CARP in its 12th Year: A Closer Examination of the

Agrarian Reform Performance 1

Saturnino M. Borras Jr. 2 , June 2000

INTRODUCTION

Amidst gusty neoliberal winds sweeping across continents, pro-redistributive reform forces
within the Philippine state and society have been trying to keep the barn lights burning for
agrarian reform, so to speak. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) has entered
into the most trying moment in its history. It has now to address highly contentious private
estates where landlord opposition to reform is greatest, while the global and national free market-
oriented context is becoming more hostile to redistributive reforms, like agrarian reform.

Twelve years into its implementation, CARP accomplished, among others, the following: i)
redistributed 4.84 million hectares of both private and public lands, comprising 47 per cent of the
country's total farmland and representing 60 per cent of total CARP scope; and ii) directly
benefiting about 2.1 million rural poor households, that constitute roughly 41 per cent of the total
peasant population. These achievements are fairly comparable to the major (non-socialist) land
reforms in world history.

CARP's partial accomplishments must neither be dismissed as insignificant, as most critics do,
nor be exaggerated as fully successful, as some government officials do. These two extreme
views can also be broadly categorized as "everything is wrong with CARP," and "everything is
right with CARP", respectively. Both assessment perspectives fail to capture the actual CARP
status and the political dynamics that go with it. In fact, a good evaluation is somewhere in
between. Looking through the lens of widespread pessimism, today's partial achievement is far
beyond what had been earlier predicted. But viewing it from the perspective of strategic agrarian
transformation, today's accomplishment is, at best, modest. This middle-ground perspective is
important so that empirically-grounded political strategies toward full and meaningful agrarian
reform implementation can build on previous achievements while striving to overcome
weaknesses.

This article hopes to contribute toward strengthening the middle-ground position around the
ongoing agrarian reform debate and struggle. The rest of this paper is divided, unevenly, into
three sections: Section 1 analyzes CARP's targets and implementing mechanisms, Section 2
analyzes accomplishments, while Section 3 identifies key challenges.

1. TARGETS AND IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS

A better understanding of CARP's accomplishments requires a good grasp of the program's

targets and implementing mechanisms. These are discussed below.
1.1. Scope. CARP is a public policy that is neither revolutionary nor conservative. Conservative
land reform program here is defined as a policy that is generally characterized by selective and
limited reforms, focusing mainly on resettlement and usually excludes productive farms. CARP
has expropriationary powers, which is rather rare in the policy world today dominated by free
market thinking. In theory, CARP covers all agricultural lands in the Philippines, private and
public, regardless of tenurial relations. Based on the original 1987 scope as shown in Table 1
below, CARP hopes to reform tenurial relations in the country's 10.3 million hectares farmland,
which is one-third of the country's total land area. 3 CARP aspires to redistribute these to about
four million landless and land-poor households, which is close to 80 per cent of the peasant
population. It is to be noted that the average farm size in the country is about two hectares, while
the land reform award ceiling is fixed at three hectares.

In addition, tenancy reform (through leasehold) is supposed to be implemented in farms below

the retention 'ceiling', which is pegged at five hectares. Finally, private lands and some
government-owned lands are to be redistributed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
while public alienable and disposable lands are for distribution by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

Table 1. Original Scope of CARP (1987)

Phase/Land Type Hectares

Phase 1 1,454,800
Tenanted Rice and Corn (PD 27) 727,800
Idle and Abandoned 250,000
Voluntary-Offer-to-Sell (VOS) 400,000
Sequestered "Marcos Crony" (PCGG) Lands 2,500
Government-owned Lands 74,500

Phase 2 7,487,900
Public Alienable and Disposable 4,495,000
Integrated Social Forestry 1,880,000
Settlements 478,500
Private Lands Above 50 Hectares 534,400

Phase 3 1,352,900
Private Lands 24-50 Hectares 303,100
Private Lands 5-24 Hectares 1,049,800

Total 10,295,600

Source: Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the Philippines, vols. 1
and 2 (Manila, 1988), cited in Riedinger, Jeffrey (1995). Agrarian Reform in the Philippines: Democratic
Transitions and Redistributive Reform. Stanford: Stanford University Press. (NB: Idle and abandoned lands =
private estates).

1.2. Exemptions. There are a number of exclusions guaranteed by CARP. The original ones cover
areas such as military reservations, penal colonies, educational and research fields,
"timberlands", and some church areas. Undeveloped hills with 18 degrees slope are also
excluded. In the mid-1990s, further exemptions were introduced, namely, agricultural sectors
that are "less dependent on land", e.g. poultry, livestock, saltbeds and fishponds.

1.3. Mechanisms in land acquisition and distribution. CARP requires compensation to the
landlords and payment by peasant recipients. Land acquisition is a transaction between
government and affected landlord. Landlord compensation is based on "just compensation"
which, in turn, is computed based on various factors such as land productivity and tax
declaration. 4 Meanwhile, land distribution is a transaction between government and peasant
recipient. The peasant has to pay for the land based on the principle of "affordability". The gap
between "just compensation" and "affordable price" is subsidized by government. 5

CARP has various acquisition modes for private lands. First, Operation Land Transfer (OLT) is
the mechanism used for rice and corn lands under the Marcos (PD 27) land reform which was
subsumed by CARP. The rest of the mechanisms are used for all nonrice and corn private lands.
Second, devised in the hope of lessening landlord resistance to reform, the Voluntary-Offer-to-
Sell (VOS) increases the cash portion in landlord's compensation by five per cent (compared to
the compulsory mode) with a corresponding five per cent decrease in the bonds portion.

Third, another mode that aspires to count landlord cooperation to the program is Voluntary Land
Transfer (VLT). VLT provides for the direct transfer of land to peasants under mutually agreed
terms between peasants and landlords (but with payment terms not less favorable to peasants
than if it were the government purchasing the land). Government's role is reduced to information
provision and contract enforcement. Both VOS and VLT, however, are in the context of the
generality of expropriation, i.e. if landlords refuse VOS or VLT, their estates will nonetheless be
acquired by the state. This brings us to the last acquisition mode, i.e. Compulsory Acquisition
(CA). Under CA, land is expropriated whether or not the landlord cooperates with the program.

Other issues are relevant. Stock Distribution Option (SDO) is a distinct mode designed for
corporate farms. SDO does not involve physical land transfer of land and instead, distribution of
corporate stocks to peasants is the mode of reform. In addition, the actual physical acquisition of
some commercial farms (e.g. banana plantations) has been deferred for ten years [i.e. 1988 to
1998] for two main reasons: i) for the plantation owners to recoup their investments, and ii) to
prepare farmworkers for the eventual plantation take-over. In June 1998 this deferment expired,
and more or less 50,000 hectares of highly productive and modern plantations should begin to
witness expropriation. 6

Furthermore, CARP allows for "leaseback" arrangement where lands awarded to peasants are, in
turn and under mutually agreed terms, immediately put to a lease arrangement between peasant
beneficiaries and investor (usually the former entity that controlled or owned the land). Finally,
acquired lands can be transferred to individuals or cooperatives. An in between category was
started under the administration of DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao, namely, the concept of
"mother or collective CLOA (Certificate of Land Ownership Award)". A collective CLOA has
been designed to expedite the process of breaking the nexus between peasants and landlord,
since individual parcelization of big properties may take time. "Individual splitting" of awarded
land is supposed to take place right after the award.

1.4. Evolving Scope. In January 1996, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, the inter-
agency and multisectoral body in-charge of the overall implementation of CARP, came up with a
revised scope of CARP. This is part of what the Garilao DAR called "data clean up". Table 2
below presents the current working scope.

A number of issues have to be raised regarding CARP scope. First, the scope was decreased by
one-fifth, from 10.3 to 8.064 million hectares. Second, the largest chunk taken out comes from
the DENR coverage of public lands, where two-fifths of its original scope was slashed. 7 There
was no clear reason given to the public as to why the cut was made and as to where the more
than two million hectares went. Third, while lands under DAR increased by more than 12 per
cent, the increase was accounted for by government-owned land. 8 The DAR scope in
government-owned land more than doubled. 9 Fourth, the DAR's scope in private land decreased
by close to 10 per cent. 10 While it is understandable that CARP scope will constantly evolve
during the implementation process, still, government owes the public a full explanation of the
1996 changes in CARP scope and the actual process and method taken toward these changes.
Finally, the land reform scope in private lands is three million hectares, accounting for almost
two-fifths of the total scope. This is low compared to what should actually be covered by the
reform. A number of factors can help explain for the current

Table 2. (Adjusted) Scope of CARP, By Agency and Land Type

Land Type Scope in Hectares

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) 4,293,453

A. Privately-Owned Agricultural Lands, PAL:  

 Deferred Farms 35,635
Operation Land Transfer (OLT, Marcos' PD 27) 579,520
Voluntary Offer-to-Sell (VOS) 396,684
Government Financing Institution- (GFI-) Owned 229,796
Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT) 287,742
Compulsory Acquisition:
Over 50 Hectares 420,963
24-50 Hectares 312,355
Below 24 Hectares 736,420
(Private) Sub-Total 2,999,105

B. Non-Privately-Owned Agricultural Lands:  

Settlements 566,332
"KKK Lands" 657,843
Land Estates 70,173
(Public under DAR) Sub-Total 1,294,348

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) 3,771,411

Public Alienable and Disposable (A&D) Lands 2,502,000

Integrated Social Forestry Areas 1,269,411

DAR + DENR, or CARP Scope Grand Total 8,064,864

Source: Department of Agrarian Reform

low coverage in private estates: i) retention limit was set at five hectares plus three hectares for
every qualified heir of the landlord [15 years old and above in 1988 and is willing to farm]; ii)
the length of time of the reform has given many landlords the needed time to illegally subdivide
or convert the use of their lands, technically evading land reform; iii) in the mid-1990s, a new
round of exemptions was enacted into law, taking some agricultural lands that are comparatively
"less land-dependent" out from CARP coverage (e.g. fishponds, livestock, and poultry) where
labor-centered reforms are instead instituted (e.g. mandatory production and profit sharing).
Using Putzel's data, which is based on the 1988 national land registration, there should still be
close to five million hectares of private lands to be covered by CARP (1992:29), despite
retention rights by landlords.

2. ACCOMPLISHMENTS
2.1 Land acquisition and distribution accomplishment. CARP has to be implemented within the
structural and institutional constraints and limitations of the Philippine political setting. In fact, it
has been implemented within the very political and institutional set-up it hopes to partly change.
The analysis of Franco (forthcoming) of the Philippine 1986-1987 regime transition and current
rural politics is useful in putting into context the political and institutional backdrop against
which CARP policymaking and implementation have been carried out. Franco explains that
while there was an opening for democratization especially at the national level through
competitive elections, the local rural polity continues to be marked by a patchwork of "local
authoritarian enclaves." 11 Moreover, Lara and Morales (1990) earlier conclude that CARP
constitutes an evidence of the "blocked" transition to democracy in the Philippines in 1986-1988.
12
Meanwhile, Putzel (1992) argues about the captivity of the Philippine state by the elites
resulting to the adoption of a less radical type of land reform despite the relatively favorable
political setting in 1986-1987. 13

Given all the analyses on CARP, it is commonly agreed that CARP is a compromise public
policy that is largely reflective of the actual balance of state and societal forces during the
policymaking process (and even during the implementation phase). Thus, most critics of CARP
were justified during the early period of CARP implementation to argue that there is not much
substantial accomplishment to be expected from CARP. But policies and politics are not static.
During the implementation, policies are brought to the crucible of state-society relations where
policy processes and outcomes depend on various factors. Policies and related institutions
themselves are constantly transformed through conflict.

It should be within this framework that CARP implementation process can be better understood.
For example, after twelve years, contrary to what most observers earlier predicted, CARP has
been able to achieve something substantial. Tables 3 and 3.1 below show CARP accomplishment
over time. Using the data in the tables below, a number of initial observations can be made. First,
by the end of 1999, CARP has been able to redistribute 4.84 million hectares of land that account
for 60 per cent of the target. 14 Second, this accomplishment is roughly 47 per cent of the
country's total farmland. Third, directly benefiting from the land redistribution are more or less
2.1 million rural poor households (more or less 1.5 million under DAR and 0.6 million under
DENR) who constitute about 41 per cent of the total peasant population. 15 Finally, half of CARP
scope in private landholdings has already been redistributed.

Table 3. DAR's Land Redistribution Accomplishment, 1972 to 1999

Area in Hectares; By Mode of Acquisition
Marcos Aquino Ramos Estrada
Grand Total
(1972-1985) (1986-1992) (July 1992 (July 1998
Mode of Acquisition (1972-1999)
13 years 6 years -June 1998) –Dec 1999)
26.5 years
(PD 27 era) (CARP era) 6 years 1.5 years

Philippines 3,041,634 70,175 848,518 1,900,035 222,907

OLT 529,554 15,059 358,907 142,851 12,737

GOL 875,049 0 166,348 655,171 53,530

Settlements 632,983 44,075 208,795 356,646 23,467

Landed Estates 74,726 11,041 24,690 38,354 641

PAL 929,323 0 89,779 707,012 132,532

VOS 361,969 0 55,332 256,032 50,605

VLT 399,330 0 20,734 330,092 48,504

CA 168,024 0 13,713 120,888 33,423

[OLT = Operation Land Transfer under Marcos' PD 27 (rice and corn lands); GOL = Government-owned Lands;
PAL = Private Lands; VOS = Voluntary Offer-to-Sell; VLT = Voluntary Land Transfer; CA = Compulsory
Acquisition].
Source: Department of Agrarian Reform

Table 3.1. DENR Accomplishment in Public Alienable and Disposable and Forest Lands
DENR Scope DENR Accomplishment

3,771,411 Hectares (estimate) 1,800,000 hectares

Overall CARP Accomplishment as of December 1999

GRAND TOTAL DAR + DENR: DAR (3.04 million hectares) +

8.064 Million Hectares DENR (1.8 m.hectares) = 4.84 million hectares

2.2. Philippine land redistribution (partial) achievement in comparative perspective. Before

proceeding to a more critical interrogation of the data above, it is useful to make a comparative
glance at the initial Philippine agrarian reform achievement vis-à-vis land reform performance in
some Latin American countries. For historical reasons, similarities in agrarian structures and land
reform initiatives between Latin America and the Philippines exist. A glance at Table 4 reveals
that despite all criticisms against CARP, and despite serious weaknesses in the program and
problems in implementation, the current CARP accomplishment has already put the Philippine
agrarian reform side by side with countries that have undergone substantial land reforms. But it
is important to note some relevant comparative contexts.

The first issue is about public and private lands. In most Latin American countries, land reform
means reform in private lands. In general, there are no more substantial volume of public lands in
most countries in that continent after massive private land titling during the colonial era, except
perhaps for some "preserved" indigenous lands. In a few countries where public lands were
extensive (e.g. Brazil, Venezuela, and Ecuador), "colonization", which is basically a resettlement
program, was resorted to by governments (e.g. three-fourths of land reform accomplishment in
Venezuela and Ecuador was in public lands -- Dorner, 1992 and Zevallos, 1989, respectively).
The situation is different in the Philippines, where numerous public lands

Table 4. Land Reform Accomplishments in Some Selected Countries

Beneficiary Households
Redistributed Land as
Country Years as % of Total Farm Sources
% of Total Farmland
Hholds

Cuba Since 1959 80 75 Kay (1998:11-12) 16

Thiesenhusen
Bolivia 1952 to 1977 74.5 83.4
(1989:10-11) 17

Nicaragua 1979-1989 Nearly 50 33 Kay (1998:11-12)

Chile 1964-1973 Nearly 50 20 (Kay, 1998:11-12)

Philippines 1988-1999 47 41 On-going

1970 data Thiesenhusen

Mexico 42.9 43.4
(since 1915) (1989:10-11)

Thiesenhusen
Peru Up to 1982 39.3 30.4
(1989:10-11)

Ecuador 1964-1985 34.2 No data Zevallos (1989:52) 18

Since 1980
El Salvador through 20 12 Paige (1996:136) 19
1990s

Venezuela Up to 1979 19.3 25.4 Paige (1996:136);

 Dorner (1992:48) 20

Thiesenhusen
Panama 1977 data 13.3 21.9
(1989:10-11)

Dominican Thiesenhusen
1983 data 8.5 14.0
R. (1989:10-11)

Costa Rica 1961-1979 7.1 13.5 Paige (1996:136)

have actually been under the effective control of elites (local and foreign), despite the absence of
legal titles. Peasants actually tilling these lands have maintained various tenurial relations with
these elites. More than half of CARP scope is in public land (62 per cent), but this excludes
ancestral domains. Most CARP critics lament the fact that CARP's accomplishment focused on
public lands, implicitly or explicitly suggesting that meaningful reforms do not occur in public
lands.

Different from the Latin American context, many public lands in the Philippines have seen
highly contentious processes of CARP coverage precisely because of deeply entrenched private
interests. A few examples are: countless cattle ranches on government-owned lands leased by
private landlords, vast tracts of agricultural lands effectively controlled by landlords through
"timberlands" or "logging concessions" (when these are in fact planted to other crops like
coconut), and huge plantations planted to export crops. Therefore, having these lands covered
under land reform should not be taken for granted, as some critics do. 21 Exploitative tenurial
relations are being reformed in these types of land in the Philippine context. In fact, land reform
in these lands has never been easy. In cases where reform was successful, they proved to be
hard-won victories by peasants (e.g. portion of Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija); in cases where
lands are not yet covered, struggles continue to be uphill battle (e.g. Davao Penal Colony in
Mindanao). Hence, it is valid to compare the Philippine land reform accomplishment that
combines private and public lands with countries presented in Table 4.

The second issue is about the character of political setting within which land reforms were
carried out. Based on Table 4, top performing reforms were carried out under revolutionary
settings (e.g. Cuba, Mexico, Bolivia and Nicaragua), by elected radical socialist groups (e.g.
Chile, or in Kerala, India), or by military dictatorships (e.g. Peru). Some other successful land
reform experiences where implemented by external forces under special geopolitical historical
juncture (e.g. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan). The Philippines stands out as among the better
performers in land reforms carried out under a less-than-democratic national political setting that
is neither revolutionary nor fully democratic nor dictatorial.

The third issue is that CARP is among the very few redistributive land reforms being carried out
during the neoliberal onslaught . Most land reform initiatives were carried out after the second
world war (with the exception of Mexico which started in 1915) and the peak of initiatives was
in the 1960s and 1970s. Global and national political contexts were relatively favorable to
agrarian reform then, as compared to the current context for the Philippines today. It is also in
today's world where a competing land reform paradigm from the neoliberals is coherently put
forward, i.e. market-assisted land reform (see Deininger, 1999), unlike before where there was
broad consensus on the concept of expropriative redistributive land reform. 22 Within the current
batch of land reforms (meaning land reforms carried out since the early 1980s), the Philippine
CARP is a far better performer compared to the rest, e.g. those in Zimbabwe and El Salvador
which both started in 1980, or to post-apartheid South Africa, or to tumultuous Brazil. The fact
that the Philippine land reform, being implemented under the most hostile neoliberal context, is
also among the league of better performers historically is worth closer examination.

2.3. Types of lands and acquisition modes. For the purpose of knowing whether or not CARP has
advanced since its implementation, the initial observations above offer useful pointers that
suggest a relatively substantial achievement of the program. But for the objective of better
understanding past processes to shed light in grappling with present processes and challenges,
further interrogation of the accomplishment data is necessary. The underlying issues examined in
the succeeding discussion revolve around the types of land covered and the acquisition modes
employed. Further disaggregation of Tables 3 and 3.1 above (through Tables 5 and 6 below) is
useful, even when it covers only the DAR accomplishments.

Table 5. DAR's Land Distribution, By Land Type (as of Dec 1999)

Operation Land Nonrice & Corn
Government-Owned
  Transfer Private Agricultural
Lands
(OLT, rice & corn) Lands

% Share 52.03% 17.41% 30.55%

Calculated from Table 3

Table 6. Private Lands Redistributed, By Mode of Acquisition (as of Dec 1999)

Voluntary-Offer-to- Voluntary Land Compulsory
 
Sell (VOS) Transfer (VLT) Acquisition (CA)

% Share (Excluding Rice

38.95% 42.97% 18.1%
& Corn Lands)

Calculated from Table 3

Further interrogation of data presented in Tables 2, 3, 3.1, 5 and 6 reveals a number of important
insights. First, half of total DAR redistribution accomplishment is in private estates (which in
turn, constitutes half of the total targeted private landholdings), contrary to what some observers
believe that DAR's land distribution achievement is mainly in public lands. Second, almost one-
third is accounted for by nonrice and corn private landholdings. This is contrary to popular
impression that accomplishment in private lands happened mainly in rice and corn lands (the
latter accounts for only less than one-fifth of total accomplishment). Third, accomplishment in
government-owned lands exceeds target. It is most likely that accounting of government-owned
lands are constantly changing (in fact shuffling of land coverage between DAR and DENR
occurs regularly). Nevertheless, this issue needs closer examination.

Fourth, Compulsory Acquisition (CA) mode has so far been used sparingly by government,
accounting for close to only one-fifth of total nonrice and corn private lands acquired. The
Voluntary Offer-to-Sell (VOS) accounts for more than one-third. It is important to note here that
there is an essential difference between VOS during the scandalous years of the Aquino
administration and the VOS transactions under the Garilao DAR and onward. Many VOS
activities in recent years are actually last-minute compromise between government, landlord and
peasants. When landlords realize that their efforts to evade land reform are futile, they normally
negotiate for better terms in compensation package that are offered under VOS. Hence, many
highly contentious private estates actually ended up being expropriated under VOS.

What is alarming, and this is the Fifth, is the rise of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT) as what
seems to be the most favored acquisition mode. VLT-processed "redistribution" accounts for the
single biggest acquisition mode: two out of five nonrice and corn private lands (and in turn
accounts for 13 per cent of total CARP accomplishment).

2.4. Agrarian Reform Community (ARC). The main strategy of government in post-land
redistribution farm and beneficiary development is the Agrarian Reform Community (ARC).
Launched by Secretary Garilao in 1993, ARC is a barangay (village) at the minimum or a cluster
of contiguous barangays where there is a critical mass of farmers or farmworkers who have been
awarded lands or are awaiting the full implementation of land redistribution. Realizing that DAR
funds are limited, the Garilao DAR opted for a strategy to concentrate limited resources to
specific targeted communities, hoping for eventual spill-over effects.

Today, about 1,000 ARCs were officially launched nationwide, covering more or less one
million hectares of lands. The ARC strategy also hopes for, and actually has been able to rally
up, foreign-assisted projects. It has to be noted that foreign donor community opted to stay away
from CARP during the scandal-ridden Aquino period. DAR Secretary Garilao was able to revive
the confidence of foreign donor community and left behind more or less PhP 25 billion (roughly
US$600 million, equivalent to half of total CARP budget) in foreign-assisted projects when he
exited from office in June 1998. Some of the major projects are only starting to be implemented
today.

A number of issues have to be pointed out. First, the ARC strategy is inherently limited in
coverage. The officially declared ARCs nationwide cover only about one million hectares of
land. Hence, more than 3.8 million hectares of redistributed lands are outside this programmed
intervention and are left on their own. Second, majority of the ARCs do not have actual on-going
projects to date. Estimates show that only about 20 per cent of total ARCs have actual substantial
projects being implemented, while more than half of all ARCs have "weak" peasant
organizations (Franco, 1998). 23

Third, other more generously funded government agencies, like the Department of Agriculture
(which has a yearly budget for agricultural development that is 15 times than the beneficiary and
farm development budget of DAR), are not systematically locating their intervention in ARCs.
Fourth, while there are limitations in ARC as a strategy, it has also contributed profoundly to the
cause of agrarian reform: i) offered concrete area for co-operation with the international donor
community; ii) some well-performing ARCs have been used by DAR to argue for the case of
agrarian reform and support for it before the yearly lobby for budget allocation, and iii) helps
"legitimize" and shield peasant claim makers in local communities from continued attacks by
anti-reform forces.

In sum, while ARC as a strategy has helped the cause of agrarian reform in some ways, it cannot
deliver the needed widespread and systematic development intervention in land reformed
communities. Sources of support, other than foreign aid, must be mobilized. Hence, inter-agency
coherence is extremely necessary, especially because other agencies are far more generously
funded than DAR.

In addition, local government units must increasingly be drawn toward assuming substantial
responsibility in making redistributed lands work productively. In recent years, more state funds
are allocated to local government units since the country embarked on decentralization several
years ago. The Local Government Code of 1992 mandates the national government to directly
channel 40 per cent of national internal revenues to local government units. The target allocation
has not been fully achieved so far, but substantial increases in budget re-allocation to local
governments have been registered. By 1997, for example, 16 per cent of the total national budget
(PhP476.2 B, or US$11.2 B), amounting to PhP75.7 B (close to US$2 B) has been directly
allocated to local governments (although 23 per cent of this goes to cities). This percentage share
more than doubled the 1992 share of local governments at 6.7 per cent, while in quantitative
terms, the amount almost quadrupled. (Alonzo, 1999:201). 24

2.5. Other related issues. There are five other related issues. First, the only known Stock
Distribution Option (SDO) case is the 6,400-hectare sugarcane Hacienda Luisita owned by ex-
President Cojuangco-Aquino's family, one of the biggest landlords in the country. The Luisita
SDO depressed the value of land while overpriced the value of non-land assets. In the end, a
small percentage of the corporation was awarded to farmworkers. Today, living standards of the
farmworkers did not register any significant improvement, while the corporation has been
converting portions of the hacienda into non-agricultural uses. The law mandates that SDOs have
to be monitored periodically by government and any violations of SDO rules are sufficient
grounds for the recall of SDO agreements and the physical acquisition of the land by
government. So far, there is no serious monitoring of the Luisita case, despite reports of the
disadvantageous conditions of farmworker-beneficiaries. But contrary to earlier predictions,
SDO has never been adopted elsewhere.
Second, the deferment of land acquisition in commercial farms, totaling to about 50,000
hectares, but mainly in banana plantations, expired in June 1998. Deferred farms should have
been acquired since then, but so far the process proved to be highly contentious especially when
local landed elites who have close tie ups with national and foreign elites are mounting serious
obstacles to reform. But the farmworkers have launched widespread and sustained collective
actions to expropriate the plantations.

Third, leaseback agreements were forged in the past, especially in some important plantations
controlled by multinational companies like Dole and Del Monte. After several years of such
arrangements, however, farmworker-beneficiaries began to rethink continuation of this type of
contract and are more inclined now to pursue family farming kind of production. The 9,000-
hectare Dole pineapple plantation in South Cotabato is a classic case of beneficiaries having been
shortchanged in the deal.

Fourth, tenancy reform through leasehold is supposed to effect tenurial reforms in farms under
the five-hectare ceiling. This means recasting social relations in more than two million hectares
of farmland, involving about one million rural poor households. Leasehold has a potentially
powerful anti-poverty impact. For example, many tenants in coconut farms are under tersyuhan
arrangement (two-thirds share to landlord; one-third to peasant). Leasehold requires an
arrangement based on three-fourths share for peasant and one-fourth for landlord, thereby
doubling the income of poor peasants without much public spending. But to date achievement in
leasehold remains negligible.

Fifth, what was conceived as a transitory scheme of immediately breaking the nexus between
landlords and peasants, "collective CLOAs", in many cases, have failed to deliver immediate,
parcelized plots to peasant-beneficiaries. This has been causing serious problems among peasants
in terms of identification of individual farms to begin production activities. Finally, peasants and
their allies continue to launch collective actions geared toward recovering excluded lands and
bringing them back to CARP coverage. There are several cases when cattle ranches, timberlands,
military reservations, fishponds, and other "escapee lands" were brought back to the scope and
subjected to redistribution, demonstrating the highly dynamic nature of the agrarian reform
process.

2.6. Three periods in CARP implementation. After an overview of the aggregated CARP
accomplishment, it is useful to look into the historical development of program implementation.
In this paper, CARP implementation is divided into three periods, namely: a) the period of
scandalous years and anemic performance, b) the era of relative momentum and modest success,
and c) the most difficult period. It is necessary to elaborate with the objective of putting into
proper historical and political context the current processes and difficulties in agrarian reform
implementation. The succeeding discussion focuses on DAR accomplishment.

2.6.1. The period of scandals and anemic performance (1987-June 1992, Aquino
Administration). During this period, accomplishment was 848,518 hectares, accounting for a
little over one-fourth of the overall DAR land redistribution output. Looking into the
accomplishment during this period, one can find that: i) 43.3 per cent is in rice and corn; ii)
nearly half is accounted for by government-owned lands; iii) only one-tenth is accounted for by
nonrice and corn private lands; iv) about one-sixth of nonrice and corn total private lands is
acquired through compulsory acquisition; v) voluntary-offer-to-sell (VOS) accounts for nearly
two-thirds of output in nonrice and corn private lands; vi) voluntary land transfer (VLT) accounts
for close to one-fourth of nonrice and corn private estates; and vii) the Aquino administration
spent more than one-third of the total original CARP budget for its accomplishment (PhP 17B
out of PhP 50 B).

Hence, nearly all accomplishments during this period come from the "less contentious"
components of CARP, with rice and corn lands combined with government-owned lands
accounting for 90.4 per cent. Most nonrice and corn private estates were acquired through the
"less contentious" acquisition modes of VOS and VLT.

A number of factors can help explain the anemic performance in CARP implementation during
this period. First, because of a series of public scandals in the CARP process within this period,
the DAR had four different secretaries, failing to gather momentum in pushing for land reform.
Second, aside from scandalous real estate deals within the framework of CARP, one of the most
significant "achievements" of this period was the infamous stock distribution option in President
Aquino's Hacienda Luisita. Ex-President Aquino was the first landlord to have evaded CARP in
the grandest scale, creating a profound negative atmosphere for the cause of agrarian reform.
Third, the national political situation was very unstable punctuated regularly by numerous
military coup d' etat attempts, while the macro-economic situation was faring badly.

Fourth, autonomous NGOs and peasant organizations continued to campaign against CARP
partly because the DAR bureaucracy refused to work with them. The DAR bureaucracy during
this period, except during the short period of Secretary Abad, opted to work solely with state co-
opted, uncritical societal groups. Finally, the single most important social movement group in
agrarian reform front in terms of mobilizable base, the national-democratic group, remained
largely solid against CARP and unwilling to engage the state within the framework of reform.

2.6.2. The period of relative momentum and modest success (July 1992 - June 1998, Ramos
Administration). The administration of President Fidel Ramos witnessed a surge in CARP
implementation, achieving more than twice what the previous administration had accomplished,
with 1.9 million hectares of land. The achievement during this period accounts for almost two-
thirds of the overall DAR land distribution output. But like its predecessor, the DAR led by
Secretary Garilao focused mainly on the less contentious components of CARP using less
contentious acquisition modes, although toward the end of its term, it began to confront the more
contentious parts of the program.

It is useful to dissect the accomplishment during this period: i) a little over half of the
accomplishment is in government-owned lands; ii) rice and corn lands account for one-
fourteenth; iii) nonrice and corn private lands account for close to two-fifths; iv) a little over one-
sixth of nonrice and corn private lands has been acquired through compulsory acquisition; v)
voluntary-offer-to-sell (VOS) accounts for a little more than one-third of nonrice and corn
private estates; vi) voluntary land transfer (VLT) accounts for nearly half (46.68 per cent) of
nonrice and corn private lands acquired; and vii) the Ramos administration spent just a little over
half of the total CARP budget (PhP 27 B out of PhP 50 B).
Thus, the Garilao DAR has maintained the tradition of its predecessor in focusing on the less
contentious landholdings and acquisition modes. At this point, the issue of "contentiousness" has
to be clarified briefly. A matter of degree, contentiousness here is taken in a relational way, i.e.
some types of lands and acquisition modes compared to others. Rice and corn and public lands
are contentious lands, but compared to commercial farms, for example, they are less contentious.
Riedinger (1995:203) explains the reasons why rice and corn landlords have been politically
weakened over time. Land reform in these lands has not been easy and automatic; political
conflicts have been core part of the process. In another plane, VOS has proven to be not very
voluntary in practice, and acquisition process under this mode has not been easy and automatic
either. But when compared to the compulsory acquisition (CA) mode, VOS proves to be less
contentious.

Despite some problematic issues, like the surge in VLT transaction, it is during this period that
the agrarian reform process began to be invigorated. The Garilao administration's encouraging
performance can be explained partly by a number of factors. First, the Ramos administration was
able to stabilize the political situation of the country, and invigorate the national economy.
Second, Secretary Garilao brought in a number of NGO and political activists to occupy key
positions within the bureaucracy undermining the traditional hold of conservative forces within
the department. Third, the Garilao DAR carried out widespread and sustained re-training and re-
tooling campaigns among the department's employees and officials. Fourth, the Garilao DAR
was able to revive the interest and confidence of foreign donor community in CARP.

Fifth, Garilao was able to forge a two-way relationship with the Office of the President that gave
the DAR secretary the confidence to implement the agrarian reform policy (but not in all
occasions since other Office of the President actors were able to subvert the program from time
to time). Sixth – and perhaps the most crucial factor – Garilao has correctly identified the
importance of working closely with autonomous peasant and non-government organizations
rather than the traditional state co-opted groups. It is at this point when the Garilao DAR became
active player in what has been called the "sandwich" or Bibingka strategy in land reform
implementation – the political strategy of combining initiatives by state reformists "from above"
with pressures from social mobilizations "from below." 25

This has become possible, and this is the Seventh, after the 1992 collapse of the Communist
Party-controlled national-democratic rural social movements. The bulk of the corps of cadres of
the national-democratic rural social movement decided to abandon the outright opposition
framework vis-à-vis agrarian reform and seriously steered along the difficult path of critical
engagement with the state. Toward the end of the Garilao administration, an unprecedented
breadth in the broad rural social movements within the "critical engagement" framework has
become notable.

The different factors cited above contributed toward achieving relative momentum in the
agrarian reform process that led to modest, but profoundly encouraging, success. While these
factors help explain the modest success during the Garilao period, other factors have to be
mentioned when looking at the more strategic contribution of the Garilao DAR to the agrarian
reform process. First, the Garilao administration can be credited for actively working to ensure
the continuity of CARP beyond 1998, the year when CARP should have ended after ten years of
implementation. A new law was passed in February 1998 that mandates for the completion of
CARP within another ten years, or until 2008.

Second, the Garilao DAR helped institutionalize (formally and informally) the usually conflict-
ridden interface between the DAR and autonomous peasant and nongovernment organizations.
Third, this period has also seen the functioning of the legal arm of DAR, albeit still relatively
weak to date. Finally, breaking the inertia it inherited from the Aquino administration, the
Garilao DAR passed on the program administration to the current DAR leadership with vibrant
state-society political dynamics relatively favorable to the cause of agrarian reform.

2.6.3. The most difficult period in CARP implementation (July 1998 – present, Estrada
Administration). The Ramos administration was able to stabilize the agrarian reform front, got
the momentum to implement the program and achieved modest success. But since the previous
administrations almost completed the less contentious components of CARP, what remain to be
implemented are the most contentious components now confronting pro-reform forces within the
state and in society.

Today, the DAR, under the leadership of political and NGO activist Horacio Morales Jr., has to
contend almost solely with the most contentious private estates.

The 1.6 million hectares balance the Morales DAR inherited from its predecessor is comprised of
coconut lands (75 per cent of), sugar haciendas (15 per cent), deferred commercial plantations
(five per cent), while the other five per cent is in remaining rice and corn lands. Landlords are
intensifying resistance to reform and are using various tactics of legal and illegal intimidation
and coercion. In addition, with the financial crisis, yearly budget allocation becomes even more
difficult. The burden of making productive close to five million hectares of land is also the
principal responsibility of the current DAR administration (at least from the public perception).
Indeed, the agrarian reform process in the Philippines has just entered into the most trying
moment in its history.

To understand better the historical, institutional and political context of the current stage in
agrarian reform, Table 7 below is constructed. It shows the land reform performance of four
different regimes in terms of land types covered and acquisition modes employed. Again, the
focus of discussion is on DAR accomplishment.

Looking into the initial achievement of the two-year old Morales DAR, we can find the
following. First, one-twentieth of its accomplishment is accounted for by rice and corn lands,
substantially less than the overall share of one-sixth by this land type (and compared to Aquino
era at 43.3 per cent and Ramos period at 7.5 per cent). Second, government-owned lands account
for one-third, far less than the general share of a little more than half of this land category.

Table 7. Comparative Perspective in Land Reform Performance,

By Regime, 1972-1999, Under DAR
Land Type/Acquisition % Ave. v-a-v Land Marcos (13 Aquino (6 Ramos (6 Estrada (1.5 yrs,
Mode, By Percentage Redstrbtn Jul. '98-Dec.
 Accomp. years) years) years) '99)

Percentage of
100% 2.3% 27.89% 62.47% 7.33%
Accomplishment

Rice and Corn Lands (OLT) 17.41% 21.46% 43.3% 7.5% 5.71%

(Nonrice and corn) Private

30.55% -- 10.6 % 37.2% 59.45%
Agricultural Lands (PAL)

Total Private Lands 48% 21.46% 53.9% 44.7% 65.16%

Nonrice & corn Compulsory

18.1% -- 15.27% 17.1% 25.22%
Acquisition, CA

Norice & corn Voluntary-

38.95% -- 61.63% 36.21% 38.18%
Offer-to-Sell, VOS

Nonrice & corn Voluntary

42.97% -- 23.1% 46.68% 36.59%
Land Transfer, VLT

Government-Owned Lands 52.03% 78.54% 47% 55% 34.82%

Third, the politically most contentious nonrice and corn private lands account for a huge three-
fifths share in the Morales DAR accomplishment, compared to the same land type's overall share
of less than one-third. This is also six times than the Aquino's output and almost double than the
Ramos's performance in the same land category. If rice and corn lands are combined with all
private lands, the total is almost two-thirds of total lands redistributed, compared to the overall
average of a little less than half.

It is interesting to note, however, that while the Morales DAR established a break from its
predecessors' concentration on less contentious lands (certainly due to lack of choice), it is
following the Garilao DAR's choices of less contentious acquisition modes. Fourth, voluntary-
offer-to-sell (VOS) accounts for more than one-third (38.18 per cent) of total nonrice and corn
private lands acquired, which is almost the same as the general VOS share. This is significantly
less than the Aquino's 61.63 per cent, but almost the same as the Ramos's 36.21 per cent.

Fifth, voluntary land transfer (VLT) continues to be a favored acquisition mode under the
Morales DAR, accounting for more than one-third – but still lower than the general VLT average
of two-fifths. But this is a lot lower than the Ramos's nearly half, although higher than Aquino's
close to one-fourth. Moreover, while it is apparent that compulsory acquisition (CA) seems to be
a less preferred acquisition mode, CA-processed redistribution witnessed substantial increase.
Under the Morales DAR, CA corners one-fourth of total nonrice and corn private lands acquired,
as against the general CA share of less than one-fifth. This is also significantly higher than the
Ramos's one-sixth, or Aquino's one-seventh.

Agrarian reform in the Philippine, as elsewhere, has always been a contentious political process,
but especially during this current period, the contentiousness of the process has greatly
intensified. This can be seen in a number of ways. First, landlords use more often than previously
various legal and illegal forms of intimidation and coercion against rural poor claim makers and
DAR personnel.

There are a few thousand beneficiaries who were awarded lands but could not physically occupy
the lands because of landlord resistance. Landlords have also resorted to the "criminalization" of
agrarian reform claim making activities, as for example beneficiaries who tried to harvest
coconuts inside the supposedly reformed lands are being slapped with charges of theft before
civilian courts. Some landlords have been trying to expel potential beneficiaries from the land, as
what the Floirendos in Davao del Norte are currently doing. Of course, these landlord actions are
met with militant responses from the peasants and their allies.

Second, some landlord-friends of President Estrada have been trying to "cash in" for their
support for the electoral campaign of the president by negotiating for the exemption of their
lands from land reform, or by having "special arrangements" under the agrarian reform program.
One example is Danding Cojuangco who, after "giving" to farmworkers "his" more than 4,000
hectares of land in Negros Occidental, wants to strike a special joint venture arrangement with
the beneficiaries. To date, there is not yet any negotiated deal because the Morales DAR refuses
to accept the terms of Cojuangco's proposed joint venture, especially with regard the issue of
land title. The DAR is firmly opposed against putting the land titles (CLOAs) of beneficiaries as
equity in the joint venture, because if this happens, so the DAR argues, the beneficiaries can lost
their land in the event of the corporation's bankruptcy.

One crucial move done by the Morales DAR was to sign a new administrative order and policy,
called Magkasaka (aka "corporative"), purportedly to promote private sector participation in
making awarded lands productive. Many groups are seriously alarmed about the possible dangers
in promoting such kinds of economic undertakings in land reform communities (although this is
not really new because CARP has promoted similar joint venture initiatives such SDO and
leaseback). But in the succeeding polemical debate on the new policy, one crucial issue has been
consistently missed: beneficiaries' land titles. Regardless of the real intentions behind the new
policy, one effect of such is that: a) physical land transfer to peasants is assured, and b)
beneficiaries' land titles cannot be put up as equity. Unless the new policy is repealed, the
Danding Cojuangco Negros land deal cannot legally push through. This new policy has,
intentionally or otherwise, sealed one important loophole in CARP.

Third, several multinational companies and big landlords engaged in plantation agriculture have
been trying to use CARP to their advantage and at the expense of farmworkers. For example,
Dole tries to manipulate legal and political process in order to renew a leaseback contract with
more than 7,000 farmworker-beneficiaries who are now owners of the more than 9,000-hectare
pineapple plantation in South Cotabato. The plantation was redistributed in 1989 and
immediately after, a 10-year leaseback contract was forged. And within the period of 10 years,
Dole retrenched from work more than 3,000 farmworker-beneficiaries. Dole paid a very low
lease rent of about PhP5,000 (US$125) per year per hectare (i.e. per beneficiary) from 1989 to
1999. Dole wants a new leaseback arrangement that would secure its control over the land for
another 25 years, with an offer to increase the lease rent, from PhP5,000 to P7,500 (or from
US$125 to $187). Majority of the beneficiaries, especially those retrenched, refuses to agree and
wants direct control over their individual parcel of land. The conflict is still unfolding.

Moreover, big plantation owners, especially in the banana sector, continue to try to circumvent
the law. It must be recalled that the deferment of land acquisition of these plantations expired last
June 1998 and should now be redistributed to farmworkers. Plantation owners have been
systematically maneuvering through various ways, such as expelling farmworkers from
plantations before and even after June 1998. The administrative order that the Morales DAR
passed (AO 9 s. of 1998) puts retrenched farmworkers back into the pool of potential
beneficiaries, against the will of most plantation owners. Most of the retrenched farmworkers
were active leaders and members of militant unions but were retrenched between 1988 and 1998
as part of the plantation owners' scheme to rid their companies of land and profit share claim
makers. Plantation owners, who are eyeing for "special" post-redistribution joint venture
arrangements do not want to deal with the politically militant farmworkers. Hence, despite the
passage of Morales' AO 9, which categorically calls for the immediate expropriation of deferred
commercial farms, the struggle for land remains an uphill battle, as seen in the plantations
controlled by highly influencial elites like the Floirendos, Ayalas, and Lorenzos, as well as a
number of multinational companies like Dole.

Fourth, decentralization has empowered local government units which are in many localities
heavily influenced by local landed elites. Hence, one unintended outcome of decentralization is
further empowerment of local landed elites. In recent years, land use conversions (to nonfarm
uses), as a way to evade land reform, have been facilitated through local government units which
are authorized to reclassify agricultural lands to other uses. Local government units are
increasingly drawn into the land reform conflict.

Fifth, the budget allotted for the completion of CARP under the new 1998 law is PhP 50B ($1.25
B), a little less than half than what is needed which is PhP 111B ($2.77B). But this budget has to
be allocated by Congress on a yearly basis. To make the situation worse, some anti-land reform
actors within the Congress are able to cut the DAR budget every year. For example, for 1999
budget, there was almost zero allotment for the acquisition of new lands. DAR managed to
accomplish more than 100,000 hectares mainly by squeezing savings from different programs
within the department.

For year 2000, the proposed budget of PhP 1.2 B for the acquisition of (175,000 hectares) new
lands was cut by half. A staunch anti-land reform senator, John Osmeña, who comes from a big
landlord family in Cebu and a close ally of President Estrada, has figured prominently in the
budget cuts. The main argument used to cut budget has always been that DAR should not engage
in acquiring new lands until it is able to assist millions of beneficiaries who already received
lands but not the necessary support services. Pro-reform actors have to come up with more
convincing counter-arguments.

Sixth, given all the difficulties being faced by CARP, the neoliberals have been eyeing for the
eventual halt of CARP and are pushing for the shift instead to the neoclassical scheme of
"market-assisted land reform." Led by World Bank experts, the scheme, which is based on
"willing seller-willing buyer" principle has been peddled since the Garilao period, but was
rejected by the previous administration. Today, the proposal is being resurrected. The Morales
DAR, in general, is not in line with the fundamental principles of the proposed market-oriented
land transaction, but is willing to engage the World Bank on the level of experimental study,
hoping that fresh funds can come in with the scheme. Nevertheless, the bottomline of the
Morales DAR is reportedly against using the market-oriented approach as alternative to CARP.

Finally, many of the provinces with the most backlogs in land redistribution are areas where the
autonomous peasant and nongovernment groups are not based significantly. The uneven
accomplishment of CARP and the uneven presence of pro-agrarian reform peasant and
nongovernment organizations across geographic locations occur against the backdrop of the
ever-present anti-reform forces.

In sum, Secretary Morales started on better institutional foundation when he assumed office in
mid-1998, as compared to when Secretary Garilao took the DAR leadership in mid-1992 amidst
the debris of scandals and widespread inertia. The current DAR administration, however, is
embedded within the political, economic and fiscal contexts that proved to be most hostile to
redistributive reforms, like agrarian reform. Completing implementation of at least CARP's land
redistribution component is the most difficult challenge addressed not only to the Morales DAR
but to the broader pro-reform forces within the state and society.

3. CHALLENGES

There are difficult challenges today and in the near future confronting pro-reform groups within
the state and in society. These challenges are organized into six clusters of broadly distinct but
interrelated issues. The ultimate accomplishment and strategic impact of agrarian reform in the
country will depend largely on the resolution of the key questions outlined below.

3.1. Completion of land redistribution component by June 2004. The land redistribution
component of CARP must be finished by June 2004, the end of the Estrada administration's term
of office. Prolonging CARP implementation and subjecting it to another national regime
transition may be too risky politically. But this task is not easy. It will require several crucial
factors, some of which are discussed below.

First, given the more or less 1.2 million hectares of highly contentious private landholdings
scheduled for acquisition and redistribution, completion of the land reform component within the
next four years will require a yearly average acquisition-redistribution output of 300,000
hectares. Historically, this annual average was achieved only in a few years during the Ramos
administration but which were focused on the less contentious landholdings. But just because
this level of output was not achieved in the past does not mean that it cannot be accomplished
today.

Second, the current trend in yearly Congress budget allocation for the acquisition of new lands
hovers around a target of 100,000 hectares annually. Hence, aspiring to acquire and redistribute
300,000 hectares per year will require tripling of the yearly budget allocation by Congress. This
can be achieved only if: i) no less than President Estrada himself seriously push for sufficient
fund allocation and block the "land-reform-budget-cut-initiatives" of some of his close allies in
Congress; ii) more widespread, intensive and consistent lobby and mobilization by rural social
movements; iii) broader and active support by pro-reform forces within Congress; and iv)
supportive media projection of the issue. The issue is not whether or not there is government
money. There is. It is an issue of budget allocation priority. Moreover, at this early, the Estrada
administration has to lobby Congress for the passage of a new law that would either remove the
budget ceiling in the February 1998 augmented CARP budget, or place a new, higher ceiling of
PhP 111B.

Third, many of the substantial backlogs in land acquisition and distribution are in provinces
where anti-reform forces have entrenched presence, while pro-reform societal groups have
minimal and uneven influence. A few examples are Regions 2, 5, and 12 (Cagayan Valley, Bicol,
and Maguindanao area, respectively). These areas require more widespread organizing, and for
the few groups present in these areas, more resources (logistical and political) are necessary to
stand up to the challenge.

Fourth, further delay in the expropriation of deferred commercial farms may impact negatively
on the overall momentum of land acquisition and redistribution of other private landholdings.
Hence, it is necessary to resolve the land question in the deferred commercial farms, especially
in the banana plantation, the soonest possible time.

Finally, most rural social movement groups address their issues, grievances and collective
actions to the Department of Agrarian Reform. This is perfectly understandable since DAR is
supposed to be the lead agency in this social reform agenda. This can also be explained by the
long history of close interface between the department and land claim makers -- a kind of
political interaction that has never been developed to a comparative degree in any other
government agencies and their respective constituencies. Unfortunately, however, in many
occasions the collective actions of pro-reform societal groups are not optimized principally
because they are mobilizing before the not-so-precise pressure points within the state. The issue
of collective action targets which is quite crucial to the land reform process, requires greater
elaboration.

It must be noted that land acquisition and redistribution in the country are handled, in various
stages, not only by the DAR but by dozens more departments and agencies. It is important to be
more specific.

1) Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for land valuation and landlord compensation. Relevant
documents pass through different levels of LBP, local to national. LBP's function requires
coordination with several more entities, private and public, for proper land value assessment (e.g.
local government units for tax declaration, Department of Agriculture for crop productivity
assessment, academic experts for independent evaluations, and so on). 2) Registry of Deeds
(ROD). This is the office where the land reform process usually starts and ends. ROD supplies
DAR of landlord titles to begin the acquisition process. In most occasions, landlords begin their
maneuvers also with this office. Hence, "missing titles" to delay the process, and so on.
Registration of CLOAs (certificates of land award) is also needed before redistribution can take
place. Again, ROD handles this process. 3). Surveying of estates for acquisition, and later, for
redistribution purposes, is not handled directly by the DAR. The Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) handles survey-related activities. In fact, actual surveying has long
been privatized so that public bidding process is necessary for every surveying requirement in
every landholding. Most delays in land reform actually occur in the offices of LBP, ROD, and
DENR. 4) If mapping is needed, the NAMRIA (the national mapping authority) is called in. 5) If
certification for water resource-related issues is necessary, the National Irrigation Authority is
brought in. 6) When agronomy-related farm viability question is relevant, the Department of
Agriculture is called upon. 7) When productivity of coconut trees in a given farm is relevant to
coverage or valuation issues, the Philippine Coconut Authority is invited to join the process. 8)
When cooperative-related issues surface, the Cooperative Development Authority, or 9) the
Department of Labor and Employment, intervenes. 10) When land use conversion (to nonfarm
land use) issues to evade land reform become a problem, the main government agency for
housing (HLURB) usually enters into the picture, or 11) the municipal local government gets
involved, or 12) the provincial local government is dragged into the scene, or 13) the Department
of Trade and Industry intervenes. When legal appeals are done related to conversion issues to
evade expropriation or about retention rights, more entities come in: 14) the provincial agrarian
reform adjudicator, or 15) the national DAR Adjudication Board, a quasi-judicial body under the
DAR, but has relative autonomy,

Oftentimes, landlords bypass these agrarian courts and instead use civilian courts, such as 16)
municipal trial courts, or 17) regional trial courts, or 18) Court of Appeals. In some instances,
legal appeals are forwarded to the 19) Office of the President, and 20) the Supreme Court. When
criminal charges are brought in against peasants, the same courts become involved, and so are
21) the local police. When contentious public lands are involved, 22) the Land Registration
Authority, and 23) Department of Justice, or even 24) the Department of Interior and Local
Government (when local governments are involved), intervene.

Post-land redistribution rural development issues are even more complex. The DAR has
marginal funds for post-redistribution development process. Whatever modest funds the DAR
has for these purposes, usually other agencies are the fund end-users because these agencies are
the direct project implementors (e.g. DPWH for farm-to-market roads, and so on). Moreover,
substantial portion of these funds are in fact pre-allocated to various Congressional districts as
members of Congress "divide the pie" among themselves before approving DAR's yearly budget.
Hence, the DAR relies mainly on foreign-assisted projects for post-redistribution rural
development. In this case, more entities get involved in the agrarian reform process, such as
multilateral aid agencies like 25) UNDP, 26) FAO, 27) ADB, 28) WB, 29) IFAD, 30) OECF, 31)
EU, 32). They also include more bilateral aid agencies, such as 33) German GTZ, 34) Australian
AusAid, 35) Belgian BIARSP, 36) Japanese JICA, and so on. Finally, legislation of agrarian
reform-related anti-reform bills and laws is done by: 37) the Senate, and 38) the Lower House of
Congress.

The list of related agencies and organizations relevant to agrarian reform implementation is long,
but still the above-cited list cannot possibly capture the full extent of the complexity of this
organizational-institutional web.

Many, if not most, pro-reform societal groups oftentimes fail to identify most crucial pressure
points within government necessary to achieve maximum impact of their collective actions. A
few examples are: i) delay in survey: demonstration in front of the DAR offices, not before the
DENR; ii) delay in valuation process: demonstration against DAR, not against LBP; iii) delay in
CLOA registration: demonstration against DAR, not against ROD; iv) land conversion initiated
by local government units: demonstration against DAR, not against the local government units
involved; v) land dispute decision in favor of landlords carried out by the Supreme Court: rally
against DAR, not the Supreme Court; vi) harassment by the local police: mobilization before
DAR offices, not before local police offices; vii) lack of support services: demonstration versus
DAR, not before the agriculture department; viii) problems in foreign-assisted projects: pressure
applied on DAR, not on the relevant multilateral or bilateral aid agencies; ix) legislation of anti-
reform laws: rally against DAR, not against Congress. The list can go on and on.

There are already some initiatives toward addressing these problems, but these undertakings
must be more consistent, widespread and sustained.

Logistical and political resources of rural social movements are extremely limited. Hence,
careful identification of the most crucial pressure points in the agrarian reform process has to be
done. This is not to argue that confronting DAR in all agrarian-related issues is wrong. It is
correct. After all, the DAR is the overall lead agency in agrarian reform. But when it comes to
the issue of "direction of the main blow," it is argued here that rural social movements have to
rethink their traditional targeting strategy. Using limited logistical and political resources
available to rural social movements in the most effective way by directly targeting most crucial
entities, can greatly expedite the process of land acquisition and distribution. It will also improve
the chances of post-land redistribution farm and beneficiary development.

3.2. Post-land redistribution farm and beneficiary development. As mentioned earlier, the
Morales DAR is saddled not only by the burden of expropriating remaining private landholdings,
but also by the popular public perception that DAR is the responsible agency for developing
close to five million hectares of redistributed lands. Formally, DAR is the lead agency for such
undertaking. In reality, however, it has negligible funds for such initiatives. Hence, concerning
post-redistribution rural development undertakings, one has to look beyond DAR.

First, bigger state funds needed for the development of redistributed lands and their immediate
communities are in the hands of at least two giant departments, namely, Departments of
Agriculture and Public Works and Highways. Unfortunately, there seems to be incoherence, and
even conflict, in policy and program priorities between DAR and these departments. Some of the
DA's and DPWH's projects may in fact indirectly subvert the course of agrarian reform when
they pour in projects in areas that still need land reform because, among others, land prices go up
when infrastructures and support services come in. These give landlords more incentives to resist
land reform.

The Morales DAR should work for more coherent inter-agency joint initiatives toward making
the DA and the DPWH more responsible in development initiatives in redistributed lands. The
inter-agency "convergence strategy" spearheaded by the Morales DAR and that seems to have
been accepted initially by the DA should be pursued on more practical and local level. As said
earlier, rural social movements have to start pressuring these departments toward the delivery of
support services in land reformed communities, despite widely perceived absence of active pro-
agrarian reform forces within these agencies, and absence of history of close interface between
social movements and these departments.

Second, despite some unintended negative consequences of decentralization to land reform, it is

quite clear that local government units have increasingly received more state funds in recent
years. These are resources that can be target of claim making initiatives of land reform
beneficiaries. Third, members of Congress are able to control billions of funds yearly through
their pork barrel. They should be good targets by land reform beneficiaries in terms of
mobilizing funds for the development of redistributed lands.

Fourth, the controversial coconut levy fund, which is currently estimated at PhP 100 B ($2.5 B)
can be a major source for the reinvigoration of the coconut sector, which covers close to one-
third of the country's total farm area. The coconut levy fund is still the subject of a complex legal
case between the government, Marcos crony Danding Cojuangco, and various groups of small
coconut farmers and farmworkers. The ongoing negotiation for the settlement of at least a
portion of the total fund must be pursued, despite serious problems related to legal technical
issues.

Finally, the first four potential sources of funds have to be mobilized especially because the main
source of DAR's money for post-land redistribution rural development, i.e. foreign-assisted
projects, may no longer see increases in the coming years. In fact foreign funds for agrarian
reform may start to taper. A number of bilateral aid agencies have recently radically cut down
the number of developing countries from their list of aid recipients (down to twenty poorest
countries in the world, the Philippines excluded). There seems to be an adoption of a new
principle in aid targeting based on "more funds for lesser countries for greater impact." Hence,
for example, the Philippines was recently delisted from the Dutch and Belgian development aid
recipient lists.

3.3. Maximizing as well as policing non-land transfer reforms. For various reasons, earlier
administrations appear to have taken for granted non-land transfer reforms, especially tenancy
reform, while failing to closely monitor other implemented schemes, such as the stock
distribution option (SDO). The non-land transfer reforms can no longer be ignored. In fact, the
Morales DAR can make profound impact on the more strategic agrarian transformation if it
tackles this issue more squarely, now.

First, the Morales DAR and the broad rural social movements must closely monitor and evaluate
SDO implementation, specifically the Hacienda Luisita SDO. When found guilty of violation of
CARP rules, the Cojuangco-Aquino sugarcane estate must be acquired immediately by
government and redistributed to farmworkers. Second, production and profit sharing scheme was
carried out in several commercial farms during the ten-year deferment period (1988-1998). This
was especially so in banana plantations. Corporations should have given their farmworkers 10
per cent share in yearly net profit and three per cent share in gross sales. While most companies
have reported compliance, farmworkers accuse them of widespread cheating. For example,
giving a farmworker PhP 500 production and profit share per year when the latter should have
received PhP 5000. In the banana sector, the estimated total value of "unpaid" production and
profit shares over the period of ten years may run to billions of pesos, according to the Banana
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Alliance and the Mindanao Farmworkers Development Center,
BARBAI and MFDC, respectively.

The Morales DAR must seriously look into these reports of violations and make the companies
pay the proper amount to farmworkers. This problem can be turned into positive, so to speak, if
the Morales DAR takes into account the nonpayment issues within the context of expropriation-
compensation process in these plantations (i.e. those found guilty of the scam, the full unpaid
amount must be automatically accounted as advance payments by farmworkers). This may prove
necessary because DAR has serious financial limitations in acquiring highly expensive banana
plantations. For example, LBP's estimate of an average acquisition price based on "just
compensation" is PhP 300,00 per hectare, while the asking price of landlords are even higher,
ranging from PhP 750,000 and PhP 1.2 million per hectare. The national average of acquisition
cost to date is somewhere between PhP 30,000 and PhP 90,000 per hectare.

Third, when the "less land-dependent" agricultural sectors were excluded from CARP coverage
in the mid-1990s, the law states that production and profit sharing scheme should instead be
implemented. The Morales DAR, as well as the broad rural social movement, must fully address
this issue since it may involve tens of thousands of rural workers and perhaps hundred millions
of pesos worth every year.

Finally, farms excluded from physical acquisition and redistribution because they are less than
the retention ceiling of five hectares are supposed to undergo tenancy reform through leasehold.
But so far, leasehold has seen negligible implementation to date. This is worrisome because there
is an estimated more than two million hectares of land under this category, involving about one
million rural poor households. Initiatives toward developing a regulated land rental market may
be highly contentious and difficult to organize and implement, e.g. to deal with widely scattered
estimated one million small landlords and the same number of rural poor households. Pro-reform
groups cannot, however, turn their backs from a million rural poor households.

3.4. Defense of previous gains. To redistribute the remaining private landholdings, to develop
close to five million hectares and redistributed lands, and carry out non-land transfer reforms
constitute herculean task. But this is not enough. Continued protection of earlier gains in land
redistribution and rural development must be a permanent agenda of pro-reform state and
societal groups. This can be done in a number of ways.

First, reversals through withdrawals of award certificates, especially in rice and corn lands, have
truly been alarming for the past few years. These withdrawals occur primarily in areas of the
urban sprawl and thus it is highly probable that the boom in land markets in these enclaves have
triggered (previous) landlords to re-claim their lands. The Morales DAR has to seriously look
into the extent of these cases and the mechanisms through which landlords are able to reverse
previous reforms.

Second, the Morales DAR has to seriously look into the VLT (voluntary land transfer)
transactions in the context on investigating whether technical land reform evasions occur in these
lands, or whether peasants are in disadvantageous situations. Policing VLT transaction may not
be easy. Rural social movements should moved into these issues as well. Third, uninstalled
beneficiaries in several thousands of hectares of lands must be put in place. Military and police
force, used by the DAR in some cases, must be employed more regularly. In some public lands
where "voluntary noninstallation of beneficiaries" occur, immediate construction of basic access
infrastructures like roads and parcellary surveys must be carried out without delay.

Finally, gains in the land reform front may be taken away from the peasants through other state
policies like privatization, deregulation and import liberalization in the context of the global
neoliberal resurgence. While the DAR alone may not be able to stop the forces of globalization,
it can do something to minimize negative impacts on the land reform farms and beneficiaries
primarily through rallying more support services to redistributed lands and beneficiaries and
continued lobby against particularly damaging state policies.

3.5. Expansion, not contraction, of scope. In an effort to expand the scope of land reform,
government and rural social movements must look into lands that, for various reasons, have
fallen outside CARP formal coverage, while protecting the current coverage. There are already
several cases when previously excluded lands ended up being expropriated and redistributed
principally because of social mobilizations from below that were met with reformist initiatives
within government.

First, there are still numerous public lands that should be placed under CARP coverage. For
example, it is widely believed that there are still tens of thousands of public lands under the
control of various state universities and colleges nationwide. More prime agricultural public
lands under private control (like the 5,200-hectare Davao Penal Colony leased by the Department
of Justice to Marcos crony Antonio Floirendo who has since 1969 used it as banana plantation
for the global giant Chiquita), have to be taken back by government and subjected to
redistribution. Finally, other government lands, e.g. many of the so-called "landed estates" that
have been effectively controlled by private interests and that government should move toward
clarifying its legal right over these lands for possible redistribution.

Second, the issue of "timberlands" remains stuck in the grey area of coverage or noncoverage.
Formally, timberlands across the country are not included in the land reform coverage.
Timberlands are usually government-owned lands that were awarded to local landed elites for
logging concessions mostly decades ago. Despite effective cessation of timber-related use of the
land, local elites have been able to perpetuate control over these lands, many of which have
already been transformed into agriculturally-productive croplands planted mostly to coconut and
corn. Some of these timberlands have been fraudulently titled privately, but then are formally
outside CARP coverage (even when they are private landholdings) precisely because these are
technically classified as "timberlands". Various sorts of tenancy relations do exist between the
timberland holders and peasants working in these lands. Government policies and laws have so
far failed to address the changed and changing land use in these timberlands over time. There are
tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousands of hectares of timberlands across the country. In Bondoc
peninsula (Quezon) alone, several thousands of hectares are in this limbo.

Third, tens of thousands of hectares of land across the country are "devoted" to cattle ranches.
Cattle ranches are exempted from land acquisition and redistribution only if they comply with the
rule of 1:1 ratio between cattle and hectare of land. Many if not most, of the cattle ranches do not
fulfill the mentioned requirement. In most cases, far less number of cattle occupy vast tracts of
land. The classic tactic of landlords is to "borrow cattle from other ranches" whenever there are
government ocular inspections to evade being charged of violating the law and having the land
expropriated. Some rural social movement groups have been able to retrieve lands within this
category, primarily through sustained mobilizations.

Fourth, there are also landholdings that are exempted from land reform (e.g. fishponds, saltbeds,
church lands), but in fact are now, for various reasons, idle and so should be covered by land
reform. For example, if not for the vigilance of people around Aquafil, the controversial fishpond
estate in Mindoro would have continued to be out of CARP coverage. Finally, there may be far
more lands that are outside the current CARP scope, like countless five hectare-farms owned by
one person, or landholdings not covered by CARP because the title is not available at the
Registry of Deeds (ROD). These lands can only be put back to CARP coverage through
widespread community-based mobilizations complemented by initiatives by reformists within
government.

3.6. Assistance for non-land reform beneficiaries. In terms of who benefited from previous land
reform initiatives in various countries, most of the recent assessments on the impact of agrarian
reform point out to two-interrelated issues. On the one hand, most of those who benefited were
the not-so-poor rural poor (tenants and regular farmworkers), while on the other the poorest of
the rural poor (seasonal farmworkers) were left out. New dimension in social differentiation
among the peasantry is emerging. 26

Most agrarian reform policies have prioritized tenants and regular farmworkers as beneficiaries
of land reform. This prioritization was resorted to by various governments because of the limited
lands up for redistribution compared to those needing lands for cultivation. The Morales DAR
and the rural social movements should not take for granted the sector and interests of the poorest
of the rural poor, e.g. seasonal farmworkers, rural women and youth. It is not easy to address
their problems without relating it to the broader agrarian transformation and macro-economics.
But some smaller building blocs can be done now.

First, the Morales DAR and the rural social movements must consciously maximize the full
absorptive capacity of CARP in order to benefit as much rural poor as possible. One example of
the issue of priority among the various rural sectors is the ongoing debate on the issue of
seasonal, retrenched and regular-active farmworkers in banana plantations now undergoing
initial acquisition processes. Second, rural women have proven to be one of the usual non-
beneficiary sectors of land reform in most agrarian reform programs in different countries, as
shown empirically by Carmen Diana Deere (1985). 27 CARP has undergone dynamic policy
reforms around the issue of women, triggered primarily by a controversial case of negative
impact on women in a Mindanao rubber plantation (Rimban, 1997). 28 Much has to be done
though to ensure that distinct rights and interests of rural women are guaranteed and protected
within the framework of land reform. At the very least though, as shown in the case studied by
Rimban, land reform must not subvert the traditional sources of income of women.

Third, bulk of the available labor force in the countryside today is comprised of the rural youth.
Most of them do not have access to land, nor are potential beneficiaries in the land reform
process. Government must devise programs that can augment the employability of the rural
youth. Finally, two government policies can help address the issues raised above. One is to
actively promote nonfarm sources of employment through cottage and other rural-based
industries. Another is carrying out widespread skills development trainings among non-land
reform beneficiaries to improve their employability in industries domestically or abroad.

CONCLUSIONS

Twelve years into its implementation, CARP has registered substantial, albeit partial,
accomplishment. The achievement is not insignificant, as what some critics claim, nor fully
successful, as what some government officials want the public to believe. While the partial
accomplishment in terms of volume of lands redistributed and number of peasant recipients is
indeed significant, the bulk of these redistributed lands are of the less contentious types and
redistributed through the less contentious acquisition modes. Thus, what remain to be
expropriated are the highly contentious private landholdings. However, despite some serious
problems within the program and its partial accomplishment, today's level of CARP achievement
(and the political process that goes with it) is profoundly encouraging in the context of hostile
global and national neoliberal setting where state-led redistributive reforms have become a
taboo. The partial CARP accomplishment is fairly comparable with the major (non-socialist)
land reforms in world history.

CARP's modest and partial success, which started to gain ground during the DAR administration
of Ernesto Garilao (1992-1998), is largely due to the dynamic political interaction of rural social
movements and reformist state actors. The current DAR administration under the leadership of
Horacio Morales Jr. is thus confronted solely by highly contentious private landholdings. Serious
problems in finances and escalating resistance of landlords are among the most difficult
problems the Morales DAR has to confront.

On the side of rural social movements, sustaining and expanding the oftentimes conflict-ridden
interaction with state reformists within the DAR is the most pragmatic option available if they
want to remain within the framework of maximizing the reformist potential of CARP. But again,
the interaction between pro-reform state and societal actors has to be mutually-reinforcing, and
not undermine each other. They have mutual interest in strengthening each other's ranks. There is
also the difficult challenge of consolidating and expanding the ranks of social movement groups
that work between outright opposition and uncritical collaboration poles.
In this regard, the launching on 10 June 2000 of UNORKA (Pambansang Ugnayan ng mga
Nagsasariling Organisasyon sa Kanayunan, or National Coordination of Autonomous Local
Rural People's Organizations) is a welcome development. UNORKA is a broad coalition of
various autonomous local peasant and farmworker organizations across the country. While many
of these local groups emerged from the tradition of national-democratic movement, some have
come from other progressive backgrounds, while still others have started as state-sponsored
associations but were later able to develop their autonomy. The founding of UNORKA comes at
a time when the hegemony of communist party-led peasant organizations has been largely
eroded; when state-co-opted peasant groups have been marginalized; and when (charismatic)
personality-centered farmers associations are steadily relegated to the margins of the agrarian
reform process. Hence, UNORKA offers fresh hope for a more vibrant rural social movement in
the country.

In closing, a quote from former DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao is most relevant for pro-reform
state and societal actors today. He says:

"The civil society partners of the DAR were given all the opportunities to penetrate the state
agrarian reform apparatus, get into alliances with national and local DAR bureaucrats, and use
legal and extralegal political action to assert and seek favorable resolution of issues, concerns
and interests."

"Not all the agrarian reform partners fully utilized this opening…"

"When reforms do not move as fast, it is easy to accuse government of lacking political will and
sincerity, and other pejorative terms in the civil society cookbook. In many cases, reforms do not
move too fast because social pressure from the constituency is weak. Many have the mistaken
notion that press releases and letters to the editor constitute sufficient social pressure…
[P]easant social mobilizations complemented by friendly media is support is a more effective
combination. State reforms are rarely won by state reformists alone. They are won… when the
alliance between autonomous peasant organizations and state reformists is much stronger than
whatever coalition of the anti-reformists within and outside government can mount." 29

END NOTES
1
An edited version is forthcoming in IPD Political Brief. Quezon City: Institute for Popular
Democracy (www.ipd.org).
2
Fellow, Institute for Popular Democracy; Vice President, Philippine Ecumenical Action for
Community Empowerment (PEACE) Foundation; and PhD candidate (Development Studies) at
the Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague, The Netherlands. Useful comments from
Jennifer Franco are greatly appreciated.
3
"Cultivable land", that includes public lands, exceeds this figure. But it is difficult to give good
estimate.
4
Landlord compensation has the following terms: a) lands above 50 hectares – 25% cash, 75%
bonds; b) lands 24-50 hectares – 30% cash, 70% bonds; and c) lands 5-24 hectares – 35% cash;
65% bonds. There are at least ten factors to be considered in the determination of "just
compensation": a) cost of acquisition, b) current value of like properties, c) nature of the land, d)
actual use, e) income, f) sworn valuation by the landowner, g) tax declaration, h) assessment
made by government assessors, i) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers
and farmworkers and by the government, and j) non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the land.
5
Current estimates of actual average subsidy (difference between landlord acquisition cost and
distribution price) are somewhere between 15 and 20 percent.
6
Data from various DAR offices regarding deferred commercial farms differ. In Table 2, 35,635
hectares was used; but in other documents from other DAR offices, different data are used, such
as more than 60,000 hectares. Hence, 50,000 hectares a crude estimate. But it is important to
note that the most important sector under deferment is the banana sector, both in terms of
hectarage covered and monetary value at stake.
7
From the original scope of 6.375 million hectares down to 3.771 million hectares, or a decrease
of 2.6 million hectares.
8
From 3,820,600 hectares to 4,293,453 hectares, or an increase of 472,853 hectares.
9
From 553,000 hectares 1,294,348 hectares.
10
From 3,267,600 hectares to 2,999,105 hectares, or a reduction by 268,495 hectares.
11
Franco, Jennifer (forthcoming). Campaigning for Democracy: Grassroots Citizenship
Movements, Less-Than-Democratic Elections and Regime Transition in the Philippines. New
York: Garland Publishing; Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy.
12
Lara, Francisco Jr. and Horacio Morales Jr. (1990). The Peasant Movement and the Challenge
of Democratisation in the Philippines. In, J. Fox (ed.). The Challenge of Rural Democratisation:
Perspectives from Latin America and the Philippines. London: Frank Cass. It is quite interesting
to note that Lara and Morales are now working within the DAR, implementing the very program
they once criticized. Morales is the current DAR Secretary, while Lara is his Head Executive
Assistant.
13
Putzel, James (1992). Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines.
London: CIIR.
14
The accomplishment data is not uncontested. Some critics argue that the reported
accomplishment data is inflated and that relevant issues must be factored in. It is specifically
argued that there are several cases of beneficiaries having the land award certificates (CLOA) but
cannot physically occupy the land because of strong landlord resistance ("uninstalled
beneficiaries"). It is also a popular lament that there are rampant cases of beneficiary desertion
(partly due to lack of infrastructure), illegal and "distress sales" by beneficiaries, and widespread
reversals (withdrawal of certificates for various reasons). The official data captures only a
portion of these incidents (i.e. reversals, uninstalled beneficiaries and desertions). Hence, it is
indeed most likely that actual accomplishment is less than what is officially reported. But while
it is a mistake to dismiss these incidents (as what some government officials do), it is also not
correct to exaggerate their extent, as is widely done by some scholars, activists and the media.
For example, incidence of uninstalled beneficiaries in private estates, which occurs in close to
50,000 hectares across the country, cannot constitute a generality, nor can a few thousands of
actual reversals. In this paper, thus, a rough estimate of five per cent less than what is reported
can constitute a reasonable estimate. In the end, a rigorous empirical research on the extent of
these incidents is necessary for a better assessment of these incidents (a research which, by the
nature of the problems, may not be easy to carry out).
15
Baseline data regarding rural households differ from one study to another. The following
computation is based on the more popularly accepted baseline information: roughly 55 percent of
the country's 70 million people live and work in rural areas = about 38.5 million people. The
average size of households is six; hence, 38.5 million people = 6.4 rural households. Roughly 80
percent of rural households comes from the peasantry (full- or part-time agriculture-based) =
5.12 million peasant households. 2.1 million households who benefited from CARP constitute
about 41 per cent of the total 5.12 million households.
16
Kay, Cristobal (1998). The Complex Legacy of Latin America's Agrarian Reform. ISS Working
Papers Series No. 268. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies
17
Thiesenhusen, William (1989). Introduction. In W. Thiesenhusen (ed.), Searching for Agrarian
Reform in Latin America. Winchester, MA: Unwin Hyman.
18
Zevallos, Jose Vicente (1989). Agrarian Reform and Structural Change: Ecuador Since 1964. In
W. Thiesenhusen (ed.). Searching for Agrarian Reform in Latin America. Winchester, MA:
Unwin Hyman.
19
Paige, Jeffrey (1996). Land Reform and Agrarian Revolution in El Salvador. In, Latin
American Research Review, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 1127-139.
20
Dorner, Peter (1992). Latin American Land Reforms In Theory and Practice: A Retrospective
Analysis. Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.
21
For example, El-Ghonemy (1999:8) presents a similar comparison of land reform
accomplishments in 22 countries worldwide. The indicators are: a) redistribution achievement in
private estates, b) excluding "resettlement schemes" (are public lands redistribution all occur
under resettlement schemes?), and c) takes the figures in (a) against total farmland in each
country. The rather simplistic schema of El-Ghonemy fails to capture important specific
contexts, such as those in the Philippines (which expectedly landed at the bottom of El-
Ghonemy's table of comparison) because: a) it is not helpful to take accomplishments in private
estates but put it through the lens of "total farmlands" because in some countries (like the
Philippines), public lands account for a substantial portion of total cultivable lands and have in
fact entrenched private interests exercising effective control over such public lands; b) El-
Ghonemy's comparative attempt could have been more useful, in the context of an attempt to
assess land reforms across continents, if redistribution in private estates was taken within the
context of "total private lands". El-Ghonemy, Riad (1999). The Political Economy of Market-
Based Land Reform. UNRISD Discussion Paper No. 104. Geneva: United Nations Research
Institute for Social Development.
22
Deininger, Klaus (1999). Making Negotiated Land Reform Work: Initial Experience from
Colombia, Brazil and South Africa. In World Development, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 651-672.
23
Franco, Jennifer (1998). Problems-Needs Assessment of Weak Organizations in Least
Developed Agrarian Reform Communities: A Study of 35 ARC Organizations. Quezon City:
FAO-UN.
24
Alonzo, Ruperto (1999). Local Governance and Poverty Alleviation. In A. Balisacan and S.
Fujisaki (eds.). Causes of Poverty: Myths, Facts and Policies: A Philippine Study. Quezon City:
University of the Philippines Press, pp. 197-228.
25
Refer to Borras, Saturnino Jr. (1999). The Bibingka Strategy in Land Reform Implementation:
Autonomous Peasant Movements and State Reformists in the Philippines. Quezon City: Institute
for Popular Democracy, Pp.199.
26
For example, refer to Herring, Ronald (1999). Political Conditions for Agrarian Reform and
Poverty Alleviation. A Background Paper prepared for the World Development Report 2000/1.
27
Deere, Carmen Diana (1985). Rural Women and State Policy: The Latin American Agrarian
Reform Experience. In, World Development, Vol. 13, No. 9, pp. 1037-1053.
28
Rimban, Luz (1997). 'Women Being Winnowed Out of Agrarian Reform,' serialized in The
Manila Times, March 3 and 4, 1997.
29
Garilao, Ernesto (1999). Foreword. In, Saturnino Borras Jr. (1999). The Bibingka Strategy...
pp.xix-xxi.

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Johny Torun (63.176.159.0) -

This is a good topic, but to narrow down this broad topic, let me talk about how the government
through programs (like the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law) implement this and how farmers are actually benefiting from such law
and program?

Let me quote this here:

"The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)

January 6th, 2008 | What's behind?

By Neil Jerome C. Morales

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) was a land reform law mandated by
Republic Act No. 6657, signed by President Corazon Aquino on June 10, 1988. It was the fifth
land reform law in fifty years, following the land reform laws of Presidents Manuel Quezon,
Ramon Magsaysay, Diosdado Macapagal and Ferdinand Marcos.

According to RA 6657, CARP aims “for a more equitable distribution and ownership of land.” It
meant to distribute lands to farmers in a span of 10 years, but was extended by the 11th Congress
due to delays in land distribution and lack of budget allocation.

Section 3 of RA 6657 defined agrarian reform as the “redistribution of lands, regardless of crops
or fruits produced, to farmers and regular farm workers who are landless” and “all other
arrangements alternative to the physical redistribution of lands, such as production or profit-
sharing, labor administration and the distribution of shares of stock which will allow
beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits of the lands they work.”

Vast agricultural lands are distributed to the farmers tilling the land, whereas only a maximum of
five hectares can be retained by the landlords, and three hectares for each of their children.

However, a common CARP loophole was that landlords escaped relinquishing their lands
through land reclassifications. Lands classified by local zoning ordinances as residential,
commercial and industrial lands are excluded from CARP.

SOURCE:

Department of Agrarian Reform website, http://www.dar.gov.ph"

Comment #1 Gerry Balbona (63.176.159.32) -

That is why it is still a Program, because there are land owners sitting in congress and they are
stopping the progress of this program from becoming a law. What is sad that instead of these
congressmen giving back to the hardworking farmers and their fellowmen, they rather use the
law and technical matters to deceive and evade the implementation of such programs. This is one
of the rotten and used up dirty politics that is still being used by politicians in the Philippines.

Comment #2 moy (63.176.159.115) -

It seems to me that politicians are the same in every part of the world. What separates them is the
level of similarity. If politicians continue sitting on the power to draft and make laws, then their
beneficiaries(the so called electorate)will continue standing to lose.

It is the norm to get into leadership circles and have a turn around in terms of principles. Is this
program ever going to see the light of day? Can President Aroyo turn things around?

Comment #3 Cesar Miniao (125.60.241.251) -

Philippine laws on land ownership sucks!!!... That's why Rebels cannot be defeated and conflicts
in Mindanao can't be resolved is because the rich families who owns the lands don't want to give
out the lands to the farmers who worked hard for so many years on those lands... That's why
there are still lots of poor people in the country is because the laws are only for the rich.. If you
are poor you'll be labeled "squatters" and they can demolish your house if they want to, even if
the government has projects on a certain land, they will just demolish the houses of poor people
and won't even pay the right amount the the house owners deserve to get!!!... In the US farmers
are rich, they farm a vast size of land, in the Philippines if you are a farmer, you are poor and
your farming a land that you don't even own, , and all the profit goes to the owners of the land.

So unless the distribution of wealth and a proper land ownership laws will be implemented,
Philippines will still suffer poverty and misery...

Comment #4 cespeta (63.176.159.38) -

I deem to agree about that issue of land reform in the Philippines. I know that there is no genuine
land reform being implemented in this land as of the moment.

Comment #5 fab (63.176.159.38) - 11/22/09 04:55

I'm agree with moy the same happens in every where. In Perú people still waiting for some
changes but the goverment has done nothing.
We thought The president Alan Garcia could do a better job after his not so memorable first term
of office which by the way was one of the worst goverment Peru has have.

You will find some numbers saying that the poverty has been cut 5 % but the reality is other.

Comment #6 Wally (63.176.159.88) - 01/09/10 10:01

That is the sad part of Politics fab, those who are in power and position will not let us know what
is the real score and data regarding a certain matter.

But I have to say that people should become more observant on what is happening in their
country. This way they will know if there are any anomalies happening.

Have a good day everyone and keep those post coming.

Comment #7 Kasi (63.176.159.211) - 02/02/10 09:07

No real information is really circulating in the respect to alot of the matters at hand and I am not
very aware of much due to this. Politics will always have it's skeletons and drama that's just a
part of the package.

Comment #8 Lorna Suarez (59.100.89.243) - 02/06/10 21:46

"Land ownership"

To Cesar Miniao:

Your comment does not make sense. While you recognise the importance of farm sizes to be
economically viable, you also want existing big farms to be subdivided/redistributed to
individuals.

What is happening in the agrarian reform, beneficiaries are selling their lands even before the 10
year requirement, because lands are too small and they have to experience starvation before a
miniscule harvest. I have seen it too many times.

Agrarian reform is not the solution to the farmers' economic hardship. What should be done is
improve the pay of farm workers/employees and make farm tenancy illegal. If land owners want
to cultivate their land, then they must pay a legally determined rate to workers. If they think they
cannot afford to pay workers, then the government should decide on what course of action to
take to make the land productive. The problem is lazy and useless government departments do
not care what is happening on the ground and workers remain very poor because they do not get
a decent wage.

The agrarian reform program is so stupid and just causing chaos.

If you are referring to the "Rebels" as the NPA's, let me tell you that those who join them are just
lazy thugs who extort money from people who sweat for a living. They even collect money from
the poor merchants in the villages. They terrorise people and so deserve to be treated as
terrorists.