and
occupies Lot 8, Block 3 of said subdivision. From June 1, 2002 until September 30, 2005,
respondent and her family consumed a total of 1,150 cubic meters (cu. m.) of water, which
upon application of the agreed rate of ₱113.00 for every 10 cu. m. of water, plus an additional
charge of ₱11.60 for every additional cu. m. of water, amounted to ₱28,580.09.8 However,
respondent only paid the amount of ₱5,468.38, thus, leaving a balance of ₱23,111.71 which was
left unpaid despite petitioner’s repeated demands.9
In defense, respondent contended that since April 1998 up to February 2003, she religiously
paid petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate of ₱75.00 for her water consumption.
Notwithstanding their agreement that the same would be adjusted only upon prior notice to the
homeowners, petitioner unilaterally charged her unreasonable and excessive adjustments (at
the average of 40 cu. m. of water per month or 1.3 cu. m. of water a day) far above the
average daily water consumption for a household of only 3 persons. She also questioned the
propriety and/or basis of the aforesaid ₱23,111.71 claim.10
In the interim, petitioner disconnected respondent’s water line for not paying the adjusted water
charges since March 2003 up to August 2005.11
The MTCC Ruling
On June 10, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision12 holding that since petitioner was issued a
Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC)13 by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) only
on August 7, 2003, then, it can only charge respondent the agreed flat rate of ₱75.00 per month
prior thereto or the sum of ₱1,050.00 for the period June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003. Thus,
given that respondent had made total payments equivalent to ₱1,685.99 for the same period,
she should be considered to have fully paid petitioner.14
The MTCC disregarded petitioner’s reliance on the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board’s
(HLURB) Decision15 dated August 17, 2000 in HLURB Case No. REM C6-00-001 entitled Nollie B.
Apura, et al. v. Dona Carmen I Subdivision, et al., as source of its authority to impose new
water consumption rates for water consumed from June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003 in the
absence of proof (a) that petitioner complied with the directive to inform the HLURB of the result
of its consultation with the concerned homeowners as regards the rates to be charged, and (b)
that the HLURB approved of the same.16
Moreover, the MTCC noted that petitioner failed to submit evidence showing (a) the exact date
when it actually began imposing the NWRB approved rates; and (b) that the parties had a
formal agreement containing the terms and conditions thereof, without which it cannot establish
with certainty respondent’s obligation.17 Accordingly, it ruled that the earlier agreed rate of
₱75.00 per month should still be the basis for respondent’s water consumption charges for the
44
period August 8, 2003 to September 30, 2005.18 Based on petitioner’s computation, respondent
had only paid ₱300.00 of her ₱1,500.00 obligation for said period. Thus, it ordered respondent
to pay petitioner the balance thereof, equivalent to ₱1,200.00 with legal interest at the rate of
6% per annum from date of receipt of the extrajudicial demand on October 14, 2010 until fully
paid.19
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari20 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the RTC, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC in finding that it
(petitioner) failed to establish with certainty respondent’s obligation, and in not ordering the
latter to pay the full amount sought to be collected.
The RTC Ruling
On November 23, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision21 dismissing the petition for certiorari, finding
that the said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims
cases as provided under Section 2322 of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases. To this
end, the RTC ruled that it cannot supplant the decision of the MTCC with another decision
directing respondent to pay petitioner a bigger sum than that which has been awarded.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration23 but was denied in an Order24 dated February 16, 2012,
hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject
small claims case.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:
SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day,
based on the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately
be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith
served on the parties.
The decision shall be final and unappealable.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the
remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its
execution.25 Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other
proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy,26 does not preclude the aggrieved party
from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general rule has
been enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation,27 wherein it was
held that:
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari
is always available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law." In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., the Court ruled:
x x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of
certiorari may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary
course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally
beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not the mere absence – of all other legal
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the
propriety of certiorari.
This ruling was reiterated in Conti v. Court of Appeals:
Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the Rules is
an absence of an appeal nor any "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of
law, one which has been so defined as a "remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial, speedy
and sufficient not merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring about a revival of
the judgment x x x complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly
relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior
court or tribunal" concerned. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the RTC’s apprehension that respondent’s
recourse before it (was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of [small claims
cases], because it asks [the court] to supplant the decision of the lower [c]ourt with another
decision directing the private respondent to pay the petitioner a bigger sum than what has been
awarded."28 Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action29 designed to
correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore
incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The
RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of whether or not
the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding
evidence that is material to the controversy.30
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of
certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary
to the RTC’s ruling.
Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the proper forum (i.e., the
RTC).1âwphi1 To be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari.31 Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however,
does not give a party unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates
that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari against first level courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort
may be had before the Court.32 This procedure is also in consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.33
Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts,34 certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their
corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition
for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In
fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an improper
remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its
proper disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 23, 2011 and Resolution
dated February 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. RTC Case No. 11-13833 is hereby REINSTATED and the court a quo is ordered
to resolve the same with dispatch.
45
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 190566               December 11, 2013
MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), as represented by
its incumbent Chairman EFRAIM GENUINO, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the Resolution2 dated September 30, 2009
issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA"".G.R. SP No. 110048, which outrightly dismissed the
petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner Mark Jerome S. Maglalang (petitioner). Also
assailed is the appellate court's Resolution3 dated November 26, 2009 which denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The facts follow.
Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, Angeles City, which was
operated by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), a
government-owned or controlled corporation existing by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1869.4
Petitioner alleged that in the afternoon of December 13, 2008, while he was performing his
functions as teller, a lady customer identified later as one Cecilia Nakasato5 (Cecilia) approached
him in his booth and handed to him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed
₱1,000.00 and ₱500.00 bills. There were 45 ₱1,000.00 and ten ₱500.00 bills for the total
amount of ₱50,000.00. Following casino procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the spreading
board. However, he erroneously spread the bills into only four clusters instead of five clusters
worth ₱10,000.00 per cluster. He then placed markers for ₱10,000.00 each cluster of cash and
declared the total amount of ₱40,000.00 to Cecilia. Perplexed, Cecilia asked petitioner why the
latter only dished out ₱40,000.00. She then pointed to the first cluster of bills and requested
petitioner to check the first cluster which she observed to be thicker than the others. Petitioner
performed a recount and found that the said cluster contained 20 pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills.
Petitioner apologized to Cecilia and rectified the error by declaring the full and correct amount
handed to him by the latter. Petitioner, however, averred that Cecilia accused him of trying to
shortchange her and that petitioner tried to deliberately fool her of her money. Petitioner tried
to explain, but Cecilia allegedly continued to berate and curse him. To ease the tension,
petitioner was asked to take a break. After ten minutes, petitioner returned to his booth.
However, Cecilia allegedly showed up and continued to berate petitioner. As a result, the two of
them were invited to the casino’s Internal Security Office in order to air their respective sides.
Thereafter, petitioner was required to file an Incident Report which he submitted on the same
day of the incident.6
On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum7 issued by the casino’s Branch Manager,
Alexander Ozaeta, informing him that he was being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino
customer and directing him to explain within 72 hours upon receipt of the memorandum why he
should not be sanctioned or dismissed. In compliance therewith, petitioner submitted a letter-
explanation8 dated January 10, 2009.
On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum9 dated March 19, 2009, stating
that the Board of Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino
customer and imposed on him a 30-day suspension for this first offense. Aggrieved, on April 2,
2009, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 seeking a reversal of the board’s decision
and further prayed in the alternative that if he is indeed found guilty as charged, the penalty be
only a reprimand as it is the appropriate penalty. During the pendency of said motion, petitioner
also filed a Motion for Production11 dated April 20, 2009, praying that he be furnished with
copies of documents relative to the case including the recommendation of the investigating
committee and the Decision/Resolution of the Board supposedly containing the latter’s factual
findings. In a letter-reply12 dated June 2, 2009, one Atty. Carlos R. Bautista, Jr. who did not
indicate his authority therein to represent PAGCOR, denied the said motion. Petitioner received
said letter-reply on June 17, 2009.
Subsequently, on June 18, 2009, PAGCOR issued a Memorandum13 dated June 18, 2009
practically reiterating the contents of its March 19, 2009 Memorandum. Attached therewith is
another Memorandum14 dated June 8, 2009 issued by PAGCOR’s Assistant Vice President for
Human Resource and Development, Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, informing petitioner that the Board
of Directors in its meeting on May 13, 2009 resolved to deny his appeal for reconsideration for
lack of merit. Petitioner received said memoranda on the same date of June 18, 2009.
On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, before the CA, averring that there is no evidence, much less
factual and legal basis to support the finding of guilt against him. Moreover, petitioner ascribed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in
adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of
its decision and in imposing the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension. Justifying his recourse to
the CA, petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension which is not within the
CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. He also claimed that discourtesy in the performance of official
duties is classified as a light offense which is punishable only by reprimand.
In its assailed Resolution16 dated September 30, 2009, the CA outrightly dismissed the petition
for certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
seeking recourse from the CA. Invoking Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,17 the
CA held that the CSC has jurisdiction over issues involving the employer-employee relationship
in all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters such as PAGCOR. Petitioner
filed his Motion for Reconsideration18 which the CA denied in the assailed Resolution19 dated
November 26, 2009. In denying the said motion, the CA relied on this Court’s ruling in Duty
Free Philippines v. Mojica20 citing Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. v. CA,21 where this
Court held as follows:
It is now settled that, conformably to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), [of the 1987 Constitution]
government-owned or controlled corporations shall be considered part of the Civil Service only if
they have original charters, as distinguished from those created under general law.
PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created directly by PD 1869 on July 11,
1983. Consequently, controversies concerning the relations of the employee with the
management of PAGCOR should come under the jurisdiction of the Merit System Protection
Board and the Civil Service Commission, conformably to the Administrative Code of 1987.
Section 16(2) of the said Code vest[s] in the Merit System Protection Board the power inter alia
to:
a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving officials and employees of the Civil
Service. Its decision shall be final except those involving dismissal or separation from the
service which may be appealed to the Commission.
46
Hence, this petition where petitioner argues that the CA committed grave and substantial error
of judgment
1. IN OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY
PETITIONER AND IN DENYING THE LATTER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION[;]
2. IN RULING THAT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAS APPELLATE JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PENALTY
INVOLVED IS NOT MORE THAN THIRTY (30) DAYS[;]
3. IN RESOLVING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY PETITIONER IN A
MANNER WHICH IS UTTERLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE[;]
4. IN UNJUSTIFIABLY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION AS TO THE PROPRIETY OR
VALIDITY OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER BY THE RESPONDENT[;]
5. IN UNDULY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION DECLARING THAT THE ASSAILED
DECISIONS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD[; AND]
6. IN UNJUSTIFIABLY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION DECLARING THAT THE
ASSAILED DECISIONS/RESOLUTIONS OF RESPONDENT WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. 22
Petitioner claims that the CA clearly overlooked the applicable laws and jurisprudence that
provide that when the penalty involved in an administrative case is suspension for not more
than 30 days, the CSC has no appellate jurisdiction over the said administrative case. As
authority, petitioner invokes our ruling in Geronga v. Hon. Varela23 which cited Section
47,24 Chapter 1, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 otherwise known
as The Administrative Code of 1987. Said Section 47 provides that the CSC may entertain
appeals only, among others, from a penalty of suspension of more than 30 days. Petitioner
asserts that his case, involving a 30-day suspension penalty, is not appealable to the CSC. Thus,
he submits that his case was properly brought before the CA via a petition for certiorari.25
On the other hand, PAGCOR alleges that petitioner intentionally omitted relevant matters in his
statement of facts. PAGCOR essentially claims that petitioner refused to apologize to Cecilia;
that he treated Cecilia’s complaint with arrogance; and that before taking the aforementioned
10-minute break, petitioner slammed the cash to the counter window in giving it back to the
customer. PAGCOR argues that the instant petition raises questions of fact which are not
reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari. PAGCOR maintains that the CA’s ruling was in
accordance with law and jurisprudence. Moreover, PAGCOR counters that petitioner’s remedy of
appeal is limited as Section 37 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service provides that a decision rendered by heads of agencies whereby a penalty of suspension
for not more than 30 days is imposed shall be final and executory. PAGCOR opines that such
intent of limiting appeals over such minor offenses is elucidated in the Concurring Opinion of
former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in CSC v. Dacoycoy26 and based on the basic premise that
appeal is merely a statutory privilege. Lastly, PAGCOR submits that the 30-day suspension
meted on petitioner is justified under its own Code of Discipline.27 Prescinding from the
foregoing, the sole question for resolution is: Was the CA correct in outrightly dismissing the
petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?
We resolve the question in the negative.
Our ruling in Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime
Holdings, Inc.28 on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is instructive, to wit:
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will
shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and
complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct
its error and dispose of the case.
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of
the following exceptions:
(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5)
when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when
to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and
unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative
review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14)
where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.29
The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no
administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered
by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30
days.
Section 37 (a) and (b) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, provides for the unavailability of any appeal:
Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.
(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine
in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from Office. A complaint may be filed directly with the
Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which
case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or
official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the
investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the
penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
(b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their
decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than
thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days’ salary. In case the decision
rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may
be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending
47
 appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which
case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the department head.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Similar provisions are reiterated in the aforequoted Section 4730 of E.O. No. 292 essentially
providing that cases of this sort are not appealable to the CSC. Correlatively, we are not
unaware of the Concurring Opinion of then Chief Justice Puno in CSC v. Dacoycoy,31 where he
opined, to wit:
Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved
is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence,
courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the
respondent court or agency. Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual
matters when the evidence on record does not support those factual findings; or when too much
is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on
record.34 Considering the circumstances and since this Court is not a trier of facts, 35 remand of
this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is in order.

In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 30, 2009 and
Law.1âwphi1 For what the law declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies involving November 26, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110048 are hereby REVERSED
suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) and SET ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
days salary. But there is a clear policy reason for declaring these decisions final. These decisions
involve minor offenses. They are numerous for they are the usual offenses committed by
government officials and employees. To allow their multiple level appeal will doubtless No pronouncement as to costs.
overburden the quasijudicial machinery of our administrative system and defeat the expectation
of fast and efficient action from these administrative agencies. Nepotism, however, is not a
petty offense. Its deleterious effect on government cannot be over-emphasized. And it is a SO ORDERED.
stubborn evil. The objective should be to eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous decisions
allowing nepotism cannot be given immunity from review, especially judicial review.  It is G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979
thus non sequitur to contend that since some decisions exonerating public officials
from minor offenses can not be appealed, ergo, even a decision acquitting a government official
from a major offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIANO C. CASTAÑEDA, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by Pampanga, Branch III, and BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, respondents.
law are still subject to judicial review. In Republic of the Phils. v. Francisco,32 we held:

Fiscal Regidor Y Aglipay and Special Counsel Vicente Macalino for petitioner.
Since the decision of the Ombudsman suspending respondents for one (1) month is final
and unappealable, it follows that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or
reverse the same. The Ombudsman was not estopped from asserting in this Court that the CA Moises Sevilla Ocampo for private petitioner.
had no appellate jurisdiction to review and reverse the decision of the Ombudsman via petition
for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. This is not to say that decisions of the
Cicero J. Punzalan for respondent.
Ombudsman cannot be questioned. Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative
agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial
review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion,
fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate
evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to
reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, SANTOS, J.:
modified or reversed via petition for certiorari  under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on
a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion
On the basis of the complaint 1 of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private respondent
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.It bears stressing that the judicial recourse
Benjamin Manaloto was charged before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided by
petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for certiorari ascribing
respondent Judge, Hon. Mariano C. Castaneda Jr., with the crime of Falsification of Public
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR,
Document committed, according to the Information, as follows:
not an appeal. Suffice it to state that an appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under
Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San
abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot this Honorable Court, the above-named a BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, with
be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that deliberate intent to commit falsification, did then and there willfully,
remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of unlawfully and feloniously counterfeit, imitate and forge the signature of his
appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.33 spouse Victoria M. Manaloto in a deed of sale executed by said accused
wherein he sold a house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership of
said spouse in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana under Doc. No. 1957, Page No.
In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
72, Book No. LVII, Series of 1975, notarized by Notary Public Abraham Pa.
course of law in view of petitioner's allegation that P AGCOR has acted without or in excess of
Gorospe, thereby making it appear that his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
gave her marital consent to said sale when in fact and in truth she did not. 2
CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside.

48
At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness stand but the defense
moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules Of Court
which provides:
SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The
following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested,
directly or indirectly as herein enumerated.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) A husband can not be examined for or at his wife without her consent;
nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil
case by one against the other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other.
The prosecution opposed said motion to disquality on the ground that the case falls under the
exception to the rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying
Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband, in an order dated March 31, 1977.
A motion for reconsideration petition was filed but was denied by respondent Judge in an order
dated May 19, 1977.
Hence, this petition for certiorari file by the office of the Provincial Fiscal, on behalf of the People
of the Philippines, seeking set aside the aforesaid order of the respondent Judge and praying
that a preliminary injunction or a ternporary restraining order be issued by this Court enjoining
said judge from further proceeding with the trial of aforesaid Criminal Case No. 1011.
On June 20, 1977, this Court resolved — (a) to issue a temporary restraining order, and (b) to
require the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the petitioner. 3 The Office of the Solicitor
General filed its Notice of Appearance on June 27, 1977, 4 and its Memorandum in support of
the Petition on August 30, 1977. 5 The respondents filed their Memorandum on September 5,
1977. 6 Whereupon, the case was considered submitted for decision. 7
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents emerges the sole issues determinative of
the instant petition, to wit: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document
filed against herein private respondent Benjamin F. Manaloto — who allegedly forged the
signature of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear that the
latter gave her marital consent to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal
partnership when in fact and in truth she did not — may be considered as a criminal case for a
crime committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on
marital disqualification.
We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as
a criminal case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.
1. The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the
forgery by the accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein
that said wife consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership
when in fact and in truth she did not. It must be noted that had the sale of the said house and
lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the
consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband Clearly, therefore,
it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it
is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime
committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which completely
disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.
2. This is not the first time that the issue of whether a specific offense may be classified as a
crime committed by one spouse against the other is presented to this Court for resolution. Thus,
in the case of Ordoño v. Daquigan, 8 this Court, through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, set up the
criterion to be followed in resolving the issue, stating that:
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down
in Cargill v. State, 35 ALR, 133, 220, Pac 64,26 OkL 314, wherein the court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the is too
narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting
domestic within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, WHEN
AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS,
THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the
statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.
Applying the foregoing criterion in said case of Ordoño v. Daquigan  this Court held that the rape
committed by the husband of the witness-wife against their daughter was a crime committed by
the husband against his wife. Although the victim of the crime committed by the accused in that
can was not his wife but their daughter, this Court, nevertheless, applied the exception for the
reason that said criminal act "Positively undermine(d) the connubial relationship. 9
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime
and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but
the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act comp of had the effect of directly and vitally
impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act Of the wife in personally
lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts 10 in
connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualified her from
testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underacore
the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have
become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point out in previous
decisions, "identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
Identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of private life
which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but Ideals which, through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home. 11 Thus, there is no reason to apply the martial
disqualification rule.
3. Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that the wife should not be
disqualified from testifying against her husband in the instant case. For, as aptly observed by
the Solicitor General," (t)o espouse the contrary view would spawn the dangerous precedent of
a husband committing as many falsifications against his wife as he could conjure, seeking
shelter in the anti-marital privilege as a license to injure and prejudice her in secret — all with
unabashed and complete impunity.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower court dated March 31, 1977,
disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband, Benjamin Manaloto, in
Criminal Case No. 1011, as well as the order dated May 19, 1977, denying the motion for
reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is
hereby lifted and the respondent Judge is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of the case,
allowing Victoria Manaloto to testify against her husband.
SO ORDERED.
49
G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS and DR. OLIVIA C. CAOILI in
her capacity as Secretary of the Board, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 87, Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City and RAMON P. NADAL, respondents.
U.P. Office of Legal Services for petitioners.
Bonifacio A. Alentajon for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the university of the people,
the U.P. administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee
payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known
as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. Spawned by the public clamor to overcome what was
perceived as the sharpening elitist profile of the U.P studentry, the STFAP aspired to expand the
coverage of government educational subsidies so as to include the deserving in the lower rungs
of the socio-economic ladder.
After broad consultations with the various university constituencies by U.P. President Jose V.
Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP.
A year later, it was granted official recognition when the Congress of the Philippines allocated a
portion of the National Budget for the implementation of the program.
In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all students are entitled to
apply for STFAP benefits which include reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and student
assistantships which give undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by
working for the University.
Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they state the
amount and source of the annual income of the family, their real and personal properties and
special circumstances from which the University may evaluate their financial status and need on
the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. At the end the application form, the
student applicant, as well as his parent, signs a sworn statement, as follows:
Statement of the Student
I hereby certify, upon my honor, that all the data and information which I
have furnished are accurate and complete. I understand that any willful
misinformation and/or withholding of information will automatically
disqualify me from receiving any financial assistance or subsidy, and may
serve as ground for my expulsion from the University.  Furthermore, is such
misinformation and/or withholding of information on my part is discovered
after I have been awarded tuition scholarship or any form of financial
assistance, I will be required to reimburse all financial benefits plus the
legal rate of interest prevailing at the time of the reimbursement without
prejudice to the filing of charges against me. (Emphasis supplied for
emphasis)
Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding team to
visit my home/residence to verify the veracity of the information provided in
this application and I will give my utmost cooperation in this regard. I also
understand that my refusal to cooperate with the fact-finding team may
mean suspension of withdrawal of STFAP benefits and privileges.
Student Signature
Statement of the Applicant's Parent or Guardian
I hereby certify to the truthfulness and completeness of the information
which my son/daughter/dependent has furnished in this application
together with all the documents attached. I further recognize that in signing
this application form, I share with my son/daughter/dependent the
responsibility for the truthfulness and completeness of the information
supplied herein. (Emphasis supplied for emphasis)
Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding team to
visit my home/residence to verify the information provided in this
application and I will give my utmost cooperation in this regard. I also
understand that my refusal to cooperate with the fact-finding team may
mean suspension or withdrawal of STFAP benefits and privileges of my
son/daughter/dependent.
———————
———————
———
Parent's/Legal
Guardian's/Spo
use's
Signature1
From the early stages of its implementation, measures were adopted to safeguard the integrity
of the program. One such precautionary measure was the inclusion as one of the punishable
acts under Section 2 (a) of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of the
University the deliberate falsification or suppression/withholding of any material information
required in the application form.
To further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data
indicated in a student's application form is undertaken. Among those who applied for STFAP
benefits for School Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law.
On March 14, 1991, a team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo Manalo conducted a
home investigation at the residence of Nadal at 31 Twinpeaks Drive, Blue Ridge, Quezon City.
Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team submitted a home visit report.
Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and
Nadal's application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M. Villanueva, head of the Office of
Scholarships and Student Services, presented the matter to the Diliman Committee on
Scholarships and Financial Assistance.2
In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him
that the investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only the fact that he had been
maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother but also the income of his
mother who was supporting his brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that
50
the Diliman Committee had reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June
1989, unless he could submit "proofs to the contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the
equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based on current commercial rates." Failure
to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the
withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be
referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation.3
On July 12, 1991, Nadal issued a certification stating, among other things, that his mother
migrated to the United States in 1981 but because her residency status had not yet been
legalized, she had not been able to find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment." He also
stated that his mother, jointly with his brother Virgilio, was shouldering the expenses of the
college education of his two younger brothers.4
Noting further discrepancies between Nadal's application form and the certification, the U.P.
charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) on August 23, 1991 with the
following:
That respondent RAMON P. NADAL (UP Student No. 83-11640), a student of
the College of Law, UP System, Diliman, Quezon City, and STFAP (ISKOLAR
NG BAYAN) recipient (Bracket 4 for SY 1989-1990; Bracket 5 for SY 1990-
1991) in his applications for STFAP (ISKOLAR NG BAYAN) benefits which he
filed for schoolyear 1989-1990, and schoolyear 1990-1991, with the Office
of Scholarship and Student Services (formerly Scholarship and Financial
Assistance Service) voluntarily and willfully withheld and did not declare the
following:
(a) That he has and maintains a car (Toyota Corolla,
Model 1977); and
(b) The income of his mother (Natividad Packing Nadal)
in the U.S.A., in support of the studies of his brothers
Antonio and Federico,
which acts of willfully withholding information is tantamount to acts of
dishonesty in relation to his studies, in violation of paragraph (a), Section 2,
of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, as
amended. (Approved by the B.O.R. at its 876th meeting on 02 September
1976, amended at the 923rd B.O.R. meeting on 31 January 1980, and
further amended at its 1017th B.O.R. meeting on 08 December 1988).5
On October 27, 1992, after hearing, the SDT6 rendered a decision in SDT Case No. 91-026
exculpating Nadal of the charge of deliberately withholding in his STFAP application form
information that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car, but finding him guilty of "wilfully and
deliberately withholding information about the income of his mother, who is living abroad, in
support of the studies of his brothers Antonio and Federico, 7 which is tantamount to acts of
dishonesty in relation to his studies in violation of paragraph [a], Section 2 of the Rules [now
covered by paragraph (i), Section 2 of the Rules, as amended 25 June 1992]." As such, the SDT
imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and required him to reimburse
all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall
be "effected by the University thru outside legal action."8
The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the Executive Committee of U.P.
Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. On
November 26, 1992, the Executive Committee, voting 13:4, affirmed the decision of the SDT;
whereupon, Nadal appealed to the Board of Regents (BOR). The appeal was included in the
agenda of the BOR meeting on January 25, 1993.9
On January 18, 1993, upon her assumption to the Chairmanship of the Senate Committee on
Education, thereby making her automatically a member of the BOR, Senator Leticia Ramos-
Shahani wrote the BOR a letter expressing her view that, after a close review of Nadal s case by
her legal staff, "it is only fair and just to find Mr. Nadal's appeal meritorious and his arguments
worthy of belief. Consequently, he should be allowed to graduate and take the bar examinations
this year." 10
At its January 25, 1993 meeting, the BOR affirmed the decision of the SDT but because "the
Board was willing to grant a degree of compassion to the appellant in view of the alleged status
and predicament of the mother as an immigrant 'TNT' in the United States," the penalty was
modified "from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension, effective immediately, plus reimbursement
of all benefits received from the STFAP, with legal interest." The BOR also decided against giving
Nadal, a certification of good moral character. 11
Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, allegedly against the
advice of his counsel. 12 The motion was placed on the agenda of the February 25, 1993 meeting
of the BOR. A day before said date, Senator Shahani wrote the BOR another letter requesting
that deliberation on Nadal's case be deferred until such time as she could attend a BOR meeting.
On March 15, 1993, the U.P. filed an opposition to Nadal's motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, the BOR held a special meeting to accommodate the request of Regent Shahani with
Nadal's case as the sole item on its agenda. Again, Nadal's motion for reconsideration was
included in the March 23, 1993 agenda but in view of the absence of Senator Shahani, the
decision thereon was deferred.
At the special meeting of the BOR on March 28, 1993 at the Board Room of the Manila Polo Club
in Forbes Park, Makati, Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material importance" of verifying
the truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid
from the Ateneo de Manila University (AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by the
AdeMU that it had not given Nadal financial aid while he was a student there was made through
a telephone call," Regent Carpio declared that there was as yet "no direct evidence in the
records to substantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal
Falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear case of gross and material
misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a
conditional vote that would depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter.
U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered by stating that "a decision
should not be anchored solely on one piece of information which he considered irrelevant, and
which would ignore the whole pattern of the respondent's dishonesty and deception from 1989
which had been established in the investigation and the reviews." He added that "the
respondent's eligibility for his AdeMU high school scholarship and financial assistance from 1979
to 1983 does not in any way establish that he is 'not guilty as charged' before the SDT," since
the formal charges against him do not include withholding of information regarding scholarship
grants received from other schools.
At the said March 28, 1993 special meeting, the Board decided to go into executive session
where the following transpired:
The Chairman of the Board, together with the President, directed the
Secretary to reflect in the minutes of the meeting the following decisions of
the Board in executive session, with only the Board members present.
A vote was held by secret ballot on whether Ramon P. Nadal was guilty or
not guilty as charged of willful withholding of information in relation to his
application for Socialized Tuition and Financial Assistance Program (STFAP)
benefits which he filed for Schoolyears 1989-1990 and 1990-1991 which is
51
 tantamount to act of dishonesty in relation to his studies, in violation of
paragraph (a), Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct
and Discipline, as amended.
The Chairman gave the following results of the Board action during the
Executive Session: four (4) voted guilty; three (3) voted not guilty; and
three (3) gave conditional votes, pending verification with Father Raymond
Holscher of Ateneo de Manila University of Ramon P. Nadal's statement in
his STFAP application that he was granted scholarship while he was in high
school. Should Ateneo confirm that Nadal had not received financial
assistance, then the conditional votes would be considered as guilty, and if
otherwise, then not guilty. The Chairman requested the President to make
the verification as soon as possible the next day. In answer to a query, the
Chairman clarified that once the information was received from Ateneo,
there would be no need for another meeting to validate the decision.
The President reiterated his objections to the casting of conditional votes.
The Chairman himself did not vote. 13
In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that Nadal was
indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again
at a special meeting at the Westin Philippine Plaza Hotel. According to Regent Carpio, in
executive session, the BOR found Nadal "guilty" as the members voted as follows: six members
— guilty, three members — not guilty, and three members abstained. 14 Consequently, the BOR
imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one (1) year effective March 29, 1993, non-
issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as
Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest per
annum from march 30, 1993 and non-issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled
his financial obligations with the university. 15
On March 30, 1993, Nadal wrote President Abueva a handwritten letter stating that "after
learning of the latest decision" of the BOR, he had been "intensely concentrating on (his) job so
that (he) can earn enough to pay for (his) financial obligations to the University." Alleging that
he was "now letting nature take its course," Nadal begged President Abueva not to issue any
press release regarding the case. 16
However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition
for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against
President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and
Olivia C. Caoili. The petition prayed:
After trial on the merits, judgment be rendered as follows:
a. Making the preliminary injunction permanent;
b. Ordering respondents 'to uphold and implement their decision rendered
on 28 March 1993, exonerating petitioner from all the charges against him,
and accordingly dismissing SDT No. 91-026;
c. Ordering respondents jointly and severally to pay petitioner litigation
expenses of at least P150,000.00.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for. 17
The motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and the writ of preliminary
injunction was immediately set for hearing. At the May 10, 1993 hearing, the lower court
declared that the only issue to be resolved was "whether or not the respondents in Civil Case
No. 93-15665 violated (Nadal's) right to due process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal
guilty of the charges against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting. After the respondents
had presented their first witness, Dr. Olivia C. Caoili, the lower court asked respondents' counsel
whether they were amenable to maintaining the status quo. Said counsel replied in the
negative, asserting the University's prerogative to discipline students found guilty of violating its
rules of discipline.18
On the same day, the lower court 19 issued the following Order:
The parties were heard on their respective positions on the incident
(application for preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary restraining
order and opposition thereto). For lack of material time set this for
continuation on May 17 and 18, 1993 both at 2:30 p.m.
In the meantime, in order that the proceedings of this case may not be
rendered moot and academic, the respondents herein, namely: Jose V.
Abueva, President of the University of the Philippines and Vice-Chairman of
the U.P. Board of Regents, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura and
Armand V. Fabella, members of the U.P. Board of Regents, Olivia C. Caoili,
the officers, agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf,
are hereby temporarily restrained from implementing their decision
rendered on March 29, 1993 in Administrative SDT Case No. 91-026 entitled
University of the Philippines vs. Ramon P. Nadal, as reflected in the Minutes
of the 1062nd meeting of the Board of Regents, U.P. held at the Romblon
Room, Westin Phil. Plaza, Manila, until further order from this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Thereafter, Nadal presented as witnesses Regents Emerenciana Y. Arcellana, Ariel P.
Tanangonan, Leticia R. Shahani and Antonio T. Carpio. The University, on the other hand,
presented Dr. Olivia Caoili and Nadal himself as a hostile witness. On May 29, 1993, the lower
court issued the following Order:
The petitioner complains that he was not afforded due process when, after
the Board Meeting on SDT Case No. 91-026 on March 28, 1993 that
resulted in a decision of "NOT GUILTY" in his favor, the Chairman of the
U.P. Board of Regents, without notice to the herein petitioner, called
another meeting the following day to deliberate on his (the Chairman's)
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, which this time resulted in a decision of
"GUILTY." While he main issue of violation of due process raised in the
petition pends trial and resolution, the petitioner prays for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction prohibiting the respondents from further
proceeding with SDT Case No. 21-026 and from suspending the petitioner
for one year.
It is a basic requirement in the issuance of the preliminary injunctive writ
that there must be a right to be protected. As the issue in the case at bar is
due process in the March 29 Board meeting, there is, indeed, a right to be
protected for, in administrative proceedings, a respondent's right to due
process exists not only at the early stages but also at the final stage
thereof.
52
 With the circulation to the members of the Board of Regents, as well as to
other UP personnel, of the Minutes of the March 29, 1993 meeting, even
after this case had already been filed, the Court is convinced that there now
exists a threat to the petitioner (respondent in SDT Case No, 91-026) that
the decision of the Board of Regents finally finding him guilty of willfully
withholding information material to his application for Socialized Tuition and
Financial Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits, will be implemented at any
time, especially during the enrollment period, and this implementation
would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his
course, and, consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job. The
injury thus caused would be irreparable.
"Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the
rule where there is no standard by which their amount
can be measured with reasonable accuracy. Where the
damage is susceptible of mathematical computation, it
is not irreparable." (Social Security Commission v.
Bayona, et al., G.R. No. L-13555, May 30, 1962).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and so as not to render moot the issues in
the instant proceedings, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
restraining the respondents, their officers, agent(s), representatives, and all
persons acting in their behalf, from further proceeding with SDT Case No.
91-026, and from suspending petitioner, upon the latter's filing a bond in
the amount of P3,000.00.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 20
Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of an injunction or temporary
restraining order, raising the following issues: whether or not Nadal was denied due process in
the administrative disciplinary proceedings against him, and, whether or not the respondent
judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing the May 29, 1993 writ of preliminary injunction
thereby preventing the BOR from implementing the suspension penalty it had imposed on
Nadal.
Before proceeding with the discussion of the merits of the instant petition, we shall confront a
threshold issue raised by private respondent, namely, that Dr. Caoili, not having been
authorized by the Board of Regents as a collegial body to file the instant petition, and Dr.
Abueva, who verified the petition, not being the "Board of Regents" nor "the University of the
Philippines," they are not real parties in interest who should file the same. 21
A real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. 'Interest' within the meaning of the rule means material
interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest."22 Undoubtedly, the U.P. Board of
Regents has an interest to protect inasmuch as what is in issue here is its power to impose
disciplinary action against a student who violated the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct
and Discipline by withholding information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits,
which information, if disclosed, would have sufficed to disqualify him from receiving the financial
assistance he sought. Such dishonesty, if left unpunished, would have the effect of subverting a
commendable program into which the University officials had devoted much time and expended
precious resources, from the conceptualization to the implementation stage, to rationalize the
socialized scheme of tuition fee payments in order that more students may benefit from the
public funds allocated to the State University.
Having specifically named Drs. Abueva and Caoili as respondents in the petition
for mandamus that he filed below, Nadal is now estopped from questioning their personality to
file the instant petition.23 Moreover, under Sec. 7 of the U.P. Charter (Act 1870) and Sec. 11 of
the University Code "all process" against the BOR shall be served on "the president or secretary
thereof'." It is in accordance with these legal provisions that Dr. Caoili is named as a petitioner.
Necessarily, Dr. Abueva, the University President and member of the BOR, has to verify the
petition. It is not mandatory, however, that each and every member of the BOR be named
petitioners. As the Court has time and again held, an action may be entertained,
notwithstanding the failure to include an indispensable party where it appears that the naming
of the party would be but a formality. 24
No longer novel, as this is not a case of first impression, is the issue on the right of an academic
institution to refuse admission to a student arising from the imposition upon him of an
administrative disciplinary sanction. In our recent decision in Ateneo de Manila University
v.  Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong,25 wherein certain law students were dismissed for hazing resulting
in the death of another, we held that the matter of admission of students is within the ambit of
academic freedom and therefore, beyond the province of the courts to decide. Certain
fundamental principles bear stressing.
One of the arguments of Nadal in his petition for mandamus below was that he was denied due
process. To clarify, the so-called lack of due process referred only to the March 29, 1993
meeting of the BOR. As stated by respondent's counsel: "What was conceded by undersigned
counsel was that Nadal was afforded due process from the start of the administrative proceeding
up to the meeting of the Board of Regents on March 28, 1993."26
With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers the same as "unquestionably
void for lack of due process" inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting. Counsel
cites the ruling in Non v.  Dames II 27 that imposition of sanctions on students requires
"observance of procedural due process," 28 the phrase obviously referring to the sending of
notice of the meeting.
Attention is drawn to the disparate factual environments obtaining in Non v.  Dames II and in
the instant case. In the former case, the students were refused admission for having led or
participated in student mass actions against the school, thereby posing a collision between
constitutionally cherished rights — freedom of expression and academic freedom. In the case at
bar, Nadal was suspended for having breached the University's disciplinary rules. In the Non
case, the Court ruled that the students were not afforded due process for even the refusal to re-
enroll them appeared to have been a mere afterthought on part of the school administrators.
Here, Nadal does not dispute the fact that his right to due process was held inviolate until the
BOR decided to meet on March 29, 1993 with his case as the sole item on the agenda.
In any event it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of
notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University rules do not require the
attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of
the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the
Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice
given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for
deliberation. He would make an exception of the March 29, 1993 meeting for it was "supposed
to reconsider the decision made on March 28, 1993 exonerating respondent Nadal from all
administrative charges against him." 29
Regent Antonio T. Carpio, in his testimony before the lower court on May 25, 1993 admitted
that there was no final verdict at the March 28, 1993 meeting in view of the conditional votes
resulting from his assertion that he was "not morally convinced that there was sufficient
evidence to make a finding of guilty against Nadal because there was no direct evidence that his
mother received income from the United States and this income was sent to the Philippines to
support the studies of the children." 30 Two regents shared the view of Regent Carpio, with the
following result: four voted guilty, three, not guilty, and three cast conditional votes. The BOR
53
agreed that, upon the suggestion of Regent Carpio, they would still verify from the AdeMU about
Nadal's alleged scholarship as a student in said institution. Consequently, no definitive decision
was arrived at by the BOR on March 28, 1993, Much less was a verdict of exoneration handed
down as averred by respondent.
Regent Carpio testified, with respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting where all twelve members
of the BOR were present, that all of them participated in the voting held to reconsider the
previous day's decision. He stated "I remember Regent Arcellana questioning the voting again
on the ground that there was already a final decision, but there was a vote taken on whether a
motion for reconsideration can be decided by the board, and a majority of the board ruled that
the matter can be reconsidered again upon motion of the chairman." 31
At said meeting, six (6) regents voted to find respondent guilty, three (3) voted that he was not
guilty and three (3) abstained. As succinctly announced by Regent Carpio, the final decision was
that which was rendered on March 29, 1993 as "no other decision was made by the Board with
respect to the same issue." 32
Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that his client was "not given due process in
the March 29 meeting because the ground upon which he was again convicted was not the same
as the original charge."33 Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on
March 28, i.e., whether or not Nadal was telling the truth when he claimed that he received a
scholarship grant from the AdeMU. However, Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge
considered was "exactly the same charge" of withholding information on the income of Nadal's
mother. 34 It should be stressed that the reason why Regent Carpio requested a verification of
Nadal's claim that he was a scholar at the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not "morally
convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he sought additional insights into the
character of Nadal through the information that would be obtained from the AdeMU.
In this regard, we find such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In his July, 12,
1991 certification aforementioned, Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was
a "TNT" who could not find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment" but that she was
supporting the education of his brothers with the help of another son. To our mind, this
constitutes sufficient admission that Nadal withheld information on the income, however measly
and irregular, of his mother. Unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable
doubt as basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial
evidence is required, that which means more than a mere scintilla or relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally
reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. 35 In light of the foregoing circumstances, we find
that Nadal has been sufficiently proven to have violated his undertaking to divulge all
information needed when he applied for the benefits of the STFAP.
Let it not be forgotten that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the professionals who would
uphold truth at all costs so that justice may prevail. The sentinels who stand guard at the
portals leading to the hallowed Temples of Justice cannot be overzealous in admitting only those
who are intellectually and morally fit. In those who exhibit duplicity in their student days, one
spots the shady character who is bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of his
profession.
Having reached his senior year, respondent is presumably aware that the bedrock axiom, Canon
I, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: "A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Further on, Canon 7, Rule 7.01 provides: "A
lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material
fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar." (Emphasis supplied for
emphasis)
Surely, it is not too early to warn entrants to the noble profession of law that honesty and
integrity are requirements no less weighty than hurdling the Bar examinations. This is the
reason why a certification of good moral character is one of the documents that must be
submitted in applying to take said examination. In fact, a charge of immoral or deceitful conduct
on the part of an applicant, when proved, is a ground for disqualifying him.
To revert to the instant case, inasmuch as it has been shown sufficiently that respondent has
committed an act of dishonesty in withholding vital information in connection with his
application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the Rules and Regulations on Student
Conduct and Discipline of petitioner University, the latter's inherent power and authority to
impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfully exercised.
As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a mill without water." Insofar
as the water turns the mill, so does the school's disciplinary power assure its right to survive
and continue operating. In more relevant terms, through its power to impose disciplinary
sanctions, an educational institution is able to exercise its academic freedom which is, in the
case at bar, the right to suspend and refuse admission to a student who has subverted its
authority in the implementation of the critically important STFAP.
At the risk of being repetitious, the matter of admission to a University is encompassed by the
right of academic freedom. In Garcia v.  The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology 36 the Court stated that a school or college which is possessed of the right of academic
freedom "decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students."
Elucidating, in Ateneo de Manila University v.  Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong, 37 the Court further
expounded:
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the
salutary proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is
discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the
student rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982,
students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,"
such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and
disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.
For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and
regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This
right . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents are under a social and
moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and
cooperate with the schools.
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and
indispensable to the successful management of the college. The rules may
include those governing student discipline." Going a step further, the
establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly
those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, if not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its
very survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the
academic groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for
themselves from the panoply of academic freedom their own rights
encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in
Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, that is, their duty to learn
under the rules laid down by the school. (Emphasis supplied.)
54
On the second issue presented for adjudication, the Court finds that the lower court gravely
abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance
of the said writ was based on the lower court's finding that the implementation of the
disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal "would work injustice to the petitioner as it would
delay him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job."
Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into account the
circumstances clearly of his own making, which led him into such a predicament. More
importantly, it has completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which
provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an
erring student of an institution of higher learning.
From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from
assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful
cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. 38 It is
of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of
discretion or judgment. 39
Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the lower court dared to tread upon legally
forbidden grounds. For, by virtue of the writ, the University's exercise of academic freedom was
peremptorily curtailed. Moreover, the door was flung wide open for Nadal to do exactly what the
decision of the BOR prohibited him from doing and that is, to violate the suspension order by
enrolling for the first semester of 1993-1994. It must have been with consternation that the
University officials helplessly watching him complete his academic requirements for taking the
Bar. 40 In the event that he be allowed to continue with his studies he would, in effect render
moot and academic the disciplinary sanction of suspension legally imposed upon him by the
BOR's final decision of March 29, 1993. What is to prevent other aspirants for STFAP
scholarships from misleading the University authorities by misrepresenting certain facts or as in
instant case, withholding vital information and stating downright falsehoods, in their application
forms with impunity? Not only would this undermine the authority of the U.P. to discipline its
students who violated the rules and regulations of the institution but, more importantly, subvert
the very concept and lofty intent to give financial assistance to poor but deserving students
through the STFAP which, incidentally, has not ceased refining and modifying it's operations.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the lower court is hereby ordered to DISMISS
the petition for mandamus.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 70484 January 29, 1988
ROMAN C. TUASON and REMEDIOS V. TUASON, by attorney-in-fact Trinidad S.
Viado, petitioners,
vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS, CALOOCAN City, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, and the NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents. TOMASA BARTOLOME, in her own behalf and in behalf of
the other members of the "Consuelo Heights Homeowners Association," petitioners-
intervenors.
Orlando A. Rayos for petitioners-intervenors.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
A more despotic, capricious, oppressive and unjustifiable exercise of government power than
that manifested in this case can scarcely be found in the sordid annals of the martial law
regime. Relief to the victims must be as it is hereby extended by the grant to them of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari and prohibition condemning as unconstitutional, and annulling
and perpetually enjoining the acts complained of.
Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On April 6, 1965, with
funds pooled from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc.
(hereafter simply, Carmel) a piece of land measuring about 8,756 square meters, in the latter's
subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale, Carmel's Torrens title (No.
64007) over the lot was cancelled and a new one (No. 8314) issued in the name of the Tuasons.
The Tuasons took possession of their property.
Some eight (8) years thereafter, the Tuasons' travails began. They woke up one morning to
discover that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the land they had
purchased with their hard-earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the
subdivision had been "declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang
Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide  occupants thereof."
On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day after the declaration of martial law Mr.
Ferdinand Marcos, then president of the country, invoking his emergency powers, issued
Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect. The decree invalidated inter alia the title of
the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the Government the land it had
subsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public (the Tuasons being among the
buyers). The land bought by Carmel was part of the Tala Estate (one of the so-called "Friar
Lands"). Carmel had bought the land under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended. Under
these statutes:
1) a bona fide settler or occupant was allowed to purchase (if he did not wish to lease) the
portion occupied by him at the price fixed by the Government, in cash or on installment; the
interested buyer was given a certificate of sale, which was regarded as an agreement by him to
pay the purchase price in the and at the interest specified, the acceptance of such certificate
making the occupant a debtor of the government;
2) until the price was fully paid however, title was reserved in the Government, and any sale or
encumbrance made by the purchaser prior to such full payment was explicitly declared to 'be
invalid as against the Government ... and ... in all respects subordinate to its prior claim;"
3) in the event of default by a purchaser to pay any installment of purchase money and interest
thereon, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now Director of Lands) had the duty at once to
protect the Government from loss by bringing suit to obtain judicial authority to enforce the
Government's lien on the "and by selling it in the same manner as for foreclosure of mortgages,
the purchaser at such sale being deemed to acquire a good and indefeasible title, and the
proceeds of the sale being applied to the payment of the costs of the court and all installments
due or to become due; and
4) in the event of completion of payment, the Government transferred title to the land to the
purchaser "by proper instrument of conveyance," the certificate of title over the land to issue
and become effective in the manner provided by the Land Registration Act. 1
55
Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding 2 that Carmel had failed to complete payment
of the price. It adjudged that —
... according to the records of the Bureau of Lands, neither the original
purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all
installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by the
Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members
of said Association  3 stand. Hence, title to said land has remained with the
Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said
association  has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of
the Philippines, any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to
segregate it from the said property of the Republic of the Philippines being
therefore null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy.
Upon this adjudgment, Mr. Marcos invalidated the titles of Carmel Farms, Inc. and all those
derived therefrom, and declared as aforestated "the members of the Malacanang Homeowners
Association, Inc. the present bona fide occupants"  of the lots which, in consequence, thereby
became open to them for "disposition and sale ... pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as
amended." 4
It seems to have completely escaped Mr. Marcos' attention that his decree contained
contradictory declarations. While acknowledging on the one hand that the lots in the Carmel
Subdivision were occupied by the buyers thereof, and in fact the latter's dwellings stood
thereon, he states on the other that the "members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association,
Inc. (are) the present bona fide occupants" of all said lots. The latter averment is not only
essentially inconsistent with the former but is both a physical and legal fallacy. Well known is
the rule of physics that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time. And the
absurdity of the subsumed proposition is self-evident for persons not in possession of land, who
probably have not even set foot thereon, cannot be deemed "occupants" thereof, much less
"bona fide" occupants.
But this notwithstanding, and upon the factual premise already indicated, Mr. Marcos disposed
of the land of the petitioner spouses and others similarly situated as they, in the following
imperious manner:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-
Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to
Proclamation 1081, dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1,
dated September 22, 1972, do hereby order and decree that any and all
sales contracts between the government and the original purchasers, are
hereby cancelled, and those between the latter and the subsequent
transferees, and any and all transfers thereafter, covering lots 979, 981,
982, 985, 988, 989, 990, 991 new, 1226, 1228, 1230, and 980-C-2 (LRC
PSD-1730), all of Tala Estate, Caloocan City, are hereby declared invalid
and null and void ab initio as against the Government; that Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 62603, 62604, 62605, covering lots 1, 2 and 3,
PCS-4383, all in the name of Carmel Farms, Inc., which are a consolidation
and subdivision survey of the lots hereinbefore enumerated, are declared
invalid and considered cancelled as against the Government; and that said
lots are declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the
Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants
thereof, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended.
On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City caused the
inscription on the Tuasons' title, TCT No. 8314, of the following:
MEMORANDUM. — Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this certificate
of title is declared invalid and null and void ab initio  and considered
cancelled as against the Government and the property described herein is
declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang
Homeowners Association, Inc.
The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos
decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected
group, in violation not only of the constitutional provisions on due process and eminent
domain 5 but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens
titles; 6 and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory
inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be compensated
for the loss from the Assurance Fund.
Mr. Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the decree. In his comment on the petition, 7 he
questioned the propriety of the remedy of certiorari resorted to by the petitioners, it not
appearing that the public respondents were being sued as judicial or quasi-judicial officers who
had acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. He opined
that the petitioner spouses had no cause to complain of unjust deprivation of property because
in legal contemplation 8 they had never become owners thereof because of non-payment of the
purchase price by their predecessor-in-interest; and the decree was justifiable under the social
justice clause of the Constitution and the police power, being in response to the pressing
housing need of the employees of the Office of the President who were left homeless and
landless after they were asked to vacate Malacanang Park where they had theretofore been
residing. He expressed the view, too, that petitioner spouses were not entitled to recover
anything from the Assurance Fund.
Petitions for intervention have of late been filed by sixty-four (64) persons, members of the
"Consuelo Heights Homeowners Association" headed by Tomasa Bartolome, on the claim that
they, too, had been divested of their lands by the same Presidential Decree No. 293, adopting
as their own the allegations and prayer embodied in the Tuasons' petition.
The procedural issue is quite easily disposed of. It is true that the extraodinary writ of
certiorari 9 may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of
prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in
relation to "proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions
judicial or ministerial." But the petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed
against an unlawful exercise of judicial power.
The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a
determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the
parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, 10 or
an exercise of jurisdiction — which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or
determine a cause. 11 He adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the original
purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the
purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on
which the dwellings of the members of ... (the) Association (of homeowners) stand." And
applying the law to that situation, he made the adjudication that "title to said land has remained
with the Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said association has never
ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines," and that 'any and all acts
affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic ...
(were) null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy.
These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an
officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts
were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr.
56
Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in
the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law 12 — the judicial acts
done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts
were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope
of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the martial law regime.
Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power — i.e. determined the relevant facts and applied
the law thereto without a trial at which all interested parties were accorded the opportunity to
adduce evidence to furnish the basis for a determination of the facts material to the
controversy. He made the finding ostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of
Lands." Prescinding from the fact that there is no indication whatever the nature and reliability
of these records and that they are in no sense conclusive, it is undeniable that the petitioner
Tuasons (and the petitioners in intervention) were never confronted with those records and
afforded a chance to dispute their trustworthiness and present countervailing evidence. This is
yet another fatal defect. The adjudication was patently and grossly violative of the right to due
process to which the petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other
words, not only arrogated unto himself a power never granted to him by the Constitution or the
laws but had in addition exercised it unconstitutionally.
One last word, respecting the petitioners in intervention, Their petition to intervene substantially
fulfilled the requirements laid down for a class suit 18 and was consequently given due course by
the Court. They are therefore covered by this judgment.
WHEREFORE, Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutional and void ab initio in
all its parts. The public respondents are commanded to cancel the inscription on the titles of the
petitioners and the petitioners in intervention of the memorandum declaring their titles null and
void and declaring the property therein respectively described open for disposition and sale to
the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. to do whatever else is needful to
restore the titles to full effect and efficacy; and henceforth to refrain, cease and desist from
implementing any provision or part of said Presidential Decree No. 293. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento
and Cortes JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION

In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for G.R. No. 230953, June 20, 2018
prohibition if the averments of the former sufficiently made out a case for the
latter. 13 Considered in this wise, it will also appear that an executive officer had acted without
jurisdiction — exercised judicial power not granted to him by the Constitution or the laws — and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND CRISTINA V.
had furthermore performed the act in violation of the constitutional rights of the parties thereby ASTUDILLO, Petitioners, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS - CEBU CITY AND FORMER
affected. The Court will grant such relief as may be proper and efficacious in the premises even JUDGE MA. LORNA P. DEMONTEVERDE, Respondents.
if not specifically sought or set out in the prayer of the appropriate pleading, the permissible
relief being determined after all not by the prayer but by the basic averments of the parties'
DECISION
pleadings. 14

There is no dispute about the fact that title to the land purchased by Carmel was actually issued
to it by the Government. This of course gives rise to the strong presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed, 15 that official duty being in this case the ascertainment by the
Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands of the fulfillment of the condition prescribed by law for such
issuance, i.e., the payment in full of the price, together with all accrued interest. Against this
presumption there is no evidence. It must hence be accorded full sway in these proceedings.
Furthermore, the title having been duly issued to Carmel, it became "effective in the manner
provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act." 16
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the review and
nullification of the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 17, 20161 and
February 16, 20172 in CA-G.R. SP No. 08362, for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The facts are as follows:

Private respondent, retired Judge Ma. Lorna P. Demonteverde (Demonteverde) started her
It may well be the fact that Carmel really did fail to make full payment of the price of the land
service in the government on July 1, 1963 with the National Electrification Administration (NEA)
purchased by it from the Government pursuant to the provisions of Act 1120. This is a
until her resignation on. February 15, 1967.3 She then transferred to the Development Bank of
possibility that cannot be totally discounted. If this be the fact, the Government may bring suit
the Philippines (DBP) - Bacolod and served until December 31, 1986. On January 29, 1987, she
to recover the unpaid installments and interest, invalidate any sale or encumbrance involving
transferred to the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) where she served until June 29, 1995. All in all,
the land subject of the sale, and enforce the lien of the Government against the land by selling
Demonteverde served in the said government agencies for a total of 32 years, from 1963 to
the same in the manner provided by Act Numbered One Hundred and Ninety for the foreclosure
1995.
of mortgages. 17 This it can do despite the lapse of a considerable period of time. Prescription
does not lie against the Government. But until and unless such a suit is brought and results in a
On June 30, 1995, Demonteverde joined the Judiciary as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
judgment favorable to the Government, the acquisition of title by Carmel and the purchases by
Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City until her retirement on February 22, 2011.
the petitioners and the petitioners-intervenors from it of portions of the land covered by its
original title must be respected. At any rate, the eventuation of that contingency will not and
In a letter dated July 28, 1995, Demonteverde requested from the Government Service
cannot in any manner affect this Court's conclusion, herein affirmed, of the unconstitutionality
Insurance System (GSIS) a refund of the retirement premiums she paid under Presidential
and invalidity of Presidential Decree No. 293, and the absolute lack of any right to the land or
Decree (P.D.) No. 11464 and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6605 in excess of the retirement premiums
any portion thereof on the part of the members of the so-called "Malacanang Homeowners
that she should pay under R.A. No. 910, as amended, the law on retirement benefits for Judges
Association, Inc." The decree was not as claimed a licit instance of the application of social
and Justices applicable to her when she joined the Judiciary on June 30, 1995.
justice principles or the exercise of police power. It was in truth a disguised, vile stratagem
deliberately resorted to favor a few individuals, in callous and disdainful disregard of the rights
However, instead of issuing a refund only of the excess of the contributions paid, the GSIS, on
of others. It was in reality a taking of private property without due process and without
August 23, 1995, refunded to Demonteverde the amount of P16,836.60 representing her
compensation whatever, from persons relying on the indefeasibility of their titles in accordance
retirement premiums, or her total personal share with interest, under R.A. No. 660.
with and as explicitly guaranteed by law.

57
On February 11,2011, Demonteverde filed with the Supreme Court her retirement application
under R.A. No. 910,6 as amended, for her service in the Judiciary from June 30, 1995 until her
retirement on February 22, 2011.
On March 3, 2011, Demonteverde likewise filed an application with the GSIS for retirement
benefits under R.A. No. 82917 covering her government service outside of the Judiciary from
July 1, 1963 until June 29, 1995.
In a letter dated October 14, 2011, the manager of the GSIS Bacolod informed Demonteverde
that the retirement laws covering her service in the government from July 1, 1963 to June 29,
1995 were P.D. No. 1146,8 R.A. No. 660, and R.A. No. 1616. The GSIS thus returned the
application of Demonteverde so that she may choose from the modes of retirement enumerated.
On November 28, 2011, Demonteverde wrote a letter to the GSIS requesting a re-evaluation of
her application for retirement under R.A. No. 8291.
Demonteverde's request was referred to the GSIS Committee on Claims (COC) for evaluation,
and on May 18, 2012, GSIS Bacolod informed her of the COC's issuance of Resolution No. 021-
2012 denying her request to retire under R.A. No. 8291. Demonteverde then appealed the
COC's Resolution to the GSIS Board of Trustees (GSIS BOT).
Given the issues raised in Demonteverde's case, the GSIS inquired with both the PAO and the
Supreme Court as to whether Demonteverde received gratuity benefits and if her entire
government service was covered in her retirement under R.A. No. 910, respectively.
In response to the inquiry, the PAO replied that Demonteverde did not apply for nor receive
gratuity benefits from the said agency when she transferred to the Judiciary in 1995.9
On the other hand, the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
advised the GSIS that pursuant to R.A. No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 9946, and its
implementing guidelines, judges who have rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service in the
Judiciary or in any branch of the government, or both, and who retired compulsorily upon
reaching the age of seventy (70) years, shall, upon retirement, be automatically entitled to a
lump sum of five (5) years' gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary, plus
the highest monthly Representation and Transportation Allowance and other allowances which
they were receiving on the date of their retirement.10
The OCA confirmed that:
3. Judge Demonteverde was able to meet the minimum fifteen (15) years government service
required to be entitled to full pension benefits under Section 1 of R.A. No. 910, as amended, and
thus, her services rendered outside of the Judiciary is no longer needed in the
determination/computation of her retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, as amended.11
The OCA likewise clarified that the monetary value of the accrued terminal leave benefits that
Demonteverde earned in her government service prior to joining the Judiciary was already
included by this Court in the payment of her retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910. The OCA
added that this Court will request reimbursement from Demonteverde if the GSIS decides to
grant retirement benefits.12
In a Decision dated October 10, 2013, the GSIS BOT granted Demonteverde's petition, to wit:
Wherefore, all the foregoing considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Petitioner is allowed to
retire under R.A. No. 8291 for her period of services outside the judiciary from 01 July 1963 to
29 June 1995. The payment of her benefits shall be reckoned from 22 February 2011, the date
when her actual separation from service took place.
SO ORDERED.13
On December 12, 2013, Demonteverde filed a Motion for Execution14 of the Decision of the GSIS
BOT, stating therein that she received a notice of the October 14, 2013 Decision on November
11, 2013; that more than 15 days had elapsed since her receipt of the copy of the decision; and
that the same had become final and executory and ripe for implementation.15 Said Motion for
Execution was granted by the GSIS BOT on even date.
However, on January 6, 2014, Demonteverde filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Partial MR) and
Withdrawal of Motion for Execution16 of the October 10, 2013 GSIS BOT Decision. She
questioned the accrual date of her retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291, arguing that the
date of her retirement should be the date when she reached sixty (60) years of age, even when
she was still in active government service at that time, and not on February 22, 2011, or the
date of her actual retirement from government service. Demonteverde likewise denied receiving
a copy of the GSIS BOT Decision, and denied that the later Notice of Decision dated November
19, 2013 contained a copy of the GSIS BOT Decision.
In its Resolution No. 1217 dated February 13, 2014, the GSIS BOT denied Demonteverde's
Partial MR and Withdrawal of Motion for Execution, for allegedly having been filed out of time.
Aggrieved, Demonteverde filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and
Prohibition under Rule 65 dated March 21, 2014, seeking to modify and set aside the October
10, 2013 Decision and Resolution No. 12 dated February 13, 2014 of the GSIS BOT.18
In a Resolution19 dated June 19, 2014, the CA dismissed the said petition, ratiocinating that the
course of action taken by Demonteverde was erroneous as the proper mode of appeal from a
decision of a quasi-judicial agency such as the GSIS is by filing a verified petition for review with
the CA under Rule 43. The appellate court added that a perusal of Demonteverde's petition
showed procedural defects, to wit:
a. Petitioner failed to incorporate therein a written explanation why the preferred
personal mode of filing the petition under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of
Court was not availed of.
b. Petitioner failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of
the assailed October 10, 2013 Decision, December 12, 2013 Order and February 13,
2014 Resolution of the GSIS, in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. While petitioner appended to the Petition copy of the assailed October
10, 2013 Decision and February 13, 2014 Resolution of the GSIS they were mere
photocopies. The assailed December 12, 2013 Order of the Hearing Officer of the
GSIS appears also to be a mere photocopy.
c. Petitioner failed to properly verify the Petition in accordance with A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC
amending Section 4, Rule 7 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which now requires that a pleading must be verified by an affidavit that the
affiant has read the pleading and the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records. Petitioner did not to (sic)
incorporate in the Verification and Certification of Non Forum Shopping the phrase "or
based on authentic records."
d. Petitioner failed to attach copies of all pleadings and documents, which are necessary
for a thorough understanding and resolution of the instant Petition, such as, but not
limited to, following:
1. Petitioner's July 28, 1995 letter to the GSIS requesting for a refund of her
retirement premiums.
2. Petitioner's February 11, 2011 and March 3, 2011 applications for claim of
retirement benefits field (sic) with the GSIS, Baco1od Branch.
3. The October 14, 2011 letter of the GSIS' Bacolod Branch Manager, Ms.
Vilma Fuentes.
4. Petitioner's November 28, 2011 letter to the GSIS requesting for a re-
evaluation of her application for retirement benefits.
58
 5. Petitioner's Petition filed with the GSIS [C]ommittee on Claims.
6. The GSIS Committee on Claims' Answer to petitioner's Petition.
7. The March 26, 2013 letter of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO Chief
Administrative Officer. (sic)
8. The July 23, 2013 and September 17, 2013 letters of the Office of the Court
Administrator of the Supreme Court.
e. The Notarial Certificate in the Verification and Certification of Non Forum Shopping
and in the Affidavit of Service did not contain the province or city where the notary
public was commissioned, the office address of the notary public, in violation of
Section 2(c) and (d), Rule VIII of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.20
Upon Demonteverde's motion for reconsideration, the CA, in the assailed February 17, 2016
Resolution, reversed itself and reinstated Demonteverde's Petition. It agreed with
Demonteverde that the case may be classified as an exception to the general rule
that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal under any of the following grounds: where
appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy, and for certain special
considerations, such as public welfare or public policy.21 Thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:
1. GRANT the Motion for Extension to file Comment and the Second Motion for Extension of
Time to File Comment filed by respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
2. ADMIT the Comment and Opposition (To the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated June 19, 2014) filed by the GSIS.
3. GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner and SET ASIDE the June 19, 2014
Resolution.
4. REINSTATE the instant petition and DIRECT respondents to FILE their COMMENT (not a
Motion to Dismiss) to the petition within TEN (10) days from receipt of this Resolution.
Petitioner is given five (5) days from receipt of Comment within which to file a Reply, if
petitioner so desires.
SO ORDERED.22
GSIS BOT moved for reconsideration and filed an Opposition to the Petition, but the CA, in its
February 16, 2017 Resolution, denied the said motion for reconsideration and directed the GSIS
BOT to file its comment to Demonteverde's petition.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, with the GSIS BOT raising the issue of whether the CA acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its February
17, 2016 Resolution reinstating Demonteverde's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus; and February 16, 2017 Resolution denying GSIS' Motion for Reconsideration of the
February 17, 2016 Resolution. It alleges the following issues in support of its petition:
I.
THE ASSAILED GSIS BOT DECISION IS FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND NOT SUBJECT TO ANY
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR APPEAL.
II.
A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS NOT AN ALTERNATE REMEDY
FOR LOST APPEALS UNDER RULE 43 AND THE TWO ACTIONS ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.
III.
THE ISSUES RAISED IN FORMER JUDGE DEMONTEVERDE'S PETITION DO NOT AFFECT PUBLIC
POLICY.
IV.
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS TAINTED WITH MANY PROCEDURAL INFIRMITIES WHICH
ARE FATAL TO THE PETITION.23
The main issue for resolution is whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its Resolution dated February 17, 2016 reinstating
Demonteverde's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus; and Resolution dated
February 16, 2017 denying GSIS BOT's Motion for Reconsideration of the February 17, 2016
Resolution.
This Court resolves to grant the instant petition.
A special civil action for certiorari, under Rule 65, is an independent action based on the specific
grounds therein provided and will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.24 A petition for certiorari will prosper only if
grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist.
"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, refers to the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power
due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise
of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to
act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave
abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.25
Having said this, there is a preliminary need to address the GSIS-BOT's argument that
Demonteverde should have filed an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court instead of filing
the certiorari suit before the CA.
A special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a cure for failure to timely
file an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.26 Rule 65 is an independent action that
cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, especially if such
loss or lapse was occasioned by one's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.27 As this
Court held in Butuan Development Corporation v. CA:28
A party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
for the remedy of appeal. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to
the availability of the special civil action of certiorari. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for
review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is
not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's
choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there
be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
Nonetheless, the general rule that an appeal and a certiorari are not interchangeable admits of
exceptions. This Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review
on certiorari, particularly: (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary
period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are
averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of rules.29
Likewise, in Department of Education v. Cuanan,30 where this Court exercised liberality and
considered the petition for certiorari filed therein as an appeal, the Court identified exceptions to
the general rule. Thus:
The remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file a petition for
review thereof under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from notice of the
resolution. Recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders the petition dismissible for
59
being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public
welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice
so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
In the instant case, the CA itself, in its June 19, 2014 Resolution, initially dismissed
Demonteverde's special civil action for certiorari, reasoning that Demonteverde had the remedy
of appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Citing the case of Madrigal Transport, Inc. v.
Lapanday Holdings Corporation,31 the CA thus said:
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained.
Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal,
especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or
lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the
ground therefore is grave abuse of discretion.
The CA even categorically ruled that the present circumstances in Demonteverde's case did not
warrant the application of the exceptions to the general rule provided by Rule 43,32 thereafter
proceeding to identify the aforementioned procedural defects in the petition.
Yet, when the CA, upon Demonteverde's motion for reconsideration, reversed itself and
reinstated the latter's Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Prohibition in the assailed February
17, 2016 Resolution, it failed to substantiate its decision to grant the said motion and set aside
its June 19, 2014 Resolution. Apart from Demonteverde's bare allegations in her pleadings and
her own testimony that her case falls under the exception to the general rule that if appeal is
available, certiorari is not a remedy, there is nothing on record that would warrant the grant of
her motion for reconsideration and the setting aside of the CA's June 19, 2014 Resolution.
A reading of the CA's assailed February 16, 2017 Resolution reveals that Demonteverde's
motion for resolution of the CA's June 19, 2014 Resolution was approved hastily. While the CA
appears to have ruled on the merits of Demonteverde's motion, its ratiocination merely consists
of two paragraphs and it summarily made a conclusion that Demonteverde's case may be
classified as an exception to the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
In doing so, the CA did not clearly and distinctly explain how it reached such conclusion. To wit:
In the case of Andrew James Mcburnie vs. Eulalio Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc. and E. Ganzon,
Inc., the Supreme Court held that the Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set
forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses
it, for otherwise, court will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been, as they in
fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities
take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Truly then,
technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, should give way to the realities
of the situation.
Applying the above-cited jurisprudence in Andrew James Mcburnie vs. Eulalia Ganzon, EGI-
Managers, Inc. and E. Ganzon, Inc., and upon perusal of the arguments contained in the instant
Motion for Reconsideration, there is basis to reconsider the dismissal of the instant Petition. The
Court agrees with petitioner, that the instant case may be classified as an exception to the
general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal under any of the following
grounds: where appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy and for certain
special considerations as public welfare or public policy. In this case, the filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration on the assailed GSIS decision maybe [sic] dispensed with on the same cited
grounds of public welfare and the advancement of public policy and in addition, in the broader
interests of justice.33
"Public policy" has a specific definition in jurisprudence. It has been defined as that principle of
the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be
injurious to the public of against public good.34 It is the principle under which freedom of
contract or private dealing is restricted for the good of the community.35
Demonteverde's claim of public policy as a justification of her inability to comply with the
general rule on appeal is unacceptable in the absence of legal and factual bases for its
invocation. The assumption of the appellate court that Demonteverde could possibly face "a
grim prospect of a lengthy appeal as it is very likely that the resolution will not happen during
her lifetime as she is already seventy-three years old" is inconsistent with the aforementioned
definition of public policy. Demonteverde failed to substantiate through clear and well-
established grounds exactly how her case warrants a deviation from the general rule that a writ
of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to an aggrieved party.
Moreover, Demonteverde failed to overcome in her petition the. presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions of public officers. She failed to present clear and convincing
evidence to corroborate her claim that the notice of decision as regards the October 10, 2013
Decision of the GSIS BOT failed to attach a copy of the written decision.36 As petitioner GSIS
BOT pointed out, Demonteverde could not have claimed in her Motion for Execution - which she
ultimately attempted to withdraw - that the GSIS BOT October 10, 2013 Decision had attained
finality if she indeed had not received a copy of it and read its full text.
In her Motion for Reconsideration 37 of the CA's June 19, 2014 Resolution, Demonteverde claims
that the GSIS BOT Decision had not yet attained finality because the GSIS BOT "did not rule on
the merits of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration."38 To wit:
Petitioner's mode of appeal via Rule 65 of the Rules was guided by the pronouncements of the
court in the case of Page-Tenorio vs. Tenorio, G.R. No. 138490, November 24, 2004. Her motion
for partial reconsideration and withdrawal of motion for execution dated 2 January 2014 was
denied by respondents on a dubious technical ground of having been filed out of time,
without resolving on the merits the reckoning period that were never taken up during the
proceedings, thus denying her due process. Petitioner was never given a chance to be
heard on the matter.39
While the CA gave credence to this claim and granted Demonteverde's motion, this Court cannot
sustain the CA's resolution.
It should be emphasized that the resort to a liberal application, or suspension of the application
of procedural rules, must remain as the exception to the well-settled principle that rules must be
complied with for the orderly administration of justice.40 While procedural rules may be relaxed
in the interest of justice, it is well settled that these are tools designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. The relaxation of procedural rules in the interest of justice was never
intended to be a license for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. Liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules can be invoked only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. While litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice.41
Applying this to the instant case, there is nothing dubious about the GSIS BOT's denial of her
Partial Motion for Reconsideration and Withdrawal of Motion for Execution on the ground that
the said motion was filed out of time. Demonteverde filed her Partial Motion for Reconsideration
and Withdrawal of Motion for Execution only on January 6, 2014, fifty-six (56) days after
November 11, 2013, which is the date of receipt of the GSIS BOT Decision indicated in her
Motion for Execution, and forty-eight (48) days after November 19, 2013, when she officially
received a copy of the GSIS BOT Decision. Clearly, Demonteverde had, by then, lost her right to
question the Decision of the GSIS BOT through a motion for reconsideration or through any
other form of appeal. Thus, the CA should have dismissed her petition outright on the ground of
erroneous cause of action as the remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or cumulative.
This Court likewise rejects Demonteverde's assertion that she was never given a chance to be
heard on the matter. On the contrary, the records show that she was given ample opportunity
to present her retirement claims and her arguments before the GSIS COC, the GSIS BOT, and
the CA. In fact, the GSIS BOT even approved her request to retire under R.A. No. 8291 for her
period of services outside the Judiciary from July 1, 1963 to June 29, 1995. The only issue that
protracted the instant case is Demonteverde's single-minded insistence that the accrual date of
her retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291 should be the date when she reached sixty (60)
years of age, even. when she was still in active government service at that time, and not on
February 22, 2011, or the date of her actual retirement from government service.
To give merit to this argument would be preposterous.
60
The reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the government.
Retirement benefits to government employees are part of emolument to encourage and retain
qualified employees in the government service. These benefits are meant to reward them for
giving the best years of their lives in the service of their country.42
However, the right to retirement benefits accrues only upon certain prerequisites. First, the
conditions imposed by the applicable law must be fulfilled. Second, there must be actual
retirement.43 Prior to retirement, an employee who has served the requisite number of years,
such as Demonteverde, is only eligible for, but not yet entitled to, retirement
benefits.44 Retirement means there is a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement
between the employer and the employees whereby the latter after reaching a certain age agrees
and/or consents to sever his or her employment with the former.45
Severance of employment is a condition sine qua non for the release of retirement benefits.
Retirement benefits are not meant to recompense employees who are still in the employ of the
government; that is the function of salaries and emoluments. Retirement benefits are in the
nature of a reward granted by the State to a government employee who has given the best
years of his life to the service of his country.
While Demonteverde met the two conditions for entitlement to benefits under R.A. No. 8291 in
2001, i.e., she had rendered at least fifteen (15) years in government service as a regular
member, and she turned sixty (60) years of age, she continued to serve the government and
did not, at that time, sever her employment with the government. Thus, not having retired from
service when she turned 60 on February 22, 2001, she cannot claim that her right to retirement
benefits had already accrued then.
In fine, this Court finds it proper to emphasize that Demonteverde's filing of separate retirement
claims for her government service outside of the Judiciary and in the Judiciary was unnecessary
and unwarranted. Apart from the fact that she continued to serve the government as a trial
court judge after serving the NEA, the DBP, and the PAO for a total of 32 years, her service in
these government agencies is creditable as part ofher overall government service for retirement
purposes under R.A. No. 910, as amended.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 9946, provides:
SECTION 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or
of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or
any other court hereafter established who has rendered at least fifteen (15) years service
in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or in both, (a) retires for
having attained the age of seventy years x x x he/she shall receive during the residue of his/her
natural life, in the manner hereinafter provided, the salary which plus the highest monthly
aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances such as personal economic
relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance which he/she was receiving at
the time of his/her retirement x x x
Considering the express wordings of R.A. No. 910, which include service "in any other branch of
the Government" as creditable service in the computation of the retirement benefits of a justice
or judge, Demonteverde's years of service as in the NEA, the DBP, and the PAO were already
correctly credited by the OCA as part of her government service when it granted her retirement
application for her service in the Judiciary from June 30, 1995 until her retirement on February
22, 2011.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the petition and NULLIFIES AND
SETS ASIDE the Resolutions dated February 17, 2016 and February 16, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 08362 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and DISMISSES the Petition for Certiorari,
Mandamus, and Prohibition under Rule 65 dated March 21, 2014 of private respondent Ma.
Lorna P. Demonteverde, former Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bacolod City, which
sought to set aside the October 10, 2013 Decision and Resolution No. 12 dated February 13,
2014 of the GSIS BOT.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 203797-98, June 27, 2018
CARMENCITA O. REYES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), OFFICE OF
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to set aside the Resolutions dated
February 29, 20122 and August 13, 20123 of the First (1st) Division of the Sandiganbayan in
Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0089 to 0101 and SB-11-CRM-0111 to 0113. The said Resolution dated
February 29, 2012 denied petitioner's Urgent Omnibus Motion dated July 19, 2011,4 while the
Resolution dated August 13, 20125 denied the Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
THE ANTECEDENTS
This case stemmed from the investigation of various transactions of the famous
P728,000,000.00 fertilizer fund allegedly involving public officers from the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and others.
On July 9, 2008, the Task Force Abono, Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the
Ombudsman filed a Complaint6 with the Office of the Ombudsman against some persons which
included petitioner Carmencita O. Reyes (Reyes).
Reyes was charged for alleged violation of Article 220 (Illegal Use of Public Funds or Property,
commonly known as Technical Malversation) of Act 3135, otherwise known as the "Revised
Penal Code of the Philippines" (RPC); and Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." Thereafter, Reyes then filed a
consolidated counter affidavit7 upon which Task Force Abono filed its Reply8 on November 26,
2008.
Based on the said Complaint, the Ombudsman filed two (2) Informations against Reyes, one for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 30199 docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0100; and
the other for violation of Article 220 of the RPC10 docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-
0113, both of which were allegedly committed during the incumbency of Reyes as Provincial
Governor of Marinduque. The Informations were consolidated into one case with the First (1st)
Division of the Sandiganbayan (Sandiganbayan). The accusatory portion of the said
Informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0100
That on or about the period covering 30 April to 08 December 2004, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused CARMENCITA O. REYES, a high ranking official being then the Governor of
61
the Province of Marinduque, DENNIS B. ARAULLO, a high ranking official being a Regional
Executive Director with Salary Grade 28, RODOLFO M. GUIEB, MARIE PAZ JASMINE M.
CABUCOL, RAYMUNDO E. BRAGANZA, GROVER L. DINO, DORY A. IRANZO, ABELARDO BRAGAS,
FELIX RAMOS, OFELIA MONTILLA and GREGORIO SANGALANG; all of the Department of
Agriculture Regional Field Unit IV (DA-RFU IV), while in the performance of their official
functions and committing the offense in relation to their office, taking advantage of their official
positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, acting with manifest
partiality and evident bad faith or through gross inexcusable negligence, at the very least, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the government,
through the issuance of Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) Resolution No. 290, dated 30 April
2004, upon the order of accused REYES as evidenced by her letter and purchase requests dated
30 April 2004 and 03 May 2004, respectively, which requests have induced the accused DA-RFU
IV employees to transact with LCV Design and Fabrication Corporation (LCV), with accused
REMUS C. VILLANUEVA as president, in whose favor the purchase order and payment for one
(1) unit Shredding Machine, one (1) unit Hammermill/Shifter, one (1) unit Pelletizer and one (1)
unit Tornado Brush Chipper/Shredder as listed under Purchase Order No. 119-04, dated 05 May
2004, duly signed by accused MARIE PAZ JASMINE M. CABUCOL, amounting to Five Million
Pesos (Php5,000,000.00), Philippine currency, charged against the Farm Input Fund for the
Ginintuang Masaganang Ani Program of the DA as covered by SARO No. E-04-00164, has been
awarded by accused BAC Members ABELARDO BRAGAS, FELIX RAMOS, OFELIA MONTILLA and
GREGORIO SANGGALANG; without the conduct of a public bidding, thereby resorting to Direct
Contracting, thus, giving said corporation unwarranted benefit, preference or advantage,
knowing fully well that at the time of procurement, the patent application of said corporation for
the equipment purchased has not yet been approved as evidenced by a notation "Subject to the
condition that the patent will be approved by the Bureau of Patent. Patent of the ff: 12)
Shredding Machine 2) Hammermill 3) Pelletizer 4) Brush Chipper" appearing on Disbursement
Voucher Nos. 2004-07-2941 dated 30 July 2004, and 2004-12-6056 dated 08 December 2004,
duly signed by accused DENNIS B. ARAULLO, RODOLFO M. GUIEB and RAYMUNDO E.
BRAGANZA, hence, said corporation cannot as yet then be considered as the exclusive
distributor of the equipment purchased and public bidding should have been conducted, aside
from the fact that the purchase of said equipment was not in accordance with the purpose for
which said funds as covered by SARO No. E-04-00164 has been appropriated, to the damage
and prejudice of the government in the amount of Five Million Pesos(Php5,000,000.00),
Philippine currency, covered by check nos. 270843-CL dated 30 July 2004 as signed by accused
DORY A. IRANZO and DENNIS B. ARAULLO and 274415-CL dated 08 December 2004 as signed
by accused GROVER L. DINO and DENNIS B. ARAULLO.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0113
That from the period covering 30 April to 08 December 2004, or for some time prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused CARMENCITA O. REYES, a high ranking public officer being then the Governor
and now the Representative of the Province of Marinduque, DENNIS B. ARAULLO, also a high
ranking public officer being the Regional Executive Director (Salary Grade 28), Department of
Agriculture-Regional Field Unit No. IV, RODOLFO M. GUIEB, MARIE PAZ JASMINE M. CABUCOL,
RAYMUNDO E. BRAGANZA, GROVER L. DINO, DORY A IRANZO, ABELARDO BRAGAS, FELIX
RAMOS, OFELIA MONTILLA and GREGORIO SANGALANG, all employees of the Department of
Agriculture Regional Field Unit IV (DA-RFU IV), being the OIC-Regional Executive Director
(Salary Grade 26), Chief Accountant (Salary Grade 15), Regional Accountant (Salary Grade 18),
Cashier I, Cashier IV-B (Salary Grade 14), members of the Bids and Awards Committee-
CALABARZON, respectively, and as such is responsible/accountable for the P5,000,000.00 which
they received from DA-Central Office by reason of their office, which amount is part of the P728
Million Fertilizer Fund released by the Department of Budget and Management to the
Department of Agriculture under SARO No. E-04-00164 dated February 3, 2004 and allocated by
Republic Act No. 8435, otherwise known as the "Agricultural and Fisheries Modernization Act
(AFMA) for the purchase of fertilizer by the identified beneficiaries/proponent in different regions
of the country in line with the "Ginintuang Masaganang Ani Program" of the Department of
Agriculture, while in the performance of their official functions and committing the offense in
relation to their office, taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, either by awarding the transaction to LCV Design and Fabrication
Corporation through Bids and Awards Committee Resolution No. 290, dated 30 April 2004,
signing, certifying, or approving, Purchase Request 119-04, dated 05 May 2004, Disbursement
Voucher Nos. 2004-07-2941, dated 30 July 2004, and 2004-12-6056, dated 08 December 2004,
and Check Nos. 270843-CL, dated 30 July 2004, or accepting the items delivered by LCV Design
and Fabrication Corporation , did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously allow/cause
the diversion/conversion of the said P5,000,000.00 fertilizer fund for the purpose for which it
was intended, i.e. purchase of fertilizer, by purchasing, upon request/inducement of accused
Reyes and in fact she received, one (1) unit Shredding Machine, one unit (1) unit
Hammermill/Shifter, one (1) unit Pelletizer and one (1) unit Tornado Brush Chipper/Shredder
from LCV Design and Fabrication Corporation, without the benefit of public bidding and knowing
fully well that the equipment purchase was not in accordance with the purpose for which the
fund was appropriated under Republic Act No. 8435, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
On July 19, 2011, Reyes filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (For Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause and Deferment of Arraignment set for 28 July 2011)13 in the anti-graft case, and another
Urgent Omnibus Motion (For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; and Deferment
of/Holding in Abeyance the Arraignment) on September 12, 201114 in the technical malversation
case.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed a Consolidated Opposition/Comment dated
August 18, 201115 and an Opposition/Comment dated October 5, 201116 upon which Reyes filed
her Consolidated Reply.17
In a Resolution dated February 29, 2012,18 the Sandiganbayan resolved the said Urgent
Omnibus Motions denying both motions. The said Resolution dated February 12, 2012 disposed
thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court hereby resolves as follows:
xxxx
7. To FIND THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS to issue warrant of arrest against accused Reyes
[herein Petitioner] in Crim. Cases No. SB-11-CRM-0100 and No. SB-11-CRM-0113; x x x.
However, considering that the accused had already posted their bail bonds, the Court will no
longer issue a warrant of arrest against them.
xxxx
SO ORDERED." 19
On March 29, 2012, Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 of the said Resolution dated
Febn1ary 29, 2012. However, it was denied in a Resolution dated August 13, 2012.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
62
Reyes submits the following issues for Our Resolution:
1. Does the evidence, relied on by the Ombudsman, justify the conclusion that there is
probable cause to charge the petitioner for the violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended?
2. Does the evidence, relied on by the Ombudsman, justify the conclusion that there is
probable cause to charge the petitioner for the Illegal Use of Public Funds/Technical
Malversation under Article 220 of the RPC?
3. Did the respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied the assertion of the petitioner that no probable
cause exists for either case?
4. Is the petitioner entitled to injunctive relief?21
In the petition, Reyes argues that there is no probable cause to charge her for the violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.22 She claims that among the elements to hold a person criminally
liable under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, no other element is present in this case except that she
was a public officer.23 She explains that the primary evidence as per Information, i.e. the letter
request24 and the purchase request,25 merely show the letter is simply a request and the
purchase request shows on its face that it was the DA officials who made the same. Reyes
likewise claims that no real evidence of conspiracy was found or established by the evidence.26
Moreover, Reyes argues that there is no probable cause to charge her under Article 220 of the
RPC.27 She claims that she is not the administrator of the funds in question with whom it
remains.28 She further claims that nothing of inducement is stated in the letter request29 She
concluded in accordance with Article 220 of the RPC, it is already clear that not all the elements
of the crime charged are met.30
Reyes further argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied her assertion that no probable cause exists for
either case. Reyes assails the Sandigabayan's reliance on the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Report being not part of the record of the case and considers it hearsay, as well as the finding
that the "arguments propounded by the accused-movants reveal that they are matters of
defense."31
Ruling of this Court
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it bears to stress that a  certiorari proceeding is limited in scope and narrow in
character. The special civil action for certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without
jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari will issue only
to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or
conclusions of the lower court.32
After a careful and thorough review of the facts and the issue at hand, as well as the law and
jurisprudence pertinent thereto, this Court finds that the First Division of the Sandiganbayan did
not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it the
denied peititioner's Urgent Omnibus Motion/s (For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause).
As to the first two issues, Reyes contends that the letter request and purchase request are
incomplete to show that the elements are present for charges of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 and Article 220 of the RPC, further claiming no evidence to show conspiracy.
We are not persuaded.
In this case, Reyes's contentions are matters of defense that should be resolved in a trial.
As public respondent correctly contends:
At first glance and on its face, petitioner Reyes' request had the appearance of being regular.
But after a careful analysis, her request was actually inducing and/or even ordering the DA to
procure the subject equipments from the LCV as the latter, according to petitioner Reyes, was
"the inventor, manufacturer and exclusive distributor" thereof. Indeed, petitioner Reyes' mere
mention in her letter of the name "LCV" as the alleged "inventor; manufacturer and exclusive
distributor" of the equipment could be considered as a strong indication that she seriously
wanted DA to procure the equipments with LCV. As a matter of fact, in the Purchase Request
dated May 3, 2004, and the Requisition and Issue Slip dated May 5, 2004, petitioner Reyes had
categorically mentioned the brand name "TORNADO" Brush Chipper/ Shredder, which was the
brand claimed to be exclusively distributed by LCV Moreover, no less than her co-respondents in
the case, the DA FRFU-IV employees, in their Joint-Counter-Affidavit, openly alleged that the
proponents, petitioner Reyes included, had a direct hand in the purchase of the equipments, viz:
11.) With respect to paragraph 13, it must be pointed out that the four (4) proponents
(Congressmen Nanette Daza, Federico Sandoval, and Oscar Gozos, and Governor Carmencita
Reyes) not only had direct hand in the questioned transactions but much more than that. They
were not only ordinary proponents or endorsers of the farm implements in question, but they
actually initiated the transactions in question as borne out by their respective letters to
Respondent Dennis B. Araullo, then the Regional Executive Director of the DA RFU No. IV The
four (4) elective public officials concerned categorically and unmistakably manifested in their
respective letters the extent of their participation and the fact their sole determination of the
specifications (and even the supplier) of the items purchased, purpose and justification why the
various farm implements or machines were purchased for their constituencies, ...33
From the foregoing, it is shown that the letter request and purchase request are enough to
engender a well-founded belief that the crime charged may have been committed by Reyes and
that any assertion by Reyes that negates the complication of the documents are matters of
defense. Besides, the Requisition and Issue Slip34 dated May 5, 2004, as alluded to by the
Ombudsman, would show that petitioner Reyes had categorically mentioned the brand name
"TORNADO" Brush Chipper/Shredder, which was the brand claimed to be exclusively distributed
by LCV Design and Fabrication Corporation. On this score, said connections can also establish
probable cause which the Sandiganbayan may disprove during the trial. Under these
circumstances, We concur with the Sandiganbayan as it aptly found, thus:
A judicious reading of the arguments propounded by the accused-movants reveal that they are
matters of defense which should be ventilated during the trial proper. Indubitably, whether or
not undue injury was caused or unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference was extended to
any party when direct contracting was resorted to instead of public bidding in the acquisition of
the subject equipment from LCV in the case of DA RFU IV, and whether or not said supplier was
indeed its exclusive distributor of the equipment which could be considered as farm inputs/farm
implements to fall under the category provided under the GMA program, and which in effect
would help settle the issue if there was illegal use of public funds or not, are matters of defense
which are not relevant considerations during the initial stage of the proceedings.35
As to the third issue, Reyes contends that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied her assertion that no
63
probable cause exists for both cases. In addition to her previous contentions, Reyes assails the
Sandigabayan's reliance on the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report being not part of the
record of the case and considers it hearsay. She considers such as highly irregular and improper
for the Sandiganbayan to have used the findings of such report as bases for upholding the
existence of probable cause.36
Reyes's contention is misplaced.
It must be emphasized that the Ombudsman itself conducted its own preliminary investigation
in this case. It was during this investigation that the Ombudsman, faced with the facts and
circumstances extant herein, was led to believe that (1) a crime has been committed; and (2)
there is probable cause that Reyes was guilty thereof. That the Ombudsman referred to the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report as additional basis for its findings does nothing to refute
the validity of the preliminary investigation, the evidence gathered therein, or the conclusion of
the Ombudsman after that investigation.
Thus, We once more find favor m the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, viz:
The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman when it
found probable cause to file the Information against the accused in these cases. x x x It is
noteworthy that aside from its own exhaustive investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman also
referred to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report to supplement its findings of probable
cause, on the basis of which the investigating prosecutors were able to determine that an
offense had probably been committed and that the accused probably perpetrated it.37
On the basis of these findings, the Sandiganbayan cannot be said to have committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied Reyes's assertion
that no probable cause exists for both cases.
In a petition for certiorari, the public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the
legal power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being
clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law.
There is grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.38 Here, there is none.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated February 29, 2012 and August
13, 2012 of the First (1st) Division of the Sandiganbayan in Case Nos. SB-11-CRM-0089 to
0101, and SB-11-CRM-0111 to 0113 insofar as the petitioner in this case is concerned,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191424               August 7, 2013
ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE SHAREHOLDERS OF
EUROCREDIT COMMUNITY BANK, PETITIONER,
vs.
THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a status quo ante order or writ of
preliminary injunction ordering the respondents to desist from closing EuroCredit Community
Bank, Incorporated (ECBI) and from pursuing the receivership thereof. The petition likewise
prays that the management and operation of ECBI be restored to its Board of Directors (BOD)
and its officers.
The Facts
The Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) was a duly registered rural banking institution with
principal office in Centro Sur, Sto. Niño, Cagayan. Record shows that the corporate life of RBFI
expired on May 31, 2005.1 Notwithstanding, petitioner Alfeo D. Vivas (Vivas) and his principals
acquired the controlling interest in RBFI sometime in January 2006. At the initiative of Vivas and
the new management team, an internal audit was conducted on RBFI and results thereof
highlighted the dismal operation of the rural bank. In view of those findings, certain measures
calculated to revitalize the bank were allegedly introduced.2 On December 8, 2006, the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued the Certificate of Authority extending the corporate life of RBFI
for another fifty (50) years. The BSP also approved the change of its corporate name to
EuroCredit Community Bank, Incorporated, as well as the increase in the number of the
members of its BOD, from five (5) to eleven (11).3
Pursuant to Section 28 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, otherwise known as The New Central
Bank Act, the Integrated Supervision Department II (ISD II) of the BSP conducted a general
examination on ECBI with the cut-off date of December 31, 2007. Shortly after the completion
of the general examination, an exit conference was held on March 27, 2008 at the BSP during
which the BSP officials and examiners apprised Vivas, the Chairman and President of ECBI, as
well as the other bank officers and members of its BOD, of the advance findings noted during
the said examination. The ECBI submitted its comments on BSP’s consolidated findings and risk
asset classification through a letter, dated April 8, 2008.4
Sometime in April 2008, the examiners from the Department of Loans and Credit of the BSP
arrived at the ECBI and cancelled the rediscounting line of the bank. Vivas appealed the
cancellation to BSP.5 Thereafter, the Monetary Board (MB) issued Resolution No. 1255, dated
September 25, 2008, placing ECBI under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework because of
the following serious findings and supervisory concerns noted during the general examination:
1] negative capital of ?14.674 million and capital adequacy ratio of negative 18.42%; 2] CAMEL
(Capital Asset Management Earnings Liquidity) composite rating of "2" with a Management
component rating of "1"; and 3] serious supervisory concerns particularly on activities deemed
unsafe or unsound.6 Vivas claimed that the BSP took the above courses of action due to the joint
influence exerted by a certain hostile shareholder and a former BSP examiner.7
Through its letter, dated September 30, 2008, the BSP furnished ECBI with a copy of the Report
of Examination (ROE) as of December 31, 2007. In addition, the BSP directed the bank’s BOD
and senior management to: 1] infuse fresh capital of ?22.643 million; 2] book the amount of ?
28.563 million representing unbooked valuation reserves on classified loans and other risks
assets on or before October 31, 2008; and 3] take appropriate action necessary to address the
violations/exceptions noted in the examination.8
Vivas moved for a reconsideration of Resolution No. 1255 on the grounds of non-observance of
due process and arbitrariness. The ISD II, on several instances, had invited the BOD of ECBI to
discuss matters pertaining to the placement of the bank under PCA framework and other
supervisory concerns before making the appropriate recommendations to the MB. The proposed
meeting, however, did not materialize due to postponements sought by Vivas.9
In its letter, dated February 20, 2009, the BSP directed ECBI to explain why it transferred the
majority shares of RBFI without securing the prior approval of the MB in apparent violation of
Subsection X126.2 of the Manual of Regulation for Banks (MORB).10 Still in another
64
letter,11 dated March 31, 2009, the ISD II required ECBI to explain why it did not obtain the
prior approval of the BSP anent the establishment and operation of the bank’s sub-offices.
Also, the scheduled March 31, 2009 general examination of the books, records and general
condition of ECBI with the cut-off date of December 31, 2008, did not push through. According
to Vivas, ECBI asked for the deferment of the examination pending resolution of its appeal
before the MB. Vivas believed that he was being treated unfairly because the letter of authority
to examine allegedly contained a clause which pertained to the Anti-Money Laundering Law and
the Bank Secrecy Act.12
The MB, on the other hand, posited that ECBI unjustly refused to allow the BSP examiners from
examining and inspecting its books and records, in violation of Sections 25 and 34 of R.A. No.
7653. In its letter,13 dated May 8, 2009, the BSP informed ECBI that it was already due for
another annual examination and that the pendency of its appeal before the MB would not
prevent the BSP from conducting another one as mandated by Section 28 of R.A. No. 7653.
In view of ECBI’s refusal to comply with the required examination, the MB issued Resolution No.
726,14 dated May 14, 2009, imposing monetary penalty/fine on ECBI, and referred the matter to
the Office of the Special Investigation (OSI) for the filing of appropriate legal action. The BSP
also wrote a letter,15 dated May 26, 2009, advising ECBI to comply with MB Resolution No. 771,
which essentially required the bank to follow its directives. On May 28, 2009, the ISD II
reiterated its demand upon the ECBI BOD to allow the BSP examiners to conduct a general
examination on June 3, 2009.16
In its June 2, 2009 Letter-Reply,  ECBI asked for another deferment of the examination due to
17
the pendency of certain unresolved issues subject of its appeal before the MB, and because
Vivas was then out of the country. The ISD II denied ECBI’s request and ordered the general
examination to proceed as previously scheduled.18
Thereafter, the MB issued Resolution No. 823,19 dated June 4, 2009, approving the issuance of a
cease and desist order against ECBI, which enjoined it from pursuing certain acts and
transactions that were considered unsafe or unsound banking practices, and from doing such
other acts or transactions constituting fraud or might result in the dissipation of its assets.
On June 10, 2009, the OSI filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint for Estafa
Through Falsification of Commercial Documents against certain officials and employees of ECBI.
Meanwhile, the MB issued Resolution No. 1164,20 dated August 13, 2009, denying the appeal of
ECBI from Resolution No. 1255 which placed it under PCA framework. On November 18, 2009,
the general examination of the books and records of ECBI with the cut-off date of September
30, 2009, was commenced and ended in December 2009. Later, the BSP officials and examiners
met with the representatives of ECBI, including Vivas, and discussed their findings.21 On
December 7, 2009, the ISD II reminded ECBI of the non-submission of its financial audit reports
for the years 2007 and 2008 with a warning that failure to submit those reports and the written
explanation for such omission shall result in the imposition of a monetary penalty.22 In a letter,
dated February 1, 2010, the ISD II informed ECBI of MB Resolution No. 1548 which denied its
request for reconsideration of Resolution No. 726.
On March 4, 2010, the MB issued Resolution No. 27623 placing ECBI under receivership in
accordance with the recommendation of the ISD II which reads:
On the basis of the examination findings as of 30 September 2009 as reported by the Integrated
Supervision Department (ISD) II, in its memorandum dated 17 February 2010, which findings
showed that the Eurocredit Community Bank, Inc. – a Rural Bank (Eurocredit Bank) (a) is
unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business; (b) has
insufficient realizable assets to meet liabilities; (c) cannot continue in business without involving
probable losses to its depositors and creditors; and (d) has willfully violated a cease and desist
order of the Monetary Board for acts or transactions which are considered unsafe and unsound
banking practices and other acts or transactions constituting fraud or dissipation of the assets of
the institution, and considering the failure of the Board of Directors/management of Eurocredit
Bank to restore the bank’s financial health and viability despite considerable time given to
address the bank’s financial problems, and that the bank had been accorded due process, the
Board, in accordance with Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7653 (The New Central Bank Act),
approved the recommendation of ISD II as follows:
To prohibit the Eurocredit Bank from doing business in the Philippines and to place its assets
and affairs under receivership; and
To designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver of the bank.
Assailing MB Resolution No. 276, Vivas filed this petition for prohibition before this Court,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking
business and for placing it under receivership. The petitioner presents the following
ARGUMENTS:
(a)
It is grave abuse of discretion amounting to loss of jurisdiction to apply the general law
embodied in Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act as opposed to the specific law embodied in
Sections 11 and 14 of the Rural Banks Act of 1992.
(b)
Even if it assumed that Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act is applicable, it is still the
gravest abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to execute the law with
manifest arbitrariness, abuse of discretion, and bad faith, violation of constitutional rights and to
further execute a mandate well in excess of its parameters.
(c)
The power delegated in favor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to place rural banks under
receiverships is unconstitutional for being a diminution or invasion of the powers of the Supreme
Court, in violation of Section 2, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution.24
Vivas submits that the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion when they erroneously
applied Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653, instead of Sections 11 and 14 of the Rural Bank Act of
1992 or R.A. No. 7353. He argues that despite the deficiencies, inadequacies and oversights in
the conduct of the affairs of ECBI, it has not committed any financial fraud and, hence, its
placement under receivership was unwarranted and improper. He posits that, instead, the BSP
should have taken over the management of ECBI and extended loans to the financially
distrained bank pursuant to Sections 11 and 14 of R.A. No. 7353 because the BSP’s power is
limited only to supervision and management take-over of banks.
He contends that the implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with arbitrariness
and bad faith, stressing that ECBI was placed under receivership without due and prior hearing
in violation of his and the bank’s right to due process. He adds that respondent PDIC actually
closed ECBI even in the absence of any directive to this effect. Lastly, Vivas assails the
constitutionality of Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 claiming that said provision vested upon the BSP
the unbridled power to close and place under receivership a hapless rural bank instead of aiding
65
its financial needs. He is of the view that such power goes way beyond its constitutional
limitation and has transformed the BSP to a sovereign in its own "kingdom of banks."25
The Court’s Ruling
The petition must fail.
Vivas Availed of the Wrong Remedy
To begin with, Vivas availed of the wrong remedy. The MB issued Resolution No. 276, dated
March 4, 2010, in the exercise of its power under R.A. No. 7653. Under Section 30 thereof, any
act of the MB placing a bank under conservatorship, receivership or liquidation may not be
restrained or set aside except on a petition for certiorari. Pertinent portions of R.A. 7653 read:
Section 30. –
x x x x.
The actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall
be final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition
for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave
abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may
only be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock within
ten (10) days from receipt by the board of directors of the institution of the order directing
receivership, liquidation or conservatorship.
x x x x. [Emphases supplied]
Prohibition is already unavailing
Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy under the
circumstances obtaining. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior
court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a
jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law, and confines them to the exercise of
those powers legally conferred. Its office is to restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons
from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in
matters of which it has cognizance.26 In our jurisdiction, the rule on prohibition is enshrined in
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that the judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as the law and justice require.
x x x x.
Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would
direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be
illegal.27 As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act
which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already
accomplished.28
Though couched in imprecise terms, this petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the
acts of closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution No. 276, however, had
already been issued by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its placement under receivership by
the PDIC were already accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of prohibition is no longer
appropriate. Settled is the rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a
fait accompli.29
The Petition Should Have Been Filed in the CA
Even if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have been filed with the CA.
Section 4 of Rule 65 reads:
Section 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall
be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a
lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed
in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. [Emphases supplied]
That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already settled and reiterated in the case of Bank of
Commerce v. Planters Development Bank And Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas.30
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it simply ignored
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence of
jurisdiction, however, does not grant the party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the
absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of his choice. The petitioner has not advanced
any special or important reason which would allow a direct resort to this Court. Under the Rules
of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court only on pure questions of law.31 In the case at
bench, there are certainly factual issues as Vivas is questioning the findings of the investigating
team.
Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the issuance of the
extraordinary writs is also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, the special action for the
obtainment of such writ must be presented to either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain
direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts;
or where exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and with
serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.32 The judicial policy
must be observed to prevent an imposition on the precious time and attention of the Court.
The MB Committed No Grave Abuse of Discretion
66
In any event, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the MB for the issuance of the
assailed Resolution No. 276.
Vivas insists that the circumstances of the case warrant the application of Section 11 of R.A. No.
7353, which provides:
Sec. 11. The power to supervise the operation of any rural bank by the Monetary Board as
herein indicated shall consist in placing limits to the maximum credit allowed to any individual
borrower; in prescribing the interest rate, in determining the loan period and loan procedures, in
indicating the manner in which technical assistance shall be extended to rural banks, in
imposing a uniform accounting system and manner of keeping the accounts and records of rural
banks; in instituting periodic surveys of loan and lending procedures, audits, test-check of cash
and other transactions of the rural banks; in conducting training courses for personnel of rural
banks; and, in general, in supervising the business operations of the rural banks.
The Central Bank shall have the power to enforce the laws, orders, instructions, rules and
regulations promulgated by the Monetary Board, applicable to rural banks; to require rural
banks, their directors, officers and agents to conduct and manage the affairs of the rural banks
in a lawful and orderly manner; and, upon proof that the rural bank or its Board of Directors, or
officers are conducting and managing the affairs of the bank in a manner contrary to laws,
orders, instructions, rules and regulations promulgated by the Monetary Board or in a manner
substantially prejudicial to the interest of the Government, depositors or creditors, to take over
the management of such bank when specifically authorized to do so by the Monetary Board after
due hearing process until a new board of directors and officers are elected and qualified without
prejudice to the prosecution of the persons responsible for such violations under the provisions
of Sections 32, 33 and 34 of Republic Act No. 265, as amended.
x x x x.
The thrust of Vivas’ argument is that ECBI did not commit any financial fraud and, hence, its
placement under receivership was unwarranted and improper. He asserts that, instead, the BSP
should have taken over the management of ECBI and extended loans to the financially
distrained bank pursuant to Sections 11 and 14 of R.A. No. 7353 because the BSP’s power is
limited only to supervision and management take-over of banks, and not receivership.
Vivas argues that implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with arbitrariness
and bad faith, stressing that ECBI was placed under receivership without due and prior hearing,
invoking Section 11 of R.A. No. 7353 which states that the BSP may take over the management
of a rural bank after due hearing.33 He adds that because R.A. No. 7353 is a special law, the
same should prevail over R.A. No. 7653 which is a general law.
The Court has taken this into account, but it appears from all over the records that ECBI was
given every opportunity to be heard and improve on its financial standing. The records disclose
that BSP officials and examiners met with the representatives of ECBI, including Vivas, and
discussed their findings.34 There were also reminders that ECBI submit its financial audit reports
for the years 2007 and 2008 with a warning that failure to submit them and a written
explanation of such omission shall result in the imposition of a monetary penalty.35 More
importantly, ECBI was heard on its motion for reconsideration. For failure of ECBI to comply, the
MB came out with Resolution No. 1548 denying its request for reconsideration of Resolution No.
726. Having been heard on its motion for reconsideration, ECBI cannot claim that it was
deprived of its right under the Rural Bank Act.
Close Now, Hear Later
At any rate, if circumstances warrant it, the MB may forbid a bank from doing business and
place it under receivership without prior notice and hearing. Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653
provides, viz:
Sec. 30. Proceedings in Receivership and Liquidation. – Whenever, upon report of the head of
the supervising or examining department, the Monetary Board finds that a bank or quasi-bank:
(a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of
business: Provided, That this shall not include inability to pay caused by extraordinary
demands induced by financial panic in the banking community;
(b) has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the Bangko Sentral, to meet
its liabilities; or
(c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors or
creditors; or
(d) has wilfully violated a cease and desist order under Section 37 that has become
final, involving acts or transactions which amount to fraud or a dissipation of the
assets of the institution; in which cases, the Monetary Board may summarily and
without need for prior hearing forbid the institution from doing business in the
Philippines and designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of
the banking institution. [Emphases supplied.]
x x x x.
Accordingly, there is no conflict which would call for the application of the doctrine that a special
law should prevail over a general law. It must be emphasized that R.A .No. 7653 is a later law
and under said act, the power of the MB over banks, including rural banks, was increased and
expanded. The Court, in several cases, upheld the power of the MB to take over banks without
need for prior hearing. It is not necessary inasmuch as the law entrusts to the MB the
appreciation and determination of whether any or all of the statutory grounds for the closure
and receivership of the erring bank are present. The MB, under R.A. No. 7653, has been
invested with more power of closure and placement of a bank under receivership for insolvency
or illiquidity, or because the bank’s continuance in business would probably result in the loss to
depositors or creditors. In the case of Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Hon.
Antonio-Valenzuela,36 the Court reiterated the doctrine of "close now, hear later," stating that it
was justified as a measure for the protection of the public interest. Thus:
The "close now, hear later" doctrine has already been justified as a measure for the protection
of the public interest. Swift action is called for on the part of the BSP when it finds that a bank is
in dire straits. Unless adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government against
distressed and mismanaged banks, public faith in the banking system is certain to deteriorate to
the prejudice of the national economy itself, not to mention the losses suffered by the bank
depositors, creditors, and stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the
government.37 [Emphasis supplied]
In Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,38 the Court also wrote that
x x x due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be
heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior
hearing: bank runs would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the
process, fortunes may be wiped out and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking
community.39
67
The doctrine is founded on practical and legal considerations to obviate unwarranted dissipation
of the bank’s assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors,
stockholders, and the general public.40 Swift, adequate and determined actions must be taken
against financially distressed and mismanaged banks by government agencies lest the public
faith in the banking system deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy.
Accordingly, the MB can immediately implement its resolution prohibiting a banking institution
to do business in the Philippines and, thereafter, appoint the PDIC as receiver. The procedure
for the involuntary closure of a bank is summary and expeditious in nature. Such action of the
MB shall be final and executory, but may be later subjected to a judicial scrutiny via a petition
for certiorari to be filed by the stockholders of record of the bank representing a majority of the
capital stock. Obviously, this procedure is designed to protect the interest of all concerned, that
is, the depositors, creditors and stockholders, the bank itself and the general public. The
protection afforded public interest warrants the exercise of a summary closure.
In the case at bench, the ISD II submitted its memorandum, dated February 17, 2010,
containing the findings noted during the general examination conducted on ECBI with the cut-off
date of September 30, 2009. The memorandum underscored the inability of ECBI to pay its
liabilities as they would fall due in the usual course of its business, its liabilities being in excess
of the assets held. Also, it was noted that ECBI’s continued banking operation would most
probably result in the incurrence of additional losses to the prejudice of its depositors and
creditors. On top of these, it was found that ECBI had willfully violated the cease-and-desist
order of the MB issued in its June 24, 2009 Resolution, and had disregarded the BSP rules and
directives. For said reasons, the MB was forced to issue the assailed Resolution No. 276 placing
ECBI under receivership. In addition, the MB stressed that it accorded ECBI ample time and
opportunity to address its monetary problem and to restore and improve its financial health and
viability but it failed to do so.
In light of the circumstances obtaining in this case, the application of the corrective measures
enunciated in Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 was proper and justified. Management take-over
under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7353 was no longer feasible considering the financial quagmire
that engulfed ECBI showing serious conditions of insolvency and illiquidity. Besides, placing ECBI
under receivership would effectively put a stop to the further draining of its assets.
No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
Lastly, the petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653, as the
legislature granted the MB a broad and unrestrained power to close and place a financially
troubled bank under receivership. He claims that the said provision was an undue delegation of
legislative power. The contention deserves scant consideration.
Preliminarily, Vivas’ attempt to assail the constitutionality of Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653
constitutes collateral attack on the said provision of law. Nothing is more settled than the rule
that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be collaterally attacked as constitutionality issues
must be pleaded directly and not collaterally.41 A collateral attack on a presumably valid law is
not permissible. Unless a law or rule is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of
its validity stands.42
Be that as it may, there is no violation of the non-delegation of legislative power.1âwphi1 The
rationale for the constitutional proscription is that "legislative discretion as to the substantive
contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine
how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject
is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate."43
"There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first
test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the
sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests
are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative."44
In this case, under the two tests, there was no undue delegation of legislative authority in the
issuance of R.A. No. 7653. To address the growing concerns in the banking industry, the
legislature has sufficiently empowered the MB to effectively monitor and supervise banks and
financial institutions and, if circumstances warrant, to forbid them to do business, to take over
their management or to place them under receivership. The legislature has clearly spelled out
the reasonable parameters of the power entrusted to the MB and assigned to it only the manner
of enforcing said power. In other words, the MB was given a wide discretion and latitude only as
to how the law should be implemented in order to attain its objective of protecting the interest
of the public, the banking industry and the economy.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186613, August 27, 2013
ROSENDO R. CORALES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF
NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, AND DR. RODOLFO R. ANGELES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR OF NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AS REPRESENTED
BY PROVINCIAL STATE AUDITOR OF LAGUNA MAXIMO L. ANDAL, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
 
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to nullify the
Decision1 and Resolution2 dated 15 September 2008 and 20 February 2009, respectively, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101296 and, in effect, to reinstate the Petition for Prohibition
and Mandamus3 filed by herein petitioners Rosendo R. Corales (Corales) and Dr. Rodolfo R.
Angeles (Dr. Angeles) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Laguna. The
assailed Decision annulled and set aside the Order4 dated 17 May 2007 of Branch 32, and the
Order5 dated 5 September 2007 of Branch 29, both of the RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna in Civil
Case No. SP-6370 (07), which respectively denied herein respondent Republic of the Philippines’
(Republic) Motion to Dismiss petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition and the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration thereof. The Court of Appeals thereby ordered the dismissal of petitioners’
Petition for Prohibition with the court a quo. The questioned Resolution, on the other hand,
denied for lack of merit petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Decision.
The antecedents, as culled from the records, are as follows:cralawlibrary
Petitioner Corales was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for three (3)
consecutive terms, i.e., the 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections. In his first term as local chief
executive, petitioner Corales appointed petitioner Dr. Angeles to the position of Municipal
Administrator, whose appointment was unanimously approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of
68
Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sangguniang Bayan) per Resolution No. 98-646 dated 22 July 1998. During
his second and third terms as municipal mayor, petitioner Corales renewed the appointment of
petitioner Dr. Angeles. But, on these times, the Sangguniang Bayan per Resolution No. 2001-
0787 dated 12 July 2001 and 26 subsequent Resolutions, disapproved petitioner Dr. Angeles’
appointment on the ground of nepotism, as well as the latter’s purported unfitness and
unsatisfactory performance. Even so, petitioner Dr. Angeles continued to discharge the functions
and duties of a Municipal Administrator for which he received an annual salary of
P210,012.00.8cralaw virtualaw library
Following an audit on various local disbursements, Maximo Andal (Andal), the Provincial State
Auditor of Laguna, issued an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2006-007-1009 dated 6
October 2006 addressed to petitioner Corales who was asked to comment/reply. The aforesaid
AOM, in sum, states that: 1) petitioner Dr. Angeles’ appointment as Municipal Administrator
(during the second and third terms of petitioner Corales) was without legal basis for having
been repeatedly denied confirmation by the Sangguniang Bayan; 2) petitioner Dr. Angeles can
be considered, however, as a de facto officer entitled to the emoluments of the office for the
actual services rendered; 3) nonetheless, it is not the Municipality of Nagcarlan that should be
made liable to pay for petitioner Dr. Angeles’ salary; instead, it is petitioner Corales, being the
appointing authority, as explicitly provided for in Article 169(I) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991,10 as well as Section 5, Rule IV of the
Omnibus Rules of Appointments and Other Personnel Actions;11 4) a post audit of payrolls
pertaining to the payment of salaries, allowances and other incentives of petitioner Dr. Angeles
from 15 July 2001 up to 31 May 200612 partially amounted to P1,282,829.99; and 5) in view
thereof, it is recommended that an appropriate Notice of Disallowance be issued for the
payment of salary expenses incurred without legal basis by the Municipality of Nagcarlan in the
aforestated amount.13cralaw virtualaw library
Instead of submitting his comment/reply thereon, petitioner Corales, together with petitioner
Dr. Angeles, opted to file a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against Andal and the then
members of the Sangguniang Bayan before the RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna, docketed as Civil
Case No. SP-6370 (07) and originally raffled to Branch 32. Petitioners sought, by way of
prohibition, to require the Office of the Provincial Auditor, through Andal, to recall its AOM and
to eventually desist from collecting reimbursement from petitioner Corales for the salaries paid
to and received by petitioner Dr. Angeles for the latter’s services as Municipal Administrator.
Petitioners similarly sought, by way of mandamus, to compel the then members of
the Sangguniang Bayan, as a collegial body, to recall its Resolutions denying confirmation to
petitioner Dr. Angeles’ appointment as Municipal Administrator and in their stead to confirm the
validity and legitimacy of such appointment.14cralaw virtualaw library
In its turn, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on Andal’s behalf, who was impleaded in
his official capacity, filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus
grounded on lack of cause of action, prematurity and non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. It was specifically contended therein that: (1) the issuance of the AOM was merely an
initiatory step in the administrative investigation of the Commission on Audit (COA) to allow
petitioner Corales to controvert the findings and conclusions of the Sangguniang Bayan in its
Resolution No. 2001-078, as well as those of then Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. in Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) Opinion No. 124 s. 2002; (2) it was only after the
completion of the said investigation that a resolution will be issued as regards the propriety of
the disbursements made by the Municipality of Nagcarlan in the form of salaries paid to
petitioner Dr. Angeles during his tenure as Municipal Administrator; and (3) instead of resorting
to judicial action, petitioner Corales should have first responded to the AOM and, in the event of
an adverse decision against him, elevate the matter for review to a higher authorities in the
COA.15 With these, petitioners’ petition should be dismissed, as petitioner Corales has no cause
of action against Andal - his resort to judicial intervention is premature and he even failed to
avail himself of, much less exhaust, the administrative remedies available to him.16cralaw
virtualaw library
In its Order dated 17 May 2007, the trial court denied the said Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that Andal was merely a nominal party.17 The subsequent motion for its reconsideration was also
denied in another Order dated 5 September 2007.18cralaw virtualaw library
Respondent Republic, as represented by COA, as represented by Andal, consequently filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the Orders dated 17 May
2007 and 5 September 2007, as it unjustly denied respondent’s right to actively prosecute the
case through a mere declaration that it was a nominal party despite a clear showing that the
Petition for Prohibition referred to the respondent as a real party in interest.19cralaw virtualaw
library
On 15 September 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision granting
respondent’s Petition for Certiorari, thereby annulling and setting aside the RTC Orders dated 17
May 2007 and 5 September 2007 and, accordingly, dismissing petitioners’ Petition for
Prohibition with the court a quo.20 The Court of Appeals justified its decision in the following
manner:
x x x We agree with the OSG’s contention that the [herein respondent Republic], herein
represented by the COA and specifically by Andal in the latter’s capacity as Provincial State
Auditor of Laguna, is not merely a nominal party to the petition for prohibition. x x
x. That the [respondent] naturally has an interest in the disposition/disbursement of
said public funds as well as in the recovery thereof should the ongoing investigative
audit confirm the illegality thereof cannot be gainsaid. Rather than a mere nominal
party, therefore, the [respondent] is an indispensable party to the petition for
prohibition and may thus seek its dismissal, given that under the attendant facts there
is a yet no actual case or controversy calling for [therein] respondent court’s exercise
of its judicial power.
Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Thus, as a condition precedent for the
exercise of judicial inquiry, there must be an actual case or controversy, which exists
when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be
resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. x x x. An actual case or controversy
thus means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.
[Herein petitioners] x x x have failed to show the existence of an actual case or
controversy that would necessitate judicial inquiry through a petition for prohibition. As the
OSG aptly observed, the issuance of the AOM is just an initiatory step in the
investigative audit being then conducted by Andal[,] as Provincial State Auditor of Laguna to
determine the propriety of the disbursements made by the Municipal Government of
Nagcarlan. While Andal may have stated an opinion in the AOM that [herein
petitioner] Corales should reimburse the government treasury for the salaries paid to
[herein petitioner Dr. Angeles] in light of the repeated disapproval and/or rejection of
the latter’s appointment by the Sangguniang [Bayan] of Nagcarlan, there is no
showing whatsoever of any affirmative action taken by Andal to enforce such audit
observation. What Andal did, as the AOM unmistakably shows, was to merely request
[petitioner] Corales to submit a reply/comment to the audit observation and in the
process afford the latter an opportunity to controvert not only Andal’s opinion on salary
reimbursement but the other statements therein expressed by the other members of the audit
team.
In the absence moreover of a showing that [petitioners], particularly [petitioner] Corales,
sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of the issuance of the AOM, there is no reason to
allow the continuance of the petition for prohibition which was, after all, manifestly conjectural
or anticipatory, filed for a speculative purpose and upon the hypothetical assumption that
[petitioner] Corales would be eventually compelled to reimburse the amounts paid as [petitioner
Dr. Angeles’] salaries should the audit investigation confirm the irregularity of such
disbursements. This Court will not engage in such speculative guesswork and neither should
respondent court x x x.21 (Emphasis and italics supplied).
Disgruntled, petitioners moved for its reconsideration but it was denied for lack of merit in a
Resolution dated 20 February 2009.
Hence, this petition.
69
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A PALPABLY ERRONEOUS
RESOLUTION OF A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT ORDERED THE
DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS’ SUIT FOR PROHIBITION.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED UNJUSTLY AND INJUDICIOUSLY
WHEN IT HELD THAT THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE SUIT FOR
PROHIBITION IS NOT YET RIPE FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN THE INTERPRETATION AND RESOLUTION OF A PIVOTAL LEGAL ISSUE
WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS NO ACTUAL DISPUTE OR CONCRETE
CONTROVERSY WHICH MAY BE THE PROPER SUBJECT MATTER OF A SUIT FOR
PROHIBITION.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS UNJUSTIFIABLY TRANSGRESSED AND
TRAMPLED UPON A CATEGORICAL JURISPRUDENTIAL DOCTRINE WHEN IT TOOK
COGNIZANCE OF AND FAVORABLY RESOLVED THE [HEREIN RESPONDENT’S] PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI, IN BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE RULE LAID DOWN IN
THE APROPOS CASE OF CHINA ROAD AND BRIDGE CORPORATION [V.] COURT OF
APPEALS (348 SCRA 401).
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERSTEPPED AND WENT BEYOND THE
BOUNDARIES OF ITS LEGITIMATE DISCRETION WHEN IT DEVIATED AND VEERED
AWAY FROM THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES OF THE CASE, INSTEAD OF PRONOUNCING THAT
PETITIONERS HAVE A VALID, PERFECT AND LEGITIMATE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
PROHIBITION.22 (Italics supplied).
The Petition is bereft of merit.
The issues will be discussed in seriatim.
The first three issues concern the ripeness or prematurity of the Petition for Prohibition assailing
the AOM issued by Andal to petitioner Corales. Petitioners argue that from the tenor of the AOM
it is clear that petitioner Corales is being adjudged liable and personally accountable to pay or to
reimburse, in his private capacity, the salaries paid to and received by petitioner Dr. Angeles for
the latter’s services as Municipal Administrator, as his appointment thereto was considered
invalid for lack of necessary confirmation from the Sangguniang Bayan. It is further argued that
contrary to the claim of respondent Republic that such AOM is a mere initiatory step in the
course of an investigative auditing process, the wordings thereof unmistakably reveal that the
same is a categorical disposition and enforcement measure requiring petitioner Corales to
reimburse the money disbursed by the Municipality of Nagcarlan to pay petitioner Dr. Angeles’
salaries as Municipal Administrator. Such AOM is a firm, clear and affirmative official action on
the part of the Provincial State Auditor to hold petitioner Corales liable for reimbursement; thus,
to require the latter to still comment or controvert the findings thereon is a mere frivolous and
useless formality. Since the requirement for petitioner Corales to pay and reimburse the salaries
of petitioner Dr. Angeles is actual, direct and forthcoming, the same may be the proper subject
of an action for prohibition. Otherwise stated, such imposition of liability for reimbursement
against petitioner Corales presents a concrete justiciable controversy and an actual dispute of
legal rights.
Petitioners’ contention is unavailing.
To begin with, this Court deems it proper to quote the significant portions of the questioned
AOM, to wit:
FOR: Hon. ROSENDO R. CORALES
Municipal Mayor
Nagcarlan, Laguna
FROM: Mr. MAXIMO L. ANDAL
State Auditor IV
Audit Team Leader
May we have your comment/reply on the following audit observation. Please return the
duplicate within fifteen (15) days upon receipt by filling up the space provided for with your
comments.
AUDIT OBSERVATION  
The appointment of [herein petitioner Dr. Angeles] as
Municipal Administrator was repeatedly denied not
confirmed/ concurred by Sangguniang Bayan hence, the
validity of the appointment as per opinion/rulings by the
then Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. of the DILG in opinion No.
124 s.2002 was without legal basis.
DILG Opinion No. 124 s[.]2002 states that the continued
discharge of powers by [petitioner Dr. Angeles] as
Municipal Administrator appears to have no legal basis. A
person may assume public office once his appointment is
already effective. The Supreme Court in one case (Atty.
David B. Corpuz [v.] Court of Appeals, et al[.], G.R. No.
123989, 26 January 1998) held that where the assent or
confirmation of some other office or body is required, the
appointment may be complete only when such assent or
confirmation is obtained. Until the process is completed,
the appointee can claim no vested right in the office nor
invoke security of tenure. Since the appointment of a
Municipal Administrator requires sanggunian concurrence
(Section 443 (d), RA 7160) and considering that the
appointment never became effective. As such, his
assumption and continued holding of the office of the
Municipal Administrator find no legal basis.
 
However, [petitioner Dr. Angeles] may claim salary for the
services he has actually rendered. As held in one case
(Civil Liberties Union [v.] Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA
317), a de facto officer is entitled to emoluments of the
office for the actual services rendered. Here, [petitioner
Dr. Angeles] can be considered as a de facto officer. x x x,
as held in the Corpuz case cited above, the Supreme Court
ruled that a public official who assumed office under an
incomplete appointment is merely a de facto officer for the
duration of his occupancy of the office for the reason that
he assumed office under color of a known appointment
which is void by a reason of some defect or irregularity in
its exercise.
 
It is worthy to emphasize along that line that while
[petitioner Dr. Angeles] may be entitled to the salary as
a de facto officer, the municipality cannot be made liable
70
to pay his salaries. Instructive on this point is Article 169
(I) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 which explicitly provides, thus:
 
“The appointing authority shall be liable for the
payment of salary of the appointee for actual
services rendered if the appointment is disapproved
because the appointing authority issued it in willful
violation of applicable laws, rules and regulations
thereby making the appointment unlawful.”
 
Corollary, Section 5 of Rule IV of the Omnibus Rules of
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions provides, thus:
 
“The services rendered by any person who was
required to assume the duties and responsibilities of
any position without appointment having been
issued by the appointing authority shall not be
credited nor recognized by the Commission and shall
be the personal accountability of the person who
made him assume office.
 
Hence, [herein petitioner Corales] shall pay the salaries of
[petitioner Dr. Angeles] for the services the latter has
actually rendered.
 
xxxxxxxxxxxx
 
Clearly, the appointment of [petitioner Dr. Angeles] per se
was bereft of legal basis in view of the absence of the
concurrence of the legislative body thus payment of his
salaries from the funds of the Municipality for actual
services rendered remained unlawful.
 
Further, in paragraph 4 of the letter of Mr. Allan Poe M.
Carmona, Director II of the CSC dated [1 December 2004]
to Mr. Ruben C. Pagaspas, OIC, Regional Cluster Director,
COA, Cluster III, Sub-Cluster VI stated that [petitioner Dr.
Angeles] cannot be appointed to Municipal Administrator
without the concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan as
provided under RA 7160.
 
Post audit of payrolls pertaining to the payment of
salaries, allowances and other incentives of [petitioner Dr.
Angeles] as Municipal Administrator for the period from
[15 July 2001] up to [31 May 2006] excluding the period
from [1 November 2001] to [31 December 2001], [16
March 2002] to [15 May 2002], [1-31 August 2002], [16-
30 June 2003], [1-31 December 2003], [1-31 September
2004] and [1 June 2006] to [30 September 2006] were
partially amounted to P1,282,829.99. x x x.
 
Issuance of Notice of Disallowance was suggested by Atty.
Eden T. Rafanan, Regional Cluster Director for [L]egal and
Adjudication Office in her 2nd Indorsement dated [3 July
2006].
 
In view hereof, it is recommended that appropriate
Notice of Disallowance be issued for the payment of
the salary expenses incurred without legal basis by the
municipality in the amount mentioned in the above
paragraph.23 (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied).
As can be gleaned therefrom, petitioner Corales was simply required to submit his
comment/reply on the observations stated in the AOM. As so keenly observed by the Court
of Appeals, any mention in the AOM that petitioner Corales shall reimburse the salaries paid to
petitioner Dr. Angeles in light of the repeated disapproval or rejection by the Sangguniang
Bayan of his appointment as Municipal Administrator was merely an initial opinion, not
conclusive, as there was no showing that Andal had taken any affirmative action thereafter to
compel petitioner Corales to make the necessary reimbursement. Otherwise stated, it has not
been shown that Andal carried out or enforced what was stated in the AOM. On the contrary,
petitioner Corales was given an opportunity to refute the findings and observations in the AOM
by requesting him to comment/reply thereto, but he never did. More so, even though the AOM
already contained a recommendation for the issuance of a Notice of Disallowance of the
payment of salary expenses, the records are bereft of any evidence to show that a Notice of
Disallowance has, in fact, been issued. Concomitantly, the AOM did not contain any
recommendation to the effect that petitioner Corales would be held personally liable for the
amount that would be disallowed. It is, therefore, incongruous to conclude that the said AOM is
tantamount to a directive requiring petitioner Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to and
received by petitioner Dr. Angeles during the latter’s stint as Municipal Administrator after his
appointment thereto was held invalid for want of conformity from the Sangguniang Bayan.
In relation thereto, as aptly observed by the OSG, to which the Court of Appeals conformed,
the issuance of the AOM is just an initiatory step in the investigative audit being
conducted by Andal as Provincial State Auditor to determine the propriety of the disbursements
made by the Municipal Government of Laguna. That the issuance of an AOM can be regarded as
just an initiatory step in the investigative audit is evident from COA Memorandum No. 2002-053
dated 26 August 2002.24 A perusal of COA Memorandum No. 2002-053, particularly Roman
Numeral III, Letter A, paragraphs 1 to 5 and 9, reveals that any finding or observation by the
Auditor stated in the AOM is not yet conclusive, as the comment/justification 25 of the head of
office or his duly authorized representative is still necessary before the Auditor can make any
conclusion. The Auditor may give due course or find the comment/justification to be without
merit but in either case, the Auditor shall clearly state the reason for the conclusion reached and
recommendation made. Subsequent thereto, the Auditor shall transmit the AOM, together with
the comment or justification of the Auditee and the former’s recommendation to the Director,
Legal and Adjudication Office (DLAO), for the sector concerned in Metro Manila and/or the
Regional Legal and Adjudication Cluster Director (RLACD) in the case of regions. The transmittal
shall be coursed through the Cluster Director concerned and the Regional Cluster Director, as
the case may be, for their own comment and recommendation. The DLAO for the sector
concerned in the Central Office and the RLACD shall make the necessary evaluation of the
records transmitted with the AOM. When, on the basis thereof, he finds that the transaction
should be suspended or disallowed, he will then issue the corresponding Notice of Suspension
(NS), Notice of Disallowance (ND) or Notice of Charge (NC), as the case may be, furnishing a
copy thereof to the Cluster Director. Otherwise, the Director may dispatch a team to conduct
further investigation work to justify the contemplated action. If after in-depth investigation, the
DLAO for each sector in Metro Manila and the RLACD for the regions find that the issuance of the
NS, ND, and NC is warranted, he shall issue the same and transmit such NS, ND or NC, as the
case may be, to the agency head and other persons found liable therefor.
From the foregoing, it is beyond doubt that the issuance of an AOM is, indeed, an initial step in
the conduct of an investigative audit considering that after its issuance there are still several
steps to be conducted before a final conclusion can be made or before the proper action can be
had against the Auditee. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner Corales’ claim that his
comment thereon would be a mere formality. Further, even though the AOM issued to petitioner
Corales already contained a recommendation for the issuance of a Notice of Disallowance, still, it
cannot be argued that his comment/reply to the AOM would be a futile act since no Notice of
Disallowance was yet issued. Again, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that Andal
has already taken any affirmative action against petitioner Corales after the issuance of the
AOM.
Viewed in this light, this Court can hardly see any actual case or controversy to warrant the
exercise of its power of judicial review. Settled is the rule that for the courts to exercise the
71
power of judicial review, the following must be extant: (1) there must be an actual case calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the
person challenging must have the “standing.” An actual case or controversy involves a conflict
of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a mere hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence. Closely related thereto is that the question must be ripe for adjudication. A
question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. The third requisite is legal standing
or locus standi, which has been defined as a personal or substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges “such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Unless a person is injuriously
affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no
standing.26cralaw virtualaw library
The requisites of actual case and ripeness are absent in the present case. To repeat, the AOM
issued by Andal merely requested petitioner Corales to comment/reply thereto. Truly, the AOM
already contained a recommendation to issue a Notice of Disallowance; however, no Notice of
Disallowance was yet issued. More so, there was no evidence to show that Andal had already
enforced against petitioner Corales the contents of the AOM. Similarly, there was no clear
showing that petitioners, particularly petitioner Corales, would sustain actual or imminent injury
by reason of the issuance of the AOM. The action taken by the petitioners to assail the AOM
was, indeed, premature and based entirely on surmises, conjectures and speculations that
petitioner Corales would eventually be compelled to reimburse petitioner Dr. Angeles’ salaries,
should the audit investigation confirm the irregularity of such disbursements. Further, as
correctly pointed out by respondent Republic in its Memorandum, what petitioners actually assail
is Andal’s authority to request them to file the desired comment/reply to the AOM, which is
beyond the scope of the action for prohibition, as such request is neither an actionable wrong
nor constitutive of an act perceived to be illegal. Andal, being the Provincial State Auditor, is
clothed with the authority to audit petitioners’ disbursements, conduct an investigation thereon
and render a final finding and recommendation thereafter. Hence, it is beyond question that in
relation to his audit investigation function, Andal can validly and legally require petitioners to
submit comment/reply to the AOM, which the latter cannot pre-empt by prematurely seeking
judicial intervention, like filing an action for prohibition.
Moreover, prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the defendant to
desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be
resorted to when there is “no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.”27cralaw virtualaw library
In this case, petitioners insist that it is no longer necessary to exhaust administrative remedies
considering that there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and appropriate remedial measure
to assail the imposition under the AOM aside from an action for prohibition.
This Court finds the said contention plain self-deception.
As previously stated, petitioners’ action for prohibition was premature. The audit investigative
process was still in its initial phase. There was yet no Notice of Disallowance issued. And, even
granting that the AOM issued to petitioner Corales is already equivalent to an order, decision or
resolution of the Auditor or that such AOM is already tantamount to a directive for petitioner
Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action for prohibition is
premature since there are still many administrative remedies available to petitioners to contest
the said AOM. Section 1, Rule V of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, provides:
“[a]n aggrieved party may appeal from an order or decision or ruling rendered by the Auditor
embodied in a report, memorandum, letter, notice of disallowances and charges, Certificate of
Settlement and Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency under audit.”
From the final order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved party may appeal to the
Commission proper.28 It is the decision or resolution of the Commission proper which can be
appealed to this Court.29cralaw virtualaw library
Clearly, petitioners have all the remedies available to them at the administrative level but they
failed to exhaust the same and instead, immediately sought judicial intervention. Otherwise
stated, the auditing process has just begun but the petitioners already thwarted the same by
immediately filing a Petition for Prohibition. In Fua, Jr. v. COA,30 citing Sison v. Tablang,31 this
Court declared that the general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the
court, he should first avail himself of all the means afforded him by administrative
processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be
summarily taken from them and submitted to the court without first giving such administrative
agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation. Also, in The Special Audit
Team, Commission on Audit v. Court of Appeals and Government Service Insurance
System,32 this Court has extensively pronounced that:
If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power
can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to
one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on
practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and
provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for
reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of
the case. x x x.
Moreover, courts have accorded respect for the specialized ability of other agencies of
government to deal with the issues within their respective specializations prior to any
court intervention. The Court has reasoned thus:
We have consistently declared that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within
the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious.
It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and
convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed.
The 1987 Constitution created the constitutional commissions as independent constitutional
bodies, tasked with specific roles in the system of governance that require expertise in certain
fields. For COA, this role involves:
The power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust
by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, instrumentalities,
including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charter. x x x.
As one of the three (3) independent constitutional commissions, COA has been empowered
to define the scope of its audit and examination and to establish the techniques and
methods required therefor; and to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of
government funds and properties.
Thus, in the light of this constitutionally delegated task, the courts must exercise caution when
intervening with disputes involving these independent bodies, for the general rule is that
before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the
means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative
agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and
submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose
of the same after due deliberation.33 (Emphasis supplied).
In their futile attempt to convince this Court to rule in their favor, petitioners aver that by filing
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action, respondent Republic, in essence,
admitted all the material averments and narration of facts stated in the Petition for Prohibition
and Mandamus. As such, there is no longer any question of fact to speak of and what remains is
a pure question of law. The judgment, therefore, of the trial court denying the Motion to Dismiss
72
is no longer subject to any appeal or review by the Court of Appeals. Instead, it is already
appealable and reviewable by this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where only pure
questions of law may be raised and dealt with. This is in line with the pronouncement in China
Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals 34 (China Road Case). The Court of Appeals
should have dismissed respondent Republic’s Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court for being an improper and inappropriate mode of review.
Petitioners’ above argument is misplaced.
China Road Case is not at all applicable in the case at bench. Therein, the Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint was granted. As the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final, as distinguished
from an interlocutory order, the proper remedy was an appeal in due course.35 Thus, this Court
in China Road Case held that:
x x x Applying the test to the instant case, it is clear that private respondent raises pure
questions of law which are not proper in an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, but should be raised
by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
We agree with private respondent that in a motion to dismiss due to failure to state a cause of
action, the trial court can consider all the pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the
evidence on record. However in so doing, the trial court does not rule on the truth or falsity of
such documents. It merely includes such documents in the hypothetical admission. Any review
of a finding of lack of cause of action based on these documents would not involve a calibration
of the probative value of such pieces of evidence but would only limit itself to the inquiry of
whether the law was properly applied given the facts and these supporting
documents. Therefore, what would inevitably arise from such a review are pure
questions of law, and not questions of fact. 36 (Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bench, however, the Motion to Dismiss was denied. It is well-entrenched that an
order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally
decided on the merits.37 Therefore, contrary to the claim of petitioners, the denial of a Motion to
Dismiss is not appealable, not even via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The only remedy for the
denial of the Motion to Dismiss is a special civil action for certiorari showing that such denial was
made with grave abuse of discretion.38cralaw virtualaw library
Taking into consideration all the foregoing, this Court finds no reversible error on the part of the
Court of Appeals in reversing the Orders of the court a quo and consequently dismissing
petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition filed thereat.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision and Resolution dated 15 September 2008 and
20 February 2009, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101296 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 193150, January 23, 2017
LOIDA M. JAVIER, Petitioner, v. PEPITO GONZALES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
Two Decisions were promulgated by the trial court in this case: the first one for conviction, and
the second for acquittal. We are called upon to resolve the procedural question of whether the
promulgation  in absentia of the earlier judgment of conviction was valid.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks a reversal of the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision1 and Resolution2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97629. The CA affirmed the Decision3 of
Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, Nueva Ecija (the RTC of Palayan City) in
Criminal Case No. 1066-P, penned by Judge Corazon D. Soluren (Judge Soluren). Judge Soluren
reversed a previous Decision4 penned by Judge Erlinda P. Buted (Judge Buted). In the earlier
Decision, respondent was convicted of murder with frustrated murder and multiple attempted
murder, and was meted the death penalty.
The Antecedents Facts
This case originated from a criminal case for murder with frustrated murder and multiple
attempted murder lodged in Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Baler, Aurora (the RTC of
Baler). The Information charged respondent Pepito Gonzales as follows:
That on December 25, 1997 at around 11:30 o'clock in the evening in Barangay Diarabasin,
Municipality of Dipaculao, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused with intent to kill and with the use of treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously throw a grenade inside
the house of one Leonardo Hermenigildo while the latter and his companions Rulino Concepcion,
who sustained mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter; that as further consequence of said explosion, Leonardo Hermenigildo was also hit
and sustained physical injuries fatal enough to cause his death without immediate and able
medical attendance; that Julio Toledo, Ariel Cabasal and Jesus Macatiag were also hit and
likewise sustained physical injuries, but the said accused did not perform all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of multiple murder as a consequence, by
reason of causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries sustained by
said Julio Toledo, Ariel Cabasal and Jesus Macatiag were not necessarily mortal.5
Gonzales filed a Motion for Bail6 with the RTC of Baler. Private complainant Carmen Macatiag
(Macatiag)—sister of the deceased victim, Rufino Concepcion —filed her Opposition7 to
Gonzales's Motion for Bail Gonzales then filed a Comment8 to which Macatiag filed her
Reply.9 The RTC Baler issued an Order10 granting Gonzales bail.
Thereafter, Macatiag filed with this Court an Urgent Petition for Transfer of Venue.11 While her
petition was pending, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration12 of the Order of the RTC of Baler
granting bail to Gonzales, who filed his Opposition13 to her motion. The RTC of Baler denied14 the
Motion for Reconsideration and upheld its Order granting bail. Macatiag also filed with the RTC
of Baler a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings15 pending the resolution of her
previous petition for transfer of venue.
On 17 August 1999, the Court granted the transfer of venue and reassigned the case to the RTC
of Palayan City, which was then presided by Judge Erlinda Buted.16 Trial on the merits ensued.
The RTC admitted the prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence.17 Gonzales filed an Urgent Motion
for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence.18 To this motion he attached a Demurrer to
Evidence,19 which the RTC denied.20 Following the denial, Gonzales presented his evidence and
witnesses and filed his Formal Offer of Evidence.21
Thereafter, on 30 November 2005, the RTC issued an Order22 setting the promulgation of the
case on 15 December 2005. The Return of Service23 indicated that the Order dated 30
November 2005 and the Notice of Promulgation dated 6 December 2005 were received on 7 and
12 December 2005 by the sister of private respondent, who refused to sign the Return.
On 15 December 2005, the scheduled date of promulgation, Gonzales failed to appear. His
lawyer, Atty. Mario Benitez (Atty. Benitez), personally filed a "Withdrawal of Counsel"24 with his
client's conformity.25 The promulgation was rescheduled to 22 December 2005.26 On the same
73
date, a warrant of arrest27 was issued and the bond forfeited in view of the nonappearance of
the accused, who was deemed to have jumped bail.
A Notice of Hearing/Subpoena and Notice of Promulgation of Judgment28 was issued on 15
December 2005 commanding the parties to appear before the Court on 22 December 2015.
Notices were sent to Gonzales and Macatiag.29
On 22 December 2005, Gonzales still failed to appear without any justification. Judge Buted
appointed a counsel de oficio in lieu of Atty. Benitez.30 The Branch Clerk of Court thereafter read
the dispositive portion of Judge Buted's Decision in the presence of the public prosecutor, the
counsel de oficio, and the heirs of Macatiag. Macatiag had been killed on 14 December 2005,
just a day before the first promulgation date, and Gonzales was also an accused in her killing.
Gonzales was convicted of the murder charges:
WHEREFORE, the Accused is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime
of MURDER with FRUSTRATED MURDER and MULTIPLE ATTEMPTED MURDER and is
hereby sentenced to a single indivisible penalty of DEATH.31
Thereafter, the Clerk of Court was directed to enter the judgment of conviction in the RTC's
criminal docket pursuant to paragraph 4, Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.32 Since the death penalty was still in force at the time the judgment was
promulgated, Judge Buted also ordered that the records of the case be immediately forwarded
to the CA for automatic review.33
In less than a month after the judgment of conviction was rendered, or on 6 January 2006,
private respondent Gonzales filed, through Atty. Benitez, an Omnibus Motion34 asking that the
judgment promulgated on 22 December 2005 be reconsidered and set aside. Gonzales argued
that he had not been properly notified of the promulgation of judgment; that he had not been
represented by counsel; and that the RTC had proceeded with deliberate haste in convicting
him.
The trial court, now presided by Judge Soluren, gave due course to the motion of Gonzales and
granted it through an Order dated 18 April 2006. The Order set aside the judgment of conviction
and reinstated his bail.35
On 20 November 2006, petitioner Javier, Macatiag's daughter, discovered that the RTC had
rendered a Decision36 dated 31 October 2006 acquitting Gonzales of all charges.37 On 16 January
2007, she filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, citing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of Judge Soluren. The Office of
the Solicitor General filed a Comment38 dated 12 October 2007 praying that the Petition be
denied due course and dismissed for lack of merit. The OSG opined that Judge Soluren did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing the earlier Decision of Judge Buted.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed Decision, the CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. It ruled out grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Judge Soluren in granting private respondent's Omnibus
Motion and rendering a new judgment of acquittal. It agreed with the theory of the OSG that the
promulgation was void, because respondent Gonzales had not been validly notified of the
rescheduled promulgation of judgment on 22 December 2005; that since Gonzales's lawyer,
Atty. Benitez, had already withdrawn his representation on the first scheduled date of
promulgation, respondent had no knowledge that the promulgation had been rescheduled to 22
December 2005; that since he was no longer Gonzales's lawyer, Atty. Benitez was relieved of
the duty to inform his client of court notices and processes; that since respondent was not
personally notified of the rescheduled promulgation, Judge Buted's promulgation in absentia was
invalid.
The CA further adopted the OSG's stance that before resorting to a Rule 65 petition for certiorari
to question respondent judge's act of acquitting private respondent, petitioner should have first
filed a motion for reconsideration. It ruled that a motion for reconsideration is not only a plain
and adequate remedy available under the law, but is an indispensible condition that must be
satisfied before an aggrieved party can resort to a special civil action for certiorari. The appellate
court held that since the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration was available to
petitioner, and none of the exceptions to the filing of that motion existed, the Petition must be
dismissed.
The Issues
The main issue in this case is whether the CA erred in affirming the Decision of acquittal issued
by Judge Soluren, who had ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on her part when she gave due course to the Omnibus Motion of private
respondent questioning his prior conviction.
In order to resolve the main issue, the following issues have to be addressed:
A. Whether there was a valid promulgation of judgment by Judge Buted in her prior
Decision of conviction;chanrobleslaw
B. Whether Judge Soluren's subsequent judgment of acquittal is valid;chanrobleslaw
C. Whether a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to
question a decision of acquittal
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is impressed with merit.
As a prologue to our ruling, We take cognizance of the unusual circumstances surrounding this
case. Petitioner is the daughter of the original private complainant, Carmen Macatiag, who was
in turn the sister of the first victim, Rufino Concepcion. When petitioner filed the instant Petition
for Review with this Court, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion39 praying that the People of
the Philippines be removed as a co-petitioner because the OSG was not joining petitioner in this
Petition. The pertinent portion40 of the OSG's Manifestation and Motion reads:
[T]he records will show that the OSG already took on a position different from that of the
petitioner Loida M. Javier when the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. Specifically, the
OSG in its Comment dated October 12, 2007 and Memorandum dated November 24, 2008 was
of the position that Honorable Judge Soluren did not commit grave abuse of discretion when she
ruled to acquit Pepito Gonzales. In this regard, the arguments raised by the OSG in the
aforementioned pleadings were in fact, adopted by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated
May 22, 2010.
While the OSG ordinarily represents the People in proceedings before this Court, We have in the
past allowed private parties to file certiorari petitions assailing rulings and orders of the RTC in
criminal cases.41 As early as 1969, in Paredes v. Gopengco,42 the Court already held that
offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as "persons aggrieved"
to file a special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65. That
ruling was in line with the underlying spirit of adopting a liberal construction of the Rules of
Court in order to promote their object. Recently, We reiterated this ruling in Almero v.
People.43 Similarly, in the case at bar, We find that the ends of substantial justice would be
better served and the issues determined in a more just, speedy, and inexpensive manner, by
entertaining the present Petition.
74
We now proceed to the merits of the case.
There are two divergent RTC Decisions: one for conviction, and another for acquittal. Our
resolution of this Petition for Review hinges on the validity of the second RTC Decision.
After review of the case and the records, We rule that the Court of Appeals, in affirming Judge
Soluren's Decision of acquittal, committed reversible error, which can be remedied by granting
this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Judge Buted's Decision convicting
respondent was validly promulgated.
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to promulgate a
judgment in absentia and gives the accused the opportunity to file an appeal within a period of
fifteen (15) days from notice to the latter or the latter's counsel; otherwise, the decision
becomes final.
Records show that respondent was properly informed of the promulgation scheduled on 15
December 2005. The RTC Order dated 30 November 200544 documents the presence of his
counsel during the hearing. It is an established doctrine that notice to counsel is notice to
client.45 In addition, the Return of Service states that the Order and Notice of Promulgation were
personally delivered to respondent's address.
During the promulgation of judgment on 15 December 2005, when respondent did not appear
despite notice, and without offering any justification for his absence, the trial court should have
immediately promulgated its Decision.46 The promulgation of judgment in absentia  is mandatory
pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6.  Promulgation of judgment.
xxxx
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite
notice, the promulgation  shall  be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and
serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel. (Emphasis supplied)
If the accused has been notified of the date of promulgation, but does not appear, the
promulgation of judgment in absentia  is warranted. This rule is intended to obviate a repetition
of the situation in the past when the judicial process could be subverted by the accused by
jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment.47 The only essential elements for its
validity are as follows: (a) the judgment was recorded in the criminal docket; and (b) a copy
thereof was served upon the accused or counsel.
In Almuete v. People,48 petitioner's counsel informed the trial court that the accused were either
ill or not notified of the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment. The RTC, however, found
their absence inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as scheduled. The accused
went up to the CA, which acquitted them of the charge. This Court reversed the CA and upheld
the validity of the promulgation.
In Estrada v. People,49 this Court also affirmed the validity of the promulgation of judgment  in
absentia, given the presence of the essential elements.
Judge Buted's Order dated 22 December 200550 fulfilled the requirements set forth by the Rules
and prevailing jurisprudence. Pertinent portions of the Order read:
The judgment of conviction which carries the death penalty was pronounced in the presence of
the Public Prosecutor, the counsel  de oficio of accused and the heirs of complainant Carmen
Macatiag, the dispositive portion of which, the OIC Clerk of Court is directed to enter into the
Criminal Docket.
xxxx
Let copy of the Decision furnished each the Public Prosecutor, the counsel de oficio of the
accused, Atty. Bembol Castillo, and the accused at his last known address.
Respondent was not left without remedy. The fifth paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120, states:
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court
shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall
state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen
(15) days from notice.
However, instead of surrendering and filing a motion for leave to explain his unjustified absence,
respondent, through Atty. Benitez, filed an Omnibus Motion before the RTC praying that the
promulgation be set aside.51 We cannot countenance this blatant circumvention of the Rules.
Judge Soluren's Decision acquitting
respondent is void and has no legal
effect.
Judge Soluren acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when she gave due course to respondent's Omnibus Motion. Aside from being the wrong
remedy, the motion lacked merit.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration to question a decision of conviction can only be
resorted to if the accused did not jump bail, but appeared in court to face the promulgation of
judgment. Respondent did not appear during the scheduled promulgation and was deemed by
the judge to have jumped bail. The fifth paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120, states that if the
judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause,
he shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment, and the court shall order
his arrest.
The Court underscores the fact that following Gonzales's waiver of the remedies under the
Rules, Judge Buted issued an Order dated 22 December 2005. According to the Order, the case
records shall be immediately forwarded to the CA for its automatic review of convictions meting
out the death penalty.52 This automatic review was pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative
Circular 20-2005 (dated 15 April 2005) as implemented by OCA Circular No. 57-2005 (dated 12
May 2005).
Supreme Court Administrative Circular 20-2005 mandates as follows:
[A]ll Regional Trial Courts concerned, through the Presiding Judges and Clerks of Court, are
hereby DIRECTED to henceforth DIRECTLY forward to the COURT OF APPEALS (Manila for Luzon
75
cases, Cebu Station for Visayas cases, and Cagayan de Oro Station for Mindanao cases) the
records of criminal cases whose decisions are subject to (a) automatic review because the
penalty imposed is death or (b) ordinary appeals (by notices of appeal) because the penalty
imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, notwithstanding a statement in the
notice of appeal that the appeal is to the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, OCA Circular No. 57-2005 gives the following directive:
[A]ll Judges and Clerks of Court of the Regional Trial Courts are hereby reminded that failure to
comply with the above-cited Administrative Circular shall warrant appropriate disciplinary action
pursuant to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. 01-8-10-SC, which took effect
on 11 September 2001, as well as the pertinent rules and regulations of the Civil Service
Commission.
This Administrative Circular took effect on 19 April 2005, strict compliance herewith is hereby
enjoined.
In utter disregard of this Court's circulars, Judge Soluren capriciously, whimsically, and
arbitrarily took cognizance of private respondent's Omnibus Motion, granted it, and rendered a
totally opposite Decision of acquittal. What she should have done was dismiss the Omnibus
Motion outright, since Judge Buted's Decision of conviction was already subject to automatic
review by the CA. By acting on the wrong remedy, which led to the reversal of the conviction,
Judge Soluren contravened the express orders of this Court. Her blatant abuse of authority was
so grave and so severe that it deprived the court of its very power to dispense justice.
We take this opportunity to correct a capricious, patent, and abusive judgment by reversing and
setting aside the Decision.
Judge Soluren retired compulsorily in 2012. Had she still been in the service, some members of
this Court would have been minded to refer this matter to the Office of the Court Administrator
for investigation into and evaluation of the question of whether the above acts call for the
application of administrative sanctions.
Double jeopardy is not triggered
when the order of acquittal is void.
Grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents
double jeopardy from attaching.53
In People v. Hernandez,54 this Court explained that "an acquittal rendered in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really 'acquit' and therefore does
not terminate the case as there can be no double jeopardy based on a void indictment."
Considering that Judge Soluren's order of acquittal was void from the very beginning, it
necessarily follows that the CA ruling dismissing the Petition for Certiorari must likewise be
reversed and set aside.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97629 dated 22 March 2010 and Resolution dated 30 July 2010
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, Nueva Ecija dated 31
October 2006 and Order dated 18 April 2006, rendered by public respondent Judge Corazon D.
Soluren acquitting respondent Pepito Gonzales, are likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Decision dated 22 December 2005 rendered by Judge Erlinda P. Buted is REINSTATED.
The Court of Appeals is hereby ordered to conduct the mandatory and automatic review of the
Decision dated 22 December 2005 pursuant to Sections 3 and 10, Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court. Let the entire records of Criminal Case No. 1066-P entitled People of the Philippines v.
Pepito Gonzales be immediately TRANSMITTED to the Court of Appeals.
The bail granted to respondent Pepito Gonzales is CANCELLED. Let copies of this Decision be
furnished the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation and the Director-General of the
Philippine National Police. The National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police
are hereby DIRECTED to cause the IMMEDIATE ARREST and DETENTION of respondent
Pepito Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 197762
CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD represented by CHAIRPERSON BERNARDO P.
ABESAMIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MA. ANTHONETTE VELASCO-ALLONES, and DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ARTURO M. LACHICA, Petitioner
vs
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION represented by CHAIRMAN FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III
AND PUBLIC ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEY PERSIDA V. RUEDA-
ACOSTA, DEPUTY CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEYS MACAPANGCAT A. MAMA, SYLVESTRE A.
MOSING, REGIONAL PUBLIC ATTORNEYS CYNTHIA M. VARGAS, FRISCO F. DOMALSIN,
TOMAS B. PADILLA, RENATO T. CABRIDO, SALVADOR S. HIPOLITO, ELPIDIO C.
BACUYAG, DIOSDADO S. SAVELLANO, RAMON N. GOMEZ, MARIE G-REE R.
CALINAWAN, FLORENCIO M. DILOY, EDGARDO D. GONZALEZ, NUNILA P. GARCIA,
FRANCIS A. CALATRAVA, DATUMANONG A. DUMAMBA, EDGAR Q. BALANSAG, PUBLIC
ATTORNEY IV MARVIN R. OSIAS, PUBLIC ATTORNEY IV HOWARD B. AREZA, PUBLIC
ATTORNEY IV IMELDA C. ALFORTE-GANANCIAL, Respondents
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
The dispute in this case concerns the classification of certain positions in the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO).The Court is asked to determine, in particular, whether these positions are properly
included in the Career Executive Service (CES); and whether the occupants of these positions
must obtain third-level eligibility to qualify for permanent appointment. To resolve these
questions, the Court must also delineate the respective jurisdictions granted by law to the
competing authorities involved in this case - the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the Career
Executive Service Board (CESB).
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,1 the CESB2 seeks the reversal of the Decision3 and
Resolution4 of the CSC declaring that (a) it had the jurisdiction to resolve an appeal from a CESB
Resolution5 refusing to declassify certain positions in PAO; and (b) the PAO positions involved in
the appeal do not require third-level eligibility.
The facts leading to the controversy are not in dispute.
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On 24 September 2010, the PAO received a copy of the CESB Report on the CES Occupancy of
the Department of Justice (DOJ).6 This document stated, among others, that out of 35 filled
positions in the PAO, 33 were occupied by persons without the required CES eligibility.
In response to the report, PAO Deputy Chief Public Attorney Silvestre A. Mosing (Deputy Chief
Mosing) sent a letter7 to CESB Executive Director Maria Anthonette V. Allones. He informed her
that the positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, and Regional Public
Attorneys (subject positions) were already permanent in nature pursuant to Section 68 of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9406, which accorded security of tenure to the occupants thereof.
A second letter dated 9 November 20109 was sent to the CESB by Deputy Chief Mosing to
reiterate its earlier communication. The letter also contained supplementary arguments in
support of the assertion that the subject positions were permanent posts; hence, their
occupants may only be removed for cause provided by law. Based on the foregoing premises,
the PAO requested the deletion of its office from the Data on CES Occupancy for the Department
of Justice (DOJ).
On 18 November 2010, the PAO received the reply sent to Deputy Chief Mosing by the CESB,
through Deputy Executive Director Arturo M. Lachica.10 The latter informed Deputy Chief Mosing
that the CESB would conduct a position classification study on the specified PAO positions to
determine whether they may still be considered CES positions in the DOJ.
The DOJ Legal Opinion
While the matter was pending, PAO Deputy Chief Mosing wrote a letter to then DOJ Secretary
Leila M. de Lima to inform her about the communications sent by the PAO to the CESB.11 He also
reiterated the PAO's opinion that the subject positions must be considered permanent in nature,
and not subject to CES requirements.12
In a letter13 sent to Chief Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta on 3 January 2011, Chief
State Counsel Ricardo V. Paras III elucidated the legal opinion of the DOJ on the matter:
Based on the foregoing, your claim that the appointments of the top-level officials of the PAO
are permanent is without merit. For one, the positions of the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief
Public Attorney and Regional Public Attorneys are part of the CES. xxx
xxxx
Secondly, since the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys and Regional Public
Attorneys are occupying CES positions, it is required by law that they should be CES eligibles to
become permanent appointees to the said position. x x x.
xxxx
This leads to the inevitable conclusion that the appointments of the Chief Public Attorney,
Deputy Chief Public Attorneys and Regional Public Attorneys are not permanent, despite your
claims to the contrary, considering that they do not possess the required CES eligibility for the
said positions. As such, they cannot invoke their right to security of tenure even if it was
expressly guaranteed to them by the PAO Law.
xxxx
Considering that the appointments of the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys
and Regional Public Attorneys are temporary, they are required to subsequently take the CES
examination. In the absence of any evidence that would show compliance with the said
condition, it is presumed that the top-level officials of the PAO are non-CES eligibles; therefore
they may be removed from office by the appointing authority without violating their
constitutional and statutory rights to security of tenure.14
The DOJ also noted that the permanent nature of an appointment does not automatically
translate to an exemption from CES coverage, as it is only the CESB that has the authority to
exempt certain positions from CES requirements.15 The DOJ further rejected the claim that the
occupants of the subject positions were exercising quasi-judicial functions. It explained that
while the lawyers of the PAO regularly conduct mediation, conciliation or arbitration of disputes,
their functions do not entail the rendition of judgments or decisions - an essential element of the
exercise of quasi-judicial functions.16
The CSC Legal Opinion
It appears that while waiting for the CESB to respond to its letters, the PAO wrote to the CSC to
request a legal opinion on the same matter.17 The PAO thereafter informed the CESB of the
former's decision to seek the opinion and requested the latter to issue no further opinion or
statement, oral or written, relative to the qualifications of the PAO officials.18
On 7 January 2011, the CSC issued the requested legal opinion.19 Citing its mandate as an
independent constitutional commission and its authority under the Administrative Code to
"render opinions and rulings on all personnel and other civil service matters," the CSC declared
that third-level eligibility is not required for the subject positions in the PAO:
The law is explicit that the positions [of] Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorney and
Regional Public Attorney in PAO shall have the same qualifications for appointment, among
other things, as those of the Chief State Prosecutor, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and
Regional State Prosecutor, respectively. These, of course include, the eligibility requirement for
these positions. x x x.
xxxx
The Prosecution Service Act of 2010 explicitly provides that the Prosecutor General (the retitled
position of Chief State Prosecutor) has the same qualifications for appointment, among other
things, as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA). Further, the Senior Deputy
State Prosecutor and the Regional Prosecutor have the same qualifications as those of an
associate justice of the CA. x x x.
xxxx
No less than the Constitution provides that justices and judges in the judiciary are required,
among other things, practice of law as requirement for appointment thereto. Pointedly, the
Presiding Justice and the Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA) have the same
qualifications as those provided for in the Constitution for Justices of the Supreme Court[,]
which includes, among other requirements, practice of law. This means that the Constitution
and the Civil Service Law prescribe RA 1080 (BAR) as the appropriate civil service eligibility
therefor. Accordingly, any imposition of a third-level eligibility (e.g. CESE, CSEE) is not proper, if
not, illegal under the circumstances. In fact, even in the 1997 Qualification Standards Manual of
the Commission, all of these positions require RA 1080 BAR eligibility for purposes of
appointment.
xxxx
77
Thus, it is the Commission's op1mon that for purposes of permanent appointment to the
positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorney and Regional Public Attorney, no
thirdlevel eligibility is required but only RA 1080 (BAR) civil service eligibility.20
CESB Resolution  No.  918
On 12 January 2011, the CESB issued Resolution No. 91821 (CESB Resolution No, 918) denying
the PAO's request to declassify the subject positions. Citing the Position Classification
Study22 submitted by its secretariat, the CESB noted that the positions in question "require
leadership and managerial competence"23 and were thus part of the CES. Hence, the
appointment of persons without third-level eligibility for these posts cannot be considered
permanent. The CESB explained:
WHEREAS, pursuant to its mandate to identify positions of equivalent rank as CES positions, the
Secretariat revisited its previous classification as part of the CES [ ofj the above positions of
PAO and conducted a position classification of the above positions and arrived at the following
findings:
1. The positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, Regional Public
Attorneys and Assistant Regional Public Attorneys who are all presidential appointees fall within
the criteria set under CESB Resolution No. 299, s. 2009, namely:
a. The position is a career position;
b. The position is above division chief level;
c. The duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive
or managerial functions.
2. While Section 3 of Republic Act 9406 which provides that:
SEC. 3. A new Section 14-A, is hereby inserted in Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987", to read as follows:
"SEC. 14-A Powers and Functions. - The PAO shall independently discharge its mandate to
render, free of charge, legal representation, assistance, and counselling to indigent persons in
criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases. In the exigency of the
service, the PAO may be called upon by proper government authorities to render such service to
other persons, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations."
The aforecited provision does not limit the mandate of PAO to perform only non-executive
functions. All that the aforecited provision states is that the PAO is mandated to render legal
representation, assistance and counseling to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor,
administrative and other quasi-judicial cases, free of charge. Notably, the positions of Chief
Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorney, Regional Public Attorneys and Assistant Regional
Public Attorneys evidently require leadership and managerial competence.
xxxx
WHEREAS, it is undisputed that the subject pos1t10ns are CES in nature and as such, the
eligibility requirement for appointment thereto is CES eligibility.
With regard to the question of its jurisdiction over the matter as against that of the CSC, the
CESB stated:
WHEREAS, under Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V of EO 292, it is the Board which has the mandate
over Third-level positions in the Career Service and not the CSC. Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V
of EO 292 provides:
Section 8. Classes of Positions in the Civil Service. - (l) Classes of positions in the career service,
appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into three major levels as follows:
xxxx
(c) The third-level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.
(2) x x x Entrance to the third-level shall be prescribed by the Career Executive Service Board.
WHEREAS, in the case of De Jesus v. People, G.R. No. 61998, February 22, 1983, 120 SCRA
760, the Supreme Court ruled that "where there are two acts, one of which is special and
particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and
thus conflict with the special act, the special must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent
more clearly than that of a general statute and must be taken as intended to constitute an
exception to the general act."
WHEREAS, following the above-cited rule, it is clear that Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V of EO 292
is the exception to [the] general act pertaining to the authority of the CSC;
xxxx
WHEREAS, it is clear that the mandate of the Board is in accordance with existing laws and
pertinent jurisprudence on matters pertaining to the CES[.]24
Aggrieved by the CESB Resolution, the PAO filed a Verified Notice of Appeal25 and an Urgent
Notice of Appeal26 with the CSC.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CSC
Before the CSC, the PAO assailed CESB Resolution No. 918 on the following grounds: (a) the
resolution was rendered contrary to R.A. 9406 in relation to R.A. 10071,27 the 1987 Constitution
and the CSC letter-opinion; and (b) the CESB usurped the legislative function of Congress when
the former required additional qualifications for appointment to certain PAO positions. The PAO
likewise asserted that its appeal had been brought to the CSC, because the latter had the power
to review decisions and actions of one of its attached agencies - the CESB.
In an Order28 dated 17 January 2011, the CSC directed the CESB to comment on the appeal.
Instead of submitting a comment, however, the CESB filed a Motion for Clarification29 to assail
the authority of the CSC to review its Decision. It asserted that the CSC had no jurisdiction to
decide the appeal given that (a) the appeal involved a controversy between two government
entities regarding questions of law;30 and (b) the CESB was an autonomous agency whose
actions were appealable to the Office of the President.31 In addition, the CESB emphasized the
inability of the CSC to render an unbiased ruling on the case, considering the latter's previous
legal opinion on the appropriate eligibility for key positions in the PA0.32
78
In a Decision33 dated 15 February 2011, the CSC granted the appeal and reversed CESB
Resolution No. 918.
As a preliminary matter, the CSC ruled that it could assume jurisdiction over the appeal, which
involved the employment status and qualification standards of employees belonging to the civil
service. It was supposedly a matter falling within its broad and plenary authority under the
Constitution and the Administrative Code. The CSC also declared that the authority of the CESB
over third-level employees was limited to the imposition of entry requirements and "should not
be interpreted as cutting off the reach of the Commission over this particular class of
positions." 34 Moreover, the CESB was declared subject to the revisory power of the CSC, given
that an attached office is not entirely and totally insulated from its mother agency.35 With
respect to the provision in the Integrated Reorganization Plan36 on appeals from the CESB to the
Office of the President, the CSC construed this requirement as pertaining only to disciplinary
proceedings.37
On the merits, the CSC ruled in favor of the PAO officials. It declared that the CESB would be in
violation of R.A. 9406 if the latter would require an additional qualification - in this case, third-
level eligibility - for purposes of permanent appointments to certain PAO positions:
The foregoing elaboration shows the qualifications of the subject PAO positions under the
existing laws. It is gleaned that nowhere in these laws is there a reference to third-level
eligibility and CESO rank as qualification requirements for attaining tenurial security. All that the
laws uniformly prescribe for the positions in question is practice of law for certain period of time,
which presupposes a bar license. This being the case, the CESB cannot, in the guise of enforcing
and administering the policies of the third-level, validly impose qualifications in addition to what
the laws prescribe. It cannot add another layer of qualification requirement which is not
otherwise specified in the statutes. As an administrative agency, the CESB can only promulgate
rules and regulations which must be consistent with and in harmony with the provisions of the
laws, and it cannot add or subtract thereto. Most evidently, therefore, in promulgating the
assailed resolution, which sets out additional qualifications for the subject positions in the PAO,
the CESB has overstepped the bounds of its authority. x x x.
In so saying, the Commission does not lose sight of the power of the CESB to identify other
positions equivalent to those enumerated in the Administrative Code of 1987 as being part of
the third-level or CES for as long as they come within the ambit of the appointing prerogative of
the President. Yet, such grant of authority is derived from a general law (the Administrative
Code) and hence, it must be deemed circumscribed or qualified by the special law governing the
PAO. Reiteratively, the PAO Law, in conjunction with other laws, merely fixes practice of law as
the principal qualification requirement for the positions of Acosta, et al.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the CESB Resolution No. 918 dated Jnaury 12, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
for not being in conformity with law and jurisprudence. It is declared that the following key
positions in the Public Attorney's Office do not require third-level eligibility and CESO rank for
purposes of tenurial security:
1. Chief Public Attorney;
2. Deputy Chief Public Attorneys;
3. Regional Public Attorneys; and
4. Assistant Regional Public Attorneys.38
The CESB sought reconsideration of the Decision, but its motion was denied.39
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
On 9 August 2011, the CESB filed the instant Petition40 imputing grave abuse of discretion to
respondent CSC. It asserts that (a) the CSC has no jurisdiction to review the Resolution of the
CESB, given the latter's autonomy as an attached agency; (b) CESB Resolution No. 918 should
have been appealed to the Office of the President, and not to the CSC, in accordance with Article
IV, Part III of the Integrated Reorganization Plan. The subject PAO positions are supposedly part
of the CES, based on criteria established by the CESB.41 These criteria were set pursuant to the
latter's power to identify positions belonging to the third-level of the civil service and to
prescribe the requirements for entry thereto. The Petition further reiterates the alleged inability
of the CSC to decide the case with impartiality.
In its Comment,42 the CSC contends that the Petition filed by the CESB before this Court should
be dismissed outright for being an improper remedy and for violating the hierarchy of courts.
The CSC further asserts its jurisdiction over the PAO's appeal from the CESB Resolution in this
case. Citing its mandate as the central personnel agency of the government based on the 1987
Constitution and the Administrative Code, the CSC insists that it has broad authority to
administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all
levels and ranks of the civil service. This authority allegedly encompasses the power to review
and revise the decisions and actions of offices attached to it, such as the CESB. It also claims
that the present dispute involves a personnel action that is within its jurisdiction.
Respondents PAO and its officials have also filed their own Comment43 on the Petition. They
assert that (a) the Petition should be dismissed outright as it is tainted with serious procedural
and jurisdictional flaws; (b) the CSC properly exercised its jurisdiction when it resolved the
appeal in this case; and (c) CESB Resolution No. 918 contravened R.A. 9406 in relation to the
1987 Constitution, R.A. 10071 and the CSC letteropinion dated 7 January 2011.
Because the instant case involves the contradictory views of two government offices, the Court
likewise required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the matter as the
lawyer of the government tasked to uphold the best interest of the latter.
On 28 February 2012, the OSG filed the required Comment.44 On the issue of jurisdiction, it
supports the view of the CSC and the PAO. It cites the Constitution and the Administrative Code
as the sources of the authority of the CSC to review rulings of the CESB, particularly with regard
to personnel matters such as the reclassification of positions.
As to the merits of the case, the OSG asserts that the subject positions in the PAO should be
declassified from the CES. It points out that the primary function of these PAO officials -- the
provision of legal assistance to the indigent - is specialized in nature; in contrast, their
managerial functions are merely incidental to their role. The OSG further contends that the
manifest intent of the law is to require PAO officials to have the same qualifications as their
counterpmis in the National Prosecution Service (NPS). Consequently, the OSG argued that the
decision of the CESB to declassify certain posts in the NPS should have likewise resulted in the
declassification of the corresponding positions in the PAO.
In its Reply to the Comment of the OSG,45 the CESB urges the Court to adhere to the alleged
limitations on the general authority of the CSC over all matters concerning the civil service. In
particular, the CESB asserts its specific and exclusive mandate to administer all matters
pertaining to the third-level of the career service. Included in these matters is the power to
promulgate rules, standards and procedures for the selection, classification, compensation and
career development of its members. Moreover, the CESB insists that it is an agency within the
Executive Department under the Integrated Reorganization Plan; hence, its decisions are
appealable only to the Office of the President. Lastly, the CESB maintains that the subject
positions properly belong to the CES, considering that executive and managerial functions must
be exercised by the occupants thereof.
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 ISSUES
The following issues are presented for resolution:
(1) Whether a petition for certiorari and prohibition was the proper remedy to question the
assailed CSC Decision and Resolution
(2) Whether the CSC had the jurisdiction to resolve the appeal filed by the PAO and to reverse
CESB Resolution No. 918
(3) Whether the CSC acted in accordance with law when it reversed the CESB and declared that
third-level eligibility is not required for occupants of the subject PAO positions
OUR RULING
We DENY the Petition.
At the outset, we note that the CESB availed itself of an improper remedy to challenge the
ruling of the CSC. In any event, after a judicious consideration of the case, we find that the CSC
acted within its jurisdiction when it resolved the PAO's appeal and reversed CESB Resolution No.
918. The CSC also correctly ruled that third-level eligibility is not required for the subject
positions.
A petition for certiorari and prohibitinn is
not the appropriate remedy to challenge
the ruling of the CSC.
As a preliminary matter, this Court must address the objections of respondents to the remedy
availed of by the CESB to question the ruling of the CSC.
Respondents contend that the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by the CESB before this
Court was improper, because the remedy of appeal was available via a petition for review under
Rule 43. On the other hand, the CESB insists that a Rule 65 petition is proper, because it is
disputing the authority and jurisdiction of the CSC.
We find in favor of respondents.
It is settled that a resort to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari  and prohibition is proper
only in cases where (a) a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires
the concurrence of both these requisites:
Section l. Petition for certiorari.  - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.1âwphi1
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule
46.
Section 2. Petition for prohibition.  - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment he rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto,
and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3,
Rule 46. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the second requirement is plainly absent. As respondents correctly observed, there
was an appeal available to the CESB in the form of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 of Rule 43 specifically provides for appeals from decisions of
the CSC:
Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court
of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are
the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission,
Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service
Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Invention Board,
Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments,
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
xxxx
Section 5. How appeal taken.  - Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in
seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the
adverse party and on the court or agency a quo.  The original copy of the petition intended for
the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.
Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk of court of the Court of
Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of ₱500.00 for costs.
Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be
granted by the Court of Appeals upon a verified motion setting forth valid grounds therefor. If
the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful
fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial. (Emphasis supplied)
In an attempt to justify its resort to certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, the CESB asserts
that the allegations in its Petition - the patent illegality of the assailed Decision and Resolution of
the CSC, as well as the lack of jurisdiction and the grave abuse of discretion attending the
latter's ruling - are not suitable for an appeal under Rule 43. It argues that since these grounds
properly pertain to a petition for certiorari and prohibition, this remedy is more appropriate.
80
We find the CESB's contention untenable. As previously stated, certiorari and prohibition are
proper only if both requirements are present, that is, if the appropriate grounds are invoked;
and an appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy is unavailable. Mere reference to a
ground under Rule 65 is not sufficient. This Court has, in fact, dismissed a Petition
for Certiorari assailing another CSC Resolution precisely on this ground. In Mahinay v. Court of
Appeals,46 the Court ruled:
As provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the proper mode of appeal from the decision of a
quasi-judicial agency, like the CSC, is a petition for review filed with the CA.
The special civil action of certiorari  under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be resorted to only
when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
In this case, petitioner clearly had the remedy of appeal provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. Madrigal Tran.\port, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation held:
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be
entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari  are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for
an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such
loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari  will not prosper, even if
the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Here, the CESB could have appealed the CSC Decision and Resolution to the CA via a petition for
review under Rule 43. Hence, the filing of the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is
improper regardless of the grounds invoked therein.
Moreover, we find no reason to allow the CESB to avail itself of the extraordinary remedies
of certiorari and prohibition. Indeed, the petition itself cites no exceptional circumstance 47 other
than the supposed transcendental importance of the issues raised, "as the assailed CSC Decision
is gravely prejudicial to the mandate of the Petitioner." Even when confronted by respondents
with regard to the availability of an appeal, the CESB still failed to cite any special justification
for its refusal to avail itself of an appeal. Instead, it opted to focus on the nature of the grounds
asserted in its Petition. For the reasons stated above, a mere reference to grave abuse of
discretion cannot justify a resort to a petition under Rule 65.
Considering the failure of the CESB to offer a compelling explanation for its insistence upon the
special remedies of certiorari and prohibition, the Court finds no justification for a liberal
application of the rules.
In any event, the contentions of the CESB are without merit. As will be further explained, we
find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC. In resolving the appeal filed by the
PAO, the CSC merely exercised the authority granted to it by the Constitution as the central
personnel agency of the government.
The CSC acted within its }urisdiction
when it resolved the PAO's appeal and
reversed CESB Resolution No. 918.
At its core, this case requires the Court to delineate the respective authorities granted by law to
two agencies involved in the management of government personnel - the CSC and the CESB.
This particular dispute involves not only the jurisdiction of each office over personnel belonging
to the third-level of the civil service, but also the relationship between the two offices.
On the one hand, the CESB asserts its jurisdiction over members of the CES. Specifically, it
refers to the identification and classification of positions belonging to the third-level, as well as
the establishment of the qualifications for appointment to those posts. The CESB further
emphasizes its autonomy from the CSC on the basis of this Court's ruling that its status as an
attached agency only pertains to policy and program coordination.
The CSC, on the other hand, defends its authority to review actions and decisions of its attached
agencies, including the CESB. The CSC further claims original and appellate jurisdiction over
administrative cases involving contested appointments, pursuant to its constitutional mandate
as the central personnel agency of the government.
In the interest of the effective and efficient organization of the civil service, this Court must
ensure that the respective powers and functions of the CSC and the CESB are well-defined. After
analyzing and harmonizing the legal provisions pertaining to each of these two agencies, the
Court concludes that the CSC has the authority to review CESB Resolution No. 918. We have
arrived at this conclusion after a consideration of (a) the broad mandate of the CSC under the
Constitution and the Administrative Code; and (b) the specific and narrowly tailored powers
granted to the CESB in the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the Administrative Code.
As the central personnel agency of the
government, the CSC has broad authority
to pass upon all civil service matters.
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution entrusts to the CSC48 the administration of the civil service,
which is comprised of "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."49 In
particular, Section 3 of Article IX-B provides for the mandate of this independent constitutional
commission:
SECTION 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government,
shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit
and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and
ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall
submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.
(Emphases supplied)
The proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission reveal the intention to emphasize the
status of the CSC as the "central personnel agency of the Government with all powers and
functions inherent in and incidental to human resources management."50 As a matter of fact, the
original proposed provision on the functions of the CSC reads:
Sec. 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government. shall
establish a career service, promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions, classif[y]
positions, prescribe conditions of employment except as to compensation and other monetary
benefits which shall be provided by law, and exercise alt powers and functions inherent in and
incidental to human resources management, to promote morale, efficiency, and integrity in the
Civil Service. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an aimual report on its personnel
programs, and perform such other functions as may be provided by law.51 (Emphases supplied)
Although the specific powers of the CSC are not enumerated in the final version of 1987
Constitution,52 it is evident from the deliberations of the framers that the concept of a "central
personnel agency" was considered all-encompassing. The concept was understood to be
81
sufficiently broad as to include the authority to promulgate and enforce policies on personnel
actions, to classify positions, and to exercise all powers and functions inherent in and incidental
to human resources management:
MR. FOZ. Will the amendment reduce the powers and functions of the Civil Service as embodied
in our original draft?
MS. AQUINO: No, it will not. The proposed deletion of lines 35 to 40 of page 2 until line 1 of
page 3 would not in any way minimize the powers of the Civil Service (Commission] because
they are deemed implicitly included in the all-embracing definition and concept of "central
personnel agency of the government." I believe that the lines we have mentioned are but
redundant articulation of that same concept, unnecessary surplusage.
MR. FOZ. For instance, will the power or function to promulgate policies on personnel actions be
encompassed by the Commissioner's amendment?
MS. AQUINO. It is not an amendment because I am retaining lines 33 to 35. I proposed an
amendment after the words "career service.'' I am only doing away with unnecessary
redundancy.
MR. FOZ. Can we say that all of the powers enumerated in the original provision are still being
granted by the Civil Service Commission despite the elimination of the listing of these powers
and functions?
MS. AQUINO. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, in the nature of a central personnel agency, it would
have to necessarily execute all of these functions.
MR. FOZ. And will the elimination of all these specific functions be a source of ambiguity and
controversies later on as to the extent of the powers and functions of the commission?
MS. AQUINO. I submit that this would not be susceptible of ambiguity because the concept of a
central personnel agency is a generally accepted concept and as experience would bear out, this
function is actually being carried out already by the Civil Service Commission, except that we
are integrating this concept. I do not think that it would be susceptible of any ambiguity.
MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas). Yes, Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. This is more for clarification.
The original Section 3 states, among others, the functions of the Civil Service Commission - to
promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions. Will Commissioner Aquino kindly indicate
to us the corresponding provisions and her proposed amendment which would encompass the
powers to promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions?
MS. AQUINO. It is my submission that the same functions are already subsumed under the
concept of a central personnel agency.
MR. REGALADO. In other words, all those functions enumerated from line 35 on page 2 to line I
of page 3 inclusive, are understood to be encompassed in the phrase "central personnel agency
of the government."
MS. AQUINO. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, except that on line 40 of page 2 and line 1 of the
subsequent page, it was only subjected to a little modification.
MR. REGALADO. May we, therefore, make it of record that the phrase"... promulgate and
enforce policies on personnel actions, classify positions, prescribe conditions of employment
except as to compensation and other monetary benefits which shall be provided by law" is
understood to be subsumed under and included in the concept of a central personnel agency.
MS. AQUINO. I would have no objection to that.53 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In accordance with the foregoing deliberations, the mandate of the CSC should therefore be
read as the comprehensive authority to perform all functions necessary to ensure the efficient
administration of the entire  civil service, including the CES.
The Administrative Code of 1987 further reinforces this view. Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter
3, Section 12 thereof enumerates the specific powers and functions of the CSC while recognizing
its comprehensive authority over all civil service matters. Section 12, Items (1) to (5), (11),
(14), and (19), are of particular relevance to this dispute:
SECTION 12. Powers and Functions.-The Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:
(1) Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for
all levels and ranks in the Civil Service;
(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of
the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws;
(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and
programs to promote economical, efficient and effective personnel administration in the
government;
(4) Formulate policies and regulations for the administration, maintenance and implementation
of position classification and compensation and set standards for the establishment, allocation
and reallocation of pay scales, classes and positions;
(5) Render opinion and rulings on all personnel and other Civil Service matters which shall be
binding on all heads of departments, offices and agencies and which may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari;
xxxx
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on
appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of
the agencies attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions,
orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings
shall be final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof;
xxxx
82
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil
Service including extension of Service beyond retirement age;
xxxx
(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel agency and such other
functions as may be provided by law.
It is evident from the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions that the CSC, as the
central personnel agency of the government, has been granted the broad authority and the
specific powers to pass upon all civil service matters. The question before the Court today is
whether this broad authority encompasses matters pertaining to the CES and are, as such,
recognized to be within the jurisdiction of the CESB.
To allow us to understand the legal framework governing the two agencies and to harmonize the
provisions of law, it is now necessary for the Court to examine the history and the mandate of
the CESB. It may thereby determine the proper relation between the CSC and the CESB.
The CESB has been granted specific and limited powers under the law.
On 9 September 1968, Congress enacted R.A. 5435 authorizing the President to reorganize
different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the
government. The statute also created a Commission on Reorganization with the mandate to
study and investigate the status of all offices in the executive branch. This commission was also
tasked to submit an integrated reorganization plan to the President, and later on to Congress,
for approval. The Commission was given until 31 December 1970 to present its plan to the
President.54
After the conduct of hearings and intensive studies, a proposed Integrated Reorganization
Plan55 was submitted to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on 31 December 1970. The plan
included a proposal to develop a professionalized and competent civil service through the
establishment of the CES - a group of senior administrators carefully selected for managerial
posts in the higher levels.56 To promulgate standards for the CES, the Commission on
Reorganization recommended the creation of the CESB:
To promulgate standards, rules and procedures regarding the selection, classification,
compensation and career development of members of the Career Executive Service, a Board is
proposed to be established. The Board shall be composed of high-level officials to provide a
government-wide view and to ensure effective support for the establishment and development
of a corps of highly competent, professional administrators.57
The plan was referred to a presidential commission for review, but Martial Law was declared
before the proposal could be acted upon. Four days after the declaration of Martial Law,
however, the Integrated Reorganization Plan was approved by former President Marcos through
Presidential Decree No. 1.58 This approved plan included the creation of the CES and the CESB.
The CES was created to "form a continuing pool of well-selected and development-oriented
career administrators who shall provide competent and faithful service."59 The CESB was
likewise established to serve as the governing body of the CES60 with the following functions: (a)
to promulgate rules, standards and procedures for the selection, classification, compensation
and career development of members of the CES;61 (b) to set up the organization and operation
of the civil service in accordance with the guidelines provided in the plan;62 (c) to prepare a
program of training and career development for members of the CES;63 (d) to investigate and
adjudicate administrative complaints against members of the CES.64
When the Administrative Code was enacted in 1987, the CESB was given the additional
authority to (a) identify other officers belonging to the CES in keeping with the conditions
imposed by law;65 and (b) prescribe requirements for entrance to the third-level.66
Based on the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the powers granted to the CESB are specific
and limited. This Court must now determine whether it is possible to interpret these powers in
harmony with the broad constitutional mandate of the CSC.
The specific powers of the CESB must be
narrowly interpreted as exceptions to the
comprehensive authority granted to the
CSC by the Constitution and relevant
statutes.
As we have earlier observed, the interplay between the broad mandate of the CSC and the
specific authority granted to the CESB is at the root of this controversy. The question we must
resolve, in particular, is whether the CSC had the authority to review and ultimately reverse
CESB Resolution No. 918, upon the appeal of the PAO.
For its part, the CESB contends that the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the Administrative
Code have granted it the exclusive authority to identify the positions belonging to the third-level
of the civil service and to prescribe the eligibility requirements for appointments thereto.67 It
thus asserts that the foregoing matters are beyond the revisory jurisdiction of the CSC, and
must instead be appealed to the Office of the President in accordance with the specific
provisions of the aforementioned laws. This special mandate must allegedly prevail over the
general authority granted to the CSC.
As to its status as an attached agency, the CESB cites this Court's pronouncement in Eugenio
v.  CSC68 on its autonomy from its mother agency. The CESB contends that its attachment to the
CSC is only for the purpose of "policy and program coordination."69 Allegedly, this attachment
does not mean that the former's decisions, particularly CESB Resolution No. 918, are subject to
the CSC's review.
On the other hand, the CSC asserts its jurisdiction to act upon the appeal from CESB Resolution
No. 918 by virtue of its status as the central personnel agency of the government. It contends
that the CESB 's authority to prescribe entrance requirements for the third-level of the civil
service does not mean that the CSC no longer has jurisdiction over that class of positions. It
also points out that the case involves a personnel action that is within the jurisdiction conferred
upon it by law.
We uphold the position of the CSC.
It is a basic principle in statutory construction that statutes must be interpreted in harmony with
the Constitution and other laws.70 In this case, the specific powers of the CESB over members of
the CES must be interpreted in a manner that takes into account the comprehensive mandate of
the CSC under the Constitution and other statutes.
The present case involves the classification of positions belonging to the CES and the
qualifications for these posts. These are matters clearly within the scope of the powers granted
to the CESB under the Administrative Code and the Integrated Reorganization Plan. However,
this fact alone does not push the matter beyond the reach of the CSC.
As previously discussed, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, is given
the comprehensive mandate to administer the civil service under Article IX-B, Section 3 of the
1987 Constitution; and Section 12, Items (4), (5), and (14) of the Administrative Code. It has
83
also been expressly granted the power to promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines for the
civil service; and to render opinions and rulings on all personne1 and other civilservice
matters.71
Here, the question of whether the subject PAO positions belong to the CES is clearly a civil
service matter falling within the comprehensive jurisdiction of the CSC. Further, considering the
repercussions of the issue concerning the appointments of those occupying the posts in
question, the jurisdiction of the CSC over personnel actions is implicated.
It must likewise be emphasized that the CSC has been granted the authority to review the
decisions of agencies attached to it under Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V
of the Administrative Code:
SECTION 12. Powers and Functions.--The Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on
appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of
the agencies attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions,
orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings
shall be final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof;
Since the CESB is an attached agency of the CSC,72 the former's decisions are expressly subject
to the CSC's review on appeal.
Against the express mandate given to the CSC in the foregoing provision, the contention of the
CESB that its decisions may only be appealed to the Office of the President must fail. We note
that the supporting provision73 cited by the CESB in support of its argument refers only to
administrative cases involving the discipline of members of the CES:
5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the selection, classification,
compensation and career development of members of the Career Executive Service. The Board
shall set up the organization and operation of the Service in accordance with the following
guidelines:
xxxx
h. Discipline.  Investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints against members of
the Career Executive Service shall be governed by Article VI, Chapter II and Paragraph I (d) of
Article II, Chapter III of this Part; provided that appeals shall be made to the Career Executive
Service Board instead of the Civil Service Commission. Administrative cases involving members
of the Service on assignment with the Board shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Board
with the right to appeal to the Office of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
In our view, the foregoing rule on appeals to the Office of the President only covers disciplinary
cases  involving members of the CES. It is evident that this special rule was created for that
particular type of case, because members of the CES arc all presidential appointees. Given that
the power to appoint generally carries with it the power to discipline,74 it is only reasonable for
the president to be given the ultimate authority to discipline presidential appointees. But this
special rule cannot apply to the matter at hand, because CESB Resolution No. 918 did not
involve a disciplinary case. Since it was clearly outside the scope of the foregoing provision, the
Resolution did not come within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President. It was therefore
correctly appealed to the CSC.
From the above discussion, it is evident that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it
resolved the PAO's appeal. The arguments of the CESB on this point must perforce be rejected.
The CSC correctly ruled that third level
eligibility is not required for the subject
positions.
The Court now comes to the final issue for resolution - whether the CSC ruled in accordance
with law when the latter declared that it was not necessary for occupants of the subject PAO
posts to possess third-level eligibility.
On this point, the CESB argues that third-level eligibility is required for the positions pursuant to
R.A. 9406 in relation to R.A. 10071. It avers that R.A. 9406 requires the Chief Public Attorney,
Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, Regional Public Attorneys and Assistant Regional Public Attorneys
to have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances and retirement
privileges as the Chief State Prosecutor, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, Regional State
Prosecutor and Assistant Regional State Prosecutor of the NPS under P.D. 1275. The latter law is
the old one that governs the NPS and requires third-level eligibility for senior prosecutorial
posts. According to the CESB, R.A. 10071 cannot apply, because R.A. 9406 could not have
referred to a law that had not yet been enacted at the time. It also asserts that the subsequent
declassification of prosecutors cannot benefit members of the PAO, because the prosecutors
exercise quasi-judicial functions while the PAO members do not.
On the other hand, the CSC argues that nowhere in R.A. 9406, P.D. 1275, R.A. 10071 or Batas
Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129 is there a reference to third-level eligibility and CESO rank as
qualification requirements. It emphasizes that the CESB cannot add to the provisions of these
laws, which only require the practice of law for a certain period of time and presuppose a bar
license. The PAO, for its part, maintains that the posts concerned are highly technical in nature
because they primarily involve legal practice, and any managerial functions performed are
merely incidental to their principal roles. It also claims that the legislature could never have
intended to require third-level eligibility for occupants of the subject posts when it enacted R.A.
9406.
After a careful consideration of the relevant statutes and rules, this Court agrees with the
conclusion of the CSC. To require the occupants of the subject PAO positions to possess third-
level eligibility would be to amend the law and defeat its spirit and intent.
The CESB effectively amended the
law when it required the occupants
of the subject PAO positions to
obtain third-level eligibility.
The authority to prescribe qualifications for pos1t10ns in the government is lodged in
Congress75 as part of its plenary legislative power to create, abolish and modify public offices to
meet societal demands.76 From this authority emanates the right to change the qualifications for
existing statutory offices.77
It was in the exercise of this power that the legislature enacted Section 5 of R.A. 9406, which
provides for the qualifications for the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys,
Regional Public Attorneys and Assistant Regional Public Attorneys:
SEC. 5. Section 16, Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
84
SEC. 16. The Chief Public Attorney and Other PAO Officials. - The PAO shall be headed by a
Chief Public Attorney and shall be assisted by two (2) Deputy Chief Public Attorneys. Each
PAO Regional Office established in each of the administrative regions of the country shall be
headed by a Regional Public Attorney who shall be assisted by an Assistant Regional Public
Attorney. The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the PAO and for the
discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Chief Public Attorney.
xxxx
The Chief Public Attorney shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries,
allowances, and retirement privileges as those of the Chief State Prosecutor of the National
Prosecution Service. The Deputy Chief Public Attorneys shall have the same qualifications for
appointment, rank, salaries, allowances, and retirement privileges as those of the Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor of the National Prosecution Service.
xxxx
The Regional Public Attorney and the Assistant Regional Public Attorney shall have the same
qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances, and retirement privileges as those of a
Regional State Prosecutor and the Assistant Regional State Prosecutor of the National
Prosecution Service respectively.
At the time of the enactment of R.A. 9406, the qualifications of officials of the NPS, to which the
foregoing provision referred, were provided by Section 3 of P.D. 1275:
Section 3. Prosecution Staff; Organization, Qualifications, Appointment. The Prosecution Staff
shall be composed of prosecuting officers in such number as hereinbelow determined. It shall be
headed by a Chief State Prosecutor who shall be assisted by three Assistants Chief State
Prosecutors.
The Chief State Prosecutor, the three Assistants Chief State Prosecutors; and the members of
the Prosecution Staff shall be selected from among qualified and professionally trained members
of the legal profession who arc of proven integrity and competence and have been in the actual
practice of the legal profession for at least five (5) years prior to their appointment or have held
during like period, any position requiring the qualifications of a lawyer. (Emphases
supplied)
Soon after, R.A. 10071 or the Prosecution Service Act of 201078 was passed. In updating the
qualifications for senior positions in the NPS, Congress again opted to refer to another set of
positions, this time in the judiciary:
SECTION 14. Qualifications, Rank and Appointment of the Prosecutor General. - The Prosecutor
General shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary
grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same
inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those
of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and shall be appointed by the President.
SECTION 15. Ranks of Prosecutors.  - The Prosecutors m the National Prosecution Service shall
have the following ranks:
Rank Position/Title
Prosecutor V (I) Senior Deputy State Prosecutors;
(2) Regional Prosecutors; and
(3) Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors of provinces or cities with at least twenty-five
(25) prosecutors and City Prosecutors of cities within a metropolitan area established by law
Prosecutor IV (1) Deputy State Prosecutors;
(2) Deputy Regional Prosecutors
(3) Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors of provinces or cities with less than twenty-five
(25) prosecutors; and
(4) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors or Deputy City Prosecutors of provinces or cities with at least
twenty- five (25) prosecutors; and Deputy City Prosecutors of cities within a metropolitan area
established by law.
xxxx
SECTION 16. Qualifications, Ranks and Appointments of Prosecutors and Other Prosecution
Officers. - Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor V shall have the same qualifications for
appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments
and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall
enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of an Associate Justice of the Court
of Appeals.
Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor IV shall have the same qualifications for appointment,
rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other
privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the
same retirement and other benefits as those of a Judge of the
Regional Trial Court.
A reading of B.P. 129 reveals, in turn, that the Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of
the Court of Appeals79 are required to have the same qualifications as the members of this
Court. 80 On the other hand, judges of the regional trial courts are governed by a separate
provision.81
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that occupants of the subject PAO positions are only
mandated to comply with requirements as to age, citizenship, education, and experience. Since
third-level eligibility is not at all mentioned in the law, it would be improper for the CESB to
impose this additional qualification as a prerequisite to permanent appointments.82 To do so
would be to amend the law and to overrule Congress.
While the CESB has been granted the power to prescribe entrance requirements for the third-
level of the civil service, this power cannot be construed as the authority to modify the
qualifications specifically set by law for certain positions. Hence, even granting that the
occupants of the subject positions indeed exercise managerial and executive functions as
incidents of their primary roles, the CESB has no power to impose additional qualifications for
them. It cannot use the authority granted to it by Congress itself to defeat the express
provisions of statutes enacted by the latter.
85
It is also beyond the power of the CESB to question or overrule the specific qualifications
imposed by Congress for the subject positions. The legislature must be deemed to have
considered the entirety of the functions attendant to these posts when it enacted R.A. 9406 and
prescribed the relevant qualifications for each position. The choice not to require third level
eligibility in this instance must be respected - not only by the CESB but also by this Court - as a
matter that goes into the wisdom and the policy of a statute.83
The intent of R.A. 9406 to establish
and maintain the parity in
qualifications between the senior
officials of the PAO and the NPS
must he respected.
This Court must likewise reject the CESB's contention that the declassification of positions in the
NPS (as a result of the enactment of R.A. 10071) cannot benefit the PAO because of a supposed
difference in their functions. This argument goes against the express terms and the clear intent
of R.A. 9406 and is therefore untenable.
As stated previously, Section 5 of R.A. 9406 amended the Administrative Code of 1987. The
amendment was done to provide for "the same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries,
allowances, and retirement privileges" of senior officials of both the PAO and the NPS. The
deliberations of Congress on R.A. 9406 reveal its intention to establish parity between the two
offices. The lawmakers clearly viewed these officers as counterparts in the administration of
justice:
Senator Enrile. Well, I agree with the gentleman. As I said, we should equalize the prosecution
and the defense. The PAO Office is actually an arm of the same government to protect those
who need protection.
Senator Pimentel. That is right.
Senator Enrile. At the same time, the Prosecution Service is the arm of the government to
punish those who would need punishment. So, these two perform the same class of service for
the nation and they should be equalized.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, I totally agree with that, that is why precisely I made this observation
that talking alone of starting pay, the level of starting pay of a PAO lawyer should not be lower
than the starting pay of a prosecutor.
Now maybe at the proper time we can insert that amendment.
Senator Enrile. I will be glad to receive the proposed amendment.84 (Emphases supplied)
During the bicameral conference on the proposed bill, Senator Franklin M. Drilon explained that
equal treatment of the two offices was essential:
SEN. DRILON. Yes, this is our amendment that the PAO chief should have the same salary as
the Chief State Prosecutor and down the line, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, etcetera.
And I want to put this on record because there are PAO lawyers here. There are PAO lawyers
here before us and we want to explain why we have placed this.
xxxx
SEN. DRILON. All right. As I said - you know, I want to put on record why we had tried to
streamline the salary structure and place it at the same level as the Chief State Prosecutor.
Because we do not want a salary distortion in the Department of Justice where you have the
PAO higher than the prosecutors. That's why we want to put them on equal footing rather than
mag - you know, there'll be whipsawing. You place the prosecutors below the PAO. I can assure
you that tomorrow the PAO will come to us - the prosecutors will come to us and say, "Put us
higher than the PAO lawyers." So you will have whipsawing here.85
Although these statements were made to address the specific issue of salary, this Court
considers them as manifestations of the intent to create and maintain parity between
prosecutors and public attorneys. In Re: Vicente  S. E. Veloso,86 this Court considered similar
provisions in other laws as confirmations of the legislative intent to grant equal treatment to
certain classes of public officers:
Nonetheless, there are existing laws which expressly require the qualifications for appointment,
confer the rank, and grant the salaries, privileges, and benefits of members of the Judiciary on
other public officers in the Executive Department, such as the following:
(a) the Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitor Generals of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG); and
(b) the Chief Legal Counsel and the Assistant Chief Legal Counsel, the Chief State Prosecutor,
and the members of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) in the Department of Justice.
The intention of the above laws is to establish a parity in qualifications required, the rank
conferred, and the salaries and benefits given to members of the Judiciary and the public
officers covered by the said laws. The said laws seek to give equal treatment to the specific
public officers in the executive department and the Judges and Justices who are covered by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, and other relevant laws. In effect, these laws recognize
that public officers who are expressly identified in the laws by the special nature of their official
functions render services which are as important as the services rendered by the Judges and
Justices. They acknowledge the respective roles of those public officers and of the members of
the Judiciary in the promotion of justice and the proper functioning of our legal and judicial
systems.
To fulfill the legislative intent to accord equal treatment to senior officials of the PAO and the
NPS, parity in their qualifications for appointment must be maintained. Accordingly, the revised
qualifications of those in the NPS must also be considered applicable to those in the PAO. The
declassification of positions in the NPS should thus benefit their counterpart positions in the
PAO. There is no justification for treating the two offices differently, given the plain provisions
and the rationale of the law.
This Court would render nugatory both the terms and the intent of the law if it sustains the view
of the CESB. We cannot construe R.A. 9046 in relation to P.D. 1275 only, while disregarding the
amendments brought about by R.A. 10071. To do so would defeat the legislature's very
purpose, which is to equalize the qualifications of the NPS and the PAO.
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction and
authority as the central personnel agency of the government when it passed upon the appeal
filed by the PAO from CESB Resolution No. 918. Further, there was no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the CSC when it reversed the said resolution, which refused to declassify the
subject PAO positions. As the CSC noted, the third-level eligibility required by the CESB as an
additional qualification for these posts contravened not only the express terms, but also the
clear intent of R.A. 9406.
86
For the reasons stated above, and as a consequence of the improper remedy the CESB has
resorted to, this Court must dismiss the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. CSC
Decision No. 110067 and Resolution No. 1100719 dated 15 February 2011 and 1 June 2011,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.
G.R. Nos. 174813-15               March 17, 2009
NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIÑO
REPRESENTING JAYCEE CORSIÑO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL REPRESENTING ARTHUR
VILLARUEL, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of Justice,
Quezon City, Branch 86, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the
Order dated 2 October 2006 of respondent Judge Teodoro A. Bay of Branch 86 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, which denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The facts of the case are as follows.
On 15 December 2003, two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the
crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsiño, Arthur
Villaruel and two others before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a
Family Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases
No. Q-03-123284, No. Q-03-123285 and No. Q-03-123286. The Informations were signed by
Assistant City Prosecutor Ronald C. Torralba.
On 23 February 2004, private complainants AAA1 and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation
asking Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations
had been filed against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and
ordered a reinvestigation of the cases.
On 19 May 2004, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the
City Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the
crimes charged.
On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation
affirming the Informations filed against petitioners and their co-accused in Criminal Cases No.
Q-03-123284-86. The Resolution was signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Raniel S. Cruz and
approved by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.
On 3 March 2006, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint
Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the
Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was lack of probable cause. On the same
date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay.
On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order of even
date.
Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the present
Petition for Mandamus, bringing forth this lone issue for our consideration:
CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL RESPONDENT JUDGE BAY TO DISMISS THE CASE
THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY VIRTUE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY FINDING NO PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE ACCUSED
AND SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION?2
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when
the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.3
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of
discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment
in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to
be exercised and not that of the court.4
In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant
the Office of the City Prosecutor’s Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In
effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge Bay’s exercise of judicial discretion.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are
beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those
matters, when refused.5 However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already
taken in the exercise of either.6 In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to
Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be
compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge
Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by
denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners believed that
Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the
Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a
Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.
Petitioners counter that the above conclusion, which has been argued by the Solicitor General, is
contrary to a ruling of this Court, which allegedly states that the proper remedy in such cases is
a Petition for Mandamus and not Certiorari. Petitioners cite the following excerpt from our ruling
in Sanchez v. Demetriou7:
The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the prosecutor,
and we do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such
discretion.
87
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in
special cases by the President of the Philippines. But even this Court cannot order the
prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to
support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but as a
rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.
The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion
that will justify a judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such a case the
proper remedy to call for such exception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or
prohibition.8 (Emphases supplied.)
Petitioners have taken the above passage way out of its context. In the case of Sanchez,
Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez brought a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, challenging
the order of the respondent Judge therein denying his motion to quash the Information filed
against him and six other persons for alleged rape and homicide. One of the arguments of
Mayor Sanchez was that there was discrimination against him because of the non-inclusion of
two other persons in the Information. We held that even this Court cannot order the prosecution
of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a
prima facie case. However, if there was an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the prosecutors in that case, Mayor Sanchez should have filed a Petition for
Mandamus to compel the filing of charges against said two other persons.
In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is directed not against the prosecution, but
against the trial court, seeking to compel the trial court to grant the Motion to Withdraw
Informations by the City Prosecutor’s Office. The prosecution has already filed a case against
petitioners. Recently, in Santos v. Orda, Jr.,9 we reiterated the doctrine we established in the
leading case of Crespo v. Mogul,10 that once a criminal complaint or an information is filed in
court, any disposition or dismissal of the case or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests
within the jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court. Thus, we held:
In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court,
any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the
exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court. The trial court is the best
and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
public prosecutor should be addressed to the court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the
Information or to dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the accused. The only
qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused
or the right of the People or the private complainant to due process of law. When the trial court
grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to
withdraw the Information in compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny
the said motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the
Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative.
Petitioners also claim that since Judge Bay granted a Motion for Reinvestigation, he should have
"deferred to the Resolution of Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera withdrawing the case."11 Petitioners
cite the following portion of our Decision in People v. Montesa, Jr.12:
In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation and directed
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the reinvestigation. The former
was, therefore, deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the
Government to consider the so-called new relevant and material evidence and determine
whether the information it had filed should stand.13
Like what was done to our ruling in Sanchez, petitioners took specific statements from our
Decision, carefully cutting off the portions which would expose the real import of our
pronouncements. The Petition for Certiorari in Montesa, Jr. was directed against a judge who,
after granting the Petition for Reinvestigation filed by the accused, proceeded nonetheless to
arraign the accused; and, shortly thereafter, the judge decided to dismiss the case on the basis
of a Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case.
The dismissal of the case in Montesa, Jr. was done despite the disapproval of the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor’s Resolution by the Provincial Prosecutor (annotated in the same
Resolution), and despite the fact that the reinvestigation the latter ordered was still ongoing,
since the Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor had not yet attained finality. We held
that the judge should have waited for the conclusion of the Petition for Reinvestigation he
ordered, before acting on whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of probable
cause, and before proceeding with the arraignment. Thus, the continuation of the above
paragraph of our Decision in Montesa, Jr. reads:
Having done so, it behooved the respondent Judge to wait for a final resolution of the incident.
In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled:
Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an
accused's motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for
reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the
resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based
thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken thereon
to the Department of Justice.
The resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor recommending the dismissal of the case
never became final, for it was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. On the contrary, the
latter disapproved it. As a consequence, the final resolution with respect to the reinvestigation is
that of the Provincial Prosecutor, for under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, no
complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Also, under
Section l(d) of R.A. No. 5180, as amended by P.D. No. 77 and P.D. No. 911.14
As can be clearly seen, the statement quoted by petitioners from Montesa, Jr. is not meant to
establish a doctrine that the judge should just follow the determination by the prosecutor of
whether or not there is probable cause. On the contrary, Montesa, Jr. states:
The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition
thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound
discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the prosecution
of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court is the best and sole judge on
what to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor
before or after the arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion
of the court. The action of the court must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the
accused or the right of the People to due process of law.15
In a seemingly desperate attempt on the part of petitioners’ counsel, he tries to convince us
that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw Informations from the prosecution only
when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for such
withdrawal; and that, where there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors,
the denial of the Motion to Withdraw Informations is void. Petitioners’ counsel states in the
Memorandum:
6.10. Furthermore, the ORDER dated October 2, 2006 of the Respondent Judge BAY consisting
of 9 pages which was attached to the URGENT PETITION did not point out any iota of grave
abuse of discretion committed by Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera in issuing his Resolution in favor
of the sons of the Petitioners. Hence, the ORDER issued by RJBAY is NULL and VOID in view of
the recent ruling of the Hon. Supreme Court in Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216,
September 5, 1997, 86 SCAD 695, 278 SCRA 657 which states that:
88
"In the absence of a finding of grave abuse of discretion, the court’s bare denial of a motion to
withdraw information pursuant to the Secretary’s resolution is void." (Underscoring ours).
6.11. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the Hon. Supreme Court disregard the argument
of the OSG because of its falsity.16
This statement of petitioners’ counsel is utterly misleading. There is no such statement in our
Decision in Ledesma.17 The excerpt from Ledesma, which appears to have a resemblance to the
statement allegedly quoted from said case, provides:
No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and considering that the issue of the
correctness of the justice secretary's resolution has been amply threshed out in petitioner's
letter, the information, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the motion to dismiss, and
even the exhaustive discussion in the motion for reconsideration - all of which were submitted
to the court - the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to
withdraw the information, based solely on his bare and ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial
court's order is inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an independent and competent
assessment of the issue(s) presented in the motion to dismiss. The trial judge was tasked to
evaluate the secretary's recommendation finding the absence of probable cause to hold
petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled to proceed with the trial
without stating his reasons for disregarding the secretary's recommendation.18 (Emphasis
supplied.)
It very much appears that the counsel of petitioners is purposely misleading this Court, in
violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
Rule 10.02 – A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper,
the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repel or amendment, or assert
as a fact that which has not been proved.
Counsel’s use of block quotation and quotation marks signifies that he intends to make it appear
that the passages are the exact words of the Court. Furthermore, putting the words
"Underscoring ours" after the text implies that, except for the underscoring, the text is a faithful
reproduction of the original. Accordingly, we are ordering Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. to show
cause why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar.
To clarify, we never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw
Information from the prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
prosecutors moving for such withdrawal. Neither did we rule therein that where there is no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to Withdraw
Information is void. What we held therein is that a trial judge commits grave abuse of discretion
if he denies a Motion to Withdraw Information without an independent and complete assessment
of the issues presented in such Motion. Thus, the opening paragraph of Ledesma states:
When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable
cause based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to
make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction
over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before
proceeding further with the trial. While the secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on
courts. A trial court, however, commits reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it
refuses/neglects to evaluate such recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the
trial on the mere pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal
action.19 (Emphases supplied.)1avvphi1.zw+
Petitioners also try to capitalize on the fact that the dispositive portion of the assailed Order
apparently states that there was no probable cause against petitioners:
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause against the herein accused for the crimes of rapes and
acts of lasciviousness, the motion to withdraw informations is DENIED.
Let the case be set for arraignment and pre-trial on October 24, 2006 at 8:30 o’clock in the
morning.20 (Underscoring ours.)
Thus, petitioners claim that since even the respondent judge himself found no probable cause
against them, the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the Office of the City Prosecutor should
be granted.21
Even a cursory reading of the assailed Order, however, clearly shows that the insertion of the
word "no" in the above dispositive portion was a mere clerical error. The assailed Order states in
full:
After a careful study of the sworn statements of the complainants and the resolution dated
March 3, 2006 of 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, the Court finds that there
was probable cause against the herein accused. The actuations of the complainants after the
alleged rapes and acts of lasciviousness cannot be the basis of dismissal or withdrawal of the
herein cases. Failure to shout or offer tenatious resistance did not make voluntary the
complainants’ submission to the criminal acts of the accused (People v. Velasquez, 377 SCRA
214, 2002). The complainants’ affidavits indicate that the accused helped one another in
committing the acts complained of. Considering that the attackers were not strangers but their
trusted classmates who enticed them to go to the house where they were molested, the
complainants cannot be expected to react forcefully or violently in protecting themselves from
the unexpected turn of events. Considering also that both complainants were fifteen (15) years
of age and considered children under our laws, the ruling of the Supreme Court in People v.
Malones, G.R. Nos. 124388-90, March 11, 2004 becomes very relevant. The Supreme Court
ruled as follows:
Rape victims, especially child victims, should not be expected to act the way mature individuals
would when placed in such a situation. It is not proper to judge the actions of children who have
undergone traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected from adults under similar
circumstances. The range of emotions shown by rape victim is yet to be captured even by
calculus. It is, thus, unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from rape victims (People v.
Malones, G.R. Nos. 124388-90, March 11, 2004).
The Court finds no need to discuss in detail the alleged actuations of the complainants after the
alleged rapes and acts of lasciviousness. The alleged actuations are evidentiary in nature and
should be evaluated after full blown trial on the merits. This is necessary to avoid a suspicion of
prejudgment against the accused.22
As can be seen, the body of the assailed Order not only plainly stated that the court found
probable cause against the petitioners, but likewise provided an adequate discussion of the
reasons for such finding. Indeed, the general rule is that where there is a conflict between the
dispositive portion or the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. However, where
the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a
mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail.23
In sum, petitioners’ resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial judge to grant their
Motion to Withdraw Informations is improper. While mandamus is available to compel action on
matters involving judgment and discretion when refused, it is never available to direct the
exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action
already taken in the exercise of either.24 The trial court, when confronted with a Motion to
89
Withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution
of the prosecuting arm of the government, but is required to make an independent assessment
of the merits of such motion, a requirement satisfied by the respondent judge in the case at
bar.25
Finally, if only to appease petitioners who came to this Court seeking a review of the finding of
probable cause by the trial court, we nevertheless carefully reviewed the records of the case.
After going through the same, we find that we are in agreement with the trial court that there is
indeed probable cause against the petitioners sufficient to hold them for trial. We decided to
omit a detailed discussion of the merits of the case, as we are not unmindful of the undue
influence that might result should this Court do so, even if such discussion is only intended to
focus on the finding of probable cause.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Mandamus is DISMISSED. Let the records of this case be
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the resumption of the proceedings
therein. The Regional Trial Court is directed to act on the case with dispatch.
Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar for his disquieting conduct as herein discussed.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 9178. March 30, 1914. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FELIPE LASTIMOSA, Defendant-Appellant.
Marcelino Lontok for Appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. MURDER; PRINCIPALS; CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — The defendant in this case declared
criminally responsible for the death of the victim as a principal, even though he might not have
himself physically caused it, because he took direct part in the execution of the deed and
cooperated therein by acts without which it could not have been accomplished. (U. S. v.
Ancheta, 1 Phil. Rep., 165; U. S. v. Santos, 2 Phil. Rep., 453; U. S. v. Balisacan, 4 Phil. Rep.,
545.)
2. ID.; TREACHERY. — The defendant and his companions having bound the deceased before
mortally wounding him, thus assuring accomplishment of the deed without risk to their persons
from any defense the victim might put up, the criminal act is qualified by this circumstance and
constitutes murder.
3. ID.; DWELLING. — The defendant and his companions having begun the aggression of which
the deceased was the victim in the latter’s own dwelling, by binding his hands and taking him so
to a place near the house where the crime was consummated, it must be held to have been
attended by the generic aggravating circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of
the victim, since the act performed cannot be divided or the unity resulting from its details be
broken up.
4. ID.; AMNESTY PROCLAMATION. — The crime in question not having been perpetrated for
political reasons or as a consequence of hatreds, feuds, or dissensions of a political character
between the deceased and the defendant, and having been solely a means of personal revenge
put into execution by the defendant, he cannot be regarded as entitled to the benefits of the
Amnesty Proclamation of July 4, 1902.
DECISION
ARAULLO, J.  :
The defendant was sentenced by a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, dated June
11, 1913, as guilty of the crime of murder, to the penalty of twenty years of cadena temporal,
to indemnify the family of the deceased Lucas Prieto in the sum of P500, and to pay the costs.
Appealing from said judgment, he alleges in his defense in this instance that the trial court erred
in weighing the evidence submitted by the prosecution, as well as in not finding as a result of
such evidence a very grave and reasonable doubt in his favor and in not declaring him to be
entitled to the benefits of the amnesty proclaimed by the President of the United States on July
4, 1902.
The deed with which Felipe Lastimosa was charged in the complaint, is that he did willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, with deliberate premeditation and assisted by a certain Pedro and one
Isco, treacherously inflict death upon Lucas Prieto one day in the month of February, 1901, in
the municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte, in these Islands, by slashing said Prieto in the
abdomen with a bolo and cutting his throat, while he was bound and held by the said Pedro and
Isco.
According to the testimony of Demetria Prieto, daughter of the deceased, her father was inside
their house in the mountains of Baybay when the men named Pedro and Isco bound him up by
order of Iping Lastimosa, that is, the defendant Felipe Lastimosa. Upon seeing this she fled in
fear and did not afterwards see her father. She added that her mother at that time also ordered
her to run away, because her father had been caught by Iping, who falsely attributed to him the
theft of a carabao of his. Finally, since that date, she had not again seen Pedro, or Isco, or the
defendant, nor had she returned to her home; and her mother, now deceased, had told her in
her aunt’s house the morning after the crime that Felipe was the one who had killed her father.
Hilario Laguna, a neighbor of Lucas Prieto’s, whose house was about 10 brazas from his,
testified that on that occasion he saw Prieto and Felipe engaged in a dispute, and when he
casually left his house he saw four persons, the deceased, the defendant Iping, Pedro, and Isco,
also leaving Prieto’s house; the latter’s two hands were tied with a rope which was held by
Pedro, who was behind him, the other two being on each side, that is, Isco on his left and the
defendant Felipe on his right. The latter struck Prieto a blow with his bolo on the right side of
the neck, so that only a very small portion of his head was left attached to his body and he died
immediately after the blow. The witness then took to flight and did not again see Felipe
Lastimosa and his companions, because they fled from the place. This witness added that the
occurrence took place at 7 o’clock in the evening; that there was a light in the deceased’s house
which illuminated that spot; that he was at a distance of 7 brazas from them; and finally, that
he had previously known the accused and his two companions. He had been informed by the
wife of the deceased that the cause of the occurrence was that her husband was charged with
the theft of a carabao.
According to another neighbor of the deceased, one Mateo Montajes, whose house was opposite
at a distance of 10 brazas, the wife of the deceased had run to it about 7 o’clock in the evening
of the day in question begging him to help her husband because he was being killed. He went
toward the place of the occurrence, concealing himself about 3 brazas from the place where the
defendant Felipe Lastimosa and his companions Pedro and Isco, whom he had known
previously, were; he saw them going away and Lucas Prieto dead, with his neck almost
completely cut through and a very small portion of his head attached to his body. The corpse
was picked up by the deceased’s own brothers about 10 o’clock the next morning. When asked
if he had testified before the justice of the peace that Lucas’ corpse bore two wounds, one in the
90
abdomen and the other in the neck, this same witness replied that blood showed on the body
but that he had not ascertained whether there was a wound or not.
Finally, the defendant himself, in testifying as a witness in his own behalf, stated that Lucas
Prieto had stolen a carabao from him; that he went to his house to ask him if he had stolen it,
and Prieto had replied in the affirmative, adding: "You and all the strangers here and your
master are marked to be killed." He decided to go to the town hall of Baybay to report the theft
to the revolutionary leader called Capili, because the revolution was then in full swing, and
having done so, Capili gave him an order, saying: "All right, you go back to the place,
accompanied by these two whom I send with you, to get the carabao and if he does not deliver
it to you, kill him." He them went back to Lucas Prieto’s house, accompanied by two insurgents
who belonged to Capili’s band, one of them called Isco, all three being armed with bolos.
When they reached the house and called up a greeting from below, Lucas, came down carrying
a reaping hook and immediately asked them: "Who are you?" When his two companions replied,
"We’ve come to get the carabao," Lucas said, "Yes, you can get the carabao, but choose
between your lives and the carabao." His companions then retreated, because it appeared that
Luca’s intention was to kill them, and as he observed that a quarrel was arising between the two
who had accompanied him and Lucas, who was the one that began the attack, he retreated a
distance of about 3 brazas; he did not know which of his two companions it was that slashed
Lucas, who was not then bound. He added that there was a light in the house but that it did not
illuminate the place where they were, and finally that he saw there the corpse of Lucas, which
had only a single wound in the neck.
As appears from the evidence taken at the trial, the defendant has corroborated the story of the
prosecution’s witnesses with reference to the fact that Lucas Prieto was violently killed on the
occasion they speak of, and for the motive assigned by some of them, although by hearsay from
the wife of the deceased. The defendant himself has also explicitly acknowledged that he was
the person directly interested in the matter that furnished the motive for the crime, which was
the recovery of the carabao that, according to him, Lucas Prieto had stolen from him; and that it
was he to whom Capili gave the order to go to the place, accompanied by the two insurgents or
revolutionists, in order to recover the carabao or kill Prieto if he did not deliver the animal to
them. On the other hand, it is unlikely that Prieto would have dared to threaten and attack the
defendant and his two companions, the three of them being armed as they were with bolos,
when they appeared at his house to demand of him the return of the carabao. If to all this be
added the consideration that there is no proof nor a single circumstance in the case which would
indicate that either the daughter of the deceased or the other two witnesses took any special
interest in incriminating the defendant, for the former confined herself to telling solely what she
had seen, when she might also have said, without fear that any one would contradict her, that
she saw the defendant himself wound her father with the bolo; and the other two witnesses told
what, under the circumstances, each one of them could have see, the conclusion is reached that
it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant who killed Lucas Prieto with
the bolo he carried, while the victim had his hands tied with a cord held by one of defendant’s
companions and he was watched by the other, the three having bound the deceased inside his
own house before taking him downstairs under the same house, where they accomplished his
death.
The accused, then, is criminally responsible therefor as a principal, and would be responsible as
such although he had not materially committed the crime himself. For it was proven that he
took a direct part in its execution and cooperated therein by acts without which it could not have
been accomplished. In the first place he went to lay his complaint against Lucas Prieto before
the revolutionary leader Capili; from him he secured the order to go with his companions to
either recover the carabao or kill Prieto; with his comrades he repaired to Lucas Prieto’s house
to carry out the order and lastly, he witnessed the execution of that part of the order that
related to the killing of Prieto, always supposing that it was not he himself who carried it out but
one of his said two companions. He did not prevent it, as he might well have done, seeing that
the order was issued by Capili for defendant’s benefit. On the contrary, he required compliance
with the order, for no other meaning could be attached to his presence in the act, interested as
he was in securing the recovery of the carabao from decedent whom he accused of stealing the
beast.
"Persons who are present during the commission of a crime and lend their moral support thereto
without actively participating therein are nevertheless guilty as principals." (U. S. v. Ancheta, 1
Phil. Rep., 165.)
"One who shares the guilty purpose and encourages and abets the crime by his presence at the
time of its perpetration is guilty as principal even though he may have taken no part in its
material execution." (U. S. v. Santos, 2 Phil. Rep., 453.)
"In order to warrant a conviction as principal in the crime of murder, it is not necessary that the
defendants should have taken an active and material part in its commission, but such conviction
will also be sustained if it appears that the defendant did willingly stay with those who took a
material part and was voluntarily present from the time the crime was commenced until it was
consummated." (U. S. v. Balisacan, 4 Phil. Rep., 545).
It having been conclusively proven that the deceased had his hands tied when he was mortally
wounded in the neck, by which means the perpetrators of the crime especially and directly
assured the consummation of their purpose without any risk to their own persons that could
proceed from any defense he might put up, the crime committed by the defendant must be
classified as murder, under article 403 of the Penal Code, by reason of the concurrence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, and there must be imposed upon him the penalty set forth
in said article for that crime.
He cannot be considered as entitled to the benefits of the amnesty granted on July 4, 1902,
because the crime in question was not perpetrated for political reasons or as a consequence of
hatreds, feuds, or dissensions of a political character between the deceased and the defendant
or between the former and the revolutionary leader Capili, it having been merely a means of
personal revenge put into execution by the defendant against the deceased on the supposition
that the latter had stolen an animal belonging to him.
The trial court has not, therefore, in the judgment appealed from, incurred any of the errors
assigned by the defense in its brief. In the commission of said crime there has concurred the
generic aggravating circumstance that the deed was executed in the dwelling of the offended
party without provocation on the part of the victim, for the defendant and his companions bound
him inside his own house and later took him in that manner to a place near by, where the crime
was consummated, a fact which cannot hinder the holding of said circumstance, because, as the
supreme court of Spain has declared in a decision of October 9, 1875, the act performed cannot,
for the purposes of such holding, be divided or its unity be broken up, when the offender began
the aggression in the dwelling of the offended party and ended it in the street or outside of said
dwelling. Nevertheless, the defendant must be given the benefit of the provisions of article 11 of
the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2142. This extenuating circumstance will offset the
generic aggravating one set forth above, wherefore the penalty fixed for the crime ought to be
imposed in its medium degree.
Therefore, we sentence the defendant to the penalty of life imprisonment (cadena perpetua),
with the accessories of article 54 of the said Code, to such extent modifying the judgment
appealed therein upon him, and affirming it in other respects with the addition that he shall not
suffer subsidiary imprisonment for insolvency of the indemnity, in view of the nature of the
principal penalty; with the costs of both instances against the Appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 156052             March 7, 2007
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S.
TUMBOKON, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.
DECISION
91
CORONA,  J.:
In this original petition for mandamus,1 petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir
Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon seek to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza,
Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
The antecedents are as follows.
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
8027.2 Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001.3 It became effective
on December 28, 2001, after its publication.4
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government
units, a principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within
constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the
society.5 This is evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof which state:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public
safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining
areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR
Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero
de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the
[n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of
Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo
Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no
longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the
date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of
businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist
from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil
companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered
into a memorandum of understanding (MOU)6 with the oil companies in which they agreed that
"the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option."
Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to perform the following:
Section 1. - Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL COMPANIES shall, upon
signing of this MOU, undertake a program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals which shall
include, among others, the immediate removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY EIGHT (28)
tanks starting with the LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety
buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. xxx
Section 2. – Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above, the OIL COMPANIES
shall establish joint operations and management, including the operation of common, integrated
and/or shared facilities, consistent with international and domestic technical, safety,
environmental and economic considerations and standards. Consequently, the joint operations
of the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated
areas/facilities. A separate agreement covering the commercial and operational terms and
conditions of the joint operations, shall be entered into by the OIL COMPANIES.
Section 3. - The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer zones mentioned
therein, which shall be taken from the properties of the OIL COMPANIES and not from the
surrounding communities, shall be the sole responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES.
The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do the following:
Section 1. - The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its appropriate action
with the view of implementing the spirit and intent thereof.
Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and intent of this MOU,
enable the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements,
within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the scale down program.
Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES’ compliance with
the provisions of this MOU.
Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the safety buffer
and green zones and shall exert all efforts at preventing future occupation or encroachment into
these areas by illegal settlers and other unauthorized parties.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.7 In the same resolution,
the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July
25, 2002.8 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No.
139 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza
to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for
a reassessment of the ordinance.10
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that
Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of
the terminals of the oil companies.11
The issues raised by petitioners are as follows:
1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or
repeal Ordinance No. 8027.12
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of
the Local Government Code (RA 7160),13 to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal
of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he has allowed them to stay.
Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the
resolutions.14 However, he also confusingly argues that the ordinance and MOU are not
inconsistent with each other and that the latter has not amended the former. He insists that the
ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way prevent
92
him from enforcing and implementing it. He maintains that the MOU should be considered as a
mere guideline for its full implementation.15
Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a
well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear
and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.17
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is
questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ
of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is
neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is
already established. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not
issue.18
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of the
ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a political party registered with the Commission on
Elections and has its offices in Manila. It claims to have many members who are residents of
Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when
a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the
people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in
interest and they need not show any specific interest.19 Besides, as residents of Manila,
petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the city’s ordinances. Respondent never
questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city
mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.">20 One of
these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the
courts.21 He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of
the law and are bound to obey it.23
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the
respondent’s duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain. This is also connected to the second issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the
MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding
on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.24
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin
Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will
surely occur in case of a terrorist attack25 on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce Ordinance
No. 8027.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 188448, January 11, 2017
RODOLFO LAYGO AND WILLIE LAYGO, Petitioners, v. MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SOLANO,
NUEVA VIZCAYA, Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from the
Decision2 dated December 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103922 and
its Resolution3 dated June 19, 2009.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Facts
In July 2005, Aniza Bandrang (Bandrang) sent two letter-complaints4 to then Municipal Mayor
Santiago O. Dickson (Mayor Dickson) and the Sangguniang Bayan of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya,
informing them of the illegal sublease she entered into with petitioners Rodolfo Laygo and Willie
Laygo over Public Market Stalls No. 77-A, 77-B, 78-A, and 78-B, which petitioners leased from
the Municipal Government. Bandrang claimed that petitioners told her to vacate the stalls, which
they subsequently subleased to another. Bandrang expressed her willingness to testify against
petitioners if need be, and appealed that she be given priority in the future to lease the stalls
she vacated.5
In August 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan endorsed the letter of Bandrang and a copy of
Resolution No. 183-20046 to Mayor Dickson for appropriate action. The Sangguniang informed
Mayor Dickson that the matter falls under the jurisdiction of his office since it (Sangguniang) has
already passed and approved Resolution No. 183-2004, which authorized Mayor Dickson to
enforce the provision against subleasing of stalls in the public market.7
Mayor Dickson, in response, informed the Sangguniang that the stalls were constructed under a
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme, which meant that the petitioners had the right to keep
their stalls until the BOT agreement was satisfied. He then asked the Sangguniang if provisions
were made to sanction lessees under the BOT scheme similar to the provision against subleasing
(Item No. 9) in the contract of lease.8
Thereafter, Bandrang wrote another letter to the Sangguniang, praying and recommending to
Mayor Dickson, by way of a resolution, the cancellation of the lease contract between the
Municipality and petitioners for violating the provision on subleasing. She suggested that after
which, the stalls can be bidded upon anew and leased to the successful bidder. She made the
suggestion because Mayor Dickson did not act on her concerns even after
the Sangguniang referred them to him.9
The Sangguniang once again referred the letter of Bandrang, together with a copy of Resolution
No. 183-2004, to Mayor Dickson for appropriate action. The Sangguniang opined that they no
longer need to make any recommendation to Mayor Dickson because Resolution No. 183-2004
already empowered and authorized him to cancel the lease contracts pursuant to its pertinent
provisions.10
Mayor Dickson, however, did not act on the letter of Bandrang and on the referrals of
93
the Sangguniang. Thus, Bandrang filed a Petition for Mandamus11 against him before the
Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya (RTC). Subsequently, she amended her
petition to implead petitioners.12 Bandrang alleged that despite already being aware of the
violations of the lease contracts of petitioners with the Municipality, Mayor Dickson still refused
to enforce the provisions of the lease contracts against subleasing. Bandrang concluded that
Mayor Dickson's inaction can only be construed as an unlawful neglect in the performance and
enforcement of his public duty as the Chief Executive of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Thus, she
sought an order directing Mayor Dickson to immediately cancel the lease between the Municipal
Government and petitioners over Public Market Stall Nos. 77-A, 77-B, 78-A, and 78-B, and to
lease the vacated stalls to interested persons.13
In his Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses,14 Mayor Dickson claimed that under the
principle of pari delicto, Bandrang had no right to seek remedy with the court as she was guilty
herself in leasing the market stalls. Mayor Dickson insisted that he acted in accordance with law
by referring the matter to the Sangguniang for appropriate action. He also argued that
Bandrang had no cause of action against him and that she was not a real-party-in-interest. He
likewise asserted that the subject of the mandamus was not proper as it entailed an act which
was purely discretionary on his part.15
In his Pre-Trial Brief,16 Mayor Dickson elaborated that Bandrang had no cause of action because
the stalls were on a BOT scheme covered by an ordinance. During the hearing, Mayor Dickson
presented a copy of the resolution of the Sangguniang indicating that there was a directive to all
stall owners in the public market of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya to build their own stalls after a fire
gutted the public market.17
On the other hand, petitioners denied that they were the lessees of Stalls 77 A and B and 78 A
and B. They clarified that Clarita Laygo (Clarita), their mother, was the lessee of the stalls by
virtue of a BOT scheme of the Municipality. At the time they entered into a contract of lease with
Bandrang, it was agreed that the contract was subject to the consent of the other heirs of
Clarita. The consent, however, was never given; hence, there was no subleasing to speak of.
Even on the assumption that there was, petitioners maintained that the prohibition on
subleasing would not apply because the contract between the Municipality and Clarita was one
under a BOT scheme. Resolution No. 183-2004 only covered stall holders who violated their
lease contracts with the Municipal Government. Since their contract with the Municipal
Government was not a lease contract but a BOT agreement, Resolution No. 183-2004 would
neither apply to them, nor be enforced against them.18 Further, even granting arguendo that the
prohibition would apply, petitioners claimed that there was no more ground for the revocation of
the lease because the subleasing claimed by Bandrang had ended and the subsequent receipt by
the Municipality of payments ratified the contract with petitioners.19
Meanwhile, on July 23, 2007, the RTC issued an Order directing the substitution of then
incumbent mayor Hon. Philip A. Dacayo (Mayor Dacayo) as respondent in place of Mayor
Dickson.20
Bandrang filed a Motion for Summary Judgment21 on January 8, 2008 arguing that no genuine
factual issues existed to necessitate trial. Bandrang reiterated the violation of petitioners against
subletting in their lease contracts with the Municipal Government. She stated that the will of
the Sangguniang to enforce the policy against subleasing was bolstered by the fact that it
passed two more resolutions, Resolution No. 017-2006 and Resolution No. 135-2007, reiterating
the implementation of Resolution No. 183-2004.22 She also alleged for the first time that after
the filing of the case, another violation besides the prohibition on subletting surfaced: the non-
payment of stall rental fees. She pointed out that petitioners admitted this violation when they
exhibited during a hearing the receipt of payment of rentals in arrears for over 17 months.
Bandrang quoted Section 7B.06 (a) of Municipal Ordinance No. 164, Series of 1994, which
stated that failure to pay the rental fee for three consecutive months shall cause automatic
cancellation of the contract of lease of space or stall. She then concluded that this section left
Mayor Dickson with no choice but to comply.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RTC Ruling
In its Resolution dated January 28, 2008, the RTC granted the petition. Thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, let a Writ of Mandamus to issue ordering the
Municipal Mayor of Solano to implement Nos. 9 and 11 of the provisions of the Contract of lease
of stall between the Municipal Government of Solano and private respondents Rodolfo and Willie
Laygo.
The Municipal Mayor of Solano, Hon. Philip A. Dacayo, is hereby ordered as it is his duty to
enforce [Sangguniang Bayan] Resolution Nos. 183-2004 and (135]-2007 immediately and
without further delay.
SO ORDERED."24ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC held that the contract between petitioners and the Municipal Government was a lease
contract, as evidenced by a certification signed by Mayor Epifanio LD. Galima (Mayor Galima)
dated September 17, 2006.25cralawred The RTC brushed aside the non-presentation of the
written contract of lease, noting that public policy and public interest must prevail. The RTC also
held that even on the assumption that there was a BOT agreement between petitioners and the
Municipal Government, petitioners had already been compensated for it, as evidenced by
certifications of the Municipal Government dated August 28, 2006 and September 17, 2006.26
As regards the non-payment of stall rentals, the RTC ruled that petitioners deemed to have
admitted the allegation when they exhibited to the court the receipt of payment of rentals in
arrears.27
The RTC, thus, concluded that petitioners clearly violated the terms and conditions of the lease
contract, which gave rise to the enactment of Resolution No. 183-2004. Since Mayor Dickson
failed in his duty to enforce the resolution and delayed its implementation without valid
reason, mandamus is a proper remedy.28
Petitioners appealed to the CA, while then incumbent Mayor Dacayo filed a manifestation
expressing his willingness to implement Resolutions No. 183-2004 and 135-
2007.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Court of Appeals Ruling
On December 16, 2008, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision30 dismissing the appeal and
sustaining the resolution of the RTC.
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the contract between petitioners and the Municipal
Government is a lease contract and, thus, Resolution No. 183-2004 applies to them.31
On the issue of whether mandamus is proper, the CA also affirmed the ruling of the RTC stating
that although mandamus is properly availed of to compel a ministerial duty, it is also available
to compel action in matters involving judgment and discretion but not to direct an action in a
particular way, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x However, mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, in matters
involving judgment and discretion, though not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the
exercise of either.
In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Bayan of Solano ("Sangguniang") delegated to Mayor
Dickson and subsequently to incumbent Mayor Dacayo, the power to cancel the lease
contracts of those market stallholders who violated their contracts with the
Municipality. Inferred from this power is the power of the Mayor to determine who among the
market stallholders violated their lease contracts with the Municipality. Such power connotes an
exercise of discretion.
When then Mayor Dickson refused to exercise this discretion, even after
94
the Sangguniang assured him that the subject resolution empowered him to have the lease
contracts of the Laygos cancelled, said act of refusal became proper subject of mandamus, as it
involved a duty expected of him to be performed. So with the incumbent Mayor, the Hon. Philip
Dacayo, as was ordered by the Court below.32ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Willie Laygo filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 20, 2009, which was denied by
theCA in a Resolution33 dated June 19, 2009.
Hence, this petition, which raised the following questions:
1. May the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 183-2004 be applied against petitioners
despite the absence of a contract of lease between them and the Municipal
Government of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya?
2. May the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 183-2004 be enforced by anybody else,
except Mayor Dickson?
Petitioners reiterate their position that Resolution No. 183-2004 cannot be enforced against
them because there was no contract of lease between them and the Municipal Government and
therefore, there cannot be any occasion for petitioner to violate any provision.
Moreover, petitioners argue that the resolution can only be enforced by Mayor Dickson because
it specified Mayor Dickson and no other. Consequently, since Mayor Dickson is no longer in
office, he cannot now enforce Resolution No. 183-2004.34
The Municipal Government, through the Provincial Legal Officer of Nueva Vizcaya, stated in its
Comment35 that the policy against subleasing was bolstered by the enactment of
the Sangguniang of another resolution, Resolution No. 135-2007, with the same purpose, but
authorizing then Mayor Dacayo to implement the No.9 and No. 11 provisions. in the contract of
lease.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
There is preponderant evidence that the contract between petitioners and the Municipal
Government is one of lease.
The type of contract existing between petitioners and the Municipal Government is disputed. The
Municipal Government asserts that it is one of lease, while petitioners insist that it is a BOT
agreement. Both parties, however, failed to present the contracts which they purport to have. It
is likewise uncertain whether the contract would fall under the coverage of the Statute of Frauds
and would, thus, be only proven through written evidence. In spite of these, we find that the
Municipal Government was able to prove its claim, through secondary evidence, that its contract
with petitioners was one of lease.
We have no reason to doubt the certifications of the former mayor of Solano, Mayor Galima, and
the Municipal Planning and Development Office (MPDO)37 which show that the contract of the
Municipal Government with petitioners' mother, Clarita, was converted into a BOT agreement for
a time in 1992 due to the fire that razed the public market. These certifications were presented
and offered in evidence by petitioners themselves. They prove that Clarita was allowed to
construct her stalls that were destroyed using her own funds, and with the payment of the lease
rentals being suspended until she recovers the cost she spent on the construction. The
construction was, in fact, supervised by the MPDO for a period of three months. The stalls were
eventually constructed completely and awarded to Clarita. She thereafter reoccupied the stalls
under a lease contract with the Municipal Government. In fact, in his Notice dated August 21,
2007, the Municipal Treasurer of Solano reminded petitioners of their delinquent stall rentals
from May 2006 to July 2007.38 As correctly posited by the Municipal Government, if the stalls
were under a BOT scheme, the Municipal Treasurer could not have assessed petitioners of any
delinquency.39
Also, petitioners themselves raised, for the sake of argument, that even if the contract may be
conceded as one of lease, the municipality is nonetheless estopped from canceling the lease
contract because it subsequently accepted payment of rentals until the time of the filing of the
case.40
In the same vein, the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 183-2004, which quoted Items No. 9
and 11 of the lease contract on the absolute prohibition against subleasing and the possible
termination of the contract in view of back rentals or any violation of the stipulations in the
contract, is presumed to have been regularly issued. It deserves weight and our respect, absent
a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the members of the Sangguniang.
Mandamus, however, is not proper.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the
state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation
or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results
from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law.41 As a
rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court,
officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or
[b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled.42 Neither will the extraordinary
remedy of mandamus lie to compel the performance of duties that are discretionary in
nature.43 In Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Villaflor,44 we explained the difference between the exercise
of ministerial and discretionary powers, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"Discretion," when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them
by law or acting officially, under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the judgment or
conscience of others. A purely ministerial act or duty in contradiction to a discretional act is one
which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such
duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the
same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.45 (Citation
omitted.)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Applying the foregoing distinction, we find that the Petition for Mandamus must fail because the
acts sought to be done are discretionary in nature.
The petition sought an order to direct Mayor Dickson to cancel the lease contract of petitioners
with the Municipal Government and to lease the vacated market stalls to interested persons. We
have already settled in the early case of Aprueba v. Ganzon46 that the privilege of operating a
market stall under license is always subject to the police power of the city government and may
be refused or granted for reasons of public policy and sound public administration.47 Being a
delegated police power falling under the general welfare clause of Section 16 of the Local
Government Code, the grant or revocation of the privilege is, therefore, discretionary in
nature.48
Moreover, Resolution No. 183-2004, or even its subsequent equivalent, Resolution No. 135-
2007, merely authorizes the mayor "to enforce the No. 11 provision of the contract of lease of
market stalls between the Municipal Government and the stallholders at the Solano [P]ublic
Market who violated the No. 9 provision of said contract x x x."49 Item No. 11 provides that "[i]f
any back rental remains unpaid for more than [15] days or if any violation be made of any of
the stipulations of this lease by the LESSEE, the LESSOR may declare this lease terminated and,
thereafter, reenter the leased premises and repossess the same, and expel the LESSEE or
others claiming under him/her from the leased premises."50 Clearly, Item No. 11 does not give
the mayor a mandate to motu propio or automatically terminate or cancel the lease with a
lessee who is delinquent in the payment of rentals or who is in violation of any of the provisions
of the contract. This is apparent from the permissive word "may" used in the provision. It does
not specifically enjoin the mayor to cancel the lease as a matter of "duty." Where the words of a
95
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.51
We do not discount, however, our ruling in previous cases where we cited exceptions to the rule
that only a ministerial duty can be compelled by a writ of mandamus. In Republic v.
Capulong,52 we held that as a general rule, a writ of mandamus will not issue to control or
review the exercise of discretion of a public officer since it is his judgment that is to be exercised
and not that of the court.53 Courts will not interfere to modify, control or inquire into the
exercise of this discretion unless it be alleged and proven that there has been an abuse or an
excess of authority on the part of the officer concerned.54
In Angchango, Jr. v. Ombudsman,55 we also held that in the performance of an official duty or
act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but
not to act one way or the other. However, this rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where
there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.56 These
exceptions do not apply in this case.
Firstly, while Mayor Dickson may be compelled to act on the directive provided in Resolution No.
135-2007, he may not be compelled to do so in a certain way, as what was prayed for by
Bandrang in seeking the cancellation of the contract and to re-lease the vacated market stalls to
interested persons. It was enough that Mayor Dickson be reminded of his authority to cancel the
contract under Item No. 11, but whether or not his decision would be for or against Bandrang
would be for Mayor Dickson alone to decide. Not even the Court can substitute its own judgment
over what he had chosen.
As it was, Mayor Dickson did act on the matter before him. He exercised his discretion by
choosing not to cancel the contract on the ground of pari delicto, explaining that Bandrang, as
the sub-lessee herself, was in violation of the same policy on subleasing. The complaint does not
allege that in deciding this way, Mayor Dickson committed grave abuse of discretion, manifest
injustice, or palpable excess of authority. Neither did Bandrang present proof that Mayor
Dickson acted arbitrarily, wantonly, fraudulently, and against the interest of the public when he
chose not to cancel the lease contract of petitioners.57
Further, aside from the imperative duty of the respondent in a petition for mandamus to
perform that which is demanded of him, it is essential that, on the one hand, the person
petitioning for it has a clear legal right to the claim that is sought.58 To be given due course, a
petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of
any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the
enjoyment of a legal right. The petitioner in every case must therefore be an aggrieved party, in
the sense that he possesses a clear right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act
to be performed. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought
before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question.
"Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act that is being
challenged.59 Does Bandrang have such legal standing to institute the petition? We answer in the
negative.
Following our ruling in the early case of Almario v. City Mayor, et al.,  where we ruled that the
60
petitioner seeking to compel the city mayor to eject occupants of stalls in the public market had
no locus standi to file the petition for mandamus, we also arrive here with the same conclusion.
Similarly with Almario, Bandrang is not an applicant for any stall in the public market which is
the subject of the controversy. She is neither a representative of any such applicant, stall
holder, or any association of persons who are deprived of their right to occupy a stall in said
market. As we have deduced in Almario:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x Verily, he is not the real party in interest who has the capacity, right or personality to
institute the present action. As this Court has well said in an analogous case, "the petitioner
does not have any special or individual interest in the subject matter of the action which would
enable us to say that he is entitled to the writ as a matter.of right. His interest is only that
a citizen at large coupled with the fact that in his capacity a[s] president of the Association of
Engineers it is his duty to safeguard the interests of the members of his association." 61 (Italics in
the original, citation omitted.)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December
16, 2008 and Resolution dated June 19, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
103922, and the Resolution dated January 28, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Mandamus against Mayor
Santiago O. Dickson is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 211362               February 24, 2015
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military Academy,
represented by his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his own behalf, and
BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR
COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND
APPEALS BOARD (CRAB), Respondents.
x-----------------------x
FILIPINA P. CUDIA, in behalf of CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA, and on
her own behalf, Petitioner-Intervenor.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The true test of a cadet's character as a leader rests on his personal commitment to uphold
what is morally and ethically righteous at the most critical and trying times, and at the most
challenging circumstances. When a cadet must face a dilemma between what is true and right
as against his security, well-being, pleasures and comfort, or dignity, what is at stake is his
honor and those that [define] his values. A man of an honorable character does not think twice
and chooses the fore. This is the essence of and. the Spirit of the Honor Code - it is championing
truth and righteousness even if it may mean the surrender of one's basic rights and privileges.1
The Procedural Antecedents
Six days prior to the March 16, 2014 graduation ceremonies of the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA), petitioners Renato P. Cudia, acting for himself and in behalf of his son, Cadet First Class
Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia (Cadet JCL Cudia), and Berteni Catalufta Causing filed this petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with application for extremely urgent temporary
restraining order (TRO).2
In a Resolution dated March 1 7, 2014, the Court denied the prayer for TRO and instead,
required respondents to file their comment on the petition.3
On March 25, 2014, Filipina P. Cudia, acting for herself and in behalf of her son Cadet 1 CL
Cudia, filed a motion for leave to intervene, attaching thereto the petition-in-intervention.4 Per
Resolution dated March 31, 2014, the Court granted the motion and resolved to await
respondents' comment on the petition.5
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A manifestation was then filed by petitioners on April 3, 2014, recommending the admission of
the petition-in-intervention and adopting it as an integral part of their petition.6 On May 20,
2014, petitioner-intervenor filed a manifestation with motion for leave to admit the Final
Investigation Report of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) dated April 25, 2014.7 The
Report8 was relative to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029 filed by the spouses Renato and Filipina
Cudia (Spouses Cudia), for themselves and in behalf of their son, against the PMA Honor
Committee (HC) members and Major Vladimir P. Gracilla (Maj. Gracilla)9 for violation of Cadet
lCL Cudia's rights to due process, education, and privacy of communication. Subsequently, on
June 3, 2014, petitioners filed a motion for leave to adopt the submission of the CHR
Report.10 The manifestation was granted and the motion was noted by the Court in its
Resolution dated July 7, 2014.
After filing three motions for extension of time,11 respondents filed their Consolidated
Comment12 on June 19, 2014. In a motion, petitioner-intervenor filed a Reply, which was later
adopted by petitioners.13 Submitted as Annex "A" of the Reply was a copy of the CHR Resolution
dated May 22, 2014 regarding CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029.14 We noted and granted the same
on August 11, 2014 and October 13, 2014.
Petitioner-intervenor twice filed a manifestation with motion to submit the case for early
resolution,15 which the Court noted in a Resolution dated August 11, 2014 and October 3,
2014.16
The Facts
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, the country's
premiere military academy located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio City. He belonged to the
"A" Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class. As claimed by petitioners and petitioner-
intervenor (hereinafter collectively called "petitioners," unless otherwise indicated), he was
supposed to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as
the top Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an ensign of the Philippine Navy.
On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air Force 1 CL cadets had a
lesson examination (LE) on Operations Research (OR432) under Dr. Maria Monica C. Costales
(Dr. Costales) at the PMAFI Room. Per published schedule from the Headquarters Academic
Group, the 4th period class in OR432 was from 1 :30-3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H), while the 5th
period class in ENG412 was from 3:05-4:05 p.m. (1505H-1605H).
Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5th period class issued a
Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1 CL Cudia because he was "[/]ate for two (2) minutes
in his Eng 412 class x x x. "17 Cadets 1 CL Narciso, Arcangel, Miranda, Pontillas, Diaz, Otila, and
Dela Cruz were also reported late for five minutes.18
On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers. They were logged
and transmitted to the Company Tactical Officers ( CTO) for explanation of the concerned
cadets. Two days later, Cadet lCL Cudia received his DR.
In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet lCL Cudia reasoned out that: "I
came directly from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir."19
On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis Hindang (Maj. Hindang), the CTO of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia, meted out to him the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Immediately, Cadet
lCL Cudia clarified with Maj. Hindang his alleged violation. The latter told him that the basis of
the punishment was the result of his conversation with Dr. Costales, who responded that she
never dismissed her class late, and the protocol to dismiss the class 10-15 minutes earlier than
scheduled. When he expressed his intention to appeal and seek reconsideration of the
punishment, he was · advised to put the request in writing. Hence, that same day, Cadet 1 CL
Cudia addressed his Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj. Benjamin L.
Leander, Senior Tactical Officer (STO), asserting:
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended
1500H and our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4t
period class, I went to my next class without any intention of being late Sir.20
A day after, Maj. Leander instructed Maj. Hindang to give his comments on the request of Cadet
1 CL Cudia and to indicate if there were other cadets belonging to the same section who were
also late.
On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted his reply to Maj. Leander pointing out that,
based on his investigation, the 4th period class was not dismissed late. As a result, Maj. Leander
sustained the penalty imposed. Petitioners alleged that Cadet 1 CL Cudia came to know of the
denial of his request only on January 24, 2014 upon inquiry with Maj. Leander.
Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia was informed that Maj. Hindang
reported him to the HC21 for violation of the Honor Code. The Honor Report stated:
Lying that is giving statement that perverts the truth in his written appeal, stating that his 4th
period class ended at l 500H that made him late in the succeeding class.22
Upon asking the HC Chairman, Cadet 1 CL Mike Anthony P. Mogol (Cadet 1 CL Mogol), as to
what Maj. Hindang meant in his Report, Cadet lCL Cudia learned that it was based on Maj.
Hindang's conversations with their instructors and classmates as well as his statement in the
request for reconsideration to Maj. Leander. He then verbally applied for and was granted an
extension of time to answer the charge against him because Dr. Costales, who could shed light
on the matter, was on emergency leave.
On January 13, 2014, Dr. Costales sent text messages to Cadet lCL Cudia, conveying:
Gud pm cdt cudia. Mam belandres gave me bkground na. She told me its a report dated
november. When maj hindang ask me, no time referens. (04:25:11 P.M.)
All the while I thot he was refering to dismisal during last day last december. Whc i told, i wud
presume they wil finish early bee its grp work. (04:29:21 P.M.)23
The next day, Cadets lCL Cudia and Arcangel approached Dr. Costales, who reaffirmed that she
and Maj. Hindang were not in the same time reference when the latter asked her.
Later, Cadet 1 CL Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the Honor Report. He averred:
Sir, We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell rang
(1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper and submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. After
which, I and Cadet lcl Arcangel asked for some query with regards (sic) to the deductions of our
previous LE. Our instructor gladly answered our question. She then told me that she will give
the copy of our section grade, so I waited at the hallway outside the ACAD5 office, and then she
came out of the room and gave me a copy of the grades. Cadet Arcangel, Cadet Narciso and I
immediately went to our 5ti period class which is ENG412.
With these statements, I would like to clarify the following:
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 1. How could this be lying?
2. What is wrong with the side of Maj. Hindang (why did he come up to that
honor report)?
3. What are his assumptions?
I appeal, in the name of clarity, fairness and truth[,] that my case be reopened and carefully
reviewed for I did not violate the honor code/system, I can answer NO to both questions (Did I
intend to deceive? Did I intend to take undue advantage?) and for the following reasons:
1. The honor report of Maj. Hindang was already settled and finalized given
the fact that no face-to-face personal conversation with Ms. Costales was
conducted to clarify what and when exactly was the issue at hand.
2. Statements of the respondents support my explanation.
3. My explanation to my appeal to my DR (Request for reconsideration of
meted punishment) further supports my explanation in my delinquency
report.
4. My understanding of the duration of the "CLASS" covers not just a
lecture in a typical classroom instruction but includes every transaction and
communication a teacher does with her students, especially that in our case
some cadets asked for queries, and I am given instruction by which (sic)
were directly related to our CLASS. Her transaction and communication with
our other classmates may have already ended but ours extended for a little
bit.
I agree and consider that because Cadet CUDIA is under my
instruction to wait, and the other cadets still have business with
me, it is reasonable enough for him to say that "Our class was
dismissed a bit late" (dealing with matter of seconds or a minute
particularly 45 seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds)
And with concern to (sic) OR432 class, I can say it ended on time
(1500H).
(signed)
M COSTALES
w/ attached certification
5. I was transparent and honest in explaining the 2-minute delay and did
not attempt to conceal anything that happened or I did.
6. Furthermore, CPT DULA WAN PA, the Tactical Officer of Hawk
Company[,] and I had a conversation with regards (sic) to the same matter
for which he can give important points of my case.
7. Cadet lcl DIAZ "D" Co can also stand as a witness that I waited for Ms.
Costales. 24
On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a preliminary investigation on the
reported honor violation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. The Foxtrot Company was designated as the
investigating team and was composed of Cadet 1 CL Hasigan as Presiding Officer, and Cadets 1
CL Mogol, lCL Raguindin, 2CL Gumilab, 2CL Saldua, 3CL Espejo, and 3CL Poncardas as
members.25 Soon after, the team submitted its Preliminary Investigation Report recommending
that the case be formalized.
The formal investigation against Cadet 1 CL Cu di a then ensued. The Presiding Officer was
Cadet 1 CL Rhona K. Salvacion, while the nine (9) voting members were Cadets lCL Jairus 0.
Fantin, lCL Bryan Sonny S. Arlegui, 1 CL Kim Adrian R. Martal, 1 CL J eanelyn P. Cabrido, 1 CL
ShuAydan G. Ayada, 1 CL Dalton John G. Lagura, 2CL Renato A. Carifio, Jr., 2CL Arwi C.
Martinez, and 2CL Niko Angelo C. Tarayao.26 Acting as recorders tasked to document the entire
proceedings were 4CL Jennifer A. Cuarteron and 3CL Leoncio Nico A. de Jesus 11.27 Those who
observed the trial were Cadets 1 CL Balmeo, Dag-uman, Hasigan, Raguindin, Paulino, Arcangel,
and Narciso; Cadets 2CL Jocson and Saldua, Jr.; and Cadet 3CL Umaguing.28
The first formal hearing started late evening of January 20, 2014 and lasted until early morning
the next day. Cadet lCL Cudia was informed of the charge against him, as to which he pleaded
"Not Guilty." Among those who testified were Cadet 1 CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and Cadets 1 CL
Arcangel and Narciso. On the second night of the hearing held on January 21, 2014, Cadet 1 CL
Cudia again appeared and was called to the witness stand along with Cadets Brit and Barrawed.
Dr. Costales also testified under oath via phone on a loudspeaker. Deliberation among the HC
voting members followed. After that, the ballot sheets were distributed. The members cast their
votes through secret balloting and submitted their accomplished ballot sheets together with
their written justification. The result was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. Cadet lCL Dalton John
G. Lagura (Cadet lCL Lagura) was the lone dissenter. Allegedly, upon the order ofHC Chairman
Cadet 1 CL Mogol, the Presiding Officer and voting members went inside a chamber adjoining
the court room for further deliberation. After several minutes, they went out and the Presiding
Officer announced the 9-0 guilty verdict. Cadet 1 CL Cudia, who already served nine (9) touring
hours, was then informed of the unanimous votes finding him guilty of violating the Honor Code.
He was immediately placed in the PMA Holding Center until the resolution of his appeal.
On January 24, 2014, Cadet ICL Cudia filed a written appeal addressed to the HC Chairman, the
full text of which stated:
WRITTEN APPEAL
14 NOVEMBER 2013
This is when I was reported for "Late for two (2) minutes in Eng412 class", my explanation on
this delinquency report when I received it, is that "Our class was dismissed a (little) bit late and
I came directly from 4th period class ... etc". Knowing the fact that in my delinquency report, it
is stated that ENG412 classes started 1500H and I am late for two minutes, it is logical enough
for I (sic) to interpret it as "I came 1502H during that class". This is the explanation that came
into my mind that time. (I just cannot recall the exact words I used in explaining that
delinquency report, but what I want to say is that I have no intention to be late). In my
statements, I convey my message as "since I was not the only one left in that class, and the
instructor is with us, I used the term "CLASS", I used the word "DISMISSED" because I was
under instruction (to wait for her to give the section grade) by the instructor, Ms. Costales. The
other cadets (lCL MIRANDA, lCL ARCANGEL) still have queries and business with her that made
me decide to use the word "CLASS", while the others who don't have queries and business with
her (ex: lCL NARCISO and 1 CL DIAZ) were also around.
Note:
The four named cadets were also reported late.
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Reference: Para 171. 0. (Leaving the Classroom Prior to Dismissal Time)(Sec XVII, CCAFPR
s2008)
It is stated in this reference that "Cadets shall not linger in the place of instruction after the
section has been dismissed. EXCEPT when told or allowed to do so by the instructor or by any
competent authority for official purposes. "
The instruction by Ms. Costales was given to me before the two bells rang (indicating the end of
class hour, 1500H). I waited for her for about 45 seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds, that
made me to decide to write "a little bit late" in my explanation. Truly, the class ENDED 1500H
but due to official purpose (instruction by Ms. Costales to wait) and the conflict in academic
schedule (to which I am not in control of the circumstances, 4th PD class 1330H-1500H and 5th
PD class 1500H-1 600H), and since Ms. Costales, my other classmates, and I were there, I used
the word "CLASS".
19 December 2013
I was informed that my delinquency report was awarded, 11 Demerits and 13 Touring hours.
Not because I don't want to serve punishment, but because I know I did nothing wrong, I
obeyed instruction, and believing that my reason is justifiable and valid, that is why I
approached our tactical officer, MAJ HINDANG PAF, to clarify and ask why it was awarded that
day.
In our conversation, he said that he had a phone call to my instructor and he even added that
they have a protocol to dismiss the class, 15 minutes or 10 minutes before 1500H. I explained:
Sir, I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended
1500H and our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4th
period class, I went to my next class without any intention of being late Sir.
These statements are supplementary to my explanation in my delinquency report, in here, I
specified the conflict in the schedule and again, I have no intention to be late. After explaining it
further with these statements, my tactical officer said that since I was reported in a written
form, I should make an appeal in a written form. Thinking that he already understood what I
want to say, I immediately made an appeal that day stating the words that I used in having
conversation with him.29
Attached to the written appeal was a Certification dated January 24, 2014, wherein Dr. Costales
attested:
1. That Cadet MIRANDA, ARCANGEL, [and] NARCISO was (sic) with Cadet CUDIA in
making query about their latest grades in OR432 and/or results of UEl outside the
ACADS office. The following facts may explain their queries on 14 November 2013:
a. That I held my class in the PMAFI room instead of room 104.
b. That OR432 releases grades every Wednesday and cadets are informed
during Thursday, either in class or posted grades in the bulletin board
(grades released was [sic J based on the previous LEs: latest LE before UE
was Decision Trees).
c. That UE papers were already checked but not yet recorded due to (sic)
other cadets have not taken the UE. Cadets were allowed to verify scores
but not to look at the papers.
d. Last 23 January 2014, Captain Dulawan clarified if indeed Cadet
NARCISO and ARCANGEL verified grades. The two cadets said that they
verified something with me after the OR432 class and they were with Cadet
CUD IA. That the statements of the three (3) cadets are all the same and
consistent, thus[,] I honor that as true.
2. As to the aspect of dismissing late, I could not really account for the specific time
that I dismissed the class. To this date, I [cannot] really recall an account that is
more than two (2) months earlier. According to my records, there was a lecture
followed by an LE during (sic) on 14 November 2013. To determine the time of my
dismissal, maybe it can be verified with the other members of class I was handling on
that said date.30
Respondents contend that the HC denied the appeal the same day, January · 24, as it found no
reason to conduct a re-trial based on the arguments and evidence presented.31 Petitioners,
however, claim that the written appeal was not acted upon until the filing of the petition-in-
intervention.32
From January 25 to February 7, 2014, respondents allege that the Headquarters Tactics Group
(HTG) conducted an informal review to check the findings of the HC. During the course of the
investigation, Prof. Berong was said to have confirmed with the Officer-in-Charge of the HC that
classes started as scheduled (i.e., 3:05 p.m. or 1505H), and that Cadet lCL Barrawed, the acting
class marcher of ENG412, verified before the Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and STO
that the class started not earlier than scheduled.
Meantime, on February 4, 2014, the OIC of the HC forwarded the Formal Investigation Report to
the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for review. The next day, the SJA found the report to be legally
in order.
On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez (Col. Briguez), the Commandant of Cadets,
affirmed the HC findings and recommended to Vice Admiral Edgar Abogado, then PMA
Superintendent, the separation from the PMA of Cadet lCL Cudia for violation of the First Tenet
of the Honor Code (Lying, pursuant to Sec. VII.12.b of the CCAFPR S-2008). On the same date,
Special Orders No. 26 was issued by the PMA Headquarters placing Cadet 1 CL Cudia on
indefinite leave of absence without pay and allowances effective February 10, 2014 pending
approval of his separation by the AFPGHQ, barring him from future appointment and/or
admission as cadet, and not permitting him to qualify for any entrance requirements to the
PMA. 33
Two days later, Vice Admiral Abogado approved the recommendation to dismiss Cadet 1 CL
Cudia.
On February 13, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of the Commandant of
Cadets requesting for reinstatement by the PMA of his status as a cadet.34
Four days passed, Annavee P. Cudia (Annavee ), the sister of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, posted his
plight in her Face book account. The day after, the Spouses Cudia gave a letter to Major General
Oscar Lopez (Maj. Gen. Lopez), the new PMA Superintendent, asking to recognize the 8-1 voting
of the HC.35 Copies of which were furnished to the AFP Chief of Staff and other concerned
military officials. Subsequently, Maj. Gen. Lopez was directed to review Cadet lCL Cudia's case.
The latter, in turn, referred the matter to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB).
On February 19, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia made his personal appeal letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez. On
even date, the AFP Chief of Staff ordered a reinvestigation following the viral Facebook post of
Annavee demanding the intervention of the military leadership.
99
Petitioners claim that, on February 21, 2014, Special Order No. 1 was issued directing all PMA
cadets to ostracize Cadet 1 CL Cudia by not talking to him and by separating him from all
activities/functions of the cadets. It is said that any violation shall be a "Class 1" offense
entailing 45 demerits, 90 hours touring, and 90 hours confinement. Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not
given a copy of the order and learned about it only from the media.36 According to an alleged
news report, PMA Spokesperson Major Agnes Lynette Flores (Maj. Flores) confirmed the HC
order to ostracize Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Among his offenses were: breach of confidentiality by
putting documents in the social media, violation of the PMA Honor Code, lack of initiative to
resign, and smearing the name of the PMA.37
On February 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia requested the CRAB for additional time, until March 4,
2014, to file an appeal on the ground that his intended witnesses are in on-the-job training
( OJT).38 As additional evidence to support his appeal, he also requested for copies of the
Minutes of the HC proceedings, relevant documents pertaining to the case, and video footages
and recordings of the HC hearings.
The next day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia and his family engaged the services of the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO) in Baguio City.
The CRAB conducted a review of the case based on the following: (a) letter of appeal of the
Spouses Cudia dated February 18, 2014; (b) directive from the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the
case; and ( c) guidance from Maj. Gen. Lopez.
On February 26, 2014, Brigadier General Andre M. Costales, Jr. (Brig. Gen. Costales, Jr.), the
CRAB Chairman, informed Cadet lCL Cudia that, pending approval of the latter's request for
extension, the CRAB would continue to review the case and submit its recommendations based
on whatever evidence and testimonies received, and that it could not favorably consider his
request for copies of the HC minutes, relevant documents, and video footages and recordings of
the HC hearings since it was neither the appropriate nor the authorized body to take action
thereon.39 Subsequently, upon verbal advice, Cadet 1 CL Cudia wrote a letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez
reiterating his request.40
Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter-complaint before the CHR-Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR) Office against the HC members and Maj. Gracilla for alleged
violation of the human rights of Cadet lCL Cudia, particularly his rights to due process,
education, and privacy of communication.41
On March 4, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia, through the PAO, moved for additional time, until March
19, 2014, to file his appeal and submit evidence. PAO also wrote a letter to AFP Chief of Staff
General Emmanuel T. Bautista (Gen. Bautista) seeking for immediate directive to the PMA to
expeditiously and favorably act on Cadet 1CL Cudia's requests.42
Exactly a week prior to the commencement exercises of Siklab Diwa Class, the following events
transpired:
On March 10, 2014, Annavee sought the assistance of PAO Chief Public Attorney Persida V.
Rueda-Acosta.43 On the other hand, the CRAB submitted a report to the AFP-GHQ upholding the
dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia.44
On March 11, 2014, PAO received a letter from Maj. Gen. Lopez stating the denial of Cadet 1CL
Cudia's requests for extension of time to file an Appeal Memorandum in view of the ample time
already given, and to be furnished with a copy of relevant documents because of confidentiality
and presumption of regularity of the HC proceedings.45 Cadet 1CL Cudia, through PAO, then filed
an Appeal Memorandum46 before the CRAB.
On March 12, 2014, Spouses Cudia wrote a letter to President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III
(Pres. Aquino), who is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, attaching thereto the Appeal
Memorandum.47 On the same day, Special Orders No. 48 was issued by the PMA constituting a
Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and PMA senior officers
to conduct a deliberate investigation pertaining to Cadet 1CL Cudia's Appeal
Memorandum.48 The focus of the inquiry was not just to find out whether the appeal has merit
or may be considered but also to investigate possible involvement of other cadets and members
of the command related to the incident and to establish specific violation of policy or regulations
that had been violated by other cadets and members of the HC.49
On March 13, 2014, the Cudia family and the Chief Public Attorney had a dialogue with Maj.
Gen. Lopez. On March 14, 2014, the CHR-CAR came out with its preliminary findings, which
recommended the following:
a. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to respect and uphold the 8 Guilty - 1 Not
guilty vote;
b. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to officially pronounce Cdt Cudia as Not
Guilty of the charge filed against him before the Honor Committee;
c. For the PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-fledge
graduating cadet and allow him to graduate on Sunday, 16 March 2014;
d. For the PMA to fully cooperate with the CHR in the investigation of Cudia's Case.50
On March 15, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family had a meeting with Pres. Aquino and
Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin. The President
recommended that they put in writing their appeal, requests, and other concerns. According to
respondents, the parties agreed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia would not join the graduation but it was
without prejudice to the result of the appeal, which was elevated to the AFP Chief of Staff. The
President then tasked Gen. Bautista to handle the reinvestigation of the case, with Maj. Gen.
Oscar Lopez supervising the group conducting the review.
Four days after Siklab Diwa Class' graduation day, petitioner Renato S. Cudia received a letter
dated March 11, 2014 from the Office of the AFP Adjutant General and signed by Brig. Gen.
Ronald N. Albano for the AFP Chief of Staff, affirming the CRAB' s denial of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s
appeal. It held:
After review, The Judge Advocate General, APP finds that the action of the PMA CRAB in denying
the appeal for reinvestigation is legally in order. There was enough evidence to sustain the
finding of guilt and the proprietary (sic) of the punishment imposed. Also, your son was afforded
sufficient time to file his appeal from the date he was informed of the final verdict on January
21, 2014, when the decision of the Honor Committee was read to him in person, until the time
the PMA CRAB conducted its review on the case. Moreover, the continued stay of your son at the
Academy was voluntary. As such, he remained subject to the Academy's policy regarding
visitation. Further, there was no violation of his right to due process considering that the
procedure undertaken by the Honor Committee and PMA CRAB was consistent with existing
policy. Thus, the previous finding and recommendation of the Honor Committee finding your
son, subject Cadet guilty of "Lying" and recommending his separation from the Academy is
sustained.
In view of the foregoing, this Headquarters resolved to deny your appeal for lack of
merit.51 Thereafter, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body issued its Final Investigation
Report on March 23, 2014 denying Cadet 1 CL Cudia's appeal.52 Subsequently, on April 28,
2014, the special investigation board tasked to probe the case submitted its final report to the
President.53 Pursuant to the administrative appeals process, the DND issued a Memorandum
100
dated May 23, 2014, directing the Office of AFP Chief of Staff to submit the complete records of
the case for purposes of DND review and recommendation for disposition by the President.54
Meanwhile, on May 22, 2014, the CHR-CAR issued its Resolution with respect to CHR-CAR Case
No. 2014-0029, concluding and recommending as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission on Human Rights-CAR Office finds
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS against the officers and members of the
PMA Honor Committee and .. certain PMA officials, specifically for violations of the rights of
CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA to dignity, due process, education, privacy/privacy of
communication, and good life.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the CHR-CAR Office RESOLVED to indorse to competent
authorities for their immediate appropriate action on the following recommendations:
1. The Philippine Military Academy must set aside the "9-Guilty, 0-Not
Guilty" verdict against Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia, for being null and void; to
uphold and respect the "8-Guilty, 1-Not Guilty" voting result and make an
official pronouncement of NOT GUILTY in favor of Cadet Cudia;
2. The PMA, the AFP Chief of Staff, and the President in whose hands rest
the ends of justice and fate of Cadet Cudia, to:
2.1 officially proclaim Cadet Cudia a graduate and alumnus of the
Philippine Military Academy;
2.2 issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding Diploma for the
degree of Bachelors of Science; and
2.3 Issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding official transcript 'of
his academic records for his BS degree, without conditions therein
as to his status as a PMA cadet.
3. The Public Attorneys' Office to provide legal services to Cadet Cudia in
pursuing administrative, criminal and civil suits against the officers and
members of the Honor Committee named hereunder, for violation of the
Honor Code and System and the Procedure in Formal Investigation,
dishonesty, violation of the secrecy of the ballot, tampering the true result
of the voting, perjury, intentional omission in the Minutes of substantive
part of the formal trial proceedings which are prejudicial to the interest of
justice and Cadet Cudia's fundamental rights to dignity, non-discrimination
and due process, which led to the infringement of his right to education and
even transgressing his right to a good life.
3.1 Cdt lCL MIKE ANTHONY MOGUL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.2 Cdt lCL RHONA K. SALVACION, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.3 Cdt 2CL ARWI C. MARTINEZ
3.4 Cdt 2CL RENATO A. CARINO, JR.
3.5 Cdt 2CL NIKOANGELOC. TARAYAO
3.6 Cdt lCL JEANEL YN P. CABRIDO, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.7 Cdt lCL KIM ADRIAN R. MARTAL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.8 Cdt lCL JAIRUS 0. FANTIN, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.9 Cdt lCL BRYAN SONNY S. ARLEGUI, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.10 Cdt lCL DALTON JOHN G. LAGURA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.11 Cdt 1 CL BIANCHIHEIMER L. EDRA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.12 Cdt 4CL JENNIFER A. CUARTERON (recorder)
3.13 Cdt 3CL LEONCIO NICO A. DE JESUS II (record)
4. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA competent authorities
should investigate and file appropriate charges against Maj. VLADIMIR P.
GRACILLA, for violation of the right to privacy of Cadet Cudia and/or failure,
as intelligence officer, to ensure the protection of the right to privacy of
Cudia who was then billeted at the PMA Holding Center;
5. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and PMA competent authorities should
investigate Maj. DENNIS ROMMEL HINDANG for his failure and ineptness to
exercise his responsibility as a competent Tactical Officer and a good father
of his cadets, in this case, to Cadet Cudia; for failure to respect exhaustion
of administrative remedies;
6. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philppines, the PMA Superintendent, to immediately cause the
comprehensive review of all rules of procedures, regulations, policies,
including the so-called practices in the implementation of the Honor Code;
and, thereafter, adopt new policies, rules of procedures and relevant
regulations which are human-rights based and consistent with the
Constitution and other applicable laws;
7. The Congress of the Philippines to consider the enactment of a law
defining and penalizing ostracism and discrimination, which is apparently
being practiced in the PMA, as a criminal offense in this jurisdiction;
8. His Excellency The President of the Philippines to certify as priority, the
passage of an anti-ostracism and/or anti-discrimination law; and
9. Finally, for the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA authorities to ensure
respect and protection of the rights of those who testified for the cause of
justice and truth as well as human rights of Cadet Cudia.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to monitor the actions by the competent authorities on the foregoing
CHR recommendations.
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Let copy of this resolution be served by personal service or by substituted service to the
complainants (the spouses Renato and Filipina Cudia; and Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia), and all the
respondents. Also, to the PMA Superintendent, the AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National
Defense, His Excellency The President of the Philippines, The Public Attorneys' Office.
SO RESOLVED.55
On June 11, 2014, the Office of the President sustained the findings of the AFP Chief of Staff and
the CRAB. The letter, which was addressed to the Spouses Cudia and signed by Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., stated in whole:
This refers to your letters to the President dated 12 March 2014 and 26 March 2014 appealing
for a reconsideration of the decision of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Honor Committee
on the case of your son, Cadet 1 CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia.
After carefully studying the records of the case of Cadet Cudia, the decision of the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Honor Code System of the AFP Cadet
Corps, this Office has found no substantial basis to disturb the findings of the AFP and the PMA
Cadet Review Appeals Board (CRAB). There is no competent evidence to support the claim that
the decision of the Honor Committee members was initially at 8 "Guilty" votes and 1 "Not
Guilty" vote. The lone affidavit of an officer, based on his purported conversation with one Honor
Committee member, lacks personal knowledge on the deliberations of the said Committee and is
hearsay at best.
Similarly, the initial recommendations of the Commission on Human Rights cannot be adopted
as basis that Cadet Cudia's due process rights were violated. Apart from being explicitly
preliminary in nature, such recommendations are anchored on a finding that there was an 8-1
vote which, as discussed above, is not supported by competent evidence.
In the evaluation of Cadet Cudia's case, this Office has been guided by the precept that military
law is regarded to be in a class of its own, "applicable only to military personnel because the
military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate from that of
civilians" (Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, 10 August 2005 citing Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.
2d 184 [1975] and Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 US 83 [1953]). Thus, this Office regarded the
findings of the AFP Chief, particularly his conclusion that there was nothing irregular in the
proceedings that ensued, as carrying great weight.
Accordingly, please be informed that the President has sustained the findings of the AFP Chief
and the PMA CRAB.56
The Issues
To petitioners, the issues for resolution are:
I.
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND THE CADET
REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING
CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA FROM THE ACADEMY IN UTTER DISREGARD OF HIS
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS CONSIDERING THAT:
A. Despite repeated requests for relevant documents regarding his case, Cadet First
Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was deprived of his right to have access to evidence which
would have proven his defense, would have totally belied the charge against him, and
more importantly, would have shown the irregularity in the Honor Committee's
hearing and rendition of decision
B. Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was vaguely informed of the decisions arrived at
by the Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine
Military Academy
C. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine
Military Academy have afforded Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia nothing but a sham
trial
D. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine
Military Academy violated their own rules and principles as embodied in the Honor
Code
E. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine
Military Academy, in deciding Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia's case, grossly and in
bad faith, misapplied the Honor Code so as to defy the 1987 Constitution,
notwithstanding the unquestionable fact that the former should yield to the latter.
II
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND THE CADET
REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT
CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA LIED, THEREBY VIOLATING THE HONOR CODE
III
WHETHER THE RESULT OF THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION INDEPENDENTLY CONDUCTED
BY THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IS OF SUCH GREAT WEIGHT AND PERSUASIVE
NATURE THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY HONOR, UPHOLD AND RESPECT57
On the other hand, in support of their prayer to dismiss the petition, respondents presented the
issues below:
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
I.
THE MANDAMUS PETITION PRAYING THAT CADET CUDIA BE INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF
GRADUATES OF SIKLAB DIWA CLASS OF 2014 AND BE ALLOWED TO TAKE PART IN THE
COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES HAS ALREADY BEEN RENDERED MOOT.
II.
THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITIONS ARE ACTUALLY FACTUAL WHICH ARE BEYOND THE
SCOPE OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS.
III.
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MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL RESPONDENTS TO GRANT THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR.
IV. IT IS PREMATURE TO INVOKE JUDICIAL REDRESS PENDING THE DECISION OF THE
PRESIDENT ON CADET CUDIA'S APPEAL.
V.
WITH UTMOST DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT MUST EXERCISE CAREFUL RESTRAINT
AND REFRAIN FROM UNDULY OR PREMATURELY INTERFERING WITH LEGITIMATE MILITARY
MATTERS.
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
VI.
CADET CUDIA HAS NECESSARILY AND VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHED CERTAIN CIVIL LIBERTIES
BY VIRTUE OF HIS ENTRY INTO THE PMA.
VII.
THE PMA ENJOYS THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHICH AUTHORIZES IT TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY
MEASURES AND PUNISHMENT AS IT DEEMS FIT AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PECULIAR NEEDS
OF THE ACADEMY.
VIII.
CADET CUDIA WAS PROPERLY AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
The PMA has regulatory authority to administratively terminate cadets despite the absence of
statutory authority.
Violation of the Honor Code warrants the administrative dismissal of a guilty cadet.
Cadet Cudia violated the first tenet of the Honor Code by providing untruthful statements in the
explanation for his tardiness.
The higher authorities of the PMA did not blindly adopt the findings of the Honor Committee.
The procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case were properly accorded to Cadet Cudia.
The subtle evolution in the voting process of the Honor Committee, by incorporating executive
session/chambering, was adopted to further strengthen the voting procedure of the Honor
Committee. Cadet Lagura voluntarily changed his vote without any pressure from the other
voting members of the Honor Committee.
Ostracism is not a sanctioned practice of the PMA.
The findings of the Commission on Human Rights are not binding on the Honorable Court, and
are, at best, recommendatory.
Cadet Cudia was not effectively deprived of his future when he was dismissed from the PMA.58
The Ruling of the Court
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
Propriety of a petition for mandamus
Respondents argue that the mandamus aspect of the petition praying that Cadet 1 CL Cudia be
included in the list of graduating cadets and for him to take part in the commencement
exercises was already rendered moot and academic when the graduation ceremonies of the PMA
Siklab Diwa Class took place on March 16, 2014. Also, a petition for mandamus is improper
since it does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Invoking Garcia v. The
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,59 respondents assert that a
mandamus petition could not be availed of to compel an academic institution to allow a student
to continue studying therein because it is merely a privilege and not a right. In this case, there
is a clear failure on petitioners' part to establish that the PMA has the, ministerial duty to include
Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list, much less award him with academic honors and commission him to
the Philippine Navy. Similar to the case of University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,60 it is submitted that the PMA may rightfully exercise its discretionary power on who
may be admitted to study pursuant to its academic freedom.
In response, petitioners contend that while the plea to allow Cadet 1 CL Cudia to participate in
the PMA 2014 commencement exercises could no longer be had, the Court may still grant the
other reliefs prayed for. They add that Garcia enunciated that a respondent can be ordered to
act in a particular manner when there is a violation of a constitutional right, and that the
certiorari aspect of the petition must still be considered because it is within the province of the
Court to determine whether a branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess thereof.
We agree that a petition for mandamus is improper.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It
may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is
ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of
[the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done."
The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform the act
specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer has the
choice to decide how or when to perform the duty.61
In this case, petitioners pray for, among others: Also, after due notice and hearing, it is prayed
of the Court to issue a Writ of Mandamus to:
1. direct the PMA to include Cadet Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab Diwa Class
of 2014 of the PMA, including inclusion in the yearbook;
2. direct the PMA to allow Cadet Cudia to take part in the commencement exercises if
he completed all the requirements for his baccalaureate degree;
103
 3. direct the PMA to award unto Cadet Cudia the academic honors he deserves, and
the commission as a new Philippine Navy ensign;
4. direct the Honor Committee to submit to the CRAB of the PMA all its records of the
proceedings taken against Cadet Cudia, including the video footage and audio
recordings of the deliberations and voting, for the purpose of allowing the CRAB to
conduct intelligent review of the case of Cadet Cudia;
5. direct the PMA's CRAB to conduct a review de nova of all the records without
requiring Cadet Cudia to submit new evidence if it was physically impossible to do so;
6. direct the PMA's CRAB to take into account the certification signed by Dr. Costales,
the new evidence consisting of the affidavit of a military officer declaring under oath
that the cadet who voted "not guilty" revealed to this officer that this cadet was
coerced into changing his vote, and other new evidence if there is any;
7. direct the PMA's CRAB to give Cadet Cudia the right to a counsel who is allowed to
participate actively in the proceedings as well as in the cross-examinations during the
exercise of the right to confront witnesses against him; and
8. direct the Honor Committee in case of remand of the case by the CRAB to allow
Cadet Cudia a representation of a counsel.62
Similarly, petitioner-intervenor seeks for the following reliefs:
A. xxx
B. a Writ of Mandamus be issued commanding:
a.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to respect and uphold the 8
Guilty -1 Not Guilty vote;
b.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to officially pronounce Cadet
Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed against him before the Honor
Committee;
c.) The PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-
fledged graduating cadet, including his diploma and awards.63
Anent the plea to direct the PMA to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab
Diwa Class of 2014 and to allow him to take part in the commencement exercises, the same was
rendered moot and academic when the graduation ceremonies pushed through on March 16,
2014 without including Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the roll of graduates.
With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights and
entitlements as a full-fledged graduating cadet, including his diploma, awards, and commission
as a new Philippine Navy ensign, the same cannot be granted in a petition for mandamus on the
basis of academic freedom, which We shall discuss in more detail below. Suffice it to say at this
point that these matters are within the ambit of or encompassed by the right of academic
freedom; therefore, beyond the province of the Court to decide.64 The powers to confer degrees
at the PMA, grant awards, and commission officers in the military service are discretionary acts
on the part of the President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief. Borrowing the words of Garcia:
There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to
be of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of petitioner
possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She [in this case, Cadet 1 CL Cudia] cannot
therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding.65
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed against an official or
government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.66 For a writ to
issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there should be an
imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated.67
The same reasons can be said as regards the other reliefs being sought by petitioners, which
pertain to the HC and the CRAB proceedings. In the absence of a clear and unmistakable
provision of a law, a mandamus petition does not lie to require anyone to a specific course of
conduct or to control or review the exercise of discretion; it will not issue to compel an official to
do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do or give to the applicant
anything to which he is not entitled by law.68
The foregoing notwithstanding, the resolution of the case must proceed since, as argued by
petitioners, the Court is empowered to settle via petition for certiorari whether there is grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondents in dismissing Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA.
Factual nature of the issues
According to respondents, the petition raises issues that actually require the Court to make
findings of fact because it sets forth several factual disputes which include, among others: the
tardiness of Cadet 1 CL Cudia in , his ENG412 class and his explanation thereto, the
circumstances that transpired in the investigation of his Honor Code violation, the proceedings
before the HC, and the allegation that Cadet 1 CL Lagura was forced to change his vote during
the executive session/"chambering."
In opposition, petitioners claim that the instant controversy presents legal issues. Rather than
determining which between the two conflicting versions of the parties is true, the case allegedly
centers on the application, appreciation, and interpretation of a person's rights to due process,
to education, and to property; the interpretation of the PMA Honor Code and Honor System; and
the conclusion on whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia's explanation constitutes lying. Even if the instant
case involves questions of fact, petitioners still hold that the Court is empowered to settle mixed
questions of fact and law. Petitioners are correct.
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value
of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns
the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, there is a
question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn
therefrom is correct is a question of law.69 The petition does not exclusively present factual
matters for the Court to decide. As pointed out, the all-encompassing issue of more importance
is the determination of whether a PMA cadet has rights to due process, to education, and to
property in the context of the Honor Code and the Honor System, and, if in the affirmative, the
extent or limit thereof. Notably, even respondents themselves raise substantive grounds that
We have to resolve. In support of their contention that the Court must exercise careful restraint
and should refrain from unduly or prematurely interfering in legitimate military matters, they
argue that Cadet 1 CL Cudia has necessarily and voluntarily relinquished certain civil liberties by
virtue of his entry into the PMA, and that the Academy enjoys academic freedom authorizing the
imposition of disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit and consistent with the
peculiar needs of the PMA. These issues, aside from being purely legal being purely legal
questions, are of first impression; hence, the Court must not hesitate to make a categorical
ruling.
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Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Respondents assert that the Court must decline jurisdiction over the petition pending President
Aquino’s resolution of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' appeal. They say that there is an obvious non-
exhaustion of the full administrative process. While Cadet 1 CL Cudia underwent the review
procedures of his guilty verdict at the Academy level - the determination by the SJA of whether
the HC acted according to the established procedures of the Honor System, the assessment by
the Commandant of Cadets of the procedural and legal correctness of the guilty verdict, the
evaluation of the PMA Superintendent to warrant the administrative separation of the guilty
cadet, and the appellate review proceedings before the CRAB - he still appealed to the
President, who has the utmost latitude in making decisions affecting the military. It is contended
that the President's power over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces is
recognized in B/Gen. (Ret.) Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Senga70 and in Section 3171 of Commonwealth
Act (CA.) No. 1 (also known as "The National Defense Act''). As such, the President could still
overturn the decision of the PMA. In respondents' view, the filing of this petition while the case
is pending resolution of the President is an irresponsible defiance, if not a personal affront. For
them, comity dictates that courts of justice should shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed.
From the unfolding of events, petitioners, however, consider that President Aquino effectively
denied the appeal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. They claim that his family exerted insurmountable
efforts to seek reconsideration of the HC recommendation from the APP officials and the
President, but was in vain. The circumstances prior to, during, and after the PMA 2014
graduation rites, which was attended by President Aquino after he talked to Cadet lCL Cudia's
family the night before, foreclose the possibility that the challenged findings would still be
overturned. In any case, petitioners insist that the· rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not absolute based on the Corsiga v. Defensor 72 and Verceles v. BLR-DOLE73 rulings.
We rule for petitioners.
In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the
prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. The rationale behind the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is that "courts, for reasons of law, comity, and
convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first
been resorted to and the proper authorities, who are competent to act upon the matter
complained of, have been given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged
errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum."74 In the U.S. case of Ringgold v. United
States,75 which was cited by respondents, it was specifically held that in a typical case involving
a decision by military authorities, the plaintiff must exhaust his remedies within the military
before appealing to the court, the doctrine being designed both to preserve the balance between
military and civilian authorities and to conserve judicial resources.
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a party may directly resort to
judicial remedies if any of the following is present:
1. when there is a violation of due process;
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.76
Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia from
the PMA. Thus, it may be a ground to give due course to the petition despite the non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies. Yet more significant is the fact that during the pendency of this
case, particularly on June 11, 2014, the Office of the President finally issued its ruling, which
sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and the CRAB. Hence, the occurrence of this supervening
event bars any objection to the petition based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Court's interference within military affairs
Respondents cite the U.S. cases of Bois v. Marsh77 and Schlesinger v. Councilman78 to support
their contention that judicial intervention would pose substantial threat to military discipline and
that there should be a deferential review of military statutes and regulations since political
branches have particular expertise and competence in assessing military needs. Likewise, in
Orloff v. Willoughby79 and Parker v. Levy,80 it was allegedly opined by the U.S. Supreme Court
that the military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from
that of the civilian. According to respondents, the U.S. courts' respect to the military recognizes
that constitutional rights may apply differently in the military context than in civilian society as a
whole. Such military deference is exercised either by refusing to apply due process and equal
protection doctrines in military cases or applying them but with leniency.
In respondents' view, although Philippine courts have the power of judicial review in cases
attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, policy
considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to military affairs. Such respect is
exercised by the court where the issues to be resolved entail a substantial consideration of
legitimate governmental interest. They suppose that allowing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case to prosper
will set an institutionally dangerous precedent, opening a Pandora's box of other challenges
against the specialized system of discipline of the PMA. They state that with the PMA's mandate
to train cadets for permanent commission in the AFP, its disciplinary rules and procedure
necessarily must impose h different standard of conduct compared with civilian institutions.
Petitioners, on the other hand, consider that this Court is part of the State's check-and-balance
machinery, specifically mandated by Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to ensure that no
branch of the government or any of its officials acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of, discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. They assert that judicial
non-interference in military affairs is not deemed as absolute even in the U.S. They cite
Schlesinger and Parker, which were invoked by respondents, as well as Burns v. Wilson81 and
Harmon v. Brucker,82 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the proceedings of military
tribunals on account of issues posed concerning due process and violations of constitutional
rights. Also, in Magno v. De Villa83 decided by this Court, petitioners note that We, in fact,
exercised the judicial power to determine whether the APP and the members of the court martial
acted with grave abuse o.f discretion in their military investigation.
105
Petitioners' contentions are tenable.
Admittedly, the Constitution entrusts the political branches of the government, not the courts,
with superintendence and control over the military because the courts generally lack the
competence and expertise necessary to evaluate military decisions and they are ill-equipped to
determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might
have.84 Nevertheless, for the sake of brevity, We rule that the facts as well as the legal issues in
the U.S. cases cited by respondents are not on all fours with the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia.
Instead, what applies is the 1975 U.S. case of Andrews v. Knowlton,85 which similarly involved
cadets who were separated from the United States Military Academy due to Honor Code
violations. Following Wasson v. Trowbridge86 and Hagopian v. Knowlton,87 Andrews re-affirmed
the power of the district courts to review procedures used at the service academies in the
separation or dismissal of cadets and midshipmen. While it recognized the "constitutional
permissibility of the military to set and enforce uncommonly high standards of conduct and
ethics," it said that the courts "have expanded at an accelerated pace the scope of judicial
access for review of military determinations." Later, in Kolesa v. Lehman,88 it was opined that it
has been well settled that federal courts have jurisdiction "where there is a substantial claim
that prescribed military procedures violates one's constitutional rights." By 1983, the U.S.
Congress eventually made major revisions to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) by
expressly providing, among others; for a direct review by the U.S. Supreme Court of decisions
by the military's highest appellate authority.89
Even without referring to U.S. cases, the position of petitioners is still formidable. In this
jurisdiction, Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the scope of judicial power
by mandating that the duty of the courts of justice includes not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" even if
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.90 Grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.91
The proceedings of the Cadet Honor Committee can, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, be
considered a governmental activity. As ruled in Andrews:
The relationship between the Cadet Honor Committee and the separation process at the
Academy has been sufficiently formalized, and is sufficiently interdependent, so as to bring that
committee's activities within the definition of governmental activity for the purposes of our
review. While the Academy has long had the informal practice of referring all alleged violations
to the Cadet Honor Committee, the relationship between that committee and the separation
process has to a degree been formalized. x x x
Regardless of whether the relationship be deemed formal or informal, the Honor Committee
under its own procedures provides that a single "not guilty" vote by a member ends the matter,
while a "guilty" finding confronts a cadet with the hard choice of either resigning or electing to
go before a Board of Officers. An adverse finding there results not only in formal separation
from the Academy but also in a damaging record that will follow the cadet through life.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Cadet Honor Committee, acting not unlike a grand jury, is
clearly part of the process whereby a cadet can ultimately be adjudged to have violated the
Cadet Honor Code and be separated from the Academy. Therefore, the effect of the committee's
procedures and determinations on the separation process is sufficiently intertwined with the
formal governmental activity which may follow as to bring it properly under judicial review92
No one is above the law, including the military. In fact, the present Constitution declares it as a
matter of principle that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.93 Consistent
with the republican system of checks and balances, the Court has been entrusted, expressly or
by necessary implication, with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate
cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action.94
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
Cadet's relinquishment of certain civil liberties
Respondents assert that the standard of rights applicable to a cadet is not the same as that of a
civilian because the former' s rights have already been recalibrated to best serve the military
purpose and necessity. They claim that both Gudani and Lt. Col. Kapunan, Jr. v. Gen. De
Villa95 recognized that, to a certain degree, individual rights of persons in the military service
may be curtailed by the rules of military discipline in order to ensure its effectiveness in fulfilling
the duties required to be discharged under the law. Respondents remind that, as a military
student aspiring to a commissioned post in the military service, Cadet 1 CL Cudia voluntarily
gave up certain civil and political rights which the rest of the civilian population enjoys. The
deliberate surrender of certain freedoms on his part is embodied in the cadets' Honor Code
Handbook. It is noted that at the beginning of their academic life in the PMA, Cadet 1 CL Cudia,
along with the rest of Cadet Corps, took an oath and undertaking to stand by the Honor Code
and the Honor System.
To say that a PMA cadet surrenders his fundamental human rights, including the right to due
process, is, for petitioners, contrary to the provisions of Section 3, Article II of the 1987
Constitution,96 Executive Order (E.O.) No. 17897 (as amended by E.O. No. 100598), AFP Code of
Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor System, military professionalism,
and, in general, military culture. They maintain that the HC, the CRAB, and the PMA, grossly
and in bad faith misapplied the Honor Code and the Honor System in deciding Cadet lCL Cudia's
case considering that these should not be implemented at the expense of human rights, due
process, and fair play. Further, under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, they can never
overpower or defy the 1987 Constitution since the former should yield to the latter. Petitioners
stress that the statement that "a cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil rights and
liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented" simply pertains to what cadets
have to sacrifice in order to prove that they are men or women of integrity and honor, such as
the right to entertain vices and the right to freely choose what they want to say or do. In the
context of disciplinary investigation, it does not contemplate a surrender of the right to due
process but, at most, refers to the cadets' rights to privacy and to remain silent.
We concur with the stand of petitioners.
Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private interests
for the proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater
degree than a student at a civilian public school.99 In fact, the Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook of the PMA expresses that, "[as] a training environment, the Cadet Corps is a society
which has its own norms. Each member binds himself to what is good for him, his subordinates,
and his peers. To be part of the Cadet Corps requires the surrender of some basic rights and
liberties for the good of the group."100
It is clear, however, from the teachings of Wasson and Hagopian, which were adopted by
Andrews, that a cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has
constitutionally protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary
proceedings conducted within the bounds of procedural due process is a must.101 For that
reason, the PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to
him, the minimal requirements of the due process clause must be satisfied.102 Likewise, the
cadet faces far more severe sanctions of being expelled from a course of college instruction
which he or she has pursued with a view to becoming a career officer and of probably
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being forever denied that career.103
The cases of Gudani and Kapunan, Jr. are inapplicable as they do not specifically pertain to
dismissal proceedings of a cadet in a military academy due to honor violation. In Gudani, the
Court denied the petition that sought to annul the directive from then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, which' enjoined petitioners from testifying before the Congress without her
consent. We ruled that petitioners may be subjected to military discipline for their defiance of a
direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. On the other hand, in Kapunan, Jr., this Court upheld the
restriction imposed on petitioner since the conditions for his "house arrest" (particularly, that he
may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during the period of his
detention) are justified by the requirements of military discipline. In these two cases, the
constitutional rights to information, transparency in matters of public concern, and to free
speech - not to due process clause - were restricted to better serve the greater military
purpose. Academic freedom of the PMA
Petitioners posit that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be used by
the PMA to dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA. They argue that Honor
Code violation is not among those listed as justifications for the attrition of cadets considering
that the Honor Code and the Honor System do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically
terminated or dismissed from service. To them, the Honor Code and Honor System are
"gentleman's agreement" that cannot take precedence over public interest - in the defense of
the nation and in view of the taxpayer's money spent for each cadet. Petitioners contend that,
based on the Civil Code, all written or verbal agreements are null and void if they violate the
law, good morals, good customs, public policy, and public safety.
In opposition, respondents claim that the PMA may impose disciplinary measures and
punishment as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the Academy. Even without
express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring
cadets since it is deemed reasonably written into C.A. No. 1. Moreover, although said law grants
to the President the authority of terminating a cadet's appointment, such power may be
delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision and control over the
cadets.
Respondents likewise contend that, as an academic institution, the PMA has the inherent right to
promulgate reasonable norms, rules and regulations that it may deem necessary for the
maintenance of school discipline, which is specifically mandated by Section 3 (2),104 Article XIV
of the 1987 Constitution. As the premiere military educational institution of the AFP in
accordance with Section 30,105 Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59,106 Chapter 9,
Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of E.O. No. 292 ("Administrative Code of 1987"), the PMA is an
institution that enjoys academic freedom guaranteed by Section 5 (2),107 Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution. In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,108 it was held that
concomitant with such freedom is the right and duty to instill and impose discipline upon its
students. Also, consistent with lsabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc.109 and Ateneo
de Manila University v. Capulong,110 the PMA has the freedom on who to admit (and, conversely,
to expel) given the high degree of discipline and honor expected from its students who are to
form part of the AFP.
For respondents, Cadet 1 CL Cudia cannot, therefore, belatedly assail the Honor Code as basis
of the HC' s decision to recommend his dismissal from the PMA. When he enlisted for enrolment
and studied in the PMA for four years, he knew or should have been fully aware of the standards
of discipline imposed on all cadets and the corresponding penalty for failing to abide by these
standards.
In their Reply, petitioners counter that, as shown in lsabelo, Jr. and Ateneo, academic freedom
is not absolute and cannot be exercised in blatant disregard of the right to due process and the
1987 Constitution. Although schools have the prerogative to choose what to teach, how to
teach, and who to teach, the same does not go so far as to deprive a student of the right to
graduate when there is clear evidence that he is entitled to the same since, in such a case, the
right to graduate becomes a vested right which takes precedence over the limited and restricted
right of the educational institution.
While both parties have valid points to consider, the arguments of respondents are more in line
with the facts of this case. We have ruled that the school-student relationship is contractual in
nature. Once admitted, a student's enrolment is not only semestral in duration but for the entire
period he or she is expected to complete it.111 An institution of learning has an obligation to
afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue.112 Such
contract is imbued with public interest because of the high priority given by the Constitution to
education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over a educational
institutions.113
The school-student relationship has also been held as reciprocal. "[It] has consequences
appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of such kind -it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal
rights and obligations. The school undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to
enable them to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students agree
to abide by the academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations."114
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of
higher learning,115 has been enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987.116 In
Garcia, this Court espoused the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix
Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,117 which enumerated "the four essential freedoms" of
a university: To determine for itself on academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2) what may be
taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted to study.118 An educational
institution has the power to adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for its
government, this being incident to the very object of incorporation, and indispensable to the
successful management of the college.119 It can decide for itself its aims and objectives and how
best to attain them, free from outside coercion or interference except when there is an
overriding public welfare which would call for some restraint.120 Indeed, "academic freedom has
never been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty
to exercise it responsibly. An equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well
expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, that every 'person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."'121
The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom
and that "the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those
pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and
efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival."122 As a Bohemian proverb puts it:
"A school without discipline is like a mill without water." Insofar as the water turns the mill, so
does the school's disciplinary power assure its right to survive and continue operating.123 In this
regard, the Court has always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions,
which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate disciplinary rules.124 In
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,125 this Court elucidated:
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e.,
"how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules
and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the
creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are
equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property.
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Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline.
Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to
teach." Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its
students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.
[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity,
respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical
development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and
spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative
thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.
In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to carry out its
responsibility to help its students "grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and
worthy citizens of the community."
Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident than in "who
may be admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic
dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom
to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.126
The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after graduation for any
act done by the student prior thereto. In University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of
Appeals,127 We upheld the university's withdrawal of a doctorate degree already conferred on a
student who was found to have committed intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. Thus:
Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning." This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973
Constitution likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional
autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in
Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to
"institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority certainly
extending to the choice of students." If such institution of higher learning can decide who can
and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and
distinction of being its graduates.
Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a
university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This
freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student, .as the Court of
Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of such a student that is in question. It is
noteworthy that the investigation of private respondent's case began before her graduation. If
she was able to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many
investigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have been
allowed to graduate.
Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the
constitutional grant of academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology, "is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a
grudging fashion."
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of
the Philippines. It has the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University
Council. It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of
Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has
granted without violating a student's rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be
powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved.
Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a university's highest academic degree upon
an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic
excellence is the university's concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to
take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity.
While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as
an educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has
the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.128
It must be borne in mind that schools are established, not merely to develop the intellect and
skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development,
or flowering if you will, of the total man.129 Essentially, education must ultimately be religious,
i.e., one which inculcates duty and reverence.130 Under the rubric of "right to education,"
students have a concomitant duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school.131 Every
citizen has a right to select a profession or, course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable admission and academic requirements.132 The PMA is not different. As the primary
training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke academic
freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor Code and
the Honor System in particular.
The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral principle. It is the minimum
standard for cadet behavior and serves as the guiding spirit behind each cadet's action. It is the
cadet's responsibility to maintain the highest standard of honor. Throughout a cadet's stay in
the PMA, he or she is absolutely bound thereto. It binds as well the members of the Cadet Corps
from its alumni or the member of the so-called "Long Gray Line."
Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for the cadets' character development. It
defines the desirable values they must possess to remain part of the Corps; it develops the
atmosphere of trust so essential in a military organization; and it makes them professional
military soldiers.133 As it is for character building, it should not only be kept within the society of
cadets. It is best adopted by the Cadet Corps with the end view of applying it outside as an
officer of the AFP and as a product of the PMA.134
The Honor Code and System could be justified as the primary means of achieving the cadets'
character development and as ways by which the Academy has chosen to identify those who are
deficient in conduct.135 Upon the Code rests the ethical standards of the Cadet Corps and it is
also an institutional goal, ensuring that graduates have strong character, unimpeachable
integrity, and moral standards of the highest order.136 To emphasize, the Academy's disciplinary
system as a whole is characterized as "correctional and educational in nature rather than being
legalistic and punitive." Its purpose is to teach the cadets "to be prepared to accept full
responsibility for all that they do or fail to do and to place loyalty to the service above self-
interest or loyalty to friends or associates. "137 Procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary
case
Respondents stress that Guzman v. National University138 is more appropriate in determining the
minimum standards for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions.
Similarly, with the guideposts set in Andrews, they believe that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was accorded
due process.
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the HC, the CRAB and the PMA fell short in observing
the important safeguards laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR139 and Non v. Judge Dames II,140 which
set the minimum standards to satisfy the demands of procedural due process in the imposition
of disciplinary sanctions. For them, Guzman did not entirely do away with the due process
requirements outlined in Ang Tibay as the Court merely stated that the minimum requirements
in the Guzman case are more apropos.
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Respondents rightly argued.
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong141 already settled the issue as it held that although both
Ang Tibay and Guzman essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the latter case is
more apropos since it specifically deals with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. That Guzman is the authority on the
procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases was reaffirmed by the Court in the fairly
recent case of Go v. Colegio De San Juan De Letran.142
In Guzman, the Court held that there are minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process, to wit:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; ( 4) they shall have
the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered
by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.143
We have been consistent in reminding that due process in disciplinary cases involving students
does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings
in courts of justice;144 that the proceedings may be summary;145 that cross-examination is not
an essential part of the investigation or hearing;146 and that the required proof in a student
disciplinary action, which is an administrative case, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt
nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."147
What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum standards of fairness to the individual,
which generally encompass the right of adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard.148 As held in De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:149
Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the
primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or
defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process - it is
enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective
sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be
based. "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court - one
may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings
is accorded, there is no denial of due process.150
The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding conducted to
investigate a cadet's honor violation need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial
proceeding. It articulates that – The Spirit of the Honor Code guides the Corps in identifying and
assessing misconduct. While cadets are interested in legal precedents in cases involving Honor
violations, those who hold the Spirit of the Honor Code dare not look into these precedents for
loopholes to justify questionable acts and they are not to interpret the system to their own
advantage.
The Spirit of the Honor Code is a way for the cadets to internalize Honor in a substantive way.
Technical and procedural misgivings of the legal systems may avert the true essence of
imparting the Spirit of the Code for the reason that it can be used to make unlawful attempt to
get into the truth of matters especially when a cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil
rights and liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented. By virtue of being a
cadet, a member of the CCAFP becomes a subject of the Honor Code and System. Cadet's
actions are bound by the existing norms that are logically applied through the Code and System
in order to realize the Academy's mission to produce leaders of character - men of integrity and
honor.151
One of the fundamental principles of the Honor System also states:
2. The Honor System correlates with legal procedures of the state's Justice System but it does
not demean its Spirit by reducing the Code to a systematic list of externally observed rules.
Where misinterpretations and loopholes arise through legalism and its technicalities, the
objective of building the character of the cadets becomes futile. While, generally, Public Law
penalizes only the faulty acts, the Honor System tries to examine both the action and the
intention.152
Like in other institutions of higher learning, there is aversion towards undue judicialization of an
administrative hearing in the military academy. It has been said that the mission of the military
is unique in the sense that its primary business is to fight or be ready to fight wars should the
occasion arise, and that over-proceduralizing military determinations necessarily gives soldiers
less time to accomplish this task.153 Extensive cadet investigations and complex due process
hearing could sacrifice simplicity, practicality, and timeliness. Investigations that last for several
days or weeks, sessions that become increasingly involved with legal and procedural' points,
and legal motions and evidentiary objections that are irrelevant and inconsequential tend to
disrupt, delay, and confuse the dismissal proceedings and make them unmanageable. Excessive
delays cannot be tolerated since it is unfair to the accused, to his or her fellow cadets, to the
Academy, and, generally, to the Armed Forces. A good balance should, therefore, be struck to
achieve fairness, thoroughness, and efficiency.154 Considering that the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia
is one of first impression in the sense that this Court has not previously dealt with the particular
issue of a dismissed cadet's right to due process, it is necessary for Us to refer to U.S.
jurisprudence for some guidance. Notably, our armed forces have been patterned after the U.S.
Army and the U.S. military code produced a salutary effect in the military justice system of the
Philippines.155 Hence, pertinent case laws interpreting the U.S. military code and practices have
persuasive, if not the same, effect in this jurisdiction.
We begin by stating that U.S. courts have uniformly viewed that "due process" is a flexible
concept, requiring consideration in each case of a variety of circumstances and calling for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.156 Hagopian opined:
In approaching the question of what process is due before governmental action adversely
affecting private interests may properly be taken, it must be recognized that due process is not
a rigid formula or simple rule of thumb to be applied undeviatingly to any given set of facts. On
the contrary, it is a flexible concept which depends upon the balancing of various factors,
including the nature of the private right or interest that is threatened, the extent to which the
proceeding is adversarial in character, the severity and consequences of any action that might
be taken, the burden that would be imposed by requiring use of all or part of the full panoply of
trial-type procedures, and the existence of other overriding interests, such as the necessity for
prompt action in the conduct of crucial military operations. The full context must therefore be
considered in each case.157 (Emphasis supplied)
Wasson, which was cited by Hagopian, broadly outlined the minimum standards of due process
required in the dismissal of a cadet. Thus:
[W]hen the government affects the private interests of individuals, it may not proceed arbitrarily
but must observe due process of law. x x x Nevertheless, the flexibility which is inherent in the
concept of due process of law precludes the dogmatic application of specific rules developed in
one context to entirely distinct forms of government action. "For, though 'due process of law'
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generally implies and includes actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and
a trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings, * * * yet, this is not universally
true." x x x Thus, to determine in any given case what procedures due process requires, the
court must carefully determine and balance the nature of the private interest affected and of the
government interest involved, taking account of history and the precise circumstances
surrounding the case at hand.
While the government must always have a legitimate concern with the subject matter before it
may validly affect private interests, in particularly vital and sensitive areas of government
concern such as national security and military affairs, the private interest must yield to a greater
degree to the governmental. x x x Few decisions properly rest so exclusively within the
discretion of the appropriate government officials than the selection, training, discipline and
dismissal of the future officers of the military and Merchant Marine. Instilling and maintaining
discipline and morale in these young men who will be required to bear weighty responsibility in
the face of adversity -- at times extreme -- is a matter of substantial national importance
scarcely within the competence of the judiciary. And it cannot be doubted that because of these
factors historically the military has been permitted greater freedom to fashion its disciplinary
procedures than the civilian authorities.
We conclude, therefore, that due process only requires for the dismissal of a Cadet from the
Merchant Marine Academy that he be given a fair hearing at which he is apprised of the charges
against him and permitted a defense. x x x For the guidance of the parties x x x the rudiments
of a fair hearing in broad outline are plain. The Cadet must be apprised of the specific charges
against him. He must be given an adequate opportunity to present his defense both from the
point of view of time and the use of witnesses and other evidence. We do not suggest, however,
that the Cadet must be given this opportunity both when demerits are awarded and when
dismissal is considered. The hearing may be procedurally informal and need not be
adversarial.158 (Emphasis supplied)
In Andrews, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that Wasson and Hagopian are equally controlling in
cases where cadets were separated from the military academy for violation of the Honor Code.
Following the two previous cases, it was ruled that in order to be proper and immune from
constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is sought to be dismissed or separated from the academy
must be afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific charges against him, and be given an
adequate opportunity to present his or her defense both from the point of view of time and the
use of witnesses and other evidence.159 Conspicuously, these vital conditions are not too far
from what We have already set in Guzman and the subsequent rulings in Alcuaz v. Philippine
School of Business Administration160 and De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.161
In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s Honor Code violation followed the
prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report
from Maj. Hindang. He was then given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was
informed about his options and the entire process that the case would undergo. The preliminary
investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon
its completion, the investigating team submitted a written report together with its
recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and
recommendations. When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team
was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed
of the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his
side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough
discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the ' Honor Code.
Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at the Academy level - from the OIC
of the HC, to the SJA, to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A
separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ
to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was
constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to
appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings.
It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the
handling of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the factual findings of
administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if not finality by the Court, unless such
findings are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the
procedure which led to the findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.162 In the case of Cadet 1
CL Cudia, We find no reason to deviate from the general rule. The grounds therefor are
discussed below seriatim:
As to the right to be represented by a counsel –
For petitioners, respondents must be compelled to give Cadet 1 CL Cudia the right to be
represented by a counsel who could actively participate in the proceedings like in the cross-
examination of the witnesses against him before the CRAB or HC, if remanded. This is because
while the CRAB allowed him to be represented by a PAO lawyer, the counsel was only made an
observer without any right to intervene and demand respect of Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
rights.163 According to them, he was not sufficiently given the opportunity to seek a counsel and
was not even asked if he would like to have one. He was only properly represented when it was
already nearing graduation day after his family sought the assistance of the PAO. Petitioners
assert that Guzman is specific in stating that the erring student has the right to answer the
charges against him or her with the assistance of counsel, if desired.
On the other hand, respondents cited Lumiqued v. Exevea164 and Nera v. The Auditor
General165 in asserting that the right to a counsel is not imperative in administrative
investigations or non-criminal proceedings. Also, based on Cadet lCL Cudia's academic standing,
he is said to be obviously not untutored to fully understand his rights and express himself.
Moreover, the confidentiality of the HC proceedings worked against his right to be represented
by a counsel. In any event, respondents claim that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not precluded from
seeking a counsel's advice in preparing his defense prior to the HC hearing.
Essentially, petitioners claim .. that Cadet lCL Cudia is guaranteed the right to have his counsel
not just in assisting him in the preparation for the investigative hearing before the HC and the
CRAB but in participating fully in said hearings. The Court disagrees.
Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a
party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a
lawyer, while desirable, is not indispensable. Further, in Remolona v. Civil Service
Commission,166 the Court held that "a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to
represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with
counsel." Hence, the administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel
because assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement.
More in point is the opinion in Wasson, which We adopt. Thus:
The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a function of all of the other aspects
of the hearing. Where the proceeding is non-criminal in nature, where the hearing is
investigative and not adversarial and the government does not proceed through counsel, where
the individual concerned is mature and educated, where his knowledge of the events x x x
should enable him to develop the facts adequately through available sources, and where the
other aspects of the hearing taken as a whole are fair, due process does not require
representation by counsel.167
To note, U.S. courts, in general, have declined to recognize a right to representation by counsel,
as a function of due process, in military academy disciplinary proceedings.168 This rule is
principally motivated by the policy of "treading lightly on the military domain, with scrupulous
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regard for the power and authority of the military establishment to govern its own affairs within
the broad confines of constitutional due process" and the courts' views that disciplinary
proceedings are not judicial in nature and should be kept informal, and that literate and
educated cadets should be able to defend themselves.169 In Hagopian, it was ruled that the
importance of informality in the proceeding militates against a requirement that the cadet be
accorded the right to representation by counsel before the Academic Board and that unlike the
welfare recipient who lacks the training and education needed to understand his rights and
express himself, the cadet should be capable of doing so.170 In the subsequent case of Wimmer
v. Lehman,171 the issue was not access to counsel but the opportunity to have counsel, instead
of oneself, examine and cross-examine witnesses, make objections, and argue the case during
the hearing. Disposing of the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was not
persuaded by the argument that an individual of a midshipman's presumed intelligence, selected
because he is expected to be able to care for himself and others, often under difficult
circumstances, and who has full awareness of what he is facing, with counsel's advice, was
deprived of due process by being required to present his defense in person at an investigatory
hearing.
In the case before Us, while the records are bereft of evidence that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was given
the option or was able to seek legal advice prior to and/or during the HC hearing, it is
indubitable that he was assisted by a counsel, a PAO lawyer to be exact, when the CRAB
reviewed and reinvestigated the case. The requirement of due process is already satisfied since,
at the very least, the counsel aided him in the drafting and filing of the Appeal Memorandum
and even acted as an observer who had no right to actively participate in the proceedings (such
as conducting the cross-examination). Moreover, not to be missed out are the facts that the
offense committed by Cadet 1 CL Cudia is not criminal in nature; that the hearings before the
HC and the CRAB were investigative and not adversarial; and that Cadet lCL Cudia's excellent-
academic standing puts him in the best position to look after his own vested interest in the
Academy.
As to the confidentiality of records of the proceedings –
Petitioners allege that when Maj. Gen. Lopez denied in his March 11, 2014 letter Cadet lCL
Cudia's request for documents, footages, and recordings relevant to the HC hearings, the vital
evidence negating the regularity of the HC trial and supporting his defense have been surely
overlooked by the CRAB in its case review. Indeed, for them, the answers on whether Cadet 1
CL Cudia was deprived of due process and whether he lied could easily be unearthed from the
video and other records of the HC investigation. Respondents did not deny their existence but
they refused to present them for the parties and the Court to peruse. In particular, they note
that the Minutes of the HC dated January 21, 2014 and the HC Formal Investigation Report
dated January 20, 2014 were considered by the CRAB but were not furnished to petitioners and
the Court; hence, there is no way to confirm the truth of the alleged statements therein. In their
view, failure to furnish these documents could only mean that it would be adverse if produced
pursuant to Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.172
For lack of legal basis on PMA' s claim of confidentiality of records, petitioners contend that it is
the ministerial duty of the HC to submit to the CRAB, for the conduct of intelligent review of the
case, all its records of the proceedings, including video footages of the deliberations and voting.
They likewise argue that PMA' s refusal to release relevant documents to Cadet 1 CL Cudia
under the guise of confidentiality reveals another misapplication of the Honor Code, which
merely provides: "A cadet who becomes part of any investigation is subject to the existing
regulations pertaining to rules of confidentiality and, therefore, must abide to the creed of
secrecy. Nothing shall be disclosed without proper guidance from those with authority" (IV. The
Honor System, Honor Committee, Cadet Observer). This provision, they say, does not deprive
Cadet 1 CL Cudia of his right to obtain copies and examine relevant documents pertaining to his
case.
Basically, petitioners want Us to assume that the documents, footages, and recordings relevant
to the HC hearings are favorable to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's cause, and, consequently, to rule that
respondents' refusal to produce and have them examined is tantamount to the denial of his
right to procedural due process. They are mistaken.
In this case, petitioners have not particularly identified any documents, witness testimony, or
oral or written presentation of facts submitted at the hearing that would support Cadet 1 CL
Cudia's defense. The Court may require that an administrative record be supplemented, but only
"where there is a 'strong showing or bad faith or improper behavior' on the part of the
agency,"173 both of which are not present here. Petitioners have not specifically indicated the
nature of the concealed evidence, if any, and the reason for withholding it. What they did was
simply supposing that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's guilty verdict would be overturned with the production
and examination of such documents, footages, and recordings. As will be further shown in the
discussions below, the requested matters, even if denied, would not relieve Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
predicament. If at all, such denial was a harmless procedural error since he was not seriously
prejudiced thereby.
As to the ostracism in the PMA –
To petitioners, the CRAB considered only biased testimonies and evidence because Special Order
No. 1 issued on February 21, 2014, which directed the ostracism of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, left him
without any opportunity, to secure statements of his own witnesses. He could not have access
to or approach the cadets who were present during the trial and who saw the 8-1 voting result.
It is argued that the Order directing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's ostracism is of doubtful legal validity
because the Honor Code unequivocally announced: "x x x But by wholeheartedly dismissing the
cruel method of ostracizing Honor Code violators, PMA will not have to resort to other
humiliating means and shall only have the option to make known among its alumni the names
of those who have not sincerely felt remorse for violating the Honor Code."
On their part, respondents assert that neither the petition nor the petition-in-intervention
attached a full text copy of the alleged Special Order No. 1. In any case, attributing its issuance
to PMA is improper and misplaced because of petitioners' admission that ostracism has been
absolutely dismissed as an Academy-sanctioned activity consistent with the trend in
International Humanitarian Law that the PMA has included in its curriculum. Assuming that said
Order was issued, respondents contend that it purely originated from the cadets themselves, the
sole purpose of which was to give a strong voice to the Cadet Corps by declaring that they did
not tolerate Cadet 1 CL Cudia's honor violation and breach of confindentiality of the HC
proceedings.
More importantly, respondents add that it is highly improbable and unlikely that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia was ostracized by his fellow cadets. They manifest that as early as January 22, 2014, he
was already transferred to the Holding Center. The practice of billeting an accused cadet at the
Holding Center is provided for in the Honor Code Handbook. Although within the PMA
compound, the Holding Center is off-limits to cadets who do not have any business to conduct
therein. The cadets could not also ostracize him during mess times since Cadet 1 CL Cudia opted
to take his meals at the Holding Center. The circumstances obtaining when Special Order No. 1
was issued clearly foreclose the possibility that he was ostracized in common areas accessible to
other cadets. He remained in the Holding Center until March 16, 2014 when he voluntarily left
the PMA. Contrary to his claim, guests were also free to visit him in the Holding Center.
However, petitioners swear that Cadet 1 CL Cudia suffered from ostracism in the PMA. The
practice was somehow recognized by respondents in their Consolidated Comment and by PMA
Spokesperson Maj. Flores in a news report. The CHR likewise confirmed the same in its
Resolution dated May 22, 2014. For them, it does not matter where the ostracism order
originated from because the PMA appeared to sanction it even if it came from the cadets
themselves. There was a tacit approval of an illegal act. If not, those cadets responsible for
ostracism would have been charged by the PMA officials. Finally, it is claimed that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia did not choose to take his meals at the Holding Center as he was not allowed to leave the
place. Petitioners opine that placing the accused cadet in the Holding Center is inconsistent with
his or her presumed innocence and certainly gives the implication of ostracism.
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We agree with respondents. Neither the petition nor the petition-inintervention attached a full
text copy or even a pertinent portion of the alleged Special Order No. 1, which authorized the
ostracism of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Being hearsay, its existence and contents are of doubtful
veracity. Hence, a definite ruling on the matter can never be granted in this case.
The Court cannot close its eyes though on what appears to be an admission of Cadet 1 CL Mogol
during the CHR hearing that, upon consultation with the entire class, the baron, and the Cadet
Conduct Policy Board, they issued an ostracism order against Cadet 1 CL Cudia.174 While not
something new in a military academy,175 ostracism's continued existence in the modem times
should no longer be countenanced. There are those who argue that the "silence" is a
punishment resulting in the loss of private interests, primarily that of reputation, and that such
penalty may render illusory the possibility of vindication by the reviewing body once found guilty
by the HC.176 Furthermore, in Our mind, ostracism practically denies the accused cadet's
protected rights to present witnesses or evidence in his or her behalf and to be presumed
innocent until finally proven otherwise in a proper proceeding.
As to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's stay in the Holding Center, the Court upholds the same. The Honor
Code and Honor System Handbook provides that, in case a cadet has been found guilty by the
HC of violating the Honor Code and has opted not to resign, he or she may stay and wait for the
disposition of the case. In such event, the cadet is not on full-duty status and shall be billeted at
the HTG Holding Center.177 Similarly, in the U.S., the purpose of "Boarders Ward" is to quarter
those cadets who are undergoing separation actions. Permitted to attend classes, the cadet is
sequestered , therein until final disposition of the case. In Andrews, it was opined that the
segregation of cadets in the Ward was a proper exercise of the discretionary authority of
Academy officials. It relied on the traditional doctrine that "with respect to decisions made by
Army authorities, 'orderly government requires us to tread lightly on the military domain, with
scrupulous regard for the power and authority of the military establishment to govern its own
affairs within the broad confines of constitutional due process.'" Also, in Birdwell v.
Schlesinger,178 the "administrative segregation" was held to be a reasonable exercise of military
discipline and could not be considered an invasion of the rights to freedom of speech and
freedom of association.
Late and vague decisions –
It is claimed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was kept in the dark as to the charge against him and the
decisions arrived at by the HC, the CRAB, and the PMA. No written decision was furnished to
him, and if any, the information was unjustly belated and the justifications for the decisions
were vague. He had to constantly seek clarification and queries just to be apprised of what he
was confronted with.
Petitioners relate that upon being informed of the "guilty" verdict, Cadet 1 CL Cudia immediately
inquired as to the grounds therefor, but Cadet 1 CL Mogol answered that it is confidential since
he would still appeal the same. By March 11, 2014, Maj. Gen. Lopez informed Cadet 1 CL Cudia
that the CRAB already forwarded their recommendation for his dismissal to the General
Headquarters sometime in February-March 2014. Even then, he received no
decision/recommendation on his case, verbally or in writing. The PMA commencement exercises
pushed through with no written decision from the CRAB or the PMA on his appeal. The letter
from the Office of the Adjutant General of the AFP was suspiciously delayed when the Cudia
family received the same only on March 20, 2014. Moreover, it fell short in laying down with
specificity the factual and legal bases used by the CRAB and even by the Office of the Adjutant
General. There remains no proof that the CRAB and the PMA considered the evidence presented
by Cadet 1 CL Cudia, it being uncertain as to what evidence was weighed by the CRAB, whether
the same is substantial, and whether the new evidence submitted by him was ever taken into
account.
In refutation, respondents allege the existence of PMA's· practice of orally declaring the HC
finding, not putting it in a written document so as to protect the integrity of the erring cadet and
guard the confidentiality of the HC proceedings pursuant to the Honor System. Further, they
aver that a copy of the report of the CRAB, dated March 10, 2014, was not furnished to Cadet 1
CL Cudia because it was his parents who filed the appeal, hence, were the ones who were given
a copy thereof.
Petitioners' contentions have no leg to stand on. While there is a constitutional mandate stating
that "[no] decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,"179 such provision does not apply in Cadet 1
CL Cudia's case. Neither Guzman nor Andrews require a specific form and content of a decision
issued in disciplinary proceedings. The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook also has no
written rule on the matter. Even if the provision applies, nowhere does it demand that a point-
by-point consideration and resolution of the issues raised by the parties are necessary.180 What
counts is that, albeit furnished to him late, Cadet 1 CL Cudia was informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the
reviewing body, assuring that it went through the processes of legal reasoning. He was not left
in the dark as to how it was reached and he knows exactly the reasons why he lost, and is able
to pinpoint the possible errors for review.
As to the blind adoption of the HC findings –
Petitioners assert that, conformably with Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1, only President
Aquino as the Commander-in-Chief has the power to appoint and remove a cadet for a
valid/legal cause. The law gives no authority to the HC as the sole body to determine the guilt
or innocence of a cadet. It also does not empower the PMA to adopt the guilty findings of the HC
as a basis for recommending the cadet's dismissal. In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, it is claimed
that the PMA blindly followed the HC's finding of guilt in terminating his military service.
Further, it is the ministerial duty of the CRAB to conduct a review de nova of all records without
requiring Cadet 1 CL Cudia to submit new evidence if it is physically impossible for him to do so.
In their minds, respondents cannot claim that the CRAB and the PMA thoroughly reviewed the
HC recommendation and heard Cadet lCL Cudia's side. As clearly stated in the letter from the
Office of the AFP Adjutant General, "[in] its report dated March 10, 2014, PMA CRAB sustained
the findings and recommendations of the Honor Committee x x x It also resolved the appeal
filed by the subject Cadet." However, the Final Investigation Report of the CRAB was dated
March 23, 2014. While such report states that a report was submitted to the AFP General
Headquarters on March 10, 2014 and that it was only on March 12, 2014 that it was designated
as a Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, it is unusual that the CRAB would do the same
things twice. This raised a valid and well-grounded suspicion that the CRAB never undertook an
in-depth investigation/review the first time it came out with its report, and the Final
Investigation Report was drafted merely as an afterthought when the lack of written decision
was pointed out by petitioners so as to remedy the apparent lack of due process during the
CRAB investigation and review.
Despite the arguments, respondents assure that there was a proper assessment of the
procedural and legal correctness of the guilty verdict against Cadet 1 CL Cudia. They assert that
the higher authorities of the PMA did not merely rely on the findings of the HC, noting that there
was also a separate investigation conducted by the HTG from January 25 to February 7, 2014.
Likewise, contrary to the contention of petitioners that the CRAB continued with the review of
the case despite the absence of necessary documents, the CRAB conducted its own review of
the case and even conducted another investigation by constituting the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body. For respondents, petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proof in
showing bad faith on the part of the PMA. In the absence of evidence to the contrary and
considering further that petitioners' allegations are merely self-serving and baseless, good faith
on the part of the PMA' s higher authorities is presumed and should, therefore, prevail.
We agree with respondents.
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The Honor Committee, acting on behalf of the Cadet Corps, has a limited role of investigating
and determining whether or not the alleged offender has actually violated the Honor Code.181 It
is given the responsibility of administering the Honor Code and, in case of breach, its task is
entirely investigative, examining in the first instance a suspected violation. As a means of
encouraging self-discipline, without ceding to it any authority to make final adjudications, the
Academy has assigned it the function of identifying suspected violators.182 Contrary to
petitioners' assertion, the HC does not have the authority to order the separation of a cadet
from the Academy. The results of its proceedings are purely recommendatory and have no
binding effect. The HC determination is somewhat like an indictment, an allegation, which, in
Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case, the PMA-CRAB investigated de novo.183 In the U.S., it was even opined
that due process safeguards do not actually apply at the Honor Committee level because it is
only a "charging body whose decisions had no effect other than to initiate de nova proceedings
before a Board of Officers."184
Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC is covered by the due process clause and that
irregularities in its proceedings were in fact committed, still, We cannot rule for petitioners. It is
not required that procedural due process be afforded at every stage of developing disciplinary
action. What is required is that an adequate hearing be held before the final act of dismissing a
cadet from the military academy.185 In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the OIC of HC, the SJA, the
Commandant of Cadets, and the PMA Superintendent reviewed the HC findings. A separate
investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to
reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Finally, a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was
constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. The Board/Body actually held
hearings on March 12, 13, 14 and 20, 2014. Instead of commendation, petitioners find it
"unusual" that the CRAB would do the same things twice and suspect that it never undertook an
in-depth investigation/review the first time it came out with its report. Such assertion is mere
conjecture that deserves scant consideration.
As to the dismissal proceedings as sham trial –
According to petitioners, the proceedings before the HC were a sham. The people behind Cadet
ICL Cudia's charge, investigation, and conviction were actually the ones who had the intent to
deceive and who took advantage of the situation. Cadet 1 CL Raguindin, who was a senior HC
member and was the second in rank to Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the Navy cadet 1 CL, was part of the
team which conducted the preliminary investigation. Also, Cadet I CL Mogol, the HC Chairman,
previously charged Cadet 1 CL Cudia with honor violation allegedly for cheating (particularly,
conniving with and tutoring his fellow cadets on a difficult topic by giving solutions to a retake
exam) but the charge was dismissed for lack of merit. Even if he was a non-voting member, he
was in a position of influence and authority. Thus, it would be a futile exercise for Cadet 1 CL
Cudia to resort to the procedure for the removal of HC members.186
Further, no sufficient prior notice of the scheduled CRAB hearing was given to Cadet I CL Cudia,
his family, or his PAO counsel. During one of her visits to him in the Holding Center, petitioner-
intervenor was advised to convince his son to resign and immediately leave the PMA. Brig. Gen.
Costales, who later became the CRAB Head, also categorically uttered to Annavee: "Your
brother, he lied!" The CRAB conferences were merely used to formalize his dismissal and the
PMA never really intended to hear his side. For petitioners, these are manifestations of PMA's
clear resolve to dismiss him no matter what.
For their part, respondents contend that the CllR's allegation that Maj. Hindang acted in obvious
bad faith and that he failed to discharge his duty to be a good father of cadets when he "paved
the road to [Cadet 1 CL Cudia's] sham trial by the Honor Committee" is an unfounded
accusation. They note that when Maj. Hindang was given the DR of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, he
revoked the penalty awarded because of his explanation. However, all revocations of awarded
penalties are subject to the review of the STO. Therefore, it was at the instance of Maj. Leander
and the established procedure followed at the PMA that Maj. Hindang was prompted to
investigate the circumstances surrounding Cadet 1 CL Cudia's tardiness. Respondents add that
bad faith cannot likewise be imputed against Maj. Hindang by referring to the actions taken by
Maj. Jekyll Dulawan, the CTO of Cadets 1 CL Narciso and Arcangel who also arrived late for their
next class. Unlike the other cadets, Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not admit his being late and effectively
evaded responsibility by ascribing his tardiness to Dr. Costales.
As to the CHR' s finding that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was likewise "in bad faith and determined to
destroy [Cadet 1 CL] Cudia, for reasons of his own" because the former previously reported the
latter for an honor violation in November 2013, respondents argue that the bias ascribed
against him is groundless as there is failure to note that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was a non-voting
member of the HC. Further, he cannot be faulted for reporting a possible honor violation since
he is the HC Chairman and nothing less is expected of him. Respondents emphasize that the
representatives of the HC are elected from each company, while the HC Chairman is elected by
secret ballot from the incoming first class representatives. Thus, if Cadet 1 CL Cu'dia believed
that there was bias against him, he should have resorted to the procedure for the removal of HC
members provided for in the Honor Code Handbook.
Finally, respondents declare that there is no reason or ill-motive on the part of the PMA to
prevent Cadet 1 CL Cudia from graduating because the Academy does not stand to gain
anything from his dismissal. On the contrary, in view of his academic standing, the separation
militates against PMA' s mission to produce outstanding, honorable, and exceptional cadets.
The Court differs with petitioners.
Partiality, like fraudulent intent, can never be presumed. Absent some showing of actual bias,
petitioners' allegations do not hold water. The mere imputation of ill-motive without proof is
speculative at best. Kolesa teaches us that to sustain the challenge, specific evidence must be
presented to overcome
a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince
that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weaknesses, conferring
investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individual poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
implemented.187
Although a CTO like Maj. Hindang must decide whether demerits are to be awarded, he is not an
adversary of the cadet but an educator who shares an identity of interest with the cadet, whom
he counsels from time to time as a future leader.188 When the occasion calls for it, cadets may
be questioned as to the accuracy or completeness of a submitted work. A particular point or
issue may be clarified. In this case, the question asked of Cadet 1 CL Cudia concerning his being
late in class is proper, since there is evidence indicating that a breach of regulation may have
occurred and there is reasonable cause to believe that he was involved in the breach of
regulations.189
For lack of actual proof of bad faith or ill-motive, the Court shall rely on the non-toleration
clause of the Honor Code, i.e., "We do not tolerate those who violate the Code." Cadets are
reminded that they are charged with a tremendous duty far more superior to their personal
feeling or friendship.190 They must learn to help others by guiding them to accept the truth and
do what is right, rather than tolerating actions against truth and justice.191 Likewise, cadets are
presumed to be characteristically honorable; they cannot overlook or arbitrarily ignore the
dishonorable action of their peers, seniors, or subordinates.192 These are what Cadet 1 CL Mogol
exactly did, although he was later proven to have erred in his accusation. Note that even the
Honor Code and Honor System Handbook recognizes that interpretation of one's honor is
generally subjective.193
Moreover, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Cadets 1 CL' Raguindin and Mogol as well
as Brig. Gen. Costales have an axe to grind against Cadet 1 CL Cudia and were bent on causing,
113
no matter what, the latter's downfall, their nefarious conduct would still be insignificant. This is
so since the HC (both the preliminary and formal investigation), the CRAB, and the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body are collegial bodies. Hence, the claim that the proceedings/hearings
conducted were merely a farce because the three personalities participated therein is
tantamount to implying the existence of a conspiracy, distrusting the competence,
independence, and integrity of the other members who constituted the majority. Again, in the
absence of specifics and substantial evidence, the Court cannot easily give credence to this
baseless insinuation.
As to the HC executive session/chambering –
Petitioners narrate that there was an irregular administrative hearing in the case of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia because two voting rounds took place. After the result of the secret balloting, Cadet 1 CL
Mogol ordered the voting members to go to a room without the cadet recorders. Therein, the
lone dissenter, Cadet lCL Lagura, was asked to explain his "not guilty" vote. Pressured to
change his vote, he was made to cast a new one finding Cadet 1 CL Cudia guilty. The original
ballot was discarded and replaced. There was no record of the change in vote from 8-1 to 9-0
that was mentioned in the HC formal report.
The Affidavit of Commander Junjie B. Tabuada executed on March 6, 2014 was submitted by
petitioners since he purportedly recalled Cadet 1 CL Lagura telling him that he was pressured to
change his "not guilty" vote after the voting members were "chambered." In the sworn
statement, Commander Tabuada said:
1. That after CDT lCL CUDIA [was] convicted for honor violation, I [cannot] remember
exactly the date but sometime in the morning of 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I was
in my office filling up forms for the renewal of my passport, CDT 1CL LAGURA entered
and had business with my staff;
2. When he was about to leave I called him. "Lags, halika muna dito," and he
approached me and I let him sit down on the chair in front of my table. I told and
asked him, "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah ... ano ha ang nangyari? Mag-Tagalog or
mag-Bisaya ka." He replied, "Talagang NOT GUILTY ang vote ko sa kanya sir", and I
asked him, "Oh, bakit naging guilty di ha pag may isang nag NOT GUILTY, abswelto
na? He replied "Chinamber ako sir, bale pinapa-justify kung bakit NOT GUILTY vote
ko, at na-pressure din ako sir kaya binago ko, sir." So, I told him, "Sayang sya,
matalino at mabait pa naman" and he replied "oo nga sir". After that conversation, I
let him go.194
It is claimed that the HC gravely abused its discretion when it committed voting manipulation
since, under the rules, it is required to have a unanimous nine (9) votes finding an accused
cadet guilty. There is nothing in the procedure that permits the HC Chairman to order the
"chambering" of a member who voted contrary to the majority and subjects him or her to
reconsider in order to reflect a unanimous vote. Neither is there an order from the Chief of Staff
or the President sanctioning the HC procedure or approving any change therein pursuant to
Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1. The HC, the CRAB, and the PMA violated their own rules and
principles as embodied in the Honor Code. Being a clear deviation from the established
procedures, the second deliberation should be considered null and void.
Petitioners further contend that the requirement of unanimous vote involves a substantive right
which cannot be unceremoniously changed without a corresponding amendment/revision in the
Honor Code and Honor System Handbook. In their view, "chambering" totally defeats the
purpose of voting by secret ballot as it glaringly destroys the very essence and philosophy
behind the provisions of the Honor System, which is to ensure that the voting member is free to
vote what is in his or her heart and mind and that no one can pressure or persuade another to
change his or her vote. They suggest that if one voting member acquits an accused cadet who is
obviously guilty of the offense, the solution is to remove him or her from the HC through the
vote of non-confidence as provided for in the Honor Code.195 Anent the above arguments,
respondents contend that a distinction must be made between the concepts of the Honor Code
and the Honor System. According to them, the former sets the standard for a cadet's, minimum
ethical and moral behavior and does not change, while the latter is a set of rules for the conduct
of the observance and implementation of the· Honor Code and may undergo necessary
adjustments as may be warranted by the incumbent members of the HC in order to be more
responsive to the moral training and character development of the cadets. The HC may provide
guidelines when the Honor System can be used to supplement regulations. This being so, the
voting process is continuously subject to change.
Respondents note that, historically, a non-unanimous guilty verdict automatically acquits a
cadet from the charge of Honor violation. The voting members only write either "guilty" or "not
guilty" in the voting sheets without stating their name or their justification. However, this
situation drew criticisms since there were instances where a reported cadet already admitted his
honor violation but was acquitted due to the lone vote of a sympathetic voting member.
In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the HC adopted an existing practice that should the voting
result in 7-2 or 8-1 the HC would automatically sanction a jury type of discussion called
"executive session" or "chambering," which is intended to elicit the explanation and insights of
the voting member/s. This prevents the tyranny of the minority or lone dissenter from prevailing
over the manifest proof of guilt. The assailed voting practice has been adopted and widely
accepted by the PMA Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 since their first year in the Academy. The
allegations of conspiracy and sham trial are, therefore, negated by the fact that such practice
was in place and applied to all cases of honor violations, not solely to the case of Cadet 1CL
Cudia.
It is emphasized by respondents that any decision to change vote rests solely on the personal
conviction of the dissenter/s, without any compulsion from the other voting members. There can
also be no pressuring to change one's vote to speak of since a vote may only be considered as
final when the Presiding Officer has affixed his signature.
To debunk Commander Tabuada's statements, respondents raise the argument that the Fact-
Finding Board/Investigating Body summoned Cadet 1 CL Lagura for inquiry. Aside from his oral
testimony made under oath, he submitted to the Board/Body an affidavit explaining that:
11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department of Naval Warfare to
ask permission if it is possible not to attend the Navy duty for the reason that I will be attending
our baseball game outside the Academy.
12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was about to exit out of the
Office, CDR JUNJIE B T ABU ADA PN, our Head Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my
attention. I approached him and he said: "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang
nangyari?" At first, I was hesitant to answer because of the confidentiality of the Honor
Committee proceedings. He again said: "Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito, alam ko naman
na bawal magsabi." Then I answered: "Ako yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding
Officer nagsabi na pumunta muna kami sa Chamber. Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung]
mga nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan
ko, eh naliwanagan ako. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir." He replied:
"Sayang si Cudia ano?" And I said: "Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman at
matalino."196
Cadet 1 CL Lagura restated the above in the Counter-Affidavit executed on March 12, 2014,
which he submitted before the CHR wherein he attested to the following:
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 3. I was chosen to be a voting member of the Honor Committee for Honor Code
violation committed by Cadet Cudia, for "lying". As a voting member, we are the one
who assess or investigate the case whether the reported Cadet is Guilty for his actions
or not.
4. I was the only one who INITIALLY voted "NOT GUILTY" among the nine (9) voting
members of the Honor Committee in the case of Cdt Cudia for Lying.
5. I initially voted "NOT GUILTY" for the reason that after the proceedings and before
the presiding Officer told the members to vote, I was confused of the case of Cadet
Cudia. I have gathered some facts from the investigation to make my decision but for
me it is not yet enough to give my verdict of guilty to Cdt Cudia so I decided to vote
"NOT GUILTY" with a reservation in my mind that we will still be discussing our
verdicts if we will arrive at 8-1 or 7-2. Thus, I can still change my vote if I may be
enlightened with the other's justifications.
6. After the votes were collected, the Presiding Officer told us that the vote is 8 for
guilty and 1 for not guilty. By way of practice and as I predicted, we were told to go
inside the anteroom for executive meeting and to discuss our respective justifications.
I have been a member for two (2) years and the voting committee will always go for
executive meeting whenever it will meet 8-1 or 7-2 votes.
7. I listened to them and they listened to me, then I saw things that enlightened my
confusions that time. I gave a thumbs-up sign and asked for another sheet of voting
paper. I then changed my vote from "NOT GUILTY" to "GUILTY" and the voting
members of the Honor Committee came up with the final vote of nine (9) votes for
guilty and zero (0) votes for not guilty.
9. Cdt Cudia was called inside the courtroom and told that the verdict was GUILTY of
LYING. After that, all persons inside the courtroom went back to barracks.
10. Right after I changed to sleeping uniform, I was approached by Cdt Jocson and
Cdt Cudia, inquiring and said: "Bakit ka naman nagpalit ng boto? ., I answered: "Nasa
process yan, may mali talaga sa rason mo." They also asked who were inside the
Chamber and I mentioned only Cdt Arlegui and Cdt Mogol. That was the last time that
Cdt Cudia and Cdt Jocson talked to me.
11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department of Naval
Warfare to asked (sic) permission if it is possible not to attend the Navy duty for the
reason that I will be attending our baseball game outside the Academy.
12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was about to exit
out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B TABUADA PN, our Head Department Naval Warfare
Officer, called my attention. I approached him and he said: "Talagang nadali si Cudia
ah. Ano ba talaga ang nangyari?" At first, I was hesitant to answer because of the
confidentiality of the Honor Committee proceedings. He again said: "Wag kang mag-
alala, atin, atin lang ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi. " Then I answered: "Ako
yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung} Presiding Officer nagsabi na pumunta muna
kami sa Chamher. Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote ng Guilty
tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh
naliwanagan aka. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir. " He replied:
"Sayang si Cudia ano?" And I said: "Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman
at matalino. "197
Still not to be outdone, petitioners argue that the very fact that Cadet 1 CL Lagura, as the lone
dissenter, was made to explain in the presence of other HC members, who were in
disagreement with him, gives a semblance of intimidation, force, or pressure. For them, the
records of the HC proceedings, which were not presented assuming they actually exist, could
have been the best way to ensure that he was free to express his views, reject the opinion of
the majority, and stick to his decision. Also, it was pointed out that Cadet 1 CL Lagura failed to
clearly explain in his affidavit why he initially found Cadet 1 CL Cudia "not guilty" and what
made him change his mind. His use of general statements like he "was confused of the case "
and "saw things that enlightened my confusions " could hardly suffice to establish why he
changed his vote. Finally, petitioners note the admission of ·Cadet 1 CL Lagura during the CHR
investigation that he was the only one who was given another ballot sheet while in the chamber
and that he accomplished it in the barracks which he only submitted the following day.
However, as the CHR found, the announcement of the 9-0 vote was done immediately after the
HC came out from the chamber and before Cadet 1 CL Lagura submitted his accomplished ballot
sheet.
We rule for respondents.
As to the manner of voting by the HC members, the Honor Code tersely provides:
After a thorough discussion and deliberation, the presiding member of the Board will call for the
members to vote whether the accused is GUILTY or NOT GUILTY. A unanimous vote (9 votes) of
GUILTY decides that a cadet is found guilty of violating the Honor Code.198
From the above-quoted provision, it readily appears that the HC practice of conducting
"executive session" or "chambering" is not at all prohibited. The HC is given leeway on the
voting procedures in' actual cases taking into account the exigency of the times. What is
important is that, in the end, there must be a unanimous nine votes in order to hold a cadet
guilty of violating the Honor Code.
Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC violated its written procedure,199 We still rule that
there is nothing inherently wrong with the practice of "chambering" considering that the
presence of intimidation or force cannot automatically be inferred therefrom. The essence of
secret balloting and the freedom to vote based on what is in the heart and mind of the voting
member is not necessarily diluted by the fact that a second/final voting was conducted. As
explained by Cadet 1CL Mogol before the CRAB:
13. x x x [The] dissenting voter would have to explain his side and insights regarding the case
at hand. The other members, on the other hand, would be given the chance to explain their
votes as well as their insights to the dissenting voter. The decision to change the vote of the
dissenting voter rests solely on his personal conviction. Thus, if he [or she] opted not to change
his/her vote despite the discussion, his [or her] vote is accorded respect by the Honor
Committee.200
It is elementary that intimidation or force is never presumed. Mere allegation is definitely not
evidence.1âwphi1 It must be substantiated and proved because a person is presumed to be
innocent of a crime or wrong and that official duty has been regularly performed.201
The oral and written statements of Cadet 1 CL Lagura should settle the issue. Before the Fact-
Finding Board/Investigating Body and the CHR, he consistently denied that he was pressured by
the other voting members of the HC. His representation must be accepted as it is regardless of
whether he has satisfactorily elaborated his decision to change his vote. Being the one who was
"chambered," he is more credible to clarify the issue. In case of doubt, We have to rely on the
faith that Cadet 1 CL Lagura observed the Honor Code, which clearly states that every cadet
must be his or her own Final' Authority in honor; that he or she should not let other cadets
dictate on him or her their sense of honor.202 Moreover, the Code implies that any person can
have confidence that a cadet and any graduate of the PMA will be fair and just in dealing with
him; that his actions, words and ways are sincere and true.203
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As to the other alleged "irregularities" committed such as not putting on record the initial/first
voting and Cadet 1CL Lagura's bringing of his ballot sheet to and accomplishing it in the
barracks, the Court shall no longer dwell on the same for being harmless procedural errors that
do not materially affect the validity of the HC proceedings.
Cadet 1 CL Cudia 's alleged untruthful statements
Petitioners insist that Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not lie. According to them, there is no clear time
reference as to when was the actual dismissal or what was the exact time of dismissal - whether
it should be the dismissal inside the room or the dismissal after the section grade was given by
Dr. Costales -in the minds of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and the HC investigators and
voting members. They claim that during long examinations, the time of dismissal was usually
five minutes before the class was set to end and the protocol of dismissing the class 15 minutes
earlier was not observed. When Maj. Hindang stated in accusatory language that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia perverted the truth by stating that OR432 class ended at 1500H, he did not state what
was the true time of dismissal. He did not mention whether the truth he was relying on was 5 or
15 minutes before the scheduled end of class.
It is also averred that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's only business was to ask Dr. Costales a query such
that his business was already finished as soon as she gave an answer. However, a new business
was initiated by Dr. Costales, which is, Cadet 1 CL Cudia must stay and wait for the section
grade. At that point in time, he was no longer in control of the circumstances. Petitioners claim
that Dr. Costales never categorically stated that Cadet lCL Cudia was lying. She recognized the
confusion. Her text messages to him clarified his alleged violation. Also, the CHR noted during
its investigation that she could not exactly recall what happened in her class on November 14,
2013.
Furthermore, petitioners reasoned out that when respondents stated that ENG412 class started
at 3:05 p.m., it proves that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was obviously not late. If, as indicated in his
Delinquency Report, he was late two (2) minutes in his 1500-1600H class in ENG 412, he must
have arrived 3:02 p.m. Respondents, however, claim that the class started at 3:05 p.m. Thus,
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not late.
Relative to his explanation to the delinquency report, petitioners were of the view that what
appears to have caused confusion in the minds of respondents is just a matter of semantics;
that the entire incident was a product of inaccuracy, not lying. It is malicious for them to
insinuate that Cadet 1 CL Cudia purposely used incorrect language to hide the truth. Citing
Merriam Webster's Dictionary, petitioners argue that "dismiss" means to permit or cause to
leave, while "class" refers to a body of students meeting regularly to study the same subject.
According to them, these two words do not have definite and precise meanings but are generic
terms. Other than the words "class" and "dismiss" used by Cadet 1 CL Cudia, which may
actually be used in their generic sense, there is nothing deceiving about what he said. Thus, the
answer he chose might be wrong or not correct, but it is not false or not true.
For petitioners, Cadet lCL Cudia's explanations are evidently truthful and with no intent to
deceive or mislead. He did not manipulate any fact and was truthful of his explanation. His ..
statements were clear and unambiguous but were given a narrow-minded interpretation. Even
the Honor Code acknowledges that "[e]xperience demonstrates that human communication is
imperfect at best, and some actions are often misinterpreted."
Lastly, petitioners contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's transcript of records reflects not only his
outstanding academic performance but proves his good conduct during his four-year stay in the
Academy. He has above-average grades in Conduct, with grades ranging from 96 to 100 in
Conduct I to XI. His propensity to lie is, therefore, far from the truth.
On the other hand, respondents were equally adamant to contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was
obviously quibbling, which, in the military parlance, is tantamount to lying. He fell short in
telling a simple truth. He lied by making untruthful statements in his written explanation.
Respondents want Us to consider the following:
First, their OR432 class was not dismissed late. During the formal investigation, Dr. Costales
testified that a class is dismissed as long as the instructor is not there and the bell has rung. In
cases of lesson examinations (LE), cadets are dismissed from the time they have answered their
respective LEs. Here, as Cadet Cudia stated in his Request for Reconsideration of Meted
Punishment, "We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell
rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper and submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales.
xxx" Clearly, at the time Cadet Cudia submitted his papers, he was already considered
dismissed. Thus, he cannot claim that his [OR432] class ended at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H)
or "a bit late."
Second, Cadet Cudia was in control of the circumstances leading to his tardiness. After
submitting his paper, Cadet Cudia is free to leave and attend his next class. However, he
initiated a conversation with Dr. Costales regarding their grades. He was not under instruction
by Dr. Costales to stay beyond the period of her class.
Furthermore, during the investigation of the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, Dr. Costales
clarified her statements in her written explanation. She explained that the "instruction to wait"
is a response to Cadet Cudia' s request and that it was not her initiated instruction. Clearly,
there was no directive from Dr. Costales for Cadet Cudia and the other cadets to stay. On the
contrary, it was them who wanted to meet with the instructor. Third, contrary to Cadet Cudia's
explanation, his subsequent class, ENG412, did not exactly start at 3:00 in the afternoon
(1500H). In the informal review conducted by the HTG to check the findings of the HC,
Professor Berong confirmed that her English class started as scheduled (3:05 in the afternoon,
or 1505H) and not earlier. Cadet 1 CL Barrawed, the acting class marcher of ENG412 also
testified that their class started as scheduled (3 :05 in the afternoon, or 1505) and not earlier.204
Respondents were unimpressed with the excuse that Cadet 1 CL Cudia had no intention to
mislead or deceive but merely used wrong and unfitting words in his explanations. For them,
considering his academic standing, it is highly improbable that he used incorrect language to
justify his mistake. Respondents' arguments are tenable.
The issue of whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed lying is an issue of fact. Unfortunately for
petitioners, the Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot pass upon factual matters as it is not
duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below.
Moreover, We reiterate the long standing rule that factual findings of administrative tribunals
are ordinarily accorded respect if not finality by the Court. In this case, as shown in the previous
discussions, there is no evidence that the findings of the investigating and reviewing bodies
below are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; that the
procedure which led to the findings is irregular; that palpable errors were committed; or that a
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. With respect to the core
issue of whether lying is present in this case, all investigating and reviewing bodies are in
consonance in holding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied.
For purposes of emphasis though, We shall supplement some points.
As succinctly worded, the Honor Code of the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines
(CCAFP) states: "We, the Cadets, do not lie, cheat, steal, nor tolerate among us those who do. "
The First Tenet of the Honor-Code is "We do not lie. " Cadets violate the Honor Code by lying if
they make an oral or written statement which is contrary to what is true or use doubtful
information with the intent to deceive or mislead.205 It is expected that every cadet's word is
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accepted without challenge on its truthfulness; that it is true without qualification; and that the
cadets must answer directly, completely and truthfully even though the answer may result in
punitive action under the CCPB and CCAFPR.206
To refresh, in his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1 CL Cudia justified
that: "I came directly from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir."
Subsequently, in his Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj. Leander, he
reasoned out as follows:
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended
1500H and our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4t
period class, I went to my next class without any intention of being late Sir.207
In this case, the Court agrees with respondents that Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed quibbling;
hence, he lied in violation of the Honor Code.
Following an Honor Reference Handbook, the term "Quibbling" has been defined in one U.S.
case as follows:
A person can easily create a false impression in the mind of his listener by cleverly wording what
he says, omitting relevant facts, or telling a partial truth. When he knowingly does so with the
intent to deceive or mislead, he is quibbling. Because it is an intentional deception, quibbling is
a form of lying.208
The above definition can be applied in the instant case. Here, instead of directly and completely
telling the cause of his being late in the ENG412 class of Prof. Berong, Cadet 1 CL Cudia chose
to omit relevant facts, thereby, telling a half-truth.
The two elements that must be presented for a cadet to have committed an honor violation are:
1. The act and/or omission, and
2. The intent pertinent to it.
Intent does not only refer to the intent to violate the Honor Code, but intent to commit or omit
the act itself.209
The basic questions a cadet must always seek to answer unequivocally are:
1. Do I intend to deceive?
2. Do I intend to take undue advantage?
If a cadet can answer NO to BOTH questions, he or she is doing the honorable thing.210
Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred
from the facts, and therefore, can only be proved by unguarded expressions, conduct and
circumstances generally.211 In this case, Cadet 1 CL Cudia's intent to deceive is manifested from
the very act of capitalizing on the use of the words "dismiss" and "class." The truth of the
matter is that the ordinary usage of these two terms, in the context of an educational
institution, does not correspond to what Cadet 1 CL Cudia is trying to make it appear. In that
sense, the words are not generic and have definite and precise meaning.
By no stretch of the imagination can Cadets 1 CL Cudia, Miranda, Arcangel, and Narciso already
constitute a "class." The Court cannot agree that such term includes "every transaction and
communication a teacher does with her students." Clearly, it does not take too much
intelligence to conclude that Cadet 1 CL Cudia should have been accurate by pinpointing who
were with him when he was late in the next class. His deceptive explanation is made more
obvious when compared with what Cadets 1 CL Archangel and Narciso wrote in their DR
explanation, which was: "We approached our instructor after our class."212
Further, it is unimportant whether the time of dismissal on November 14, 2013 was five or
fifteen minutes ahead of the scheduled end of class. Worth noting is that even Dr. Costales, who
stood as a witness for Cadet 1 CL Cudia, consistently admitted before the HC, the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body, and the CHR that he was already dismissed when he passed his LE
paper.213 During the hearing of the Board/Body, she also declared that she merely responded to
his request to see the results of the UE 1 and that she had reservations on the phrases "under
my instruction" and "dismissed a bit late" used in his letter of explanation to the HC. In addition,
Dr. Costales manifested her view before the CHR that the act of Cadet 1 CL Cudia of inquiring
about his grade outside their classroom after he submitted his LE paper is not part of the class
time because the consultation, being cadet-initiated, is voluntary.214 Assuming, for the sake of
argument, that a new business was initiated by Dr. Costales when Cadet 1 CL Cudia was asked
to stay and wait for the section grade, still, this does not acquit him. Given such situation, a
responsible cadet who is fully aware of the time constraint has the last say, that is, to politely
decline the invitation and immediately go to the next class. This was not done by Cadet 1 CL
Cudia. Thus, it cannot be said that he already lost control over the circumstances.
It is apparent, therefore, that Cadet 1 CL Cudia cunningly chose words which led to confusion in
the minds of respondents and eventually commenced the HC inquiry. His case is not just a
matter of semantics and a product of plain and simple inaccuracy. There is manipulation of facts
and presentation of untruthful explanation constitutive of Honor Code violation.
Evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear Cadet 1 CL Cudia .. While his Transcript of Records
(TOR) may reflect not only his outstanding academic performance but his excellent grade in
subjects on Conduct during his four-year stay in the PMA,215 it does not necessarily follow that
he is innocent of the offense charged. It is enough to say that "evidence that one did or did not
do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or
similar thing at another time."216 While the TOR may be received to prove his identity or habit as
an exceptional PMA student, it does not show his specific intent, plan, or scheme as cadet
accused of committing a specific Honor Code violation.
Dismissal from the PMA as unjust and cruel punishment
Respondents insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants separation of the guilty cadet from
the cadet corps. Under the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines Regulation (CCAFPR), a
violation of the Cadet Honor Code is considered Grave (Class 1) delinquency which merits a
recommendation for a cadet's dismissal from the PMA Superintendent. The same is likewise
clear from the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook. Cadet 1 CL Cudia is, therefore,
presumed to know that the Honor Code does not accommodate a gradation or degree of
offenses. There is no difference between a little lie and a huge falsehood. Respondents
emphasize that the Honor Code has always been considered as an absolute yardstick against
which cadets have measured themselves ever since the PMA began and that the Honor Code
and System seek to assure that only those who are able to meet the high standards of integrity
and honor are produced by the PMA. As held in Andrews, it is constitutionally permissible for the
military "to set and enforce uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics. " Thus, in
violating the Honor Code, Cadet 1 CL Cudia forfeits his privilege to graduate from the PMA.
On their part, petitioners concede that if it is proven that a cadet breached the Honor Code, the
offense warrants his or her dismissal since such a policy may be the only means to maintain and
uphold the spirit of integrity in the military.217 They maintain though that in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
case there is no need to distinguish between a "little lie" and a "huge falsehood" since he did not
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lie at all. Absent any intent to deceive and to take undue advantage, the penalty imposed on
him is considered as unjust and cruel. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the
penalty of dismissal is not commensurate to the fact that he is a graduating cadet with honors
and what he allegedly committed does not amount to an academic deficiency or an intentional
and flagrant violation of the PMA non-academic rules and regulations. Citing Non, petitioners
argue that the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense. Further, lsabelo, Jr. is
squarely applicable to the facts of the case. Cadet 1 CL Cudia was deprived of his right to
education, the only means by which he may have a secure life and future.
Considering Our finding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied and his acceptance that
violation of the Honor Code warrants the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the PMA, there is
actually no more dispute to resolve. Indeed, the sanction is clearly set forth and Cadet 1 CL
Cudia, by contract, risked this when he entered the Academy.218 We adopt the ruling in
Andrews219 wherein it was held that, while the penalty is severe, it is nevertheless reasonable
and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process. It quoted the disposition of the
district court, thus:
The fact that a cadet will be separated from the Academy upon a finding that he has violated the
Honor Code is known to all cadets even prior to the beginning of their careers there. The finding
of a Code violation by hypothesis includes a finding of scienter on the part of the offender. While
separation is admittedly a drastic and tragic consequence of a cadet's transgression, it is not an
unconstitutionally arbitrary one, but rather a reasonable albeit severe method of preventing
men who have suffered ethical lapses from becoming career officers. That a policy of
admonitions or lesser penalties for single violations might be more compassionate --or even
more effective in achieving the intended result --is quite immaterial to the question of whether
the harsher penalty violates due process.220
Nature of the CHR Findings
Petitioners contend that the PMA turned a blind eye on the CHR's recommendations. The CHR,
they note, is a constitutional body mandated by the 1987 Constitution to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights, and to conduct investigative
monitoring of economic, social, and cultural rights, particularly of vulnerable sectors of society.
Further, it was contended that the results of CHR's investigation and recommendations are so
persuasive that this Court, on several occasions like in the cases of Cruz v. Sec. of Environment
& Natural Resources221 and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections,222 gave its
findings serious consideration. It is not, therefore, too late for the Court to hear what an
independent and unbiased fact-finding body has to say on the case.
In opposition, respondents assert that Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights223 ruled that
the CHR is merely a recommendatory body that is not empowered to arrive at a conclusive
determination of any controversy.
We are in accord with respondents.
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are merely recommendatory and,
therefore, not binding to this Court. The reason is that the CHR's constitutional mandate
extends only to the investigation of all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights.224 As held in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights225 and a number of
subsequent cases,226 the CHR is only a fact-finding body, not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial
agency. It is not empowered to adjudicate claims on the merits or settle actual case or
controversies. The power to investigate is not the same as adjudication:
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy
is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided
or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
xxxx
[i]t cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even
quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular
or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate, "commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely:
inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x x to subject to an official probe x x x:
to conduct an official inquiry;" The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out,
to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into
with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a
legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as
"(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am
J2d Adm L Sec. 257; xx x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of
facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,
determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the
rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: xx to pass
judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon
as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: xx to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy x x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority.1âwphi1 To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and
"adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn.
xx Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment. "226
All told, petitioners are not entitled to moral and exemplary damages in accordance with Articles
19, 2217, 2219 and 2229 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA did
not effectively deprive him of a future. Cliche though it may sound, being a PMA graduate is not
the "be-all and end-all" of his existence. A cadet separated from the PMA may still continue to
pursue military or civilian career elsewhere without suffering the stigma attached to his or her
dismissal. For one, as suggested by respondents, DND-AFP Circular No. 13, dated July 15, 1991,
on the enlistment and reenlistment in the APP Regular Force, provides under Section 14 (b)
thereof that priority shall be given to, among others, the ex-PMA or PAFFFS cadets.227 If the
positions open does not appeal to his interest for being way below the rank he could have
achieved as a PMA graduate, Cadet 1 CL Cudia could still practice other equally noble profession
or calling that is best suited to his credentials, competence, and potential. Definitely, nobody
can deprive him of that choice.
118
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from
the Philippine Military Academy is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN,
COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this Court via a Petition for
Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief1 under Rules 65 and 63 of the
Rules of Court, respectively, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC),
requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant
to second-level courts, on the ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with grave
abuse of discretion.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI,
which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of
Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch
13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.
In a letter2 dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination,
informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations.
On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration
of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants
who did not pass the prejudicature examination.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter3 dated February 3,
2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its
decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-
standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others,
incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the
petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This
caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court.
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an
RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the
equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year
requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights for Equal
Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also asserted that the requirement of the
Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 104 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 85575 should not be
merely directory and should be fully implemented. He further alleged that he has all the
qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution and by Congress, since he has
already complied with the requirement of 10 years of practice of law.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution6 dated April 22, 2014, the JBC7 and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG)8separately submitted their Comments. Summing up the arguments of
the JBC and the OSG, they essentially stated that the petition is procedurally infirm and that the
assailed policy does not violate the equal protection and due process clauses. They posited that:
(1) the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its
principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the
JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) the remedy of mandamus
and declaratory relief will not lie because the petitioner has no clear legal right that needs to be
protected; (3) the equal protection clause is not violated because the classification of lower
court judges who have served at least five years and those who have served less than five years
is valid as it is performance and experience based; and (4) there is no violation of due process
as the policy is merely internal in nature.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Issue
The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as
judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is
constitutional.
Ruling of the Court
Procedural Issues:
Before resolving the substantive issues, the Court considers it necessary to first determine
whether or not the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and declaratory relief
commenced by the petitioner was proper.
One. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses
two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition,
and both are governed by Rule 65."9 As discussed in the case of Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc.,
et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al.,10 this Court explained
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive
officials.11 (Citation omitted)
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening
applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto
itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of
guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and
incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on
whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court's power
of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is the power
of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures
that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and
complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not
lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are
not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They
may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this
119
matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.12
Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that
the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are
being attacked, then the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to
inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules.
Two. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy.
The petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper because his right was violated when he was not
included in the list of candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He said that his non-inclusion
in the list of candidates for these stations has caused him direct injury.
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform
the act required.13 The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right
to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the
respondent to perform the act. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of
discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.
The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel
a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what the petitioner would have the JBC
do in his favor. The function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial
positions is discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner cannot claim any legal right to
be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and
statutory qualifications for appointment to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that
one's name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the list
of the candidates depends on the discretion of the JBC, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The fact that an individual possesses the constitutional and statutory qualifications for
appointment to the Judiciary does not create an entitlement or expectation that his or her name
be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. By submitting an application or
accepting a recommendation, one submits to the authority of the JBC to subject the former to
the search, screening, and selection process, and to use its discretion in deciding whether or not
one should be included in the list. Indeed, assuming that if one has the legal right to be included
in the list of candidates simply because he or she possesses the constitutional and statutory
qualifications, then the application process would then be reduced to a mere mechanical
function of the JBC; and the search, screening, and selection process would not only be
unnecessary, but also improper. However, this is clearly not the constitutional intent. One's
inclusion in the list of candidates is subject to the discretion of the JBC over the
selection of nominees for a particular judicial post. Such candidate's inclusion is not,
therefore, a legally demandable right, but simply a privilege the conferment of which is subject
to the JBC's sound discretion.
Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a promotional appointment, that is, a promotion from
a first-level court to a second level court. There is no law, however, that grants him the
right to a promotion to second-level courts.15 (Emphasis in the original)
Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by
mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC.
Three. The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief should be
filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and
whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The
relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of
the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties
thereunder."16 "[T]he purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights
and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in its
enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach."17
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the
petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included
in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the
Court reiterates that no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in
the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial
office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by
any person. The inclusion in the list of candidates, which is one of the incidents of such
appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right that could have
been affected by the assailed policy.
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.18 The
special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate
RTC pursuant to Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.No. 7691.20
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its
expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any
event, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition should still be
dismissed.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Substantive Issues
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the
judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President
may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened
with a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the men and
women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the
qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own
set of rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC's
principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for
appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the
process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants' qualifications. In carrying out its
main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees
for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the
Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily
requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus,
the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.
JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial vacancies in
order to promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given this pragmatic
situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an
applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities expected
of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year requirement policy applied by JBC to
the petitioner's case is necessary and incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to
the JBC.
Equal Protection
There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a rational basis to screen applicants
who cannot be all accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the judiciary, to determine who
is best qualified among the applicants, and not to discriminate against any particular individual
or class.
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a
law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as
long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government
end.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
120
"The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may
be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary."22 "The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is
not violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for
regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered
invalid."23
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised its discretion
in accordance with the constitutional requirement and its rules that a member of the Judiciary
must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence.24"To ensure the fulfillment
of these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring
judges and justices, among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President
are all qualified and suitably best for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is
shielded from the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and mediocre
and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified."25
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees does not
constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it
employs number of years of service to screen and differentiate applicants from the competition.
The number of years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which
may be measured by experience, among other factors. The difference in treatment between
lower court judges who have served at least five years and those who have served less than five
years, on the other hand, was rationalized by JBC as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Formulating policies which streamline the selection process falls squarely under the purview of
the JBC. No other constitutional body is bestowed with the mandate and competency to set
criteria for applicants that refer to the more general categories of probity, integrity and
independence.
The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level court, which is five years
experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by the
Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely
applying one of the stringent constitutional standards requiring that a member of the judiciary
be of "proven competence." In determining competence, the JBC considers, among other
qualifications, experience and performance.
Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been judges of first-level courts for five
(5) years are better qualified for promotion to second-level courts. It deems length of
experience as a judge as indicative of conversance with the law and court procedure. Five years
is considered as a sufficient span of time for one to acquire professional skills for the next level
court, declog the dockets, put in place improved procedures and an efficient case management
system, adjust to the work environment, and gain extensive experience in the judicial process.
A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of the integrity,
probity, and independence of judges seeking promotion. To merit JBC's nomination for their
promotion, they must have had a "record of, and reputation for, honesty, integrity,
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards."
Likewise, their decisions must be reflective of the soundness of their judgment, courage,
rectitude, cold neutrality and strength of character.
Hence, for the purpose of determining whether judges are worthy of promotion to the next level
court, it would be premature or difficult to assess their merit if they have had less than one year
of service on the bench.26 (Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)
At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only factor that determines
the selection of candidates for RTC judge to be appointed by the President. Persons with this
qualification are neither automatically selected nor do they automatically become nominees. The
applicants are chosen based on an array of factors and are evaluated based on their individual
merits. Thus, it cannot be said that the questioned policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made
without any basis.
Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test. The
foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five year
experience and those with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the
classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate
purpose. The Court, thus, rules that the questioned policy does not infringe on the equal
protection clause as it is based on reasonable classification intended to gauge the proven
competence of the applicants. Therefore, the said policy is valid and constitutional.
Due Process
The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates procedural due process for lack of
publication and non-submission to the University of the Philippines Law Center Office of the
National Administrative Register (ONAR). The petitioner said that the assailed policy will affect
all applying judges, thus, the said policy should have been published.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR
because the publication requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of administrative
agencies under the Executive branch of the government.27 Since the JBC is a body under the
supervision of the Supreme Court,28 it is not covered by the publication requirements of the
Administrative Code.
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level
courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been published.
As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative
rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect.
There are, however, several exceptions to the requirement of publication, such as interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, which regulate only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters
of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.29
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and regulations
exempted from the publication requirement. The assailed policy involves a qualification standard
by which the JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal
regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC and
their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to lawyers who meet the qualifications
in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions.
Thus, it is but a natural consequence thereof that potential applicants be informed of the
requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be able to prepare for and comply with
them.
The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise known as the Rules of the Judicial and
Bar Council, the JBC had put its criteria in writing and listed the guidelines in determining
competence, independence, integrity and probity. Section 1, Paragraph 1 of Rule 9 expressly
provides that applicants for the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, should, as a general
rule, have at least five years of experience as an RTC judge, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RULE 9 - SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR NOMINATION TO A VACANCY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
AND SANDIGANBAYAN
Section 1. Additional criteria for nomination to the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. -
In addition to the foregoing guidelines the Council should consider the following in evaluating
the merits of applicants for a vacancy in the Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan:
1. As a general rule, he must have at least five years of experience as a judge of Regional
Trial Court, except when he has in his favor outstanding credentials, as evidenced by, inter
alia, impressive scholastic or educational record and performance in the Bar examinations,
excellent reputation for honesty, integrity, probity and independence of mind; at least very
satisfactory performance rating for three (3) years preceding the filing of his application for
nomination; and excellent potentials for appellate judgeship.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which have been duly published on the
website of the JBC and in a newspaper of general circulation suggests that the JBC is aware that
121
these are not mere internal rules, but are rules implementing the Constitution that should be
published. Thus, if the JBC were so-minded to add special guidelines for determining
competence of applicants for RTC judges, then it could and should have amended its rules and
published the same. This, the JBC did not do as JBC-009 and its amendatory rule do not have
special guidelines for applicants to the RTC.
Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be published. Thus,
by analogy, publication is also required for the five-year requirement because it seeks to
implement a constitutional provision requiring proven competence from members of the
judiciary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court,
however, DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council comply with the publication requirement of
(1) the assailed policy requiring five years of experience as judges of first-level courts before
they can qualify as applicant to the Regional Trial Court, and (2) other special guidelines that
the Judicial and Bar Council is or will be implementing.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Nonetheless, the JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced the petitioner's SECOND DIVISION
private interest. At the risk of being repetitive, the petitioner has no legal right to be included in
the list of nominees for judicial vacancies since the possession of the constitutional and [G.R. No. 131977. February 4, 1999]
statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally demand that
one's name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the
shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the JBC.30 PEDRO MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. RAY ALLAS and GODOFREDO OLORES, Respondents.

As to the issue that the JBC failed or refused to implement the completion of the prejudicature
DECISION
program as a requirement for appointment or promotion in the judiciary under R.A. No. 8557,
this ground of the petition, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded. Clearly, it cannot be said
that JBC unlawfully neglects the performance of a duty enjoined by law. PUNO, J.:

Finally, the petitioner argued but failed to establish that the assailed policy violates the
constitutional provision under social justice and human rights for equal opportunity of Before us, petitioner prays for the execution of the decision of the trial court1 granting his
employment. The OSG explained:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary petition for quo warranto which ordered his reinstatement as Director III, Customs Intelligence
[T]he questioned policy does not violate equality of employment opportunities. The and Investigation Service, and the payment of his back salaries and benefits.
constitutional provision does not call for appointment to the Judiciary of all who might, for any
number of reasons, wish to apply. As with all professions, it is regulated by the State. The office
Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He held the positions of Port
of a judge is no ordinary office. It is imbued with public interest and is central in the
Security Chief from March 1972 to August 1972, Deputy Commissioner of Customs from August
administration of justice x x x. Applicants who meet the constitutional and legal qualifications
1972 to September 1975, Acting Commissioner of Customs from September 1975 to April 1977
must vie and withstand the competition and rigorous screening and selection process. They
and Customs Operations Chief I from October 1987 to February 1988.2 On March 1, 1988, he
must submit themselves to the selection criteria, processes and discretion of respondent JBC,
was appointed Customs Service Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service
which has the constitutional mandate of screening and selecting candidates whose names will be
(CIIS). In 1989, the position of Customs Service Chief was reclassified by the Civil Service as
in the list to be submitted to the President. So long as a fair opportunity is available for all
"Director III" in accordance with Republic Act No. 6758 and National Compensation Circular No.
applicants who are evaluated on the basis of their individual merits and abilities, the questioned
50. Petitioner's position was thus categorized as "Director III, CIIS" and he discharged the
policy cannot be struck down as unconstitutional.31 (Citations omitted)
function and duties of said office.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the petitioner has not established a clear legal right to
justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The petitioner has merely filed an application
with the JBC for the position of RTC judge, and he has no clear legal right to be nominated for On April 22, 1993, petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection
that office nor to be selected and included in the list to be submitted to the President which is District X, Cagayan de Oro City. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting
subject to the discretion of the JBC. The JBC has the power to determine who shall be Director III" of the CIIS. Despite petitioner's new assignment as Acting District Collector,
recommended to the judicial post. To be included in the list of applicants is a privilege as one however, he continued to receive the salary and benefits of the position of Director III.
can only be chosen under existing criteria imposed by the JBC itself. As such, prospective
applicants, including the petitioner, cannot claim any demandable right to take part in it if they
fail to meet these criteria. Hence, in the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of an In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z.
injunctive writ is not justified. Dario, informing him of his termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas'
appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos. The pertinent portion of the letter
As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening, and selecting reads:
applicants relative to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has the authority to
determine how best to perform such constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the JBC
"Effective March 4, 1994, Mr. Ray Allas was appointed Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos
issues various policies setting forth the guidelines to be observed in the evaluation of applicants,
and as a consequence, [petitioner's] services were terminated without prejudice to [his] claim
and formulates rules and guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to
for all government benefits due [him]."
existing circumstances. Its discretion is freed from legislative, executive or judicial intervention
to ensure that the JBC is shielded from any outside pressure and improper influence. Limiting
qualified applicants in this case to those judges with five years of experience was an exercise of Attached to the letter was the appointment of respondent Ray Allas as "Director III, CIIS,
discretion by the JBC. The potential applicants, however, should have been informed of the Bureau of Customs, vice Pedro Mendoza."
requirements to the judicial positions, so that they could properly prepare for and comply with
them. Hence, unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from
interfering with the exercise of JBC's powers, and will respect the initiative and independence Petitioner wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full back wages
inherent in the latter.cralawred and without loss of seniority rights. No reply was made.

122
On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas
before the Regional Trial Court, Paranaque, Branch 258.3 The case was tried and on September
11, 1995, a decision was rendered granting the petition. The court found that petitioner was
illegally terminated from office without due process of law and in violation of his security of
tenure, and that as he was deemed not to have vacated his office, the appointment of
respondent Allas to the same office was void ab initio. The court ordered the ouster of
respondent Allas from the position of Director III, and at the same time directed the
reinstatement of petitioner to the same position with payment of full back salaries and other
benefits appurtenant thereto.
Respondent Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 8, 1996, while the case was
pending before said court, respondent Allas was promoted by President Ramos to the position of
Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. As a consequence of this
promotion, petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as having been rendered moot and
academic. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the case accordingly. The
order of dismissal became final and entry of judgment was made on March 19,
1996.4cräläwvirtualibräry
On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. On
July 24, 1996, the court denied the motion on the ground that the contested position vacated by
respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores who was not a party
to the quo warranto petition.5cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals
questioning the order of the trial court.6 On November 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition.7 Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner claims that:
"The Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that a writ of execution may no longer be issued,
considering that respondent Olores who was not a party to the case now occupies the subject
position."8
The instant petition arose from a special civil action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some individual or
corporation to show by what right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the
state which, according to the Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise
except by virtue of a grant or authority from the state.9 In other words, a petition for quo
warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise
or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has
forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.10 The action may be commenced for the Government by
the Solicitor General or the fiscal11 against individuals who usurp a public office, against a public
officer whose acts constitute a ground for the forfeiture of his office, and against an association
which acts as a corporation without being legally incorporated.12 The action may also be
instituted by an individual in his own name who claims to be entitled to the public office or
position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.13cräläwvirtualibräry
Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the
controverted position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the
office.14 If the court finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the
respondent is entitled to the office.15 If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and declares
the respondent guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office,
judgment may be rendered as follows:
"Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found.-- When the defendant is found guilty of usurping,
intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right, privilege, or
franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded
therefrom, and that the plaintiff or relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further
judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and to the office, position, right,
privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires."
If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or
unlawfully holding the same, the court may order:
(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office;
(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;
(3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege or
franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.16
The character of the judgment to be rendered in quo warranto rests to some extent in the
discretion of the court and on the relief sought.17 In the case at bar, petitioner prayed for the
following relief:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that respondent be ousted and altogether excluded from
the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of
Customs, and petitioner be seated to the position as the one legally appointed and entitled
thereto.
Other reliefs, just or equitable in the premises, are likewise prayed for."18
In granting the petition, the trial court ordered that:
"WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered granting this
petition for quo warranto by:
1. Ousting and excluding respondent Ray Allas from the position of Director III, Customs
Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs; and
2. Reinstating petitioner Pedro C. Mendoza, Jr. to the position of Director III, Customs
Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs with full back wages and other
monetary benefits appurtenant thereto from the time they were withheld until reinstated."19
The trial court found that respondent Allas usurped the position of "Director III, Chief of the
Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service." Consequently, the court ordered that
respondent Allas be ousted from the contested position and that petitioner be reinstated in his
stead. Although petitioner did not specifically pray for his back salaries, the court ordered that
he be paid his "full back wages and other monetary benefits" appurtenant to the contested
position "from the time they were withheld until reinstated."
The decision of the trial court had long become final and executory, and petitioner prays for its
execution. He alleges that he should have been reinstated despite respondent Olores'
appointment because the subject position was never vacant to begin with. Petitioner's removal
was illegal and he was deemed never to have vacated his office when respondent Allas was
appointed to the same. Respondent Allas' appointment was null and void and this nullity
allegedly extends to respondent Olores, his successor-in-interest.20cräläwvirtualibräry
123
Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in
office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases.21 A judgment in quo
warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may
trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself.
It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person-- to determine whether
he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of
the office to which he lays claim.22 In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by
petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the
qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas,
not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial
court's decision.
Petitioner has apprised this Court that he reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five
(65) years on November 13, 1997. Reinstatement not being possible, petitioner now prays for
the payment of his back salaries and other benefits from the time he was illegally dismissed
until finality of the trial court's decision.23cräläwvirtualibräry
Respondent Allas cannot be held personally liable for petitioner's back salaries and benefits. He
was merely appointed to the subject position by the President of the Philippines in the exercise
of his constitutional power as Chief Executive. Neither can the Bureau of Customs be compelled
to pay the said back salaries and benefits of petitioner. The Bureau of Customs was not a party
to the petition for quo warranto.24cräläwvirtualibräry
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 41801 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 168696 : February 28, 2006]
MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA, JOAQUIN M. CALLEJA, JR., JADELSON PETER P. CALLEJA,
MA. JESSICA T. FLORES, MERCIE C. TIPONES and PERFECTO NIXON C.
TABORA, Petitioners, v. JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAY, AUGUSTO R. PANDAY and MA. THELNA
P. MALLARI, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Order1 of the Regional Trial Court
of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 58 (RTC-Br. 58) issued on July 13, 2005.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On May 16, 2005, respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Camarines Sur for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction, Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein petitioners.
Respondents alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, they had
been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but
sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the incorporators and stockholders of
said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which supposedly
belonged to Respondents.
On May 24, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the Regional Trial Court
in Naga City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified petition showed petitioners therein
(herein respondents) to be residents of Naga City, then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the action for quo warranto should be brought in the Regional
Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the
respondents resides. However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the
case folder of the subject case for quo warranto, stating that improper venue is not a ground for
transferring a quo warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction.
The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons on herein petitioners (respondents
below). Petitioner Tabora filed his Answer dated June 8, 2005, raising therein the affirmative
defenses of (1) improper venue, (2) lack of jurisdiction, and (3) wrong remedy of quo warranto.
Thereafter, the other petitioners also filed their Answer, also raising the same affirmative
defenses. All the parties were then required to submit their respective memoranda.
On July 13, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued the assailed Order, the pertinent portions of which read as
follows:
It is undisputed that the plaintiffs' cause of action involves controversies arising out of intra-
corporate relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates of the St. John
Hospital Inc. which originally under PD 902-A approved on March 11, 1976 is within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission to try and decide
in addition to its regulatory and adjudicated functions (Section 5, PD 902-A). Upon the advent of
RA 8799 approved on July 19, 2000, otherwise known as the Securities and Regulation Code,
the Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated in Section 5, Presidential Decree 902-A
were transferred ["]to the Court of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court
with a proviso that the "Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the
Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases." Pursuant to this
mandate of RA 8799, the Supreme Court in the exercise of said mandated authority,
promulgated on November 21, 2000, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC which took effect 15 December
2000 designated certain branches of the Regional Trial Court to try and decide Securities and
Exchange Commission Cases arising within their respective territorial jurisdiction with respect to
the National Capital Region and within the respective provinces in the First to Twelve Judicial
Region. Accordingly, in the Province of Camarines Sur, (Naga City) RTC Branch 23 presided by
the Hon. Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. was designated as "special court" (Section 1, A.M. No. 00-11-03-
SC).
Subsequently, on January 23, 2001, supplemental Administrative Circular No. 8-01 which took
effect on March 1, 2001 was issued by the Supreme Court which directed that "all SEC cases
originally assigned or transmitted to the regular Regional Trial Court shall be transferred to
branches of the Regional Trial Court specially designated to hear such cases in accordance with
A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC.
On March 13, 2001, A.M. No. 01-2-04 SC was promulgated and took effect on April 1, 2001.
From the foregoing discussion and historical background relative to the venue and jurisdiction to
try and decide cases originally enumerated in Section 5 of PD 902-A and later under Section 5.2
of RA 8799, it is evident that the clear intent of the circular is to bestow the juridiction "to try
and decide these cases to the "special courts" created under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC. . . .
Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to Dismiss is among the prohibited pleadings.
On the otherhand, the Supreme Court under Administrative Order 8-01 has directed the transfer
from the regular courts to the branches of the Regional Trial Courts specially designated to try
and decide intra-corporate dispute.
124
In the light of the above-noted observations and discussion, the Motion to
Dismiss is DENIED pursuant to the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates that motion to dismiss is a prohibited
pleading (Section 8) and in consonance with Administrative Order 8-01 of the Supreme Court
dated March 1, 2001, this case is hereby ordered remandedto the Regional Trial Court Branch
23, Naga City which under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated as special court to try
and decide intra-corporate controversies under R.A. 8799.
The scheduled hearing on the prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
set on July 18, 2005 is hereby cancelled.
For reasons of comity the issue of whether Quo Warranto is the proper remedy is better left to
the court of competent jurisdiction to rule upon.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order and, instead,
immediately elevated the case to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The petition raises the following issues:
I While a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 would ordinarily be inappropriate to
WHETHER A BRANCH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TRY
AND DECIDE A CASE HAS AUTHORITY TO REMAND THE SAME TO ANOTHER CO-EQUAL COURT
IN ORDER TO CURE THE DEFECTS ON VENUE AND JURISDICTION
II
WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 8-01 DATED JANUARY 23, 2001 WHICH
TOOK EFFECT ON MARCH 1, 2001 MAY BE APPLIED IN THE PRESENT CASE WHICH WAS FILED
ON MAY 16, 2005.3
In their Comment, respondents argue that the present petition should be denied due course and
dismissed on the grounds that (1) an appeal under Rule 45 is inappropriate in this case because
the Order dated July 13, 2005 is merely an interlocutory order and not a final order as
contemplated under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the wrong remedy under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC, which provides
that "all decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate
Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies
under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for
Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court;" and (3) the petition was intended merely to delay
the proceedings in the trial court because when the case was transferred to Branch 21 of the
Regional Trial Court, said court granted petitioners' motion to hold the proceedings in view of
the present petition pending before this Court.
Subsequently, petitioners also filed an Urgent Motion to Restore Status Quo Ante, alleging that
on January 12, 2006, respondent Jose Pierre Panday, with the aid of 14 armed men, assaulted
the premises of St. John Hospital in Naga City, taking away the daily hospital collections
estimated at P400,000.00.
The Court notes that, indeed, petitioners chose the wrong remedy to assail the Order of July 13,
2005. It is hornbook principle that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs appeals
from judgments or final orders.4 The Order dated July 13, 2005 is basically a denial of herein
petitioners' prayer in their Answer for the dismissal of respondents' case against them. As a
consequence of the trial court's refusal to dismiss the case, it then directed the transfer of the
case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court that had been designated as a special court to
hear cases formerly cognizable by the SEC. Verily, the order was merely interlocutory as it does
not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something more to be done on its merits. Such
being the case, the assailed Order cannot ordinarily be reviewed through a petition under Rule
45. As we held in Tolentino v. Natanauan, 5 to wit:
In the case of Bangko Silangan Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the
well-settled rule that:
. . . an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable,
nor can it be the subject of a Petition for Review on Certiorari . Such order may only be
reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary
procedure to be followed in that event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is
adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment.6
It appears, however, that the longer this case remains unresolved, the greater chance there is
for more violence between the parties to erupt. In Philippine Airlines v. Spouses
Kurangking,7 the Court proceeded to give due course to a case despite the wrong remedy
resorted to by the petitioner therein, stating thus:
assail an interlocutory order, in the interest, however, of arresting the perpetuation of an
apparent error committed below that could only serve to unnecessarily burden the parties, the
Court has resolved to ignore the technical flaw and, also, to treat the petition, there being no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, as a special civil action for certiorari . Not much,
after all, can be gained if the Court were to refrain from now making a pronouncement on an
issue so basic as that submitted by the parties.8
In this case, the basic issue of which court has jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by
the SEC under Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 902-A (P.D. No. 902-A), and the propensity of
the parties to resort to violence behoove the Court to look beyond petitioners' technical lapse of
filing a Petition for Review on Certiorari instead of filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
with the proper court. Thus, the Court shall proceed to resolve the case on its merits.
It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped
the offices, powers and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers
make out a case for an intra-corporate controversy.9 Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799,
the Court, adopting Justice Jose Y. Feria's view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appeals 10 that
Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is "limited to actions of quo
warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who
forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally
incorporated," while "[a]ctions of quo warranto against corporations, or against persons who
usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as amended)."11
However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows:
5.2. The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate
Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may
designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. xxx
125
Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which
were formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have
been transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that
Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against
persons who usurp an office in a private corporation. Presently, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 reads
thus:
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. - An action for the usurpation of a public
office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines against
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position
or franchise;
xxx
As explained in the Unilongo12 case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer
contains the phrase "or an office in a corporation created by authority of law" which was found
in the old Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against
persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office;
and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the
passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-
Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to
the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what is being
questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of
directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.
The Interim Rules provide thus:
Section 1. (a) Cases covered. - These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in civil
cases involving the following:
xxx
(2) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, or association relations,
between and among stockholders, members, or associates, and between, any or all of
them and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members,
or associates, respectively;
(3) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or
managers of corporations, partnerships, or associations;
xxx
SEC. 5. Venue. - All actions covered by these Rules shall be commenced and tried in the
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation,
partnership, or association concerned. xxx (Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, the Supreme Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-11-03-
SC (effective December 15, 2000) designating certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to
try and decide cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission. For the
Fifth Judicial Region, this Court designated the following branches of the Regional Trial Court, to
wit:
Branch 23, Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr.
Branch 4, Judge Gregorio A. Consulta
Branch 52, Judge Honesto A. Villamor
Subsequently, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, effective July 1, 2003, which
provides that:
1. The Regional Courts previously designated as SEC Courts through the: (a) Resolutions
of this Court dated 21 November 2000, 4 July 2001, 12 November 2002, and 9 July 2002, all
issued in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC, (b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M. No. 01-5-298-
RTC; and (c) Resolution dated 8 July 2002 in A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC are
hereby DESIGNATED and shall be CALLED as Special Commercial Courts to try and
decide cases involving violations of Intellectual Property Rights which fall within their
jurisdiction and those cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange
Commission;
xxx
4. The Special Commercial Courts shall have jurisdiction over cases arising within their
respective territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Judicial Region and
within the respective provinces with respect to the First to Twelfth Judicial Regions. Thus,
cases shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the
designated Special Commercial Court; (Emphasis ours)
The next question then is, which branch of the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
present action for quo warrato? Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition should
be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the principal office
of the corporation. It is undisputed that the principal office of the corporation is situated at
Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, it is
the Regional Trial Court designated as Special Commercial Courts in Camarines Sur which
shall have jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto filed by herein Respondents.
Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents'
petition for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one
involving an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No.
8799 and the aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never
designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over
cases previously cognizable by the SEC.
Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the
transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br.
58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. In HLC
Construction and Development Corp. v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners'
Association,13 the Court held that the trial court, having no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the complaint, should dismiss the same so the issues therein could be expeditiously heard
and resolved by the tribunal which was clothed with jurisdiction.
Note, further, that respondents' petition for quo warranto was filed as late as 2005. A.M. No.
03-03-03-SC took effect as early as July 1, 2003 and it was clearly provided therein that such
petitions shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the
designated Special Commercial Court. Since the official station of the designated Special
Commercial Court for Camarines Sur is the Regional Trial Court in Naga City, respondents
should have filed their petition with said court. A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC having been in effect for
four years and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC having been in effect for almost two years by the time
respondents filed their petition, there is no cogent reason why respondents were not aware of
the appropriate court where their petition should be filed.
126
The ratiocination of RTC-Br.58 that Administrative Circular No. 08-2001 authorized said trial
court to order the transfer of respondents' petition to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City is
specious because as of the time of filing of the petition, A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, which clearly
stated that cases formerly cognizable by the SEC should be filed with the Office of the Clerk of
Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court, had been in
effect for almost two years. Thus, the filing of the petition with the Regional Trial Court of San
Jose, Camarines Sur, which had no jurisdiction over those kinds of actions, was clearly
erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Order of the Regional
Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur dated July 13, 2005 is SET ASIDE for being NULL and
VOID. The petition for quo warranto in Civil Case No. T-1007 (now re-docketed as SEC Case
No. RTC 2005-0001), entitled "Jose Pierre A. Panday, et al. v. Sps. Joaquin M. Calleja, Jr., et
al." is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 179431-32               June 22, 2010
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST
CORRUPTION (CIBAC), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 180443
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, CINCHONA
C. GONZALES and ARMI JANE R. BORJE, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for certiorari and
mandamus is whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue implementing rules
and regulations (IRRs) that provide a ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee not
written in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941,1 otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, the law
that the COMELEC thereby implements.
Common Antecedents
The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered
under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the
May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent
to participate,2 CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of
five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required
number of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the
certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007,3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2)
herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5)
Emil L. Galang. The nominees’ certificates of acceptance were attached to the certificate of
nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees was later published in two newspapers of
general circulation, The Philippine Star News4 (sic) and The Philippine Daily Inquirer.5
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007,6 whereby it withdrew
the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the
nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-
Gonzales, and (3) Borje.
Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC
Chairperson Benjamin Abalos,7 transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of
the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and
Galang and the substitution of Borje. In their petitions, the members of CIBAC averred that
Lokin and Tugna were not among the nominees presented and proclaimed by CIBAC in its
proclamation rally held in May 2007; and that Galang had signified his desire to focus on his
family life.
On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en
banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as
its second nominee.8 The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus
proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC
to have garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion
asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation.
The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
Notwithstanding Villanueva’s filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment
of the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC
failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007.9
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,10 whereby it resolved to set the
matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and
Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was docketed
as E.M. No. 07-054.
In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc,  sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued
National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 200711 to partially
proclaim the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List
System as having won in the May 14, 2007 elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan
Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives, Advocacy
for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
Reforms, Inc., Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party, Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party, Cooperative-Natco
Network Party, Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns and Abono; and to defer the
proclamation of the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes
until final resolution of their respective cases.
The COMELEC en banc issued another resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72 dated July 18,
2007,12 proclaiming Buhay Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2 additional seats and Bayan Muna,
CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, and Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives to an
additional seat each; and holding in abeyance the proclamation of the nominees of said parties,
organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until the final resolution of their respective
cases.
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With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos,
purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of
the House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested
that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office.
Nazareno replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because
COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.
On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-05413 thuswise:
WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the
withdrawal of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as
second, third and fourth nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona
C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the
party list CIBAC. The new order of CIBAC's nominees therefore shall be:
1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
2. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales
3. Armi Jane R. Borje
SO ORDERED.
The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of
CIBAC were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that the president was
charged by Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC By-Laws to oversee and direct the corporate
activities, which included the act of submitting the party's manifestation of intent to participate
in the May 14, 2007 elections as well as its certificate of nominees; that from all indications,
Villanueva as the president of CIBAC had always been provided the leeway to act as the party's
representative and that his actions had always been considered as valid; that the act of
withdrawal, although done without any written Board approval, was accomplished with the
Board’s acquiescence or at least understanding; and that the intent of the party should be given
paramount consideration in the selection of the nominees.
As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of
CIBAC.14 Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office
as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.15
Precís of the Consolidated Cases
In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent
COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January
12, 2007;16 and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving
CIBAC’s withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBAC’s second, third and
fourth nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead,
based on the right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No.
7804).17 He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941.18 the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement.
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse
in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her assumption of that
office; that Lokin’s proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction
over the matter being raised by Lokin.
For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for
mandamus and a petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to have
him proclaimed as the second nominee of CIBAC.
Issues
The issues are the following:
(a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;
(b) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;
(c) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates
the Party-List System Act; and
(d) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC
and allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact
or law and after the close of the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-
corporate in nature.
Ruling
The petitions are granted.
A
The Court has jurisdiction over the case
The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has been
done and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the candidates to the House of Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the
HRET pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the
question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a special civil action for quo
warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court.
We do not agree.
An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest
between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and
irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal
votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed
a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of
ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible
person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the
128
action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because
the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for
it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second
nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list
organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the
defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal
votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby
wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action
for quo warranto  lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of
Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek
the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7
of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by
Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of
the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a
petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a
limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.
B The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance
Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping
Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment. Thus, forum shopping may arise: (a) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in
one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or
(b) if, after having filed a petition in the Supreme Court, a party files another petition in the
Court of Appeals, because he thereby deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as one
case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar
remedy) would still be open"; or (c) where a party attempts to obtain a writ of preliminary
injunction from a court after failing to obtain the writ from another court.19
What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the
vexation caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses different courts and
administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions
being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue.20
The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act constitutes
forum shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and
as abusing their processes. Forum shopping is an improper conduct that degrades the
administration of justice.21
Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily
constitute forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances.22 The actions must also raise
identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues.23 Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other.24
Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the
second nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 (announcing CIBAC’s
entitlement to an additional seat in the House of Representatives), and to strike down the
provision in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 and NBC Resolution No. 07-72 holding in abeyance "all
proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending
disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases." He
has insisted that the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to proclaim him due to his being CIBAC’s
second nominee; and that the COMELEC had no authority to exercise discretion and to suspend
or defer the proclamation of winning party-list organizations with pending disputes.
On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the September 14,
2007 resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna
and Galang and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee and Borje as the third
nominee); and to challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELEC’s
basis for allowing CIBAC’s withdrawal of Lokin’s nomination.
Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the
action for mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved
the same parties, because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they
sought were different.
C
Invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804
with the doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or
abdicate its legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make
laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not
legislative in character may be delegated.25
Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and
administrative boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation
lawful, the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to
control in given cases. The Legislature should set a definite or primary standard to guide those
empowered to execute the law. For as long as the policy is laid down and a proper standard is
established by statute, there can be no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the
Legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate rules within the
prescribed limits, although there is conferred upon the executive officer or administrative board
a large measure of discretion. There is a distinction between the delegation of power to make a
law and the conferment of an authority or a discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law, for the power to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be.26
The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the
operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is
rather administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not,
however, subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be
legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of
administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to
this is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment.
It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere
administrative rule issued for its implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.27
To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be
valid:28
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
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 2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and
4. It must be reasonable.
The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a recall.29 In
addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the COMELEC is also
charged to promulgate IRRs implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other
laws that the COMELEC enforces and administers.30
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act.31 Hence, the COMELEC met the first
requisite.
The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804
underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in the resolution itself.
Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of
whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of
Lokin against Section 13 succeeds.
As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply means that the
resulting IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the authority
conferred. It is basic that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress,32 for
administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law. The
administrative agency issuing the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the
law it administers and enforces, and cannot engraft additional non-contradictory requirements
not contemplated by the Legislature.33
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or
coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list
of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it
obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in
writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or
a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No
change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall
have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in
writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee
shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of
Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.
The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of
the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to
the COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his
nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally
because its language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and
sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the
Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the courts should be convinced that the
Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should
defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the
law, from which the courts must not depart.34 When the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for
application.35 Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not
construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous.36
The legislative intent to deprive the party-list organization of the right to change the nominees
or to alter the order of the nominees was also expressed during the deliberations of the
Congress, viz:
MR. LAGMAN: And again on Section 5, on the nomination of party list representatives, I do not
see any provision here which prohibits or for that matter allows the nominating party to change
the nominees or to alter the order of prioritization of names of nominees. Is the implication
correct that at any time after submission the names could still be changed or the listing altered?
MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, that is a good issue brought out by the distinguished Gentleman from
Albay and perhaps a perfecting amendment may be introduced therein. The sponsoring
committee will gladly consider the same.
MR. LAGMAN: In other words, what I would like to see is that after the list is submitted to the
COMELEC officially, no more changes should be made in the names or in the order of listing.
MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, there may be a situation wherein the name of a particular nominee
has been submitted to the Commission on Elections but before election day the nominee
changed his political party affiliation. The nominee is therefore no longer qualified to be included
in the party list and the political party has a perfect right to change the name of that nominee
who changed his political party affiliation.
MR. LAGMAN: Yes of course. In that particular case, the change can be effected but will be the
exception rather than the rule. Another exception most probably is the nominee dies, then there
has to be a change but any change for that matter should always be at the last part of the list
so that the prioritization made by the party will not be adversely affected.37
The usage of "No" in Section 8 – "No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees
shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases
where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in
which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list"  – renders Section
8 a negative law, and is indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory.
Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but one way to obey
the command "thou shall not," and that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden
act,38 subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself, like in this case.
Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list organization of its right to choose its nominees,
but merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order in the list of its
nominees’ names after submission of the list to the COMELEC.
The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of
lawmakers. The COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list
reflects the true will of the party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with
whether or not the list contains the real intended nominees of the party-list organization, but
will only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements prescribed by the law and
whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers of general circulation.
Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of election,
130
not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any
particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in
newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make
intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list organization to change its
nominees through withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after
the submission of the list of nominees circumvents the voters’ demand for transparency. The
lawmakers’ exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such
circumvention.
D implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with
Exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusive
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list organization
can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the
COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his
nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated.
The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not falling
under any of the three exceptions.
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the
exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their
language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision
rather than the exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions,
none but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the
latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it is
always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case,
it accords with reason and justice.391avvphi1
The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of
the general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general
words. Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the
statute shall apply to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict
construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision and against the
exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in many
circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited or abridged,
should receive a restricted construction.
E
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded
the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:
Section 13. Substitution of nominees. – A party-list nominee may be substituted only
when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes
incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In
any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list of
nominees.
No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.
Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth
being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party."
Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three
statutory grounds for substituting a nominee.
We agree with Lokin.
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement
and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,40 has
neither the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to
the law to be implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that
the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.41
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under
legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying the law’s general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be
expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.42
The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of
R.A. No. 7941,43 because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory provision’s
phraseology.
The explanation does not persuade.
To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase
anew or in a new form.44 Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is
not altered.
However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941, because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The
new ground granted to the party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination
already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done.
Neither was the grant of the unilateral right contemplated by the drafters of the law, who
precisely denied the right to withdraw the nomination (as the quoted record of the deliberations
of the House of Representatives has indicated). The grant thus conflicted with the statutory
intent to save the nominee from falling under the whim of the party-list organization once his
name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate from the capriciousness
of the party-list organizations.
We further note that the new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No. 7941 of developing
and guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list electoral system. The success of the system
could only be ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the party-list organizations,
by seeing to the transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be
afforded the chance of making intelligent and informed choices of their party-list
representatives.
The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law postulates that
administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their
IRRs, but must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in
view. If the IRRs are shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were
authorized to be issued, they must be held to be invalid and should be struck down.45
F
Effect of partial nullity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804
131
An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law.46 In case of conflict between the law and the
IRR, the law prevails. There can be no question that an IRR or any of its parts not adopted
pursuant to the law is no law at all and has neither the force nor the effect of law.47 The invalid
rule, regulation, or part thereof cannot be a valid source of any right, obligation, or power.
Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 – to the extent that it allows the party-list
organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC – was invalid,
CIBAC’s withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its substitution of them with
new nominees were also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin
and the others could only be for any of the grounds expressly stated in Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941. Resultantly, the COMELEC’s approval of CIBAC’s petition of withdrawal of the nominations
and its recognition of CIBAC’s substitution, both through its assailed September 14, 2007
resolution, should be struck down for lack of legal basis. Thereby, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction, having relied on the invalidly issued Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to support
its action.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus.
We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it
authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has
submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections.
Accordingly, we annul and set aside:
(a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E. M. No. 07-054 approving
Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption’s withdrawal of the nominations of Luis K. Lokin,
Jr., Sherwin N. Tugna, and Emil Galang as its second, third, and fourth nominees,
respectively, and ordering their substitution by Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second
nominee and Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee; and
(b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as
a Party-List Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the
House of Representatives.
We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a
Party-List Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the House of
Representatives.
We make no pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-2354. December 13, 1949.]
ALFONSO ARANETA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARTA CUI VDA. DE SANSON, Defendant-
Appellee.
Tomas Alonso and Gaudioso O. Sosmeña for Appellant.
Hipolito Alo for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. MORATORIUM LAW, NATURE OF; WAIVABLE. — The law on debt moratorium does not
condone debts or the payments of obligations. It merely suspends collection and payment. The
right to such suspension may be invoked by the debtor; but he may also waive or renounce it
(Doctrine in Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. v. Barrious, 45 Off. Gaz., p. 2444, 2 reiterated.)
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On June 17, 1941, Alfonso Araneta and his wife Dolores Bobadilla sold two parcels of land with
the improvements thereon, located in the City of Cebu, to Julian Sanson and his wife Marta Cui
for P2,000, with right to repurchase within one year, with the condition that pending
repurchase, the vendors as lessees could continue occupying the property by paying rent at the
rate of P20 a month (Exhibit A). The period of one year expired without the vendors exercising
their right of repurchase. Legally, the vendees became absolute owners of the two parcels, but
on June 24, 1946, Marta Cui Vda. de Sanson (her husband Julian being already dead) as an act
of charity or generosity, resold the said two parcels to the vendors Alfonso and Dolores for the
same amount of P2,000, plus P1,000 as rents unpaid.
Afterwards, and after consulting some lawyers who were supposed to have advised him that he
was not under obligation to pay the P1,000 as back rents, Alfonso Araneta sought to recover the
said amount from Marta and upon her refusal, he brought the corresponding action to collect
from Marta in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (civil case No. R-27). Judgment was rendered
absolving the defendant Marta Cui Vda. de Sanson and Alfonso is now appealing from that
decision.
Appellant’s contention is that under the provisions of Executive Order No. 25, as amended by
Executive Order No. 32 on debt moratorium, his payment of P1,000 was prematurely made and
that the said amount should be returned to him by the defendant-appellee. This contention is
clearly untenable. We quote with approval a portion of Judge Felix Martinez’ decision appealed
from on this point of the moratorium law.
"Si el demandante debia por alquileres esa cantidad a la demandada, bien hecho estaba que a
requerimiento de esta, aquel la pagara. La orden de moratoria no condonaba lo adeudado;
posponia solamente la obligacion de pagarlo por el periodo de su vigencia. La moratoria trataba
de aliviar las dificultades en que un deudor podria hallarse con ocasion de la guerra; pero si de
todos modos el aqui demandante, siendo deudor, estaba en situacion de pagar su deuda, y de
hecho la pago; no hay razon, ni se le debe permitir, que volviese atras, ya que de todos modos
tenia que hacerlo tarde o temprano."cralaw virtua1aw library
The law of debt moratorium does not condone debts on the payments of obligations. It merely
suspends collection and payment. The right to such suspension may be invoked by the debtor;
but he may also waive or renounce it. Plaintiff herein in voluntarily paying the P1,000 waived his
right to suspend or postpone. As was said by this Court in the case of Ma-ao Sugar Central Co.
v. Barrios, 45 Off. Gaz., No. 6, p. 2444, 1 the right granted by Executive Order No. 25, as
amended by Executive Order No. 32, is a right granted by law to debtors and such right may be
waived because its waiver does not affect the public interest or the rights of third parties.
But there is yet another reason against the contention of the appellant. According to the deed of
sale (Exhibit A) by virtue of which Alfonso Araneta and his wife sold the two parcels to the
appellee and her husband in 1941, and wherein it was agreed that the vendors were to continue
occupying the property as lessees by paying P20 monthly rent, said vendors may not exercise
the right of redemption if they were delinquent in the payment of any rent. Consequently, the
right of appellant Alfonso to redeem the property in question was conditioned on his paying the
back rent amounting to P1,000. In other words, the appellee was under no obligation to resell
the property to him unless and until he first paid the P1,000 back rents. This, aside from the
132
fact that as already stated, the period for repurchase had long expired as far back as June,
1942, and that it was only out of consideration and charity that the appellee reconveyed the
property to appellant. We repeat that the contention of the appellant in this case is absolutely
untenable, not to say, savoring of the ingratitude and lack of appreciation.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 194994               April 16, 2013
EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs.
EMERSON S. CARLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before us is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto under Rule 66 filed by
Emmanuel A. de Castro (petitioner) seeking to oust respondent Emerson S. Carlos (respondent)
from the position of assistant general manager for operations (AGMO) of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA).
On 29 July 2009, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed petitioner as AGM0.  His1
appointment was concurred in by the members of the Metro Manila Council in MMDA Resolution
No. 09-10, Series of 2009.2 He took his oath on 17 August 2009 before then Chairperson Bayani
F. Fernando.3
Meanwhile, on 29 July 2010, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa issued Office of the President
(OP) Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 2010, amending OP Memorandum Circular No. 1,
Series of 2010.
OP Memorandum Circular No. 2 states:
2. All non-Career Executive Service Officials (non-CESO) occupying Career Executive Service
(CES) positions in all agencies of the executive branch shall remain in office and continue to
perform their duties and discharge their responsibility until October 31, 2010 or until their
resignations have been accepted and/or until their respective replacements have been
appointed or designated, whichever comes first, unless they are reappointed in the meantime.4
On 30 July 2010, Atty. Francis N. Tolentino, chairperson of the MMDA, issued Office Order No.
106,5 designating Corazon B. Cruz as officer-in-charge (OIC) of the Office of the AGMO.
Petitioner was then reassigned to the Legal and Legislative Affairs Office, Office of the General
Manager. The service vehicle and the office space previously assigned to him were withdrawn
and assigned to other employees.
Subsequently, on 2 November 2010, Chairperson Tolentino designated respondent as OIC of the
Office of the AGMO by virtue of Memorandum Order No. 24,6 which in turn cited OP
Memorandum Circular No. 2 as basis. Thereafter, the name of petitioner was stricken off the
MMDA payroll, and he was no longer paid his salary beginning November 2010.
Petitioner sought a clarification 7 from the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) as to the
proper classification of the position of AGMO. In her reply,8 Executive Director Maria Anthonette
Allones (Executive Director Allones), CESO I, stated that the position of AGMO had not yet been
classified and could not be considered as belonging to the Career Executive Service (CES). She
further stated that a perusal of the appointment papers of petitioner showed that he was not
holding a coterminous position. In sum, she said, he was not covered by OP Memorandum
Circular Nos. 1 and 2.
Petitioner was later offered the position of Director IV of MMDA Public Health and Safety
Services and/or MMDA consultant. He turned down the offer, claiming that it was a demotion in
rank.
Demanding payment of his salary and reinstatement in the monthly payroll,9 petitioner sent a
letter on 5 December 2010 to Edenison Faisan, assistant general manager (AGM) for Finance
and Administration; and Lydia Domingo, Director III, Administrative Services. For his failure to
obtain an action or a response from MMDA, he then made a formal demand for his
reinstatement as AGMO through a letter addressed to the Office of the President on 17
December 2010.10
However, on 4 January 2011, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) appointed
respondent as the new AGMO of the MMDA.11 On 10 January 2011, the latter took his oath of
office.
Hence, the instant Petition.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent, filed its Comment on 19
August 2011.12 However, upon motion of petitioner, it was disqualified from representing
respondent. Thus, a private law firm13 entered an appearance as counsel for respondent and
adopted the Comment filed by the OSG.14
Petitioner filed his Reply on 17 November 2011.
ISSUES
Petitioner raises the following issues15 for the consideration of this Court:
(1) Whether respondent Emerson S. Carlos was validly appointed by President Aquino to the
position of AGMO of the MMDA;
(2) Whether petitioner Emmanuel A. de Castro is entitled to the position of AGMO; and
(3) Whether or not respondent should pay petitioner the salaries and financial benefits he
received during his illegal tenure as AGMO of the MMDA.
THE COURT’S RULING
Petitioner contends that Section 2(3), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the
security of tenure of employees in the civil service. He further argues that his appointment as
AGMO is not covered by OP Memorandum Circular No. 2, since it is not a CES position as
determined by the CESB.
133
On the other hand, respondent posits that the AGMO position belongs to the CES; thus, in order
to have security of tenure, petitioner, must be a Career Executive Service official (CESO).
Respondent maintains that the function of an AGM is executive and managerial in nature. Thus,
considering that petitioner is a non-CESO occupying a CES position, he is covered by OP
Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2. Respondent likewise raises the issue of procedural infirmity
in the direct recourse to the Supreme Court by petitioner, who thereby failed to adhere to the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Hierarchy of Courts
As to the procedural issue, petitioner submits that a direct recourse to this Court is warranted
by the urgent demands of public interest, particularly the veritable need for stability in the civil
service and the protection of the rights of civil servants. Moreover, considering that no other
than the President of the Philippines is the appointing authority, petitioner doubts if a trial court
judge or an appellate court justice, with a prospect of promotion in the judiciary would be willing
to go against a presidential appointment.
Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive but is concurrent
with that of the Court of Appeals and regional trial court and does not give petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.16 The hierarchy of courts must be strictly
observed.
Settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial
tradition." 17 A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright
dismissal of a petition.18
A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and
important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition.19 The rationale behind
this policy arises from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and
attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction;
and (2) further overcrowding of the Court’s docket.20
In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he filed his
Reply and after respondent had already raised the procedural infirmity that may cause the
outright dismissal of the present Petition. Petitioner likewise cites stability in the civil service and
protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.
Petitioner’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct
recourse to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion
of the lower courts are not and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts.
Thus, the Petition must be dismissed.
Nature of the AGMO Position
Even assuming that petitioner’s direct resort to this Court is permissible, the Petition must still
be dismissed for lack of merit.
"A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise
a franchise or an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not
well-founded, or if his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited."21 Where the action is filed
by a private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted
position, otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.22
The controversy arose from the issuance of OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2, which
applies to all non-CESO’s occupying CES positions in all agencies of the executive branch.
Petitioner, being a non-CESO, avers that he is not covered by these OP memoranda considering
that the AGMO of the MMDA is a non-CES position.
In order to settle the controversy, there is a need to determine the nature of the contentious
position of AGMO of the MMDA.
Career vs. non-career
Section 4 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7924,23 otherwise known as the MMDA Charter, specifically
created the position of AGMO. It reads as follows:
Sec. 4 Metro Manila Council. x x x.
xxxx
The Council shall be headed by a Chairman, who shall be appointed by the President and who
shall continue to hold office at the discretion of the appointing authority. He shall be vested with
the rank, rights, privileges, disqualifications, and prohibitions of a Cabinet member.
The Chairman shall be assisted by a General Manager, an Assistant General Manager for Finance
and Administration, an Assistant General Manager for Planning and an Assistant General
Manager for Operations, all of whom shall be appointed by the President with the consent and
concurrence of the majority of the Council, subject to civil service laws and regulations. They
shall enjoy security of tenure and may be removed for cause in accordance with law. (Emphasis
supplied)
Executive Order No. (E.O.) 292, otherwise known as The Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
provides for two classifications of positions in the civil service: career and non-career.24
Career service is characterized by the existence of security of tenure,25 as contradistinguished
from non-career service whose tenure is coterminous with that of the appointing authority; or
subject to the latter’s pleasure; or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a
particular project for which purpose the appointment was made.26
Applying the foregoing distinction to the instant case, this Court finds that an AGMO holds a
career position, considering that the MMDA Charter specifically provides that AGMs enjoy
security of tenure – the core characteristic of a career service, as distinguished from a non-
career service position.  
CES vs. non-CES
Career service includes the following:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate
examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the
faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical
positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit
systems;
134
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief
of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President;
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the
President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a
separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing
governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.27 (Emphasis supplied)
In Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals and PCSO,28 the Court clarified the positions
covered by the CES:
Thus, from the long line of cases cited above, in order for a position to be covered by the CES,
two elements must concur. First, the position must either be (1) a position enumerated under
Book V, Title I, Subsection A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e.,
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional
Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service, or (2) a position of equal
rank as those enumerated, and identified by the Career Executive Service Board to be such
position of equal rank. Second, the holder of the position must be a presidential appointee.
Failing in any of these requirements, a position cannot be considered as one covered by the
third-level or CES. (Emphasis supplied)
In sum, there are two elements required for a position to be considered as CES:
1) The position is among those enumerated under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section
7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987 OR a position of equal rank as those enumerated and
identified by the CESB to be such position of equal rank; AND
2) The holder of the position is a presidential appointee. Records show that in reply29 to
Chairperson Tolentino’s query on whether the positions of general manager and AGM of the
MMDA are covered by the CES,30 the CESB – thru Executive Director Allones – categorically
stated that these positions are not among those covered by the CES.
Upon petitioner’s separate inquiry on the matter,31 the CESB similarly responded that the
AGMO’s position could not be considered as belonging to the CES.32 Additionally, Executive
Director Allones said that petitioner was not covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2,
to wit:
A cursory perusal of your appointment papers would show that it does not bear any indication
that you are holding a coterminous appointment. Neither your position as AGMO can be
considered as created in excess of the authorized staffing pattern since RA 7924, the law that
created the MMDA clearly provided for such position. As further stated above, your position will
not fall under paragraph No. 2 of OP MC 1 because it is not yet considered as belonging to the
CES. Hence, we posit that you are not covered by OP MC 1 and 2.33
However, contrary to Executive Director Allones’ statement, the CESB, through Resolution No.
799 already declared certain positions meeting the criteria set therein as embraced within the
CES.
It is worthy of note that CESB Resolution No. 799 was issued on 19 May 2009, even prior to
petitioner’s appointment on 29 July 2009. Moreover, as early as 31 May 1994, the above
classification was already embodied in CSC Resolution No. 34-2925, circularized in CSC
Memorandum Circular 21, Series of 1994.
Resolution No. 799 classified the following positions as falling within the coverage of the CES:
a. The Career Executive Service includes the positions of Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau director, Assistant Bureau Director, regional Director (department-wide and bureau-
wide), Assistant Regional Director (department-wide and bureau-wide), and Chief of Department
Service;
b. Unless provided otherwise, all other managerial or executive positions in the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters are embraced
within the CES provided that they meet the following criteria:
i.) The position is a career position;
ii.) The position is above division chief level; and,
iii.) The duties and responsibilities of the position require performance of executive and
managerial functions.
Without a doubt, the AGMO position is not one of those enumerated in the above-cited
paragraph(a) but it clearly falls under paragraph(b) considering that it belongs to a government-
owned and controlled corporation with an original charter. The nature of AGMO is clear from the
provisions of the MMDA Charter.
First, we have already determined that an AGMO is a career position that enjoys security of
tenure by virtue of the MMDA Charter.
Second, it is undisputed that the position of AGMO is above the division chief level, which is
equivalent to the rank of assistant secretary with Salary Grade 29.34
Third, a perusal of the MMDA Charter readily reveals that the duties and responsibilities of the
position require the performance of executive and managerial functions.
Section 12.4, Rule IV of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7924 provides the
powers, functions, duties and responsibilities of an AGMO, as follows:
12.4 Assistant General Manager for Operations
The Assistant General Manager for Operations shall perform the following functions:
a. Establish a mechanism for coordinating and operationalizing the delivery of metro-wide basic
services;
135
b. Maintain a monitoring system for the effective evaluation of the implementation of approved
policies, plans and programs for the development of Metropolitan Manila;
c. Mobilize the participation of local government units, executive departments or agencies of the
national government, and the private sector in the delivery of metro-wide services; and
d. Operate a central radio communication system.
He shall perform such other duties as are incidental or related to the above functions or as may
be assigned from time to time.
An AGMO performs functions that are managerial in character; exercises management over
people, resource, and/or policy; and assumes functions like planning, organizing, directing,
coordinating, controlling, and overseeing the activities of MMDA. The position requires the
application of managerial or supervisory skills necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities
involving functional guidance, leadership, and supervision.
For the foregoing reasons, the position of AGMO is within the coverage of the CES.
In relation thereto, positions in the career service, for which appointments require
examinations, are grouped into three major levels:35
Sec. 8. Classes of positions in the Career Service. — (1) Classes of positions in the career
service appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into three major levels as
follows:
(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts and custodial service positions which
involve non-professional or sub-professional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity
requiring less than four years of collegiate studies;
(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve
professional, technical or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring
at least four years of college work up to Division Chief levels; and
(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service. (Emphasis supplied)
Entrance to different levels requires corresponding civil service eligibilities.36 Those at the third
level (CES positions) require career service executive eligibility (CSEE) as a requirement for
permanent appointment.37
Evidently, an AGMO should possess all the qualifications required by third-level career service
within the CES. In this case, petitioner does not have the required eligibility. Therefore, we find
that his appointment to the position of AGMO was merely temporary.
Amores v. Civil Service Commission38 is instructive as to the nature of temporary appointments
in the CES. The Court held therein that an appointee cannot hold a position in a permanent
capacity without the required CES eligibility:
We begin with the precept, firmly established by law and jurisprudence that a permanent
appointment in the civil service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the
position to which the appointment is made in accordance with law and the rules issued pursuant
thereto. An appointment is permanent where the appointee meets all the requirements for the
position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, and it is
temporary where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position except only the
appropriate civil service eligibility.
xxxx
With particular reference to positions in the career executive service (CES), the requisite civil
service eligibility is acquired upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board
and the subsequent conferment of such eligibility upon passing the examinations. Once a person
acquires eligibility, he either earns the status of a permanent appointee to the CES position to
which he has previously been appointed, or he becomes qualified for a permanent appointment
to that position provided only that he also possesses all the other qualifications for the position.
Verily, it is clear that the possession of the required CES eligibility is that which will make an
appointment in the career executive service a permanent one. Petitioner does not possess such
eligibility, however, it cannot be said that his appointment to the position was permanent.
Indeed, the law permits, on many occasions, the appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES
positions in the government in the absence of appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity
in the interest of public service to fill vacancies in the government. But in all such cases, the
appointment is at best merely temporary as it is said to be conditioned on the subsequent
obtention of the required CES eligibility. This rule, according to De Leon v. Court of Appeals,
Dimayuga v. Benedicto, Caringal v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and Achacoso v.
Macaraig, is invariable even though the given appointment may have been designated as
permanent by the appointing authority.
xxxx
Security of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a permanent
appointment, takes place upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board x
x x.
Petitioner undisputedly lacked CES eligibility. Thus, he did not hold the position of AGMO in a
permanent capacity or acquire security of tenure in that position. Otherwise stated, his
appointment was temporary and "co-terminus with the appointing authority."39 In Carillo v.
CA,40 this Court ruled that "one who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of
office; his employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, there being
no need to show that the termination is for cause." Therefore, we find no violation of security of
tenure when petitioner was replaced by respondent upon the latter’s appointment to the
position of AGMO by President Aquino.
Even granting for the sake of argument that the position of AGMO is yet to be classified by the
CESB, petitioner’s appointment is still deemed coterminous pursuant to CESB Resolution No.
945 issued on 14 June 2011, which reads:
WHEREAS, on November 23, 2010, the Supreme Court in the case of PCSO v. CSC, G.R. NO.
185766 and G.R. No. 185767 limited the coverage of positions belonging to the CES to positions
requiring Presidential appointments.
WHEREAS, in the same vein, CES positions have now become synonymous to third level
positions by virtue of the said ruling.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Board RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED,
to issue the following guidelines to clarify the policy on the coverage of CES and its
classification:
136
1. For career service positions requiring Presidential appointments expressly enumerated under
Section 7(3), Chapter 2, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 namely:
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional
Director, Assistant Regional Director, and Chief of Department Service, no classification of
position is necessary to place them under the coverage of the CES, except if they belong to
Project Offices, in which case a position classification is required, in consultation with the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM).
2. For positions requiring Presidential appointments other than those enumerated above, a
classification of positions is necessary which shall be conducted by the Board, upon request of
the head of office of the government department/agency concerned, to place them under the
coverage of the CES provided they comply with the following criteria:
i.) The position is a career position;
ii.) The position is above division chief level; and,
iii.)The duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive and
managerial functions.
All appointments to positions which have not been previously classified as part of the CES would
be deemed co-terminus with the appointing authority. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, considering that petitioner is an appointee of then President Arroyo whose term
ended on 30 June 2010, petitioner’s term of office was also deemed terminated upon the
assumption of President Aquino.
Likewise, it is inconsequential that petitioner was allegedly replaced by another non-CESO
eligible. In a quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right to
the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent a showing of that right, the lack of
qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.41
All the foregoing considered, the petition merits an outright dismissal for disregarding the
hierarchy of courts and petitioner’s lack of cause of action against respondent for failure to
sufficiently show that he has undisturbed rights to the position of AGMO of the MMDA.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 211140
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN 1 B.
BARUA-YAP AND REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In the same manner that this Court is cautioned to be circumspect because one party is the son
of a sitting Justice of this Court, so too must we avoid abjuring what ought to be done as
dictated by law and justice solely for that reason.
Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus  filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, by Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) against Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr.
(Speaker Belmonte, Jr.), Speaker, House of Representatives, Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap (Sec.
Gen. Barua-Yap ), Secretary General,  House of Representatives, and Hon. Regina Ongsiako
Reyes (Reyes), Representative,  Lone District of the Province of Marinduque .
Velasco principally alleges that he is the "legal and rightful winner during the May 13, 2013
elections in accordance with final and executory resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and [this] Honorable Court;"2 thus, he seeks the following reliefs:
a. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against the HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.
be issued ordering said respondent to administer the proper OATH in favor of
petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco for the position of Representative for the Lone
District of Marinduque; -and allow petitioner to assume the position of representative
for Marinduque and exercise the powers and prerogatives of said position of
Marinduque representative;
b. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against SECRETARY-GENERAL [MARILYN] BARUA-YAP
be issued ordering said respondent to REMOVE the name of Regina 0. Reyes in the
Roll of Members of the House of Representatives and to REGISTER the name of
petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco, herein petitioner, in her stead; and
c. that a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be issued to RESTRAIN, PREVENT and
PROHIBIT respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES from usurping the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque and from
further exercising the prerogatives of said position and performing the duties
pertaining thereto, and DIRECTING her to IMMEDIATELY VACATE said position.3
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the present petition are:
On October 10, 2012, one Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), a registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a
petition4 to deny due course or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes as candidate
for the position of Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. In his
petition, Tan alleged that Reyes made several material misrepresentations in her
COC, i.e., "(i)  that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque; (ii)  that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen; (iii)  that she is not a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign
country; (iv)  that her date of birth is July 3, 1964; (v) that her civil status is single; and
finally (vi) that she is eligible for the office she seeks to be elected to."5 The case was docketed
as SPA No. 13-053 (DC), entitled "Joseph Socorro B. Tan v. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition; hence, Reyes's
COC was accordingly cancelled. The dispositive part of said resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Certificate of Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is hereby CANCELLED.6
Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration thereto.
137
But while said motion was pending resolution, the synchronized local and national elections were
held on May 13, 2013.
The day after, or on May 14, 2013, the COMELEC  En Banc affirmed the resolution of the
COMELEC First Division, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. The March 27, 2013 Resolution of the Commission (First Division) is
hereby AFFIRMED.7
A copy of the foregoing resolution was received by the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Marinduque, through Executive Assistant Rossini M. Oscadin, on May 15, 2013.
Likewise, Reyes's counsel, Atty. Nelia S. Aureus, received a copy of the same on May 16, 2013.
On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC Resolution, the Marinduque
Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the winner of the May 13, 2013
elections for the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
On May 31, 2013, Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam  against Reyes in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) docketed as HRET Case No. 13-028, entitled "Lord
Allan Jay Q. Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
Also on the same date, a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam was also filed against Reyes in
the HRET docketed as HRET Case No. 13-027, entitled "Christopher P Matienzo  v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes."
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality 8 in SPA No. 13-053
(DC), which provides:
NOW, THEREFORE, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have lapsed since the
date of the promulgation with no Order issued by the Supreme Court restraining its execution,
the Resolution of the Commission en banc promulgated on May 14, 2013 is hereby
declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.9
On June 7, 2013, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. administered the oath of office to Reyes.
On June 10, 2013, Reyes filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari docketed as GR. No.
207264, entitled "Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on Elections and Joseph Socorro
Tan,"  assailing (i) the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which denied her
motion for reconsideration of the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division
cancelling her . Certificate of Candidacy (for material misrepresentations made therein);
and (ii) the June 5, 2013 Certificate of Finality.
In the meantime, it appears that Velasco filed a Petition for Certiorari  before the COMELEC
docketed as SPC No. 13-010, entitled "Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco vs. New Members/Old
Members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) of the Lone District of Marinduque and
Regina Ongsiako Reyes," assailing the proceedings of the PBOC and the proclamation of
Reyes as null and void.
On June 19, 2013, however, the COMELEC denied the aforementioned petition in SPC No. 13-
010.
On June 25, 2013, in G.R. No. 207264, this Court promulgated a Resolution dismissing Reyes's
petition, viz.:
IN VIEW OF THE· FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc  affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is
upheld.10
Significantly, this Court held that Reyes cannot assert that it is the HRET which has jurisdiction
over her since she is not yet considered a Member of the House of Representatives. This Court
explained that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (i)  a valid proclamation, (ii) a proper oath,
and (iii) assumption of office.11
On June 28, 2013, Tan filed a Motion for Execution (of the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division and the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc) in SPA No.
13-053 (DC), wherein he prayed that:
[A]n Order be issued granting the instant motion; and cause the immediate EXECUTION of this
Honorable Commission's Resolutions dated March 27, 2013 and May 14, 2013; CAUSE the
PROCLAMATION of LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque, during the May 2013 National and Local
Elections.12
At noon of June 30, 2013, it would appear that Reyes assumed office and started discharging
the functions of a Member of the House of Representatives.
On July 9, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting on the motion for reconsideration of Velasco, the
COMELEC En Banc  reversed the June 19, 2013 denial of Velasco's petition and declared null and
void and without legal effect the proclamation of Reyes. The dispositive part reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed June 19, 2013 Resolution of the First Division is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Corollary thereto, the May 18, 2013 proclamation of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is
declared NULL and VOID and without any legal force and effect. Petitioner LORD ALLAN JAY
Q. VELASCO is hereby proclaimed the winning candidate for the position of representative
in the House of Representatives for the province of Marinduque.13 (Emphasis supplied.)
Significantly, the aforequoted Resolution has not been challenged in this Court.
On July 10, 2013, in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), the COMELEC En Banc,  issued an Order (i)
granting Tan's motion for execution (of the May 14, 2013 Resolution); and (ii)  directing the
reconstitution of a new PBOC of Marinduque, as well as the proclamation by said new Board of
Velasco as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. The fallo of which
states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Commission hereby GRANTS the instant Motion. Accordingly,
a new composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque is hereby constituted to
be composed of the following:
1. Atty. Ma. Josefina E. Dela Cruz - Chairman
138
 2. Atty. Abigail Justine Cuaresma-Lilagan - Vice Chairman
3. Dir. Ester Villaflor-Roxas - Member
4. Three (3) Support Staffs
For this purpose, the Commission hereby directs, after due notice to the parties, the convening
of the New Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque on July 16, 2013 (Tuesday) at 2:00
p.m., at the COMELEC Session Hall. gth Floor. PDG Intramuros, Manila and to PROCLAIM LORD
ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of Marinduque in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections.
Further, Director Ester Villaflor-Roxas is directed to submit before the New Provincial Board of
Canvassers (NPBOC) a certified true copy of the votes of congressional candidate Lord Allan Jay
Q. Velasco in the 2013 National and Local Elections.
Finally, the NPBOC of the Province of Marinduque is likewise directed to furnish copy of the
Certificate of Proclamation to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the
House of Representatives.14
On July 16, 2013, the newly constituted PBOC of Marinduque proclaimed herein petitioner
Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of
Marinduque with 48,396 votes obtained from 245 clustered precincts.15
On July 22, 2013, the 16th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines formally convened in a
joint session. On the same day, Reyes, as the recognized elected Representative for the Lone
District of Marinduque, along with the rest of the Members of the House of Representatives, took
their oaths in open session before Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
On July 23, 2013, Reyes filed a Manifestation and Notice of Withdrawal of Petition "without
waiver of her arguments, positions, defenses/causes of action as will be articulated in the HRET
which is now the proper forum."16
On October 22, 2013, Reyes's motion for reconsideration17 (of this Court's June 25, 2013
Resolution in GR. No. 207264) filed on July 15, 2013, was denied by this Court, viz.:
WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is
affirmed. Entry of Judgment is ordered.18
On November 27, 2013, Reyes filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Motion for
Reconsideration  in G.R. No. 207264.
On December 3, 2013, said motion was treated as a second motion for reconsideration and was
denied by this Court.
On December 5, 2013 and January 20, 2014, respectively, Velasco sent two letters to Reyes
essentially demanding that she vacate the office of Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque and to relinquish the same in his favor.
On December 10, 2013, Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. requesting, among
others, that he be allowed to assume the position of Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque.
On December 11, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting .on the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Execution filed by Velasco on November 29, 2013, praying that:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of execution be ISSUED to implement and
enforce the May 14, 2013 Resolution in SPA No. 13-053, the July 9, 2013 Resolution in SPC No.
13-010 and the July 16, 2013 Certificate of Proclamation of Petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco
as Representative of Marinduque. It is further prayed that a certified true copy of the writ of
execution be personally served and delivered by the Commission's bailiff to Speaker Feliciano
Belmonte for the latter's implementation and enforcement of the aforementioned May 14, 2013
Resolution and July 9, 2013 Resolution and the July 16, 2013 Certificate of Proclamation issued
by the Special Board of Canvassers of the Honorable Commission.19
the COMELEC issued an Order20 dated December 11, 2013 directing, inter alia,  that all copies of
its Resolutions in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No. 13-010, the Certificate of Finality dated
June 5, 2013, the Order dated July 10, 2013, and the Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16,
2013 be forwarded and furnished to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. for the latter's information and
guidance.
On February 4, 2014, Velasco wrote another letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. reiterating the
above-mentioned request but to no avail.
On February 6, 2014, Velasco also wrote a letter to Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap reiterating his earlier
requests (July 12 and 18, 2013) to delete the name of Reyes from the Roll of Members and
register his name in her place as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque.
However, Velasco relates that his efforts proved futile. He alleges that despite all the letters and
requests to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, they refused to recognize him as
the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. Likewise, in the face of
numerous written demands for Reyes to vacate the position and office of the Representative of
the Lone District of Marinduque, she continues to discharge the duties of said position.
Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or injunction anchored on the following issues:
A. Whether or not Speaker Belmonte, Jr. can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED and
ORDERED by a Writ of Mandamus to administer the oath in favor of petitioner as duly
elected Marinduque Representative and allow him to assume said position and
exercise the prerogatives of said office.
B. Whether or not respondent SG Barna-Yap can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED and
ORDERED by a Writ of Mandamus to delete the name of respondent Reyes from the
Roll of Members of the House and include the name of the Petitioner in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives.
C. Whether or not a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) and a Writ of
PERMANENT. INJUNCTION can be issued to prevent, restrain and prohibit respondent
Reyes from exercising the prerogatives and performing the functions as Marinduque
Representative, and to order her to VACATE the said office.21
As to the first and second issues, Velasco contends that he "has a well-defined and clear legal
right and basis to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus." 22 He insists that the final and
executory decisions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), and this Court in G.R. No.
207264, as well as the nullification of respondent Reyes's proclamation and his subsequent
139
proclamation as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque, collectively
give him the legal right to claim the congressional seat.
Thus, he contends that it is the ministerial duty of (i) respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr. "to
administer the oath to [him] and to allow him to assume and exercise the prerogatives of the
congressional seat for Marinduque representative;"23 and (ii) respondent Sec. Gen. Barua-
Yap "to register [his] name xx x as the duly elected member of the House and delete the name
of respondent Reyes from the Roll ofM embers."  24 Velasco anchors his position on Codilla, Sr. v.
De Venecia,25 citing a statement of this Court to the effect that the Speaker of the House of
Representatives has the ministerial duty to recognize the petitioner therein (Codilla) as the duly
elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.
Despite the foregoing, Velasco asserts that both respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec.
Gen. Barua-Yap are unlawfully neglecting the performance of their alleged ministerial duties;
thus, illegally excluding him (Velasco) from the enjoyment of his right as the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.26
With respect to the third issue, Velasco posits that the "continued usurpation and unlawful
holding of such position by respondent Reyes has worked injustice and serious prejudice to
[him] in that she has already received the salaries, allowances, bonuses and emoluments that
pertain to the position of Marinduque Representative since June 30, 2013 up to the present in
the amount of around several hundreds of thousands of pesos."  Therefore, he prays for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of permanent injunction against respondent
Reyes to "restrain, prevent and prohibit [her] from usurping the position." 27
In her Comment, Reyes contends that the petition is actually one for quo warranto  and not
mandamus given that it essentially seeks a declaration that she usurped the subject office; and
the installation of Velasco in her place by Speaker Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers his
oath of office and enters his name in the Roll of Members. She argues that, being a collateral
attack on a title to public office, the petition must be dismissed as enunciated by the Court in
several cases.28
As to the issues presented for resolution, Reyes questions the jurisdiction of the Court over Quo
Warranto cases involving Members of the House of Representatives. She posits that "even if the
Petition for Mandamus be treated as one of Quo Warranto, it is still dismissible for lack of
jurisdiction and absence of a clear legal right on the part of [Velasco]. "29 She argues that
numerous jurisprudence have already ruled that it is the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. Moreover, she insists
that there is also an abundance of case law that categorically states that the COMELEC is
divested of jurisdiction upon her proclamation as the winning candidate, as, in fact, the HRET
had already assumed jurisdiction over quo warranto  cases30 filed against Reyes by several
individuals.
Given the foregoing, Reyes concludes that this Court is "devoid of original jurisdiction to annul
[her] proclamation.  "31 But she hastens to point out that (i) "[e]ven granting for the sake of
argument that the proclamation was validly nullified, [Velasco] as second placer cannot be
declared the winner x x x" as he was not the choice of the people of the Province of
Marinduque; and (ii) Velasco is estopped from asserting the jurisdiction of this Court over her
(Reyes) election because he (Velasco) filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam in the HRET on May
31, 2014.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), arguing for Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen.
Barua-Yap, opposed Velasco's petition on the following grounds:
I.
UPON RESPONDENT REYES' PROCLAMATION ON MAY 18, 2013, EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO
RESOLVE ELECTION CONTESTS INVOLVING RESPONDENT REYES, INCLUDING THE VALIDITY OF
HER PROCLAMATION AND HER ELIGIBILITY FOR OFFICE, VESTED IN THE HRET.
Hence, until and unless the HRET grants any quo warranto petition or election protest filed
against respondent Reyes, and such HRET resolution or resolutions become final and executory,
respondent Reyes may not be restrained from exercising the prerogatives of Marinduque
Representative, and respondent Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap may not be compelled by mandamus to
remove respondent Reyes :S name from the Roll of Members of the House.
II.
CODILLA v. COMELEC IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE, GIVEN THAT PETITIONER, BEING
MERELY THE SECOND PLACER IN THE MAY 13, 2013 ELECTIONS, CANNOT VALIDLY ASSUME
THE POST OF MARINDUQUE REPRESENTATIVE.
Hence, respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap may not be compelled by
mandamus to, respectively, administer the proper oath to petitioner and register the latter's
name in the Roll of Members of the House.
III.
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR.32
The OSG presents the foregoing arguments on the premise that there is a need for this Court
to revisit  its twin Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 both in GR. No.
207264, given that (i) this Court was "divided" when it issued the same; and (ii)  there were
strong dissents to the majority opinion. It argues that this Court has in the past revisited
decisions already final and executory; there is no hindrance for this Court to do the same in G.R.
No. 207264.
Moreover, the OSG contends that:
Despite the finality of the June 25, 2013 Resolution and the October 22, 2013 Resolution,
upholding the cancellation of respondent Reyes's CoC, there has been no compelling reason for
the House to withdraw its recognition of respondent Reyes as Marinduque Representative, in the
absence· of any specific order or directive to the House. To be sure, there was nothing in the
Honorable Court's disposition in Reyes v. COMELEC  that required any action from the House.
Again, it bears emphasis that neither petitioner nor respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec.
Gen. Barna-Yap were parties in Reyes v. COMELEC.
Further, records with the HRET show that the following cases have been filed against respondent
Reyes:
(i) Case No. 13-036 (Quo Warranto), entitled Noeme Mayores Tan & Jeasseca L.
Mapacpac  v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes;
(ii) Case No. 13-037 (Quo Warranto), entitled Eric D. Junio v. Regina Ongsiako
Reyes;
(iii) Case No. 13-027 (Quo Warranto ), entitled Christopher Matienzo v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes; and
140
 (iv) Case No. 13-028 (Election Protest), entitled Lord Allan Jay Velasco v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes.33
And in view of the cases filed in the HRET, the OSG insists that:
If the jurisdiction of the COMELEC were to be retained until the assumption of office of the
winner, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the election, then there would
obviously be a clash of jurisdiction between the HRET and the COMELEC, given that the 2011
HRET Rules provide that the appropriate cases should be filed before it within 15 days from the
date of proclamation of the winner. If, as the June 25, 2013 Resolution provides, the HRET's
jurisdiction begins only after assumption of office, at noon of June 30 following the election,
then quo warranto  petitions and election protests filed on or after said date would be dismissed
outright by the HRET under its own rules for having been filed out of time, where the winners
have already been proclaimed within the period after the May elections and up to June 14.34
In recent development, however, the HRET promulgated a Resolution on December 14, 2015
dismissing HRET Case Nos. 13-036 and 13-037,35 the twin petitions for quo warranto  filed
against Reyes, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the September 23, 2014 Motion for Reconsideration of
Victor Vela Sioco is hereby GRANTED. The September 11, 2014 Resolution of [the] Tribunal is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the present Petitions for Quo Warranto are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.36
In the said Resolution, the HR.ET held that "the final Supreme Court ruling in GR. No. 207264 is
the COGENT REASON to set aside the September 11, 2014 Resolution." 37
To make clear, the September 11, 2014 Resolution of the HRET ordered the dismissal of
a Petition-In-Intervention  filed by one Victor Vela Sioco (Sioco) in the twin petitions for quo
warranto,  for "lack of merit." Further, the HRET directed "the hearing and reception of evidence
of the two Petitions for Quo Warranto against x x x Respondent [Reyes] to proceed. "38 Sioco,
however, moved for the reconsideration of the said September 11, 2014
HR.ET Resolution  based on the argument that the latter was contrary to law and jurisprudence
given the Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264.
Subsequently, the December 14, 2015 Resolution  of the HRET held that-
The Tribunals Jurisdiction
It is necessary to clarify the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the present petitions for quo
warranto,  considering the parties' divergent postures on how the Tribunal should resolve the
same vis-a-vis the Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264.
The petitioners believe that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over their petitions. They pray that
"after due proceedings," the Tribunal "declare Respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES
DISQUALIFIED/INELIGIBLE to sit as Member of the House of Representatives, representing the
Province of Marinduque." In addition, the petitioner Eric Del Mundo Junio urges the Tribunal to
follow the Supreme Court pronouncement in G.R. No. 207264.
On the other hand, Victor Vela Sioco, in his Petition-In-Intervention,  pleads for the outright
dismissal of the present petitions considering the Supreme Court final ruling in G.R. No. 207264.
For her part, respondent Regina Reyes prays too for the dismissal of the present petitions, albeit
after reception of evidence by the contending parties.
The constitutional mandate of the Tribunal is clear: It is "the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of [House] Members." Such power or authority of the
Tribunal is echoed in its 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal: "The
Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of
the Members of the House of Representatives."
xxxx
In the present cases, before respondent Regina Reyes was proclaimed on May 18, 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution of May 14, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), had already
resolved that the COMELEC First Division correctly cancelled her COC on the ground that she
lacked the Filipino citizenship and residency requirements. Thus, the COMELEC nullified her
proclamation. When Regina Reyes challenged the COMELEC actions, the Supreme Court En
Banc, in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No. 207246, upheld the same.
With the COMELEC's cancellation of respondent Regina Reyes' COC, resulting in the nullification
of her proclamation, the Tribunal, much as we would want to, cannot assume jurisdiction over
the present petitions. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered
a Member of the House of Representatives. And to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office, so the Supreme Court
pronounced in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No. 207264, thus:
x x x, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the
House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
xxxx
As held in Marcos  v. COMELEC,  the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not
a member of the House of Representatives x x x.
xxxx
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of
Representatives?
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC,  citing Aggabao v. COMELEC  and Guerrero  v. COMELEC,  the
Court ruled that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and
the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.xx x
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office x x x.
Based on the above-quoted ruling of the Supreme Court, a valid proclamation is the first
essential element before a candidate can be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives over which the Tribunal could assume jurisdiction. Such element is obviously
absent in the present cases as Regina Reyes' proclamation was nullified by the COMELEC, which
nullification was upheld by the Supreme Court. On this ground alone, the Tribunal is without
power to assume jurisdiction over the present petitions since Regina Reyes "cannot be
141
considered a Member of the House of Representatives," as declared by the Supreme Court En
Banc  in G.R. No. 207264. It further stresses:
"x x x there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner [Regina Reyes] on 18 May 2013.
Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a
precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office."
The Supreme Court has spoken. Its pronouncements must be respected. Being the ultimate
guardian of the Constitution, and by constitutional design, the Supreme Court is "supreme in its
task of adjudication; x x x. As a rule, all decisions and determinations in the exercise of judicial
power ultimately go to and stop at the Supreme Court whose judgment is final." This Tribunal,
as all other courts, must take their bearings from the decisions and rulings of the Supreme
Court.39
Incidentally, it appears that an Information against Reyes for violation of Article 1 77
(Usurpation of Official Functions) of the Revised Penal Code, dated August 3, 2015, has been
filed in court,40 entitled "People of the Philippines  v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes.  "41
The Issue
The issue for this Court's resolution boils down to the propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus  to
compel Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to perform the specific acts sought by
Velasco in this petition.
The Ruling
The petition has merit.
At the outset, this Court observes that the respondents have taken advantage of this petition to
re-litigate what has been settled in G.R. No. 207264. Respondents are reminded to respect
the Entry of Judgment that has been issued therein on October 22, 2013.
After a painstaking evaluation of the allegations in this petition, it is readily apparent that this
special civil action is really one for mandamus  and not a quo warranto  case, contrary to the
asseverations of the respondents.
A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or
exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not
well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed by a
private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise,
respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.42 In this case, given the
present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No.
207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC)
cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii)  the final and executory resolution of the
COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming
Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque - it cannot be claimed that the present petition is one for the
determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office.
To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to
try disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not convert this petition to one
for quo warranto.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may file a
verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is
shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial  act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the
part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain
right to warrant the grant thereof.43
The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been established. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.44
As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Y ap have no
discretion whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register the latter's
name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, respectively. It is beyond cavil
that there is in existence final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264
affirming the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling
Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise a final and executory resolution of the
COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes, and proclaiming
Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque.
The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts as settled and
beyond dispute - Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the Representative of
the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.
Reyes argues in essence that this Court is devoid of original jurisdiction to annul her
proclamation. Instead, it is the HRET that is constitutionally mandated to resolve any questions
regarding her election, the returns of such election, and her qualifications as a Member of the
House of Representatives especially so that she has already been proclaimed, taken her oath,
and started to discharge her duties as a Member of the House of Representatives representing
the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. But the confluence of the three acts in this case
- her proclamation, oath and assumption of office - has not altered the legal situation
between Velasco and Reyes.
The important point of reference should be the date the COMELEC finally decided to cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes which was on May 14, 2013. The most crucial time is
when Reyes's COC was cancelled due to her non-eligibility to run as Representative of the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque - for without a valid COC, Reyes could not be
treated as a candidate in the election and much less as a duly proclaimed winner. That
particular decision of the COMELEC was promulgated even before Reyes' s proclamation, and
which was affirmed by this Court's final and executory Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and
October 22, 2013.
This Court will not give premium to the illegal actions of a subordinate entity of the COMELEC,
the PBOC who, despite knowledge of the May 14, 2013 resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc  cancelling Reyes' s COC, still proclaimed her as the winning candidate on May 18, 2013.
Note must also be made that as early as May 16, 2013, a couple of days before she was
proclaimed, Reyes had already received the said decision cancelling her COC. These points
clearly show that the much argued proclamation was made in clear defiance of the said
COMELEC En Banc  Resolution.
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That Velasco now has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the present
petition for mandamus  is supported by the following undisputed facts that should be taken into
consideration:
First. At the time of Reyes's proclamation, her COC was already cancelled by the
COMELEC En Banc  in its final finding in its resolution dated May 14, 2013, the
effectivity of which was not enjoined by this Court, as Reyes did not avail of the
prescribed remedy which is to seek a restraining order within a period of five (5) days
as required by Section 13(b), Rule 18 of COMELEC Rules. Since no restraining order
was forthcoming, the PBOC should have refrained from proclaiming Reyes.
Second. This Court upheld the COMELEC decision cancelling respondent Reyes's COC
in its Resolutions of June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 and these Resolutions are
already final and executory.
Third. As a consequence of the above events, the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010
cancelled respondent Reyes's proclamation and, in turn, proclaimed Velasco as the
duly elected Member of the House of Representatives in representation of the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque. The said proclamation has not been
challenged or questioned by Reyes in any proceeding.
Fourth. When Reyes took her oath of office before respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
in open session, Reyes had NO valid COC NOR a valid proclamation.
Thus, to consider Reyes' s proclamation and treating it as a material fact in deciding
this case will paradoxically alter the well-established legal milieu between her and
Velasco.
Fifth. In view of the foregoing, Reyes HAS ABSOLUTELY NO LEGAL BASIS to serve
as a Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque, and therefore, she HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY to be recognized as
a party-respondent at a quo warranto  proceeding before the HRET.
And this is precisely the basis for the HRET' s December. 14, 2015 Resolution acknowledging
and ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the twin petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes.
Its finding was based on the existence of a final and executory ruling of this Court in G.R. No.
207264 that Reyes is not a bona fide  member of the House of Representatives for lack of a valid
proclamation.  To reiterate this Court's pronouncement in its Resolution, entitled Reyes v.
Commission on Elections45-
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The
crucial question is whether or not petitioner [Reyes] could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013.
Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May
2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without
a precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office.
xxxx
"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy - that before the
proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed
of the issue of petitioner's [Reyes] lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution
dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending
case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives. x x x."
As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner [Reyes] who continues to argue on the
basis of her "due proclamation," the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the
undeniable fact we here repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18 May
2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS." (Emphasis supplied.)
Put in another way, contrary to the view that the resort to the jurisdiction of the HRET is a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, such recourse is not a legally available remedy to any party,
specially to Velasco, who should be the sitting Member of the House of Representatives if it were
not for the disregard by the leadership of the latter of the binding decisions of a constitutional
body, the COMELEC, and the Supreme Court
Though the earlier existence of the twin quo warranto petitions filed against Reyes before the
HRET had actually no bearing on the status of finality of the decision of the COMELEC in SPC No.
13-010. Nonetheless, their dismissal pursuant to the HRET' s December 14, 2015 Resolution
sustained Velasco's well-defined, clear and certain right to the subject office.
The present Petition for Mandamus  seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus  to compel
respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap
to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory Decisions and Resolution of this Court
and of the COMELEC by administering the oath of office to Velasco and entering the latter's
name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. In other words, the Court is called
upon to determine whether or not the prayed for acts, i.e.,  (i) the administration of the oath of
office to Velasco; and (ii) the inclusion of his name in the Roll of Members, are ministerial in
character vis-a-vis the factual and legal milieu of this case. As we have previously stated, the
administration of oath and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque are no longer a matter of
discretion or judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap. They
are legally duty-bound to recognize Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by this Court
and the COMELEC'S compliance with the said ruling, now both final and executory.
It will not be the first time that the Court will grant Mandamus to compel the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to administer the oath to the rightful Representative of a legislative
district and the Secretary-General to enter said Representative's name in the Roll of Members of
the House of Representatives. In Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,46 the Court decreed:
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified
petition for mandamus  "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law." For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that
the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial  act or duty, and not purely
discretionary  on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-
defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
143
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no
longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and
beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got
53,447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the
proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc  set
aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The
Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent
Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus  is GRANTED. Public respondent Hon. Feliciano R.
Belmonte, Jr., Speaker, House of Representatives, shall administer the oath of office of
petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco as the duly-elected Representative of the Lone District of
the Province of Marinduque. And public respondent Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap, Secretary
General, House of Representatives, shall register the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of
office. This Decision shall be IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.

In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4  legislative district of Leyte has
th

been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc,  the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the
matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land There is
no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the
duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-
General shall likewise register the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives after he has taken his oath of office. This decision shall be immediately
executory. (Citations omitted.)

Similarly, in this case, by virtue of (i) COMELEC en bane  Resolution dated May 14, 2013 in SPA
No. 13-053 (DC); (ii) Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053
(DC); (iii)  COMELEC en banc Resolution dated June 19, 2013 in SPC No. 13-
010; (iv)  COMELEC en banc Resolution dated July 10, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC);
and (v) Velasco's Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16, 2013, Velasco is the rightful
Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque; hence, entitled to a
writ of Mandamus.

As to the view of Reyes and the OSG that since Velasco, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen.
Barna-Yap are not parties to G.R. No. 207264, Velasco can neither ask for the enforcement of
the Decision rendered therein nor argue that the doctrine of res judieata by conclusiveness of
judgment applies to him and the public respondents, this Court maintains that such contention
is incorrect. Velasco, along with public respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barna-
Yap, are all legally bound by this Court's judgment in G.R. No. 207264, i.e., essentially, that the
COMELEC correctly cancelled Reyes' s COC for Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of the Province of Marinduque on the ground that the latter was ineligible for the
subject position due to her failure to prove her Filipino citizenship and the requisite one-year
residency in the Province of Marinduque. A contrary view would have our dockets unnecessarily
clogged with petitions to be filed in every direction by any and all registered voters not a party
to a case to question the final decision of this Court. Such restricted interpretation of res
judieata is intolerable for it will defeat this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 207264. To be sure,
Velasco who was duly proclaimed by COMELEC is a proper party to invoke the Court's final
judgment that Reyes was ineligible for the subject position.47

It is well past the time for everyone concerned to accept what has been adjudicated and take
judicial notice of the fact that Reyes's ineligibility to run for and be elected to the subject
position had already been long affirmed by this Court. Any ruling deviating from such
established ruling will be contrary to the Rule of Law  and should not be countenanced.

In view of finality of the rulings in G.R. No. 207264, SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No. 13-010,
there is no longer any issue as to who is the rightful Representative of the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque; therefore, to borrow the pronouncement of this Court, speaking
through then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, in Codilla, Sr.  v. De Venecia,48  "[t]he rule of
law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to
the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion."

144