Professional Documents
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Tab 4 - Lauzon v. Axa Insurance (Canada), 2012 ONSC 6730
Tab 4 - Lauzon v. Axa Insurance (Canada), 2012 ONSC 6730
Tab 4 - Lauzon v. Axa Insurance (Canada), 2012 ONSC 6730
ONTARIO
B E T W E E N: )
)
Daniel Lauzon ) Morris Manning Q.C. and Frederick A.
) Shuh, Counsel for the Plaintiff
)
)
Plaintiff )
)
- and - )
)
Axa Insurance (Canada), Darlene Skinner and ) Peter Kryworuk and Tyler Kaczmarczyk,
Ron Williams, ) Counsel for the Defendants
)
)
Defendants )
)
- and - )
)
The Corporation of the City of Waterloo ) James H. Bennett, Counsel for the Third
) Party (did not appear or participate in these
) motions)
)
Third Party )
)
) HEARD: October 22nd, 2012
RULING ON MOTIONS
GLITHERO, J.
[1] This action arises out of a flood which damaged the plaintiff’s residential property on
or about January 9, 2008. The property was insured by the defendant Axa and the other two
[2] The action was commenced May 1, 2008, and the plaintiff claims $300,000, primarily
for damage to the premises, and $1,000,000 based on various allegations arising out of the
[3] The defence admits that a loss was sustained, but denies liability on the basis that the
damage occurred as a result of blockage of storm drains, which is said to fall within a policy
exclusion.
a) The defendants move for an order compelling the plaintiff to attend either at an
questions pertaining to the scope and quantum of the plaintiff’s damages, and to
the existence of this motion which is the foundation for the second one.
Anthony J. Bedard on May 22, 2011, returnable on July 14, 2011, and
subsequently adjourned.
Mr. Bedard is the appraiser appointed under the Insurance Act by the defendants and is
[5] A summary of the events preceding and giving rise to these motions is necessary.
[6] The flood damages are alleged to have occurred on January 9, 2008. The statement of
claim was issued on May 1, 2008. The statement of defence is dated June 13, 2008. The third
party claim was issued October 29, 2009, with a third party defence delivered January 28, 2010.
[7] By letter dated October 20, 2008, plaintiff’s counsel served proof of loss dated
October 9, 2008.
[8] On the face page of the proof of loss the claimant claims “replacement costs” at
$171,190.12, “cash value” as being the same amount and “total loss or damage” as being the
same amount, and makes a claim under the policy for the same amount of $171,190.12.
Attached to the proof of loss is a summary of proof of loss, with the six heads of loss being:
cleanup costs, restoration costs, replacement of items costs, offsite emergency living expenses,
legal fees and banking fees, with amounts for each. The total of those items plus interest
amounts to $171,190.12.
[9] There is then a summary page which relates to the “replacement of items costs”
component from the first page and breaks that claim down in terms of the amounts sought in
respect of six different rooms and an item for closets. Also attached is a list of items from
closets said to be damaged by floodwaters, with a “estimated value” in respect of each item, a
similar page for items said to be damaged in the family room, another for items said to be
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damaged in the laundry room, another for the fruit cellar, another for the computer room, another
for mud-room and finally one for the garage. All of these room by room itemizations of
[10] No supporting documentation whatsoever is provided for the claimed items for
cleanup costs, restoration costs, offsite emergency living expenses, legal fees or banking fees.
[11] By letter dated December 12, 2008, defence counsel acknowledged receipt of the proof
of loss and indicated that it was being reviewed and that counsel would advise as to the
sufficiency of the proof of loss with respect to the requirements of Statutory Condition 6. She
also asked for the process used at arriving at the estimated value of the damaged items. By letter
dated January 22, 2009, defence counsel advised the plaintiff’s counsel that Axa was prepared to
accept the proof of loss as submitted “on condition that it is agreed that any further questions
regarding the nature and extent of the loss, as outlined in Statutory Condition 6, can be addressed
through the discovery process in this litigation, through productions, oral examinations for
discovery of your client, undertakings and any follow-up thereon.” It further provided that on
that basis the statement of defence would not be amended to address the issues relating to the
proof of loss. By letter dated November 9, 2009, defence counsel requested immediate
information pertaining to the dates of purchase for the items claimed, information as to where
they were purchased, and supporting receipts, invoices and accounts in respect of replacement
cost or repair, and did so after referring to the plaintiff’s document as a “partial proof of loss”.
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By letter dated February 22, 2010, defence counsel reiterated that their client does not have the
necessary damage information as previously requested and reiterated the information sought
[12] By letter dated February 24, 2010, plaintiff’s counsel expressed the position that the
plaintiff has complied with the rules with respect to document production and claimed a failure
to understand any basis in contract or in law for the defendants’ request that the further
documentation be produced.
[13] By letter March 4, 2010, defence counsel wrote plaintiff’s counsel detailing the
requirements of Statutory Condition 6 as to the detail required with respect to the claim for
property damage, and referring plaintiff’s counsel to Statutory Condition 9, requiring an insured
Condition 11, regarding the appraisal procedure available under the Insurance Act as
[14] By letter dated April 28, 2010, defence counsel advised the plaintiff’s counsel that the
valuation of the loss was being referred to appraisal pursuant to Statutory Condition 11 and
advised that Mr. Anthony Bedard had been appointed as the insurer’s appraiser, and refers to s.
128 of the Insurance Act. The letter also indicates the defendant’s desire to proceed with the
examination for discovery of the plaintiff with respect to coverage issues and to proceed with an
examination under oath in respect of the quantum of the damage claim, and suggests that both
[15] By responding letter dated May 15, 2010, plaintiff’s counsel advised that the
plaintiff’s appraiser will be George Milne. Further, it advises that because the defendants elected
rights of discovery were left open to the defendants and confirmed June 11, 2010, as the day for
the examinations of the plaintiff “to the extent that the insurer’s entitled to discoveries”.
[16] By letter dated May 30, 2010, plaintiff’s counsel reiterated the position that the
property damage issue is mandated to be done pursuant to the appraisal process as the defendants
had seen fit to choose that route, and asserts the only matter available for discovery is the issue
of liability.
[17] By letter dated June 7, 2010, defendants’ counsel asserted the position that the
discovery process and the appraisal process were distinct and referred to the Court of Appeal
decision in Baig v. Guarantee Company of North America, 2007 O.N.C.A. 847 (CanLII). The
letter specifies that the examination for discovery will relate to coverage issues, while the
[18] The plaintiff appeared on June 11, 2010. As defence counsel sought to embark on the
examination under oath with respect to damages she was met with a blanket refusal by plaintiff’s
counsel on the basis that the appraisal procedure is the sole avenue available to deal with issues
of quantum. The examination under oath was accordingly adjourned, and the examination for
[19] By letter dated May 22, 2011, plaintiff’s counsel wrote Mr. Bedard at Lerners LLP
confirming that he had been served with a Summons to Witness and of the plaintiff’s intention to
dated May 25, 2011, advising that the Summons is an unwarranted fishing expedition, that it is
an abuse of process, that the documentation sought to be produced according to the Summons is
information that would be available to the plaintiff from its appraiser, Mr. Milnes. The letter
advises that steps will be taken to quash the summons. The letter reiterates that any examination
pursuant to the summons has to be relevant to issues on the motion in respect of which the
examination was sought. It reiterates Mr. Bedard’s view that the motion relates to defence
efforts to compel the plaintiff to comply with its contractual obligation to provide evidence
quantifying the damages and that the Summons to Witness served upon him can’t possibly be
[20] Mr. Bedard and Mr. Milnes, the respective appraisers, agreed to have to Mr. Greg
Brimblecombe, a Kitchener lawyer, act as umpire in the appraisal process. Mr. Milne, the
plaintiff’s appraiser, insisted that Mr. Brimblecombe proceed with the appraisal despite the fact
that the defendants’ motion to compel the plaintiff to submit to examination under oath with
respect to the quantum of damages was still pending before the court. The two appraisers and
the umpire, Mr. Brimblecombe, had a teleconference on June 25, 2012, during which the two
appraisers made their submissions. By email sent June 25, 2012, the umpire, Mr. Brimblecombe,
expressed the opinion that the appraisal could not proceed as to date there was no “true
disagreement” as to quantum. He opined that “the parties have to have sufficient information
from one another to know that the dispute exists”. He reiterated his understanding of the
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defendant’s position that it had insufficient information to ascertain whether any dispute exists
on the quantum issue. He expressly declined to offer any comment on whether the insurer was
outside the scope of this proceeding”, and he agreed with the defendants’ position that the matter
could not proceed immediately and could not proceed until the plaintiffs are able to provide
sufficient detail about their claim so as to enable the appraisers and the umpire to accurately
[21] Thereafter, both Mr. Milne, the plaintiff’s appraiser, and Mr. Shuh, one of plaintiff’s
counsel, continued to contact umpire Brimblecombe seeking to have him proceed with the
appraisal process. There has been no additional response from umpire Brimblecombe.
[22] This is a summons issued pursuant to Rule 39.03 requiring Mr. Bedard to attend to be
examined as a witness before the hearing of the pending motion (the main motion). It was
originally returnable on July 14, 2011. As the defendants moved to quash the summons, the
examination has been adjourned pending the outcome of the motion to quash. If the summons is
not quashed then the examination of Mr. Bedard would proceed and lead to the production of a
transcript of his examination which would then be available for use on the main motion. Both
motions were returned before me at the same time, but obviously I must rule on the motion to
quash first. If it fails I can proceed to rule on the main motion. If the summons is not quashed,
the examination would proceed and the main motion will have to further adjourned.
-9-
[23] The summons requires Mr. Bedard to bring with him all written or electronic
correspondence between he and Mr. Milne, the appraiser appointed by the plaintiff; all notes and
[24] The main motion was commenced by notice of motion dated April 21, 2011 and originally
returnable May 4, 2011, and subsequently adjourned to July 14, 2011. The summons to Mr.
Bedard was served on him on May 22, 2011 and was returnable July 14, 2011. This motion to
quash the summons was made returnable July 14, 2011 as well.
[25] By letter dated May 22, 2011 counsel for the plaintiff advised Mr. Beddard that he would
be examined with respect to his role as the appraiser for the defendants. By return mail Mr.
Beddard advised plaintiff’s counsel that was an abuse of process, and encroached on solicitor
client privilege in respect to the demand for “all other documents relating to the appraisal
process”.
[26] The examination required by the summons must be undertaken with reasonable diligence.
The person summonsed to be examined must be shown to have evidence having at least a
semblance of relevance to the pending motion. In the context of this case the “pending motion”
is that of the defendants seeking an order to compel the plaintiff to attend for either an
quantum of the loss: Rule 39.03 (1) and (3); Apotex v Bausch, [2006] O. J. No. 3539.
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[27] The party seeking to examine pursuant to Rule 39.03, if the summons is challenged, has
the onus of putting forth a proper evidentiary base to support the examination of the non-party,
demonstrate that the examination is likely to produce evidence which enhances the record to be
considered on the return of the motion---as opposed to amounting to nothing more than “a
fishing expedition”. It is not to be used as a general discovery within the action. The record must
show that the witness likely has evidence relevant to the issues on the pending motion. See
Coburn v. Barber, [2010] O. J. No. 2465 (S. C. J.-Master); Portelance v. Williams {2010] O. J.
[28] When the summons requires the production of documents which is overly broad it warrants
paragraph 102 Campbell J stated the test to be “the basic premise that must be satisfied is that
there will likely be evidence obtained relevant to the defendant’s motion(emphasis added)”.
[30] Where the party wishing to examine advances a proper evidentiary base demonstrating
likely relevance the onus then shifts to the party resisting the examination to show that it would
be an abuse of process, such as would be the case if the evidence sought was not necessary to the
[31] The jurisprudence demonstrates examples of the type of circumstances which have led to a
fishing trip: Palms of Pasadena Hospital v. Royal and SunAlliance Insurance Co. of Canada,
for a perceived slight: GMAC Leasco Ltd. V. 1348259 Ontario Inc., [2004] O. J. No. 150 (S. C.
J.);
[32] Where a party seeks to call opposing counsel as a witness, there is an onus to demonstrate
not only that counsel would likely have relevant evidence, but also that such evidence is
[33] Under s. 128 of the Insurance Act the role of the appraiser is to meet with the opposing
appraiser, see if the issue can be resolved, and if not to present their clients position to the
umpire. The information the appraiser might have would be that supplied by the client.
[34] In this case the complaint of the defendants is that they have not received any information
on the issue of damages, although frequently demanded. The plaintiff’s position is that the
defence isn’t entitled to any more information than it has received. It is notable that the summons
requires the witness to bring written or electronic correspondence as between the appraisers, or
notes and recordings of telephone calls between the appraisers, and “all other documents
[35] In my assessment there is no adequate evidentiary basis shown to justify the summons.
The plaintiff’s appraiser will already have copies of the correspondence, and was a party to the
plaintiff can get that information from its own appraiser. As to the claim for “all other
documents”, it signifies the very type fishing expedition which is an abuse of the rule.
[36] The plaintiff’s materials indicate that what is to be examined upon is discernable from the
affidavits of Laura Emmett, an associate in the office of defence counsel. I have reviewed both
affidavits and both set out the history of the matter and contain many references to the pleadings,
the exchanges of correspondence as between counsel, and describe the various exchanges as
between the 2 appraisers. Her affidavits do not refer to items on which an examination of Mr.
Bedard would provide evidence relevant to the issues in the main motion.
[37] The affidavit material filed on behalf of the plaintiff is that of his appraiser, and that of
Donna Franker, a clerk in the office of counsel. The former says nothing relevant to issues on
the main motion, as it deals with exchanges between the parties as to who would be appropriate
to act as an umpire---a matter now settled. The affidavit of Ms. Franker does nothing more than
plaintiff already has these materials and need not get copies from Mr. Bedard or examine him as
[38] I conclude that the examination of Mr. Bedard is unlikely to produce evidence relevant to
the main motion, and that it is unnecessary. For these reasons the Summons to Witness to Mr.
Bedard is quashed.
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information in support of the damages claimed, together with supporting documentation. As the
plaintiffs failed to do so in the Proof of Loss, and have refused so either by examination under
oath, or by examination for discovery, the defendants submit that the court should order them to
do one or the other. They submit that the appraisal procedure invoked here by them does not oust
[40] The submissions on behalf of the plaintiff are that the appraisal procedure, as invoked by
the defendants here, has to be viewed as a self-contained procedure in respect of the quantum of
damages, and accordingly if falls to the umpire to determine the loss based on the submissions of
the parties. The plaintiff takes the position that the court has no jurisdiction to order the plaintiff
to attend at an examination under oath, or an examination for discovery with respect to quantum
of damages.
[41] Statutory Condition 6, incorporated into the policy, requires that after a loss the insured
declaration: (i) giving a complete inventory of the destroyed and damaged property and showing
in detail quantities, costs, actual cash value and particulars of the amount of loss claimed;”
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provided under the Insurance Act before there can be any recovery under this contract whether
the right to recover on the contract is disputed or not, and independently of all other questions.
There shall be no right to an appraisal until a specific demand therefor is made in writing and
[43] On page 6 of the policy “Actual Cash Value” is defined as being “what the property is
worth and takes into account such things as the cost of replacement less any depreciation and
immediately before the damage occurred, the resale value and the normal life expectancy.”
[44] Section III subsection 6 of the policy provides that the insurer will pay on the basis of
replacement cost only if the property lost or damaged is repaired or replaced with the intention to
retain as soon as reasonably possible, but in no case more than 1 year after the date of loss.
[45] Statutory Condition ix on page 15 of the policy provides “After a loss which may be
insured under Section 1 of this policy, you shall as often as we reasonably require: a. submit to
examinations under oath and subscribe to same; and b. produce…members of your household or
others for examination under oath to the extent it is within your power to do so.”
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[46] Section 128 of the Insurance Act R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8 provides that in any contract
providing for an appraisal to determine specified matters in the event of a disagreement, each of
umpire. The appraisers are to determine the matter in dispute, and if they fail to agree, they are to
submit their differences to the umpire. The written finding of any 2 of the 3 of them determines
the matter. Where the parties fail to each appoint an appraiser, or in the appraisers fail to agree
[47] In Baig v. Guarantee Co. of North America (2007), 88 O.R. (3d) 161 the Court of Appeal
considered the scope of statutory condition as then written which provided for the right to
examine an insured under oath. The section then expressly provided that the insured was to
produce all documents relating to the matter in question. But the section otherwise was as free of
conditions as the current section is. The court allowed an appeal from a trial finding that the right
to examine under oath pursuant to the statutory condition no longer applied after litigation had
commenced. The court found that the statutory condition did not cease to exist because of
pending litigation, and held at paragraph 3 that “the scope of the examination extends to all
matters material to the insurers liability and extent thereof which the insurer has an objective and
reasonable basis to explore.” There the car insurance was obtained on the basis of an appraised
value of the car. This was not an appraisal within the scheme envisioned in s. 128. The insured
appeared for the examination but through counsel refused to allow any questions as to how the
appraised value had been determined. Counsel sought to restrict the questions to issues related to
the quantum of the loss. Then an action was commenced by the insured and a counterclaim based
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on misrepresentation was delivered. Then the insurer sought to examine the insured under oath
pursuant to the statutory condition. At paragraph 15 the court noted that the statutory condition
commenced. The statutory condition was to be applied according to its plain terms”.
[48] While the factual situation in Baig is different, the result in my opinion is useful. Just as
the commencement of a lawsuit did not oust the right to examine under oath, because the plain
wording did not suggest any such restriction, similarly in this case the plain meaning does not
suggest that the right terminates on an election to utilize the appraisal process under s. 128 and
statutory condition 6.
[49] Seed v. ING Halifax Insurance [2005] O. J. No. 4870 is useful. It was also a case of flood
damage and the involvement of the appraisal mechanism contained in the Insurance Act. At
paragraph 23 the Divisional Court panel majority held that “the purpose of the appraisal process
under s. 128 of the Insurance Act is to provide an expeditious and easy manner fort the
settlement of claims ….”. The case is also instructive in that the proceedings leading up to the
impugned decision of the umpire involved the Superior Court. The insured had commenced an
action and then sought an order staying the appraisal and requiring the insurer to file pleadings.
That application failed. The insurer sought an order that the appraisal proceed without further
delay. Accordingly the case is some authority that the commencement of the appraisal process
does not oust the jurisdiction of the court, and leave the umpire as the only entity with
jurisdiction over the damage quantification issue submitted to appraisal. The court retains
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[50] I start with the position of the plaintiff, respondent. It seems to suggest that the insurer
cannot explore the quantum of the loss through the lawsuit, on examination for discovery, or on
an examination under oath, or at trial, because it implemented the appraisal process. And the
insurer can’t explore the quantum of the loss in the appraisal process because it is a self-
contained or stand alone process and accordingly the right under the Insurance Act to an
examination under oath is ousted by the election to utilize the appraisal process. If this position
were allowed to prevail the insured would have effectively insulated the quantum of his claim
from any degree of inspection, by either the insurer, or the umpire, or the court. This submission
cannot succeed.
[51] The proof of loss submitted by the plaintiff is substantially deficient and falls far short of
the statutory requirements. As a proof of loss is a pre-condition to resort to the appraisal process,
I suggested during argument that it might be appropriate to seek an order that the appraisal
process be struck and the matter proceed to discovery within the lawsuit. Counsel for the insurer
resisted that suggestion as clearly the insurer believes the appraisal process is the most
expeditious and hence least expensive way to quantify the loss. Ordinarily it would be. It is not
so given the conduct of the plaintiff. It should also be remembered that counsel for the insurer
pointed out the deficiencies in the proof of loss but agreed to proceed on the express
understanding that those deficiencies could be rectified during the discovery process. There was
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no timely rejection of that understanding. The defence proceeded on that basis and it would now
be unfair to allow the plaintiff to escape any form of disclosure in terms of the quantum of his
[52] I am satisfied that I have the jurisdiction to make the order requested and require the
plaintiff to attend for examination under oath on the issue of the quantum of the loss. I find some
support for that view from the Bains and the Seed decisions as discussed above, as well as in s.
commencement of litigation does not oust resort to an examination under oath, neither should
resort to the appraisal process do so. Just as in Seed the court had jurisdiction to make procedural
orders necessary to give effect to the intent of s. 128, so do I in the circumstances of this case.
[53] Finally, I am of the view that I have inherent jurisdiction to make such orders as are
necessary to facilitate the sensible implementation of the statutory scheme, and to prevent an
interpretation that flies in the face of the basic concepts of modern litigation----to prevent
just results, and to equip both sides (and here the umpire) with the information needed to present
[54] For these reasons an order will go requiring the plaintiff to attend for an examination
under oath to answer questions relevant to the scope and quantum of his claim for damages, and
requiring the plaintiff to produce at least 30 days before the examination the documentation
relevant to that issue, as sought in the correspondence from counsel for the defendants and as
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required by statutory condition 6. The examination under oath is to take place within 75 days of
the release of this ruling or such longer period as may be agreed to as between counsel.
[55] In the event counsel are unable to resolve the issue of costs, submissions in writing may
be forwarded to my chambers in Kitchener. Such submissions are not to exceed 5 typed pages
exclusive of bills of costs and supporting documents. Those of the defendants are to be received
within 21 days of the release of these reasons, with those of the plaintiff within 21 days of receipt
of those of the defendants. In the event that submissions are not received within those timelines
(or any extension which may be granted) the costs issue will be deemed to have been resolved on
consent.
_____________________________
C. Stephen Glithero J.
ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Danielle Lauzon
Plaintiff
- and –
Defendants
- and –
Third Party
RULING ON MOTIONS
Glithero J.
C.S.G // dm