International Relations (VisionIAS-2021)

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VISION IAS
www.visionias.in
INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
S.N. TOPIC PAGE NO.
1. Background and Overview 1-20
2. India - Neighbourhood Relations: Bangladesh, Bhutan, 21-55
Nepal, Shri Lanka, Maldives, SAARC
3. India - Neighbourhood Relations: Pakistan and Afghanistan 56-73
4. India and China 74 89
-
5. India and SEA 90-109

6. India and Indo Pacific 110 121-
7. India and Indian Ocean 122-130

8. India and West Asia 131 151-
9. India and Central Asia 152-160

10. India and Russia 161 169-
11. India and Europe 170-186

12. India USA 187-202
13. Latin America and Africa 203-218
14. Organisations, Groupings and Institution in IR 219-245
15. Key Issues in IR 246 276-
1 6. The Diaspora 277-287
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Student Notes:
LECTURE-1
BACK GROUND AND OVERVIEW
Contents
1. India’s Relations: Evolution of India’s Foreign Policy.................................................................. 3
1.1. Understanding Foreign Policy and International Relations ................................................. 3
1.2. Determinants: Actors and Factors Shaping India’s Foreign Policy ...................................... 3
2. Evolution of India’s Foreign Policy .............................................................................................. 3
2.1. 1947-1962: Internationalist, Idealist and Non-Aligned India .............................................. 3
2.1.1. Panchsheel ................................................................................................................... 4
2.1.2. Setback with China: 1962 ............................................................................................. 5
2.1.3. The Colombo Conference and Limits of Non-Aligned Movement ............................... 5
2.1.4. A brief overview of the Non Aligned Movement ......................................................... 6
2.2. 1962-1991: Period of Self Help Approach ........................................................................... 6
2.2.1. The Chinese Nuclear Test and After ............................................................................. 7
2.2.2. Changes with Continuity .............................................................................................. 7
2.2.3. The Simla Agreement ................................................................................................... 8
2.3. 1991 and After: Era of “Pragmatic” Foreign Policy ............................................................. 9
2.3.1. Beginning of A New Era .............................................................................................. 10
3. Let Us Address A Key Question ................................................................................................ 13
3.1. Non-Alignment: Relevance of the Idea and the Movement ............................................. 13
3.2. Arguments in the Context of Irrelevance of NAM............................................................. 13
3.2.1. Arguments in Defence of NAM and Non-Alignment .................................................. 13
3.2.2. A Contemporary Assessment ..................................................................................... 14
4. Supplementary Reading ........................................................................................................... 15
4.1. India’s Policy of Non-Alignment ........................................................................................ 15
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4.2. Reasons for Non-Alignment .............................................................................................. 17

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4.3. The Non-Aligned Movement ............................................................................................. 17

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DELHI JAIPUR PUNE HYDERABAD AHMEDABAD LUCKNOW

1 www.visionias.in # 8468022022 ©Vision IAS

Student Notes:
Syllabus of the Civil Services Examination clearly demarcates the boundaries of knowledge as
far as the section of International Relations (IR) is concerned. In the context of the examination,
the significance of international relations is mediated through India’s interaction with the
world, factors that shape and influence it and the consequences. The ideal way is to understand
the sources, determinants, objectives, tools, methods, hindrances, factors, actors, and
developments in the context of India’s foreign policy and its relations with the world. Thus, IR in
this context is better understood as India’s Relations. And these relations are subject matter of
India’s foreign policy.
The lectures would broadly cover the following themes:
• India’s Foreign policy: Determinants, Evolution, Achievements, Challenges and key
questions.
• Neighbors: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka Maldives, Pakistan, Afghanistan, SAARC
• Extended Neighborhood: South East Asia (ASEAN, Myanmar, Vietnam, Singapore); West
Asia (GCC, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE); East Asia and beyond (Japan, South Korea, Australia,
Pacific Ocean- Indo Pacific, FIPIC); Indian Ocean (Mauritius, IORA)
• Global Relations- Important Powers: China, USA, Russia, European Union, France Germany
and United Kingdom
• Regional Relations: Africa, Latin America (Brazil/MERCOSUR).
• Organizations and groupings
• Diaspora
• Key Issues in IR
• Feel Free to add your Own Notes in blank Spaces

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1. India’s Relations: Evolution of India’s Foreign Policy

1.1. Understanding Foreign Policy and International Relations
Foreign policy by definition is about the world around us. If you imagine a country as an
individual then you need to think of foreign policy as the way an individual negotiates with the
environment around. So for Instance, an individual operates through a set of identities, self
definition and self interests and is enmeshed in a web of relations (Family, friends, competitors,
enemies etc.). An individual has certain desires and goals. Thus, based on one’s capabilities one
engages in making and shaping ones relation to achieve ones goals and desires. These goals and
desires for an individual are often related to security, prosperity and self-growth.
In case of sovereign nation states these goals and desires can be termed as National Interest.
National interest in its fine print may vary from time to time but at its heart has the security
(military preparedness, internal and external security ), prosperity (economic wellbeing e.g FDI,
Trade, poverty eradication etc.) and status (political position in the world order of the day e.g
Membership of UN Security Council) of the country. Foreign policy is both a statement of these
interests and a blueprint to achieve them. According to J. Bandopadhyay it involves an exercise
of choice of ends and means in an international setting. In much simpler terms, foreign policy
is a nation protocol for making and maintaining relations with foreign countries. Thus, India’s
foreign policy define, articulates and pursues national interests in a world where these
interests are in many ways dependent on the actors and factors outside the boundaries of the
country.
1.2. Determinants: Actors and Factors Shaping India’s Foreign

Policy
The foreign policy of any country as well as its success or failure is determined by many factors.
To name a few:
• History: Political Tradition and philosophical basis as in case of India peaceful coexistence as
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well as non aggression are attributed to its history and culture and political tradition.
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• Geography: location and resources- Geo-politics and Geo-strategy: Many rivers in India are
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transboundary e.g Ganges, Brahmaputra, Teesta. Himalaya and the Indian Ocean are crucial
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for India’s security.

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• Economic development: the development needs and stage of a country contribute to its
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foreign policy choices and both in terms of means and ends.

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• Domestic Milieu: Institutions, political atmosphere and consensus on National Interest,

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needs, ambitions and capabilities, Leadership, bureaucracy.

• International Milieu: War, peace and stability e.g. a peaceful external environment is
conducive for economic growth and development.
In terms of means of foreign Policy Objectives on can count diplomatic tools, economic tools,
and military tools. One can better appreciate the significance of the above discussion in light of
the evolution of India’s foreign policy over the years.
2. Evolution of India’s Foreign Policy

2.1. 1947-1962: Internationalist, Idealist and Non-Aligned India
Independent India’s foreign policy was the result of multiple factors such as the legacy of
national movement against the British rule, post-Second World War developments, domestic
needs and personalities such as Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Even the Indian
constitution included a provision, under article 51, for promotion of international peace and
security, wherein the state shall Endeavour to:

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(a) Promote international peace and security;

(b) Maintain just and honourable relations between nations;
(c) Foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised
peoples with one another; and
(d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration.
The formative influence of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru is the feature of initial years of
foreign policy of India which left a long lasting impact and polarised opinions for years to come.
His vision included special status of India given its history, size and potential. It was a foreign
policy predicated on internationalism, Afro-Asian Solidarity, anti colonialism and non alignment
in the era of cold war power politics dominated by the two superpowers i.e. the USA and the
USSR.
Even before India became Independent the Asian relations Conference was held in New Delhi
from 23 March to 2 April 1947. Mr. Nehru observed “we stand at the end of an era and on the
threshold of a new period of history... Asia, after a long period of quiescence, has suddenly
become important again in world affairs”.
India was the first to suggest plebiscite as a peaceful method for resolving the Junagadh dispute
with Pakistan. India made a similar offer for settling the Kashmir situation in 1947. The referral
of Pakistan’s aggression in Kashmir to the United Nations in December 1947 is seen by many
as a mistake on the part of India’s leadership in reposing its trust in international organisation
such as the UN. According to J. Bandopadhyay Nehru’s attempt to combine both idealism and
realism in his policy towards Kashmir affected certain aspects of the Kashmir diplomacy, and it
would “conceivably have been different if dealt by someone else”. However, According to Rajiv
Sikri, Nehru “was ready to take the war to Pakistan in 1948 when things were getting difficult in
Jammu and Kashmir but was overruled by his British army chief. He took the Kashmir question
to the United Nations under pressure from the British Governor General of India.”
Nonetheless, this initial experience at the UN further cemented scepticism towards the western
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world in India’s foreign policy. The result was a quest for charting a new path that involved
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newly independent countries of Asia and Africa and equidistance from the power politics of the
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In this phase three key features characterized India’s foreign policy conduct. First, India played
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a significant role in multilateral institutions and particularly in United Nations peacekeeping

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operations. Second, it also emerged as a critical proponent of the nonaligned movement.

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Third, as a leader of the nonaligned movement it also made a significant contribution toward
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the process of decolonization. India’s in international participation was most visible in:
• International Control Commission in Vietnam along with Canada and Poland (1954),
• Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea (1952-54)
• United Nations Peacekeeping forces in the Belgian Congo (1960-1964)
India’s activism in this phase also reflected in the arena of disarmament, specifically the nuclear
weapons. As one of the early proponents of a nuclear test ban treaty, in 1952 India introduced
a draft resolution co-sponsored with Ireland to bring about a global ban on nuclear tests.
2.1.1. Panchsheel
In this period the approach towards foreign relations was further underlined by the “Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, known as the Panchsheel Treaty between China and India
in 1954. They were enunciated in the preamble to the "Agreement (with exchange of notes) on
trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India", which was signed at Peking on
29 April 1954.This agreement stated the five principles as:

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1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

2. Mutual non-aggression.
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
4. Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit.
5. Peaceful co-existence.
Internationalist, approach of foreign policy was also reflected in the active participation of India
at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung (Indonesia) 1955. This Conference was held in
Bandung on April 18-24, 1955 and gathered 29 Heads of States belonging to the first post-
colonial generation of leaders from the two continents with the aim of identifying and
assessing world issues at the time and pursuing out joint policies in international relations. The
principles that would govern relations among large and small nations, known as the "Ten
Principles of Bandung", were proclaimed at that Conference. The Bandung conference paved
way for the creation of the Movement of Non-Aligned nations in 1961.
The Indus Water Treaty signed in Karachi on 19 September 1960 by Prime Minister of India
Jawaharlal Nehru and President of Pakistan Ayub Khan, was a testimony to progress made on
contentious issues through diplomatic means. However, even though India professed diplomacy
as the preferred choice to resolve disputes, it took certain stringent actions when required. For
instance, when extensive diplomatic discussion with the stubborn Salazar regime in Portugal
produced a deadlock and Prime Minister Nehru faced increasing criticism from a group of Afro-
Asian leaders, India chose to use force to oust the Portuguese from their colonial enclave in
Goa in 1961.
2.1.2. Setback with China: 1962
One of the key elements of a foreign policy based on the idea of nonalignment was the
limitation of high defence expenditures. Such a policy weakened the hard power capabilities of
India. It was tested most acutely in its relations with People’s Republic of China (PRC). India
gave refuge to the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama in 1959 and negotiations with the PRC
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reached a dead end in 1960. Consequently, India adopted, in the words of Sumit Ganguly, a
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“strategy of compellence designed to restore what it deemed to be the territorial status quo
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along the disputed Himalayan border”. It involved sending in lightly armed, poorly equipped
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and ill-prepared troops to high altitudes without adequate supply lines. This policy, however,
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was proved to be ill conceived.

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When in 1962 the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the PRC invaded India with extensive
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force, the Indian military was unprepared to face the assault. The PLA inflicted considerable
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losses on the Indian forces and then withdrew from some of the areas that they had entered.
However, they did not vacate Axai Chin, an area of more than 14,000 square miles, that they
had initially claimed and it remains a bone of contention in India’s relation with China.
2.1.3. The Colombo Conference and Limits of Non-Aligned Movement
Six of the non-aligned nations — Egypt, Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ghana and Indonesia,
selected on the basis that they were all acceptable to India and China - met in Colombo on 10
December 1962. The proposals that emerged from the Colombo Conference stipulated a
Chinese withdrawal of 20 km from the ceasefire line observed by China without any reciprocal
withdrawal on India’s behalf. Although the mediation effort was encouraged, the failure of
these six nations unequivocally to condemn China is deeply disappointed India. Nevertheless,
India accepted the proposals while China accepted them in principle as the basis to start
negotiations. Eventually the initiative withered away.
Thus, 1962 war with China marked an end to a phase in India’s foreign policy marked by
idealism with initial success and multiple legacies that India had to contend with in the future.

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2.1.4. A brief overview of the Non Aligned Movement

Six years after Bandung, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries was founded on a wider
geographical basis at the First Summit Conference of Belgrade, which was held on September
1-6, 1961. The Conference was attended by 25 countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Yemen,
Myanmar, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India,
Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia,
and Yugoslavia.
In 1960, in the light of the results achieved in Bandung, the creation of the Movement of Non-
Aligned Countries was given boost during the Fifteenth Ordinary Session of the United Nations
General Assembly, during which 17 new African and Asian countries were admitted to the UN.
A key role was played in this process by the then Heads of State and Government Gamal Abdel
Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Ahmed Sukarno of
Indonesia and Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, who later became the founding fathers of the
movement and its emblematic leaders.
The Bandung Principles were adopted later as the main goals and objectives of the policy of
non-alignment. The fulfilment of those principles became the essential criterion for Non-
Aligned Movement membership; it is what was known as the "quintessence of the Movement"
until the early 1990s.
The Founders of NAM have preferred to declare it as a movement but not an organization in
order to avoid bureaucratic implications of the latter.
Primary of objectives of the non-aligned countries focused on:
• the support of self-determination, national independence and the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of States;
• opposition to apartheid;
• non-adherence to multilateral military pacts and the independence of non-aligned
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countries from great power or block influences and rivalries;

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• the struggle against imperialism in all its forms and manifestations;

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• the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, foreign occupation and

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• disarmament;
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non-interference into the internal affairs of States and peaceful coexistence among all
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• rejection of the use or threat of use of force in international relations;

• the strengthening of the United Nations; the democratization of international relations;
• Socioeconomic development and the restructuring of the international economic system;
as well as international cooperation on an equal footing.
2.2. 1962-1991: Period of Self Help Approach

In the aftermath of the China war Nehru faced criticism at home, however there was none
taller than him in the domestic politics. Thus, changes in India’s approach after the debacle also
begun under him. Most importantly, India embarked on a substantial program of military
modernization. It committed itself to the creation of a million-strong army with ten new
mountain divisions equipped and trained for high altitude warfare, a 45-squadron air force
with supersonic aircraft and a modest program of naval expansion.
Even under Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, after Nehru’s demise in 1964, India still did not
formally abandon the stated adherence to a policy of nonalignment. As a result, at the level of
rhetoric and principle nonalignment remained a constant feature of Indian foreign policy.

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India’s foreign policy behaviour, however, increasingly acquired a more realist orientation in
multiple senses.
In this phase the shaping of cold war in Asia affected India as well. Pakistan had joined the US
backed security initiatives such as the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and
the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1955. The United States had provided arms to
Pakistan as well. For a brief period of military cooperation with India in the aftermath of the
1962 war, the United States disengaged itself from South Asia after the second India-Pakistan
conflict in 1965 as it became increasingly preoccupied with the prosecution of the Vietnam
War. During the 1965 war the US suspended military aid to both the countries. With this
American disengagement from the subcontinent, Pakistan sought to expand the scope of its
security cooperation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to balance Indian power. This
contributed to a growing security nexus between India’s two major adversaries.
On the other hand facing difficulties in its relations with PRC and sensing an opportunity to
expand its influence in the subcontinent, the USSR mediated the Tashkent agreement between
India and Pakistan in 1966.
In this phase, except for the pressure for tempering criticism on the Vietnam War, agricultural
policy and opening up of markets under the Johnson administration in 1966, the US mostly
remained oblivious to India’s concerns.
2.2.1. The Chinese Nuclear Test and After
Following the Chinese nuclear test at Lop Nor in 1964, arguments were made in the parliament
called for an abandonment of nonalignment and even urged that India acquire an independent
nuclear weapons option. Prime Minister Shastri privately explored the possibility of help from
the United States for nuclear security. More importantly he declared India would not make
nuclear weapons of its own. In 1966, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who succeeded Mr. Shastri,
also decided to seek a nuclear guarantee from the great powers. This effort, however, brought
no success. Hence, Prime Minister Gandhi authorized India’s Subterranean Nuclear Explosions
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Project (SNEP) which led to India’s first nuclear test of May 1974.
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It is important to note that India had signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) which came into
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existence in 1963. It was perhaps in the hope that the treaty would lead to further nuclear
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disarmament. However these hopes remained hopes only. The Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
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which opened for signature in 1968 represented the inequities of global order. India opposed
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the treaty citing norms of sovereign equality, at the same time the potential constraints of NPT
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on its own nuclear options was a key consideration.

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2.2.2. Changes with Continuity

In this phase, India’s foreign policy sought to sustain “two competing visions of world order”.
On the one hand, India still supported the cause of decolonization and continued to lead the
cause representing the weaker states in the international system. For example, it remained a
staunch opponent of the apartheid regime in South Africa; it was an unyielding supporter of
the Palestinian cause. On the other hand, it also came to accept the importance of defence
preparedness and increasingly overcame its reservations about the use of force in
international politics.
Thus, in 1971 faced with the influx of millions of refugees from East Pakistan after the
outbreak of a civil war, India quickly moved ahead with a strategic vision to devise a political
and diplomatic initiative backed by military action against Pakistan. This strategy involved a
security understanding with the Soviet Union to counter possible Chinese involvement. Thus,
India signed a 20-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in
August 1971. With the political leadership securing its interests on the northern borders, Indian

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armed force moved swiftly into East Pakistan and helped the Mukti Bahini and the leadership
of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in the establishment of Bangladesh as an independent nation.
2.2.3. The Simla Agreement
In the aftermath of the war India adopted a magnanimous gesture as reflected in repatriation
of more than 91,000 PoWs of Pakistan and the Simla Agreement signed by Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi and President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan on 2 July 1972. It was much more
than a peace treaty seeking to reverse the consequences of the 1971 war. It was a
comprehensive blue print for good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan. The
following principles of the Agreement are, however, particularly noteworthy:
• A mutual commitment to the peaceful resolution of all issues through direct bilateral
approaches.
• To build the foundations of a cooperative relationship with special focus on people to
people contacts.
• To uphold the inviolability of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, this is a most
important CBM between India and Pakistan, and a key to durable peace.
Thus, even though on the face of it the agreement is criticised by many a lost opportunity, it
established the framework that India has continuously put forward as a template to resolve all
disputes within a bilateral framework.
A better understanding of the period requires appreciation of the fact that in July 1971,
President Nixon's National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger secretly visited Beijing during a
trip to Pakistan, and laid the groundwork for Nixon's visit to China in 1972. This was in the
aftermath of a Sino-Soviet rift. Ultimately PRC entered the UN and assumed the seat in the
Security Council in October 1971.
In the larger international economic context, India remained at the forefront of the Group of
77, a group established in 1964 comprising of developing nations seeking fundamental changes
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in the global economic order. Furthermore, the 1973 oil crisis in the wake of the Arab-Israeli
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war in the same year placed an economic challenge before India. However, even as the leader
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of the developing countries India failed to obtain any meaningful concessions as a resource-
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poor developing nation from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). It was
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weakness in the economic capacity that prevented India from pursuing a nuclear weapons
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program even after it 1974.

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The mid 1970s saw India undergoing a period of political turmoil involving emergency and the
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emergence of the Janata Party government in 1977 under Prime Minister Morarji Desai. The
brief period of the Desai government saw many pronouncements about altering the course of
India including a move to “genuine non-alignment. However, this period was a brief interlude
and marked by much continuity in India’s foreign policy. The visit of Minister of External Affairs
Atal Bihari Vajpayee to China and the US president Jimmy Carter to India were key
developments of this period.
Events in the cold war dominated world in this period had a long-lasting impact on India. In
this context the year 1979 is important as three key developments proved that national
interests of India were subject to developments outside. Firstly, in February 1979 the
revolution in Iran brought fundamental changes in West Asian region. Secondly, the during
November and December the events surrounding the seizure of Grand Mosque in Saudi
Arabia brought further upheaval in a region key to India. Thirdly, in December Soviet Union
invaded USSR in Afghanistan. While the consequences of first two events had an impact on
India in the long term, it’s the Soviet entry into Afghanistan that set in motion factors that had
important consequences in terms of India’s neighborhood specifically Pakistan and Afghanistan.

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The United States renewed strategic relationship with Pakistan in the aftermath of the Soviet
invasion. Under General Zia-ul-Haq Pakistan became the frontline in the US efforts to bog
down the Soviets in Afghanistan. This entailed enhanced funding and military aid to Pakistan
to be channelled in Afghanistan against the soviets through the Afghan fighters. As a
consequence with the objective of maintaining its military superiority over Pakistan, India
entered into a closer military cooperation relationship with the Soviet Union. However, this
perhaps dented the non-aligned credentials of India as it was forced to maintain an ambiguous
stance on Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Nonetheless, the Seventh NAM summit in March 1983 at New Delhi became an occasion for
assuming leadership of the multilateral forum of which India was a founding member. However,
by this time the membership of the group had grown to nearly a 100 as compared to 25 at its
first Summit in Belgrade in 1961. As astutely observed in one of the media reports of the era,
“paradoxically, NAM has attained a spatial expansion that would have astonished its founding
fathers, including Jawaharlal Nehru; at the same time, it has lost its cohesion and unity of
objectives and purposes, and is unable to cope with the critical problems and issues that cry
out for urgent solutions.”
The assassination of PM Indira Gandhi in 1984 was followed by a transition to the tenure of
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. In this period India undertook some steps towards modernisation
of the economy and armed forces. In 1988 Rajiv Gandhi became the first Indian Prime Minister
to visit China since 1954 and establishing contacts with Deng Xiaoping under whom China had
ushered in new era of economic reforms. The initiative for regional cooperation materialised in
the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985. This
period also saw greater involvement in the neighborhood including the signing of an
agreement with Pakistan on not attacking each other nuclear installations, a visit followed in
1989 making it first visit of any Indian Prime Minister after Nehru’s visit in 1960. The India-Sri
Lanka Peace Accord in 1987 and subsequent decision to send Indian Peace Keeping Forces
(IPKF) in Sri Lanka had long lasting impact in the region. India’s assertion in the neighbourhood
was further highlighted by “Operation Cactus” that involved military action against the coup in
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At the end of this period India experienced greater political and economic instability such as
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the Bofors scandal, short lived coalition governments of Prime Ministers V.P. Singh and
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Chandrasekhar as well as the balance of payment crisis. These developments accompanied by

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changes in the international environment led to the next phase in India’s foreign policy.
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2.3. 1991 and After: Era of “Pragmatic” Foreign Policy

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The disintegration of Soviet Union and the transformation of the international order with the
end of cold war made it imperative for India to chart a new course in foreign policy. At the
beginning of the post cold war era in international relations, the ascendance of US raised
multiple questions on relevance of ideology in foreign policy as well as the option of
nonalignment. On the economic front the country was also confronted with an unprecedented
balance of payment crisis partly as a consequence of the first Gulf War of 1991. This situation
led to the choices that dramatically altered India’s domestic and international economic
policies. This involved the adherence to Washington Consensus backed by the IMF and the
World Bank. Concretely, this meant structural reforms that increased the role of market forces
in exchange for immediate financial help. This also meant a greater quest for foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) to transform India’s economy. In order to make it an attractive destination for
FDI India, in this phase pursued multiple changes, such as:
• Giving up the commitment to import-substituting industrialization,
• Restructuring its vast public sector
• Dismantling the previous regime of regulations, licenses, permits and quotas.

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At the same time India turned towards Southeast Asia in search for avenues that can be
explored for engagement in economic and strategic arena. Previously, in the duration of the
cold war India had been largely oblivious to the states of Southeast Asia. With the opening of its
markets to foreign investment and an eye on development of a viable export sector, the country
embarked upon a “Look East policy” after 1991. While these changes were afoot, the P.V.
Narasimha Rao Government in 1992, in the context of the Oslo Accord between Israel and the
Palestinians, upgraded its diplomatic relations with Israel to the ambassadorial level.
With China the Narasimha Rao government continued a process that had been initiated during
the Rajiv Gandhi government. During the Prime Minister Narsimha Rao’s visit to China in
September 1993 a land mark agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along
the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the India - China Border Area was signed. This was followed
up by the visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin in 1996 when another agreement on
Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) in the Military Field was signed.
In the neighbourhood India reassessed its tactics to bring about transformation in relations
with its neighbours. The neighbourhood was identified as the first concentric circle of India’s
foreign policy and in policy terms this was reflected in the Gujral Doctrine of 1996, named so
after the then Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral .
The five key principles of Gujral Doctrine were as follows:
• With neighbours viz. Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka, India must not
ask for reciprocity, but should give all that it can in good faith and trust.
• No South Asian country would allow its territory to be used against the interest of another
country
• No country would interfere in the internal affairs of another.
• South Asian Countries should respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty
• Countries of South Asia must settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral
negotiations.
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However, for most part in the 1990s the relations with Pakistan remained contentious. This
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was majorly on account Pakistan’s role in the armed insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir since
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December 1989. With the outbreak of the insurgency Pakistan’s leadership helped transform a
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largely internal militancy into an ideologically charged proxy war. In this context and in view of
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the clandestine nuclear programme of Islamabad concerns regarding conventional military

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balance played large on India’s security calculations.

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Coupled with the Pakistan factor, the calculation from nuclear threat posed by China drove
India’s nuclear weapons program to its next stage. In this scenario, the successful extension of
NPT in 1995 and the efforts by United States to complete the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), which came up in 1996, coincided with India seriously considering its nuclear options.
Thus, the Indian policymakers chose to exercise the nuclear option to thwart rising pressures to
accede to the international nuclear regimes. India declared itself a fully fledged nuclear state
after 5 nuclear tests at Pokharan in May 1998. This attracted sanctions from United States and
the other great powers; and led to the recognition of India as a de facto nuclear power in the
later years.
2.3.1. Beginning of A New Era
This was also the beginning of an era of new engagement with the United States, which
involved bilateral negotiations between US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and
India’s Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh (1998-2000). This was followed by a visit of
President Clinton to India in 2000. The upswing in these relations since this period culminated
in the Civil Nuclear Deal of 2005 which de-facto recognized India as a nuclear power as well as

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its responsible record on non-proliferation, thus paving way for an the beginning of the end to
its isolation at technology regimes such as the Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECR).
Under Prime Minster Atal Bihari Vajpayee diplomacy with Pakistan, including a Bus trip
involving the Prime Minister across the Border in 1999, could not yield much results. The
Lahore declaration of February 1999 was followed by incursion in the Kargil region in Jammu
and Kashmir. This led to a limited war between the two nuclear states in 1999. Despite this
provocation India exercised remarkable restraint and a large-scale war was effectively avoided.
Significantly, Washington sojourn of Pakistan’s then Prime Minister Nawaz Shariff was marked
by considerable coldness. This perhaps was the sign coming changes in the relation between
India, United States and Pakistan.
Terrorism which had been a key challenge for India became a key issue in global politics after
the cold war and especially since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York. In the
aftermath of the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 India resorted to
a strategy of coercive diplomacy which yielded limited results. India’s coercive options against
the terror ploy were limited, as nuclear capability of Pakistan meant greater possibility of a
conflict escalating into a nuclear one and thus inviting the United States to intervene. Thus,
India has been seeking recognition of terrorism as a global scourge which requires a concerted
action by the international community. To this end India has been pursuing the Comprehensive
Convention Against International Terrorism at the United Nations since 1996, although
without much success due to difference in the international community. Nonetheless, the 2008
attacks in Mumbai, though a tragic occasion, demonstrated a greater isolation of Pakistan and
allowed for closer anti-terrorism cooperation between India and the United States.
The changes in the international scenario presented certain choices in front of India and as a
response multiple changes were made. Nonetheless, its commitment to inclusive development
and a just world order remain a continuous facet of its policy. For instance, at the WTO
negotiations, especially in the Doha development round, India has spearheaded the concerns
of the developing countries, the Doha declaration of 2001 is testimony to the values that India
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still holds in the international sphere. Similarly, India, while upholding its national interests, has
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not shied away from upholding the principles of equity and responsibility, as reflected in its role
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in the Climate negotiations. Here too India has not shied away from forming a loose coalition
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with like minded nations as Brazil, South Africa, and China (BASIC).
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The economic profile of India ever since 1991 along with, it’s educated manpower, military
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and technological prowess have acquired greater recognition. These factors have led India
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being labelled as emerging power and a potential great power. During the global economic
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crisis of 2008, India played an important role in global negotiations through mediums such as
the G-20. Nonetheless, its quest for reforms at the United Nations, along with the Group of 4,
has not born results. Even so, through groupings such as BRICS India has expressed its intention
to reshape the global order through multilateral efforts.
These objectives, challenges, and opportunities have continued to shape foreign policymaking
in India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi since 2014. Thus, in the recent years
neighbourhood has acquired new salience, so have multiple engagements with key states in
international relations. India’s membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (2016),
Wassenaar Arrangement (2017) and Australia Group (2018) are certain achievements of the
recent years; however, the membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group remains a challenge to
contend with.
On the basis of the discussion above we can
1. Identify certain Achievements of this phase:
• Economic growth

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• Recognised Nuclear capability

• Key relations: US, Japan, Russia, South East Asia
• Management of relations with China: improvement in trade despite persistence in
differences on the border question.
• End of isolation at technology regimes. e.g. the MTCR, Wassenar Arrangement and
Australia Group.
• Multilateralism and multi-alignment to manage transition in the global order and
pursue national interest e.g. BASIC, BRICS, IBSA etc.
2. Key challenges that remain:
• Sustaining the country’s economic growth rate to utilise the demographic dividend,
• Ensuring energy security,
• resolving the country’s internal security problems within the framework of the
constitution
• Strengthening the neighbours to ensure that they flourish politically, economically, and
even ecologically.
3. Strategically there are few questions that India needs to constantly engage with:
• How to manage the contentious relationship with Pakistan?
• How does India respond to the rise of China?
• What would be the shape of India’s relationship with the United States in the coming
years?
• How to reshape the architecture of global governance (UN, IMF and World Bank, WTO
etc.)?
• How to deal with the menace of terrorism as well as emerging challenges such as
climate change?
We shall be looking into the ideas and concepts discussed in this lectures in greater detail in the
context of specific relations and organisations.
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3. Let Us Address A Key Question

3.1. Non-Alignment: Relevance of the Idea and the Movement
The Essay Paper of the Civil Services Mains Examination 2017 required the aspirants to write an
essay on the topic “Has the Non- Alignment Movement (NAM) lost its relevance in a multi-
polar world?” This, perhaps, is a testimony to the significance of the Non Aligned Movement,
as it remains a key issue in understanding India’s Foreign Policy trajectory.
Started in 1961, NAM now has 120 members. The countries of the Non-Aligned Movement
represent nearly two-thirds of the membership of the United Nations and 55% of the world
population. In the Cold war period its aim was to ensure "the national independence,
sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries" and "struggle against
imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and all forms of foreign aggression,
occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc
politics. In the years since the Cold War's end, it has focused on developing multilateral ties and
connections as well as unity among the developing nations of the world, especially those within
the Global South.
In contemporary times the questions on the relevance of NAM acquired salience since the end
of Cold war. The 17th Summit of the NAM held in September 2016 in Margarita, Venezuela,
was marked by the absence of representation at the head of government level from India. This
had happened only once before i.e. in 1979 when the then caretaker Prime Minister Mr. Charan
Singh could not participate in the Havana Summit of the NAM. Many view this as the
distancing of India from NAM.
3.2. Arguments in the Context of Irrelevance of NAM

NAM has been pronounced irrelevant increasingly since the end of Cold War and especially
since the advent of the 21st century. In 2007 the then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
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advised India to “move past old ways of thinking” as the Non-Aligned Movement had lost its
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meaning. Ever since the inception of NAM some commentators had felt that the:
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• Word ‘non-alignment’ conveyed the wrong notion of neutrality and it only aimed at
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remaining unaligned.
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• Many argue that NAM did not have any binding principles and that it was a marriage of
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convenience among disparate countries. This criticism gained significance as the

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membership of NAM grew over the years.

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• Another argument in this context is that NAM countries did not come forward on any of
the critical occasions when India needed solidarity, such as the Chinese aggression in 1962
or the Bangladesh war in 1971.
• After the end of Cold war many argued that there was no basis of non-alignment after the
end of Superpower rivalry.
3.2.1. Arguments in Defence of NAM and Non-Alignment
In response to Condoleezza Rice’s statement, then Minster of External Affairs Mr. Pranab
Mukherji reminded her that NAM played an important role on the issues such as
decolonisation and its relevance in South-South cooperation cannot be written off in the
contemporary world.
• Many others such as former diplomat T.P. Sreenivasan, argue that the quintessence of non-
alignment was freedom of judgment and action and it remained valid, whether there was
one bloc or two.

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• He also argues that seen in this context, non-military alliances can also be within the ambit
of non-alignment, which was subsequently characterised as ‘strategic autonomy’. In other
words, India does not have to denounce non-alignment to follow its present foreign
policy.
• In response to lack of help on crucial, juncture Mr. Sreenivasan argued that the whole
philosophy of NAM is that it remains united on larger global issues, even if does not side
with a member on a specific issue. India itself has followed this approach, whenever the
members had problems with others either inside or outside the movement.
Historical genesis of the doctrine of non alignment in India can be traced to domestic context,
which further led to India spearheading the Non-Aligned Movement in the international
sphere. Sumit Ganguly provides an informed assessment, he argues that:
• Under Nehru, India followed an ideational foreign policy which involved multilateral
institutions, constraints on defence spending, and advocacy of decolonisation. These
goals became embodied in the doctrine of non-alignment.
• The policy was also in keeping with India’s national experience of colonialism. As a former
colonized state India was wary of limiting its foreign policy option’s through an alignment
with either Superpower.
• Ideas embodied in the doctrine of non-alignement were in keeping with India’s historical
and cultural legacies.
• The moral stance of nonalignment against colonization and apartheid neatly dovetailed
with India’s Gandhian heritage.
• At the international level, the policy made sense as it enabled a materially weak state to
play a role that was considerably more significant than its capabilities would allow it to
be.
Furthermore, the NAM in the 1970s and 1980s, it can be argued, served as a forum to channel
India’s views on many global issues such as:
• India’s deep dissatisfaction with the international order characterised as it was by
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economic, political, and nuclear hierarchies.

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• It was through NAM that India articulated the call for a new international economic order
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that would cater for the special needs of the developing countries.
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• Similarly, it was through NAM that India articulated the call for a new world information
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and communication order to provide a greater voice for developing countries in global
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communications.
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• NAM also served as a forum for India to articulate its views on global nuclear disarmament
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and the discriminatory nature of the global nuclear order at the centre of which stood the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
3.2.2. A Contemporary Assessment
At the very outset one has to distinguish between the idea of non-alignment and the
membership of Non Aligned movement.
In the opinion of David M. Malone, “Non-alignment, in theory...allowed India to play the two
superpowers and their related blocs off against each other, although after the 1950s, India was
not successful in doing so.” He also argues that “the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that Nehru
played such a large role in bringing about and shaping was a useful placeholder for India at a
time when its leaders needed to devote the bulk of their time to pressing internal challenges.”
In the opinion of former diplomat Rajiv Sikri:
Non-alignment as a policy option for India, as distinct from the Non-Aligned Movement,
was essentially about resisting pressures to join rival camps during the Cold War and about

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examining foreign policy options on merit. In short, it was about having an independent
foreign policy. This national consensus remains very strong in India, and has nothing to do
with the so-called ‘Cold War mentality’ as many analysts derisively claim.
Similarly many like former diplomat G. Parthsarthy emphasize on drawing a distinction
between being “non-aligned” and being a member of the “Non-Aligned Movement”, in
contemporary times. In his words “non-alignment in the post-Cold War era is still relevant and
really means the freedom to choose a wide range of partners to cooperate with on different
issues, to protect our national interests. Thus, while being non-aligned gives us the flexibility to
choose our partners and partnerships, the Non-Aligned Movement is a forum of little
relevance in today’s world.” As rightly pointed out by put by Shyam Saran, Non Aligned
Movement is not what determined India’s non alignment; rather it is India’s non alignment
that facilitated the functioning of the movement.
Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War, India has become a key member of various
multilateral groupings:
• BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) for protecting and promoting its interests on
climate change;
• G4 for pushing through reforms of the UN Security Council;
• G20 for managing the world economy;
• BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa)
to enhance economic coordination with countries that are similarly placed;
• ASEAN-centred institutions,
• Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),
• Russia-India-China (RIC) grouping for pursuing political and security interests.
These engagements in multiple forums for varying economic, political and security purposes
have, as argued by Shashi Tharoor, made the Non-Aligned Movement “largely incidental” to
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India’s pursuit of its national interest since the end of the Cold War. This view suggests that the
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idea of non-alignment remains relevant in terms of strategic autonomy and has increasingly
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expressed in terms of multi-alignment. The NAM, on the other hand needs to reinvent or
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reorient itself to remain relevant. This provides India both an opportunity and challenge.
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4. Supplementary Reading
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4.1. India’s Policy of Non-Alignment

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India, under the leadership of first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, was the first country to
have adopted the policy of non-alignment. India’s policy has been positive or dynamic
neutralism in which a country acts independently and decides its policy on each issue on its
merit. Non-alignment is based on positive reasoning. It is not a negative, middle of the road
reluctance to distinguish between right and wrong. It does not mean that a country just
retires into a shell.
P M Nehru had declared in the US Congress in 1948, “Where freedom is menaced, or justice is
threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral … our
policy is not neutralist, but one of active endeavour to preserve and, if possible, establish peace
on firm foundations.” Commenting on India’s foreign policy, K.M. Panikkar claims that India
“has been able to build up a position of independence and, in association with other states
similarly placed, has been able to exercise considerable influence in the cause of international
goodwill.” In a way, this policy promotes Gandhiji’s belief in non-violence. The critics in early
days argued that India’s policy was to remain, “neutral on the side of democracy.”

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Speaking in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) on December 4, 1947, Nehru had sought to
remove the impression that India’s non-alignment also meant neutrality. He had said:
We have proclaimed during this past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular
group. This has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else. If there is a big
war, there is no particular reason why we should jump into it… We are not going to join a
war if we can help it, and we are going to join the side which is to our interest when the
time comes to make the choice.
India wanted to prevent the international conflict after the horrors of the Second World War.
Nehru said: “If and when disaster comes it will affect the world as a whole… Our first effort
should be to prevent that disaster from happening.” Reiterating India’s resolve to keep away
from power blocs, he said in 1949, “If by any chance we align ourselves definitely with one
power group, we may perhaps from one point of view do some good, but I have not the
shadow of doubt that from a larger point of view, not only of India but of world peace, it will do
harm. Because them we lose that tremendous vantage ground that we have of using such
influence as we possess… in the cause of world peace.”
Priorities of independent India’s foreign policy revolved around-
• economic development of the country,
• maintenance of independence of action in foreign affairs,
• safeguarding country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
• and world peace.
India has firmly believed that these objectives can be achieved only by keeping away from
power blocs, and exercising freedom of taking foreign policy decisions.
Nehru was committed to western concept of liberalism and democracy. Nonetheless, he did
not approve of the military alliance like NATO and SEATO initiated by the United States to
contain communism. He opposed western alliances on the ground that they encouraged new
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form of colonialism; and also because these were likely to promote countermoves and race for
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armaments between the two camps. Nehru was impressed by socialism and strongly
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advocated the idea of democratic socialism. Nonetheless, he totally rejected the communist
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state as “monolithic” and described Marxism as an outmoded theory. Nehru was a

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combination of a socialist and a liberal democrat. He was opposed to the very idea of power
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blocs in international relations. India’s policy of non-alignment, therefore, was not to

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promote a third bloc, but to ensure freedom of decision-making of the recently decolonized
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states. Non-alignment was promoted by India as a policy of peace, as against the policy of
confrontation.
India’s policy of non-alignment was against the status quo situation in international relations.
That meant opposition of colonialism, imperialism, racial discrimination and now of neo-
colonialism. Also, non-alignment rejects the concept of superiority of Super Powers. It
advocates sovereign equality of all states. Furthermore, non-alignment encourages friendly
relations among countries. It is opposed to the alliances that divide the world into groups of
states, or power blocs. Non-alignment advocates peaceful settlement of international disputes
and rejects the use of force. It favours complete destruction of nuclear weapons and pleads
for comprehensive disarmament. It supports all efforts to strengthen the United Nations.
Thus, India’s policy of non-alignment emphasizes prioratising the social and economic
problems of mankind. India has always supported the demand for a new international
economic order so that the unjust and unbalanced existing economic order may be changed
into a new and just economic order.

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4.2. Reasons for Non-Alignment

India had adopted the policy of non-alignment as it did not want to lose its freedom of
decision-making, and because India’s primary concern soon after independence was
economic development. The policy has been sustained for five decades. Professor M.S. Rajan
had mentioned seven reasons for adopting this policy initially.
• Firstly, it was felt that India’s alignment with either the US or the USSR bloc would
aggravate international tension, rather than promote international peace. Besides, the
Indian Government left later than in view of size, geopolitical importance and contribution
to civilization, India had “a positive role to play in reducing international tension, promoting
peace and serving as a bridge between the two camps.”
• Secondly, India was neither a great power, nor could she allow herself to be treated as a
nation of no consequence. India was, however, potentially a great power. Non-alignment
suited India’s “present needs to keep out national identity” and on the other hand not to
compromise “out future role of an acknowledged Great Power.”
• Thirdly, India could not join either of the power blocs because of emotional and
ideological reasons. We could not join the Western (American) Bloc because many of its
member countries were colonial powers or ex-colonial powers, and some still practiced
racial discrimination. We could not join the Eastern (Soviet) Blot because communism, as
an ideology, was completely alien to Indian thinking and way of life.
• Fourthly, like any sovereign country, India, who had just become sovereign, wanted to
retain and exercise independence of judgement, and not to “be tied to the apron-strings of
another country.” It meant that India wanted freedom to decide every issue on its merit.
• Fifthly, once India launched economic development plans, we needed foreign economic
aid “it was both desirable politically not to depend upon aid from one bloc only, and
profitable to be able to get it from more than one source.”
• Sixthly, non-alignment is in accordance with India’s traditional belief that “truth, right and
goodness” are not the monopoly of anyone religion or philosophy. India believes in
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tolerance. Therefore, the world situation, called for tolerance and peaceful co-existence of
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both the systems, with India not aligning with any of the blocs, nor being hostile to them.
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• Lastly, the domestic political situation was also responsible for the adoption of the policy
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of non-alignment. According to Professor Rajan, “By aligning India with either of the Blocks,
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the Indian Government would have sown seeds of political controversy and instability in the
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country…”
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Whatever the actual reasons that may have promoted Nehru and his Government to adopt the
policy of non-alignment, it is obvious that the people of India by and large supported the
policy. Many other countries found it in their national interest to adopt this policy which led to
the establishment of the Non-Alignment Movement.
4.3. The Non-Aligned Movement

India was largely responsible for launching the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. The
basic concept for the group originated in 1955 during discussions that took place at the Asia-
Africa Bandung Conference held in Indonesia. Subsequently, a preparatory meeting for the First
NAM Summit Conference was held in Cairo, Egypt from 5-12 June 1961. It was initiated by
Nehru, Yugoslav President Joseph Brez Tito and Egyptian President Colonel Nasser.
Twenty-five countries attended the first NAM conference held at Belgrade and presided over
by Tito in September 1961. Invitations were sent out by Nehru, Nasser and Tito after careful
scrutiny of foreign policies of proposed participants of the first NAM Summit.

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The five criteria for joining NAM were:

• the country followed independent foreign policy based on non-alignment and peaceful co-
existence;
• the country was opposed to colonialism and imperialism;
• it should not have been a member of a Cold War related military bloc;
• it should not have had a bilateral treaty with any of the Super Powers; and
• NAM should not have allowed any foreign military base on its territory.
NAM does not have a formal constitution or permanent secretariat, and its administration is
non-hierarchical and rotational. Decisions are made by consensus, which requires substantial
agreement, but not unanimity.
At each Summit, a new Head of State formally becomes the chair, and assumes that position
until the next Summit. The chair is responsible for promoting the principles and activities of
NAM, and the Foreign Ministry and Permanent Mission in New York of the Chair's State
assumes administrative responsibility.
Coordinating Bureau is an ambassadorial-level body, based at the United Nations in New York,
reviews and facilitates activities between the working groups, contact groups, task forces, and
committees. It is also charged with strengthening coordination and cooperation among NAM
States. The Chair's Permanent Representative to the UN in New York functions as the CoB chair.
Troika Created in 1997, this body consists of past, serving and future Chairs, and operates at
the discretion of the incumbent chair.
The Non-Aligned Security Council Caucus consists of NAM countries who are elected to the
UN Security Council as rotating members. These States seek to adopt unified positions and to
reflect the decisions and positions adopted at NAM Summits and Ministerial Conferences.
The Joint Coordinating Committee of NAM and the Group of 77 members meets regularly in
New York to coordinate and promote the interests of developing countries in the international
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community. It was established in 1994.

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From its inception in 1961, the NAM has grown both quantitatively and qualitatively. In 2015,
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there were as many as 120 members of NAM, 17 Observer States and 10 observer
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organizations.
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Its summits are periodically held in which issues concerning international politics are discussed,
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and attempts are made to evolve a common approach to various issues. Since the number of
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members has grown very large, it often becomes difficult to adopt an approach that all
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countries can follow. The NAM lost some of its fervor after the end of Cold War, though its
relevance is claimed by various leaders.
NAM: Role after the Cold War

Since the end of the Cold War and the formal end of colonialism, the Non-Aligned Movement
has been forced to redefine itself and reinvent its purpose in the current world system. A
major question has been whether many of its foundational ideologies, principally national
independence, territorial integrity, and the struggle against colonialism and imperialism, can be
applied to contemporary issues.
The movement has emphasised its principles of multilateralism, equality, and mutual non-
aggression in attempting to become a stronger voice for the global South, and an instrument
that can be utilised to promote the needs of member nations at the international level and
strengthen their political leverage when negotiating with developed nations. In its efforts to
advance Southern interests, the movement has stressed the importance of cooperation and
unity amongst member states, but as in the past, cohesion remains a problem since the size of

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the organisation and the divergence of agendas and allegiances present the ongoing potential
for fragmentation.
While agreement on basic principles has been smooth, taking definitive action vis-à-vis
particular international issues has been rare, with the movement preferring to assert its
criticism or support rather than pass hard-line resolutions. The movement continues to see a
role for itself, as in its view, the world’s poorest nations remain exploited and marginalised, no
longer by opposing superpowers, but rather in a uni-polar world, and it is Western hegemony
and neo-colonialism that the movement has really re-aligned itself against. It opposes foreign
occupation, interference in internal affairs, and aggressive unilateral measures, but it has also
shifted to focus on the socio-economic challenges facing member states, especially the
inequalities manifested by globalisation and the implications of neo-liberal policies. The Non-
Aligned Movement has identified economic underdevelopment, poverty, and social injustices
as growing threats to peace and security.
Recent activities and positions of NAM:
Summits
13th Summit: 13th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
from 24-25 February 2003.
14th Summit: The 14th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-
Aligned Movement was held in Havana, Cuba, from 11-16 September 2006.
15th Summit: On 15 July 2009, NAM concluded its 15th summit meeting at an Egyptian Red Sea
Resort in Sharm el-Sheikh.
16th Summit: from 26-31 August 2012, the 16th Summit Conference of Heads of State or
Government of the Non-Aligned Movement was held in Tehran, Iran. During the conference,
the Heads of State or Government discussed a variety of issues, The Final Document contained
positions on global, regional and sub-regional and development, social and human rights issues.
17th Summit: On 17 September 2016, Venezuela hosted the 17th summit of the Non-Aligned
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Movement. Attendance at the summit has dwindled in recent years; thirty-five heads of state
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attended in 2012 and only ten attended in 2016. Discussions covered Palestine, the U.S.-Cuba
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relationship, and Venezuela’s political climate.

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18th Summit: Proposed to take place in Azerbaijan in 2019

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Positions:
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Criticism of US policy
In recent years the organization has criticized US foreign policy. The US invasion of Iraq and the
War on Terrorism, its attempts to stifle Iran and North Korea's nuclear plans, and its other
actions have been denounced as human rights violations and attempts to run roughshod over
the sovereignty of smaller nations. The movement’s leaders have also criticized the American
control over the United Nations and other international structures.
Self-determination of Puerto Rico
Since 1961, the group have supported the discussion of the case of Puerto Rico's self-
determination before the United Nations.
Self-determination of Western Sahara
Since 1973, the group have supported the discussion of the case of Western Sahara's self-
determination before the United Nations. The Non-Aligned Movement reaffirmed in its meeting
at (Sharm El Sheikh 2009) the support to the Self-determination of the Sahrawi people by

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choosing between any valid option, welcomed the direct conversations between the parts, and
remembered the responsibility of the United Nations on the Sahrawi issue.
Sustainable development
The movement is publicly committed to the tenets of sustainable development and the
attainment of the Millennium Development Goals, but it believes that the international
community has not created conditions conducive to development and has infringed upon the
right to sovereign development by each member state. Issues such as globalisation, the debt
burden, unfair trade practices, the decline in foreign aid, donor conditionalities, and the lack of
democracy in international financial decision-making are cited as factors inhibiting
development.
Reforms of the UN
The Non-Aligned Movement has been quite outspoken in its criticism of current UN structures
and power dynamics, mostly in how the organisation has been utilised by powerful states in
ways that violate the movement’s principles. It has made a number of recommendations that
would strengthen the representation and power of ‘non-aligned’ states. The
proposed reforms are also aimed at improving the transparency and democracy of UN decision-
making. The UN Security Council is the element considered the most distorted, undemocratic,
and in need of reshaping.
South-south cooperation
Lately the Non-Aligned Movement has collaborated with other organisations of the developing
world, primarily the Group of 77, forming a number of joint committees and releasing
statements and document representing the shared interests of both groups. This dialogue and
cooperation can be taken as an effort to increase the global awareness about the organisation
and bolster its political clout.
Cultural diversity and human rights
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The movement accepts the universality of human rights and social justice, but fiercely resists
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cultural homogenisation. In line with its views on sovereignty, the organisation appeals for the
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protection of cultural diversity, and the tolerance of the religious, socio-cultural, and historical
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particularities that define human rights in a specific region.

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Feel Free to add your Own Notes in blank Spaces

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Copyright © by Vision IAS

All rights are reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or
otherwise, without prior permission of Vision IAS.

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LECTURE-2
INDIA NEIGHBORHOOD: RELATIONS
Contents
1. India-Bangladesh Relations: Fraternal Friendship.................................................................... 23
1.1. Background ....................................................................................................................... 23
1.2. Evolution ........................................................................................................................... 23
1.3. Recent Top Level Visits ...................................................................................................... 24
1.4. River Waters ...................................................................................................................... 24
1.4.1. The Teesta Dispute ..................................................................................................... 24
1.5. The Border Issue ............................................................................................................... 25
1.6. The Borders and Boundaries: Key Agreements................................................................. 25
1.6.1. The LBA....................................................................................................................... 26
1.6.2. The Maritime Boundary Award.................................................................................. 26
1.7. Economic Cooperation and Trade ..................................................................................... 27
1.8. Energy ............................................................................................................................... 28
1.9. Connectivity ...................................................................................................................... 28
1.10. Security ........................................................................................................................... 29
1.11. Issues to resolved and future challenges ........................................................................ 29
2. India and Bhutan ...................................................................................................................... 30
2.1. Background and Evolution ................................................................................................ 30
2.2. Recent Dynamics ............................................................................................................... 31
2.3. Hydropower ...................................................................................................................... 31
2.4. Economic Development .................................................................................................... 31
2.5. Security ............................................................................................................................. 31
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2.5.1. Incidents in Doklam Area 2017- India-Bhutan-China: ................................................ 32

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2.6. Concerns ........................................................................................................................... 32

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3. India and Nepal ........................................................................................................................ 33

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3.1. Background ....................................................................................................................... 33

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3.2. The Evolution of Democratic Process in Nepal ................................................................. 33

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3.2.1. After 2015 .................................................................................................................. 34

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3.2.2. Elections ..................................................................................................................... 35

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3.3. Recent Visits ...................................................................................................................... 35

3.4. Security ............................................................................................................................. 35
3.5. Water Resources ............................................................................................................... 36
3.6. Power ................................................................................................................................ 36
3.7. Trade.................................................................................................................................. 36
3.8. Connectivity ...................................................................................................................... 37
3.9. Border Dispute .................................................................................................................. 37
3.9.1. Challenges .................................................................................................................. 37
4. The BBIN Framework................................................................................................................ 38
4.1. Vision of BBIN.................................................................................................................... 38
4.2. Potential ............................................................................................................................ 38
4.2.1. Recent Developments ................................................................................................ 38
5. India-Sri Lanka .......................................................................................................................... 39
5.1. The Background ................................................................................................................ 39
5.2. Evolution of India Sri Lanka Relations ............................................................................... 40
5.2.1. Recent Visits ............................................................................................................... 40

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5.3 Ethnic Issue ........................................................................................................................ 40

5.3.1. Fishermen Issue ......................................................................................................... 40
5.4. Economic Cooperation and Trade ..................................................................................... 41
5.4.1. Development Cooperation ......................................................................................... 42
5.5. The China Factor ............................................................................................................... 42
5.5.1. India Interest .............................................................................................................. 42
6. India-Maldives .......................................................................................................................... 43
6.1. Background ....................................................................................................................... 43
6.2. Security ............................................................................................................................. 44
6.3. Economic and Development Cooperation ........................................................................ 45
6.4. Democratic Transition in Maldives .................................................................................... 45
6.5. Recent Dynamics ............................................................................................................... 45
6.5.1. Options for India ........................................................................................................ 46
7. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) .................................................... 47
7.1. Background ....................................................................................................................... 48
7.2. The Organisation ............................................................................................................... 48
7.3. Evolution ........................................................................................................................... 48
7.3.1. Factors Shaping the Agenda: Initial Phase ................................................................. 48
7.3.2. The SAARC Agenda ..................................................................................................... 49
7.3.3. Principles of the SAARC Charter ................................................................................. 49
7.3.4. SAARC Regional Centres ............................................................................................. 49
7.4. Trade and Commerce: The SAARC Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA) ................... 50
7.4.1. Lack of Progress in SAPTA........................................................................................... 50
7.5. South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) ..................................................................... 50
7.5.1. Steps to Strengthen SAFTA ......................................................................................... 51
7.5.2. SAFTA: Key Challenges................................................................................................ 51
7.5.3. Way Forward .............................................................................................................. 51
7.6. SAARC: Comparative Assessment ..................................................................................... 51
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7.6.1. Sluggish Progress: Views from Within........................................................................ 52

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7.7. Causes for the Limited Progress of SAARC ........................................................................ 52

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7.7.1. Making SAARC Work .................................................................................................. 53

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7.8. India’s Contributions ......................................................................................................... 53

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7.9. Recent Developments within SAARC ................................................................................ 54

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7.10. Deadlock at SAARC: Options for Regional Cooperation in South Asia ............................ 54
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7.11. India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Neighbourhood First ...................................................... 55

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1. India-Bangladesh Relations: Fraternal Friendship

Map 2.1: Bangladesh
Image Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/graphics/maps/bg-map.gif
1.1. Background
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• India and Bangladesh share land and maritime boundaries, ethnic ties across borders as
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well as trans-boundary rivers. Similarities in language, culture and development trajectory

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makes the relations special

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• Geographical locations complement each other and present an opportunity for both to
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further develop their connectivity links and economies.

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• India played a significant role in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 by providing moral,
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material, military and diplomatic support to the Mukti Bahini and the leadership of the
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Awami League, especially Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

• India was the first country to recognize Bangladesh as a separate and independent state.
• The 1972 India Bangladesh Treaty of Peace and Friendship laid the foundations of good
relations between the two Countries
1.2. Evolution
• Despite the bonhomie of initial years the relations soured especially since the military
coup and assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the ascendance of the Military
ruler Zia ur Rahman in the year 1975.
• Bangladesh remained under Military or Quasi Military rule for 1975 to 1990.
• This period, for most part, the relations were marked by brief periods of raised
expectations and longer period coldness.
• Begum Khaleda Zia of Bangladesh Nationalist Pary (BNP) became the Prime Minister in
1991. In 1996 Awami League came to Power under Sheikh Hasina. In 2001 she lost to the
BNP and Khaleda Zia. 2008 Saw the victory of Awami league under Shiekh Hasina

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• One of the worst periods in India-Bangladesh relations was between 2001 and 2006. Only
minor protocols or agreements were signed during this time and there was a surge in
insurgency activities in the Northeast with the United Liberation Front of Asom and the
Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland, among other outfits, crossing the border for
training.
• From 2009 onwards, as cross-border issues were addressed, bilateral relationship
improved and progress was made in some key areas.
• Recent years have seen remarkable shift in these relations, under different governments
in New Delhi.
1.3. Recent Top Level Visits

• Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Shiekh Hasina Visited India in April 2017. Both Countries
signed 22 agreements.
• Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Bangladesh in June 2015
• Prime Minister Manmohan Singh Visited Bangladesh in 2011
1.4. River Waters

• India and Bangladesh share 54 common rivers: Ganga and Brahmaputra are chief among
them. Bangladesh is a lower riparian state.
• Joint Rivers Water Commission was formed in 1972 for carrying out survey of the shared
river systems.
• Farrakka Barrage constructed in 1975 by India to use water from Ganges to flush the
Hooghly river and keep the Kolkata Port operational, became a bone of contention.
Bangladesh under general Zia confronted India and tried to internationalise the issue.
• A settlement was finally reached in 1977, with a new government in India led by the Janata
party, known as the Farakka accord.
• The Ganges Waters Treaty was signed in 1996 for the sharing of waters of the River Ganges
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during the lean season (January 1-May 31).

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• On the Teesta River, an interim agreement was reached by both sides for water sharing in
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1984. However, a final agreement has been elusive. The West Bengal’s government’s
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opposes any such agreement perceived to be unjust & insensitive to West Bengal’s water
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needs & demands.

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1.4.1. The Teesta Dispute

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• Historically, the root of the disputes over the river can be located in the report of the
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Boundary Commission (BC), which was set up in 1947 under Sir Cyril Radcliffe to
demarcate the boundary line between West Bengal (India) and East Bengal (Pakistan, then
Bangladesh from 1971). During East Bengal’s days as a part of Pakistan, no serious dialogue
took place on water issues between India and East Pakistan. In 1972, the India-Bangladesh
Joint Rivers Commission was established.
• The Teesta river originates in Sikkim and flows through West Bengal as well as
Bangladesh. India claims a share of 55 percent of the river's water.
• The river is Bangladesh's fourth largest transboundary river for irrigation and fishing. The
Teesta's floodplain covers 2,750sq km in Bangladesh. Of the river's catchment - an area of
land where water collects - 83 percent is in India and 17 percent is in Bangladesh. That
means more than one lakh hectares of land across five districts in Bangladesh are severely
affected by withdrawals of the Teesta's waters in India, said the Observer Research
Foundation. These five Bangladesh districts then face acute shortages during the dry
season, it added.

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• In 1983, an ad hoc arrangement on sharing of waters from the Teesta was made, according
to which Bangladesh got 36% and India 39% of the waters, while the remaining 25%
remained unallocated.
• After the Ganga Water Treaty, a Joint Committee of Experts was set up to study the other
rivers. The committee gave importance to the Teesta. In 2000, Bangladesh presented its
draft on the Teesta. The final draft was accepted by India and Bangladesh in 2010. In 2011,
during then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Dhaka, a new formula to
share Teesta waters was agreed upon between the political leadership of the two
countries.
• The 2011 interim deal - that was supposed to last 15 years - gave India 42.5 percent of the
Teesta's waters and gave Bangladesh 37.5 percent.
• West Bengal CM, Mamata Banerjee opposed this deal so it was shelved and remains
unsigned. In fact, she was scheduled to accompany the then PM Manmohan Singh to
Bangladesh to sign that deal in 2011, but cancelled the trip.
• West Bengal CM Mamata Banerjee has in the past countered Bangladesh’s argument citing
the amount of Teesta waters India already gives Bangladesh. "When we need a certain
quantity of water to maintain our Kolkata Port and fulfil the need of farmers, water is
released from Teesta and Farakka barrages to Bangladesh sacrificing the state's interest"
she said in 2013.
• Hydropower on the Teesta is another point of conflict. There are at least 26 projects on
the river mostly in Sikkim, aimed at producing some 50,000MW.
• Mamta Banerjee has proposed sharing the waters of other rivers. As north Bengal is
completely dependent on the Teesta, she said, rivers like the Torsa and Manshai, which are
closer to the border of India and Bangladesh, are good options. The Torsa, in fact, has
connectivity with Bangladesh's Padma river. The West Bengal CM proposed that the two
countries set up a commission to ascertain the level of water flowing through the Torsa and
the quantum of water that can be shared.
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1.5. The Border Issue

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• India and Bangladesh share 4096.7 km. of border, which is the longest land boundary that
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India shares with any of its neighbours.

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• Before the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) came in to effect in 2015, the border was
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contentious due to numerous exclaves and enclaves.

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• For allowing Bangladesh access to its enclaves in West Bengal, the Government of India had
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agreed to lease out a small corridor of land (Teen Bigha Corridor) in 1974, however, it faced
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strong domestic opposition within India & the matter was finally resolved only in 1982. This
generated needless friction over the delay in implementation of the agreement
1.6. The Borders and Boundaries: Key Agreements

• A Coordinated Border Management Plan (CBMP) was signed in 2011 to synergize the
efforts of both Border Guarding Forces for more effective control over cross border illegal
activities and crimes as well as for the maintenance of peace and tranquility along the
India-Bangladesh border.
• The Land boundary agreement (LBA) was implemented in 2015.
• Government of India has sanctioned barbed wire fencing to the extent of 3326.14 km along
the Indo-Bangladesh border. Out of this, fencing to the extent of 2731 km has been
completed till March 2017.
• The settlement of the maritime boundary arbitration between India and Bangladesh, as
per UNCLOS award on July 7, 2014, paved the way for the economic development of this
part of the Bay of Bengal and is seen as beneficial to both countries.

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1.6.1. The LBA

India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA), was first signed in 1974. A protocol to this
agreement was signed in 2011.
The three outstanding issues were:
o an un-demarcated land boundary of approximately 6.1 km
o exchange of enclaves
o unresolved adverse possession
• The agreement was, Implemented in 2015, with the passage of relevant Act (100th
Amendment Act) by the Indian Parliament and exchange of instruments the same year.
• This step not only removed all hurdles for the final settlement of borders, but also ensured
the way for exchange of Enclaves and merger of Adverse Possessions by re-drawing the
International Boundary (IB), also known as the Radcliffe Line.
• India transferred 111 enclaves with a total area of 17,160.63 acres to Bangladesh, while
Bangladesh transferred 51 enclaves with an area of 7,110.02 acres to India.
• As for Adverse Possessions, India received 2777.038 acres of land and transferred 2267.682
acres to Bangladesh.
• Thus, the 2015 LBA implements the unresolved issues stemming from
o the un-demarcated land boundary—approximately 6.1-km long—in three sectors, viz.
Daikhata-56 (West Bengal), Muhuri River–Belonia (Tripura) and Lathitila–Dumabari
(Assam);
o exchange of enclaves; and
o Adverse possessions, which were first addressed in the 2011 Protocol.
• The nearly 14,000 residents of the Bangladeshi enclaves in India have decided to stay on
and become citizens as per the option given to them under the LBA. 971 residents of the
Indian enclaves in Bangladesh, out of the nearly 37,000, opted for Indian citizenship.
1.6.2. The Maritime Boundary Award
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• On 7 July 2014 a landmark judgment of the Hague-based Permanent Court of Attribution

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(PCA) awarded Bangladesh an area of 19,467 sq km, four-fifth of the total area of 25,602
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sq km disputed maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal with India.

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The UN Tribunal’s award clearly delineated the course of maritime boundary line
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between India and Bangladesh in the territorial sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and
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continental shelf within and beyond 200 nautical miles (nm).

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Now, Bangladesh’s maritime boundary has been extended by 118,813 sq km comprising 12

nm of territorial sea and an EEZ extending up to 200 nm into the high seas. In addition, the
ruling acknowledged Bangladesh’s sovereign rights of undersea resources in the continental
shelf extending as far as 345 nm in the high seas, taking Chittagong coast as the base line.
• The verdict has been broadly accepted by both the countries as a positive development
for further consolidation of friendly relations
• India is also happy with the ruling and considers it as a diplomatic breakthrough for
various reasons. Among other gains, the verdict has recognised India’s sovereignty over
New Moore Island and awarded nearly 6000 sq km of the contested zone where the island
had once existed.

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Map 2.2India Bangladesh Maritime Boundary award
Image Source: http://www.thedailystar.net/sites/default/files/upload-2014/gallery/image/arts/bay-win-

cheers.jpg
1.6.2.1. Significance of the Maritime Boundary Award

The award is significant given the geo-strategic/political significance of greater Indian Ocean
region and South Asian sub-region. Moreover, the award has wide security and economic
implications not only for India and Bangladesh but also for the entire Bay of Bengal region.
• The verdict would contribute towards establishing strategic partnerships among the
nations sharing borders in the Bay. The award is expected to have positive impact on
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emerging multilateral forum like BIMSTEC.

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• The verdict has been broadly accepted by both the countries as a positive development for
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further consolidation of friendly relations especially given the geo-strategic/political

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significance of greater Indian Ocean region and South Asian sub-region.

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• By clearly delineating the maritime boundary between the two nations, the verdict could
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help boosting coastal and maritime security in the region.

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• It opened the door for exploration of oil and gas in the Bay—the site of huge energy
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reserves. India’s discovery of natural gas in 2006 took place in a creek which is situated
about 50 km south of the mouth of the Hariabhanga river within the contested zone.
• The development of Fishery resources is another prospect.
• The award is expected to have positive impact on regional integration and emerging
multilateral forum like BIMSTEC. It may be noted that India has already settled its maritime
borders with Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Thailand.
1.7. Economic Cooperation and Trade

• Bilateral trade between India and Bangladesh has grown steadily over the last decade. In
the last five years, total trade between the two countries has grown by more than 17%.
India’s exports to Bangladesh in the period July 2016 – March 2017 stood at US$ 4489.30
million and imports from Bangladesh during FY 2016-17 stood at US$ 672.40 million.
• There are estimates that the trade potential is at least four times the present level.
• Lines of Credit: In recent Year India has extended three lines of credit worth US$ 8 billion
to Bangladesh for a range of projects, including railway infrastructure, supply of Broad

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Gauge microprocessor-based locomotives and passenger coaches, procurement of buses,

and dredging projects. This is the largest quantum of credit India has extended to any
other country by far and comes at a highly concessional rate of interest.
• Despite duty-free access, Bangladeshi exporters face high non-tariff barriers in the form of
bureaucratic and customs bottlenecks, delays due to manual clearance, visa problems, lack
of banking services and warehouse facilities at the border. The cost of cross-border trade is
quite high.
• ‘Border Haats’, or markets across the India-Bangladesh border (currently four such haats
are functional), were a successful solution to increase legal business on the borders.
Recently, Bangladesh and India have agreed to set up six more haats along their borders.
1.8. Energy
• Power: Government-to-government power trade is 1,300 MW from India to Bangladesh.
• India’s state-run Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) is building the Rampal coal-fired
power plant in Bangladesh.
• In the private sector, Reliance Power has won approval to set up a 750 MW LNG-based
power plant and an LNG terminal in Bangladesh, paving the way for $1.3 billion
investment, and Adani Group is set to sell 3,000 MW power to Bangladesh.
• Connectivity: the focus has been road, rail, rivers, sea, transmission lines, petroleum
pipelines, and digital links that would give India access to the Northeast and to Southeast
Asia through Bangladesh.
1.9. Connectivity
• Two Trains services, Maitri and Bandhan, run between Kolkata and Dhaka.
• The new Kolkata-Dhaka-Agartala bus service via Dhaka was started in 2016.
• Trains are planned to run from Kolkata to Agartala via Dhaka, a project to be completed in
2019. on the Completion of the Akhaura-Agartala section the railway distance between
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Tripura and Kolkata would be reduced by over 1,000 km

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• The two sides agreed to examine the request of Bangladesh to establish a new rail link
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between Panchagarh (Bangladesh) to Siliguri (India).

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• Bangladesh-India coastal shipping began operationalisation in March 2016.

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In 2017 Bangladesh allowed Indian vessels to dock at Chittagong Port, the first time after
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40 years. Indian companies are interested in developing Payra Port.

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• Trucks carrying Indian goods reached Tripura from Ashuganj port in Bangladesh on June 19
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2016, making the long-cherished idea of transshipment into reality

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• Grid Connectivity: Bangladesh already draws 600 megawatt from the Indian grid, with
another 500 megawatt to be added through the Bheramara-Bahrampur inter-connection.
• Diesel Pipeline: India is already constructing a Indo-Bangla friendship pipeline from Siliguri
to Parbatipur (In Bangladesh) for supply of high speed diesel as a grant-in-aid.
• If the two neighbors have their way, by mid-2020 India will cease to depend only on the
Siliguri Corridor or the Chickens Neck, the 22-km corridor near Siliguri in West Bengal that
connects the Northeast with the rest of the country.
• Waterways: Once the dredging in Bangladesh is complete, large vessels can move from
Varanasi in National Waterway 1 (NW-1, the Ganga) to NW-2 (Brahmaputra) and NW-16
(Barak) via Bangladesh river channels, thereby reducing the over-dependence on the
narrow stretch.
• An ambitious gas pipeline project with Bangladesh and Myanmar has been revived in
2017 at the conceptual level. India can take this opportunity forward to consolidate
regional connectivity.
•

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Map 2.3 : India-Bangladesh Connectivity
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Image Source: http://images.indianexpress.com/2015/11/bangala.jpg

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1.10. Security
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Security cooperation is a key area in the relations between the two countries.
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• In 2013 the extradition treaty between the two countries came into effect. The
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implementation of this treaty saw the extradition of figures such as Anup Chetia of the
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ULFA.
• A MoU on Cyber Security was signed between the two countries in 2017.
• In recent years Bangladesh has also faced some serious challenges from terrorism and is an
invaluable partner in our fight against terrorism by India.
• The two countries cooperate on checking the smuggling and circulation of fake currency
notes and narcotics.
• Standard Operating Procedures for operationalisation of the MoU on Cooperation
between the Coast Guards between the two countries is in place.
1.11. Issues to resolved and future challenges

• The Teesta River Water issue remains to be resolved
• Tipaimukh project on the Barak River has been a sensitive issue for Bangladesh.
• The issue of illegal immigration is a sensitive issue for India and especially in states such as
Assam. Where India remains sensitive to the issue of illegal immigrants, Bangladesh has
consistently denied that Bangladeshis are illegally migrating.

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• Favourable Trade conditions are especially important for Bangladesh

• Rohingya issue- it is a sensitive issue involving the migration of Rohingya refugees from
Myanmar to Bangladesh. India as key regional player is expected to play a positive role in
the issue in which China is also actively involved.
• Bangladesh goes to elections in 2018. It would be especially sensitive time for the
relations.
• The Agreement on Ganges Water would expire in 2026.
2. India and Bhutan

Map 2.4: Bhutan
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Source: https https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bt.html

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2.1. Background and Evolution

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• From 1949 onwards the relations were governed by a Treaty of Perpetual Peace and
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Friendship of 1949. Article 2 of the treaty was significant wherein “the Government of
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Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its
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external relations.”
• Diplomatic relations between India and Bhutan were established in 1968 with the
appointment of a resident representative of India in Thimphu.
• The Kingdom of Bhutan was admitted as a member of the United Nations on 21st
September 1971.
• The first democratic elections in Bhutan began in 2007
• The Indian-Bhutan Friendship Treaty, which was signed in New Delhi on 8th February
2007, has come into force following the exchange of Instruments of Ratification between
the two governments in Thimphu on 2nd March 2007.
• In the revised treaty of 2007, Article 2 was replaced with: “In keeping with the abiding ties
of close friendship between Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan
and the Government of Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues
relating to their national interests. Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory
for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other.” The 2007 Treaty has
begun a new era in bilateral cooperation.

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• On June 21, 2012, during a meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations Rio+ 20
conference, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigmi Y. Thinley for
the first time.
• In June-July 2013 LPG and Kerosene subsidy withdrawal by India marked a brief episode of
acrimony in the relationship.
2.2. Recent Dynamics

• It was the first country visited by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014.
• King of Bhutan, Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuk, visited India in November 2017.
• Prime Minister of Bhutan Tshering Tobgay visited India in February 2018.
• Bhutan opened consulate office on 2 February 2018, in Guwahati, Assam.
2.3. Hydropower
• Extensive cooperation in the field of development extends to the mutually beneficial sector
of hydropower.
• Three Hydropower projects developed with Indian assistance are 1020 MW Tala
Hydroelectric Project, 336 MW Chukha Hydroelectric Project, 60 MW Kurichhu
Hydroelectric Project.
• Ten more projects have been agreed to. Of these three are already under construction –
Punatsangchhu-I Hydro Electric Project, Punatsangchhu–II and Mangedechhu HEPs.
• The Union Cabinet has approved the signing of an Inter Government Agreement (IGA) on
four JV-mode HEPs (Kholongchu, Wangchhu, Bunakha and Chamkharchhu) with Bhutan,
and 15% GOI funding (DGPC’s equity) for the 600 MW Kholongchhu HEP.
• Both countries have set a goal of goal of 10,000MW in hydropower by 2020
2.4. Economic Development

• India continues to be the largest trade and development partner of Bhutan.
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• Planned development efforts in Bhutan began in the early 1960s. The First Five Year Plan
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(FYP) of Bhutan was launched in 1961. Since then, India has been extending financial
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assistance to Bhutan’s FYPs.

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Standby Credit Facility: GoI extended a standby credit facility of Rs 1000 crores to RGoB to
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help Bhutan overcome the rupee liquidity crunch. This Credit Facility was provided at a
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concessional interest rate of 5% per annum. It is valid for 5 years.

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• The new free trade agreement is in force since 29 July 2017, provides for a free trade
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regime between the territories of India and Bhutan. The agreement also provides for duty-
free transit of Bhutanese merchandise for trade with third countries.
2.5. Security
• President Ram Nath Kovind, in 2017, termed the security of India and Bhutan is
“indivisible and mutual”-
• The Eastern Army Command and the Eastern Air Command both have integrated
protection of Bhutan into their role.
• The Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT), headed by a Major General, plays a critical
role in training Bhutanese security personnel.
• Recent incidents in the Doklam area underlined the significance of security cooperation
between the two countries.
• Both Countries maintain high level coordination on security issues. In this context the
foreign Secretary, National Security Advisor and Army Chief visited Thimphu in February
2018.

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2.5.1. Incidents in Doklam Area 2017- India-Bhutan-China:

Map 2.5: India-Bhutan-China
Source:
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article12665125.ece/alternates/FREE_660/India%20Bhutan%2
0China
• Lacking any treaty describing the boundary, Bhutan and China continue negotiations to
establish a common boundary alignment to resolve territorial disputes arising from
substantial cartographic discrepancies, the most contentious of which lie in Bhutan's west
along Chumbi salient.
• The incidents in Doklam area in 2017, involving Indian armed forces confronting the
Chinese, to prevent unilateral changes in the tri-junction border area, marked the
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example of close security cooperation between India and Bhutan based on the treaty of
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friendship between the two countries.

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2.6. Concerns
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As of July 2017, Bhutan’s debt to India for the three major ongoing projects: Mangdechhu,
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Punatsangchhu 1 and 2 is approximately ₹12,300 crores which accounts for 77% of the
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country’s total debt, and is 87% of its GDP.

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•
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While the cost of the 720 MW Mangdechhu project has nearly doubled in the past two
years of construction, both Punatsangchhu 1 and 2, each of 1200 MW have trebled in cost
and been delayed more than five years over the original completion schedule.
• Meanwhile, the interest repayment on projects that are being financed by India as 30%
grant and 70% loan at 10% annual interest is piling up.
• The demarcation of boundaries of Bhutan with China under the1988 and 1998
agreements remain process in waiting. This has security implications for India and requires
a new formulation.

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3. India and Nepal

Map 2.6: Nepal
Image Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/np.html
3.1. Background
• As close neighbours, India and Nepal share a unique relationship of friendship and
cooperation characterized by open borders and deep-rooted people-to-people contacts of
kinship and culture.
•
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Nepal has an area of 147,181 sq. kms. and a population of 29 million. It shares a border of
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over 1850 kms in the east, south and west with five Indian States – Sikkim, West Bengal,
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Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand – and in the north with the Tibet Autonomous Region
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of the People's Republic of China

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• The India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 forms the bedrock of the special
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relations that exist between India and Nepal.

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Under the provisions of this Treaty, the Nepalese citizens have enjoyed unparalleled
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national treatment in India, availing facilities and opportunities at par with Indian
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citizens. Nearly 6 million Nepali citizens live and work in India. Around 6,00,000 Indians are
living/domiciled in Nepal.
3.2. The Evolution of Democratic Process in Nepal

• In 1951, the Nepali Monarch, King Tribhuwan, ended the century-old system of rule by
hereditary Prime Ministers (the Ranas) and instituted a cabinet system that brought
political parties into the government.
• In December 1960, the then King Mahendra suspended the constitution, dissolved the
elected parliament and dismissed the cabinet. He instituted a Panchayat system-
hierarchical system of village, district and national councils.
• In 1990 pro-democracy agitation co-ordinated by Nepali Congress Party(NCP) and leftist
groups erupted. Street protests were suppressed by security forces resulting in deaths and
mass arrests. King Birendra eventually bows to pressure and agrees to new democratic
constitution.
• 1991 - NCP won first democratic elections. Girija Prasad Koirala becomes prime minister.

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• The Maoist revolt began in 1995, it dragged on for more than a decade and resulted in the
death of thousands. Among other things, the rebels wanted the monarchy to be abolished.
• The Royal Family Massacre: On 1 June 2001 - Crown Prince Dipendra killed King Birendra,
Queen Aishwarya and several members of the royal family, before shooting himself. The
king's brother, Gyanendra was crowned king.
• 2005 February - King Gyanendra dismisses the government, restores an absolute monarchy
and declares a state of emergency, citing the need to defeat Maoist rebels.
• 2005 November - Maoist rebels and Seven Party Alliance (SPA) of parliamentary parties
agreed on a programme intended to restore democracy.
• 2006 April - King Gyanendra agreed to reinstate the parliament following weeks of violent
strikes and protests against direct royal rule as part of the Loktantra Movement.
• 2006 May - Parliament voted unanimously to curb the king's political powers. The
government holds peace talks with the Maoist rebels.
• Peace deal. In November 2006- The government signed a peace deal with the Maoists. The
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) - formally ended the decade-long insurgency.
• 2007 January - Maoist leaders entered parliament under the terms of a temporary
constitution. In April the Maoists joined an interim government, a move which brought
them into the political mainstream. Later, Maoists quit the interim government, demanding
the abolition of the monarchy.
• End of monarchy: In December 2007 - Parliament approved the abolition of monarchy as
part of peace deal with Maoists, who agree to rejoin government.
• Elections to New Constituent Assembly: In April 2008 - Former Maoist rebels won the
largest bloc of seats in elections to the new Constituent Assembly (CA), but failed to achieve
an outright majority. 2008 May - Nepal became a republic.
• 2008 June - Maoist ministers resigned from the cabinet in a row over who should be the
next head of state. In July2008 - Ram Baran Yadav becomes Nepal's first president.
• 2008 August - Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda formed coalition
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government, with Nepali Congress going into opposition. Later the same year Maoists left
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the government
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2009 May - Prime Minister Prachanda resigned following a row with President Yadav over
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the integration of former rebel fighters into the military and impasse over constitution
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continued.
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• 2010 May - The Constituent Assembly (CA) voted to extend the deadline for drafting the
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constitution, the first of four extensions.

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• 2012 May - The Constituent Assembly (CA) is dissolved after failing to produce a draft
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constitution.
• Second Constituent Assembly: In November 2018 - The Communist Party of Nepal (UML)
and Nepali Congress shared the win in the second Constituent Assembly elections, pushing
the former ruling Maoists into third place and leaving no party with a majority.
• 2014 February -Nepali Congress leader Sushil Koirala was elected prime minister after
securing parliamentary support.
• 2014 November - Nepal and India sign a deal to build a $1bn hydropower plant on Nepal's
Arun river to counter crippling energy shortages.
3.2.1. After 2015
• Earthquake: In April 2015 - A 7.8-magnitude earthquake struck Kathmandu and its
surrounding areas killing more than 8,000 people, causing mass devastation and leaving
millions homeless.
• Donors Conference: At an international Donor’s conference in July 2015 in Nepal, India
pledged 1 billion US$ in support of the reconstruction efforts. China was the Second

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largest donor with over 480 million US$

• Landmark constitution: in September 2015 Nepal adopted a landmark constitution, which
defined Nepal as a secular country, despite calls to delay voting after more than 40 people
are killed in protests in Madhesi dominated Terai region.
• This period also saw downturn in India Nepal relations based on blockade on the
movement of goods from India to Nepal due to violence in the bordering areas
dominated by the Madhesis.
• 2015 October - K.P. Sharma Oli becomes the first prime minister to be elected under the
new constitution.
• 2016 February - Government lifts fuel rationing after the ethnic minority Madhesi
communities, partially backed by India, end a six-month border blockade in protest over
the new constitution which they say is discriminatory.
• 2016 July - Maoist party pulled out of the governing coalition. Prime Minister K.P. Sharma
Oli resigns ahead of a no-confidence vote in parliament.
• 2016 August - Parliament elects former communist rebel leader and Maoist party leader
Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda as prime minister for the second time. In 2016, China
and Nepal hold their first ever joint military exercise.
• 2017 June - Pushpa Kamal Dahal was replaced as prime minister by the Congress leader
Sher Bahadur Deuba under a rotation agreement.
3.2.2. Elections
• In December 2017, Nepal held Parliamentary Elections. The Lower House, House of
Representatives (Pratindihi Sabha), comprises of 275 seats, out of which 165 are elected
on the FPTP system and 110 through the proportional representation system.
• Elections for Upper house, National Assembly (Rashtiriya Sabha,) were held in February
2018, it has 59 members.
• The victory of left alliance including the Communist Party of Nepal and the Maoist Party
ensured swearing in of K.P. Oli as the new Prime Minister.
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It is apparent that the Mr. Oli has a clear tilt towards China, this perhaps adds to
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challenges in India Nepal Relations.

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3.3. Recent Visits

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In 2014, Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi visited Nepal twice – in August for a bilateral
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visit and in November for the SAARC Summit – during which several bilateral agreements
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were signed.
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• The Nepalese Prime Minister, Mr. K.P. Oli, was on a State visit to India from 19 to 24
February 2016. During his visit several bilateral agreements were signed.
• Nepalese Prime Minister, Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ paid a state visit to India
from 15-18 September 2016.
• Shri Pranab Mukherjee, Hon’ble President of India paid a state visit from 2-4 November,
2016
• Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba Visited New Delhi in 2017.
• Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj visited Nepal in February 2018
• Prime Minister K.P. Oli made his first state visit to India in April 2018, this marks the
occasion for both sides to take the relationship forward
3.4. Security
• India has played a leading role in helping the Nepalese Army (NA) in its modernization
through provision of equipment and training. About 250+ training slots are provided every
year for training of NA personnel in various Indian Army Training institutions.

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• The 10th Indo-Nepal Army Battalion level Joint Exercise was conducted at Saljhandi (Nepal)
from 31 October to 13 November 2016. The 11th Indo-Nepal Army Battalion level Joint
Exercise, Surya Kiran, was conducted at Pithoragarh (India) in March 2017.
• The Gorkha Regiment of the Indian Army is raised partly by recruitment from hill districts
of Nepal. Currently, about 32,000 Gorkha Soldiers from Nepal are serving in the Indian
Army.
3.5. Water Resources

• Cooperation in Water Resources primarily concerning the common rivers is one of the
most important areas of our bilateral relations and has immense potential.
• It is estimated that around 250 small and large rivers flow from Nepal to India and
constitute an important part of the Ganges river basins.
• These rivers have the potential to become major sources of irrigation and power for Nepal
and India, but without planning, are a source of devastating floods in Nepal’s Terai region,
and the Indian States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.
• A three–tier bilateral mechanism established in 2008, to discuss issues relating to
cooperation in water resources and hydropower between the two countries, has been
working well.
• In November 2014 Nepal and India sign a deal to build a $1bn hydropower plant on
Nepal's Arun river to counter crippling energy shortages.
• The Commencement of Work on the Pancheshwar Multipurpose project on Mahakali
river in 2017 is expected to provide impetus to water resource cooperation between India
and Nepal.
3.6. Power
• India and Nepal have a Power Exchange Agreement since 1971 for meeting the power
requirements in the border areas of the two countries, taking advantage of each other's
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transmission infrastructure.
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• There are more than twenty 132 KV, 33 KV and 11 KV transmission interconnections
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which are used both for power exchange in the bordering areas and for power trade. For
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enhanced transmission of electricity, short term augmentation of the existing grid has been
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completed.
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• Under mid–term augmentation, with grant assistance from GoI, 132 KV Kataiya–Kushaha
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and 132 KV Raxaul–Parwanipur transmission lines are being operationalized.

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For long–term augmentation of the cross–border grid infrastructure, with a funding of US$
13.2 million (from GoI’s US$ 100 Million LoC), the construction of a 400 KV Muzzafarpur–
Dhalkebar transmission line is in progress.
• On completion, the Muzzafarpur–Dhalkebar transmission line would allow import of up to
1000 MW of power by Nepal from India and also export from Nepal to India.
• At present, the total supply of electricity to Nepal from India is about 400 MW.
• An Agreement on ‘Electric Power Trade, Cross-border Transmission Interconnection and
Grid Connectivity’ between India and Nepal was signed on 21 October 2014.
3.7. Trade
• Since 1996, Nepal’s exports to India have grown more than eleven times and bilateral
trade more than seven times; the bilateral trade that was 29.8% of total external trade of
Nepal in year 1995-96 has reached 61.2% in 2015-16.
• The bilateral trade grew from IRs. 1,755 crores in 1995-96 to IRs.32294Crores (US$ 4.8
billion) in 2015-16.

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• Indian firms are the biggest investors in Nepal, accounting for about 40% of the total
approved foreign direct investments. There are about 150 Indian ventures operating in
Nepal. They are engaged in manufacturing, services (banking, insurance, dry port,
education and telecom), power sector and tourism industries. Some large Indian investors
include ITC, Dabur India, Hindustan Unilever, VSNL, TCIL, MTNL, State Bank of India, Punjab
National Bank, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Asian Paints, CONCOR, GMR India etc.
• The Union Budget 2018 increased the funding allocation of Nepal from 375 crores to 650
crores
• India accounts for 2/3rd of Nepals trade in Merchandise, 1/3rd in Services and 46% of FDIs.
Almost 100 percent petroleum supplies to Nepal are from India.
• India’s FDI in Nepa till May 2017 stood at 5159.86 crores.
• 98 per cent of Nepal’s third country trade goes through India and to the port of Kolkata.
• In February 2016 India agreed on giving dedicated access to Nepal to the port of Vizag.
3.8. Connectivity
• The Augmentation of Jayanagar-Janakpur Railway line is in Progress between the two
countries. Originally built during the British rule this line was functional till 2014, when it
was closed for up gradation.
• In 2017 India has also proposed a direct rail link to Kathmandu from Delhi & Kolkata.
• Currently India and Nepal are connected by a directed bus service launched in 2014.
• Both the countries are signatories to the BBIN Motor Vehicle Agreement as part of sub
regional-connectivity efforts.
3.9. Border Dispute

• Delineation of boundary between India and Nepal is subject to the resolution over the
territorial dispute on Susta and Kalapani areas.
• The Kalapani row is over a 35 square km disputed area where the border is marked by the
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river Mahakali.
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• The changing course of the Gandak river, known as Narayani in Nepal, has caused
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controversy around Susta. Gandak forms the international boundary between Nepal and
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India.
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• A British era agreement, known as the Treaty of Sugauli (1816), led to the demarcation of
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the international boundary between India and Nepal. Another Supplementary Boundary
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Treaty was signed in December 1816 to settle the border dispute.

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• In 1981, a Joint Technical Level Nepal-India Boundary Committee was set up, which after
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years of surveying and deliberations delineated 98% of the India-Nepal border on 182 strip
maps. But, Susta was not part of this delineation.
• In 2007, these strip maps were presented to both countries for ratification.
• Nepal refused to sign the documents without resolving the Susta and Kalapani disputes
India, too, did not endorse the maps.
3.9.1. Challenges
• Political transition in Nepal: Constitutional process and ethnic linkages invoving Madhesis,
Tharus and janajatis pose a key challenge to the future of the bilateral relations.
• Cooperation in developing water resources: Nepal has 43,000 MWs hydropower potential
that is known to be technically feasible and economically viable. However, major projects
have not taken-off due to considerations outside the realm of economics. Ironically, India is
a net exporter of power to Nepal. Over the years differences over over the 1954 Kosi
Agreement and the 1959 Gandak Agreement, have become cause of resentment in. Three
large projects namely — Saptakosi with 5,000MW, Karnali-Chisapani with 11,000MW, and

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Pancheshwar with 6,500MW — have been stuck for 30 years. 27 survey licenses were
granted to India comapnies, but none of them is in the construction phase.
• The China Factor: China has showed renewed interest in Nepal following the constitutional
logjam, the earthquake in 2015 and the blockade on the Indo-Nepal borders in the same
year. Changing political leadership inn Nepal has shown inclination to use the China factor
vis-a-vis India.
• In 2012, Nepal approved a $1.8 billion contract to China for the West Seti Hydropower
Project.
• In November 2017 in a decision which could have far reaching consequences in the region
and for China, Nepal cancelled the Budhi Gandaki hydropower project which had been
contracted to a Chinese company Chinese company.
• In January 2018 China began providing broadband connectivity to Nepal which had been an
Indian monopoly hitherto.
• According to a World Bank report, Nepal needs to invest up to $18 million in infrastructure
projects by 2020 to remove binding constraints to economic growth.
4. The BBIN Framework

• In eastern sub-region comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN), the four
South Asian nations signed the BBIN Agreement in Thimphu and it was seen as a significant
symbol of sub-regional unity.
• The BBIN initiative, for the time being, operates through inter-governmental Joint Working
Groups (JWG) comprising senior officials of respective governments, under the aegis of
their respective Foreign Affairs ministries but drawing in representatives of other concerned
ministries/agencies of the government.
• Two such JWGs were set up, one on Trade, Connectivity and Transit, the other on Water
Resources Management, and Power/hydropower trade and Grid Connectivity.
4.1. Vision of BBIN

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• BBIN vision for the sub-region rests on Four pillars

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o Trade, connectivity and transit.

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o Investment in power generation and water management sectors.

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o Cooperation in energy area, in power trade and converting national grids into a sub-
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regional grid.
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o Contact between the peoples of the region.

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4.2. Potential
• Once implemented thoroughly, they have the potential to increase India’s-regional trade
within South Asia by almost 60% and with the rest of the world by over 30%.
• This would be a visible advantage for South Asia with transport corridors transformed into
economic corridors.
• The BBIN Agreement signals that relations which were earlier characterized by trust-
deficit among countries are now decisively moving towards a national political consensus
for cooperation among the neighbours.
4.2.1. Recent Developments
• India proposed a SAARC Motor Vehicle Agreement during the SAARC Summit in
Kathmandu in November 2014. Due to objections from Pakistan, an agreement could not
be reached.
• India instead pursued a similar motor vehicle agreement with the BBIN. The Bangladesh-
Bhutan-India-Nepal Motor Vehicles Agreement was signed on 15 June 2015.

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• However, in 2017 Bhutan backed out from joining this agreement asking the other
countries to continue with operationalisation.
• India approved $1.08 Billion for construction and upgradation of 558 km long roads that
join Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal.
• The project will receive 50% funding from Asian Development Bank. The project is
scheduled to be completed by 2018.
5. India-Sri Lanka
5.1. The Background
• As Ceylon, it became independent in 1948; its name was changed to Sri Lanka in 1972.
• Ethnic issues-Sri Lanka comprises of various ethnic groups- Sinhalese 74.9%, Sri Lankan
Tamil 11.2%, Sri Lankan Moors or Muslims 9.2%, Indian Tamil 4.2%, other 0.5%
• Tamils were disenfranchised in 1949. The 1956 Sinhala Only Act further institutionalised
the discrimination.
• Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was formed in 1976 and it was involved in an armed
conflict with Sri Lankan armed forces from 1983 to 2009.
Map 2.7: Sri Lanka
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Map Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ce.html

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• In 1987 India-Sri Lanka Agreement signed between Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and
President J.R. Jayewardene sought to end the civil war in the island nation.
• This agreement envisaged the creation of provincial councils with autonomy enabled by
the 13th amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution.
• Also under the agreement, Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was sent to Sri Lanka's
Northern and Eastern provinces, to “guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities”
between the Tamil separatist groups and the government.
• However, the situation turned into a military confrontation between the IPKF and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which refused to disarm and join the political
mainstream.
• The IPKF-LTTE conflict that began on October 10, 1987, and lasted till 1990 saw the death of
over 1,200 Indian soldiers and 660 LTTE cadres.
• The assassination of former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 further changed India’s
attitude towards the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka
• Civil War in Sri Lanka ended through military operation in 2009.

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5.2. Evolution of India Sri Lanka Relations

• The relationship between India and Sri Lanka is more than 2,500 years old and both sides
have built upon a legacy of intellectual, cultural, religious and linguistic interaction.
• India and Sri Lanka commemorated the 2600th year of the attainment of enlightenment
by Lord Buddha (Sambuddhatva Jayanthi) through joint activities. These included the
exposition of Sacred Kapilavastu Relics in Sri Lanka that took place in August - September
2012.
• A Maritime agreement was signed by India and Sri Lanka in 1974. Where in India handed
over the uninhabited Kacchateevu.
• Signed in 1999, the India-Sri Lanka FTA entered into force in 2000
• 2009, 2012 and 2013 India votes in favour of resolutions asking for probe in Sri Lanka’s
war against the LTTE at the Human Rights Council.
• Change of governments in India in 2014 and Sri Lanka in 2015 provided an opportunity for
fresh engagement.
• A Civil Nuclear Agreement was signed between the two countries in 2015.
5.2.1. Recent Visits
• Prime Minister Modi was the Chief Guest at the International Vesak day Celebrations in
Colombo in May 2017. It is PMs second trip to Sri Lanka since March 2015.
• Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe visitied India in April 2017, his third visit to
the capital since January 2015.
• India’s Sri Lanka policy, following the defeat of Mahinda Rajapaksa, has been centred on
economic cooperation and security concerns, and far less on political matters.
5.3 Ethnic Issue

The nearly three-decade long armed conflict between Sri Lankan forces and the LTTE came to
an end in May 2009. During the course of the conflict, India supported the right of the
Government of Sri Lanka to act against terrorist forces. At the same time, it also conveyed its
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deep concern at the plight of the mostly Tamil civilian population, emphasizing that their
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rights and welfare should not get enmeshed in hostilities against the LTTE. In this context India
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has undertaken the following efforts.

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• India supported the 13th Amendment which involves autonomy to provinces and rights of
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the Tamil minorities

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• India is involved in the resettlement and rehabilitation efforts in the Northern and Eastern
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provinces of Sri Lanka with Tamil Population

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• The need for national reconciliation through a political settlement of the ethnic issue has
been reiterated by India at the highest levels. India's consistent position is in favour of a
negotiated political settlement, which is acceptable to all communities within the
framework of a united Sri Lanka and which is consistent with democracy, pluralism and
respect for human rights.
• Domestically, sensitivity on ethnic ties continues to be evident in Tamil Nadu, e.g. the
fishermen issue.
5.3.1. Fishermen Issue
• Both Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen have been fishing into Palk Bay area for centuries.
Problem emerged only after a maritime agreement was signed by India and Sri Lanka in
1974. In fact, initially the 1974 border agreement did not affect fishing on either sides of
the border.
• In 1976, through an exchange of letter, both India and Sri Lanka agreed to stop fishing in
each other’s waters. However, the agreement could not stop the fishermen from fishing in
these waters, as fishermen know no boundary.

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• Both India and Sri Lankan fishermen have been known for entering into each other’s
waters.
• However, cases of arrest of Sri Lankan fishermen by Indian authorities are comparatively
less since they mostly fish in the high seas by using multi-day crafts.
• On the other hand, due to the dearth of multi-day fishing capability, Indian fishermen
cannot shift their fishing effort from the Palk Bay area to the offshore areas of the Indian
waters or way beyond the continental shelf.
• Therefore, Indian fishermen have no other option but to fish into the Sri Lankan waters.
While for the Sri Lankan authorities protecting their maritime boundary is important, for
the Indian fishermen the priority is of securing their livelihood.
• In early 2017 India raised at the highest level the killing of an Indian fisherman near
Katchatheevu islet in Palk Straits by the Sri Lankan navy. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister
Palaniswami wrote to Prime Minister Narendra Modi seeking the release of 85 fishermen
and their 128 boats under Sri Lankan custody.
• On the other hand Sri Lankan Fishermen too have been concerned about increasing
trawling activities from Indian boats in the region.
• The two countries set up a Joint Working Group in November 2016, and India has assured
Sri Lanka to phase out bottom trawling.
Map 2.8: Katchatheevu
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Source:
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http://images.tribuneindia.com/cms/gall_content/2017/3/2017_3$largeimg08_Wednesday_2017_02304
8576.jpg

• Sri Lanka is one of the largest trading partners of India in South Asia.
• India in turn is Sri Lanka's largest trade partner globally.
• Trade between the two countries grew particularly rapidly after the entry into force of the
India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement in March 2000.
• Bilateral trade in 2015 amounted to US $ 4.7 billion. Exports from India to Sri Lanka in 2015
were US$ 4.1 billion (up by 2.1%), while exports from Sri Lanka to India were US$ 645
million (up by 3.2%) (MEA December 2016).
• According to Sri Lankan Customs, bilateral trade in 2016 amounted to US $ 4.38 billion.
Exports from India to Sri Lanka in 2016 were US$ 3.83 billion, while exports from Sri Lanka
to India were US$ 551 million.
• India is among the top four investors in Sri Lanka with cumulative investments of over
US$ 1 billion since 2003.

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5.4.1. Development Cooperation

• The conclusion of the armed conflict saw the emergence of a major humanitarian
challenge, with nearly 300,000 Tamil civilians housed in camps for Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs). The Government of India put in place a robust programme of assistance to
help the IDPs return to normal life as quickly as possible. This included:
o construction of 50,000 housing units,
o rehabilitation of the Northern Railway lines,
o wreck-removal and rehabilitation of the KKS Harbour,
o establishment of Vocational Training Centres,
o construction of a Cultural Centre at Jaffna, restoration of Thiruketheeswaram
Temple,
o establishing an Agricultural Research Institute in the Northern Province
• Sri Lanka is one of the major recipients of development credit given by the Government
of India, with total commitment of US$2.6 billion, including US$ 436 million as grants.
o A line of credit of $800 million for track laying and supply of rolling stock to support
construction railway lines in Northern Sri Lanka is already operational.
o In October 2014 the Pallai-Jaffna reconstructed railway track and signal system was
inaugurated thereby reconnecting Jaffna to Colombo by rail.
o Emergency Ambulance Service was launched in Sri Lanka on 28th July 2016 under
Indian Grant Assistance of US $ 7.55 million. The project involves deployment of 88
ambulances Western and Southern provinces, setting up of an Emergency Response
Center and first year of operations.
o Under another line of credit of $167.4 million, the tsunami-damaged Colombo-Matara
rail link has been repaired and upgraded.
5.5. The China Factor

• During the Mahinda Rajpaksha tenure(2005-2015) Tilt towards China was evident. This era
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saw projects such as the Hamabntota port and Colombo port City granted to the Chinese.
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• The construction of the Hambantota port was completed and operations began in 2010. It
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was part of a slew of mega infrastructure projects launched by then Sri Lankan president
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Mahinda Rajapaksa, whose family hailed from the coastal city of Hambantota. All of them
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were funded by Chinese loans, which stoked apprehension in New Delhi about the
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• During the Current government: The Hambantota port has been handed over to China on
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99 year lease as part of a debt for equity swap.
• In May 2017, Sri Lanka had rejected Chinese request to dock a submarine on its
port. However, in [previous years sightings of Chinese submarine on the Sri Lankan coast
has been reported multiple times.
• Sri Lanka is also a keen supporter of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)of China.
• Sri Lanka’s estimated national debt is $64.9 billion, of which $8 billion is owed to China—
this can be attributed to the high interest rate on Chinese loans. For the Hambantota port
project, Sri Lanka borrowed $301 million from China with an interest rate of 6.3%, while the
interest rates on soft loans from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank are only
0.25–3%. Interest rates of India’s line of credit to the neighboring countries are as low as
1%, or even less in some cases.
5.5.1. India Interest
• The Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport (MRIA) in Hambantota, 250 km south from
Colombo, was built with with Chinese assistance of $190 million, more than 90 per cent of

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the total cost. Today, MRIA is running into losses and Sri Lanka is unable to pay back dues to
China’s EXIM Bank. Ironically, Sri Lanka may now hand over the airport to India so that it can
repay the Chinese loan. India is in advanced talks with Sri Lanka to operate the airport.
• India is also interested in developing container facilities at the Colombo Port and
developing the Trincomalee harbour
• The RBI initiative- Sri Lanka’s location is strategic for India’s maritime security, and China’s
RBI – Maritime Silk Route. India is strongly asserting against China which is trying to build
strategic assets in the garb of infrastructure projects all around India. India has conveyed
to Sri Lanka its conerns about security and Sri Lanka has assured of not allowing anything
against India’s security interests. In the context of the Hamabntota port India hopes that
the security assurances inserted in the concession agreement would be scrupulously
upheld in the future.
6. India-Maldives
Map2.9: Maldives
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Image Source: https://www.mapsofindia.com/neighbouring-countries-maps/maps/india-

maldives.jpg
6.1. Background
• An archipelago of 1,200 coral islands, spanning roughly 115 square miles, Maldives is Asia's
smallest nation, both by area and population.
• India was among the first to recognise Maldives after its independence in 1965 and to
establish diplomatic relations with the country.
• India established its mission at Malé in 1972.

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• Indian Army's 'Operation Cactus' foiled a coup in Maldives that was attempted by a pro-
Eelam group in 1988.
• Indian Coast Guard's Dornier was the first to land at the Ibrahim Nasir Airport with relief
and supplies after the tsunami of December 26, 2004.
• India maintains a naval presence in Maldives, at the request of the Maldives, since 2009.
• On December 5, 2014, India dispatched “water aid” to the Maldivian capital of Male, after
a fire destroyed the generator of its biggest water treatment plant.
• The first-ever presidential elections under a multi-candidate, multi-party system were
held in October 2008 only to be removed in 2012 and replaced by Abdulla Yameen Abdul
Gayoom in a 2013 election.
• Abdulla Yameen has sought to weaken democratic institutions, jail his political
opponents, restrict the press, and exert control over the judiciary to strengthen his hold
on power and limit dissent.
• The democratic turmoil caused the cancellation of Indian Prime Ministers Visit to the
island nation in 2015.
• President Yameen visited India in April 2016.
• In 2018 the proclamation of emergency by President Yameen further stirred the situation
in the island country
6.2. Security
• The location of Maldives in the Indian ocean makes it important from the perspective of
maritime security. It is situated in a mid-way between Strait of Malacca and Suez, which
are the world’s busiest trade routes and thousands of cargoes pass through these trade
routes.
• At the same time, as Kerala and Lakshadweep are in close proximity to the Maldivian
islands, there are always India’s concerns about the possible use of Maldives’ territory
against it.
•
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Maldives also occupies a special place in India’s foreign policy priority list because of
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increasing cases of piracy in the Indian Ocean near Somalia and Strait of Malacca, which
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has made the position of Maldives very important for establishing Naval bases for
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security in the Indian Ocean.

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• The Trilateral Maritime Security Co-operation Initiative was launched by India, Sri Lanka
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and Maldives in October 2011 at Male during the first National Security Adviser (NSA) level
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meeting on the subject. This initiative involved the three littoral states to enhance
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maritime security in the neighborhood. There were two subsequent meetings in 2013 and
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2014.
• In 2014 it was decided that next meeting would be held in Maldives. However, it remains to
be held.
• Prime Minister Modi was also scheduled to visit Maldives as part of his visit to the other
three Indian Ocean countries that took place in March 2015, but it was cancelled at the last
moment due to internal political developments in the Maldives.
• India has espoused SAGAR – Security and Growth for all in the Region – vision for the
Indian ocean
• Indo-Maldivian Action Plan for defence that was concluded in 2016, The Action Plan
envisages an institutional mechanism at the level of the Defence Secretaries to further
bilateral defence cooperation, according to the Ministry of External Affairs. Development of
ports, continuous training, capacity building
• India has installed three Coastal Surveillance Radar Systems in Maldives and had plans to
setup 10 more such facilities. However, further movement on this front has been delayed
by recent events in Maldives.

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6.3. Economic and Development Cooperation

• India is a leading development partner and has established many of the leading
institutions of Maldives including the Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital (IGMH), Faculty of
Engineering Technology (FET) and Faculty of Hospitality & Tourism Studies (IMFFHTS).
• Currently, India has provided US $ 100 million Stand-by Credit facility (SCF) to Maldives,
including long-term loans and revolving credit for trade.
• Under new Line of Credit worth US$40 million offered by the Government of India to
Maldives, the Overseas Infrastructure Alliance (OIA) of India has been given a contract to
construct 485 housing units in Maldives.
• India and Maldives signed a trade agreement in 1981, which provides for export of
essential commodities. Growing from modest beginnings, India-Maldives bilateral trade
stood at Rs.700 crores (MEA, 2015).
6.4. Democratic Transition in Maldives

• Maumoon Abdul Gauoom served as the president of Maldives from 1978 to 2008.
• In 2008 under pressure from the civil society democratic reforms were initiated and a
new constitution was adopted
• Mohamed Nasheed was the first democratically-elected President of Maldives in 2008.
He was made to step down after a series of events that has been described in some
quarters as a coup in 2012.
• Ever since the Indian Ocean archipelago is witnessing political tussles.
• Nasheed had taken refuge at Indian High Commission once, fearing arrest under the regime
of his successor.
• In 2013 Abdulla Yameen was elected president in 2013
• Nasheed Was jailed for 13 years in 2015 on terrorism charges, his conviction was widely
condemned internationally. In 2016 Mohd. Nasheed received poltical asylum in the UK.
• In June 2016 opposition groups united to form the Maldives United Opposition, with a
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purpose of restoring democracy by removing Yameen.

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• In recent times, India has been largely silent on the major assault on democratic institutions
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and the Opposition in the archipelego nation, while most countries which have a stake in
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the region, including the US, UK, and the European Union, have condemned the Yameen
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Government's transgressions.
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• In February 2018 the Maldivian Supreme Court quashed the convictions of 9 opposition
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leaders including Mohd. Nasheed and ordered their release. The court also reinstated 12
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MPs disqualified by the election commission, this meant the United Oppositio would have
majority in the majlis or parliament with the power to impeach the president.
• President Yameen responded by declaring a state of emergency and ordering the arrest of
chief justice Abdulla Saeed and another judge. This forced the remaining three judges to
change court’s previous orders to release opposition leaders.
6.5. Recent Dynamics

• For China Maldives is a key link in its maritime silk road plan under the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI)
• In December 2017, Maldives Signed a Free Trade Agreement with China, while endorsing
its Maritime Silk Road project shunned by India for its strategic implications in the Indian
Ocean.Maldives’ strategy of achieving economic progress by making use of its geographic
advantages.
• In 2012 relations between India and Maldives came under a strain after Male had
terminated the agreement it entered into with GMR in 2010 for the modernisation of the

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Ibrahim Nasir International Airport. The airport was taken over by the Maldives Airports
Company Limited after legal tussle in which GMR challenged the government’s deceision.
Maldives government maintains the reason for cancellation of the project was because "the
contract was illegally awarded" by the then President Nasheed.
• The country's anti-graft watchdog has ruled out any corruption in the leasing of the
international airport to GMR. The airport expansion project was subsequently given to the
Chinese company, which will plough in US $ 800 million.
• GMR, meanwhile, won arbitration against the Maldives at Singapore based International
Arbitration Tribunal which awarded $270 million as compensation to the company.
• India is uneasy with Maldives's relationship with China. It is also believed that the new
law passed by Maldives, allowing absolute foreign ownership of land on the conditions
that interested parties would make a minimum investment of one billion dollar and reclaim
70 per cent land from the sea, will greatly benefit China in expanding its foothold in the
Indian Ocean.
• India’s concern is that China, with its strategic ally Pakistan, could use the Maldives as a
strategic choke point for India
• Country's former President Mohamed Nasheed has more than once even commented on
Maldives' 'pro-China' tilt.
6.5.1. Options for India
• In the crisis ensued, in February 2018, since the judicial verdict and followed by
announcements by President Yameen of emergency, there were calls for India to intervene.
Global and regional commentary on the issue has focused on what India's options are for
intervening in the Maldives.
• Former President Mohamed Nasheed, who is in exile in Sri Lanka, requested India to send
an envoy, backed by its military, to release the judges and political prisoners.
• India on its part displayed its dismay over the imposition and then extension of
emergency.
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• After the emergency was lifted on 22 2018, India welcomed it even while calling upon the
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Maldivian government to restore all Articles of the Constitution, to allow the Supreme
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Court and other branches of the judiciary to operate in full independence, to promote
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and support the free and proper functioning of Parliament, to implement the Supreme
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Court's Full Bench order of 1 February 2018 and to support a genuine political dialogue
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• As a neighbour whose security is closely intertwined with that of the Maldives, India
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wishes to see a stable, peaceful and prosperous Maldives that meets the aspiration of its
citizens.
• In this context the following aspects are key for understanding India’s position:
o International actors such as the EU and USA have echoed India’s position.
o Direct intervention though seemed attractive was ruled out for the time being unlike
in 1988, it is not the Maldivian government but opposition that has asked for
intervention. Also, it will further enhance ties between China and Maldives.
o Conventional wisdom and recent experience confirm that foreign-imposed regime
changes, overt or covert, are doomed to failure.
o Furthermore, hard action could also be ruled out as India could not be sure how a new
Government in Malé, after a regime change, will behave with regard to Indian
interests.
o New Delhi is wary of instability taking root in island nation where the radical Islamic
State (IS) has been making inroads.
• Maldives is a nascent democracy and is in the process of strengthening its institutions and
capacity building. In recent times also Maldives has professed an “India first” policy.

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• India should remain committed to assist the Government and people of Maldives in their
endeavours to build a stable, democratic, peaceful and prosperous country. India needs to
tread with extreme caution in this sensitive area because the developments, so far, in the
Maldives are a domestic issue and remain within the ambit of the nation's "internal
affairs".
• In this context, India should be actively engaged with all stakeholders in the reconciliation
process in the wake of recent developments, in order to ensure that they continue to take
the democratic process forward.
• Coordination with international community would add to India’s options.
• Now, it remains to be seen how India manages to keep China at a distance, reinforcing its
position of an ultimate security provider in the South Asia region. •As the strategic
competition between India and China in the Indian Ocean gathers pace, we must be
prepared to face such situations more frequently. We need to craft a creative and dynamic
strategy to counter them.
• As Admiral Arun Prakash has observed, certain fundamentals of geography and history are
key to remember here:
o From Male, the nearest Chinese port, Haikou (Hainan), is 2,700 miles as the crow flies
and 3,400 miles by sea. An aircraft would take 7-8 hours to cover this distance,
overflying three countries, and a ship would take 8-10 days to reach Male. Compare
this to the flying time.
o From India the flying time is just over an hour, and sailing time of a little over 24
hours to cover the 500 miles between Male and the nearest Indian port/airport of
Kochi.
• Indian Navy’s sterling performance in the 2004 tsunami relief effort is a reminder of how
close India is to Maldives both geographically and metaphorically.
7. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

(SAARC)
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Map2.9: SAARC countries

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Image Source:
http://media.economist.com/sites/default/files/cf_images/20051119/cas941.jpg

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7.1. Background
• South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was founded in Dhaka on 8
December 1985. Its secretariat is based in Kathmandu, Nepal.
• SAARC has eight members (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal,
Pakistan and Sri Lanka).
• These eight nations of South Asia constitute 3 per cent of the world’s area, but house 21
per cent of the global population. India, significantly, constitutes 70 per cent of SAARC’s
area and population.
• The organization promotes multilateral cooperation and regional integration. It launched
the South Asian Free Trade Area in 2006.
• SAARC also has nine Observers (Australia, China, European Union, Iran, Japan, Mauritius,
Myanmar, South Korea and USA). SAARC maintains permanent diplomatic relations at the
United Nations as an observer and has developed links with multilateral entities.
• 19th SAARC Summit, scheduled to take place in 2015 in Islamabad, was postponed due to
non participation of India and other countries owing to Pakistan's interference in the
domestic affairs of other countries.
7.2. The Organisation

• The Charter Bodies are the main mechanisms of SAARC. These include the Summit,
Council of Ministers, Standing Committee, Programming Committee, Technical
Committees and Action Committees.
• The Summit is the highest decision making authority in SAARC. These meetings are hosted
biennially by the Member States in rotation in alphabetical order. The Member State
hosting the Summit assumes the Chair of the Association until the next such meeting
hosted by another Member State.
• The key outcome of the SAARC Summit is the Declaration. It contains decisions and
directives of the Heads of State or Government to strengthen regional cooperation in the
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agreed areas.
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7.3. Evolution
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• The idea of SAARC itself was put on the table by Bangladeshi leader Ziaur Rehman in the
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late 1970’s and it was Bangladesh which had actually pushed forward the idea of SAARC at
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initial stages.
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• Dhaka pursued the idea of SAARC initially with a view to containing the “hegemony” of
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India in South Asia, a view fuelled by the structural asymmetry between India and its
smaller South Asian neighbors.
• India also on the other hand was not very enthusiastic about the idea of SAARC as it
believed that given the fact that its neighbors harboured too many apprehensions about it
and this will hamper the prospects of India at the organization, rather it will become a
platform for bashing India.
• Pakistan also was not very enthusiastic about SAARC since its inception as it knew that
SAARC would be dominated by India (due to its sheer size).
7.3.1. Factors Shaping the Agenda: Initial Phase
The initial phase gave shaped the functioning of SAARC future as seen in the following:
• No Bilateral Issues: From the very inception of SAARC as an idea, India insisted that it
would not agree to the use of any international forum for discussion of bilateral disputes
and would prefer to resolve them on a bilateral level only.
• Small countries Apprehensive on Trade: The smaller countries on the other hand were not

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interested in putting trade & commerce on the agenda of SAARC as they were
apprehensive that such a move will flood their market with Indian goods given the
relatively larger size of Indian economy.
• Non-Controversial issues only: The SAARC agenda has focus on nine non-controversial
areas of cooperation known as- “SAARC integrated programme of action” or “Regional
Program of action”. The nine areas were- Agriculture & Rural development, Transport &
Communication, Science & Technology, Culture, Health, Population control, Sports and
Arts.
7.3.2. The SAARC Agenda
• Regional Cooperation
• Regional Integration
• Multilaterlism
7.3.3. Principles of the SAARC Charter
• Keeping the apprehensions of both India and its smaller neighbours in mind, SAARC
developed a charter which would guides its functioning based on:
o Sovereign equality.
o Territorial integrity.
o Political independence.
o Non interference in domestic matters.
7.3.4. SAARC Regional Centres
Since 1989, a number of Regional Centres with specific mandates have been established to
strengthen and promote regional cooperation. The Regional Centres implement programme
activities and are expected to evolve into Centres of excellence in their respective areas.
• SAARC Agriculture Centre (SAC), Dhaka
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Established in 1989 with the mandate to provide timely, relevant and universal access to
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Member Countries to achieve their respective goals through networking agricultural

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knowledge and information systems by adopting the appropriate information and

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• SAARC Energy Centre (SEC), Islamabad

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Established in 2006 with the mandate to act as a catalyst for the economic growth and
development of South Asia region by initiating, coordinating and facilitating regional as well
as joint and collective activities on energy. SEC would provide technical inputs for the
SAARC Working Group (and other) meetings on Energy, and will facilitate accelerating the
integration of energy strategies within the region by providing relevant information, state-
of-the-art technology and expertise.
SAARC Cultural Centre (SCC), Colombo, Sri Lanka
This center was established in 2009 with the mandate to promote regional unity through
cultural integration and intercultural dialogue and contribute towards preservation,
conservation and protection of South Asia’s cultural heritage within the framework of the
SAARC Agenda for Culture.
• SAARC Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS Centre (STAC), Kathmandu
This center was established in 1992 with the mandate to prevent and control Tuberculosis
in the region by coordinating efforts of the National TB Programmes of Member States;

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exchange of information, research, capacity building and implement activities; collects,

collates, analyses and disseminates information on the latest developments and findings in
the field of tuberculosis in the region and elsewhere.
• SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC), Delhi, India
This Centre was re-established in November 2016 for expanded role by merging four
erstwhile SAARC Centres viz. (1) SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC – New Delhi,
India); (2) SAARC Meteorological Research Centre (SMRC – Dhaka, Bangladesh); (3) SAARC
Forestry Centre (SFC – Thimphu, Bhutan); (4) SAARC Coastal Zone Management Centre
(SCZMC – Male, Maldives) with the mandate to support Member States in their Disaster
Risk Reduction initiatives through application of Science & Technology, knowledge from
multiple disciplines, exchange of best practices, capacity development, collaborative
research and networking in line with the Global Priorities / Goals and other relevant
frameworks adopted by Member States.
7.4. Trade and Commerce: The SAARC Preferential Trade

Arrangement (SAPTA)
• The idea of including trade and commerce on the agenda of SAARC was first given a
concrete form in 1993 with the signing of (SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA)
signed in Dhaka on the 11th of April 1993 which provided for the adoption of various
instruments of trade liberalization on a preferential basis. Another aspect was SAARC’s
more economically developed countries agreed to assist the less developed countries in
the region. SAPTA was launched in 1995.
7.4.1. Lack of Progress in SAPTA
• However, SAPTA could not make any desired progress promotion of intra-regional trade.
• The volume of intra-regional trade increased only marginally. The list of concessions
offered under SAPTA included 3857 tariff lines but the major limitation was the actual
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trade coverage of preferential trade granted. The concessions granted by the countries
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were not substantial enough to increase the overall trade of the region.
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Moreover, considering the poor state of relation among the member states of SAARC,
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SAPTA continued to be a trade arrangement with very limited ambitions.

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SAPTA Suffered from the Following Drawbacks

1. No targets for tariff reduction were earmarked for individual countries.
2. Countries were meant to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers in a gradual manner with no
time limits.
3. Countries provided a positive list (rather than a negative list of items) which could be traded
under PTA.
7.5. South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA)

• Another attempt was made to strengthen the economic integration of SAARC members
with the implementation of the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in 2006.
• In 2004, SAARC summit at Islamabad SAFTA was signed and it was seen as an effort to give a
new lease of life to the idea of SAARC.
• SAFTA was operationalised from 2006 onwards & has the following features:

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o Member states will reduce tariff barriers in a time bound manner. Maximum tariff will
be in the range of 0-5%.
o Non LDC’s of SAARC (India, Pakistan, Srilanka) had a timeframe of 7 years to reduce
tariffs, while the LDC’s were provided a time frame of 10 years. As per SAFTA, South
Asia was to become a free trade zone by 2016.
o Instead of positive list, concept of sensitive list was introduced (sensitive list would
include items which would not be subjected to time bound commitment with regard to
tariff reduction). However, it was agreed upon that sensitive list would be revised
regularly with the objective of bringing reductions.
o A dispute resolution mechanism for tariff and non-tariff barriers related disputes was
agreed upon.
o A compensation clause was introduced- under SAFTA a compensation clause would be
introduced to make up for the loss of revenue of LDC’s as they maybe adversely
impacted initially by FTA. They are to be compensated with a development aid for a
limited period.
7.5.1. Steps to Strengthen SAFTA
At SAARC summit 2011- India has announced the removal of 46 textile items from India’s
negative list
(a) India has also removed all the 25 items on sensitive list for Least Developed Countries
(LDC’s) of SAARC.
(b) Steps have been taken to revive border hats at Meghalaya & Tripura border b/w India &
Bangladesh.
(c) India has given five South Asian partners duty free access to 99.7% of their goods
7.5.2. SAFTA: Key Challenges
However, SAFTA has continued to face certain challenges:
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1. The nature of relations between India & Pakistan will always remain a crucial factor for the
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2. FTA’s have greater chances of success when the economies are complimentary, whereas
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3. Absence of strong rail, road, air and port connectivity links between the various south
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7.5.3. Way Forward

In a context when less than 10% of the region's internal trade takes place under SAARC Free
Trade Area it is imperative to look for ways to make SAFTA work. In recent times Track 2
initiatives, in the context of SAARC, like the South Asian Forum have put forward following
recommendations-
3. Enhancing connectivity across borders.
4. Creation of a South Asian brand
5. Liberalized visa regime for businesses & freedom to invest across borders.
7.6. SAARC: Comparative Assessment
• As compared to other regional organizations SAARC is deemed to be an under performer.
• Least integrated Region: When compared to other regions at the global level, South Asia
is one of the least integrated regions of the world (as compared to Europe or South East
Asia), as also argued by the World Bank.

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• Political issues between member countries have constantly superseded SAARC’s

economic interests. The SAARC has not been able to significantly further economic
integration. Nor has it been able to enhance trade considerably.
• The volume of Intra SAARC stands at 5%, in contrast EU countries trade about 66% of their
goods and services in their region, NAFTA reaches 53%, while ASEAN reaches 25%.
• Ease of Movement: Under EU, European countries have established a common market
for goods, a common currency, also it provides visa free travel for countries which are
part of Schengen Agreement.
• Managing differences: ASEAN has moved forward to unify the region under what was
called the ‘ASEAN Way’ based on the ideals of non-interference, informality, minimal
institutionalisation, consultation and consensus, non-use of force and non-confrontation.
7.6.1. Sluggish Progress: Views from Within
• For the first time member countries at the Thimpu Summit in Bhutan, marking the 25 th
anniversary, in 2010 expressed their frustration with SAARC’s sluggish progress.
• The then Prime Minister of India Manmoha Singh expressed his disappointment by saying
that “the glass of regional cooperation, regional development and regional integration is
half empty” and emphasized that “the region must be better connected, empowered, fed
and educated” to achieve comparable success with other regional organizations.
• In 2014 PM Narendra Modi in his speech at the 18th SAARC Summit in Kathmandu
observed that “nowhere in the world are collective efforts more urgent than in South
Asia; and, nowhere else is it so modest.”
• He also observed that “Each of us (South Asian Countries) has taken our own initiatives.
However, as SAARC we have failed to move with the speed that our people expect and
want”.
• In the inaugural conference of the SAARC in 1985, poverty eradication and improving the
living standards through mutual cooperation were the main themes. However, SAARC has
clearly not been able to achieve tangible outcomes on these fronts.
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7.7. Causes for the Limited Progress of SAARC

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Some of the major reasons for the limited progress on the part of SAARC to take off in any
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concrete manner has been due to-

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1. Origin of SAARC- since its inception, SAARC was seen as a tool by some countries to
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contain India, while India also harbored its own apprehensions that the organization may
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2. India- Pakistan relations: bilateral difficulties between two of the largest members of
SAARC have had casted a long shadow over the idea of SAARC. Other members of SAARC
have often argued that the SAARC grouping has been crippled/ has been held back because
of the fluctuating nature of their relationship. Moreover, Pakistan has never supported the
idea of strengthening SAARC as it fears that India will occupy centre stage within the
grouping.
3. The structural asymmetry between size of India & its South Asian neighbors provides a
fertile ground for apprehensions/insecurities to crop up between nations. In this context
the advocacy of inclusion of China as a member by Pakistan and now Nepal in recent
times is to be seen as an attempt to counter India’s role.
4. High level of trust deficit between South Asian nations- as a result of pending border
conflicts, water sharing conflicts etc between the members of the region.
5. Lack of Political Stability amongst member states of SAARC- almost all the SAARC states
have suffered from political instability over the past two decades and this further
complicates the efforts aimed at building sustainable partnerships between South Asian
states.

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6. Lack of Implementation: What bars SAARC from achieving the desired effectiveness or
speed is the lack of implementation of the agreements on the part of the member states.
7.7.1. Making SAARC Work
• A number of initiatives have been agreed upon by the member countries in the 16th SAARC
summit held at Thimpu in 2010 & 17th summit at Addu in 2011.
• Following steps have been suggested at the 16th summit-
o It was also realised that effective communication and public diplomacy is essential to
reach out to students, youth, private media, think tanks, civil society and institutions
for economic development. This would be important to popularize the concept of
regional cooperation and generate an interest among the people of the region on the
activities of SAARC. It would essentially build the image of the organization which many
consider as a dead horse.
o An ambitious vision has been adopted. For example: 2010-2020 has been declared
“Decade of Intra-regional Connectivity in SAARC” when member countries themselves
are hesitant to provide even bilateral connectivity.
o On the positive side, the SAARC Development Fund (SDF) was ratified and its
secretariat was inaugurated in Thimpu. It will finance regional and sub-regional
projects.
o India did put forward a proposal for developing a SAARC Market for Electricity trading
assumes importance as the region is reeling under power shortages.
• As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said, the challenge is “to translate institutions into
activities, conventions into programmes, official statements into popular sentiments.
Declarations at summits and official level meetings do not amount to regional cooperation
or integration.”
• Instead of taking up new areas in its summit declarations, SAARC should focus on trade,
connectivity and security and the need to develop a regional identity.
• In this context increasing people to people ties is paramount.
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• Only a regional identity will generate a regional approach and not the other way around.
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o Time line for rail, sea connectivity-has to be determined an implemented seriously

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o Need is to finalise a Regional Railways Agreement and complete the preparatory

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work on an Indian Ocean Cargo and Passenger Ferry Service. Timely completion of
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demonstration run of a Bangladesh- India-Nepal container train as envisaged in the

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Addu declaration needs to be taken up.

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o On the trade front, the emphasis has to be on effective implementation of the free
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trade pact, paring the sensitive lists, eliminating non-tariff barriers and harmonising
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standards and customs procedures.
7.8. India’s Contributions

India has made unilateral offers and contributions of:
• Offer of setting up a Special Purpose Facility to finance infrastructure projects in the
region and of business visa for 3-5 years for SAARC (At the 2014 Summit)
• upgradation of the SAARC Supra Reference Laboratory at Kathmandu,
• supplying vaccines for the children of South Asia,
• tele-medicine projects in Afghanistan, Bhutan and Nepal,
• launching of SAARC satellite in 2017,
• building of South Asian University, at new Delhi, at the cost of around USD 240 million
and
• voluntary contribution of US $ 100 million to the SAARC Development Fund.
It is expected these initiatives will increase mutual trust and confidence amongst citizens of
SAARC.

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7.9. Recent Developments within SAARC

• At the 18th Summit of SAARC in 2014, at Kathmandu, a SAARC Framework Agreement on
Energy Cooperation (electricity) was signed. The rationale for signing the SAARC electricity
trade agreement was the impending domestic energy crisis faced by individual member
countries. For instance, Pakistan is struggling to meet its rising energy demands. Under this
agreement:
o agreement is meant to be an overarching cooperative scheme that aims to address
broad issues such as the enabling of cross border trade in electricity, the development
of a common regulatory mechanism and the waiving of customs fees
• 18th summit decided to close down three regional centres, namely the SAARC
Documentation Centre (SDC) in New Delhi, SAARC Human Resource Development Centre
(SHRDC) in Islamabad and SAARC Information Centre (SIC) in Kathmandu and transfer their
mandates to the secretariat and other mechanisms.
• it also decided to merge four regional centres, namely the SAARC Coastal Zone
Management Centre (SCZMC), SAARC Meteorological Research Centre (SMRC), SAARC
Forestry Centre (SFC) and SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC), and create a new
centre named ‘SAARC Environment and Disaster Management Centre’ (SEDMC).
• Against the backdrop that only 18 summits could be held in the last 29 years - although the
SAARC Charter mandates the regional body to meet every year - this time the regional
leaders decided to hold the summit every two years.
• Two other agreements, the SAARC Motor Vehicles Agreement for the Regulation of
Passenger and Cargo Vehicular Traffic and the SAARC Regional Agreement on Railways
could to be signed at the 18th Summit due to last minute objections to them by Pakistan.
• The 19th summit scheduled to be hosted by Islamabad scheduled in November 2017 was
postponed after request from four nations- Afghanistan, Bhutan, Bangladesh and. This
was following escalation of tension between India and Pakistan owing to the issue of cross
border terrorism.
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7.10. Deadlock at SAARC: Options for Regional Cooperation in

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South Asia
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India’s decision to skip the South Asian summit in Islamabad in November 2016 was, in
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essence, about the deteriorating relationship with Pakistan. However, it also underlined the
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growing irrelevance of the SAARC for India’s regionalism. In this context search for
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alternatives to SAARC has acquired a new momentum. In this context SAARC minus one
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formulation refers to moving ahead in regional cooperation without Pakistan. examples are:
• The BBIN framework: A formulation involving sub-regional cooperation on connectivity,
trade and energy, people to people ties between Bhutan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal. The
BBIN, however, was very much part of the SAARC framework. The SAARC charter allows
two or more countries of the forum to embark on what is called ‘sub-regional cooperation’.
• The South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) program of Asian
Development Bank: this brings together Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Myanmar,
Nepal, and Sri Lanka in a project-based partnership that aims to promote regional
prosperity, improve economic opportunities, and build a better quality of life for the people
of the subregion. In 2016, the SASEC countries approved the SASEC Operational Plan 2016-
2025, a 10-year strategic roadmap, which introduced Economic Corridor Development as a
sectoral area of focus. Since 2001, SASEC countries have implemented 49 regional projects
worth over $10.74 billion in the energy, economic corridor development, transport, trade
facilitation, and information and communications technology sectors.
• Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC):
dates back to 1997, the forum that brings five South Asian countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan,

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India, Nepal and Sri Lanka) together with two south east Asian countries (Burma and
Thailand). It had remined dormant for long, however in recent times India has taken
initiatve to revive cooperation at this forum. In this context India had invited the
BIMSTEC leaders to join the BRICS leaders at the Goa summit in 2016.
• However, these options do not resolve India’s Pakistan problem in promoting economic
cooperation with Afghanistan. With no physical access to Afghanistan, India needs to find
creative ways to deepen bilateral economic engagement with Kabul bilaterally and
through trilateral cooperation with other partners like Tehran.
• India can’t compel Pakistan to join the project of South Asian integration. SAARC for the
time being seems to be becoming redundant. However, success in other regional
integration initiative might help Pakistan see the benefit and then SAARC can revived. Thus
instead of focusing on Pakistan India must devote itself to bilateral, sub-regional and
trans-regional cooperation with our neighbors, all of whom except Pakistan want India to
do more.
7.11. India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Neighbourhood First
• When PM Narendra Modi took oath as the 14th Indian Prime Minister in May 2014, he
made a significant diplomatic outreach to India’s neighbours by inviting their heads of
government.
• The PM soon made his first foreign visit to Bhutan. Minister of External Affairs Sushma
Swaraj too, made her first official foreign visit in the neighbourhood, to Bangladesh. The
diplomatic priority that government attached to the neighbourhood is evident from the
PM’s visit to all of India’s neighbours, except Maldives, and the numerous leaders hosted
in New Delhi and meetings at other multilateral fora.
• These developments have gave rise to the term ‘nieghborhood first’ as India’s policy in its
periphery.
• India’s neighbourhood first policy has four aspects.
o The willingness to give political and diplomatic priority to its immediate neighbours
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and Indian Ocean island states,

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o providing them with support as needed

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o greater connectivity and integration

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o to promote a model of India-led regionalism with which its neighbours are

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comfortable.
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India realises that development and rapid economic growth cannot be fulfilled without a
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stable and conducive neighbourhood. India shares borders, rivers, climatic zones, cultural
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and ethnic ties with its neighbors which can be a source of both conflict and cooperation.
• The centrality of India’s neighborhood in its foreign policy has become ever more critical in
the context of the changing geopolitical landscape. The rise of China, an important
neighbor and domestic changes in neighboring South Asian countries provide the backdrop
of these developments
• Growing development need of India’s smaller neighbours and the increasing desire to fulfil
them has made Chinese access easier. In this context India’s needs to focus on the growing
aspirations of its smaller neighbours. The simple logic that drives smaller neighbours is
how to maximise benefits from the two rising Asian giants.
• India needs to create a narrative that reassures its smaller neighbours that it wants to
contribute to their rise as well. Development partnerships, trade, people to people ties can
pave the way ahead.

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LECTURE-3
INDIA NEIGHBOURHOOD RELATIONS:
PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN
Contents
1. India and Pakistan .................................................................................................................... 57
1.1. The Background ................................................................................................................ 57
1.2. India-Pakistan Relations A Framework: Dialogue-Disruption-Dialogue ............................ 60
1.3. Key Issues .......................................................................................................................... 61
1.4. The Indus Water Treaty ..................................................................................................... 62
1.4.1. Significance ................................................................................................................ 62
1.4.2. Important Provisions .................................................................................................. 62
1.4.3. Indus, Jhelum and Chenab: Western Rivers and India ............................................... 62
1.4.4. Recent Disagreements ............................................................................................... 63
1.4.5. What are Indian Concerns in Recent Times? ............................................................. 64
1.4.6. Increasing Questions on the Treaty............................................................................ 64
1.4.7. Should the Treaty be Revoked? .................................................................................. 65
1.4.8. India’s Options............................................................................................................ 65
1.5. Sir Creek Dispute ............................................................................................................... 65
1.5.1. India’s Claims v Pakistan’s Claims ............................................................................... 66
1.5.2. The Sir Creek Issue: Significance ................................................................................ 66
1.6. Siachen .............................................................................................................................. 67
1.6.1. India v Pakistan Claims ............................................................................................... 67
1.6.2. India’s Position on the Way Forward.......................................................................... 68
1.7. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) ................................................................. 68
1.8. The Kulbhushan Jadhav Issue............................................................................................ 69
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1.9. Trade.................................................................................................................................. 69
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1.10. Vision and Reality ............................................................................................................ 70

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2. India and Afghanistan............................................................................................................... 70

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2.1. Background ....................................................................................................................... 70

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2.2. Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) ............................................................................. 71

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2.3. Heart of Asia Process ........................................................................................................ 71

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2.4. India’s Contribution in Reconstruction Efforts .................................................................. 72

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2.4.1. Challenges of Connectivity ......................................................................................... 72

2.5 Multiple Aspects of Cooperation ....................................................................................... 73

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1. India and Pakistan

Map3.1 India-Pakistan and Afghanistan
Image Source: http://www.essential-humanities.net/img/history/his119.png
1.1. The Background

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•
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Pakistan resolution passed in the annual session of the All India Muslim League held in
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Lahore on 22–24 March 1940.

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• Partition of India 1947: Creation of Pakistan

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• Kashmir issue was taken up at the UN 1948 and Ceasefire came into existence in 1949.
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• Pakistan Joins the SEATO (1954) and Baghdad Pact or CENTO (1955)
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•
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The Indus Water Treaty was signed in 1960 with the Mediation of the World Bank
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• 6 rounds of talks in1962-64

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• The India-Pakistan War 1965-

• Tashkent agreement 1966- Both sides giving up territorial claims, withdrawing their armies
from the disputed territory.
• The Bangladesh War 1971: Defeat and loss of territory marks a new phase in Pakistan’s
politics and relations with India
• The Simla Agreement 1972: Signed between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto from Pakistan
o The Simla Agreement designates the ceasefire line of December 17, 1971, as being the
new "Line-of-Control (LoC)" between the two countries, which neither side is to seek to
alter unilaterally, and which "shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the
recognised position of either side".
o It also contains a, mutual commitment to the peaceful resolution of all issues through
direct bilateral approaches.
• Domestic turmoil in Pakistan- Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is removed by General Ziaul Haq who
becomes the president in 1978 and launches Islamic legal system. Bhutto is hanged in 1979.

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• Operation Meghdoot in 1984 brought the Siachen Glacier under India’s control.
• 1988 Agreement - The two countries signed an agreement that neither side will attack the
other's nuclear installations or facilities. These include "nuclear power and research
reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, isotopes separation and reprocessing
facilities as well as any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and materials
in any form and establishments storing significant quantities of radio-active materials".
Since January 1992, India and Pakistan have exchanged lists of their respective civilian
nuclear-related facilities.
• 1989 - Armed insurgency the Kashmir valley begins. Muslim political actors, after accusing
the state government of rigging the 1987 state legislative elections, form militant wings.
• In 1991 - The two countries signed agreements on providing advance notification of
military exercises, manoeuvres and troop movements, as well as on preventing airspace
violations and establishing overflight rules.
• A joint declaration prohibiting the use of chemical weapons is signed in New Delhi in
1992.
• In 1998 India detonates five nuclear devices at Pokhran. Pakistan responds by detonating
six nuclear devices of its own in the Chaghai Hills. The tests result in international
sanctions being placed on both countries. In the same year, both countries carry out tests
of long-range missiles.
• 1999 - Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee meets with Nawaz Sharif, his Pakistani
counterpart, in Lahore. The two sign the Lahore Declaration, the first major agreement
between the two countries since the 1972 Simla Agreement. Both countries reaffirm their
commitment to the Simla Accord, and agree to undertake a number of 'Confidence
Building Measures' (CBMs).
• Some of the diplomatic gains are eroded, however, after the Kargil conflict breaks out in
May 1999. Pakistani forces occupy strategic positions on the Indian side of the LoC,
prompting an Indian counter offensive in which they are pushed back to the other side of
the original LoC. Kargil was the first armed conflict between the two neighbours since they
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officially conducted nuclear weapons tests.

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• In October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani chief of army staff, leads a
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military coup, deposing Nawaz Sharif, the then prime minister, and installing himself as the
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head of the government.

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Hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight-IC 814 in Indian airspace by members of Harkat-ul-

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Mujahideen, a Pakistan-based extremist group, highlighted Pakistan’s role in the supporting

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terrorism against India.

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• 2001 - Tensions along the Line of Control remain high, with 38 people killed in an attack on
the Kashmiri assembly in Srinagar. In July, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf meet for a two-day summit at Agra. That summit
collapses after two days, with both sides unable to reach agreement on the issue of
Kashmir. On December 13, an armed attack on the Indian parliament in New Delhi leaves
14 people dead. India blames Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad for the attacks.
The attacks lead to a mobilization of India's (referred to as Operation Parakram) and
Pakistan's militaries along the LoC. The standoff only ends in October 2002, after
international mediation.
• 2002 - President Musharraf pledges that Pakistan will combat extremism on its own soil,
but affirms that the country has a right to Kashmir.
• 2003 - After Musharraf calls for a ceasefire along the LoC during a UN General Assembly
meeting in September, the two countries reach an agreement to cool tensions and cease
hostilities across the LoC.

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• 2004 - Vajpayee and Musharraf hold direct talks at the 12th SAARC summit in Islamabad
in January, and the two countries' foreign secretaries meet later in the year. This year marks
the beginning of the Composite Dialogue Process, in which bilateral meetings are held
between officials at various levels of government (including foreign ministers, foreign
secretaries, military officers, border security officials, anti-narcotics officials and nuclear
experts). In November, on the eve of a visit to Jammu and Kashmir, the new Indian prime
minister, Manmohan Singh, announces that India will be reducing its deployment of troops
there.
• 2006 - India redeploys 5,000 troops from Jammu and Kashmir, citing an "improvement" in
the situation there, but the two countries are unable to reach an agreement on
withdrawing forces from the Siachen glacier.
• In September, President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh agree to put into place an
India-Pakistan institutional anti-terrorism mechanism.
• 2007 - On February 18, the train service between India and Pakistan, the Samjhauta
Express, is bombed near Panipat, north of New Delhi. Sixty-eight people are killed, and
dozens injured.
• The fifth round of talks regarding the review of nuclear and ballistic missile-related CBMs is
held as part of the Composite Dialogue Process. The second round of the Joint Anti-
Terrorism Mechanism (JATM) is also held.
• 2008 - India joins a framework agreement between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan
on a $7.6bn gas pipeline project (TAPI).
• A series of Kashmir-specific CBMs are also agreed to, including the approval of a triple-entry
permit facility with leniency for senior citizens.
• In July, India blames Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate for a bomb attack
on the Indian embassy in Kabul, which kills 58 and injures another 141.
• In September, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Indian Prime Minister Singh formally
announce the opening of several trade routes between the two countries.
• In October, cross-LoC trade commences, though it is limited to 21 items and can take place
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on only two days a week.

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• On November 26, armed gunmen open fire on civilians at several sites in Mumbai, India.
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The attacks prompt an almost three-day siege of the Taj Hotel, where gunmen remain holed
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up until all but one of them are killed in an Indian security forces operation. More than 160
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people are killed in the attacks. Ajmal Kasab, the only attacker captured alive, says the
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attackers were members of Lashkar-e-Taiba. In the wake of the attacks, India breaks off
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talks with Pakistan

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• 2009 - The Pakistani government admits that the Mumbai attacks may have been partly
planned on Pakistani soil, while vigorously denying allegations that the plotters were
sanctioned or aided by Pakistan's intelligence agencies. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh and Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani meet on the sidelines of a Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, issuing a joint statement
charting future talks. Singh rules out, however, the resumption of the Composite Dialogue
Process at the present time.The Indian government continues to take a stern line with
Pakistan and maintains that it is up to Pakistan to take the first step towards the resumption
of substantive talks by cracking down on terrorist groups on its soil. In August, India gives
Pakistan a new dossier of evidence regarding the Mumbai attacks, asking it to prosecute
Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the head of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, an Islamic charity with ties to
Lashkar-e-Taiba.
• 2010 - In January, Indian and Pakistani forces exchange fire across the LoC in Kashmir, the
latest in a string of such incidents that have led to rising tension in the area. In February,
India and Pakistan's foreign secretaries meet in New Delhi for talks. This meeting is followed

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by the two countries' foreign ministers meeting in Islamabad in July. In May, Ajmal Kasab is
found guilty of murder, conspiracy and of waging war against India in the Mumbai attacks
case. He is sentenced to death.
• 2011 - In January, Indian Home Secretary GK Pillai says India will share information with
Pakistan regarding the 2001 Samjhauta Express bombing. The two countries' foreign
secretaries meet in Thimpu, in February, and agree to resume peace talks "on all issues".
• 2013 - In January, India and Pakistan trade accusations of violating the cease-fire in Kashmir,
with Islamabad accusing Indian troops of a cross-border raid that killed a soldier and India
charging that Pakistani shelling destroyed a home on its side.
• 2013 - In September, the prime ministers of India and Pakistan meet in New York on the
sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Both the leaders agree to end tension between
armies of both sides in the disputed Kashmir.
• 2014 - On February 12, India and Pakistan agree to release trucks detained in their
respective territories, ending a three week impasse triggered by seizure of a truck in India-
administered Kashmir coming from across the de facto Line of Control for allegedly carrying
brown sugar.
• 2014 - On May 1, Pakistan's Army chief General Raheel Sharif calls Kashmir the "jugular
vein" of Pakistan, and that the dispute should be resolved in accordance with the wishes
and aspirations of Kashmiris and in line with UNSC resolutions for lasting peace in the
region.
• 2014 - On May 25, Pakistan releases 151 Indian fishermen from its jails in a goodwill gesture
ahead of swearing-in ceremony of Narendra Modi as prime minister.
• 2014 - On May 27, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi holds talks with Pakistan's Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif in New Delhi. Both sides express willingness to begin new era of
bilateral relations.
• In December 2015 PM Modi makes a surprise visit to Lahore on Nawaz Sharif's birthday
and the wedding of his granddaughter.
• In January 2016 Six gunmen attack an Indian air force base in the northern town of
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Pathankot, killing seven soldiers in a battle that lasted nearly four days.
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• In July 2016, Indian soldiers kill Hizbul Mujahideen’s terrorist leader Burhan Wani, sparking
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months of anti-India protests and deadly clashes.

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• In September 2016 Suspected terrorists sneak into an Indian army base in Kashmir's Uri and
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kill 18 soldiers. Four attackers are also killed.11 days later, Indian Army said it has carried
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out "surgical strikes" to destroy terror launch pads across the Line of Control in Pakistan.
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1.2. India-Pakistan Relations A Framework: Dialogue-Disruption-

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Dialogue
• The relations between India and Pakistan are marked by divergent narratives starting with
the very beginning of these countries as independent nations in 1947 in the backdrop of
the colonial rule, the two nation theory and the partition of India. This had made it difficult
to reconcile positions on issues ranging from territory (J&K), boundaries (Sir Creek and
Siachen) and Security (Terrorism).
• The foundational apprehensions of Pakistan against India and its quest for defining itself
as the opposite has led to its intransigence on many issues.
• The structure of this relation has been conflict prone and marked by asymmetry.
• The pattern in the decades since independence has shown a cycle of Disruption-Dialogue-
Disruption. This means cooperation and peace have often taken place parallel to the
threats of war or have been disrupted by violent episodes of terrorism.
• Though there had been sporadic agreements and treaties signed between India and
Pakistan such as the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, the Tashkent Agreement of 1966, and the

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Shimla Agreement of 1972, a systematic peace-process between the two adversarial

neighbours had never taken off till the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) in the late
1990s’
• Idea of a “composite dialogue process” (CDP) was articulated at the 1997 Male meeting
between Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
• However the composite dialogue process has also been disrupted by events such as the
Kargil war of 1999, the attack on India parliament in 2001 and the 26/11 attack in Mumbai
in 2008.
• When the two countries again started engaging in 2010 it the name of CDP was changed to
the ‘Resumed Dialogue’, with some changes in the content, including progress on Mumbai
trial.
• Two rounds of resumed dialogue took place and the foreign ministers analyzed the
developments. But it stopped in 2012 post the incident of firing on the border and
beheading of India soldier Hemraj following which then Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan
Singh said 'that there cannot be business as usual with Pakistan
• When Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif met in Ufa in 2015, on the
sidelines of the SCO summit, It was decided that the two sides will hold one discussion on
terrorism and the other for peace on the border.
• In 2015, during Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj’s recent visit to Islamabad on 8-9
December 2015 for the ‘Heart of Asia’ Conference, it was decided that India and Pakistan
would hold discussions on wide-ranging issues under the rubric of a ‘Comprehensive
Bilateral Dialogue’ as opposed to the nomenclature of ‘Composite Dialogue’ or ‘Resumed
Dialogue’ used earlier.
• In the latest stage the dialogue between the two countries that resumed in 2015 was
again disrupted by the terrorist attack in Pathankot and Uri in 2016.
• India desires peaceful, friendly and cooperative relations with Pakistan, in an
environment free from terrorism and violence.
• According to the MEA Indian Policy on Pakistan is as follows:
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o Issues can be resolved through dialogue;

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o There are only two parties to such dialogue-India and Pakistan;

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o However, terror and talks cannot go together.

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1.3. Key Issues

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The India-Pakistan joint statement on 23 September 1998, following the meeting of the two
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Foreign Secretaries in New York, identified the issues to be included in the CDP between the
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two countries and the levels at which they were to be addressed.

1. Peace and Security including Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) — Foreign Secretaries
2. Jammu and Kashmir — Foreign Secretaries
3. Siachen — Defence Secretaries
4. Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project — Secretaries, Water & Power
5. Sir Creek — Additional Secretary (Defence)/Surveyors General
6. Terrorism and Drug Trafficking — Home/Interior Secretaries
7. Economic and Commercial Cooperation — Commerce Secretaries.
8. Promotion of Friendly exchanges in various fields — Secretaries, Culture.
• Terrorism: India has been pressing its concern on the role of Pakistan based actors in
terrorism in India. This is backed by the US as well. Terrorism emanating from Pakistan
and territory under its control has, however, severely limited and disrupted initiatives to
build a stable relationship.

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• Kashmir: Following the Indo-Pakistan War of 1947 over the former princely state of
Jammu and Kashmir, its territory has remained divided between India and Pakistan. A
ceasefire line (1949), later known as the Line of Control (LoC, since 1972), separates the
Indian-administered and Pakistan-administered parts. Pakistan has been trying to
internationalise the issue at forums such as the United Nations. However this has produced
diminishing returns. CDP remains the only bilateral forum where Kashmir is formally
brought to the table by India and Pakistan
• Normalization: Normalization refers to the process of making progress on the contentious
issues between the country. It involves, trade, cultural exchanges and resolving the issues
known as ‘low hanging fruits’ such as Siachen and Sirceek issues.
• In the context of the recent acrimony in relations issues related to the Indus Water Treaty
have gained salience.
1.4. The Indus Water Treaty

• The Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960 after nine years of negotiations between India
and Pakistan with the help of the World Bank, which is also a signatory. Signed by India’s
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the then President of Pakistan, Ayub Khan.
• The treaty pertains to most complete and satisfactory utilisation of the waters of the Indus
system comprising of the six rivers running across the Indus basin.
• The negotiations were the initiative of former World Bank President Eugene Black.
• Former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower described it as "one bright spot ... in a very
depressing world picture that we see so often."
1.4.1. Significance
• It is Seen as one of the most successful international treaties,
• It has survived frequent tensions, including conflict, and
• It has provided a framework for irrigation and hydropower development for more than
half a century.
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It is a generous treaty in terms of both the sharing ratio (80.52 per cent of the aggregate
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water flows in the Indus system reserved for Pakistan) and the total volume of basin waters
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for the downstream state.

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• It is the first and only treaty that goes beyond water sharing to partitioning rivers.
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1.4.2. Important Provisions

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• The three western rivers (Jhelum, Chenab and Indus) were made available to Pakistan for
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unrestricted use.
• Three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej), were made available to India for unrestricted
use.
1.4.3. Indus, Jhelum and Chenab: Western Rivers and India
• Under the treaty obligation India shall not permit any interference with these waters
except for the following uses defined under the treaty:
o Domestic Use;
o Non-Consumptive Use;
o Agricultural Use, as set out in Annexure C; and
o Generation of hydro-electric power, as set out in Annexure D.
• Except as provided in Annexure D and E, India shall not store any water of, or construct
any storage works on, the Western Rivers.
• Thus, while India could use the western rivers, restrictions were placed on building of
storage systems.

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• The treaty states that except in certain cases, no storage and irrigation systems can be
built by India on the western rivers.
• India is permitted to construct hydroelectric power facilities on these rivers subject to
constraints specified in Annexures to the Treaty.
Working of the treaty:
• Treaty sets out a mechanism for cooperation and information exchange between the two
countries regarding their use of the rivers, known as the Permanent Indus Commission,
which has a commissioner from each country.
• The Treaty also sets forth distinct procedures to handle issues which may arise:
o “questions” are handled by the Commission;
o “differences” are to be resolved by a Neutral Expert; and
o “disputes” are to be referred to a seven-member arbitral tribunal called the “Court of
Arbitration.”
o The World Bank’s role in relation to “differences” and “disputes” is limited to the
designation of people to fulfill certain roles when requested by either or both of the
parties.
Map3.2-The Indus River System
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Image Source: http://nriachievers.in/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/1.jpg

1.4.4. Recent Disagreements
• India and Pakistan disagree about the construction of the Kishenganga (330 megawatts)
and Ratle (850 megawatts) hydroelectric power plants being built by India.
• The two countries disagree over whether the technical design features of the two
hydroelectric plants contravene the Treaty.
• The plants are on respectively a tributary of the Jhelum and the Chenab Rivers.
• The Treaty designates these two rivers as well as the Indus as the “Western Rivers” to
which Pakistan has unrestricted use.
• Among other uses, under the Treaty, India is permitted to construct hydroelectric power
facilities on these rivers subject to constraints specified in Annexures to the Treaty.

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• Talks related to the Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric power plants are ongoing.
However, different treaty mechanisms are sought by India and Pakistan.
• Pakistan asked the World Bank to facilitate the setting up of a Court of Arbitration to look
into its concerns about the designs of the two hydroelectric power projects. India asked for
the appointment of a Neutral Expert for the same purpose.
• The Treaty does not empower the World Bank to choose whether one procedure should
take precedence over the other.
• On December 12, 2016, World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim announced that the
World Bank would pause before taking further steps in each of the two processes requested
by the parties
1.4.5. What are Indian Concerns in Recent Times?
• From the Indian point of view, the basic dissatisfaction with the treaty arises from the fact
that it prevents the country from building any storage systems on the western rivers. Even
though the treaty lays out that under certain exceptional circumstances storage systems
can be built, the complaint raised by India is that Pakistan deliberately stops any such effort
due to the political rivalry it shares with India.
• The Treaty has too many engineering provisions and gives Pakistan undue right to vet the
designs of the Indian projects. India has been attempting to construct run of the river
projects on the western rivers. Run-of-the-river projects are permitted by the Indus treaty
within defined limits. But Pakistan wants no Indian works on the three “western rivers”
and seeks international intercession by invoking the treaty’s dispute-settlement
provisions. This has in effect to denied J&K the limited benefits permissible under the
treaty, Pakistan wishes to further its strategy to foment discontent and violence there.
• Since the treaty’s conception in 1960, the two countries have been embroiled in conflicts
over a number of projects including the Baglihar, the Kishenganga and Ratle (Chenab
river) hydroelectric plants proposed by India on the west flowing rivers.
• Given that water is J&K’s main natural resource and essential for economic development,
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the there. gifting of its river waters to Pakistan by treaty has fostered popular grievance.
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1.4.6. Increasing Questions on the Treaty

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In the context of terrorism being used as an instrument of state policy by Pakistan

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questions have been raised about the treat

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In 1960, India accepted the treaty as a goodwill gesture trading water for peace. Within
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• Pakistan insists on rights without responsibilities. Many argue, that use of state-reared
terrorist groups can be invoked by India, under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, as constituting reasonable grounds for withdrawal from the Indus treaty.
The International Court of Justice has upheld the principle that a treaty may be dissolved
by reason of a fundamental change of circumstances.
• As argued by David Lilienthal “No Armies with bombs and shellfire could devastate a land so
thoroughly as Pakistan could be devastated by simple expedient of India’s permanently
shutting off the source of water that keeps the fields and people of Pakistan green.”
• If Pakistan wishes to preserve the Indus treaty, despite its diminishing returns for India, it
will have to strike a balance between its right to keep utilising the bulk of the river system’s
waters and a corresponding obligation (enshrined in international law) not to cause
“palpable harm” to its co-riparian state by exporting terror.

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1.4.7. Should the Treaty be Revoked?

• Any calls for revoking the treaty needs to be tempered with multiple factors:
• Revoking the treaty could be used by the Pakistani side to draw into another limited
conflict or further boost its attempts to foment trouble in Kashmir.
• Given the China-Pakistan axis, revoking the treaty maybe used to portray India as
attempting to arm-twist the lower riparian in the region. Moreover, China can use this as
a precedent for refusing to change their current stand of refusing to enter into a water
sharing agreement on Brahmaputra river.
• The treaty has prevented water conflicts and created incentive for Peace. For over five
decades, both India and Pakistan are peacefully sharing the water of Indus and its
tributaries, thanks to The Indus Water Treaty. It may be noted that both India and Pakistan
are still at loggerheads over various issues since Partition, but there has been no fight over
water after the Treaty was ratified.
• The treaty has survived India-Pakistan wars of 1965, 1971 and the 1999 Kargil standoff
besides Kashmir insurgency since 1990 and is considered as the most successful water
treaty in world. Upholding the treaty even under adverse circumstances has added to the
international image and India prides itself in being a responsible country
• Short of abrogation, the Treaty may be modified under the existing provisions of article
12.
1.4.8. India’s Options
• Utilizing the eastern river waters optimally.
• Ensure that the infrastructure which needs to be developed to fully exploit the capacity as
provisioned as part of the IWT with respect to both western and eastern rivers should be
completed expeditiously in a time bound manner.
• Utilizing the existing dispute resolution mechanism judiciously.
• India needs to continue its engagement with Afghanistan and assist in dam construction,
not withstanding protestations by Pakistan.
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1.5. Sir Creek Dispute

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• The 96-km estuary between India and Pakistan, cutting through where Gujarat State and
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Sindh province meet, has had a dramatic impact on Indian security, though it’s always been
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• Six rounds of talks have taken place, the two sides have conducted a joint survey of the
creek and exchanged maps showing their respective positions.
• The issue remains unresolved.
• Map3.3 Sir Creek

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Image Source:
http://media2.intoday.in/indiatoday/images/stories//2012december/sircreek02_small_121612120133.jp
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1.5.1. India’s Claims v Pakistan’s Claims

• The Provisions of two contradictory paragraphs in the 1914 Verdict of the Bombay
Government, make India and Pakistan contenders on the same issue.
• Paragraph 9 of this verdict states that the boundary between Kutch and Sindh lies ‘to the
east of the Creek,’ (Green Line) which effectively implied that the creek belonged to
Sindh and, therefore, to Pakistan.
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• On the other hand, Paragraph 10 states that since Sir Creek is navigable most of the year.
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the middle of the navigable channel, which meant that it has be divided between Sindh
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is also bolstered by a map dating back to 1925.

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1.5.2. The Sir Creek Issue: Significance

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• Over the years, the creek has also changed its course considerably. If one country agrees to
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the other’s traditional position, then the former will end up losing a vast amount of
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A vital reason for two countries locking horns over this
creek is the possible presence of great oil and gas concentration under the sea, which are
currently unexploited thanks to the impending deadlock on the issue.
• Because of various factors, the Sir Creek area is also a great fishing destination for
hundreds of fishermen from both India and Pakistan. Sir Creek is considered to be among
the largest fishing grounds in Asia. In the desperation for a great catch, many of their boats
stray across the perceived boundaries, and they end up being arrested by the other side.
• Maritime security concerns were heightened since November 2008, when 10 terrorists
from the Lashkar-e-Taiba left in a Pakistani boat for Mumbai. They captured an Indian
fishing vessel, Kuber, off Sir Creek, and used it to attack Mumbai.
• Drug trade: Officials monitoring the phone conversations in the disputed waters off Sir
Creek say the indications are that drug cartels are active in the region, and the quantity and
frequency show that the area could be among the world’s most active for trading centres.

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Map3.4 Siachen Glacier
Source: http://img01.ibnlive.in/ibnlive/uploads/875x584/jpg/2016/03/siachen-map.jpg
1.6. Siachen
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The Siachen dispute is a direct result of the ambiguity that exists in the Karachi ceasefire
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agreement of July 1949. The agreement, which established the ceasefire line, the positions
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of the two militaries at the end of the 1947-1948 war, did not delineate beyond grid
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reference NJ 9842, which falls south of the Siachen glacier,

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the glaciers”.
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• India established its ground position in 1984, a response to Pakistan’s Oropolitics,

through the Operation Meghdoot in 1984 and remains in control of the glacier
• Divergent positions held by India and Pakistan on the dispute is one of the primary
reasons why the negotiations on demilitarising the Siachen glacier and the adjoining areas
have not progressed much.
1.6.1. India v Pakistan Claims
• Indian and Pakistani sides have interpreted the phrase “North to the glaciers” very
differently. Pakistan argues that this means that the line should go from NJ 9842 straight to
the Karakoram pass on the Sino-Indian border. India, however, insists that the line should
proceed north from NJ 9842 along the Saltoro range to the border with China. Between
these two interpretations lies a substantial amount of glaciated territory that both sides
want control of.
• These contrasting interpretations have made it difficult for a final resolution of the
dispute even though it is possible to mutually demilitarise the region given that both
Indian and Pakistani soldiers regularly lose their lives there due to harsh climatic

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conditions. However, demilitarization talks in the past have met with major roadblocks
owing to mutual distrust in the relationship
1.6.2. India’s Position on the Way Forward
• India has stated that the present ground positions on the Saltoro ridge should be
demarcated and authenticated on a map before any demilitarisation could be conducted,
fearing that once India withdraws from the region, the Pakistan Army could occupy the high
ground, something the latter was weeks close to doing when the Indian occupation took
place in 1984 after operation Meghdoot.
• India has therefore insisted that joint demarcation of the Actual Ground Position Line
(AGPL) on the ground as well as the map should be the first step to be followed by a joint
verification agreement and redeployment of forces to mutually agreed positions.
1.7. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

Map 3.5: The CPEC
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Image Source: http://media2.intoday.in/indiatoday/images/stories//2017May/cpec-

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• The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is part of the larger OBOR or the Belt and
Road(BRI) project of China.
• It aims to connect Kasgar in the Xinxiang province of China to the warm water port of
Gwadar in the Baluchistan province of Pakistan. It involves multiple infrastructure projects
including, highways, railroads, waterways and pipelines. The Project investment estimates
range from US$ 40 billion to 60 billion.
• Gwadar deep sea port, a culmination point of the ambitious China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC), which will be able to handle 13 million tonnes of cargo annually within five
years — and an astounding 400 million tonnes annually by 2030 to be transported to
landlocked Central Asia and to western China.

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• The project through the development of Gwadar port also has strategic significance as it
provides China a presence in the Indian Ocean.
• India’s main concern is regarding the alignment of the Project that passes through the
Gilgit-Baltistan region of Jammu and Kashmir and thus violates India’s sovereign claims.
1.8. The Kulbhushan Jadhav Issue

• Pakistan claimed to have arrested Jadhav from Balochistan on March 3, 2016. India
maintains that Jadhav was kidnapped from Iran where he was involved in business
activities after retiring from the Indian Navy in 2002.
• In April 2017 Pakistan's military establishment announced that Jadhav would be hanged.
• Shortly after India approached the International Court of Justice (ICJ. As India was denied
Consular access to Jadhav. India has accused Pakistan of violating the Vienna Convention.
• Pakistan contended that the Vienna Convention provisions on consular access were not
intended for a "spy" involved in subversive activities.
• India believes the ICJ can look into Jadhav’s case as both the countries are signatories to
the optional protocol of the Vienna convention on consular relations (VCCR). The protocol
says any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of VCCR shall lie within the
jurisdiction of the ICJ.
• On 18 May 2017 International Court of Justice stays death sentence given to Kulbhushan
Jadhav by Pakistani military court until further notice.
• This is the first time after 1971 that India has turned to the ICJ in a dispute with Pakistan.
• In September 1974, India spelt out the matters over which it would accept the jurisdiction
of the ICJ, replacing a similar declaration made in 1959.
• Among the matters over which India does not accept the ICJ jurisdiction are: “Disputes
with the government of any state which is or has been a member of the Commonwealth
of Nations”.
• Moving the ICJ amounts to taking disputes with Pakistan to a multilateral forum, which New
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Delhi tends to avoid.

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1.9. Trade
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• Trade relations remained vibrant for an extended period after Partition. As noted by former
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Pakistan commerce secretary Zafar Mahmood, in 1948-49, India accounted for around 56%
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of Pakistan’s total exports and 32% of its total imports. Indeed, despite the hostilities of
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The trade relationship took a nosedive with the 1965 and 1971 wars, and only resumed,
on a limited scale, after the Shimla Agreement was signed in 1972.
• India unilaterally accorded Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to Pakistan in 1996. There
is increased question mark on this in recent years.
• Withdrawing MFN status to Islamabad could mark an important – even if symbolic –
attempt by New Delhi to demonstrate that it is taking tough action.
• But it won't have any real effect: volumes of trade between the two countries are too
small for sanctions to actually make a difference.
• While India’s exports to Pakistan have marginally grown from 0.78% of total exports in
2007-'08 to 0.88% in the year 2015-'16, India’s imports from Pakistan remain negligible at
0.12% of total exports, according to the data for the last financial year.
• Pakistan’s total import from South Asia itself is less than 4 per cent.
• By not revoking the MFN status India can legitimately claim the moral high ground in
fulfilling WTO obligations while Pakistan does not

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1.10. Vision and Reality

• As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said in January 2007, he dreamt of a day when “while
retaining our respective national identities, one can have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in
Lahore and dinner in Kabul. That is how my forefathers lived. That is how I want my
grandchildren to live.”
• According to TCA Raghavan: from 2008 till the present day “enough has changed to make
sure older solutions will not work.” Nonetheless, “the cyclical pattern” of reconciliatory
moves and hawkish standoffs will go on.
2. India and Afghanistan

Map3.6-Afghanistan
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2.1. Background
• Relations between the people of Afghanistan and India traces to the Indus Valley
Civilisation.
• The Durand Line is the 2,430-kilometre International border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Sir Mortimer Durand had drawn this line in 1893 between Afghanistan and
then British India, which later got divided into two countries India and Pakistan in 1947.
• The Durand Line cuts through the Pashtun tribal areas and further south through the
Balochistan region. It politically divides ethnic Pashtuns, as well as the Baloch and other
ethnic groups, who live on both sides of the border in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan.

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• During the Soviet intervention (1979-89), India was the only South Asian nation to
recognise the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. India also provided
humanitarian aid to then Afghan President Najibullah's government. Following the
withdrawal of the Soviet forces, India continued to with humanitarian aid.
• In 1990s, India became one of the key supporters of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.
• In 2005, India proposed Afghanistan's membership in the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
• Both nations also developed strategic and military cooperation against Islamist militants.
• Indo-Afghan relations have been strengthened by the Strategic Partnership Agreement
signed between the two countries in 2011.
• As Afghanistan was undergoing three simultaneous political, security and economic
transitions in 2015.
• India had allayed its fears about its future by making a long-term commitment to the
security and development of Afghanistan.
• Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani visited India for his first state visit in April 2015 and in
October 2017
• Prime Minister Modi visited Afghanistan in December 2016.
2.2. Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA)

The Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) between the two sides, inter alia, provides for
• assistance to help rebuild Afghanistan's infrastructure and institutions, education and
technical assistance to re-build indigenous Afghan capacity in different areas,
• encouraging investment in Afghanistan's natural resources, providing duty free access to
the Indian market for Afghanistan's exports
• support for an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, broad-based and inclusive process of peace
and reconciliation,
• advocating the need for a sustained and long-term commitment to Afghanistan by the
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international community.
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2.3. Heart of Asia Process

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• Heart of Asia process or the Istanbul Process, started in 2011 to provide more assistance
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o Political consultations
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o Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

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o Cooperation with Regional Organizations

• This platform was established to address the shared challenges and interests of
Afghanistan and its neighbors and regional partners. The Heart of Asia is comprised of 14
participating countries, 17 supporting countries, and 12 supporting regional and
international organizations.
• The Heart of Asia provides a platform for results-oriented regional cooperation by placing
Afghanistan at its center, in recognition of the fact that a secure and stable Afghanistan is
vital to the prosperity of the Heart of Asia region.
• India is the lead country for Trade, Commerce and Investment CBM of Heart of Asia
Process,
• India hosted Senior Officials Meeting of the Heart of Asia countries in New Delhi in
January 2014 and with the help of FICCI, India organized a 6th Regional Technical Group
(RTG) in New Delhi on November 2015.
• India hosted the Sixth Ministerial conference of Heart of Asia in December 2016 at
Amritsar. It was Jointly Inaugurated by PM Modi and President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan

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2.4. India’s Contribution in Reconstruction Efforts

• India has committed over 2 billion US$ for development efforts in Afghanistan.
• It has financed and built significant projects such as:
o Delaram Zaranj Highway,
o Parliament Building,
o India Afghanistan Friendship Dam/Selma Dam, Hari River, Heart Province
o Transmission lines to Kabul.
• While it has avoided its own military presence, India views foreign military presence in
Afghanistan as indispensable in promoting political stability and development in the
country. The USA has also urged India to get involved more.
• India believes in invest and endure strategy for Afghanistan.
2.4.1. Challenges of Connectivity
• Pakistan, in particular, has been opposed to any growth in Indian influence and views
Afghanistan as essential for achieving strategic depth.
• Despite India's requests for direct land access to Afghanistan, Pakistan has refused to
provide such facility over its strategic concerns.
• Alternate routes India could use to access Afghanistan: in the absence of direct land
access, India is also working with Afghanistan and Iran to develop trilateral transit.
Participation in development of Chahbahar port will augment our connectivity with
Afghanistan and beyond.
• India in October 2017 began shipment of wheat to Afghanistan through the Iranian port of
Chabahar.
• India and Afghanistan have also established two air corridors - one between Delhi and
Kabul and the other Kandahar to Delhi - to carry goods at subsidised rates.
Map 3.7 Connecting Afghanistan
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Image Source:
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article19945496.ece/alternates/FREE_660/Geo-strategiccol

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2.5 Multiple Aspects of Cooperation

• India delivered three Russia-made Mi-25 attack helicopters to Afghanistan in 2015 and
2016. Reports suggest it is to deliver an additional helicopter soon.
• India remains wary of any efforts to reconcile with Taliban. In course of time India
reconciled with the fact that others including the US wanted to include Taliban in the talks,
however the Indian position includes the Taliban who renounce violence.
• For India any process of reconciliation should remain Afghan led, transparent and
inclusive. Thus, India stresses so much on the capacity building of the Afghan government.
• India is also considering a run of the river project on the Kabul river. This can put pressure
on Pakistan in the context of the Indus Water Treaty. Pakistan and Afghanistan have now
river water treaty.
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LECTURE-4
INDIA AND CHINA
Contents
1. India and China ........................................................................................................................ 75
1.1. Background ....................................................................................................................... 75
1.1.1. Evolution .................................................................................................................... 75
1.2. Boundary Question and Territorial Integrity ..................................................................... 78
1.3. India-China Border: Specific Sectors ................................................................................. 79
1.3.1. Western Sector ........................................................................................................... 79
1.3.2. The Eastern Sector ..................................................................................................... 80
1.3.3. The Middle Sector ...................................................................................................... 80
1.4. Current Negotiation Framework ....................................................................................... 80
1.4.1. Progress in Negotiations Since 2005 .......................................................................... 80
1.5. The Incident in Doklam Area-2017.................................................................................... 81
1.5.1. Confrontation at the Borders: A Pattern .................................................................... 82
1.6. Rivers ................................................................................................................................. 83
1.7. Trade and Economy ........................................................................................................... 84
1.8. Geo-Strategic Competition................................................................................................ 84
1.9. India’s Response Mechanism ............................................................................................ 85
1.10. Multilateral Engagement................................................................................................. 85
1.10.1 The BCIM Corridor .................................................................................................... 86
1.11. OBOR/BRI ........................................................................................................................ 87
1.11.1. Early Assessment of OBOR/BRI ................................................................................ 87
1.11.2. India and the OBOR .................................................................................................. 88
1.12. The Pakistan Factor ......................................................................................................... 88
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1.13. The USA Factor ................................................................................................................ 88

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1.14. The Russia Factor ............................................................................................................ 89

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1.15. The Japan Factor ............................................................................................................. 89

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1.16. The Rise of China and India ............................................................................................. 89

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1. India and China

Map 4.1- China
1.1. Background
• India shares total border of around 3,488 k.m with China (second largest after
Bangladesh).
• The border is not fully demarcated and the process of clarifying and confirming the Line
of Actual Control is in progress. It is characterized by high altitude terrain and inadequate
development of infrastructure in these regions. The Sino-Indian border can be divided
into three sectors namely: Western sector, Middle sector, and Eastern sector
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• 5 states viz. Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal
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Pradesh share border with China.

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• Major rivers such as Indus, Brahmaputra originate in China. India is a lower riparian state.
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China is not an Indian Ocean littoral country, neither is India a Pacific littoral countries.
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• In 2005- During Premier Hu Jintao’s visit to India, the two sides signed the strategic
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partnership agreement
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1.1.1. Evolution
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• 30 December 1949: India became the second non-communist nation to recognize the
Peoples’ Republic of China after its proclamation on 1 October.
• 7 October 1950: The Peoples Liberation Army, Chinese troops, crossed the Sino-Tibetan
boundary, and moved towards Lhasa, Tibet. This was for the first time since 1793 when a
Chinese Tibetan army had marched till Kathmandu to punish Nepal’ rulers, India faced
large Chinese army on its northern borders. The British policy had aimed at making Tibet a
buffer to avoid such a scenario.
• May 1951: China forced the Tibetan Governor of Chamdo to concede full suzerainty over
Tibet.
• 15 May 1954: China and India signed the Panchsheel document.
• 2 March 1955: India objects to the inclusion of a portion of India’s northern frontier on
the official map of China, saying it was a clear infringement of Panchsheel.
• 1 April 1955: India signs a Protocol at Lhasa handing over to China the control of all
communication services in Tibet.

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• November 1956: Zhou Enlai visits India for the second time on a goodwill mission.
• 18 December 1956: Chinese nationals who entered Ladakh were illegally detained and later
sent back to China.
• September 1957: Indian Vice-President S. Radhakrishnan’s visits China.
• 4 September 1958: India officially objects to the inclusion of a big chunk of Northern
Assam and NEFA in the China Pictorial - an official organ of the Chinese Peoples’ Republic.
• 23 January 1959: Zhou Enlai spells out for the first time China’s claims to over 40,000
square miles of Indian territory both in Ladakh and NEFA.
• 3 April 1959: Dalai Lama escapes from Lhasa and crosses into Indian territory. India’s
decision to grant asylum to him sours relations with Beijing.
• 8 September 1959: China refuses to accept the Mc Mohan Line with Zhou Enlai stating that
China was not a signatory to the 1842 Peace Treaty between British India and England.
Further, Beijing laid claims to almost 50,000 square miles of Indian territory in Sikkim and
Bhutan.
• 19 April 1960: A meeting in New Delhi between Zhou Enlai and Nehru to address the
boundary question ends in deadlock.
• February 1961: China refuses to discuss the Sino-Bhutanese and Sino-Sikkimese boundary
disputes and further occupies 12,000 square miles in the western sector of the Sino-
Indian border.
• 15-18 November 1962: A massive Chinese attack on the eastern front, Tawang, Walong in
the western sector over run, Rezang La and the Chushul airport shelled. Chinese troops
capture Bomdila in the NEFA region
• 21 November 1962: China declares a unilateral ceasefire along the entire border and
announces withdrawal of its troops to position 20km behind the LAC.
• 8 December 1962: China sends a note signed by Zhou Enlai to India reiterating the three-
point ceasefire formula.
o Both parties would respect the Line of Actual Control,
o the armed forces would withdraw 20km from this line and;
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o talks between the prime-ministers of both countries to seek a friendly settlement.

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India accepts and later on 10 December endorses Colombo proposals.

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• 2 March 1963: China and Pakistan sign a boundary settlement in Beijing between Kashmir
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and Xinjiang where Pakistan ceded 5080 sq. km of Pakistan occupied Kashmir territory.
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• 27 August 1965: China accuses India of crossing the Sikkim-China boundary.

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30 November 1965: Chinese troops intrude into north Sikkim and NEFA once again.
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• 1986: Differences surface over the precise limits of the McMahon Line in the Sumdorung
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Chu area of Arunachal Pradesh.

• 8 December 1986: Beijing express strong condemnation over the establishment of
Arunachal Pradesh as a full fledged State of the Indian Union.
• December1988: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visits China. Agreement to set up a Joint
Working Group on Boundary question and a Joint Group on Economic Relations, Trade,
Science and Technology signed.
• December 1991: Chinese premier Li Peng visits India after a gap of 31 years, pledges to
resolve the boundary question through friendly consultations.
• September 1993: Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao visits China, signs agreement on
Border Peace and Tranquility and the setting up of the India-China Expert Group of
Diplomatic and Military Officers to assist the work in Joint Working Group.
• 1994: Vice-President K R Narayanan visits China.
• August 1995: India and China agree to pull back their troops on the Sumdorong Chu Valley
in the eastern sector.

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• November 1996: Chinese President Jiang Zemin visits India, signs Agreement on
Confidence Building Measures (CBM) in the military field along the LAC in the India-China
Border Areas.
• August 1997: The India-China Joint Working Group meets in New Delhi. Instruments of
ratification in respect to Confidence Building Measures agreement exchanged.
• May 1998: Defence minister George Fernandes reported claim that China was India’s threat
number one offends China.
• 14 May 1998: China strongly condemns India’s second peaceful nuclear tests.
• July 1998: China urges India and Pakistan to give up their nuclear ambitions and sign the
NPT.
• August 1998: India officially announces talks with China on the reopening of the Ladakh-
Kailash-Mansarovar route.
• June 1999: China displays neutrality on the Kargil conflict and agrees to establish a security
mechanism with India.
• 28 September 1999: China asks New Delhi to stop the ‘splitting activities’ of Dalai Lama
from Indian soil to improve bilateral relations.
• 24 November 1999: India and China hold detailed discussions in New Delhi on ways to
settle their border row.
• 7 January 2000: Karmapa Lama flees China, reaches Dharamshala and joins the Dalai Lama.
• 11 January 2000: Beijing warns that giving political asylum to the Karmapa would violate
the five principles of peaceful coexistence.
• 4 January 2000: India officially declares to China that the 17th Karmapa has arrived in
Dharamshala, but has not been granted refugee status.
• 22 January 2000: The Dalai Lama writes to the Prime Minister urging him to accord
protection to the 17th Karmapa.
• 31 January 2000: The Chinese Peoples Liberation Army build a permanent road network
and sets up bunkers 5km in the Indian side of the LAC in Ladakh’s Aksai Chin area.
•
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22 February 2000: India and China sign a bilateral trade agreement in Beijing to facilitate
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China’s early entry into the WTO and an MOU for setting up a Joint Working Group in the
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field of steel.
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• 1 April 2000: India and China commemorate 50th anniversary of their diplomatic relations.
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13 January 2002: Chinese premier Zhu Rongji visits India.

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• 29 March 2002: India and China agree in Beijing to quicken the pace of LAC delineation in
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order to resolve the vexatious border dispute within a reasonable time-frame.

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23 June 2003: Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee makes a landmark visit to China.
This marks the Beginning of the Special Representatives framework on Border
negotiations
• April 9, 2005: Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visits Bangalore to push for an increase in
Sino-Indian cooperation in high-tech industries. India and China also sign an agreement
aimed at resolving disputes over their Himalayan border.
• 6 July 2006: China and India re-open Nathu La Pass, which was closed since the Sino-Indian
war in 1962.
• 25 May 2007: China denies a visa to Arunachal Pradesh chief minister, arguing that since
the state is in fact a part of China he would not require a visa to visit his own country.
• 13 October 2009: China objects to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Arunachal
Pradesh.
• 3 January 2009: Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visits China. Bilateral trade
surpasses $50 billion and China becomes India’s largest trading partner in goods.
• 27 August 2010: India cancels defense exchanges with China after Beijing refuses to permit
Lt. Gen. B.S. Jaswal, head of the northern command, a visa because he “controlled” the

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disputed area of Jammu and Kashmir. India subsequently refuses to allow two Chinese
defense officials to visit New Delhi.
• November 2010: China started the practice of issuing stapled visas to people from Jammu
and Kashmir.
• April 2013: The Chinese troops intruded into Depsang Bulge in East Ladakh, approximately
19 km inside our perception of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) claimed it to be a part of its
Xinjiang province. They were, however, pushed back.
• May 2014: China congratulates Modi’s election victory. Later in the month, Modi’s visit to
Arunachal Pradesh, which China considers disputed territory, invites remarks from the
Chinese foreign ministry.
• June 2014: China’s foreign minister Wang Yi visits New Delhi to hold talks with his Indian
counterpart Sushma Swaraj and Modi. Later in June, India’s vice president, Hamid Ansari,
travels to Beijing on a five-day visit.
• July 2014: India’s army chief Bikram Singh travels to Beijing for a three-day trip. Later that
month, P.M. Modi meets Xi for the first time during the BRICS summit in Brazil. The two
meet for almost 80 minutes.
• August 2014: PM Modi visits Japan for five days and makes a speech describing the world as
divided into two camps.
• September 2014: President Xi visits India, and P.M. Modi, breaking protocol, receives him
in Ahmedabad. They spend an evening strolling on the banks of the Sabarmati river. China
promises $20 billion worth of investments in India over five years. Both countries, however,
remain engaged in a face-off at the border in Ladakh, after Chinese troops allegedly crossed
over to the Indian side, through the entire visit.
• November 2014: President Xi invites P.M. Modi to attend the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation) summit in Beijing. Modi declines the offer, but travels to Myanmar, Australia
and Fiji. India also appoints its national security advisor, Ajit Doval, as the country’s special
representative for Sino-India boundary negotiations.
• January 2015: During US president Barack Obama’s Republic Day visit, Obama and Modi
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reportedly spend some 45 minutes talking about China, and both express concern about
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Beijing’s expansionist stance, especially in the South China Sea.

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• February 2015: Less than a week after Obama’s departure visit, foreign minister Swaraj
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leaves for Beijing and meets president Xi.

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March 2015: India starts the 18th round of talks with China over the land boundary issue.
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National security advisor Doval and China’s special representative Yang Jiechi meet in Delhi.
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• May 2015: P.M. Modi visited China. His first stop is Xian, Xi’s home town, after which he’ll
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head to Beijing.
• October 2016: P.M. Modi meets Chinese president Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Goa
BRICS Summit.
• May 2017: India declines Chinese invitation to attend the Belt and Road Initiative summit in
Beijing and issues a detailed statement listing its objections.
• 8-9 June 2017: India admitted to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as full-member
along with Pakistan. Modi meets Chinese president Xi Jinping and thanks for his country’s
support for India’s full membership in SCO.
1.2. Boundary Question and Territorial Integrity
• despite over 30 years of regular dialogues, Sino-Indian border issues remain complicated
and difficult.
• China continues to be in illegal occupation of approximately 38,000 sq. kms. in the Indian
state of Jammu and Kashmir. In addition, under the so-called `Sino-Pakistan Boundary
Agreement of 1963`, Pakistan illegally ceded 5180 sq. kms. of Indian territory in Pakistan
Occupied Kashmir to China.

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• China honed its "salami tactics" in the Himalayas in the 1950s, when it grabbed the Aksai
Chin plateau by surreptitiously building a strategic highway through that unguarded
region. Aksai Chin, part of the original princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, provided China
with the only passageway between its restive regions of Tibet and Xinjiang.
• In 1993, the signing of an Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along
the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the India-China Border Areas.
• The LAC currently represents the de-facto border between India and China and is divided
into three sectors: the western, middle, and eastern
• As many as 15 rounds of negotiations were held under the JWG mechanism between
1988 and 2003.
• The talks were rebooted to the current Special Representative (SR) mechanism in 2003
after prime minister AB Vajpayee’s China visit.
• Between 2003 and 2005, Beijing incrementally and implicitly but formally recognized
Sikkim as a state of the Indian Union, changing a 20 year long policy.
Map4.2 India-China Border
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Image Source:
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http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article19180924.ece/alternates/FREE_615/ChinaJPG
1.3. India-China Border: Specific Sectors

1.3.1. Western Sector
• Aksai Chin is the biggest disputed territory is 38,000 sq km in size. It is under the
occupation of China but claimed by India as part of the Ladakh district of Jammu and
Kashmir
• Neither of the countries have sufficient documents to make strong historical claims in the
area. However, more than the legal claims, the region has huge strategic significance for
China to gain access to Tibet region.
• Historically British always wanted to create outer Tibet as a buffer zone. Boundaries in the
western sector were hardly demarcated.
• In 1957, China built its Western Highway that connects Xinjiang with Tibet, cutting across
Aksai Chin. Eventually occupied it after 1962.

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• In the Ladakh sector, the question of where exactly Chinese forces stood after the war
remains contested.
• Demarcating boundary in Aksai Chin is more complicated because it has never been an
inhabited area & no markers really exist to demarcate their sovereignty.
1.3.2. The Eastern Sector
• At the 1914 China-Tibet-Britain Simla Convention, Sir Henry McMahon, foreign secretary
of British India, drew up the 890-km McMahon Line as the border between British India
and Tibet.
• The line, drawn primarily on the highest watershed principle, marked out previously
unclaimed/undefined borders between Britain and Tibet.
• The line put Tawang and other Tibetan areas in the British empire. The line was forgotten
until the British government published the documents in the 1937 edition of Aitchison’s
Collection of Treaties. Subsequently, China refused to accept the line.
• In the Arunachal sector, China treats the McMahon Line as the LAC. But it challenges
India’s claim that it should follow the watershed. China lays its calim on Arunachal as
“South Tibet” and is specifically keen on the Tawang area.
1.3.3. The Middle Sector
• Disagreement between in certain areas such as the Barahoti plains in Uttarakhand
• Sikkim sector is considered to be settled by China. For a long time, China did not accept
Sikkim’s accession to be a legitimate territory of India. It was only after the joint statement
of 2005, China formally accepted Sikkim as a state of India.
• The basic problem is lack of any formal treaty defining the boundaries & varying
interpretation of Indo-China border. Both the countries went for a full fledged war in 1962
over the issue.
1.4. Current Negotiation Framework

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• In 2003 during PM Vajpayee’s visit to China the 1st comprehensive document for
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development of bilateral ties was signed at the highest level. During this visit both sides
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agreed to establish a special representative mechanism for settling the boundary dispute
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issue.
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For resolving the border dispute the talks are supposed to proceed through a three staged
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process-
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o Stage 1- agreement on the broad principles and political parameters that will be
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followed for resolving the border dispute.

o Stage 2- negotiating the broad framework for resolving disputes in all sectors
o Stage 3- delineating the border in maps and on ground
• In 2005, an agreement was reached on the “political parameters & guiding principles”
(stage 1 of negotiations was completed) that should be followed to resolve the boundary
dispute.
1.4.1. Progress in Negotiations Since 2005
• Currently the talks are in the second stage. In December 2017 SR meeting was the 20th
round of negotiations to come to an agreement upon the broad framework, after which
the talks can enter the last stage.
• Some observers have voiced their opinion that the talks have been stuck in a deadlock in
the 2nd stage of the three staged process.
• In November 2013, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Beijing, both sides
signed a Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) aimed at expanding on the
ground engagement and formalising patrolling rules to prevent recurrence of stand-offs.

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1.5. The Incident in Doklam Area-2017

Map4.3-Doklam Area
Source:
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article12665125.ece/alternates/FREE_660/India%20Bhutan%2
0China
• The land in question spans 269 square kilometres on a sparsely populated plateau in
western Bhutan, which has no diplomatic ties with China and coordinates its relations with
Beijing through New Delhi.
• In 1890, convention Between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet was
signed which delimited the boundary between the Tibet region of China and Sikkim. China
claimed India violated this convention.
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Map4.4-China-Bhutan
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Image Source: https://i0.wp.com/thewire.in/wp-

content/uploads/2017/07/Chinese_incursion_Bhutan.jpg?resize=648%2C505&ssl=1

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• In June 2017 the Indian troops thwarted Chinese attempts to build a road in this area
which constitutes the trijunction between the three countries and is close to India’s Siliguri
corridor. This led to a 73-day-long military standoff between the two countries which
ended in August 2017 with the disengagement of the Indiana and Chinese forces.
• Bhutan said the road China has been building would run from the town of Dokola to the
Bhutanese army camp at Zompelri.
• India argued that the two governments reached an agreement in 2012 that the status of
the Doklam area which falls between China and India on a Bhutanese plateau would be
finalised only through joint consultations involving all parties.
• Bhutan’s Foreign Ministry called it a “direct violation” of agreements reached in 1988 and
1998 to maintain peace and refrain from unilateral action in the area pending a final
border settlement.
• Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang argued that India had “illegally trespassed
the boundary into Chinese territory” when they confronted the Chinese army construction
team.
• The Chinese have responded by suspending the Kailash-Mansoravar yatra through the
Nathu La pass and even warning India to not forget “historical lessons” from the 1962 war.
• For India, securing the Doklam Plateau is seen as essential to the Siliguri corridor, that
connects to its remote northeastern States.
• India has said the Chinese road project threatens its access to the corridor, while China
has questioned why India should even have a say in a matter that concerns only Beijing and
Bhutan.
• Indian analysts said China appeared to be trying to pre-empt settlement negotiations by
establishing its presence in Doklam, As Beijing has been trying long to gain a tactical
advantage in this sector.
• The dispute was discussed briefly without resolution by Chinese President Xi Jinping and
Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the G-20 summit.
• With the August 28, 2017 disengagement while the crisis has been defused for the time
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being, the probability of a future flare up cannot be ruled out.

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1.5.1. Confrontation at the Borders: A Pattern

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• There Have been other such skirmishes in the past too:

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Military stand-off in Chumar-Demchok area in Ladakh region 2014.Chumar area, on the

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other hand, was never contested till recently and was beyond the Chinese claim line of
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1960.
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• In the Depsang incident 2013, Area intruded was beyond the 1960 claim line of China and
also beyond the farthest line up to which Chinese army had reached during 1962 War, the
LAC in this area has not been mutually agreed upon.

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1.6. Rivers
Map4.5-Chinese Dams on the Brahmaputra
Image Source:
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/multimedia/dynamic/01418/brahmaputra_new_14183
38f.jpg
• India and China Share major River Systems such as the Indus and the Brahmaputra. The
two countries do not have any treaty arrangements on the river for water sharing. Under
existing bilateral MoU, China provides to India hydrological information of Brahmaputra
River (Yarlong Zangbo) and Sutlej River (Langqen Zangbo) during the flood seasons.
• Brahmaputra, originates in Tibet, known as the Yarlung Tsangpo there, and flows down to
India and further enters Bangladesh where it joins the Ganges and empties into the Bay of
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Bengal. About 18 percent of Brahmaputra’s water is contributed by glacial melt in Tibet.

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Most of its water is contributed by rainfall in the Indian territory

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• India, China and Bangladesh don't have a joint treaty for the management of Brahmaputra.
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• India and China, in 2006, set up an expert level mechanism to discuss interaction and
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cooperation on sharing flood season hydrological data, emergency management, and other
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issues regarding trans-border rivers.

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• Hydrological data of the river is shared by China, under a MoU signed in October 2013,
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during monsoon season between 15 May and 15 October. The data is mainly of the water
level of the river to alert downstream countries in case of floods.
• Delhi has also asked for data for non-monsoonal flows of the river, because there are
suspicions in India that China could divert the waters of the Brahmaputra to its parched
regions during dry seasons.
• In 2017 monsoon season India did not receive hydrological data - for the Brahmaputra
river from upstream China, despite the agreement.
• Beijing has constructed several hydropower dams on the river, which is known as Yarlung
ZangboTsangpo) in Tibet. The Zangmu dam was operationalised in 2015.
• China says the dams do not store or divert water and they will not be against the interest
of downstream countries. But in recent years, particularly in northeastern India, fears are
also growing that China could suddenly release a huge amount of water.
• The issue of the pollution of the Siang river which has contaminated the flow of the
Brahmaputra in Assam. Though India has raised the issue during December 2017 discussion
with visiting foreign minister Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson has
dismissed the report.

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• Experts argue that in view of China’s dam building- which causes concerns of diversion of
river water, lack of non-monsoonal data and interruption in data sharing, India should push
for a comprehensive river water treaty for Brahmaputra. However, the impending border
dispute is a hurdle fro any such dispute.
• Pending such comprehensive treaty India must use available technological resources,
satellite imagery etc. to monitor the river flow.
• In this context involving Bangladesh, which is also a co-riparian can be considered to
strengthen India’s position.
1.7. Trade and Economy

• Rapid Growth: Trade volume between the two countries in the beginning of the century,
year 2000, stood at US$ 3 billion. In 2008, bilateral trade reached US$ 51.8 billion with
China replacing the United States as India’s largest “Goods trading partner.” In 2011
bilateral trade reached an all-time high of US$ 73.9 billion.
• According to recently released data by Chinese Customs, India-China trade in 2016
decreased by 0.67% year-on-year to US$ 71.18 billion. India’s exports to China decreased by
12.29% year-on-year to US$ 11.748 billion while India’s imports from China saw a year-on-
year growth of 2.01% to US$ 59.428 billion.
• The Indian trade deficit with China is a matter of concern. It stood at $51.08 billion in 2016-
17 and $52.69 billion in 2015-16. India is discussing the issue of allowing greater access to
Indian products and services in the Chinese market with its neighbour.
• In 2016, India was the 7th largest export destination for Chinese products, and the 27th
largest exporter to China.
• India-China trade in the first eight months of 2017 increased by 18.34% year-on-year to
US$ 55.11 billion. India’s exports to China increased by 40.69% year-on-year to US$ 10.60
billion while India’s imports from China saw a year-on-year growth of 14.02 % to US$ 44.50
billion.
• The India-China Economic and Commercial Relations are shaped through various dialogue
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mechanism such as:

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o Joint Economic Group led by the Commerce Ministers of both sides,

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o Strategic Economic Dialogues led by the Vice Chairman of NITI Ayog and the Chairman
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of National Development and Reform Commission of China,

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o the NITI Aayog and the Development Research Center Dialogue and
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o the Financial Dialogue led by Secretary Department of Economic Affairs of India and
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Vice Minister, Ministry of Finance of PRC.

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• Some of the other institutionalized dialogue mechanisms between the two countries
include the Joint Working Group (JWG) on Trade, JWG on Collaboration in Skill
Development and Vocational Education, Joint Working Group on Information and
Communication Technology & High-Technology, Joint Study Group and Joint Task Force on
Regional Trading Agreement (RTA), India-China Joint Working Group on Agriculture, India-
China Joint Working Group on Cooperation in Energy and the.
1.8. Geo-Strategic Competition

• The relation between India and China are shaped and influenced by perceived and real
competition that can turn into conflict and needs to be managed.
• The rise of China and India coincide, historically rise of powers has resulted in conflict.
South Asia, South-East Asia, Indo-Pacific and Africa are certain regions wher this pattern can
be seen.
• Recent decades have seen the emergence of ideas, such as the String of Pearls, a term
coined by US based academics, which refers to the network of Chinese military and
commercial facilities and relationships along its sea lines of communication. The sea lines

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run through several major maritime choke points such as the Strait of Mandeb (connects
the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden), the Strait of Malacca ( stretch of water between the
peninsular Malaysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra).
• The One Belt One Road initiative also involves building maritime infrastructure in the
Indian Ocean; this has strategic implications for India. Key countries in India’s
nieghbourhood- Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Myanmar, Bangladesh- are important
locations for OBOR.
1.9. India’s Response Mechanism

• Malabar Exercise Since 1992: Multi lateral Naval exercise including Japan and the USA.
Past non-permanent participants are Australia and Singapore.
• India-Japan-Australia trilateral
• India-Japan-Australia-US Quadrilateral, Quad Met at the Sidelines of the ASEAN summit at
Manila in November 2017. It is perceived as a coming-together of likeminded Asia-Pacific
democracies to balance China.
• Metal Chain and Iron curtain: Naval analyst Zhang Ming recently proclaimed that the
Islands of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Archipelago could be used as a ‘metal chain’ to
block Chinese access to the Straits of Malacca. China has gone further to claim that India is
building an ‘Iron Curtain’ in the Indian Ocean, which is debatable.
• String of flowers: since 2015, agreements have been signed by India to develop
infrastructure on Agalega islands in Mauritius and Assumption Island of Seychelles. They
add to an Indian listening post on Madagascar, off the coast of Africa, commissioned in
2007 to monitor activities of foreign navies in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). These are
termed as the emergence of an Indian 'String of Flowers' to counter China's 'String of
Pearls'.
• However both countries have denied having either a string of pearls or a string of flowers
strategy.
1.10. Multilateral Engagement

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• Being significant international actors in their own right, India and China interact at various
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few key issues of difference in this context.

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• Anti-Piracy operations: in Gulf of Aden and horn of Africa naval coordination between
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• BCIM corridor: Both countries have been engaging in dialogue on promoting regional
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connectivity through the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor

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• BRICS: Multilateral Cooperation on the issues of common concerns is promoted at this

forum which also includes Russia, Brazil and South Africa e.g. the NDB as alternative to
the Brettonwoods institutions
• BASIC: bloc of four large newly industrialized countries – Brazil, South Africa, India
and China – formed by an agreement on 28 November 2009. The four committed to
act jointly at the Copenhagen climate summit.
• RIC: Russia-India-China Foreign Ministerial Forum is the platform of the three major
countires is aimed at facilitating common position on key global challenges -- radical
ideas, terror threats, Afghanistan and West Asia.
• SCO: The central Asia based organisation is a forum at which both India and China are
members. Countering terrorism is one of the prime objectives of this organisation.
• AIIB: It is a Chinese multilateral initiative which India has joined as the second largest
capital contributor and shareholder.
• G-20: Both the nations are member of this grouping of developed and emerging
economies for deliberating of global economic issues.

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• United Nations: The China being a permanent member of UNSC is important for India
achieving its aims such as UNSC reforms and action agains terrorism. However, in
recent times Chinese attitude towards India’s candidature and UNSC reforms has
been ambiguous. It has also been blocking India’s reqaues at the 1267 committee to
consider banning of Masood Azhar, the head of the Jaish-e-Mohammed,
• OBOR/BRI: The Chinese connectivity initiative was not joined by India which remains
sceptical about the aims and methods of the initiative.
• NSG: China has been blocking India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It has
reiterated that India’s inclusion in the Nuclear Suppliers Group is contingent upon the
country signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
1.10.1 The BCIM Corridor
• One of the key policy initiatives among national governments in Asia in recent years is
directed towards developing sub-regional, regional and trans-regional corridors with the
aim to further connect and integrate their economies.
• One such corridor is the proposed Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar-Economic
Corridor (BCIM-EC) involving four nations and has generated much interests as well as
concerns.
• Conceived as a sub-regional economic cooperation, BCIM initiative was launched in 1999
in Kunming, the capital of Chinese Yunnan province.
• Two prominent objectives had driven the BCIM- one is economic integration of the sub-
region that would also enable integration of Asia and the other is development of the
border regions. The BCIM priority agenda has evolved over time. From the 3-T’s of Trade,
Transport, and Tourism, the BCIM priority agenda has moved to TTE (Trade, Transport, and
Energy).
• The year 2013 was crucial in the development of BCIM initiative. In February that year a
car rally from Kunming to Kolkata (K2K) was organised with great success.The idea was first
mooted in 2006 by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during Chinese President Hu Jintao’s
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visit to New Delhi.In October 2013, during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit
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to China, Kolkata and Kunming as sister-cities was unveiled.

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India and China have a Joint Study Group on BCIM Economic Corridor. The first meeting of
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• These developments have given a clear indication that India and China are prepared to
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• Challenges: The relations between India and China, the strategic implications it might have
on the region and the conditions in the region through which the proposed corridor passes
through are the major challenges.
• There are various political and security issues at the local, national, regional levels that
need to be addressed before discussing the commercial prospects of the BCIM-EC.
• Trade architectures, transit facilities, infrastructure capabilities are all important but these
operational aspects of economic corridor need to be discussed within the larger societal
context. Perhaps, the question boils down to who gets what, and at what cost if the BCIM-
EC is seen purely from the economic perspective.
• If one expands the scope of the BCIM framework to the society there is a lot that the
BCIM initiative could offer to all stakeholders. While top-down governmental initiatives
are important, it is the society that determines the success or failure of any national and
transnational initiatives.

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Map4.6-The BCIM Corridor
Image Source: http://www.thehindu.com/migration_catalog/article10441468.ece/alternates/FREE_660/HURDLES-TO-PROG+HURDLES-

TO-PROGRESS.jpg
1.11. OBOR/BRI
• 6 September 2013, Astana, Xi Jinping’s Speech-Land based silk road economic belt
• In October 2013, his soeech at the Indonesian parliament spelled out the idea of Maritime
silkroute.
• These two ideas combined to form the ambitious One Belt One Road (OBOR) also know
as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
• Considered as the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ambitious project, the One Belt One Road
initiative focuses on:
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o On improving connectivity and cooperation among Asian countries, Africa, China and
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Europe.
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o The emphasis is on enhancing land as well as maritime routes. The policy is significant
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for China since it aims to boost domestic growth in the country.

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It will impact 4.4 billion people.

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• China is said to be spending $1 trillion on it.

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• It is not one project but six major routes which will include several railways line, roads,
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ports and other infrastructure.

• Experts have noted that also a part of China’s strategy for economic diplomacy.
Considering China’s exclusion from G7, OBOR policy might just provide China an
opportunity to continue its economic development.
• China claims these economic corridors will not only build infrastructure in countries that
cannot afford to do it themselves but also boost global trade.
• Beijing hosted the two-day Belt and Road Forum (BRF) in May 2017 facilitating high-level
delegations talks among leaders, including 29 Heads of State, on OBOR. It also marked the
official launch of the OBOR. India did not attend the forum.
• Audit firm PwC estimates that currently about US$ 250 billion worth of projects are either
underway or signed off.
1.11.1. Early Assessment of OBOR/BRI
• China’s strategy: China's strategy to grab land and assets in smaller, less-developed
countries is simple: it gives them loans on high rates for infrastructural projects, gets
equity into projects, and when the country is unable to repay the loan, it gets ownership

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of the project. Thus, it is also seen as a unilateral and exploitative project that involves
strategic footholds in important locations around the world
• China’s image: Many expect this scenario to unfold in dozens of small countries in Asia and
Africa if OBOR project becomes a reality. Touted as a global partnership by China, many
including the United States, believe that OBOR is actually an exploitative, colonial
stratagem to gain vital vital assets in small countries.
• The investment: the investment estimates for project of such a magnitude are touted to
be in excess of US$ 5 trillion, whereas current Chinese commitment stands at estimated
US$ 1 trillion
• Early indicators: In November 2017, Pakistan turned down China's offer of assistance for
the $14-billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam. Pakistan has asked China to take the project out of the
nearly $60 billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor a part of OBOR—and allow it to build
the dam on its own. The reason: it found China's conditions exploitative. From its early
reception, it is clear OBOR faces difficulties even in countries that count China as a friend.
Incidents in Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan have cast serious doubts over China's project to
dominate the world through investments in infrastructure.
1.11.2. India and the OBOR
• India is the only South-Asian country, apart from Bhutan, not to be involved in the Asian
superpower’s ambitious project.
• The main reason behind India’s opposition towards the policy is the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is a part of OBOR.
• Accordin to the MEA India is all for promoting connectivity, however the problem with the
OBOR, is that since the so-called CPEC forms a part of OBOR, and it passes through Indian
territory.
• Citing sovereignty issues, India has raised objections over CPEC projects in Pakistan-
occupied Kashmir (PoK).
• China, however, initially did not try to attenuate India’s concerns. “The CPEC is a flagship
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project, but all countries in South Asia have now confirmed participation in the Belt and
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Road Forum and are making use of the initiative,” Wang Dehua, Director, Institute for South
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and Central Asia Studies in Shanghai.

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• In November 2017, the Chinese Ambassador to India indicated that China“ can change the
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name of CPEC" and "create an alternative corridor through Jammu & Kashmir, Nathu La
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pass or Nepal to deal with India's concerns".

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• Recognizing the significance of connectivity and infrastructure India is putting forward

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alternatives such as the INSTC, Cahabahar corridor and the Asia-Africa growth corridor
1.12. The Pakistan Factor

• With its strategic position, Pakistan offers China an opportunity to expand its influence
against India in South Asia.
• Beijing has been showering Islamabad with military and economic aid, such as the
multibillion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which concerns India as it traverses
through PoK.
• Pakistan’s support to China over the South China Sea issue and its willingness to provide
China a foothold in the Indian Ocean throught the Gwadar port also add to the concerns of
India.
1.13. The USA Factor

• The USA and China are strategic rivals. As china rises and asserts itself the US would be
trying to contain it. India seeks good relations with both

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• The indication of rising tensions can be found in the recently released (December 2017)
Nations Security Strategy document of the USA as well as tariff escalation in 2018.
• In policy terms it is reflected in the Pivot to Asia of the Obama administration and the
Indo-Pacific formulations of the Trump administration.
1.14. The Russia Factor

• Russia and China had frosty relations for much of the Soviet era (Sino Soviet rift of the
1960s). The two countries faced off in 1969 border skirmishes. This led China to open up to
the USA in 1971.
• However, in the recent years there has been a greater convergence between the two
countries on the issues of western interventionism, SCO, Syria, Crimea and South China
Sea. In 2014 the two sides inked a 30-year, $400bn (£237bn) deal for Gazprom to deliver
Russian gas to China in a deal that underscores Russia's shift towards Asia amid strained
relations with the west.
• Thus, there seems to be a short term convergence, however this sits on deep seated
geographical realities that can change the scenario.
• The RIC forum is a key to this triangular interaction for India.
1.15. The Japan Factor

• Japan and China have a complex relationship. The era of Japanese imperialism between
the two world wars is a source of bitter memory.
• The dispute over the Senkaku (japan)/Diaoyu (China) islands is a sign of increasing
tension.
• In such a scenario Japan has started courting India. This scenario has both opportunities
and challenges for India.
• Japan had strongly supported India during the Doklam Standoff.
1.16. The Rise of China and India

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• President Xi- Jinping, is considered to be the strongest leader since Den Xiaoping and by
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some after Mao. OBOR is his brainchild.

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• At the recent 19th Party Congress in October 2017-Xi Jinping thought was included in the
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constitution along with the OBOR.Xi further consolidated his power at the weeklong
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leadership reshuffle event, held every five years.

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• Xi underlined the theme of this year’s congress as never forgetting the party’s founding
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purpose, including realization of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”—also

known as the “Chinese Dream”.
• Under Xi China’s rise has acquired assertive tone and this is expected to continue. e.g. the
South China sea issue.
• China under Xi has caused alarm, interest and caution in the international community.
• India needs to continue cooperation wherever possible, augment is own strength and
resolve border and river disputes amicably. A framework is available for such a strategy.
• For India, the first step is to understand China better, the recent move by the Ministry of
External affairs to establish a think tank dedicated to China with experts fluent in Chinese is
perhaps a good start.


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LECTURE-5
INDIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA
Contents
1. India and South East Asia ......................................................................................................... 91
1.1. Myanmar: The Gateway to South East Asia ...................................................................... 91
1.2. India-Myanmar Relations .................................................................................................. 91
1.2.1. Key Visits .................................................................................................................... 92
1.2.2. Trade........................................................................................................................... 92
1.2.3. Development Assistance ............................................................................................ 92
1.2.4. Security....................................................................................................................... 94
1.2.5. Bilateral Cooperation in Regional/Sub-Regional Context........................................... 94
1.2.6. Chinese Involvement in Myanmar ............................................................................. 94
1.2.7. Significance of Myanmar ............................................................................................ 94
1.2.8. What Should India Do? .............................................................................................. 94
1.3. BIMSTEC ............................................................................................................................ 95
1.4. Mekong-Ganga Cooperation ............................................................................................. 95
2. Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) .................................................................... 95
2.1. What is ASEAN? ................................................................................................................. 95
2.2. India and South East Asia .................................................................................................. 98
2.2.1. Background ................................................................................................................ 98
2.2.2. From Look East to Act East: Evolving Policy Framework ............................................ 98
2.2.3. The Look East Policy ................................................................................................... 99
2.2.4. Taking the Look East Forward: Look East 2.0 or the New Look East .......................... 99
2.2.5. The Act East: Action and Implementation Oriented Approach to a Wider East ...... 100
2.3. India-Asean ..................................................................................................................... 100
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2.3.1. India-ASEAN: Recent Developments ........................................................................ 101

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2.3.2. Trade......................................................................................................................... 101

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2.3.3. Investment ............................................................................................................... 102

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2.4. RCEP Negotiations: From Trade to Economic Partnership .............................................. 102

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2.4.1. Significance of RCEP ................................................................................................. 102

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2.4.2. RCEP and India’s Current Concerns .......................................................................... 103

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2.5. Connectivity .................................................................................................................... 104

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2.6. Security Factor in the region ........................................................................................... 104

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2.6.1. The South China Sea Disputes .................................................................................. 105

2.6.2. India’s Position ......................................................................................................... 106
2.6.3. Need for Further Action: .......................................................................................... 107
2.7. Cultural Ties Between India and South East Asia ............................................................ 107
2.8. India and Singapore......................................................................................................... 107
2.8.1. Background .............................................................................................................. 107
2.8.2. Trade & Investment .................................................................................................. 108
2.8.3. Smart Cities .............................................................................................................. 108
2.8.4. Defence Cooperation ............................................................................................... 108
2.9. India and Vietnam ........................................................................................................... 109

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1. India and South East Asia

1.1. Myanmar: The Gateway to South East Asia
Map5.1 Myanmar
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Image Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

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factbook/graphics/maps/bm-map.gif
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1.2. India-Myanmar Relations

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• India shares a long land border of over 1600 Km with Myanmar (previously known as
Burma) as well as a maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal. Four north-eastern states
(Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram) share boundary with Myanmar.
• India and Myanmar share close cultural ties and a sense of deep kinship given India's
Buddhist heritage.
• Over a period of 62 years (1824-1886), Britain conquered Burma and incorporated the
country into its Indian Empire. Burma was administered as a province of India until 1937
• There are varying estimates of 1.5-2.5 million people of Indian origin living and working in
various parts of Myanmar
• Myanmar is the only ASEAN country adjoining India and, therefore, India’s gateway to
South East Asia with which we are seeking greater economic integration through India's
'Look East' and now 'Act East' Policy.
• The landslide victory by Aung San Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy (NLD) in
November 2015 general elections and the formation of NLD government has provided
opportunities to strengthen the engagement building on previous efforts.

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• Various institutional mechanisms: The first meeting of the India-Myanmar Joint

Consultative Commission (JCC) was held on 16 July 2015 at New Delhi.
• Secretary-level meetings include Foreign Office Consultations at the level of Foreign
Secretary/Dy Foreign Minister.
• Myanmar side has provided assurances at the highest levels that it will cooperate with India
in taking necessary action in preventing the use of Myanmar territory for anti-India
activity.
1.2.1. Key Visits
• Then PM Dr. Manmohan Singh’s State Visit to Myanmar took place (May 2012) after 25
years.
• Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended the 12thASEAN-India Summit and 9 th East Asia
Summit (Nov 11-13, 2014, Nay Pyi Taw).
• Myanmar President U Htin Kyaw undertook a State Visit to India from August 27-30, 2016.
• State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi undertook a State Visit to India on 17- 19 October
2016 after participating in the BRICS-BIMSTEC Outreach Summit in October, at Goa.
1.2.2. Trade
• A bilateral Trade Agreement was signed in 1970. Bilateral trade has been growing steadily
to reach US$2178.44 million (2016-17), of which Indian exports amounted to US$1111.19
million and Indian's imports to US$1067.25 million.
• India is the fifth largest trading partner of Myanmar but trade remains below potential.
Agriculture sector dominates trade, particularly supply of beans & pulses to India ($
809million, 2016-17) and timber ($ 156 million).
• India's exports to Myanmar include sugar ($ 424 million), pharmaceuticals ($ 184 million),
etc.
• Border trade via Moreh and Zawkhatar reached to $ 87.89 million; Indian exports being $
24.44 million and Indian imports being $ 63.46 million.
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India is presently the tenth largest investor with an approved investment of US$ 740.64
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million by 25 Indian companies (as of 30Jun 2017). Most India's investments have been in
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oil & gas sector. 100% FDI is allowed in select sectors. Indian companies have evinced
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interest in investing in Myanmar and major contracts have been won by Indian companies.
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1.2.3. Development Assistance

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• Currently, according to the MEA, India's commitment to Myanmar's development stands

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at over US$ 1.726 billion, which is more than the assistance offered by other countries.
• India has committed to provide grant-in-aid assistance amounting to almost Rs 4000 crore.
These include support for:
o the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project;
o the Trilateral Highway Project, which is an East-West corridor connecting our Northeast
with Myanmar and Thailand;
o the Rhi-Tiddim road;
o supply of Bailey bridges;
o assistance for border area development in the Naga Self Administered Zone by
financing bridges, roads, schools and small health centers;
o assistance in setting up institutions for higher learning and research, namely Myanmar
Institute of Information Technology, Advance Centre for Agricultural Research and
Education, Myanmar-India Entrepreneurship Development Centre, Myanmar-India
Centre for English Language Training, India-Myanmar Industrial Training Centres,
assistance in public health by supporting upgradation of Yangon Children's Hospital,

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Sittwe General Hospital etc.

• Disaster Relief: India has responded promptly and effectively to assist Myanmar in
humanitarian relief operations following natural calamities like Cyclone Mora (2017),
Komen (2015), Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and earthquake in Shan Statein 2010.
• On 20 December 2017, India and Myanmar an MoU, as a government-to-government
(G2G) agreement on long-term socio-economic development of Rakhine, with US$ 25
million commitment from India.
Map5.2 Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project
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Image Source: http://www.myanmarmatters.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Vol6_014.jpg

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1.2.3.1. Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project

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• The project includes a waterways component of 158 km on Kaladan river from Sittwe to
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Paletwa in Myanmar and a road component of 109 km from Paletwa to Zorinpui on the
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India-Myanmar border in Mizoram State. The waterways component comprises Sittwe Port,
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Inland Water Transport (IWT) terminals, backup facilities and navigational channel.
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Mooted in 2003, India entered a framework agreement with Myanmar for Kaladan project
in 2008. Construction began in 2010 with a deadline in June 2015. However, the project
faced delays especially on the road project. Inadequate fund allocation and planning
failure were seen as major reasons for the delay.
• The project is being implemented with GoI’s grant assistance under the head of ‘Aid to
Myanmar
• By Early 2017, Under waterways component, Port and Inland Water Transport (IWT)
terminal at Sittwe and related infrastructure/back up facilities; IWT/trans-shipment
terminal and related facilities at Paletwa; navigational channel along Kaladan river from
Sittwe to Paletwa and six self-propelled IWT vessels have been completed.
• The construction of the road component is behind schedule. The work on road
construction has already been awarded on 17 March 2017 and the construction period is 36
months.
• According to sources, as per the framework agreement, India should also set up an SEZ at
Sittwe, which is located closer to the Chinese port and SEZ at Kyaukphyu.

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1.2.4. Security
• The Indian Armed Forces have traditionally had friendly relations with their Myanmar
counterparts.
• Both countries face problems of armed separatist groups using each other’s soil.
• The KIA, an insurgent group in Myanmar, has backed India’s north-eastern separatist
groups such as ULFA and the NSCN (Khaplang), in consultation with government officials in
China’s neighbouring Yunnan province.
1.2.5. Bilateral Cooperation in Regional/Sub-Regional Context
• Myanmar's membership of ASEAN, BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganga Cooperation has
introduced a regional/sub-regional dimension to bilateral relations and imparted added
significance in the context of our "Act East" policy.
• Myanmar has generally been supportive of India's stand to various international
organisations.
• India supported the inclusion of Myanmar as an observer in SAARC in 2008
1.2.6. Chinese Involvement in Myanmar
• Large Chinese infrastructure and mining projects in Myanmar have come up since the
early 1990s, with scant regard for environmental degradation and displacement.
• China has increased its economic profile in the country in recent times pushing for a special
economic zone at Kyauk Phyu among other projects. The special economic zone, expected
to cover more than 4,200 acres (17 sq. km), includes the $7.3 billion deep sea port and a
$2.3 billion industrial park, with plans to attract industries such as textiles and oil refining,
a Reuters report said.
• It also used short-sighted western aid policies to acquire considerable leverage within
Myanmar.
• China now has an ability to significantly influence Myanmar insurgent groups such as the
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United WA State Army (UWSA) and Kachin Independence Army (KIA).

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• Its navy recently held joint exercises along Myanmar’s shores.

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1.2.7. Significance of Myanmar

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• Myanmar is seen as a crucial partner in the fight to end insurgency in India’s north-east,
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as a gateway to South-East Asia and

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• a key component of new vision for South and South-East Asian regional cooperation and
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India’s Act East Policy.

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• It has significant hydrocarbon resources

• It is also a neighbor that is increasingly being wooed by China.
1.2.8. What Should India Do?
• India needs to review and restructure its economic cooperation with Myanmar, with an
increasing focus on assisting the populations living close to our borders through
imaginative schemes for education, health, communications and small/village industries.
• India has already extended nearly $2 billion in soft loans. It has offered to help Myanmar
developmental assistance in the areas it wants rather than be prescriptive.
• Here the need is to address delays in project implementation.
• India is keen to signing an agreement with Myanmar to streamline the free movement of
people within 16 km along the border. A MoU was signed between the countires in this
context in September 2017. In January 2018 the Union Cabinet had approved proposed
agreement between India and Myanmar on land border crossing to enhance economic
interaction between people of the two countries. However, This agreement is yet to be
signed between the two countries.

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India has shown understanding of Myanmar’s internal problems of insurgency and the Rohingya
issue. Cooperation can be furthered in accordance with the Key Points of Joint Statement
Issued in 2017 during P.M. Modi’s visit to Myanmar
• “India condemned the recent terrorist attacks in northern Rakhine State, wherein several
members of the Myanmar security forces lost their lives. Both sides agreed that terrorism
violates human rights and there should, therefore, be no glorification of terrorists as
martyrs,”.
• On its part, Myanmar “reaffirmed its respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
India and steadfastly upheld the policy of not allowing any insurgent group to utilise
Myanmar’s soil to undertake hostile acts against the Indian Government.
1.3. BIMSTEC
• India’s strategy is to bridge south and South-East Asia. In this context groupings such as the
BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganaga Cooperation are significant.
• The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
(BIMSTEC) formed in 1997.
• It comprises Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, and
brings together 1.5 billion people or 21% of the world population and a combined gross
domestic product (GDP) of over $2.5 trillion.
• For India, making BIMSTEC work is important as for years it has blamed Pakistan for holding
back the SAARC.
• India’s leadership in activating the BIMSTEC was evident in the BRICS-BIMSTEC outreach
hosted in Goa in 2016.
1.4. Mekong-Ganga Cooperation

• The Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) is an initiative by six countries – India and five
ASEAN countries, namely, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam for
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cooperation in tourism, culture, education, as well as transport and communications.

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It was launched in 2000 at Vientiane, Lao PDR. Both the Ganga and the Mekong are
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civilizational rivers, and the MGC initiative aims to facilitate closer contacts among the
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people inhabiting these two major river basins. The MGC is also indicative of the cultural
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and commercial linkages among the member countries of the MGC down the centuries.
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Indian drafted a Plan of Action (POA) 2016-18 which was endorsed to become the core
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guideline for future action. On the future direction of MGC, it was recommended that POA
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2016-18 may be continued.
2. Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

2.1. What is ASEAN?
• The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967 by Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand to promote political and economic
cooperation and regional stability. It based on the vision of an ASEAN Community
comprised of three pillars, the Political-Security Community, Economic Community and
Socio-Cultural Community.

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Map 5.3 ASEAN Members
Image Source:
https://assets.weforum.org/editor/i4SuKiQBoWo0xuL_rK4bt5ymoHAc14VZxI_r976m-P4.PNG
• In 1976, the members signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, emphasizing ASEAN’s
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promotion of peace, friendship, and cooperation to build solidarity.

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• The members signed a deal in 1995 to create a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia
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• It has evolved into a regional grouping that promotes economic, political, and security
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cooperation among its members.

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10 States are part of the ASEAN (Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia,
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Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, Philipines). East Timor is an observer state.

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• It’s secretariat is based in Jakarta.

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• ASEAN is chaired by an annually rotating presidency. Decisions are reached through

consultation and consensus guided by the principles of noninterference in internal affairs
and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.
• In 2007, the ten members adopted the ASEAN Charter
• ASEAN countries have a population of nearly 640 million people and a combined GDP of
$2.57 trillion. Since the start of the ASEAN free trade area in 1993, intra-ASEAN trade has
grown from 19.2 percent to 25.9 percent in 2016.
• The group has spurred economic integration, signing six free-trade agreements with other
regional economies (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea)
• Critics argue that ASEAN’s impact is limited by a lack of strategic vision, diverging national
priorities, and weak leadership. The bloc’s biggest challenge is negotiating a unified
approach to China, particularly in response to its widespread maritime claims in the South
China Sea.

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Map 5.4-ASEAN and Affiliated groups
Image Source: https://www.cfr.org/content/publications/ASEAN-Affiliated-Groups-Final.jpg

• ASEAN security challenges include border disputes, human trafficking, natural and
manmade disasters, food security, and cross-border terrorism and insurgencies.
• Regional security issues are dealt with through ASEAN or the following ASEAN-led forums
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ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)-

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the twenty-seven-member multilateral grouping was developed to facilitate cooperation

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on political and security issues to contribute to regional confidence-building and

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preventive diplomacy.
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• First meeting Held at Bangkok, Thailand, in 1994.

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It includes ASEAN and 10 dialogue partners i.e Australia, Canada, China, the European
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Union, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, New Zealand, and the United States. Also included
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are the Papua New Guinea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan,
Timor-Leste, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
• Unique among international organizations of its type, the ARF is characterized by minimal
institutionalization, decision making by consensus, and the use of both “first track” (official)
and “second track” (nonofficial) diplomacy.
East Asia Summit (EAS)
• Established in 2005, EAS is a unique Leaders-led forum of 18 (10+8). It seeks to promote
security and prosperity in the region and is usually attended by the heads of state from
ASEAN, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United
States.
• It has evolved as a forum for strategic dialogue and cooperation on political, security and
economic issues of common regional concern and plays an important role in the regional
architecture.

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ASEAN+3
• The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) cooperation process began in December 1997 with the
convening of an Informal Summit among the Leaders of ASEAN and China, Japan and the
South Korea. The APT Summit was institutionalised in 1999 when the Leaders issued a
Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation at the Third APT Summit in Manila.
2.2. India and South East Asia

2.2.1. Background
• India and South East Asia have age old cultural and civilisation ties. Hinduism, Buddhism
and Islam spread from India to the region and the imprint of this shared cultural heritage is
also seen in art forms and architecture.
• Geography played an important role in the maritime connectivity through the Monsoon.
• British colonial period saw many from India to migrate to the region and the Indian
National Army received support from this region.
• Cold war period saw estrangement as the region came under the American influence and
India charted its own path. Nonetheless Indonesia was an important part of the NAM.
• The End of Cold war brought new orientation and India moved ahead with the “ Look East
Policy” to cement ties with the region
• In recent times the Act East policy of India accords greater significance to the region.
• Apart from ASEAN, India has taken other policy initiatives in the region that involve some
members of ASEAN like BIMSTEC, MGC etc. India is also an active participant in several
regional forums like the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting + (ADMM+) and Expanded
ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF).
• In the present geopolitical situation, Southeast Asia is the most important focal point of
India's foreign policy.
• By focusing on connectivity, the government wants to make the point that it considers the
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region a part of its immediate, not extended, neighbourhood, given that it shares
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maritime boundaries with some countries and also land boundary in the case of Myanmar.
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• India and ASEAN have just completed 25 years of dialogue partnership, 15 years of
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summit-level interaction and five years of strategic partnership.

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The P.M participated in the15th ASEAN-India Summit and 12th East Asia Summit in
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Manila, Philippines (November 14, 2017)

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• India hosted the leaders of all 10 ASEAN nations for the 2018 Republic Day. As part of a
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commemorative summit.
2.2.2. From Look East to Act East: Evolving Policy Framework
In the context of South East Asia, India’s Look East Policy (LEP) has been a major pillar of our
foreign policy since the early 1990s. In the second half of 2014, LEP was upgraded to Act East
Policy which focuses on the extended neighbourhood in the Asia-Pacific region. The policy
which was originally conceived as an economic initiative, has gained political, strategic and
cultural dimensions including establishment of institutional mechanisms for dialogue and
cooperation.
The key principles and objectives of ''Act East Policy” is to promote economic cooperation,
cultural ties and develop strategic relationship with countries in the Asia-Pacific region through
continuous engagement at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels thereby providing
enhanced connectivity to the States of North Eastern Region with other countries in our
neighbourhood.

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2.2.3. The Look East Policy

• Under PM Narasimha Rao & finance minister Manmohan Singh, India initiated upon the
“look east policy”- The principal aim of the policy was to pursue a policy of active
engagement with countries of South East Asia. Primary focus of this policy was the fast
growing economies of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member-
countries, particularly Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Burma/Myanmar.
• Factors responsible for India’s Look East Policy:
o Collapse of Soviet Union- the collapse of India’s long term ally left India isolated on
the International arena. Moreover, the gulf crisis, the spike in oil prices, the collapse of
rupee-rubal agreement, all left India on its own, without an ally on the international
scene. This made search for new partners imperative.
o Balance of Payment crisis- The BoP crisis & the conditions imposed upon it for
obtaining loans from IMF resulted in India opening up its market by reducing tariffs to
the world. Thus providing a ready market for goods.
• During this initial phase the focus was on establishing trade & economic linkages with East
Asian countries & for achieving this aim, it went ahead to foster greater trade & economic
linkages with ASEAN group of countries.
• In this period India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1992 and then
becoming a Summit level partner in 2002.
• Trade between India and ASEAN multiplied fourfold — from $ 3.1 billion in 1991 to about
$ 12 billion in 2002.
2.2.4. Taking the Look East Forward: Look East 2.0 or the New Look East
While the focus of First phase of Look East policy was primarily on economic engagement, in
the second phase along with deepening of the economic ties, strategic & domestic dimensions
gained salience.
• Thus the three guiding parameters for Look East 2.0 were-
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o Deeper & wider economic engagements- Deeper economic engagements would

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involve establishing institutional linkages between India & ASEAN group of

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countries.2010- India signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN in goods. (This
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is the first trade bloc with which India finalized a FTA). In 2012, trade between India and
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ASEAN stood at $80 billion. Following the implementation of FTA in goods, trade grew
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by 41 per cent in 2011-12. Two-way flows in investments have also grown rapidly to
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reach $43 billion over the past decade.

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o Strategic & Security Component- The phenomenal rise of China has been a cause of
concern for many ASEAN countries & also for other East Asian one’s including Japan,
South Korea etc. The rise of China has been accompanied by its growing assertiveness
in its backyard is seen in the frequency with which it has asserted claims in south china
sea & east china sea. These countries view India as a possible partner in their effort to
maintain balance of power & peace in the region. India tacitly seems to share this
concern as was reflected in PM’s speech in 2012- “India looks at ASEAN not simply as
an institution of economic development but also as an integral part of India’s vision
of stable, secure & prosperous Asia”. However, India does not see itself as adopting a
confrontationist attitude with China, even as it steps up engagement with both ASEAN
& countries like Japan.
o Domestic dimension- Looking East through the North East. India has lagged behind in
economic growth, trade, industrialization & connectivity. Apart from this, the long
porous borders have been a security issue. These factors coupled with ethnic issues
have fuelled insurgency in the region. Establishing trade & connectivity links with
South East Asian countries via North East has been one of the focus areas under the

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Look East policy 2.0. This aimed at economically strengthening the region. For this
purpose, the following initiatives came up in this period suggested-
(a) Trilateral Highway- India-Myanmar-Thailand
(b) Kaladan Multi Modal Transport
(c) Mekong Ganga Corridor
(d) Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor
2.2.5. The Act East: Action and Implementation Oriented Approach to a Wider
East
• The Look East Policy has today matured into a dynamic and action oriented ‘Act East Policy.
PM at the 12th ASEAN India Summit and the 9th East Asia Summit held in Nay Pyi Taw,
Myanmar, in November, 2014, formally enunciated the Act East Policy.
• India's Act East Policy focusses on the extended neighbourhood in the Asia-Pacific region.
• The policy which was originally conceived as an economic initiative, has gained political,
strategic and cultural dimensions including establishment of institutional mechanisms for
dialogue and cooperation.
• India has upgraded its relations to strategic partnership with Indonesia, Vietnam,
Malaysia, Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Singapore and Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and forged close ties with all countries in the Asia-Pacific
region.
• Further, apart from ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asia Summit (EAS),
India has also been actively engaged in regional fora such as Bay of Bengal Initiative for
Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Asia Cooperation
Dialogue (ACD), Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and Indian Ocean Rim Association
(IORA).
• Act East Policy has placed emphasis on India-ASEAN cooperation in our domestic agenda
on infrastructure, manufacturing, trade, skills, urban renewal, smart cities, Make in India
and other initiatives.
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• Connectivity projects, cooperation in space, S&T and people-to-people exchanges could

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become a springboard for regional integration and prosperity.

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•
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The North East of India has been a priority in our Act East Policy (AEP). AEP provides an
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interface between North East India including the state of Arunachal Pradesh and the ASEAN
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region. Various plans at bilateral and regional levels include steady efforts to develop and
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strengthen connectivity of Northeast with the ASEAN region through trade, culture,
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people-to-people contacts and physical infrastructure (road, airport, telecommunication,

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power, etc.). Some of the major projects include Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport
Project, the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway Project, Rhi-Tiddim Road Project,
Border Haats, etc.
2.3. India-Asean
• India's relationship with ASEAN is a key pillar of our foreign policy and the foundation of
our Act East Policy.
• The up-gradation of the relationship into a Strategic Partnership in 2012 was a natural
progression to the ground covered.
• India became a Sectoral Partner of the ASEAN in 1992, Dialogue Partner in 1996 and
Summit Level Partner in 2002.
• There are, in total, 30 Dialogue Mechanisms between India and ASEAN, cutting across
various sectors.

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• Mission to ASEAN: India has set up a separate Mission to ASEAN and the EAS in Jakarta in
April 2015 with a dedicated Ambassador to strengthen engagement with ASEAN and
ASEAN-centric processes.
• Delhi Dialogue: India has an annual Track 1.5 event Delhi Dialogue, for discussing politico-
security and economic issues between ASEAN and India. Since 2009, India has had nine
editions of this event. The 9th edition of Delhi Dialogue was hosted by the MEA on 4-5 July
2017 in New Delhi.
2.3.1. India-ASEAN: Recent Developments
• India hosted leaders of the 10 ASEAN nations ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit to
mark the 25th Anniversary of ASEAN-India Dialogue Relations in January 2018. This
occasion marked the release of Delhi declaration.
• In November 2017 PM participated in the 15th ASEAN-India Summit on the sideline of the
31st ASEAN Summit in Manila.
• The ASEAN-India connectivity summit in Delhi from December 11-12 2017 saw
participation from all the 10 ASEAN countries along with Japan.
• The summit also focused on ensuring better digital connectivity as the government looks
to align its initiative with ASEAN's Master Plan on Connectivity, 2025, which centres on
five strategic areas:
o sustainable infrastructure,
o digital innovation,
o seamless logistics,
o regulatory excellence and
o people’s mobility.
• The summit looked at regulatory frameworks to support digital technologies, financing of
digital infrastructure and use of technology by MSMEs
• India had, in 2015, proposed a $ 1 billion line of credit to promote projects with ASEAN. In
addition.
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• India has also set up a project development fund of $77 million for developing
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manufacturing hubs in CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) countries.

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• Japan had inaugurated an Act East forum with India on 5 December 2017. The forum is
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also meant to expand cooperation with the Japan in the north east.
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• India and Japan seek to counter balance China’s OBOR that is often accused of following
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exploitative debt financing practice.

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•
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Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy converges with India’s Act East Policy, and this
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is specifically beneficial for India’s Northeast where these initiatives geographically

converge.
2.3.2. Trade
• India-ASEAN trade and investment relations have been growing steadily.
• ASEAN is India's fourth largest trading partner.
• India's trade with ASEAN has increased to US$ 70 billion in 2016-17 from US$ 65 billion in
2015-16.
• India's export to ASEAN has increased to US$ 31.07 billion in 2016-17 from US$ 25 billion in
2015-16.
• India’s import to ASEAN increased by 1.8% in 2016-17 vis-à-vis 2015-16 and stood at US$
40.63 billion.
• The trade represents 10.85% of India’s total trade with the world.

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2.3.3. Investment
• Investment flows are also substantial both ways:
• With ASEAN accounts for approximately 12.5% of investment flows into India since 2000.
• FDI inflows into India from ASEAN between April 2000 to August 2017 was about US$
514.73 billion,
• FDI outflows from India to ASEAN countries, the from April 2007 to March 2015, as per data
maintained by DEA, was about US$38.672 billion.
• The final agreement on ASEAN-India Free Trade Area signed on was on 13 August 2009. The
free trade area came into effect on 1 January 2010. ASEAN-India Free Trade Area has been
completed with the entering into force of the ASEAN-India Agreements on Trade in Service
and Investments on 1 July 2015.
• India has setup Project Development Fund with a corpus of INR 500 crores to develop
manufacturing hubs in CLMV countries at the 13th ASEAN India Summit held in Malaysia in
November 2015.
2.4. RCEP Negotiations: From Trade to Economic Partnership

• While the India-ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement was inked and enforced from January 1,
2010, India’s goods trade deficit with ASEAN widened from $4.98 billion in 2010-11 to
$14.75 billion in 2015-16, and then narrowed to $9.56 billion in 2016-17.
• The huge goods trade deficit has led to questions on whether the pact is only helping
ASEAN nations and not benefiting India.
• In this context the Proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is
significant. The 19th round of the Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) meetings and other
related meetings were held from 17 to 28 July 2017 in Hyderabad, India. 20th round of
negotiations for RCEP were held in Incheon, Korea, from October 17 to 28, 2017.
• RCEP is a proposed comprehensive regional economic integration agreement or a mega
Free Trade Agreement amongst the 10-ASEAN countries (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
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Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and its
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six Free Trade Agreements.

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• The RCEP involves negotiations in goods, services, investment, economic and technical
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cooperation, intellectual property rights, competition, dispute settlement and other

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issues like Rules of Origin, customs procedures and trade facilitation measures.
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• The RCEP involves 16 countries:

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o China, Japan and South Korea in North-east Asia;

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o the ten ASEAN members in South-east Asia; and

o three non-East Asian countries -- India, Australia and New Zealand.
2.4.1. Significance of RCEP
• The economies of countries involved in RCEP negotiations account for about half of the
world's population, and about 30% of the global GDP.
• After the USA pulled out of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) under President Trump, the
RCEP is the most significant integration platform for the whole of the Asia-Pacific,
including most of the countries that were involved in the TPP.
• Why should India Join RCEP:
• India should join it because it will mean
o Access to the Asia Pacific region which will be important for its future economic and
strategic status in the region.
o It will deepen its ties with the ASEAN further.

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o RCEP is also an important opportunity for India to meet the higher standards
promoted by a mega Regional Trading Agreement (RTA) while it continues to support
its domestic industries and promotes the development dimensions of trade.
o India has indicated its interest especially in expanding trade in services, removing
trade barriers as well as specific interest in trade in goods like pharmaceuticals and
textiles.
2.4.2. RCEP and India’s Current Concerns
• India currently faces a demand to eliminate duties on 92% of its products and perhaps
keep very low duties on another 7%, covering a total of 99% of all its agricultural and
industrial products.
• What is troubling the government is the fact that other RCEP countries have so far been
lukewarm to India’s demands for greater market access in services, particularly on easing
norms on the movement of professionals and skilled workers across borders for short-term
work.
• India has said no to e-commerce negotiations at the WTO and any difference in its stance
at the RCEP is likely to have repercussions.
• RCEP has been criticized by global and Indian health activists for potentially forcing India
to end its cheap supply of drugs, specially related to HIV/AIDS to developing countries,
especially Africa. India has to be wary of measures that may lead to its losing the right to
produce cheap generic drugs due to the enforcement of a strict IPR regime related to
patent term extension and data exclusivity.
• In 2017 the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has taken a strong stand that the country
should restrain itself from concluding any such pact from which it would not gain in the
medium term.
• Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar’s comments before Department Related Parliamentary
Standing Committee on Commerce in June 2017, called for observance of due restraint and
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not conclude trade arrangements which are not to our medium term advantage.” The
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panel’s report is on ‘trade with Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)’ was
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released on December 18 2017. According to the report, the senior official “submitted that
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a lot of our [India’s free trade] agreements have not served as well as they could have.”
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• Referring to the RCEP before the standing committee, Mr. Jaishankar had said that “though
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larger FTAs are important for getting preferential access to the markets, it is important to
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be cautious about the manner in which such arrangements work out in respect of our
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imports as well as on our efforts to increase the share of manufacturing sector in our
economy.”
• Mr. Jaishankar stressed that India’s external trade arrangements must be supportive of the
Make in India initiative. As per the committee’s report, he pointed out that “emphasis in
these trade arrangements is mostly on trade in goods and the same enthusiasm is not
shared for trade in services. The reluctance in giving market access for trade in services is a
big challenge.”
• The official added that such a strong stand would also be adopted in other negotiations
including those on the proposed India-European Union Broad Based Trade and Investment
Agreement.
• At the ASEAN-India commemorative summit held on January 25 2018, the issue of the
long-delayed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was taken up and India
has maintained commitment to take the process forward.

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2.5. Connectivity
ASEAN-India connectivity is a priority for India as also the ASEAN countries.
• In 2013, India became the third dialogue partner of ASEAN to initiate an ASEAN
Connectivity Coordinating Committee-India Meeting.
• India has made considerable progress in implementing the India-Myanmar-Thailand
Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multimodal Project,
• issues related to increasing the maritime and air connectivity between ASEAN and India and
transforming the corridors of connectivity into economic corridors are under discussion.
• A possible extension to India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway to Cambodia, Lao PDR
and Viet Nam is also under consideration.
• A consensus on finalising the proposed protocol of the India-Myanmar-Thailand Motor
Vehicle Agreement (IMT MVA) has been reached. This agreement will have a critical role in
realizing seamless movement of passenger, personal and cargo vehicles along roads linking
India, Myanmar and Thailand.
• In 2015 PM announced a Line of Credit of US$ 1 billion to promote projects that support
physical and digital connectivity between India and ASEAN and
• India has also organized a Connectivity Summit in December 2017.
2.6. Security Factor in the region

Faced with growing traditional and non-traditional challenges, politico-security cooperation is a
key and an emerging pillar of this relationship:
• Maritime security-Safeguarding Sea lanes of communication and combating piracy
• Radicalisation and terrorism
• Drug trafficking and Human trafficking
• South China Sea disputes
• In this context India has following attributes that can enhance cooperation:
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o Tri services command in Andaman and NIcobar

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o Participation in forum for ASEAN security dialogue such as the ASEAN Regional Forum
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(ARF). India has been attending annual meetings of this forum since 1996 and has
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actively participated in its various activities.

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o The ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) Plus is the highest defence
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consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN. The ADMM+ brings together

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Defence Ministers from the 10 ASEAN nations plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New
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Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russia, and the United States on a biannual basis.
o Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) is an avenue for track 1.5 diplomacy
focusing on cross cutting maritime issues of common concern.
o CSCAP: Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, is a Track-2 organ of
the security related bodies, such as ARF, EAS and the ADMM. India was given a
membership of the CSCAP in 2000 and participates in periodic conference that acts as
forum for regional scholars and experts to exchange views and often provide useful
policy option for Track-1.
• In the Delhi declaration 2018 the two sides reaffirmed the:
o commitment to work closely together on common regional and international security
issues of mutual concern and ensure an open, transparent, inclusive and rules-based
regional architecture through existing ASEAN-led frameworks and mechanisms
o importance of maintaining and promoting peace, stability, maritime safety and
security, freedom of navigation and overflight in the region and other lawful uses of
the seas and unimpeded lawful maritime commerce and to promote peaceful
resolutions of disputes, in accordance United Nations Convention on the Law of the

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Sea (UNCLOS), and the relevant standards and recommended practices by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime
Organization (IMO).
o Strengthen maritime cooperation through existing relevant mechanisms and work
together to prevent and manage accidents and incidents at sea and promote effective
coordination between ASEAN and India in maritime search and rescue.
o Deepen cooperation in combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,
violent extremism and radicalisation through information sharing, law enforcement
cooperation and capacity building under the existing ASEAN-led mechanisms.
o Support the implementation of the Langkawi Declaration on the Global Movement of
Moderates to promote peace, security, upholding rule of law,
o Commitment and promote comprehensive approach to combat terrorism through
close cooperation by disrupting and countering terrorists, terrorist groups and
networks, including by countering cross border movement of terrorists and foreign
terrorist fighters and misuse of Internet including social media by terror entities;
strengthen cooperation to stop terrorism financing efforts, and prevent recruitment of
members of terrorist groups; support efforts in targeting terrorist groups and
sanctuaries; and take further urgent measures to counter and prevent the spread of
terrorism, while stressing that there can be no justification for acts of terror on any
grounds whatsoever.
o Work together with the international community to ensure compliance with the
relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding counter-terrorism, and
to note efforts on the negotiations of the Comprehensive Convention on International
Terrorism (CCIT) at the United Nations.
o Strengthen cooperation between ASEAN and India on cyber-security capacity building
and policy coordination, including through supporting the implementation of the
ASEAN Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy. The declaration also proposed First ASEAN-
India Cyber Dialogue in 2018.
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2.6.1. The South China Sea Disputes

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• Since the 1970s, the South China Sea has been a nest of competing sovereignty claims
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over the island features and ocean spaces by a number of adjacent countries.
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• The South China dispute is over territory, sovereignty and maritime rights and
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entitlement, particularly along the Paracel and the Spratly island chains.
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• These island chains are claimed by a number of countries in the region including China,
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Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei.

• China through its unilateral 9 dash lines, declared in 1947, claims nearly the entire south
China Sea.
• The islands lie among the world's busiest shipping lanes and have vast mineral resources
around them, making them highly strategic assets.
• In addition, China has recently engaged in, amongst other things, the physical
enhancement of many of the small features of the Spratly Islands and enforcement of a
moratorium on fishing in the South China Sea.

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Map 5.5 South China Sea
Image Source:
https://cdn.staticeconomist.com/sites/default/files/images/2017/05/blogs/economistexplains/20170527
_sm909.png
2.6.1.1 Recent Dispute and International Ruling

• In 2013, the Philippines commenced a case against China under the provisions of
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UNCLOS, to the Permanent court of Arbitration in the Hague. Although a long-standing

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party to the Convention, China declined to participate in the establishment of the Tribunal
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or to appear before it.

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• An Arbitral tribunal was constituted under annex vii to the 1982 UNCLOS.
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• Issues concerned: legal basis of maritime rights and entitlements in the South China Sea,
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the status of certain geographic features in the South China Sea, and the lawfulness of
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certain actions taken by China in the South China Sea.

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• China viewed the principal subject matters in dispute as political and beyond the
jurisdiction and competence of the Tribunal.
• The tribunal, issued in 2015 an Award on Jurisdiction, stating that it had jurisdiction to
consider the merits of almost all the Submissions made by the Philippines.
• In 2016 a final Award ruled that many of China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea
were contrary to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and had
thereby violated Philippine sovereign rights and freedoms.
• China states that the both awards are “null and void” and have “no binding force”.
2.6.2. India’s Position
• More the 55 % of India’s trade passes through the region.
• India has significant investments in the hydrocarbon sector along the Vietnam coast, in
South China Sea.
• Thus, India has advocated a peaceful resolution of differences in the framework of
international law.

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• At the same time India has expressed its resolute position supporting the freedom of
navigations and open Sea lanes of Communication. India’s reaction to the PCA verdict
emphasized on freedom of navigation, over-flight and the rule of law.
• Chinese maritime power in South East Asia has a direct bearing on the it navies’ power
projection plans in the Indian Ocean. From an Indian perspective, China’s growing military
presence in the South China Sea has a destabilizing effect on the wider Asian littorals, as
it exacerbates existing power asymmetries.
• By taking a principled stand on the territorial disputes, India must contribute to the
restoration of strategic equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific.
• In the Delhi declaration 2018 India supported the full and effective implementation of the
Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and look forward
to an early conclusion of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).
2.6.3. Need for Further Action:
• It is essential to recognize that India’s domain of maritime interest- now stretching across
the Indo-Pacific provides multiple opportunities
• India needs to expand the vision of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region)
from its Indian Ocean underpinnings to an all-round maritime outreach.
• Promote collaborative multilateral action for sustaining “good order at sea”. This can be
done by fostering cooperation among regional actors on safety of shipping, anti-piracy
operations, search-and-rescue and disaster relief are responsibilities.
• Without relying too much on US endorsement India should initiate an “Indo-Pacific
Maritime partnership” that seeks mutually-beneficial maritime security cooperation with
ASEAN nations.
• The Delhi Declaration 2018 flags much of these ideas. However ideas need to converted
into action and fro that India needs to craft a National Maritime Strategy.
2.7. Cultural Ties Between India and South East Asia

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•
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3 Cs – commerce, connectivity and culture – are at the core of India’s Act East policy.
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•
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India’s soft power is reflected in

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o Buddhism, yoga,
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o Revival of Nalanda University,

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o Chairs of Indian studies in universities (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia)

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o Indian cultural centres (Jakarta, Bali, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Suva, Lautoka), and
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o joint restoration of monuments (Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos).

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• India has been organizing a large number of programmes to boost People-to-People

Interaction with ASEAN,
o such as inviting ASEAN students to India each year for the Students Exchange
Programme,
o Special Training Course for ASEAN diplomats,
o Exchange of Parliamentarians, Participation of ASEAN students in the National
Children’s Science Congress, ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks,
o ASEAN-India Eminent Persons Lecture Series, etc.
o In 2017 As part of commomerative events India organised Youth centric Programs such
as youth summit, artists camp and music band festival.
2.8. India and Singapore

2.8.1. Background
• Singapore was established as a trading post in 1819. It became a colony under British
India, governed from Calcutta (1830-1867). It becam an independent state in 1965.

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• Even though small, 700 Sq Kilometre area, Singapore is strategically located.

• It has become a melting pot of multiracial and multi cultural identities including people of
Indian origi.
• Subhash Chandra Bose had resided in Singapore. Jawahar Lal Nehru visited in 1937 and
1946
• Founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew is credited with transforming Singapore into the
modern city state with economic might.
• Singapore has been a staunch supporter of India in ASEAN. Singapore believes in pivotal
role for India in Asia. Singapore a hub of India’s political, economic, security engagement
in South East Asia. Singapore views India as a stabilising force. “India is Neither dominantly
western nor eastern oriented, India is India”
• 2015 marked 50th anniversary of the bilateral relations and bilateral ties were elevated to
a Strategic Partnership.
• Relations are underpinned by the Defence cooperation agreement 2003 and
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) of 2005.
• The 5-S Plank - Five areas of cooperation to enhance bilateral relations – referred to as
• 5-S Plank- were agreed during the visit of EAM to Singapore in August 2014. 5S Plank
directs the relationship towards– (i) Scale up Trade & Investment; (ii) Speed up
Connectivity; (iii) Smart Cities and Urban Rejuvenation; (iv)Skill development; and (v) State
focus.
2.8.2. Trade & Investment
• Bilateral trade expanded after the conclusion of CECA from US$ 6.7 billion in 2004-05 to
reachUS$ 16.7 billion in 2016-17.
• Singapore is India’s 10th largest bilateral trade partner (2016-17) and the 2nd largest
among ASEAN countries with a share of 2.5 % and 2.6 % of overall trade of India and
Singapore respectively
• Total foreign direct investments from Singapore into India was USD 57.6 billion (till June
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2017) which was 16.8% of total FDI inflow. The outward Indian FDI to Singapore was USD
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49.45 billion (till June 2017), making Singapore one of the top destinations for Indian
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investments.
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• 6000, Indian companies are registered in Singapore

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2.8.3. Smart Cities

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• Singapore has expressed interest in working with India on the Smart Cities initiative. A
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consortium of Singapore companies is working to develop Amaravati, new capital city of

Andhra Pradesh. Singapore is also working with Government of Rajasthan in preparing
Concept Plans for townships in Udaipur and Jodhpur and with the Government of Himachal
Pradesh for developing an integrated township of Greater Shimla.
2.8.4. Defence Cooperation
• Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA), signed in October 2003, and the enhanced DCA
signed in November 2015 provides an overarching framework for bilateral defence
including includes conduct of policy dialogues, working group and staff talks, exercises,
training activities, exhibitions and conferences.
• Pursuant to the enhanced DCA, the inaugural Defence Minister Dialogue was held on 3
June 2016.
• Exchange of visits and exercises are regularly held between armed forces of two countries.
• Singapore Armed forces have unique relation.

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• Navies have mutual logistical support. Indian Navy can base its Naval vessels at the Changi
Naval base permanently. The agreement was strengthened in 2017.
• Singapore India Maritime Bilateral Exercises (SIMBEX) Naval exercise was conducted in
2017 in South China Sea. Air force Agreement.
• In November 2017 the two countries signed an agreement to deepen cooperation in the
maritime security domain and called for ensuring freedom of navigation in critical sea
lanes against the backdrop of China's.
• Agreement provides for naval cooperation through increased engagement in the maritime
security sphere, join exercises, temporary deployments from each other’s naval facilities
and logistics support. Increasing military manoeuvres in the India-Pacific region.
2.9. India and Vietnam

• Vietnam declared independence in 1945. Resistance of the French Rule continued after that
which ended in the defeat of the French in 1954
• Jawahar Lal Nehru became first foreign leader to visit Vietnam in 1954
• Doi-Moi reforms: economic reforms initiated in Vietnam in 1986 with the goal of creating a
"socialist-oriented market economy".
• Vietnam much deeper and historical hostility towards China exacerbated by a 1979 war
• A Strategic Parternship agreement was signed between India and Vietnam in 2007.
• A pivot to India’s role in South East Asia. Export of technology. Possibility of Export of
Brahmos missile
• The two countries had signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement in 2016, pursuant to
which a MoU on Cooperation between the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GCNEP) and the Vietnam Atomic Energy Institute (VINATOM) was signed in 2018.
• Petroleum Exploration: In 2006, OVL won a contract to jointly explore, along with
PetroVietnam, Blocks 127 and 128 in the Phu Khanh basin, Vietnam. It then signed a three-
year deal with Petrovietnam in September 2011 to jointly explore for oil and gas in these
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blocks. OVL later relinquished Block 127 after it encountered dry wells.
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• India signed an agreement with Vietnam in October 2011 to expand and promote oil
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exploration in South China Sea and stood by its decision despite China’s challenge to the
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legality of Indian presence.

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P.M. Narendra Modi visited Vietnam September 2016, on his way to China for the G-20
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PM Modi announced a new line of credit of $500 million for Vietnam to facilitate deeper
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defence cooperation.
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• India already provides Vietnam a $100 million concessional line of credit, some of which
has been used for procuring Offshore Patrol Vehicles (OPVs),
• Talks continue on Akash Surface to Air Missile systems (SR-SAMS) and Dhruv advanced light
helicopters.
• India’s outreach to Hanoi comes at a time when the United States has lifted its long-
standing ban on the sale of lethal military equipment to Vietnam.
• While India may want to downplay the Brahmos sale at this point in its engagement with
Vietnam, a final decision will have to be made soon.


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LECTURE-6
INDIA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC
Contents
1. India and Japan ...................................................................................................................... 111
1.1. Background ..................................................................................................................... 111
1.1.1. New Era of Relationships ......................................................................................... 112
1.2. Economy .......................................................................................................................... 112
1.2.1. Bilateral Assistance and Investment ........................................................................ 112
1.3. Technology Cooperation ................................................................................................. 113
1.4. The Geo-Strategic Dimension ......................................................................................... 113
1.4.1. The Island Dispute with China.................................................................................. 114
1.5. Expanding Scope ............................................................................................................. 114
1.6. Issues to Address............................................................................................................. 115
2. India and South Korea ............................................................................................................ 115
2.1. Background ..................................................................................................................... 115
2.1.1. New Era of Relationships ......................................................................................... 116
2.2. Economy .......................................................................................................................... 116
2.3. Cultural Ties..................................................................................................................... 116
3. India-Australia ........................................................................................................................ 117
3.1. Background ..................................................................................................................... 117
3.2 India-Australia: Institutional Mechanisms ....................................................................... 117
3.3 India-Australia: Recent Ties .............................................................................................. 118
3.4 India-Australia: Political Cooperation............................................................................... 118
3.5 Economic and Trade Relations ......................................................................................... 118
3.6 Civil Nuclear Cooperation ................................................................................................ 119
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4. India and the Pacific Island Countries .................................................................................... 119

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4.1. Pacific Ocean and Island Countries ................................................................................. 119

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4.2. India and the Pacific Island Countries ............................................................................. 119

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4.2.1. India and Pacific Island Countries: FIPIC .................................................................. 120

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4.3 The Concept of Indo-Pacific ............................................................................................. 120

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1. India and Japan

Map 6.1-Japan
1.1. Background
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• The friendship between India and Japan has a long history rooted in spiritual affinity and
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strong cultural and civilizational ties. India’s earliest documented direct contact with Japan
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was with the Todaiji Temple in Nara, where the consecration or eye-opening of the
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towering statue of Lord Buddha was performed by an Indian monk, Bodhisena, in 752 AD.
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In contemporary times, among prominent Indians associated with Japan were Swami
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Vivekananda, Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore, JRD Tata, Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose and
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Judge Radha Binod Pal.

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• The Japan-India Association was set up in 1903, and is today the oldest international
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friendship body in Japan.

• Japan’s victory in its war against Russia in 1905 served as an inspiration to many Asian’s
including in India.
• The two countries have never been adversaries. Bilateral ties have been singularly free of
any kind of dispute – ideological, cultural or territorial.
• Post the Second World War, India did not attend the San Francisco Conference, but decided
to conclude a separate peace treaty with Japan in 1952 after its sovereignty was fully
restored.
• The sole dissenting voice of Judge Radha Binod Pal at the War Crimes Tribunal struck a deep
chord among the Japanese public that continues to reverberate to this day.
• Today, India is the largest democracy in Asia and Japan the most prosperous.
• In the first decade after diplomatic ties were established, several high level exchanges took
place, including Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s visit to India in 1957, Prime
Minister Nehru’s return visit to Tokyo the same year (with a gift of two elephants) and
President Rajendra Prasad’s visit in 1958.

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• A transformational development in the economic history of India was Suzuki Motor

Corporation’s path breaking investment in India in the early 1980s that revolutionized the
automobile sector, bringing in advanced technology and management ethics to India.
• A test of the reliability of Japan as a friend was witnessed in 1991, when Japan was among
the few countries that unconditionally bailed India out of the balance of payment crisis.
1.1.1. New Era of Relationships
• The beginning of the 21st century witnessed a transformation in bilateral ties. During
Prime Minister Mori’s path-breaking visit to India in 2000, the Japan-India Global
Partnership in the 21st century was launched.
• The Joint Statement signed by Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Shinzo Abe in 2006
factored in the new challenges, and the relationship was upgraded to a Global and
Strategic Partnership with the provision of annual Prime Ministerial Summits.
• A Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between Japan and India was
concluded in 2011.
• PM Shinzo Abe paid an official visit to India for the 8th Annual Summit with Prime Minister
Dr. Manmohan Singh from 25-27 January 2014 and was the Chief Guest at the Republic
Day parade in New Delhi.
• Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Japan from 30 August – September 3, 2014 for the
9th Annual Summit Meeting with Prime Minster Shinzo Abe.
• During the visit in 2014, the two sides upgraded the relationship to a ‘Special Strategic and
Global Partnership’. Both sides also agreed to establish the ‘India-Japan Investment
Promotion Partnership’. PM Abe pledged to realize public and private investments worth
JPY 3.5 trillion and doubling of the number of Japanese companies in India over the next
five years.
• Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Visited India in September 2017
1.2. Economy
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• Economic relations between India and Japan have vast potential for growth, given the
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complementarities that exist between the two Asian economies.

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• Japan's interest in India is increasing due to a variety of reasons including India's large and
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growing market and its resources, especially the human resources.

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• The India-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) that came into
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force in August 2011 is the most comprehensive of all such agreements concluded by India.
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• CEPA covers not only trade in goods but also Services, Movement of Natural Persons,
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Investments, Intellectual Property Rights, Custom Procedures and other trade related
issues.
• The CEPA envisages abolition of tariffs over 94% of items traded between India and Japan
over a period of 10 years.
• In the Financial Year (FY) 2015-16, India-Japan trade reached US$ 14.51 billion, showing a
decrease of 6.47% over FR 2014-15, when the total bilateral trade was US$ 15.51 billion.
The bilateral trade in the period April-September 2016 was US$ 6.48 billion. India’s export
to Japan for 2015-16 was US$ 4.66 billion; whereas India’s Import from Japan for 2015-16
was US$ 9.85 billion.
1.2.1. Bilateral Assistance and Investment

• Japan has been extending bilateral loan and grant assistance to India since 1958, and is
the largest bilateral donor for India.
• Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) supports India’s efforts for accelerated
economic development particularly in priority areas like power, transportation,

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environmental projects and projects related to basic human needs. Multiple mega projects
are on the anvil which will transform India in the next decade.
o The Ahmedabad-Mumbai High Speed Rail,
o the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor (DFC),
o the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor with twelve new industrial townships,
o the Chennai-Bengaluru Industrial Corridor (CBIC)
o Delhi Metro Project has also been realized with Japanese assistance.
• Last year has seen the highest ever disbursement of official development assistance from
Japan in a financial year 2016-17
• The amount of Japan's cumulative investment in India since April 2000 to September
2016 is US$ 23.76 billion, which is nearly 8 per cent of India's overall FDI during this period.
Japanese FDI into India has mainly been in automobile, electrical equipment,
telecommunications, chemical and pharmaceutical sectors.
• FDI flows from Japan have almost tripled in last three years (2014-2017).
1.3. Technology Cooperation

• The bilateral Science & Technology Cooperation Agreement signed in 1985 underpins the
bilateral S&T cooperation. The India-Japan Science Council (IJSC) was established in the
year 1993.
• In 2006, Department of Science and Technology (DST) initiated a value based partnership
working on the principles of 'reciprocity and co-funding with the Japan Society for the
Promotion of Science (JSPS) and Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) through MEXT
(Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology).
• Since May 2015, about 250 students have visited Japan under the annual “Japan-Asia Youth
Exchange Program in Science” also known as the “SAKURA Exchange Program"
implemented by DST and JST.
• During the September 2017 visit of Abe to India marked the commencement of the
Mumbai-Ahmedabad high speed rail project (bullet train) with financial and technological
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support of Japan.
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1.4. The Geo-Strategic Dimension

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• The strategic logic underpinning the cooperation between India and Japan is based on:
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• China: The recent joint statement, 2017, calls for “a free, open and prosperous Indo-
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Pacific region where sovereignty and international law are respected, and differences are
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resolved through dialogue, and where all countries, large or small, enjoy freedom of
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navigation and overflight, sustainable development, and a free, fair, and open trade and
investment system.” This is an obvious reference to Chinese assertion in recent times. The
joint statement also endorses the principles on which India decided to sit out the Chinese
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• The joint statement is also much more direct in condemning North Korea and Pakistan. The
statement also hints at the role of China in creating the international problems that North
Korea and Pakistan are today. In a way, India and Japan show themselves to be an open
and democratic bulwark against the conduct of the Rawalpindi-Beijing-Pyongyang axis.
• Japan has been unsure of the US commitment to its allies ever since Donald Trump
started his presidential campaign. The ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) capability of
North Korea has aggravated Tokyo’s worries about the decoupling of the US-Japan alliance.
• India-Japan Act East Forum was launched in 2017 to build synergy between India’s Act East
and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific policies.

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1.4.1. The Island Dispute with China

Map 6.2: Japan-China Island dispute
Image Source: https://cdn.static-economist.com/sites/default/files/images/print edition/20131130 _ ASM111.png

• Ties between Japan and China have been strained by a territorial row over a group of
islands, known as the Senkaku islands in Japan and the Diaoyu islands in China.
• At the heart of the dispute are eight uninhabited islands and rocks in the East China Sea.
They have a total area of about 7 sq km and lie north-east of Taiwan, east of the Chinese
mainland and south-west of Japan's southern-most prefecture, Okinawa. The islands are
controlled by Japan.
• They matter because they are close to important shipping lanes, offer rich fishing grounds
and lie near potential oil and gas reserves.
• They are also in a strategically significant position, amid rising competition between the US
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and China for military primacy in the Asia-Pacific region.

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In 2013, China declared a formal Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) covering airspace
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over the islands and overlapping with airspace claimed by Japan. The ADIZ declaration
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required airlines flying over the waters to first notify China.

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The two countries are often at loggerheads with violation of each other’s line and
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scrambling of fighter jets

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1.5. Expanding Scope

• In the few years the momentum in relationship is marked by the following developments:
o Since 2015 Japan has been made a permanent participant in the Malabar naval
exercises which also involves the US;
o the two countries have inked a civil nuclear deal in 2016—Japan’s first with a non-
signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
o the India-Japan-US trilateral has been upgraded to ministerial level; and
o a new trilateral at the foreign secretary level has been initiated with Australia as the
third country.
o two countries are exploring cooperation on infrastructure and human development
projects beyond India. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), if pursued with an
unwavering focus, has the potential to become a serious counterweight to China’s BRI.
Unlike BRI, the AAGC promises to evolve a consultative mechanism towards
identification and implementation of projects.

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1.6. Issues to Address

• The burgeoning relationship needs to address a few issues to develop optimally:
o Bilateral trade —below $15 billion annually in the last two years—do not reflect the
economic ties between the third and the fourth largest (on purchasing power parity
terms) economies in the world. In this context it must be noted that China is Japan's
biggest trading partner; the two have a bilateral trade of above $300 billion.
o Long pending defence deals—especially the sale of US-2 amphibious aircraft to India—
too hasn’t moved forward.
o UNSC reforms: The cooperation of two countries as part of G-4 needs further
momentum.
• However, these areas of slow growth cannot take away from the tremendous distance that
has been covered elsewhere.
2. India and South Korea

Map 6.3-South Korea
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2.1. Background
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• According to "SamgukYusa" or "The Heritage History of the Three Kingdoms" written in the
13th century, a Princess from Ayodhya (Suriratna) came to Korea, married King Kim-Suro,
and became Queen Hur Hwang-ok in the year 48 AD.
• Korean Buddhist Monk Hyecho (704–787 CE) or Hong Jiao visited India from 723 to 729
AD and wrote travelogue "Pilgrimage to the five kingdoms of India" which gives a vivid
account of Indian culture, politics & society.
• Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore also composed a short but evocative poem – 'Lamp
of the East' - in 1929 about Korea's glorious past and its promising bright future.
• India played an important and positive role in Korean affairs after Korea's independence
in 1945. Mr K P S Menon of India was the Chairman of the 9-member UN Commission set
up in 1947 to hold elections in Korea. During the Korean War (1950- 53), both the warring
sides accepted a resolution sponsored by India, and the ceasefire was declared on 27 July
1953. Lt. General K.S. Thimayya of India, served as the chairman of the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission [NNRC], after the armistice and contributed to resolving the
humanitarian issues arising out of the War, which won appreciation from all quarters.

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• Consistent Indian support for peaceful reunification of the two Koreas has been well
received in this country.
• Bilateral consular relations were established in 1962 which was upgraded to Ambassador-
level in 1973.
2.1.1. New Era of Relationships
• RoK's open market policies found resonance with India's economic liberalization and
'Look East Policy'
• The visit of President APJ Abdul Kalam in 2006, led to the launch of a Joint Task Force to
conclude a bilateral Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)
operationalized on 1st January 2010.
• In 2010, the bilateral ties were raised to the level of Strategic Partnership.
• 2011 two sides signed a Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement was signed.
• Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid a state visit to Korea during 18-19 May 2015, taking
place within the first year of his government. During the visit the bilateral relationship was
upgraded to ‘special strategic partnership’. In the ‘Joint Statement for Special Strategic
Partnership’ PM and President Park Geun-hye agreed to establish a 2+2 consultation
mechanism at Secretary/Vice Minister of Foreign Office and Defence Ministry.
2.2. Economy
• Trade and economic relations have started to gather momentum again following the
implementation of CEPA in 2010
• A revised trade target of USD 40 billion by 2015 was set by PM Singh and President Lee on
25 March 2012. However, bilateral trade has since declined to USD 18.13 billion in 2014-15,
USD 16.56 billion in 2015-16, USD 16.82 billion in 2016-17, which finally recovered and
posted a positive growth of 30% in the first seven months of 2017.
• Shipbuilding, automobile, electronics, textiles, food processing and manufacture being
sectors of particular interest.
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Separately, an updated India ROK Bilateral Air Services Agreement was revised in October
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2015 in New Delhi, tripling the number of flight connections to 19 per week
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• An Indian Chamber of Commerce in Korea was established in January 2010 to help Korean
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companies interested in doing business with India.

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• India and South Korea launched an initiative ‘Korea Plus’, in June 2016 in India to promote
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and facilitate Korean Investments in India.

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• Major Korean conglomerates such as Samsung, Hyundai Motors and LG have made
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significant investments into India, estimated at over $3 billion. Indian investments in ROK
have already exceeded $2 billion.
• Mahindra & Mahindra acquired a majority stake in SsangYong Motors, the country's
4thlargest auto manufacturer, in March 2011, with an investment of about $360 million.
Tata Motors acquired Daewoo Commercial Vehicle Company for $102 million in March
2004.
• In 2017 the two countries also signed agreements to establish $9 billion in concessional
credit and $1 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) funding for infrastructure
development projects in India.
2.3. Cultural Ties

• To further enhance cultural exchanges between Indian and Korea, an Indian Cultural Centre
(ICC) was established in Seoul in April 2011.
• Another Culture Centre was established in Busan in December 2013 on Public Private
Partnership mode.

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• A bust of Rabindranath Tagore was unveiled in Seoul by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha Smt.
Meira Kumar in May 2011.
• A bust of Mahatma Gandhi, presented by ICCR, was unveiled at the Hongbeop-sa temple in
Busan on 21 July 2014.
• ICC in Seoul and Busan offers regular classes on yoga and dance, both contemporary and
classical for promotion of Indian culture.
3. India-Australia
Map 6.4: Australia
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3.1. Background
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• The India-Australia bilateral relationship has undergone evolution in recent years,

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developing along a positive track, into a friendly partnership.

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The two nations have much in common, underpinned by shared values of a pluralistic,
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Westminster-style democracies, Commonwealth traditions, expanding economic

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engagement and increasing high level interaction.

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• Their several commonalities including strong, vibrant, secular and multicultural

democracies, free press, independent judicial system and English language, serve as a
foundation for a closer co-operation and multifaceted interaction.
• The long-standing people-to-people ties, ever increasing Indian students going to
Australia for higher education, growing tourism and sporting links, especially Cricket and
Hockey, have played a significant role in further strengthening bilateral relations between
the two countries.
• With the changing global scenario, Australia has come to look at India as a potential
partner in promoting regional security and stability.
• This led to upgradation of bilateral relationship between the two nations to a ‘Strategic
Partnership’, including a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2009.
3.2 India-Australia: Institutional Mechanisms

• Over the years an array of institutional mechanism has been put in place to promote
bilateral co-operation such as exchange of high level visits, Foreign Ministers’ Framework

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Dialogue, Joint Trade & Commerce Ministerial Commission, Defence Policy Talks including
Policy talks at the level of Senior Officials, Staff Talks, Energy Security Dialogue and
Australia-India Education Council, Track-2 Dialogues like Australia-India Leadership
Dialogue, Youth Dialogue.
• Foreign Ministers’ Framework Dialogue (FMFD), the central mechanism for advancing the
bilateral agenda, is held annually, alternatively in India and Australia.
• The India-Australia Dialogue on East Asia is also held at senior official level.
3.3 India-Australia: Recent Ties

• The two way Prime Ministerial visits in 2014 built significant momentum in the bilateral
relationship.
• Prime Minister Mr. Tony Abbott visited India from 04-05 September 2014, During the visit,
four Agreements/ MoUs on Civil Nuclear Cooperation, Sports, Water resources and Skills
were signed along with a number of significant initiative were launched.
• Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Australia for G20 Leaders' Summit at Brisbane in
November 2014, followed by bilateral visit from 16-18 November 2014. During the visit, he
held wide-ranging talks with then PM Abbott and addressed a joint sitting of both houses of
Parliament, the first by an Indian PM. Five Agreements/MoUs on Social security, Tourism,
Arts & Culture, Sentenced persons and combating Narcotics were signed on this occasion.
• On his State Visit to India during 09-12 April 2017, Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull held
bilateral discussion with Prime Minister Modi and both leaders committed to deepening
bilateral defence and strategic partnership, broader economic relationship with greater
emphasis on energy, education, science and innovation, sports and health cooperation and
strengthening international rule based systems.
• Inaugural Secretary-level Trilateral talks between India, Australia and Japan held in New
Delhi in June 2015. The second Foreign Secretary level trilateral talks were held in Tokyo on
26 February 2016 and the third took place in Canberra on 29 April 2017.
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3.4 India-Australia: Political Cooperation

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Australia supports India’s candidature in an expanded UN Security Council.

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• Both India and Australia are members of the Commonwealth, IORA, ASEAN Regional
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Forum, Asia Pacific Partnership on Climate and Clean Development, and have participated
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in the East Asia Summits.

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Both countries have also been cooperating as members of the Five Interested Parties (FIP)
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in the WTO context.

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• Australia is an important player in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and

supports India's membership of the organisation.
• In 2008, Australia became an Observer in SAARC.
3.5 Economic and Trade Relations

• Bilateral Trade: India’s trade in goods and services with Australia was approximately US$
15.6 billion (A$20.7 bn) in 2016. India's exports to Australia stood approximately at US$4.6
billion (A$6.1 bn) in 2016 while India's import from Australia 3 during the same period
stood at US$11 billion (A$14.6 bn).
• The two countries are currently discussing a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
Agreement (CECA) which will provide greater market access to exporters of goods and
services.
• The two sides have exchanged their goods and services offer lists. It is expected that the
conclusion of the CECA will expand the base of merchandise trade, remove non-tariff
barriers, encourage investment and address the border restrictions to trade.

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• India is also seeking to address its adverse balance of trade in Goods and Services through
specialized market access for its products. During his recent visit to India, Prime Minister
Turnbull confirmed that CECA was still “on the agenda” and both countries remained
committed to it.
3.6 Civil Nuclear Cooperation

• A Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement between the two countries was signed in
September 2014 during the visit of then PM Tony Abbott to India.
• The agreement came into force from 13 November 2015
• provides the framework for substantial new trade in energy between Australia and India.
The Australian Parliament passed the “Civil Nuclear Transfer to India Bill 2016” on 01
December, 2016 which ensures that Uranium mining companies in Australia may fulfil
contracts to supply Australian uranium to India for civil use with confidence that exports
would not be hindered by domestic legal action challenging the consistency of the
safeguards applied by the IAEA in India and Australia’s international non-proliferation
obligations.
• It also ensures that any future bilateral trade in other nuclear-related material or items for
civil use will also be protected.
4. India and the Pacific Island Countries

4.1. Pacific Ocean and Island Countries
• The Pacific Ocean is the earth's largest ocean covering 46 per cent of water surface and 33
per cent of the earth's total surface, making it larger than the entire earth's land area.
• It is bounded by 41 sovereign states plus Taiwan, and 22 non-independent territories.
• It is rich in marine resources and accounts for 71 per cent of the world's ocean fishery
catch.
• The Pacific has for long been an area of geostrategic interest for countries such as the US,
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Japan, China, Russia, Australia, and Indonesia – large economies which lie on its boundary.
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The 14 PIF members are being wooed by these powers.

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• The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) is a political grouping with 18 Members: Australia, Cook
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Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New
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Caledonia New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands,
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Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

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• The Pacific Islands Forum was founded in 1971 as the South Pacific Forum. In 2000, the
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name was changed to the Pacific Islands Forum to better reflect the geographic location of
its members in the north and south Pacific. Its secretariat is based in Suva, Fiji
• Two developed Pacific Island countries – Australia and New Zealand – have tended to
dominate regional cooperation forums such as the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).
4.2. India and the Pacific Island Countries

• India's focus has largely been on the Indian Ocean where it has sought to play a major role
and protect its strategic and commercial interests.
• In recent times India’s interest in the region to its east has expanded to include the Pacific
Ocean as well.
• India has had a long history of cooperation and close engagement with Fiji, which has a
large population of Indian origin.
• In 2016, the state visit by President Pranab Mukherjee to Papua New Guinea (PNG) and
New Zealand marked an important milestone in India’s extended ‘Act East’ policy.

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• India has participated in Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), meetings as one of the 17 dialogue
partners (including US, EU and China).
• The Forum for India Pacific Cooperation (FIPIC) initiative marks a serious effort to expand
India’s engagement in the Pacific region.
4.2.1. India and Pacific Island Countries: FIPIC
• Forum for India Pacific Cooperation (FIPIC) includes 14 of the island countries – Cook
Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. It was launched during the visit of
Prime Minister Modi to Fiji in November 2014.
• The second summit of the Forum for India Pacific Cooperation (FIPIC-2) was organised in
Jaipur on 21-22 August 2015.
• The Ministry of External Affairs, hosted the ‘India-Pacific Islands Sustainable Development
Conference’ in Suva, Fiji from 25 to 26 May, 2017. The conference was held under the
framework of FIPIC.
• Though these countries are relatively small in land area and distant from India, many have
large exclusive economic zones (EEZs), and offer promising possibilities for fruitful
cooperation.
• Transport, communications, renewable energy, health services, fisheries (“blue”
economy), and agro-based industries are areas where India can make an impact.
• In this context India has envisaged following steps:
o Setting up of a 'special fund of $1 million' for adapting climate change vis-a-vis clean
energy,
o establishing a 'trade office' in India,
o 'Pan Pacific Islands e-network' to close the physical distance between the islands by
improving digital connectivity,
o extending visa on arrival at Indian airports for all the fourteen Pacific Island countries,
o 'space cooperation' in space technology applications for improving the quality of life
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of the islands,
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o 'training to diplomats' from Pacific Island countries to increase mutual understanding.

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These countries range in land area from the largest Papua New Guinea (461,700 sq km) to
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the smallest Nauru (21 sq km). The size of their population ranges from Papua New Guinea
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(7.7 million) to Niue (1,500).

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• Development indicators also vary widely with per capita income ranging from USD 27,340
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(Cook Islands) to USD 1020 (Papua New Guinea). These figures highlight the wide
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disparities among these countries.
4.3 The Concept of Indo-Pacific

• The emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a new geopolitical frame of reference is embedded
in the growing strategic importance of the maritime domain and the rise of states that
have demonstrated the ability to ‘transcend’ their respective sub-regions.
• The term “Indo-Pacific” has long been in vogue among marine biologists and
ichthyologists to define the stretch of water from the tropical Indian Ocean, through the
equatorial seas around the Indonesian archipelago, the South China Sea, and to the
western and central Pacific Ocean.
• In geopolitical terms it has come in vogue in the early 21st century and, predictably, has
proved to be far more contentious than its scientific definition.
• It was first brought up by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007 in a speech to the
Indian Parliament to represent the vast swathe of water that connects the Pacific and the
Indian Oceans.

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• It has recently got some traction after Rex Tillerson, the US Secretary of State, used it in a
major policy speech in Washington. Trump in his visit to China also referred to the Indo-
Pacific.
• The first ever use of the term in the National Security Strategy Document of the USA,
released in 2017, has provided the term new salience.
• Against this backdrop, efforts to rejuvenate the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or the
“Quad”) between Australia, India, Japan and the US on the sidelines of the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Manila in 2017 is of
notable significance.
• The rise and increasing assertion of China has provided the current context for the salince
the term has acquired in geo-strategic circles.
• In this context apart from the Quad, the ASEAN and institutions centred around it can
play a key role in evolving an economic, security and political architecture in the Indo-
Pacific.
• India is already a part of Quadrilateral, and engages with ASEA and institutions such as
the EAS as well as ARF.
• Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): is a regional economic forum established in
1989 to leverage the growing interdependence of the Asia-Pacific among 21 members. The
APEC process is supported by a permanent secretariat based in Singapore.
• India is not a member of the APEC. Given its significance in the emerging architecture of
the Indo-Pacific India’s membership in the forum dominated by China can be a positive
step.
• Over the years ideas such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor has been put forward by
the USA.
• In recent times the USA has also underlined India’s significance in this region.
• The idea of Indo-Pacific thus is gaining momentum, the need is to
o Evolve an inclusive, multi-stakeholder approach towards this region of global
significance.
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o Identify key areas of cooperation and encourage multilateralism

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o Avoid narrow goals such as containing China and prevent power struggle
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o Ensure rules based order and address security issues jointly.

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LECTURE-7
INDIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN
Contents
1. India and the Indian Ocean .................................................................................................... 123
1.1. The Indian Ocean ............................................................................................................ 123
1.1.1. Significance of the Indian Ocean .............................................................................. 123
1.1.2. India Ocean: People and Regions ............................................................................. 124
1.1.3. India and the Indian Ocean ...................................................................................... 125
1.1.4. Push for A Comprehensive Maritime Policy............................................................. 125
1.1.5. The Geo-Strategic Dimensions ................................................................................. 125
1.1.6. India’s Vision for Maritime Security ......................................................................... 126
1.1.7. India as Net-Security Provider.................................................................................. 126
1.1.8. Key Developments ................................................................................................... 127
1.2. Prime Ministers Visit to the Indian Ocean Countries 2015 ............................................. 127
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1.2.1. India-Mauritius ......................................................................................................... 127

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1.2.2. India-Seychelles........................................................................................................ 127

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1.2.3. Project Mausam ....................................................................................................... 128

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1.3. Blue Economy .................................................................................................................. 129

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1.4. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) ...................................................................... 129
1.5. Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) .......................................................................... 129

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1. India and the Indian Ocean

Map7.1-The Indian Ocean
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1.1. The Indian Ocean

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• Indian Ocean, covers approximately one-fifth of the total ocean area of the world.
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• It is the smallest, geologically youngest, and physically most complex of the world’s three
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major oceans.
• It stretches for more than 6,200 miles (10,000 km) between the southern tips
of Africa and Australia and, without its marginal seas, has an area of about 28,360,000
square miles (73,440,000 square km).
• The decision by the International Hydrographic Organization in 2000 to delimit a fifth
ocean, the Southern Ocean, removed the portion of the Indian Ocean south of 60 degrees
south latitude.
• The Indian Ocean’s average depth is 12,990 feet (3,960 metres), and its deepest point, in
the Sunda Deep of the Java Trench off the southern coast of the island of Java (Indonesia),
is 24,442 feet (7,450 metres).
1.1.1. Significance of the Indian Ocean
• Four critically important access waterways are the Suez Canal (Egypt), Bab el Mandeb
(Djibouti-Yemen), Strait of Hormuz (Iran-Oman), and Strait of Malacca (Indonesia-
Malaysia).

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• The Indian Ocean provides major sea routes connecting the Middle East, Africa, and East
Asia with Europe and the Americas. It carries a particularly heavy traffic of petroleum and
petroleum products from the oilfields of the Persian Gulf and Indonesia.
• It has significant fisheries resources to the bordering countries for domestic consumption
and export. Fishing fleets from Russia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan also exploit the
Indian Ocean, mainly for shrimp and tuna.
• Large reserves of hydrocarbons are being tapped in the offshore areas of Saudi Arabia,
Iran, India, and western Australia. An estimated 40% of the world's offshore oil production
comes from the Indian Ocean.
• Beach sands rich in heavy minerals and offshore placer deposits are actively exploited by
bordering countries, particularly India, South Africa, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.
• Major Seaports: Chennai (India); Colombo (Sri Lanka); Durban (South Africa); Jakarta
(Indonesia); Kolkata (India); Melbourne (Australia); Mumbai (India); Richards Bay (South
Africa)
• International Trade: Indian Ocean and its various channels are responsible for two-thirds of
world’s oil shipment, one third of world’s cargo movement and nearly half of its container
traffic movement.
1.1.2. India Ocean: People and Regions
• Home to nearly 2.7 billion people, states whose shores are washed by the ocean are rich in
cultural diversity and richness in languages, religions, traditions, arts and cuisines.
• They vary considerably in terms of their areas, populations and levels of economic
development.
• They may also be divided into a number of sub-regions (Australasia, Southeast Asia, South
Asia, West Asia and Eastern & Southern Africa), each with their own regional groupings
(such as ASEAN, SAARC, GCC and SADC, to name a few). Despite such diversity and
differences, these countries are bound together by the Indian Ocean.
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1.1.2.1. Piracy in the Indian Ocean

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• More than eighty countries, organizations, and industry groups participate in operations
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in the IOR under the auspices of the ad hoc, voluntary Contact Group on Piracy off the
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Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), created in January 2009 in response to UN Security Council

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Resolution 1851 on Somali piracy and armed robbery at sea.

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• The International Maritime Bureau continues to report the territorial waters of littoral
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states and offshore waters as high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships,
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particularly in the Gulf of Aden, along the east coast of Africa, the Bay of Bengal, and the
Strait of Malacca;
• the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy
measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security
teams, have reduced incidents of piracy; in response, Somali-based pirates, using hijacked
fishing trawlers as "mother ships" to extend their range, shifted operations as far south as
the Mozambique Channel, eastward to the vicinity of the Maldives, and northeastward to
the Strait of Hormuz;
• Operation Ocean Shield, the NATO naval task force established in 2009 to combat Somali
piracy, concluded its operations in December 2016 as a result of the drop in reported
incidents over the last few years; the EU naval mission continues its operations in the Gulf
of Aden and Indian Ocean;
• the first half of 2017 has seen an increase in attacks with two incidents in the Gulf of Aden,
one in the Red Sea, and four off the coast of Somalia

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1.1.3. India and the Indian Ocean

• India has a coastline of 7,500 km and is surrounded by Oceans and Seas in three sides of its
international boundaries.
• Independent India was a typical continental power, mostly due to its difficult land border
disputes with China and Pakistan.
• During the Cold War days, India wanted that the major world powers should withdraw
themselves from the Indian Ocean, presence of whom was actually a threat to India’s
ideological inclination to the non-aligned movement.
• The end of Cold War brought few changes in Indian policy making, including economic
liberalisation and enhanced supply of oil through Oceans and Seas in an order that
increasing domestic demand for energy is satisfied.
• Approximately 80 percent of India’s energy imports traverse through the Indian Ocean
and its different channels.
• In the 1990s, India became enthused about regional maritime cooperation as well, thanks
to the increasing number of regional trading blocs across the world that played a stimulator
for India’s integration with various regional groupings. Given this context, India’s interests
in the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC, now Indian
Ocean Rim Association- IORA) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium are well founded.
• As Expressed by Prime Minister Modi “For us, it also serves as a strategic bridge with the
nations in our immediate and extended maritime neighbourhood ...”
• The Indian Ocean Region is one of India’s foremost policy priorities.
• India’s approach is evident in the vision of ‘sagar’, which means ocean and stands for
Security and Growth for all in the region.
1.1.4. Push for A Comprehensive Maritime Policy
• There are several factors that are pushing India towards a more comprehensive maritime
policy.
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o India’s own desire to play a significant role in the Indo-Pacific region, which is
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supported by regional powers like United States, Australia and Japan.

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o China’s special emphasis towards Indian Ocean (through its Silk Road project and
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growing cooperation with the littoral nations) as well as its formation of the blue water
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navy was perhaps a reminder to New Delhi that stirred the latter to strengthen its
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1.1.5. The Geo-Strategic Dimensions

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• During his 2015 visit to Mauritius and Seychelles, Prime Minister Mr. Modi underlined that
India is now ready to mark its presence in the wider geographic region of the Indo-Pacific
and India may even consider building military bases outside its own national territory.
• This changed perception should be understood in the context of Mumbai 2008 attack,
perpetrators of which came through the Seas and revealed that India still has to overcome
few challenges in terms of safeguarding its coastlines and national interests.
• India’s Goal is to:
o seek a climate of trust and transparency
o respect for international maritime rules and norms by all countries;
o sensitivity to each other’s interests;
o peaceful resolution of maritime security issues;
o increase in maritime cooperation

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1.1.6. India’s Vision for Maritime Security

• India’s new vision for maritime security is comprehensively articulated in Ensuring Secure
Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, a 2015 document by the Indian Navy.
• The document clarifies that the Indian Navy’s interest areas now cover
o The Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, IOR Island nations, Southwest Indian Ocean
and East Coast of Africa littoral countries among many other nations and areas.
o The South China Sea, East China Sea and Western Pacific Ocean and their littoral
nations are included in the Indian Navy’s secondary priority areas.
By these, one expert has argued that India is trying to satisfy ASEAN which advocates for a
larger Indian role in South China Sea on the one hand and on the other, content US-Australia-
Japan, countries that want to see India as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean.
1.1.7. India as Net-Security Provider
• The 2015 IMSS Document explains that the term Net Security Provider Includes
o “…the state of actual security available in an area, upon balancing prevailing threats,
inherent risks and rising challenges in the maritime environment, against the ability
to monitor, contain and counter all of these.”
• In the process, India’s role in this context also stands clarified. India seeks a role as a ‘net
security provider’ in the region, rather than being a ‘net provider of security’ as a regional
‘policeman.’
• The Joint Strategic Vision with the US (2015), Japan’s inclusion into the Malabar Exercise,
bilateral exercises with countries like Japan, Australia and Indonesia and re-engaging with
the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and South Pacific island nations – all signal India’s
preparedness for a critical role in the Indo-Pacific region.
1.1.7.1. Issues to Address
• To prepare for a larger role India is:
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o Increasing number of joint exercises with IOR partner countries,

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o Promote blue economy and sustainable use of marine resources in a cooperative

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• There are Certain challenges:

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o One of the challenges is the ambitions and activities of China. China’s ambition to
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control the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean and its creation
of a chain of friendly island countries only escalates the existing bilateral tensions
between India and China.
o Another challenge emanates from Pakistan. Pakistan considers India as a constant
threat which has to be deterred.
o India’s poor record in forming multilateral mechanisms (example, SAARC, BIMSTEC
etc.) is another concern as due to its failure in the aforementioned institutions India is
mostly viewed as a country of bilateral choice. Holistic maritime cooperation, on the
other hand, is based on multilateralism.
• However, India is constantly learning, for instance the International Fleet Review in
February 2016 in Vishakhapatnam, India exhibited firm commitment towards intensified
maritime cooperation with the IOR partner nations.

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1.1.8. Key Developments

• U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region released in
January 2015.
• In March 2015 Prime Minister Modi Visited the Indian Ocean Neighbours: Mauritius,
Seychelles and Srilanka
• In May 2015, it was reported that China was going to establish a naval base in the East
African nation of Djibouti.
1.2. Prime Ministers Visit to the Indian Ocean Countries 2015

India’s role as the "net security provider" in the Indian Ocean region received a major boost
when Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited three India Ocean nations of Seychelles, Mauritius
and Sri Lanka from March 10-14 2015.
1.2.1. India-Mauritius
• The national day of Mauritius is celebrated every year on March 12. This day was selected
as a tribute to Gandhiji as he had launched the famous Dandi March.
• 68 per cent of the inhabitants are of Indian origin.
• Mauritius has a vast 2.3 million sq km of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Mauritius by virtue
of its strategic location is recognised as a hub of maritime activities in Indian Ocean.
• Two Countries in 2015, signed five agreements, one on opening up the “ocean economy”,
or “blue economy”.
• Another is a key memorandum of understanding that will see India taking over
responsibility to build transport infrastructure (sea and air links) for the Agalega Islands.
• The induction of an India-built naval patrol vessel 1,300-tonne vessel ‘Barracuda’ for the
Mauritian National Coast Guard marked the first of such sales to this strategic island nation,
which include fast attack craft under construction in Indian shipyards.
• In addition, India has extended a US$500-million Line of Credit for development or security
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projects that Mauritius will decide on.

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1.2.2. India-Seychelles
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P.M Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Seychelles in 34 years.
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• Modi announced that India will give a second Dornier aircraft to the Island nation for
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coastal surveillance
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• The two nations signed four agreements for cooperation in hydrography, renewable
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energy, infrastructure development and hydro-graphic survey.

• Another important agreement is for infrastructure development in the Assumption Island.
• P.M. also inaugurated the first of the eight Coastal Surveillance Radar Systems (CSRS)
being set up by India. India is helping Indian Ocean littorals as part of capacity and
capability enhancement in strengthening their maritime domain awareness capabilities.In
addition to Seychelles, an agreement for setting up similar systems in Maldives is pending
and six Automatic Identification System (AIS) stations have been set up in Sri Lanka.

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Map7.2Various Strategic Posts in The Indian Ocean
Image Source: http://static.indianexpress.com/m-images/M_Id_8720.jpg

Map 7.3: Strategic Geography of the Indian Ocean
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Image Source: http://navalinstitute.com.au/wp-content/uploads/Strategic-Geography-of-the-Indian-

Ocean-2010.jpeg
1.2.3. Project Mausam

• Project ‘Mausam’ is the initiative of Ministry of Culture to be implemented by the
Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) as the nodal agency with research support of the Indira
Gandhi National Centre for the Arts (IGNCA) and National Museum as associate bodies.
• Project ‘Mausam’ was launched in the 38th Session of World Heritage Committee meeting
which was held at Doha in June, 2014.
• This project aims to explore the multi-faceted Indian Ocean ‘world’ – collating
archaeological and historical research in order to document the diversity of cultural,
commercial and religious interactions in the Indian Ocean – extending from East Africa,
the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian Subcontinent and Sri Lanka to the Southeast Asian
archipelago.

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• It also aims to promote research on themes related to the study of Maritime Routes
through international scientific seminars and meetings and by adopting a multidisciplinary
approach.
• 39 Indian Ocean countries identified under Project Mausam.
1.3. Blue Economy

• The Blue Economy is sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved
livelihoods and jobs, while preserving the health of marine and coastal ecosystem. The Blue
Economy encompasses many activities that impact every one. (World Bank)
• The objective of the Blue Economy is to promote smart, sustainable and inclusive growth
and employment opportunities within the Indian Ocean region maritime economic
activities. The Blue Economy is determined to initiate appropriate programs for sustainable
harnessing of ocean resources, research and develop relevant sectors of oceanography,
assess stock marine resources, introduce marine aquaculture deep sea/long line fishing and
biotechnology and develop human resources. (IORA)
• This special area of focus was recognised at the 14th IORA Ministerial Meeting in Perth,
Australia, on 9 October 2014.
1.4. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)

• The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) is an inter-governmental organisation which
was established on 7 March 1997.
• The vision for IORA originated during a visit by late President Nelson Mandela of South
Africa to India in 1995, where he said:
“The natural urge of the facts of history and geography should broaden itself to include the
concept of an Indian Ocean Rim for socio-economic co-operation”
• his sentiment and rationale underpinned the Indian Ocean Rim Initiative in March 1995,
and the creation of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (then known as the Indian Ocean Rim
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Association for Regional Co-operation), in March 1997.

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The IORA has 21 Member States and 7 Dialogue Partners

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• IORA’s apex body is the Council of Foreign Ministers (COM) which meets annually. The
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Republic of South Africa will assume the role for 2017-2019, followed by the United Arab
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A committee of Senior Officials (CSO) meets twice a year to progress IORA’s agenda and
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academics to implement policies and projects to improve the lives of people within the
Indian Ocean Member States.
• The year 2017 is a landmark for IORA, celebrating the 20th Anniversary of the Association
as a proactive inter-governmental organisation
• The Vice-President of India led the Indian delegation to the first Indian Ocean Rim
Association (IORA) Leaders' Summit held on 7 March 2017 in Jakarta to commemorate the
20th Anniversary of the Association.
1.5. Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)

• The ‘Indian Ocean Naval Symposium’ (IONS) is a voluntary initiative that seeks to increase
maritime co-operation among navies of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region by
providing an open and inclusive forum for discussion of regionally relevant maritime
issues.

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• In the process, it endeavors to generate a flow of information between naval professionals

that would lead to common understanding and possibly cooperative solutions on the way
ahead.
• The inaugural IONS-2008 was held in New Delhi, India on 14 Feb 08. CNS, Indian Navy was
designated the Chairman IONS for the period 2008-10. A ‘Charter of Business’ was
mutually agreed to by the Chiefs of the member-navies, which has been forwarded to all
the member navies for ratification. The theme of the IONS-2008 was “Contemporary Trans-
national Challenges – International Maritime Connectivities”.
• That the launch of so important a regional initiative was able to meet with such wide
acceptance across the length and breadth of the Indian Ocean was in itself a unique
phenomenon. There are 35 members - navies of the IONS which have been geographically
grouped into the following four sub-regions:
o South Asian Littorals- Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan, Seychelles and Sri Lanka
o West Asian Littorals- Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and
Yemen
o East African Littorals- Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eriteria, France, Kenya, Madagascar,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan and Tanzania
o South East Asian and Australian Littorals- Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Singapore, Thailand and Timor Leste.
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LECTURE-8
INDIA AND WEST ASIA
Contents
1. India and West Asia ................................................................................................................ 133
1.1. West Asia ......................................................................................................................... 133
1.2. India’s Focus In West Asia ............................................................................................... 133
1.3. India And West Asia: A Background ................................................................................ 133
1.4. The GCC ........................................................................................................................... 135
1.5. India-GCC Relations: Key Aspects.................................................................................... 136
1.6. Basis of Expanding Cooperation...................................................................................... 136
1.6.1. Energy Security......................................................................................................... 137
1.6.2. People to People Ties ............................................................................................... 137
1.6.3. Economic Ties........................................................................................................... 137
1.6.4. Security Ties ............................................................................................................. 137

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2. India-Saudi Arabia .................................................................................................................. 138

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2.1. Background ..................................................................................................................... 138

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2.2. Economy .......................................................................................................................... 138

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2.3. The People....................................................................................................................... 138

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2.4. Security ........................................................................................................................... 139
3. India-UAE................................................................................................................................ 139
3.1. Background ..................................................................................................................... 139
3.2. Recent Momentum ......................................................................................................... 140
3.3. Economy: Trade and Investment ..................................................................................... 140
3.4. The People....................................................................................................................... 140
3.5. Energy ............................................................................................................................. 141
3.6. Strategic Partnership ....................................................................................................... 141
3.7. Key areas to Work on ...................................................................................................... 141

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4. India-Iran ................................................................................................................................ 141
4.1. Background ..................................................................................................................... 141
4.2. Recent Momentum ......................................................................................................... 142
4.3. The Chabahar Port .......................................................................................................... 142
4.4. Economy: Energy Trade ................................................................................................... 143
4.5. Iran: New Opportunities?................................................................................................ 143
4.6. Challenges ....................................................................................................................... 144
4.7. Potential: Way Forward ................................................................................................... 145
5. India-Israel.............................................................................................................................. 145
5.1. Background ..................................................................................................................... 145
5.2. Defence and Security ...................................................................................................... 145
5.3. People ............................................................................................................................. 146
5.4. Trade................................................................................................................................ 146
5.5. Agriculture....................................................................................................................... 146
5.6. Recent Momentum: The Visits of Prime Minsters .......................................................... 146

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5.7. Way Forward ................................................................................................................... 147

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6. India-Palestine ........................................................................................................................ 147

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6.1. The Palestinian Issue ....................................................................................................... 147

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6.2. India’s Position ................................................................................................................ 148

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6.3. Financial Assistance......................................................................................................... 149
6.4. Recent developments and the Future: De-Hyphenation ................................................ 149
6.4.1. Two-State Solution ................................................................................................... 150
7. India’s Look West Policy: An Evolving Framework ................................................................. 150

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1. India and West Asia

1.1. West Asia
• Western Asia, West Asia, Southwestern Asia or Southwest Asia is the westernmost sub
region of Asia. The concept significantly overlaps with the Middle East (or the Near East),
the main difference usually being the exclusion of the majority of Egypt (which would be
counted as part of North Africa) and the inclusion of the Caucasus.
• The term is sometimes used for the purposes of grouping countries in statistics. The total
population of Western Asia is an estimated 300 million as of 2015.
• The World Economy: Historical Statistics (2003) by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) only includes Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Palestinian territories (called West Bank and Gaza in the latter),
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, UAE, and Yemen as West Asian countries.
• The WANA [West Asia & North Africa] Division of MEA deals with all matters relating to
Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Israel, Libya, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Palestine, Sudan, South
Sudan, Somalia, Jordan and Tunisia
• The Gulf Division of MEA includes all matters relating to Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, UAE, GCC and OIC].
1.2. India’s Focus In West Asia

• The region is significant for India’s energy security, people to people ties, trade and
investment and security relations.
• Key actors from India’s perspective in this region are the regional organizations such as
the Gulf Cooperation Council, States such as: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, and Israel.
• India has a historic and abiding interest in the Palestinian issue.
• In this diverse region India’s policy is to seek regional stability which is threatened by
regional rivalries (Iran-Saudi Arabia; Israel-Iran etc) and emergence of non state extremist
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1.3. India And West Asia: A Background1

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• Until the end of the Cold War India’s relations with West Asia were primarily shaped by
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India’s policy responses to evolving geopolitical ground realities internationally and in the
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region.
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When India became independent, the West exercised almost unchallengeable influence
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and control over West Asia. All independent West Asian countries then had strongly anti-
Communist, pro-West regimes and had become a part of the American-led bloc in the
context of the newly emerged Cold War. However, to the West’s great disappointment,
even anger, India adopted a unique approach - not being aligned with either camp.
• India’s consistent support for the Palestinian cause and pan-Arab nationalism with strong
denunciations of Israeli and Western policies further angered Western powers.
• India had consistently provided a welcoming haven to Jewish people going back 2000 years.
But having strongly denounced the Balfour Declaration (1917) during India’s freedom
struggle, it was inevitable for India to oppose the creation of Israel and its admission to the
United Nations as a matter of principle.
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This section is based on Ambassador Ranjit Gupta’s article available at:
http://www.mei.edu/content/map/india-s-relations-west-asia India and West Asia

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• Britain had deliberately created Pakistan as an independent Muslim State. Pakistan’s

belligerent hostility to India from day one was also manifested in its malevolent use of the
Islamic card against India. There was automatic Western and Arab/Iranian/Turkish support
for the emergence of Pakistan and in the many disputes that Pakistan created with India
and in the wars that it initiated against India starting from its brazen invasion of Kashmir on
October 22, 1947.
• Britain sponsored the Baghdad Pact (1955), a military alliance with the region’s
heavyweights — the Shah’s Iran and Iraq (until 1958 a pro-Western monarchy) as well as
Pakistan and Turkey — in order to ensure its continued strategic control over the region
and particularly to prevent the ingress of any Soviet influence. However, Pakistan’s sole
motivation to join the alliance was the “India factor.” Unsurprisingly, India strongly
denounced the formation of this military alliance.
• In the context of non alignment India had viewed the advent of Gamal Abdel Nasser in
Egypt very positively and had great empathy with the Nasserite ideology of pan-Arab
nationalism, socialism, secular and republican governance. India supported Egypt strongly
during the Suez crisis (1956) and against the consequent Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of
Egypt and later in the 1967 war with Israel.
• In 1969 after the Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco invited India to the summit of Muslim
countries in Rabat, which led to the formation of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
(O.I.C.), India was not allowed to participate after the inaugural session due to Pakistan’s
threat to walk out.
• To India’s great annoyance, the O.I.C. and its Contact Group (established at the O.I.C.
summit in Tehran in 1994) adopted, at Pakistani instigation, strongly worded anti-India
recommendations, resolutions and statements regularly on Kashmir and on the supposed
plight of Indian Muslims. Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have been proactively involved
throughout.
• India's relationship with Iraq under Saddam Hussein was close, multidimensional and
fruitful. Indeed, it was probably India’s most valuable and productive bilateral relationship
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in West Asia during the Cold War period. India implemented dozens of projects in Iraq and
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provided military training, particularly for the Iraqi air force. Iraq was India’s leading oil
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supplier. And Saddam Hussein extended explicit political support in the context of India’s
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problems with Pakistan. Both countries were close to the Soviet Union. However, this was
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viewed negatively by almost all West Asian countries.

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• The 1979 Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and the consequent mounting of
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the modern jihad by the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to evict Soviet forces
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became a particularly strong cementing factor between them while becoming yet another
source of severe dissonance between India on the one hand, and West Asian countries and
the West on the other.
• As the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan intensified, the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)
also became a particularly strong Pakistan supporter. These same two Arab countries
became the staunchest supporters of the Taliban regime.
• Iran was also conspicuously pro-Pakistan during both the Shah and Khomenei eras — in
the former as part of the alliance with the West, and in the latter due to Iran’s ambition to
become the leader of the Islamic world and hence its strong support to all ‘Muslim’ causes.
• When the Cold War ended, India’s only friends in West Asia were Palestine Liberation
Organization (P.L.O.) Chairman Yasir ‘Arafat, who was gravely compromised due to his
support for Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait; a greatly weakened and strategically besieged
Saddam; and Oman and Syria.

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• India’s lone pillar of strategic support in the world, the Soviet Union, disintegrated. So
dire was the state of the economy that India’s gold reserves were physically airlifted to
Europe in 1990 in order to enable an International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) loan.
• Post Cold War India ceased viewing West Asia through the prism of its issues with
Pakistan, discontinued the use of strong rhetoric denouncing other countries’ policies, and
abandoned defensive, reactive policy approaches.
• India also started consciously courting the United States, now the lone global superpower.
Importantly, India began to reach out to all West Asian countries without picking and
choosing between them, and on the basis of mutual benefit.
• In particularly audacious moves in December 1991, India reversed its earlier vote in the
United Nations that had equated Zionism with racism. After personally obtaining P.L.O.
Chairman Arafat’s full concurrence, Narasimha Rao established full diplomatic relations
with Israel in January 1992, disregarding extremely strong domestic criticism. The
relationship has flourished since then.
• In December 1992, Rao, courageously risking a potential rebuff, reached out to Iran; his
visit the next year turned out to be exceedingly satisfying. A great rapport was established
between him and President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
• The Indian economy began to grow impressively, even as Pakistan became increasingly
enmeshed in Afghanistan and mired in internal political instability. The spreading Islamist
extremist militancy and terrorism in Pakistan and West Asia — while the world’s third
largest Muslim community in India remained immune to this danger — presented a
particularly strong and impressive contrast internationally.
• Taken together, these developments constituted public recognition that the world
welcomed India’s rise, in contrast with growing anxieties about China’s rise. These same
circumstances also persuaded Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies to look at India very
differently.
• In response to Pakistan’s adventurism in Kargil in 1999, West Asian countries and the
West declined to support Pakistan — the first time such response in the long history of the
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India-Pakistan conflict.
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• With the advent of the new millennium, there has been an extraordinary turnaround in
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the relationship between the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.) countries and India.
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• The Indo-Iranian economic relationship is also poised for a dramatic upsurge. On May 24,
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2016, Prime Minister Modi and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani signed a historic deal to
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develop the strategic port of Chabahar and thereby open transport-and-trade corridor to
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and through Afghanistan to Central Asia and Europe.

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• First ever visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Israel in 2017 and reciprocal visit of Israel’s
prime minister in 2018 have moved relations with Israel in to the fore.
• Prime Minster Modi’s stand alone visit to Palestine in 2018 again reiterated India’s support
for a Palestinian state and completed what is known as de-hyphenation of relations
between India on the one hand and Israel and Palestine on the other.
• Wars in Syria and Yemen, emergence of ISIS, difference between Iran and Arab States as
well as political transition, mark different aspects of current conflicts in West Asia.
However, by a large India and leadership in these countries have consciously not allowed
this to adversely affect their bilateral relations.
1.4. The GCC

• Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), is political and economic alliance of six West Asian
countries:
o Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman.

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• The GCC was established in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in May 1981. officially it is known as
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf
• The purpose of the GCC is to achieve unity among its members based on their common
objectives and their similar political and cultural identities, which are rooted in Islamic
beliefs.
• Presidency of the council rotates annually.
• The GCC also has a defense planning council that coordinates military cooperation
between member countries.
• The highest decision-making entity of the GCC is the Supreme Council, which meets on an
annual basis and consists of GCC heads of state. Decisions of the Supreme Council are
adopted by unanimous approval.
• Some of the most important achievements of the GCC include the creation of the Peninsula
Shield Force, a joint military venture based in Saudi Arabia, and the signing of an
intelligence-sharing pact in 2004.
• At a GCC summit in December 2009, an agreement was reached to launch a single
regional currency similar to the euro. This agreement remains unimplemented yet.
1.5. India-GCC Relations: Key Aspects

• Collectively, the G.C.C. countries have become India’s preeminent oil and gas supplier and
leading trade partner.
• Indians are the largest expatriate group in each of the six G.C.C. countries.
• 3,050,000 Indians live and work in Saudi Arabia constituting the largest number of Indian
passport holders abroad, followed by 2,800,000 in the U.A.E.
• The processes propelling this movement took place because of the high comfort level with
Indians due to the millennia old people to people interaction and their reputation for
being law abiding and hard-working. There was no Indian government role in sending them
to the region.
•
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Significantly, the number of Indians in G.C.C. countries has continued to rise

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notwithstanding the tightening of domestic policies to curtail the influx of expatriate

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manpower and despite the ongoing wars in West Asia from early 2011 onwards.
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1.6. Basis of Expanding Cooperation

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• No major power has the kind of people-to-people socio-cultural compatibility and socio-
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economic interdependence with countries of the Gulf region, in particular with G.C.C.
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countries that India has.

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• Except for continuing O.I.C. activism relating to Kashmir in particular, there are no
bilaterally contentious political issues between India and the G.C.C. countries.
• India is very proud of being the world's largest democracy but India believes strongly that it
is not the business of foreign countries to impose forms of government on other countries;
in fact,
• India believes that monarchies in G.C.C. countries are a factor of stability, fully in keeping
with the customs, ethos and traditions of the Arabian Peninsula.
• The deadly terrorist attacks in November 2008 in Mumbai was a watershed — the G.C.C.
countries finally recognized the potential dangers to the region of Pakistani-sponsored
terrorism against India.
• Since then in particular Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. have provided excellent and
expanding anti-terrorism cooperation by repatriating those India wanted for terrorist
activity .
• P.M.s historic visits to the U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Qatar between August 2015 and
June 2016 have marked renewed cooperation.

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1.6.1. Energy Security

• The IEA defines Energy Security as uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an
affordable price.
• India is a net importer of energy resources.
• Much of this import is sourced from West Asia, specifically the Gulf countries.
• In 2001, the region accounted for 66 percent of oil imports and in 2016 it accounted for 64
percent. Saudi Arabia has been the largest oil supplier to India over the years.
• The Gulf Arab states 85 percent of its natural gas requirements
• India is the third largest export destination for gas from Qatar (behind Japan and South
Korea). Qatar is the largest supplier of LNG to India, accounting for over 65 per cent of
India’s global import and 15 per cent of Qatar’s export of LNG.
1.6.2. People to People Ties
• GCC countries are host to the over 8 million strong and growing Indian expatriate
community
• This is also refelcted in about US$ 35 billion annual remittances.
• Hajj- In 2017 India's Haj quota increased from 1,36,020 to 1,70,520.
• The Indian workers in Gulf countries face various issues:
o Delayed or non payment of Wages;
o Exit Visa issues;
o non-fulfilment of contracts;
o filing of false police cases etc
• India has signed Labour Agreements with multiple GCC countries including Saudi Arabia
and the UAE.
1.6.3. Economic Ties
• The GCC region remains a top priority region for India, being one of the our largest trading
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partners with bilateral trade over US$ 97 billion in 2015-16. In 2013-14 It was India’s
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largest trading partner group with a trade of US$ 171 billion (MEA).
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• India is also seeking to tap the G.C.C. countries’ sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) for its
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domestic investment and infrastructural development.

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• Negotiations for and India-GCC FTA is expected to boost business and economic
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cooperation between the two sides.

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1.6.4. Security Ties

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• Security Challenges: Radicalisation and terrorism, regional wars and maritime security
remain key security challenges in the region.
• Wars in Syria and Yemen, emergence of ISIS, difference between Iran and Arab States as
well as political transition, marks different aspects of current conflicts in West Asia.
• India’s maritime doctrine of 2009 and 2015 state that the Gulf and Arabian Sea are vital
to India’s interests, including securing choke points.
• In recent years, India has signed security and defense agreements with Saudi Arabia, the
UAE, Oman, and Qatar.
• The naval engagement with Oman has been most notable. While India and Oman entered
into a “strategic partnership” in 2008, naval cooperation has been on since 1993 in the
form of a biennial exercise, Naseem Al-Bahr.
• More significantly, Oman has played a key role in sustaining India’s security efforts in the
Gulf of Aden by offering berthing and replenishment facilities to naval ships, and hosting
a crucial listening post in the Western Indian Ocean. In 2018 India and Oman signed an
agreement allowing Indian Naval vessels to use the Duqm Port.

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2. India-Saudi Arabia
2.1. Background
• Visit of King Abdullah to India in 2006 resulted in signing of ‘Delhi Declaration’ imparting a
fresh momentum to the bilateral relationship. The visit provided the framework for
cooperation in all fields of mutual interest.
• The reciprocal visit by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to Saudi Arabia in 2010 raised
the level of bilateral engagement to ‘Strategic Partnership’ and the ‘Riyadh Declaration’
signed during the visit captured the spirit of enhanced cooperation in political, economic,
security and defence realms.
• The visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Riyadh from April 2-3, 2016 could be seen as
a taking forward the momentum.
2.2. Economy
• Saudi Arabia today is India’s 4th largest trade partner (after China, USA and UAE) and
• The value of India Saudi Arabia bilateral trade during 2016-17 decreased to USD 25.079
billion, a slight decrease from USD 26.71 billion in 2015-16, as per figures provided by the
Directorate General of Foreign Trade.
• During this period, our imports from Saudi Arabia reached USD 19.94 billion, registering a
decline of 1.85% over previous year (USD 20.32 billion) whereas our exports to Saudi
Arabia reached USD 5.13 billion registering a decline of 19.70% over previous year (USD
6.39 billion). The current bilateral trade (April-May 2017) is valued USD 4.063 billion.
• Saudi Arabia is the 8th largest market in the world for Indian exports and is destination to
more than 1.86% (2016-17) of India’s global exports. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is
the source of 5.19% (2016-17) of India’s global imports.
• For Saudi Arabia, as per 2016 data, India is the 4th largest market for its exports,
accounting for 9.3 % of its global exports. In terms of imports by Saudi Arabia, India ranks
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7th and is source of around 3.7 % of Saudi Arabia’s total imports.

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2.3. The People

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• The 3.2 million strong Indian community in Saudi Arabia is the largest expatriate
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community in the Kingdom and is the ‘most preferred community’ due to their expertise,
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sense of discipline, law abiding and peace loving nature.

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Saudi Arabia continues to be among the most preferred destinations for Indians seeking
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jobs abroad, resulting in the Gulf kingdom becoming among the highest sources of
remittances to India, according to official data. According to figures provided by the
Embassy of India in Riyadh, the number of expatriate Indians in Saudi Arabia increased
from 3,039,193 in March 2017 to 3,253,901 in October 2017, a rise of over 200,000 within
seven months.
• However, there are issues pertaining to employment and living conditions, that the two
countries engage in to resolve bilaterally
• Agreement on Labour Cooperation for Domestic Service Workers Recruitment, was signed
in 2014.
• In 2016 external affairs ministry and the Saudi labour ministry also signed an agreement
on labour cooperation for recruitment of general category workers
• In April 2013, King Abdullah announced a grace period allowing overstaying expatriates to
correct the status, get new jobs or leave the country without facing penal action till the end
of the grace period i.e. November 3, 2013. More than 1.4 lakh Indians availed the amnesty
and returned back to home without facing penalty.

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• Saudization, officially known as Saudi nationalization scheme, or Nitaqat system in Arabic,

is the newest policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia implemented by its Ministry of Labor .
• The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been following the policy of Nitaqat
(Saudization), since 2011. This broadly aims at increasing the employment opportunities
of the Saudi citizens both in the public and private sectors by reducing dependence on the
expatriate workers.
• These efforts of the Saudi side have of late gained momentum after the ongoing slowdown
of the economy due to continued low crude oil prices. From September 2017, only a
handful of organisations with high grades - based on number of Saudi nationals employed
by them and other criteria - will be able to apply for new block visas for migrant employees.
• The policy is not specifically directed at Indian nationals and the Saudi Government is
exercising its prerogative and sovereign right by following this policy uniformly in respect of
all foreign nationalities.
• However, full implementation of the policy has implications for Indians in Saudi Arabia.
Thus:
o The Government has been in regular contact with the Saudi Government towards
safeguarding the interests and welfare of the resident Indian community.
o There is a need for a comprehensive policy response at the level of the Union
government
o Since the welfare of any of the Indian’s returning from Saudi Arabi lies with their
respective state, there is a need to prepare the states for such eventuality and enhance
Union State cooperation.
2.4. Security
• The 2010 Riyadh Declaration has been termed as ‘a new era of strategic partnership’
between the two countries. The visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Riyadh from April
2-3, 2016 could be seen as a taking forward the momentum in India’s growing engagement
with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has taken an upward strategic direction.
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•
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Terrorism is an important issue on which cooperation between India and Saudi Arabia is
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crucial. Collaborating with each other in combating terrorism has become necessary
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keeping in view the transnational nature of terrorist funding, operation and ideology.
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• In 2015 the Saudis deported Abu Jundal, who was wanted in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks,
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making counter terrorism a key area of cooperation between the two countries.
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• The visit of A. K. Antony to Saudi Arabia on February 13-14, 2012 was the first ever visit by
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an Indian Defence Minister to the Kingdom.

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• Only in recent years that the two countries have begun to conduct joint naval exercises.
Indian ships have visited Saudi Arabia on port calls and India has been providing training to
some Saudi defence personnel.
3. India-UAE
3.1. Background
• India and United Arab Emirates (UAE) enjoy strong bonds of friendship based on age-old
cultural, religious and economic ties between the two nations.
• The relationship flourished after the accession of H.H. Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan as
the Ruler of Abu Dhabi in 1966 and subsequently with the creation of the UAE Federation
in 1971.
• Both countries soon established diplomatic relations in 1972 with UAE Embassy in India
opening in 1972 and Indian Embassy in UAE opening in 1973. Since then, both sides have
made sincere efforts to improve relations in all fields.

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3.2. Recent Momentum

• The visit Prime Minister of India to UAE on 16-17 August 2015 marked the beginning of a
new comprehensive and strategic partnership.
• Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, crown prince of Abu Dhabi and deputy supreme
commander of the UAE armed forces, visited India twice — once in February 2016 and
then as chief guest at the Republic Day celebrations in 2017.
• P.M. Modi visited UAE in February 2018. This was his second visit to the UAE, which has
emerged as a key strategic partner of India. After their talks, the two sides signed five
agreements related to energy sector, railways, manpower and financial services.
3.3. Economy: Trade and Investment

• India-UAE bilateral relationship has evolved into a significant partnership in the economic
and commercial sphere. India-UAE trade is around US$ 52 billion (2016-17) making India
the largest trading partner of UAE, while UAE is India’s third largest trading partner (after
China and US).
• UAE is the second largest export destination of India of over US$ 30 billion for the year
2016-17.
• Investment: There is an estimated US$ 8 billion UAE investment in India of which around
US$ 4.03 billion (Mar. 2016) is in the form of foreign direct investment, while the
remaining is portfolio investment.
• UAE is the tenth biggest investor in India in terms of FDI. UAE’s investments in India are
concentrated mainly in five sectors: Services (10.33%), Construction Development (9.97%),
Power (9.54%), Air Transport (8.44%) and Hotel & Tourism (7.82%).
3.4. The People

• UAE is home to 2.8 million Indian expatriates, the largest expatriate community in the
UAE.
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• Professionally qualified personnel constitute about 15 & 20 percent of the community,

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followed by 20 percent white-collar non-professionals (clerical staff, shop assistants, sales

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men, accountants, etc.) and the remainder 65% comprises blue-collar workers.
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• There is a significant business community from India. The Indian community has played a
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major role in the economic development of the UAE.

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• The annual remittances made by the large Indian community in UAE amount to over US$
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13.75 billion (2015).

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• The contribution of Indian community in development and prosperity of UAE was also
acknowledged by UAE Government during the discussions in recently concluded 2nd India-
UAE Strategic Dialogue.
• In 2018 India and the UAE signed an MoU that aims to institutionalize the collaborative
administration of contractual employment of Indian workers in the Gulf country.
• IN 2015 government of Abu Dhabi announced plans for building the first Hindu temple in
Abu Dhabi and allocated land for it. The Ground breaking took place in 2018.
• There are 1,076 flights a week between India and the UAE, which is the largest operation
of its kind. More than 50 percent of Indians, who travel outside India to
different destinations, such as Europe or America, use Dubai and Abu Dhabi as their transit
hub.

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3.5. Energy
• The UAE contributes significantly to India’s energy security and was the fifth-largest
supplier of crude oil to India in 2016-17.
• The UAE accounts for 8 percent of India’s oil imports.
• India is the second-biggest buyer of U.A.E. crude behind Japan.
• Significantly, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), in a first of its kind deal, has
agreed to store crude oil in India’s strategic storage facility at Manglore.
• In 2018 consortium of Indian oil companies led by ONGC videsh ltd. signed an agreement
for 10% stake in one of Abu Dhabi’s offshore Lower Zakum Concession.
• This is the first Indian Investment in upstream oil sector of UAE, transforming the
traditional buyer-seller relationship to a long-term investor relationship.
3.6. Strategic Partnership

• India and UAE signed an agreement to upgrade the relations to Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership, apart from 13 other MoUs, in 2017.
• the first Strategic Dialogue meeting between the two Foreign Offices was held in New Delhi
on January 20, 2017. The second Meeting took Place in October 2017 in Abu Dhabi
• India and UAE see each other as important players in maintaining peace and stability in
their respective regions and have reinforced their partnership in countering terrorism,
combating radicalization and preventing terror finance through intelligence sharing and
close contacts between their National Security Councils.
• The most significant support from the UAE came to India after the Uri attack when Abu
Dhabi sent out a very clear public statement suggesting India to take decisive action
against perpetrators of the attack. Even on Pathankot attack, the UAE supported India.
3.7. Key areas to Work on

• UAE also has the large sovereign wealth fund that India IS looking for investments. There
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is an agreement that UAE will invest nearly $75 billion in India over the next few years
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• In 2017, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority became the first institutional investor in the
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National Investment and Infrastructure Fund’s Master Fund, with an investment of $1

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billion.
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•
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In January 2018 Dubai Ports (DP) World, the top port operator in the United Arab
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Emirates (UAE), announced that has partnered with NIIF to invest in India's infrastructure
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projects.
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4. India-Iran
4.1. Background
• India-Iran relations span millennia marked by meaningful interactions. The two countries
shared a border till 1947 and share several common features in their language, culture and
traditions.
• Independent India and Iran established diplomatic links on March 15, 1950. In addition to
the Embassy in Tehran, India has two Consulates in Iran, one in Bandar Abbas and other in
Zahedan.
• In recent times Iran has emerged as a key location for India’s connectivity initiatives for
Afghanistan and Central Asia.
• Thus, connectivity, commerce, culture, and energy are key pillars of India Iran relation in
the current context.

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4.2. Recent Momentum

• The trend was enhanced at the turn of the millennium with the visit of Prime Minister Shri
Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Tehran in April 2001 wherein the two countries signed the “Tehran
Declaration” which set forth the areas of possible cooperation between the two countries.
• President Mohammad Khatami visited India from January 24-28, 2003 as the Chief Guest
at the Republic Day parade. Both sides signed “The New Delhi Declaration” which set forth
the vision of strategic partnership between India and Iran.
• Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh visited Iran to attend the 16th NonAligned
Movement (NAM) Summit held in Tehran from August 28-31, 2012.
• Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi paid a bilateral visit to Iran from May 22- 23, 2016. 12
MoUs/Agreements were signed between India and Iran.
• External Affairs Minister Smt. Sushma Swaraj visited Iran on December 2, 2017 on her
return journey from SCO Summit at Sochi.
• Chabahar Port was inaugurated by the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran H.E. Mr
Hassan Rouhani on December 3 in the presence of Ministers from India, Afghanistan and
the region.
• President Hassan Rouhani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, paid his first State
Visit to India from 15-17 February 2018.
4.3. The Chabahar Port

• Trilateral Transit and Trade Agreement signed in May 2016 between India, Iran and
Afghanistan.
• Under the agreement signed between India and Iran in May 2016 , India is to equip and
operate two berths in Chabahar Port Phase-I with capital investment of USD 85.21 million
and annual revenue expenditure of USD 22.95 million on a 10-year lease.
• Chabahar port's location on the south-eastern coast of Iran is expected to open up greater
opportunities for promotion of trade and commerce, especially from the ports along
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India’s western coast, with Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia and beyond.
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• India's participation in the development of Chabahar Port will provide India an alternative
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and reliable access route into Afghanistan utilizing India’s earlier investment in Zaranj-
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Delaram road built in Afghanistan, and also a reliable and more direct sea-road access route
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into Central Asian Region.

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• The first shipment of wheat assistance to Afghanistan was realised though Chabahar port
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in November 2017. This has demonstrated that Chabahar port is a viable and secure
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alternative for promoting regional connectivity among India, Iran and Afghanistan and
possibly to Central Asia.
• The port in the Sistan-Balochistan province on the energy-rich nation’s southern coast is
easily accessible from India’s western coast and is increasingly seen as a counter to
Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, which is being developed with Chinese investment and is located
at distance of around 80 kms from Chabahar.

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Image Source: http://www.livemint.com/r/LiveMint/Period2/2016/05/24/Photos/G-

iraqmap(modi)web.jpg
4.4. Economy: Energy Trade

• India-Iran commercial ties have traditionally been dominated by Indian import of Iranian
crude oil.
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• India is the second largest buyer of Iranian crude after China and Iran was the third
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largest supplier of crude to India (April-Sep 2016).

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• The India-Iran bilateral trade during the fiscal year 2015-16 was USD 9.054 billion. India
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imported USD 6.2 billion worth of goods mainly crude oil and exported commodities worth
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USD 2.7 billion.

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• Major Indian exports to Iran include rice, tea, iron and steel, organic chemicals, metals,
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electrical machinery, drugs/pharmaceuticals, etc.

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•
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Major Indian imports from Iran include petroleum and its products, inorganic/organic
chemicals, fertilizers, plastic and articles, edible fruit and nuts, glass and glassware etc.
• Indian exports to Iran have steadily declined from $4.9 billion in 2013-14 to $2.379 billion
in 2016-17, increasing the trade deficit. There is need to address the problem of declining
Indian exports to Iran by putting in place a robust payment mechanism.
• A provision for investments in rupees has already been made between the two countries
to take care of contingency if dollar payments are stopped because of sanctions.
4.5. Iran: New Opportunities?

• Iran, with the world’s second largest gas reserves and fourth largest oil reserves.
• Iran has a diversified economy with substantial scope for investments in sectors like
tourism, healthcare, manufacturing, transportation, finance, etc., that has started
attracting many major global players. Its other major advantage is its demographics: 60% of
its population is below 30 years of age.
• Much of this potential was subdued by the international sanctions trgeted at Iran’s
nuclear programme. India voted against Iran in 2005, 2006, 2009, and 2011 for failing to

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comply with its NPT obligations. India reduced oil imports in this period- importing21.20
million tonnes of crude oil from Iran in 2009-10, which was reduced to 18.50 million tones
in 2010-11, 18.11 million tones in 2011-12 and 13.14 million tonnes in 2012-13.
• Nuclear sanctions imposed against Iran were finally lifted on January 16, 2016 after it was
certified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran had met its obligations
under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached in July 2015 among six
world powers.
• The deal has not only allowed Iran access to the billions of dollars of assets in
international bank accounts that were frozen during the sanctions period, but will also
possibly see thousands of barrels of Iranian crude added to its current exports of 2.9
million barrels per day (mb/d), with the possibility of 1 million barrels extra per day (mb/d)
by the end of 2016.
• The economic situation in Iran has been improving from early 2016 after the lifting of
international sanctions following the implementation of the nuclear deal by this oil
exporting nation.
• The Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline project: In 1993, Pakistan and Iran announced a
plan to build a gas pipeline, which Iran later proposed extending into India. Dubbed the
"peace pipeline“.
• New Delhi has not been participating in talks on the 1,036-km Iran-Pakistan-India gas
pipeline since 2007 citing security and commercial concerns but has never officially pulled
out of the $7.6 billion project.
• It had succumbed to the sanctions regime as well as fierce opposition from the US, with
Washington pushing for the rival Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) project.
Lifting of sanctions provide an opportunity to consider this project afresh.
• The Farzad-B gasfield, according to India holds reserves of almost 19 trillion cubic feet.
The consortium, which includes Indian Oil Corp. and Oil India Ltd., has been trying to
secure development rights to the Farzad-B gas field since at least 2009. OVL also leads a
group that discovered Farzad B natural gas field off Iran under an exploration services
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contract. ONGC Videsh and Indian Oil each own 40 percent interest in the Farsi block that
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holds Farzad-B field, while Oil India has 20 percent.

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The joint statement in 2018 makes a reference to the Farzad B gas field, there is need to do
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Recently, Iran has signed an initial pact with Russia's Gazprom for developing Farzad B,
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discovered by ONGC. France’s oil major Total and the China National Petroleum
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Corporation have already signed agreement for South Pars, Phase 11

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4.6. Challenges
• European sanctions linked to human rights and US sanctions linked to terrorism are still in
place.
• Embargoes on the sales and exports of conventional weapons and ballistic missile
technology also remain.
• US administration under president Trump has been dissatisfied with the nuclear
agreement or JCPOA, lifting sanctions on Iran.
• Iran’s rivalry with its Arab neighbours i.e Saudi Arabia, UAE etc. and its confrontation with
Israel remain a key issue for regional stability.
• The Chinese are building a refinery in Chabahar Free Trade Zone, and Iran has also joined
China’s OBOR.

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4.7. Potential: Way Forward

• Iran is poised to become India’s “gateway” to Central Asia, Europe and Russia as a result
of the future construction of the ports at Chabahar and Bandar Abbas and the
International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
• Iran is a valuable ally in the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Finally, Iran is an
emerging regional power with wide-ranging influence in West Asia that could contribute to
regional stability.
• It is for these reasons that India worked assiduously to sustain its relationship with Iran in
the face of pressure by the U.S., Israel, and the G.C.C. countries regarding the Iranian
nuclear program.
5. India-Israel
5.1. Background
• India formally recognised Israel on September 17, 1950. Soon thereafter, the Jewish
Agency established an immigration office in Bombay. This was later converted into a Trade
Office and subsequently into a Consulate. Embassies were opened in 1992 when full
diplomatic relations were established.
• Since the upgradation of relations in 1992, defence and agriculture have been the main
pillars of bilateral engagement. In recent years, ties have expanded to areas such as S&T,
education and security.
• Two Israeli Presidents have visited India - Ezer Weizmann in 1996 and Reuven Rivlin in
2016. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visited India in 2003.
• From India, President Pranab Mukherjee visited Israel in October 2015.
• Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit in 2017, marked the first such visit from India at the
head of government level.
• Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Visited India in January 2018.
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• These visits provided much public visibility to this relationship.

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5.2. Defence and Security

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• India imports important defence technologies from Israel.

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• India is the number one export target of the Israel defence industry. Nearly 41 % of Israel
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defence exports are to India hence, India’s defence import sustains Israel,defence industry.
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However, between 2005 and 2014, it accounted for 7 percent of military equipment
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deliveries, the third highest after Russia and the United States.
• There are regular exchanges between the armed forces and defence personnel. Air Chief
Marshal, Arup Raha, visited Israel in March, 2016 while Israeli Naval and Air Force Chiefs
visited India in 2015. INS Trikand made a port call at the Haifa port in August, 2015.
• In February 2014, India and Israel signed three important agreements on:
o Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
o Cooperation in Homeland and Public Security, and
o Protection of Classified Material.
• Under Cooperation in Homeland Security, four working groups in the areas of border
management, internal security and public safety, police modernization and capacity
building for combating crime, crime prevention and cyber crime were established.
• IPS officer trainees visited Israel in 2015 and 2016 for foreign exposure visit.
• There is ongoing cooperation on counter-terrorism issues, including through a Joint
Working Group on Counter-Terrorism which held its last meeting in July, 2015.

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5.3. People
• Major waves of immigration of Jews from India to Israel took place in the 1950s and 1960s.
There are approximately 85,000 Jews of Indian-origin in Israel. The majority is from
Maharashtra (Bene Israelis) with relatively smaller numbers from Kerala (Cochini Jews)
and Kolkata (Baghdadi Jews).
• In recent years, some Indian Jews from North Eastern states of India (Bnei Menashe) have
been immigrating to Israel. While the older generation still maintains an Indian lifestyle
and storng cultural links with India, the younger generation is more fully integrated into
Israeli society. However, the Know India Programme, which provide Indian origin persons
opportunities to visit India, have been received well by the younger generation of Indian
jews.
• There are about 12,500 Indian citizens in Israel, of whom around 11,500 are care-givers.
Others are diamond traders, some IT professionals, and students.
• For Israelis India has emerged as a key tourist destination.
• The launch of direct flight between Delhi and Tel Aviv on 22 March 2018 is expected to
give major push to people to people ties.
5.4. Trade
• From US$ 200 million in 1992 (comprising primarily trade in diamonds), bilateral
merchandise reached US$ 5.19 billion in 2011. Since then, it has, however, stagnated
around US$ 4 - 4.5 billion with bilateral trade (excluding defence) for 2015 being US$ 4.14
billion.
• Though trade in diamonds constitutes more than half of bilateral trade, trade has
diversified in recent years to include sectors such as pharmaceuticals, agriculture, IT etc.
• Major exports from India to Israel include diamonds and metals, chemical products and
textiles. Major imports by India from Israel also include diamonds and metals, chemicals
(mainly potash) and machinery and transport equipment. Though reliable figures of
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services are unavailable, it is estimated that almost 75% of bilateral trade in services flow
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from India to Israel.

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action plan for 2015-18 is currently operational.

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India and Israel agreed to establish a "Strategic Partnership in Water and Agriculture” in
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2017. This will focus on water conservation, waste-water treatment and its reuse for
agriculture, desalination, water utility reforms, and the cleaning of the Ganges and other
rivers using advanced water technologies.
• 10 out of the proposed 26 Centers of Excellence in agriculture being developed in India
with Israeli help have already been commissioned across different states such as Haryana,
Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Gujarat etc.
• India has benefited from Israeli expertise and technologies in horticulture mechanization,
protected cultivation, orchard and canopy management, nursery management, micro-
irrigation and post-harvest management.
• Israeli drip irrigation technologies and products are now widely used in India.
5.6. Recent Momentum: The Visits of Prime Minsters

• P.M. visited Israel in July 2017, marking 25 years of exchange of emabssies.
• A Memorandum of Understanding was signed for establishing the India-Israel Industrial
R&D and Innovation Fund (I4F) by the Department of Science and Technology, India and

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the National Authority for Technological Innovation, Israel with a contribution of US$ 20
million from each side.
• Both the countries also agreed for India-Israel Development Cooperation, a three-year
work programme in the agriculture sector. They also launched a five-year technology
fund.
• MoUs were signed in 2017 on Plan of Cooperation Between the Indian Space Research
Organisation (ISRO) and the Israel Space Agency (ISA) regarding cooperation in Atomic,
Clocks, GEO-LEO Optical Link and Electric Propulsion for Small Satellites.
• India-Israel CEO Forum, was established in July 2017 during Prime Minister Modi's visit to
Israel
• However, certain developments such as on the vote at the UN on Jerusalem issue in
December 2017 and the news of India cancelling a $ 500 million deal to buy 1,600 Spike
anti-tank guided missiles from Israel, indicated the issues of friction in the bilateral
relations.
• The two Prime Ministers discussed the developments pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian
Peace Process. They underlined the need for the establishment of a just and durable
peace in the region. They reaffirmed their support for an early negotiated solution
between the sides based on mutual recognition and security arrangements.
• However, these issues did not cause much concern as seen during the January 2018 visit of
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to India.
• During this visit, The two prime ministers noted with satisfaction the commencement and
implementation of India-Israel development cooperation - three-year work programme in
Agriculture (2018-2020)
• MoU on Cooperation in the Oil and Gas sector was signed.
• Security cooperation was taken further by signing of the MoU on Cooperation in Cyber
Security between India and Israel.
• The two sides affirmed commitment to enhanced people-to-people contacts, through
signing of a Protocol Amending Air Transport Agreement to expand the scope of
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• Both sides have signed an MoU in Film Co-Production in recognition of the role that films
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play in promoting people-to-people contact.

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• A decision was made on holding Festivals of India and Israel in their respective countries
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5.7. Way Forward

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• India’s flourishing relationship with Israel has not damaged its relations with other West
Asian countries; on the contrary, the scale and scope of these relationships have been
expanding
• Stand alone visit of the Prime Minister to Israel in 2017 marked the de-hyphenation of
relation with Israel from that with Palestinians and other Arab countries. This needs to be
taken forward in a balanced way.
6. India-Palestine
6.1. The Palestinian Issue
• Mandate of Palestine was to be partitioned into Jewish and Arab states under United
Nations Resolution 181, approved in November 1947. Jerusalem is put under international
control.
• The state of Israel was finally created on May 14, 1948, provoking an eight-month war
with Arab states.

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• The war resulted in the West Bank including east Jerusalem going to Jordan and the Gaza
Strip to Egypt. Israel ended up occupying more territory than the resolution 181 had
visualized.
• Thus, the First Arab-Israeli war resulted in statelessness for Palestinian people with many
becoming refugees in the neighboring Arab states.
• The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) is created in 1964 with the aim of liberating
the whole of historical Palestine.
• In the June war of 1967 between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Israel defeated Egypt,
Jordan and Syria and occupied east Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the
Golan Heights. This war brought the Palestinians under Israeli occupation.
• The first intifada, or Palestinian uprising against Israeli rule, rages from 1987 to 1993.
• In 1993, Israel and the PLO sign a declaration on principles for Palestinian autonomy after
six months of secret negotiations in Oslo, launching an abortive peace process.
• PLO leader Yasser Arafat returns to Gaza in July 1994 to create the Palestinian National
Authority (PNA or PA). Self-rule is established for the first time in the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank town of Jericho.
• The Oslo Peace process broke down in 1999-2000. This was followed by a violent second
intifada and Israeli response to it
• Mahmud Abbas took over the leadership of the Palestinian Authority in January 2005,
after the death of Arafat.
• The last Israeli forces left Gaza after a 38-year occupation in September 2005.
• In June 2007, Islamist movement Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip after ferocious
fighting with its rivals in the Fatah faction led by Abbas, who remains in power in the West
Bank. Hamas is a Palestinian Islamist political organization and militant group that has
waged war on Israel since the group's 1987 founding, most notably through suicide
bombings and rocket attacks. It seeks to replace Israel with a Palestinian state. It also
governs Gaza independently of the Palestinian Authority.
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In 2014, Israel launched a new operation against Gaza in an attempt to stop rocket fire and
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to destroy tunnels from the Palestinian territory.

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Hamas and Fatah sign a reconciliation accord in October 2017 aimed at ending a decade of
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discord.
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• Thus, the Palestinians remain stateless and the territory which is expected to become a
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future state of Palestine, i.e. West Bank and Gaze Strip remain separated and under
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Israeli occupation (West Bank) or blockaded (Gaza strip).

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• The Palestinian
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• International community including India supports a peaceful negotiated resolution of the

issue with the Palestinian state, security and recognition for Israel remaining the end
goal.
6.2. India’s Position

• India’s solidarity with the Palestinian people and its attitude to the Palestinian question
was given voice during our freedom struggle by Mahatma Gandhi. Since then, empathy
with the Palestinian cause and friendship with the people of Palestine have become an
integral part of India’s foreign policy.
• India was the first Non-Arab State to recognize PLO as sole and legitimate representative
of the Palestinian people in 1974. India was one of the first countries to recognize the State
of Palestine in 1988.
• In 1996, India opened its Representative Office to the Palestine Authority in Gaza, which
later was shifted to Ramallah in 2003.

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• India has always played a proactive role in garnering support for the Palestinian cause in
multilateral fora. India co-sponsored the draft resolution on “the right of Palestinians to
self determination” during the 53rd session of the UN General Assembly and voted in
favour of it.
• India also voted in favour of UN General Assembly Resolution in October 2003 against
construction of the separation wall by Israel and supported subsequent resolutions of the
UNGA in this regard. India voted in favour of accepting Palestine as a full member of
UNESCO in 2011.
• At the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 2012 the status of Palestine
was upgraded to a ‘non-member state’. India co-sponsored this resolution and voted in
favour of it. India supported the Bandung Declaration on Palestine at Asian African
Commemorative Conference in April 2015. India supported installation of Palestinian flag
at UN premises along with other observer states, like the flags of member states, in
September 2015.
6.3. Financial Assistance

• India has so far extended budgetary and project support of US$ 60 million to Palestine.
During the visit of President Abbas to India in the year 2008, India announced a grant of
US$ 10 million as budgetary support and this was transferred to Palestine in March 2009.
During the visit of President Abbas to India in February 2010, India announced a budgetary
support of US$ 10 million and this was transferred in the month of March 2010.
• Again in 2012, during the visit of President Abbas India announced a grant of US$ 10 million
as budgetary support to Palestine.
• During the year 2015, India provided a total of US$ 9 million as financial assistance to
Palestine; US$ 4 million was provided as project assistance towards the reconstruction of
Gaza (on 12 January 2015), and US$ 5million was provided as budgetary assistance (on 12
October 2015).
• In 2018, during the PMs visit a total of 50 million US$ was committed by India as
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• A MoU was signed between India and Palestine for setting up of India-Palestine Super-
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specialty hospital at Beit Sahour in Bethelhem Governorate at a cost of US$ 30 million.

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• Construction of India Palestine Centre for Empowring women, "Turathi” at a cost of US$ 5
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• India also earmarked funds for Palestine for setting up of new National Printing Press at
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Ramallah at a cost of US$ 5 million.

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6.4. Recent developments and the Future: De-Hyphenation

• The prime Minister during his 2018 visit observed that: “India hopes that Palestine soon
becomes a sovereign and independent country in a peaceful atmosphere... permanent
solution to the issue of Palestine is ultimately contained in negotiations and
understanding through which a path to a peaceful coexistence can be obtained.”
• According to recent MEA Statement "India’s position on Palestine is independent and
consistent. It is shaped by our views and interests and not determined by any third
country," said the Official Spokesperson in a statement to the media. India has traditionally
supported an independent Palestine as part of a two-state solution.
• The recent vote in the UN on the issue of Jerusalem is also consistent with India’s
longstanding view on the matter.
• PM Modi’s trip to Palestinian 2018 was a standalone visits just like his visit to Israel
in2017. This was seen as the completion of the de-hyphenation process.

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6.4.1. Two-State Solution

• The "two-state solution" would create an independent Israel and Palestine, and is the
internationally accepted approach to resolving the conflict. The idea is that Israelis and
Palestinians want to run their countries differently; Israelis want a Jewish state, and
Palestinians want a Palestinian one. Because neither side can get what it wants in a joined
state, the only possible solution that satisfies everyone involves separating Palestinians and
Israelis.
• Most polling suggests that both Israelis and Palestinians prefer a two-state solution.
However, the inability of Israelis and Palestinians to come to two-state terms has led to a
recent surge in interest in a one-state solution, partly out of a sense of hopelessness and
partly out of fear that if the sides cannot negotiate a two-state solution, a de facto one-
state outcome will be inevitable.
• The "one-state solution" would merge Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip into one
big country. It comes in two versions. One, favored by some leftists and Palestinians, would
create a single democratic country. Arab Muslims would outnumber Jews, thus ending
Israel as a Jewish state. The other version, favored by some rightists and Israelis, would
involve Israel annexing the West Bank and either forcing out Palestinians or denying them
the right to vote. Virtually the entire world, including most Zionists, rejects this option as an
unacceptable human rights violation.
7. India’s Look West Policy: An Evolving Framework

• Despite long historical ties, India’s links to the Gulf countries in the last few decades had
come to be defined by the twin factors of energy imports and labour exports.
• In 2005 P.M. Manmohan Singh officially argued that
"the Gulf region, like South-East and South Asia, is part of our natural economic
hinterland. We must pursue closer economic relations with all our neighbours in our
wider Asian neighbourhood. India has successfully pursued a Look East policy to come
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closer to the countries of South-East Asia. We must, similarly, come closer to our western
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neighbours in the Gulf."

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This statement had the elements of the “Look West Policy” which further received
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momentum and shape through Prime Minister Modi’ trips to Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran and
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Israel since 2014.

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• PM Modi had used the phrase “Link West” in earlier speeches as well, In May 2017, the
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Indian foreign ministry spokesperson promoted the policy further by referring to a “Go
West” connectivity and outreach policy with West Asia
• The phrase Think West was used for the first time in the inaugural Raisina Dialogue
(March 2016) by foreign secretary S. Jaishankar.
• The key factor here is not just a “shared” past but of shared challenges in the present and
a shared future. Proximity, history, cultural affinity, strong links between people, natural
synergies, shared aspirations and common challenges create boundless potential for a
natural partnership between India the region.
• This view is defined not just by India’s “Look West” policy, based on its energy and financial
needs, but that it is equally defined by the GCC’s “Look East” policy, soliciting greater Indian
engagement with West Asia. Several factors have contributed to this fundamental shift in
West Asian strategic thinking:
o the desire of the US to cut down its global security role is timed with India’s
aspiration to play a greater role in the Indian Ocean.
o The fall in commodity prices, has driven down the logic of diversification among the
oil-rich nations in West Asia.

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o the rise of religious radicalism globally and India’s ability to largely escape that
ominous trend has underlined the success of India’s multicultural social fabric.
o in a world reeling under the long-term negative effects of the financial crisis, India is a
remarkable anchor of stability as it continues to be a fast growing economy
• Thus, West Asia, especially the gulf states, is ‘looking east’ concerned about the emerging
strategic instability in its own neighbourhood and the structural shift in the global energy
market.
• In this context the need there has been increased engagement with the region with that
also needs to be taken further through:
o Closer government-to-government (G2G) relations,
o attention to the vibrant business-to-business (B2B) and
o people-to-people (P2P) relationships.
• Further one can see elements of a think west or look west strategy in:
o India is building infrastructure in Iran while also sharing intelligence with Saudi Arabia.
o And while the UAE is cooperating with India on maritime security, Israel is selling arms
to New Delhi.
• The next logical step may be for India to assume a catalytic role in promoting an inclusive
Gulf security arrangement…in concert with principal Asian countries—China, Japan, and
Republic of Korea.
• Thus the making of a look west or think west is based on the need to harness common
objectives and potentials and complementarities and it involves:
o Energy Security
o Investment opportunities
o Security Cooperation
o Connectivity
o Cultural contacts
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LECTURE-9
INDIA AND CENTRAL ASIA
Contents
1. India and Central Asia ............................................................................................................ 153
1.1. Background ..................................................................................................................... 153
1.2. India and Central Asia ..................................................................................................... 154
1.2.1. India-Tajikistan ......................................................................................................... 154
1.2.2. India-Turkmenistan .................................................................................................. 155
1.2.3. India-Kazakhstan ...................................................................................................... 155
1.2.4. India-Uzbekistan....................................................................................................... 156
1.2.5. Ashgabat Agreement................................................................................................ 156
1.2.6. India-Kyrgyzstan ....................................................................................................... 156
1.3. The Connect Central Asia Policy ...................................................................................... 157
1.3.1. Some Limitations ...................................................................................................... 157

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1.4. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation ............................................................................... 157

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1.4.1. India at the SCO........................................................................................................ 158

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1.4.2. Limitations of India at SCO ....................................................................................... 158

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1.5. What Should India Do? ................................................................................................... 159

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1.6. The International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) ............................................ 159

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1. India and Central Asia

Map 9.1-Central Asia
Image Source: http://open.lib.umn.edu/worldgeography/wp-

content/uploads/sites/181/2016/04/9752c66d3ef6a53cee2f78a606aff33c.jpg
1.1. Background
• Central Asia stretches from the Caspian Sea in the west to China in the east and
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from Afghanistan in the south to Russia in the north.

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Central Asia was located on what was known as the Silk Road between Europe and the
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Far East and has long been a crossroads for people, ideas, and trade
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• The region is rich in diverse energy resources.

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It is a landlocked region. The region consists of the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan,
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Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.

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• The Central Asian Republics (CARs) emerged as independent states in 1991, after the
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disintegration of Soviet Union

• Central Asia has a population of about 70 million, consisting of five republics:
o Kazakhstan (18 million),
o Kyrgyzstan (6 million),
o Tajikistan (9 million),
o Turkmenistan (6 million), and
o Uzbekistan (31 million).
• Afghanistan (pop. 35 million) is also sometimes included
• In the post cold war period, the Central Asian countries have engaged themselves in nation
building and consolidation of their statehoods.
• The pessimistic scenarios feared in the early nineties of Central Asia disintegrating have not
fortunately been realized. No state has become a failing state. On the contrary, countries
like Kazakhstan have made great strides.
• At the same time, the Central Asian countries continue to face daunting socio-economic
and security problems.

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• The relations among themselves are far from smooth. Issues like water security, borders,
environmental degradation and migration have become acute and pose serious challenge
to regional stability. Religious extremism & fundamentalism.
1.2. India and Central Asia

• Energy-rich Central Asia, with which India shares historical linkages, holds great strategic
importance.
• The flow of Buddhism from India to Central Asia and Sufi ideas from Central Asia to India
are examples of age old relations. These deep rooted linkages are evident even today in
similarities in food, language, dress and culture.
• India’s disconnect with Central Asia came with Partition and the loss of direct
geographical links.
• Although Central Asia is highly endowed with natural resources, the ongoing conflict in
Afghanistan and Pakistan’s denial of transit prevent India from directly accessing these
resources and deepening economic ties with the countries of the region. This is an
important factor that led India to seek membership in SCO.
• India hopes to
o build closer political, security, economic and cultural relations.
o based on ancient civilisational linkages.
• Three countries, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have enhanced relations to
strategic partnership level.
• The ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy was first unveiled in 2012. The policy is often seen by
many as an alternative to China’s earlier New Silk Road and current One Belt One Road
(OBOR) initiatives.
• Though India no longer shares physical boundaries with the region. This challenge is sought
to be overcome enhancing connectivity i.e. land based, maritime, air, digital.
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• Prime Minister Modi’s Visit to all the 5 Central Asian Republics in 2015 was a significant
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1.2.1. India-Tajikistan
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Tajikistan, which borders Pakistan, Afghanistan and China (and Kyrgyz Republic and
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Uzbekistan), has been a close ally of India and is a “valued friend and strategic partner in
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The country served as an important link for India in the 1990s when India recognised and
supported the Northern Alliance government in Afghanistan and practically had no ties
with Taliban government.
• Tajikistan has set up a field hospital in Farkor at the border with Afghanistan to treat
Northern Alliance fighters. India, it also has a “quietly functional” small base to aid the
Afghan government, and helped service and repair Mi fighter planes.
• In 1995, India extended a $5 million credit line to Tajikistan to set up a joint venture with a
private Indian company for the production of pharmaceuticals.
• Despite these links, bilateral trade is not too high at a little over $58 million of which $53.7
million are export from India.
• India and Tajikistan elevated their bilateral relations to the level of a “Strategic Partnership”
during the visit of President Rahmon to India in 2012.
• Till date, 993slots for ITEC and 339 ICCR scholarships have been utilized by Tajik
candidates to study in India. Tajikistan is one of the largest beneficiaries of the ITEC
programme (ITEC training slots were increased from 100 to150 during the visit of President
Rahmon to India in September 2012).

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1.2.2. India-Turkmenistan
• Turkmenistan, one of the Republics of the former USSR, was proclaimed as an independent
State on 27 October 1991.
• It shares borders with Kazakhstan in the north, Uzbekistan in the north and North-east, Iran
in the South and Afghanistan in the Southeast. It has an area of 488,100 square kms and
stretches 650 kms from north to south and 1,100 km from east to west. The main river of
Turkmenistan is Amu Darya, which enters the country from Afghanistan and flows along the
north-eastern borders before it enters Uzbekistan.
o TAPI- Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI countries) signed two basic
documents on 11 December 2010, making a beginning to the TAPI project.
o The TAPI Gas Sales & Purchase Agreement (GSPA) was signed in May 2012. At the 22nd
Steering Committee Meeting of TAPI held in Ashgabat on 06 August, 2015,
Turkmenistan offered to lead the Consortium. In 2015 groundbreaking for the
Turkmenistan leg was held. Transit fee payable by India to Pakistan and Afghanistan has
also been agreed.
o The groundbreaking ceremony for the Afghan section of an ambitious, multi-billion
dollar gas pipeline was conducted in the presence of Minister of State for External
Affairs M.J. Akbar for the ceremony at gas-rich on 23 February 2018.
o 1,840-km pipeline aims to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh gas
fields by the beginning of 2020. It is expected to help ease energy deficits in South Asia.
The bulk of the 33 billion cubic metres of gas to be pumped annually through the
conduit will be purchased by South Asian rivals Pakistan and India.
o For Turkmenistan it provides an avenue for diversification of gas deliveries.
o The pipeline will traverse Afghanistan, raising security concerns, and specifically for
India the passage through Pakistan is of key concern.
o The overall funding picture for the mammoth gas pipeline, with an estimated
requirement of 15 billion US$ remains unclear, with commercial energy giants such as
France’s Total failing to follow up on reported interest in the project.
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• India provides ITEC training for Turkmen nationals in India. In the year 2016-17, 30 ITEC
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slots were offered to them. In all, since the inception of the programme for Turkmenistan
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in 1994, over 380 Turkmen nationals have been trained in various courses.
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• Agreement for the Lapis Lazuli Corridor was signed in Novemebr 2017. It seeks to foster
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transit and trade cooperation between Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia

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and Turkey by reducing barriers facing transit trade. Providing for a major international
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trade and transport corridor stretching from Turkey to Afghanistan via Central Asian
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republics
• India is not a part of the Lapis Lazuli corridor.
1.2.3. India-Kazakhstan
• Kazakhstan became independent on 16 December 1991. Diplomatic relations were
established in February 1992.
• President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan to be the Chief Guest at our 60th Republic Day
celebrations in 2009. A Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership was adopted during the
visit.
• Issues of mutual concerns are :regional peace, connectivity and integration; reforms in
the United Nations; and, combating terrorism.
• An Agreement between ONGC Videsh Limited and KazMunaiGaz on the purchase of 25%
stake in the Satpayev Oil Block in the Caspian Sea marked a new beginning in cooperation
in the hydrocarbon sector.
• In 2015 India and Kazakhstan inked five key agreements including a defence pact to
enhance military cooperation and a contract for supply of uranium.

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• Kazaksthan was one of the first countries with which India launched civil nuclear
cooperation through a uranium purchase contract.
• A 14-day joint training exercise between Indian and Kazakhstan armies, Prabal Dostyk,
was conducted at Bakloh in HP in November 2017. This was the second joint exercise
between the two countries.
• Kazakhstan is India’s largest trade and investment partner in Central Asia. Bilateral trade
amounted to US$ 461 mln in 2015 and US$ 618 mln in 2016.
• India provides capacity building assistance to Kazakhstan in various specialized fields under
ITEC program. Since 1992, more than 1000 specialists have undergone training under ITEC
programme. A total of 31 ITEC slots were utilized in 2016-17.
1.2.4. India-Uzbekistan
• Uzbekistan is bordered by five landlocked countries: Kazakhstan to the
north; Kyrgyzstan to the northeast; Tajikistan to the southeast; Afghanistan to the south;
and Turkmenistan to the southwest. Uzbekistan is a major producer and exporter of cotton.
The country also operates the largest open-pit gold mine in the world.
• Uzbekistan became independent on 1st September 1991. Consulate General of India in
Tashkent was formally inaugurated on 7th April 1987. Indian leaders often visited Tashkent
and other places. Prime Minister, Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri passed away in Tashkent on 11
January 1966 after signing the Tashkent declaration with Pakistan.
• Mirza Ghalib and Amir Khusro are notable Indians of Uzbek parentage.
• In August 1991, as the events leading to the disintegration of the USSR unfolded, President
Islam Karimov, in his then capacity as Chairman of Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan, was
visiting India.
• Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh on April, 2006. First, Central Asian country that Prime
Minister Narendra Modi Visited in July 2015.
• Uzbekistan, the seventh biggest uranium exporter in the world, will be a key player in
India’s plan to procure nuclear fuel to create a strategic uranium reserve.
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• Trade relations between India and Uzbekistan are governed by the Agreement on Trade
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and Economic Cooperation signed in May 1993.

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• Uzbekistan is a partner of India’s ITEC Programme since 1993-1994. Currently 150 slots are
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being allotted annually.

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1.2.5. Ashgabat Agreement

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• It is a transit pact established in 2011 between Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, and

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Oman. Kazhakstan joined subsequently and Pakistan joined in 2016. Indian joined the
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agreement in 2017.
o Ashgabat Agreement is a transit pact signed in 2011 between Uzbekistan, Iran,
Turkmenistan, and Oman and Qatar. While Qatar subsequently withdrew from the
agreement in 2013, Kazakhstan and Pakistan joined the grouping in 2016.
o The Ashgabat Agreement came into force in April 2016.
o Its objective is to enhance connectivity within the Eurasian region and synchronize it
with other regional transport corridors, including the International North–South
Transport Corridor (INSTC).
o India joined the Agreement in 2018.
o Accession to the Agreement would diversify India’s connectivity options with Central
Asia and have a positive influence on India’s trade and commercial ties with the region.
1.2.6. India-Kyrgyzstan
• Since the independence of Kyrgyz Republic on 31st August, 1991, India was among the first
to establish diplomatic relations on 18 March 1992; the resident Mission of India was set up
on 23 May 1994.

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• Several framework agreements, including on Culture, Trade and Economic Cooperation,

Civil Aviation, Investment Promotion and Protection, Avoidance of Double Taxation,
Consular Convention etc.
• In 1995, India had extended a US$ 5 million line of credit to Kyrgyzstan; out of this, US$ 2.78
million were disbursed for four project.
• India announced its Connect Central Asia Policy during the visit Minister of State for
External Affairs, Shri E. Ahamed to Kyrgyzstan in 2012.
• India-Kyrgyz trade was US$ 24.98 million in 2016-17. India’s exports to Kyrgyzstan was US$
22.66 million whereas Kyrgyz exports to India was US$2.32 million. Apparel and clothing,
leather goods, drugs & pharmaceuticals, fine chemicals, and tea are some of the important
items in our export basket to Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz exports to India consist of raw hides,
metalifers ores & metal scrap etc.
• The "Khanjar” series of India-Kyrgyzstan military exercises has become an annual event.
"Khanjar-II” exercises were held in March 2015 in Kyrgyzstan, "Khanjar III” in March-April
2016 in Gwalior, India. The "Khanjar-IV” exercises are scheduled to be held in Kyrgyzstan in
February-March 2017.
• Technical assistance under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC)
Program, particularly in terms of human resources development, is the cornerstone of
India’s economic involvement in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan has utilized 58 slots for 2016-17.
More than 1040 professionals from Kyrgyzstan have received training in India since 1992. 80
ITEC slots have been sanctioned for 2017-18.
1.3. The Connect Central Asia Policy

• The ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy (CCAP) was first in June 2012 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan to
fast-track India’s relations with the Central Asian Republics (CAR) – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
• The policy calls for:
o Human resource cooperation through setting up universities, hospitals, information
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technology (IT) centers, an e-network in telemedicine connecting India to the CARs,

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o joint commercial ventures,

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o improving air connectivity to boost trade and tourism,

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o joint scientific research and strategic partnerships in defense and security affairs.
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1.3.1. Some Limitations

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• In 2015 the five Central Asian republics account for trade of only about $1.6 billion with
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India, compared to about $50 billion with China that has made them a key to its Silk Road
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Economic Belt (SREB) initiative.

• Despite bonhomie and much celebration, India has lacked presence on the ground in
terms of G2G, B2B and P2P linkages.
• Connectivity is the key weakness in India’s quest for increasing cooperation with Central
Asia.
1.4. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

• SCO was formulated in 1996 with five countries- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, China,
Tajikistan.
• Uzbekistan joined in the group in 2001. Its headquarters is in Beijing.
• India and Pakistan, became permanent members of the body in 2017.
• The primary motive behind the formation was to ensure stability along the borders.
• SCO now represents over 40 per cent of humanity and nearly 20 per cent of global GDP.
• Tashkent-based Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) is the security apparatus of the
SCO.

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1.4.1. India at the SCO

• The Astana summit in June 2017 fulfilled India’s long-time desire to attain full membership
of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
• India had been an observer of SCO meeting since 2005 and participated in ministerial-level
meetings, which focused on security and economic co-operation in the Eurasian region.
• With India gaining a full membership, the country aims to achieve regional and global
stability and prosperity. But, Pakistan’s inclusion in the body poses potential difficulties in
India’s plan.
• It is expected that becoming a full member of the body will strengthen India’s position
and reach in Central Asia.
• it will help India engage the Central Asian Republics (CARs) on a regular basis every year,
something which has proved rather difficult in a bilateral format
• Membership in SCO is likely to help India fulfil its aspiration of playing an active role in its
extended neighborhood as well as checking the ever growing influence of China in Eurasia
by intensifying regional integration, promote connectivity and stability across borders.
• SCO countries have a significant role in stabilising Afghanistan, membership would
provide India another avenue to remain engaged in this process.
• SCO also provides a platform for India to simultaneously engage with its traditional friend
Russia as well as its rivals, China and Pakistan
• India could gain from SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) – manned by 30
professionals analysing key intelligence inputs on the movements of terror outfits, drug-
trafficking, cyber security threats and public information in the region that we in India know
little about.
• Likewise, participation in SCO’s counter-terror exercises and military drills could be
beneficial to the Indian armed forces.
• SCO membership could help advance talks on the construction of stalled pipelines like
TAPI (and possibly IPI later) which is of considerable importance to India’s natural gas
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1.4.2. Limitations of India at SCO

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Since China and Russia are co-founders of SCO and its dominant powers, India’s ability to
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assert itself would be limited and it may have to content itself to playing the second fiddle.
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In addition, India may also have to either dilute its growing partnership with the West or
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engage in a delicate balancing act.

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• Except India, all the other members of SCO have endorsed China’s BRI initiative. India’s
primary concern is related to the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Infact,
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan had long crossed India’s sovereignty red lines when they
signed the Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement (QTTA) with Pakistan in 1995 to use
the Karakoram Highway (KKH) passing through Gilgit-Baltistan as a transit corridor.
• Given the state of relations between India and Pakistan, many assume that the spotlight
would shift away from Central Asia towards tensions in South Asia, thus making regional
cooperation hard to foster.
• With regards to RATS, India might face difficulties as the Indian understanding of terrorism
is different from the other members of SCO. Whereas for India it is related to state
sponsored cross border terrorism. SCO’s targets are groups like East-Turkestan Islamic
Movement (ETIM) and Al-Qaeda, whereas groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaiesh-e-
Mohammad, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network do not come
under the ambit of the SCO anti-terror structure

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1.5. What Should India Do?

• Profiting in terms of energy security would be critical, but the idea of a SCO “Energy Club”
will gain full meaning only if Iran joins the grouping eventually.
• It is imperative to look at central Asia through the Eurasian prism. India would do well to
enter into the Eurasia integration path by seeking an early conclusion of a Free Trade
Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in order to enable unhindered flow of
goods, raw-materials, capital and technology.
• The commissioning of the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) along
with the proposed Chabahar project would enable Indian goods to gain better access to
the untapped markets of the entire Eurasian region including Russia’s Far East.
• India should rope in one or more SCO countries, preferably Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, in
its effort to project Chabahar as India’s gateway to Eurasia.
• In the meantime, it should seek to benefit from maintaining a regional presence, tracking
regional trends in security, energy, trade, connectivity and cultural interests.
• India should use the SCO atmosphere for building better convergences with China and
Russia as well as to minimise the intensity of China-Pakistan alignment which actually
undercuts India’s direct access to Eurasia.
1.6. The International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC)

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Image Source: https://cdn.rbth.com/web/in-rbth/images/2016-11/top/north-south-transport-

corridor.jpg
• The 7,200 km International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is a multimodal
transport network linking Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea via Iran, and
onward to northern Europe via St. Petersburg, Russia.
• The INSTC is a joint initiative launched by India, Iran, and Russia in September, 2000 to
facilitate shipments and logistics. The agreement came into effect in May, 2002 after
being ratified by all three signatory states.

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• This corridor connects India Ocean and Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea via Iran, further
connected to St. Petersburg and North European via Russian Federation. From St
Petersburg, North Europe is within easy reach via the Russian Federation. The estimated
capacity of the corridor is 20-30 million tonnes of goods per year.
• The INSTC was expanded to include 10 new members, namely: Republic of Azerbaijan,
Republic of Armenia, Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Tajikistan,
Republic of Turkey, Republic of Ukraine, Republic of Belarus, Oman, Syria. Bulgaria joined
the initiative as an observer as.
• The International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) connecting Mumbai with St
Petersburg and beyond – which has been 17 years in the making – is set to be
operationalised in 2018 with the first consignment from India to Russia.
• INSTC will not only help cut down on costs and time taken for transfer of goods from India
to Russia and Europe via Iran but also provide an alternative connectivity initiative to
countries in the Eurasian region.
• It could help India and Russia boost up their bilateral trade and help to reach their target
of USD 30 billion over the next 10 years from the current trade of less than USD 7 billion in
2016.
• It will be India’s second corridor after the Chabahar Port to access resource rich Central
Asia and its market.
• INSTC is widely argued as best possible response to China's 'One Belt' initiative.
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LECTURE-10
INDIA AND RUSSIA
Contents
1. India and Russia ..................................................................................................................... 162
1.1. Russia: Background ......................................................................................................... 162
1.1.1. Russia: Borders and Resources................................................................................. 162
1.1.2. Russia: Politics .......................................................................................................... 163
1.2. India and Russia .............................................................................................................. 163
1.2.1. Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership ............................................................ 163
1.2.2. Political Relations: Mechanisms ............................................................................... 163
1.2.3. Defence and Security Cooperation .......................................................................... 164
1.2.4. Economic Relations .................................................................................................. 165
1.2.5. Energy Cooperation.................................................................................................. 166
1.2.6. Science and Technology ........................................................................................... 167

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1.2.7. Cultural Relations ..................................................................................................... 168

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1.3. 70 Years: An Assessment of Prospects and Challenges ................................................... 168

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1.3.1. Way Forward ............................................................................................................ 169

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1. India and Russia

Russia an Introduction: “Russia is never as strong as she appears, and never as weak as she
appears.”- Klemens, Fürst (prince) von Metternich.
Map10.1-Russia
1.1. Russia: Background

• Russia stretches over a vast expanse of eastern Europe and northern Asia. Once the
preeminent republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R. commonly known as
the Soviet Union), Russia became an independent country after the dissolution of the
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Soviet Union in December 1991.

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• It is world’s largest country, it covers nearly twice the territory of Canada, the second
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largest. It extends across the whole of northern Asia and the eastern third of Europe,
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spanning 11 time zones and incorporating a great range of environments and landforms,
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from deserts to semiarid steppes to deep forests and Arctic tundra. Russia contains
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Europe’s longest river, the Volga, and its largest lake, Ladoga. Russia also is home to the
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world’s deepest lake, Baikal, and the country recorded the world’s lowest temperature
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outside the North and South poles.

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• The inhabitants of Russia are quite diverse. Most are ethnic Russians, but there also are
more than 120 other ethnic groups present, speaking many languages and following
disparate religious and cultural traditions.
• Most of the Russian population is concentrated in the European portion of the country,
especially in the fertile region surrounding Moscow, the capital.
• Moscow and St. Petersburg (formerly Leningrad) are the two most important cultural and
financial centres in Russia. Russians are also populous in Asia, however; beginning in the
17th century, and particularly pronounced throughout much of the 20th century, a steady
flow of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking people moved eastward into Siberia, where
cities such as Vladivostok and Irkutsk now flourish.
1.1.1. Russia: Borders and Resources
• Russia is bounded to the north and east by the Arctic and Pacific oceans, and it has small
frontages in the northwest on the Baltic Sea at St. Petersburg and at the detached
Russian oblast (region) of Kaliningrad (a part of what was once East Prussia annexed in

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1945), which also abuts Poland and Lithuania. To the south Russia borders North
Korea, China, Mongolia, and Kazhakstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia. To the south west and
west it borders Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, and Estonia, as well as Finland and Norway.
• Although the climate adds a layer of difficulty to daily life, the land is a generous source of
crops and materials, including vast reserves of oil, gas, and precious metals.
• Russia is among the world’s leading producers of oil, extracting about one-fifth of the global
total. It also is responsible for more than one-fourth of the world’s total natural gas output.
1.1.2. Russia: Politics
• The Russian republic was established immediately after the Russian Revolution of
1917 and became a union republic of USSSR in 1922.
• In 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia joined with several other
former Soviet republics to form a loose coalition, the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS).
• The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) formed when the former Soviet Union
dissolved in 1991. At its conception it consisted of ten former Soviet Republics: Armenia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan
• Under the new constitution (1993), the Federal Assembly became the country’s
legislature. It consists of the Federation Council (an upper house comprising appointed
representatives from each of Russia’s administrative divisions) and the State Duma (a 450-
member popularly elected lower house).
• The president, who is elected in a national vote and cannot serve more than two terms
consecutively, is vested with significant powers. As Russia’s head of state, the president is
empowered to appoint the head of the government (prime minister), key judges, and
cabinet members. In 2008 an amendment to the constitution, to take effect with the 2012
election, extended the presidential term from four to six years.
• In international politics, Russia is a key power with the permanent membership of the UN
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Security Council and a large nuclear arsenal.

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1.2. India and Russia

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• In 2017 India and Russia Completed 70 years of diplomatic relations.

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Since the signing of “Declaration on the India-Russia Strategic Partnership” in October

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2000 (during the visit of Russian President H.E. Mr. Vladimir Putin to India), India-Russia ties
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have acquired a qualitatively new character with enhanced levels of cooperation in almost
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all areas of the bilateral relationship including political, security, trade and economy,
defence, science and technology, and culture.
1.2.1. Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership
• Under the Strategic Partnership, several institutionalized dialogue mechanisms operate at
both political and official levels to ensure regular interaction and follow up on cooperation
activities.
• During the visit of the Russian President to India in December 2010, the Strategic
Partnership was elevated to the level of a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.”
• Over the years India and Russia have evolved mechanisms of engagement at multilateral
level at forums such as the UN, G-20, BRICS and SCO.
1.2.2. Political Relations: Mechanisms
• Annual Summit: The Annual Summit meeting between the Prime Minister of India and the
President of the Russian Federation is the highest institutionalized dialogue mechanism in
the strategic partnership between India and Russia.

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• Annual Summit meetings take place alternatively in India and Russia. Russian President
Vladimir Putin visited Goa from 15-16 October 2016 for the 17th Annual Summit, which
resulted in 19 documents related to cooperation in defence, space, information security,
foreign policy, trade & investment, hydrocarbons, shipbuilding, railways, and science and
technology. Prime Minister Modi and President Putin also adopted a Joint Statement
"Partnership for Global Peace and Stability” and a “Roadmap of Events” to celebrate the
70th anniversary of the establishment of the diplomatic relations between India and Russia
in the year 2017.
• Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited St. Petersburg, Russia from 31st May to 2nd June
for the 18th India-Russia Annual Summit, this resulted in the conclusion of 12 documents
related to cooperation over a very wide range of activities.
• The 18th Summit also witnessed the adoption of the “St. Petersburg Declaration” which
not only highlights the multi-faceted cooperation between the two countries but also
provides a comprehensive matrix for future cooperation. During this visit, PM had a
separate meeting with governors of sixteen Russian regions where they discussed various
aspects related to the enhancement of cooperation between Indian and Russian regions.
PM also participated in the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum as the Guest of
Honour.
• Intergovernmental Commissions: There is regular high-level interaction between the two
countries.
• Two Inter-Governmental Commissions- one on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological
and Cultural Cooperation (IRIGC-TEC), Co-chaired by the External Affairs Minister (EAM)
and the Russian Deputy Prime Minister (DPM), and
• another on Military Technical Cooperation (IRIGC- MTC) Co-chaired by Russian and Indian
Defence Ministers, meet annually.
• The Inter Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC) Co-
chaired by the two Defence Ministers and its Working Groups and Sub-Groups review
defence cooperation between the two countries.
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• Consultations: During the 17th Annual Summit, the sides concluded a Protocol for
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Consultations between the foreign ministries for the period 2017-18.

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Pursuant to the signing of the Protocol for Consultations between the foreign ministries,
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Secretary (West), Secretary (ER) and Secretary (East) visited Russia for bilateral
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consultations in 2016.
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1.2.3. Defence and Security Cooperation

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India has longstanding and wide-ranging cooperation with Russia in the field of defence.
• Since 1960, the overall value of contracts within the framework of military and technical
cooperation has amounted to over USD 65 billion, while the portfolio of orders in 2012-
2016 exceeded USD 46 billion.
• India-Russia military technical cooperation is evolving from a buyer - seller framework to
one involving joint research, development and production of advanced defence
technologies and systems.
• BrahMos Missile System as well as the licensed production in India of SU-30 aircraft and
T-90 tanks, are examples of such flagship cooperation.
• During the 17th Annual Summit, the sides concluded agreements on supply of S-400 air
defence systems, construction of frigates under Project 1135.6 and shareholders
agreement on the formation of joint venture to manufacture Ka-226T helicopters in India.
• The two countries also hold exchanges and training exercises between their armed forces
annually.
• The annual bilateral naval exercise ‘Indra - Navy’ took place off the coast of
Vishakhapatnam on 14-21 December 2016.

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• Both sides conducted the first ever tri-services exercise INDRA-2017 was successfully
conducted from 19 to 29 Oct 2017 at Vladivostok in Russia.
• A roadmap for the development of bilateral defence cooperation was signed during the
17th Meeting of the IRIGC-MTC.
• Air Chief, Arup Raha visited Russia from 24-29 October 2016. Russian Naval Chief visited
India in March 2017.
• The first ever India-Russia Military Conference took place in Delhi in March 2017. Nearly
45 Russian entities participated in this conference. FSB Director, Alexander Bortnikov led a
nine-member delegation to India in March 2017 and called on the Minister of Home Affairs.
1.2.4. Economic Relations
• Making the economic partnership a strong pillar of the bilateral partnership like other areas
of cooperation between India and Russia is a key priority for both governments
• The Inter- Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and
Cultural Cooperation (IRIGC-TEC) is the apex G2G forum to review economic cooperation.
• Mechanisms such as India-Russia Business Council (partnership between FICCI of India and
CCI of Russia), India-Russia Trade, Investment and Technology Promotion Council
(partnership between CII of India and RUIE of Russia), India- Russia Business Dialogue
(partnership between CII of India and Russia’s Business Council for Cooperation with India)
and India-Russia Chamber of Commerce (with focus on SMEs) supplement the efforts to
build direct B2B-business - to - business ties.
• In December 2014, the leaders of the two countries set a target of US $ 30 billion bilateral
trade by 2025.
• According to Russian Federal Customs Service data, bilateral trade during in 2016
amounted to US$ 7.71 billion (decline of 1.5 % over 2015), with Indian exports amounting
to US$ 2.39 billion and imports from Russia amounting to US$ 5.32 billion.
• Major items of export from India include pharmaceuticals, tea, coffee and tobacco,
machinery and mechanical appliances, organic chemicals, and electrical machinery and
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equipment.
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• Major items of import from Russia include pearls, precious and semi-precious stones &
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metals, nuclear power equipment, electrical machinery and equipment, mineral oil &
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products, iron & steels, and optical, precision and surgical equipment.
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1.2.4.1. Enhancing Economic Ties: Trade

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• India and Russia are exploring various ways for enhancing bilateral trade. A few important
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steps/projects that could provide a major boost to bilateral trade are:

o operationalization of the ‘Green Corridor’ project between the two countries which
has already reached an advanced stage;
o implementation of the International North- South Transport Corridor (INSTC),
o and the signing of an FTA between Indian and the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU).
• In December 2016, Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) approved the decision to start
negotiations between India and the EaEU for signing an FTA.
• The Eurasian Economic Union (officially EAEU, but sometimes called EEU) is an economic
union of states located primarily in northern Eurasia. The Treaty aiming for the
establishment of the EAEU was signed on 29 May 2014 by the leaders
of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, and came into force on 1 January 2015.
• There are four types of corridors introduced in the customs border: green corridor (goods
through this corridor does not undergo customs inspection), blue corridor (goods undergo
examination in the customs border), yellow corridor (goods which need a special licence for
the importation) and red corridor (goods are subjected to mandatory inspection).

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• The green corridor concept was launched by the European Union in 2007 to enable trade
traffic more smoothly and efficiently.
• Russia is already implementing the Green corridor project with Finland and Turkey. Moscow
has also signed such agreements with China, Italy, Lebanon and Iran.
1.2.4.2. Economic Relations: Investments
• Both sides had expressed their desire to raise the level of investments in each other’s
countries to US $ 15 billion (each way) by 2025. Based upon current figures it appears that
the target will be achieved almost eight years earlier than planned.
• Indian investments in Russia are estimated to be about US$ 13 billion which include
Vankorneft and Taas-Yuryakh Tass fields; Imperial Energy Tomsk; Sakhalin I; Volzhsky
Abrasive Works Volgograd; and Commercial Indo bank.
• Russian investments in India total about US$ 16 billion, including the acquisition of the
ESSAR Group, Kamaz Vectra in Hosur; Shyam Sistema Telecom Ltd, Sberbank and VTB.
1.2.5. Energy Cooperation
• Hydrocarbons is an active area for exploring cooperation between the two countries.
• In the second and third quarter of 2016, Indian companies invested close to US$ 5.5 billion
in Russia’s Oil and Gas sector, which included acquisition of 23.9% stake in Vankorneft
and 29.9% in Taas-Yuryakh by an Indian Consortium of Indian Oil Corporation Limited
(IOCL), Indian Oil Corporation Limited (OIL) and Bharat Petro Resources Limited (BPRL); and
acquisition of 15% and 11% stake by ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) in Vankorneft from Rosneft
Oil Company of Russia.
• During the 17th Annual Summit, the sides concluded documents between Engineers India
Ltd and Gazprom on the Joint Study of a gas pipeline to India and other possible areas of
cooperation;
• Agreement in the area of Education and Training between ONGC Videsh Ltd and Rosneft Oil
Company; and Programme of Cooperation (PoC) in the Field of Oil and Gas for the period
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2017-18;
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• and the Sale and Purchase Agreement between a Rosneft-led consortium and Essar for
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acquisition of 98% stake in Essar Oil Limited. The Rosneft led Consortium has invested close
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to US $ 13 billion in this deal.

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The sides are working towards realization of an ‘Energy Bridge’ between the two countries,
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which is based on:

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o robust civil nuclear cooperation,

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o LNG sourcing, partnership in the Oil and Gas sector,

o and engagement in renewable energy sources.
• The idea to setup SCO Energy Club, proposed by Vladimir Putin in 2006, should contribute
to deepening interaction between energy producers (Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and
Iran) and energy consumers (China, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, India, Pakistan and Mongolia)
1.2.5.1. Nuclear Energy
• Russia is an important partner for India in the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy. It
recognizes India as a country with advanced nuclear technology with an impeccable non-
proliferation record.
• In 2009, India and Russia have sealed a breakthrough long-term pact for expanding civil
nuclear cooperation that is free from any restrictions on India and guarantees it against any
curbs in the future.
• In December 2014, Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and Russia’s Rosatom signed the
Strategic Vision for strengthening cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy between
India and Russia.

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• Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP) is being built in India with Russian cooperation.
KKNPP Units 1 and 2 have already become operational. PM Modi and President Putin jointly
dedicated Units 1 & 2 to the nation on separate occasions through videoconferencing.
• They also initiated the concrete pouring for Units 3 &4 through videoconference on
October 15, 2016.
• An agreement on localization of manufacturing of nuclear equipment in India was also
concluded during the Annual Summit on 24 December 2015. The agreement for KKNPP
Units 5 & 6 was concluded during the 18th Annual Bilateral Summit in St. Petersburg in June
2017.
1.2.6. Science and Technology
• With Russia’s technical and financial assistance, the pioneers of Indian industrialization
came into existence: metallurgical complexes in Bhilai, Visakhapatnam and Bokaro, the
mining equipment plant in Durgapur, the thermal power station in Neyveli, the
electromechanical enterprise in Korba, antibiotics plants in Rishikesh and the
pharmaceutical plant in Hyderabad.
• Russian scientists and academics participated in the establishment of research and
education centers in India. These include the Indian Institute of Technology in Bombay,
research institutes of petroleum industry in Dehradun and Ahmedabad.
1.2.6.1. Space
• India-Russia cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of outer space dates back to about
four decades.
• 2015 marked the 40th anniversary of the launch of India’s first satellite “Aryabhatt” on a
Russian (then USSR) launch vehicle ‘Soyuz.’
• In 2007, India and Russia signed a framework agreement on cooperation in the peaceful
uses of outer space, including satellite launches, GLONASS navigation system, remote
sensing and other societal applications of outer space.
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• In June 2015, the space agencies signed an MoU on expansion of cooperation in the field of
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the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

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An agreement was signed between C-DAC and GLONASS for cooperation in technologies
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based on satellite navigation.

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On 15 October 2016, ISRO and Roscosmos signed an MoU to establish ground

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measurement gathering stations for GLONASS and NAvIC in India and Russia.
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• Both sides are also exploring the possibility of cooperation in manned space flight.
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1.2.6.2. Science and Technology: Other Areas

• The Working Group on Science and Technology functioning under IRIGC- TEC, the
Integrated Long Term Programme (ILTP) and the Basic Science Cooperation Programme
are the three main institutional mechanisms for bilateral Science and Technology
cooperation, while the Science Academies of the two countries promote inter-academy
exchanges.
• ILTP during its 25-year long implementation period, supported over 500 joint R&D projects
and setting up of 9 thematic centers in India and Russia that resulted in generation of over
1500 joint publications and many new products, processes, facilities, and research centers
besides developing over 10,000 scientific contacts.
• India-Russia Science and Technology Centre with a branch each in Delhi-NCR and Moscow
was set up in 2011-12 in order to promote two-way transfer of technologies and their
commercialization.
• On 8 May 2015, Department of Science & Technology (DST) and Russian Science Foundation
signed an agreement to support basic and exploratory research.

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• During the 17th Summit, DST and FASO (Federal Agency for Scientific Organization) signed
an agreement for cooperation in the field of science and technology. A Basic Science
Cooperation Programme between DST and the Russian Foundation for Basic Research has
been working quite successfully from 2016-17.
• A number of new initiatives such as the IndiRussia Bridge to Innovation, cooperation in
telemedicine, creation of a Traditional Knowledge Digital Library, GIAN, and the Russia-India
Network (RIN) of Universities are being promoted to encourage the growth of bilateral
interaction in the field of S &T.
1.2.7. Cultural Relations
• There are regular cultural initiatives to promote people-to-people contacts between India
and Russia, including reciprocal Years of Culture.
• There is a strong tradition of Indian studies in Russia. Jawaharlal Nehru Cultural Centre at
the Embassy of India, Moscow (JNCC) maintains close cooperation with leading Russian
institutions, including the Institute of Philosophy (Moscow); Russian State University for
Humanities (Moscow); Institute of Oriental Studies (Moscow); Institute of Asian and African
Studies of the Moscow State University; School of International Relations of the St.
Petersburg University; Institute of Oriental Manuscripts (St Petersburg); Peter the Great
Museum of Anthropoalogy & Ethnography (Kunstkamera) in St Petersburg; Far Eastern
Federal University (Vladivostok);and Russian Institute for Cultural Research (Krasnodar).
• There is a Mahatma Gandhi Chair on Indian Philosophy in the Institute of Philosophy,
Moscow.
• About 20 Russian Institutions, including leading universities and schools, regularly teach
Hindi to about 1500 Russian students.
• The President of India inaugurated the Year of Indian Culture ‘Namaste Russia’ in Moscow
on 10 May 2015. About 15 performances in 8 cities were held as part of ‘Namaste Russia’
across various parts of Russia over 2015.
• The Embassy with support from regional governments organized week-long celebrations
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marking the third International Day of Yoga (IDY) covering 68 regions spanning 87 locations
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and involving over 37685 Yoga enthusiasts.

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• During the previous Summit in October, the leaders adopted a ‘Roadmap of Events’ to
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celebrate the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the diplomatic relations between
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India and Russia with year-long celebrations in 2017 under which numerous events have
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already been held in both countries.

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1.3. 70 Years: An Assessment of Prospects and Challenges

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• A report on the state of ties between the two nations brought out by two think tanks (VIF
and Russian International Affairs Council) calls for a major revamp of the engagement
between the once-close partners.
• Once seen as closer to the former Soviet Union, India’s ties with the US have undergone a
dramatic change in recent years, with Washington emerging as a key source of military
hardware for India. New Delhi also has close to three dozen dialogues with Washington—
unthinkable during the Cold War years when the US was seen as a major ally of Pakistan.
• Meanwhile, the once close India-Russia ties have developed signs of strain with
Moscow’s growing ties with Islamabad. Once seen as being on the same page over the
threat posed by the Pakistan-backed Taliban in Afghanistan, India and Russia now have
differences on the subject with Moscow seemingly more worried about the threat posed by
the Islamic State than Taliban.
• India’s concerns of Russia’s ties with New Delhi’s strategic rival China casting a shadow
over Moscow-New Delhi relations. New Delhi also views Moscow’s recent reaching out to
India’s arch rival Pakistan as a subset of Russia-China ties.

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• In the case of Russia, Moscow has been worried about the growing warmth in India-US ties.
• Aprt from geopolitical factors, “an imperfect legal framework, tariff and non-tariff trade
limitations, the lack of up-to-date information on political processes in both countries;
the low level of business contacts; and the outdated images of both Russia and India their
citizens have” are some of the impediments standing in the way of a new partnership
between the two nations.
1.3.1. Way Forward
• Report calls for increased interaction at the ministerial and bureaucratic levels throughout
the year, rather than confining dialogue to an annual summit between the Russian and
Indian leaderships. India and Russia have been having regular bilateral summits between
the Russian president and the Indian prime minister since 2000.
• It also calls for a three-way talks between Russia, India and the US besides Russia, India
and Israel to increase the ambit of cooperation. India and Russia already have a trilateral
arrangement with China.
• On terrorism and religious extremism, the paper calls for the two countries to support
each other more closely and visibly.
• It also calls for the two countries to collaborate in third countries—such as those in
India’s neighbourhood like Nepal and on Russia’s periphery like the Central Asian
Republics. In this context development of Vietnam’s hydrocarbon sector also provides
opportunity for cooperation in third country.
• Giving a new impetus to Moscow-New Delhi relations would allow Russia to diversify its
efforts in Asia.
• It is important to further expand Russia-India engagement on the international arena,
Russia should continue to actively support India’s claim for greater participation in
international affairs.
• Connectivity needs a geopolitical interest in actively promoting the North-South Corridor
through Iran so that connectivity projects in the region get diversified and single-country
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domination is avoided.
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• To strengthen economic linkages between the two countries, “it is necessary to set out
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mutually acceptable business conditions, stimulate investment flows and greenlight

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mutual investments,” the report said.

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On defence collaboration, the report said “it is important to secure and consolidate new
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trends in the development of military-technical cooperation and, first and foremost, to

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transition from the “seller–buyer” model to large-scale joint breakthrough projects.”

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• Russian should actively participate in India’s Make in India programme in defence

manufacturing, with more technology transfers, as that would consolidate Russia’s
dominant position as India’s defence partner.


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LECTURE-11
INDIA AND EUROPE
Contents
1. India and the European Union ............................................................................................... 171
1.1. The European Union (EU)................................................................................................ 171
1.1.1. Institutional Setup .................................................................................................... 172
1.2. The European Union: Evolution ...................................................................................... 172
1.3. The European Union: A Unique Identity ......................................................................... 173
1.4. Recent Developments and Issues for Europe ................................................................. 173
2. India and the European Union ............................................................................................... 174
2.1. Background ..................................................................................................................... 174
2.2. Political and Security Cooperation .................................................................................. 175
2.3. Economic Cooperation and Trade ................................................................................... 175
2.4. Science, Technology, Energy and Environment ............................................................... 176
2.5. Education and Culture ..................................................................................................... 176
2.6. India-EU FTA or the BTIA ................................................................................................. 176
2.6.1. The India-Meeting on BTIA Talks: Recent Developments ........................................ 177
2.6.2. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures...................................................................... 178
3. India and France ..................................................................................................................... 178
3.1. Background ..................................................................................................................... 178
3.2. Convergence.................................................................................................................... 178
3.3. Recent Visits .................................................................................................................... 178
3.4. Dialogue Mechanism....................................................................................................... 179
3.5. Security and Defence ...................................................................................................... 179
3.6. Technology: Space ........................................................................................................... 180
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3.6.1. Civil Nuclear Cooperation......................................................................................... 180

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3.7. Economic and Trade Cooperation ................................................................................... 181

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4. India-Germany........................................................................................................................ 181
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4.1. Background ..................................................................................................................... 181

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4.2. Dialogue Mechanism....................................................................................................... 182

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4.3. Defence Cooperation ...................................................................................................... 182

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4.4. Economic Cooperation .................................................................................................... 182

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4.5. Science and Technology .................................................................................................. 183

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5. India and United Kingdom...................................................................................................... 183

5.1. United Kingdom: Background ......................................................................................... 183
5.2. India and UK Bilateral Ties............................................................................................... 184
5.2.1. Dialogue Mechanism................................................................................................ 184
5.2.2. Economic Ties........................................................................................................... 184
5.2.3. Defence Ties ............................................................................................................. 185
5.2.4. Education, Science and Technology ......................................................................... 185
5.2.5. Diaspora ................................................................................................................... 185
5.3. Brexit ............................................................................................................................... 185
5.3.1. 2nd Phase of Negotiations ....................................................................................... 186
5.3.2. India and Brexit ........................................................................................................ 186

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1. India and the European Union
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1.1. The European Union (EU)

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• The European Union has evolved into a hybrid intergovernmental and supranational
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organization of 28 countries across the European continent

• With a population of 516,195,432, it constitutes an important market.
• With just 6,9% of the world’s population, the EU's trade with the rest of the world
accounts for around 20% of global exports and imports.
• Over 62% of EU countries’ total trade is done with other EU countries.
• A common currency – The Euro as a common currency circulates among 19 of the
member states known as the Eurozone, under the auspices of the European Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU).
o Eleven members states introduced the euro as their common currency on 1 January
1999. Greece in 2001.
o Slovenia (2007), Cyprus and Malta (2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014),
and Lithuania (2015) have adopted the euro;
o 7 other member states - not including the UK nor Denmark, which have formal opt-outs
- are required by EU treaties to adopt the common currency upon meeting fiscal and
monetary convergence criteria.

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• The total GDP of EU countries stood at GDP PPP: $19.97 trillion (2016 est.) or GDP Official
Exchange rate: $16.52 trillion (2016 est.)
• With a GDP Per Capita: of $39,200 (2016 est.) EU ranks amongs the most prosperous
regions in the world
• The Schengen Area is one of the greatest achievements of the EU. It is an area without
internal borders, an area within which citizens, many non-EU nationals, business people
and tourists can freely circulate without being subjected to border checks.Since 1985, it has
gradually grown and encompasses today almost all EU States and a few associated non-EU
countries.
• Joining the EU: Any country that satisfies the conditions for membership can apply. These
conditions are known as the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ and include a free-market economy, a
stable democracy and the rule of law, and the acceptance of all EU legislation, including of
the euro.
1.1.1. Institutional Setup
EU's unique institutional set-up includes:
• European Council: the EU's broad priorities are set by the European Council, which brings
together national and EU-level leaders i.e Heads of states and governments as well as
President of the European Commission. Donald Tusk is the current president of the European
Council.
• European Parliament: directly elected Members of European Parliament (MEPs) represent
European citizens in the European Parliament (751 seats)
• Council of the EU: governments defend their own country's national interests in the
Council of the European Union. It is a ministerial-level body. It conducts policymaking and
coordinating functions as well as legislative functions.
• European Commission: the interests of the EU as a whole are promoted by the European
Commission, whose members are appointed by national governments. At its head is a
College of Commissioners comprised of 28 members (one from each member country)
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including the president; each commissioner is responsible for one or more policy areas. Its
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current president is Jean-Claude JUNCKER.

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In principle, the Commission proposes new laws, and the Parliament and Council adopt them.
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The Commission and the member countries then implement them, and the Commission
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ensures that the laws are properly applied and implemented.

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• Other important institutions such as Court of Justice of the EU, located in Luxembourg;
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upholds the rule of European law.

• the Court of Auditors, located in, Luxembourg checks the financing of the EU's activities.
• European Central Bank, located in Frankfurt, Germany, responsible for European monetary
policy.
1.2. The European Union: Evolution

• European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was set up when in 1951 six members -
Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands - signed the Treaty
of Paris
• In 1957, envisioning an "ever closer union," the Treaties of Rome created the European
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and
the six member states undertook to eliminate trade barriers among themselves by forming
a common market.
• In 1967, the institutions of all three communities were formally merged into the European
Community (EC), creating a single Commission, a single Council of Ministers, and the body
known today as the European Parliament.

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• Members of the European Parliament were initially selected by national parliaments, but
in 1979 the first direct elections were undertaken and have been held every five years
since.
• In 1993 the Single Market is completed with the 'four freedoms' of: movement of goods,
services, people and money.
• The 1993 Treaty of Maastricht on European Union laid the basis for further forms of
cooperation in foreign and defense policy, in judicial and internal affairs, and in the creation
of an economic and monetary union - including a common currency. This further
integration created the European Union (EU), at the time standing alongside the EC. In
1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU/EC, raising the membership total to 15.
• A new currency, the euro, was launched in world money markets on 1 January 1999; it
became the unit of exchange for all EU member states except Denmark, Sweden, and the
UK.
• In 2002, citizens of those 12 countries began using euro banknotes and coins. Ten new
countries joined the EU in 2004 - Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
• Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007 and Croatia in 2013, bringing the current membership
to 28. (Seven of these new countries - Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia,
and Slovenia - have now adopted the euro, bringing total euro-zone membership to 19.)
• In an effort to ensure that the EU could function efficiently with an expanded membership,
the Treaty of Nice (concluded in 2000; entered into force in 2003) set forth rules to
streamline the size and procedures of EU institutions. An effort to establish a "Constitution
for Europe," growing out of a Convention held in 2002-2003, foundered when it was
rejected in referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005.
• The Treaty of Lisbon is ratified by all EU countries before entering into force in 2009. It
provides the EU with modern institutions and more efficient working methods.
• The Treaty's provisions are part of the basic consolidated versions of the Treaty on
European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
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now governing what remains a very specific integration project.

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1.3. The European Union: A Unique Identity

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• The evolution of what is today the European Union (EU) from a regional economic
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agreement among six neighboring states in 1951 to today's hybrid intergovernmental and
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supranational organization of 28 countries across the European continent stands as an

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unprecedented phenomenon in history.

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• Although the EU is not a federation in the strict sense, it is far more than a free-trade
association such as ASEAN, NAFTA, or Mercosur,
• It has certain attributes associated with independent nations: its own flag, currency (for
some members), and law-making abilities, as well as diplomatic representation and a
common foreign and security policy in its dealings with external partners.
• In view of its achievements, the European Union is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize In
2012.
1.4. Recent Developments and Issues for Europe

• Brexit: In the European elections are held in 2014 and more Eurosceptics, those doubting
the efficacy of EU, were elected into the European Parliament. Questions on the EUs
efficacy are also raised by the Brexit, wherein frustration with EU bureaucracy combined
with immigration issues led the UK to vote for an exit from the European Union in 2016.
The exit negotiations will be difficult and potentially divisive, but are far less important than
the negotiations on establishing a new formal relationship between the UK and the EU.

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• Russia: A new security policy was established in the wake of the annexation of Crimea by
Russia in 2014. However, Europe depends on Russia's gas exports, which rose in recent
years, despite rising competition and concerns about the country’s dominance of supply.
State-run Gazprom, the world’s largest gas producer, has a monopoly over Russia’s network
of pipelines to Europe and supplies close to 40 per cent of Europe’s gas. But it has been
forced to lower its prices in recent years to protect its market share in the face of moves by
EU member states to buy more gas from the US, Qatar and other producers.
• Refugees: Regional instability in the Middle East and various countries and regions around
the world, leading to unrest and wars has resultedt in many people fleeing their homes and
seeking refuge in Europe. The 2015 refugee crisis abated after the EU-Turkey migration
deal and the closure of the Balkan route in the spring of 2016. The total number of
migrants reaching Europe by two main sea routes in 2016 fell by nearly two-thirds, to
364,000 in comparison with 2015. However, the EU needs to work on a comprehensive
response to the refugee crisis that can ensure internal cohesion, in view of strong views
within the members and the rise of anti immigration sentiments, as well as protect its
claims of being a normative power.
• Climate change is still high on the agenda and leaders agree to reduce harmful emissions.
However, it has to manage allies such as the US which has pulled out of the Paris agreement
as well as developing countries that have demanded better performance on technology and
funding.
• Terrorism: In recent time various European countries such as France and Germany have
been target of several terrorist attacks. It is an issue that needs a EU response in view of the
open borders within Europe.
• Trade and Protectionism: Much of EUs success has based on its open economy and free
trade. The recent move by the United States to rase tariffs gives rise to the spectre of
protectionism. EU would need to play a key role in upholding a rules based order fro global
trade.
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2. India and the European Union

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2.1. Background
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• In 2017, the European Union and India celebrated 55 years of diplomatic relations. The
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14th EU-India Summit, took place in New Delhi on 6 October 2017. It was an opportunity
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to review progress in many aspects of the bilateral relationship and to discuss international
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and regional challenges.

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• The EU is also the largest destination for Indian exports and a key source of the
investment and cutting edge technologies.
• India-EU relations date to the early 1960s, with India being amongst the first countries to
establish diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community. A cooperation
agreement signed in 1994 took the bilateral relationship beyond trade and economic
cooperation.
• The first India-EU Summit took place in Lisbon on 28 June 2000 and marked a watershed
in the evolution of the relationship. Since then, thirteen annual Summits have been held.
• At the 5th India-EU Summit held at The Hague in 2004, the relationship was upgraded to a
‘Strategic Partnership’. The two sides adopted a Joint Action Plan in 2005 (which was
reviewed in 2008) that provided for strengthening dialogue and consultation mechanisms in
the political and economic spheres, enhancing trade and investment, and bringing peoples
and cultures together.
• India-EU relations received another boost with the 13th India-EU Summit at Brussels, held
after a gap of four years, in March 2016 adopting the India-EU Agenda 2020, which lays

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down a road map for cooperation on a wide range of issues including nuclear
cooperation, investments, Internet Governance, climate change, 5G communications.
• In 2017 the two sides expressed their intent on cooperation through Joint Statements on
Urban Partnership, Counter Terrorism, Clean Energy and Climate Change.
2.2. Political and Security Cooperation

• The 14th annual Summit between India and the European Union (EU) was held in New
Delhi on 6 October 2017.
• India and EU also interact at the ASIA Europe Meeting (ASEM). The Asia-Europe Meeting
(ASEM) is an intergovernmental process established in 1996 to foster dialogue and
cooperation between Asia and Europe. Presently it comprises 53 partners: 30 European
and 21 Asian countries, the European Union and the ASEAN Secretariat. ASEM addresses
political, economic, social, cultural, and educational issues of common interest, in a spirit
of mutual respect and equal partnership.
• India and the EU interact regularly at the Foreign Minister level.
• A Security Dialogue envisaged under the Joint Action Plan has been held annually since
May 2006.
• The Security Dialogue was merged with the Foreign Policy Consultations in 2016.
• The 2016 EU-India Summit adopted a Joint Declaration on the fight against Terrorism.
• Both sides have also instituted Foreign Policy Consultations at the level of Secretaries. The
first meeting took place in New Delhi on 15 November 2011, followed by a second round in
Brussels on 20 July 2012. The last round of the Foreign Policy Consultations (4th) was held
in Brussels on 29 February 2016.
• A bilateral Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism reports to the Security Dialogue, as
do dialogues on Cyber-Security and Counter-Piracy.
• An annual India-EU Ad-hoc Dialogue on Human Rights is also held in New Delhi, the eighth
meeting of which took place on 27 November 2013.
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In addition, a High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Mobility has been instituted at

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Secretary Level.
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India has participated in the EU-hosted Brussels Conference on Afghanistan in October

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2016; and the Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region of
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April 2017
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• A Delegation for Relations with India (D-IN) was formally constituted in the European
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Parliament (EP) in 2007 to follow relations with India.

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• The EU as a bloc of 28 countries is India’s largest regional trading partner while India was
the EU’s 9th largest trading partner in 2016.
• Bilateral trade in goods standing at US$ 88 bn in 2016. The EU is also the largest
destination for Indian exports.
• In goods, India’s export to the EU in 2015 stood at € 39.41 billion ($43.73 billion) while
India’s imports from the EU were valued at € 38.1 billion ($42.3 billion).
• In 2015, the trade balance in goods was in India’s favour by €1.3 billion ($1.44 billion).
• India’s bilateral trade with the EU28 during the first eight months of 2016 (Jan-Aug 2016)
stood at €51.2bn with India’s exports valued at €26.6bn and India’s imports from the EU at
€24.6bn.
• EU bilateral trade in services was €27.7billion ($30.75 billion) in 2015 comprising Indian
exports of services to the EU worth € 13.67billion ($15.17 billion) and Indian imports from
the EU worth €14.03billion ($15.58 billion).

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• India received around US$ 83 bn FDI flows from Europe during 2000-17 constituting
approximately 24% of the total FDI inflows into the country during the period makeing it
one of the largest source of FDI.
• India and the EU are in the process of negotiating a bilateral Broad-based Trade and
Investment Agreement (BTIA) since 2007.
• As of late, both sides are discussing the modalities of resumption of BTIA talks on a fast
track.
• The India-EU Joint Commission dealing with economic and commercial issues meets
annually, as do its three Sub-Commissions on Trade, Economic Cooperation and
Development Cooperation.
• In addition to enhance sector-specific cooperation, there are regular meetings of Joint
Workings Groups
o Textiles and Clothing,
o Agriculture and Marine Products,
o Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and
o Phyto-sanitary Issues, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology (SPS/TBT) as well as Food
Processing Industries.
• A Macroeconomic Dialogue at Secretary Level along with a Dialogue on Financial Services
Regulations have also been instituted and take place annually.
2.4. Science, Technology, Energy and Environment

• The India-EU Science and Technology Steering Committee meets annually to discuss
cooperation in this field.
• India and the EU set up an Energy Panel in 2005 to enhance cooperation in the critical
sector of energy and energy security.
• Separate sub-groups have been constituted under the panel dealing with coal and clean
coal conversion technologies, energy efficiency and renewable energy, etc.
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As envisaged in the Joint Action Plan, a Joint Working Group on Environment dealing with
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prevention of pollution, waste minimization, protection of biological diversity, sustainable

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forest management, environmental education, etc. has been created.

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• An Environmental Forum which brings together academia, business and civil society of
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both sides to exchange views on specific environmental issues also meets annually.
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• An “Indo European Water Forum” meeting jointly organised by EU delegation to India, DG

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Environment and India’s National Water Mission took place on 23-24 Nov 2015.
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2.5. Education and Culture

• The framework of India-EU cooperation in the fields of education and culture is provided by
three Joint Declarations covering cooperation in the fields of Education and Training,
Multilingualism and Culture.
• 50,000 Indian students are in EU in higher education, with 5,000 having been provided
ERASMUS scholarships.
2.6. India-EU FTA or the BTIA

• With its combination of rapid growth, complementary trade baskets and relatively high
degree of market protection, India is an obvious partner for a free trade agreement (FTA)
for the EU.
• The parameters for an ambitious FTA were set out in the report of the EU-India High Level
Trade Group in October 2006.
• Other studies have reinforced the economic potential of an FTA between the EU and India,
notably a sustainability impact assessment concluded in 2009.

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• Negotiations on the India-EU free trade agreement started back in 2007 and 16 rounds of
talks have been held since then. The last round was held in 2013, after which negotiations
were suspended.
• These negotiations, covering trade, investment protection and intellectual property, have
remained deadlocked since 2013.
• In recent times the uncertainties over Brexit and inflexibility on both sides have prevented
resumption of formal talks.
• EU wants stringent measures on investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) and Sanitary and
Phyto-Sanitary measures
• The recent unilateral termination of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) by India with
many EU member countries including Germany has complicated things further, leaving
many European businesses worried about investment protection in India.
o India had unilaterally terminated BITs with most EU members in 2017, asking them to
renegotiate the treaty based on a new model BIT passed by the Cabinet in December
2015.
o The Indian Model BIT requires a foreign investor to litigate in national courts for at
least five years before approaching an international tribunal.
o On the other hand, the ISDS provision in EU-Singapore FTA (2013), the gives investors
a choice between bringing a dispute against a host state before the national court of
the country where the investment has been made and submitting the dispute to
international arbitration.
o Rejecting a proposal by EU to suspend such termination, India proposed a toned-
down version of the BTIA, which would include an investment chapter and avoid
contentious issues for the time being.
o However, the EU didn’t agree. The issue came up for discussion again during the
meeting of the two chief trade negotiators.
• At the 14th India-EU Summit in Delhi in October 2017, both sides resolved to restart
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negotiations for BTIA.

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• After months of deadlock, India and the European Union (EU) chief trade negotiators met
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in New Delhi in November 2017 to hammer out a way forward for the long-pending free
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trade agreement negotiations between the two sides. It is not the resumption of BTIA
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negotiations, but to find a way forward to resume negotiations.

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2.6.1. The India-Meeting on BTIA Talks: Recent Developments

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• On 15 November 2017, senior officials of India and European Union (EU) held discussions
on the long-stalled free trade pact and expressed willingness to address issues in a time-
bound manner.
• The negotiations for the pact have been held up since May 2013 as both the sides are yet to
bridge substantial gaps on crucial issues such as:
o intellectual property rights,
o duty cut in automobile and spirits, and
o liberal visa regime.
• The two sides have to iron out differences related to movement of professionals. A liberal
visa regime is key for India in this context.
• The EU, besides demanding significant duty cuts in automobiles, wants tax reduction in
wines, spirits and dairy products, and a strong intellectual property regime.
• India is asking for 'data secure nation' status to be granted by the EU. The country is
among the nations not considered data secure by the EU. The matter is crucial as it will
have a bearing on Indian IT companies wanting market access.

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2.6.2. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures

• Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are measures to protect humans, animals, and
plants from diseases, pests, or contaminants.
• All countries maintain measures to ensure that food is safe for consumers, and to prevent
the spread of pests or diseases among animals and plants.
• Sanitary (human and animal health) and phytosanitary (plant health) measures apply to
domestically produced food or local animal and plant diseases, as well as to products
coming from other countries.
• These sanitary and phytosanitary measures can take many forms, such as:
o requiring products to come from a disease-free area,
o inspection of products, specific treatment or processing of products,
o setting of allowable maximum levels of pesticide residues or permitted use of only
certain additives in food.
3. India and France

3.1. Background
• India and France have traditionally close and friendly relations. In 1998, the two countries
entered into Strategic Partnership which is emblematic of their convergence of views on a
range of international issues apart from a close and growing bilateral relationship.
• The areas of defence cooperation, space cooperation and civil nuclear cooperation
constitute the three principal pillars of our Strategic Partnership.
• Apart from these traditional fields of cooperation, India and France are increasingly
engaged in new areas of cooperation like climate change, sustainable growth and
development, the International Solar Alliance etc.
• France is the only western country with large territory in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)
including the Reunion Islands, that spans about two million square kilometres of an
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Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and it has a population of one million French Citizens in the
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region, including about 30% of Indian origin.

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• The French navy maintains bases in the UAE, Djibouti as well as in Reunion, with a total of
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20,000 forces permanently based in the IOR.

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3.2. Convergence
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• India and France support a multi-polar world order. France has continued to support
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India’s claim for permanent membership of the Security Council and the reforms of the
United Nations.
• France has provided consistent support to India’s candidature for the membership of
Multilateral Export Control regimes, viz. NSG and MTCR. France’s support was vital in
India’s accession to MTCR in June 2016.
• India and France have consistently condemned terrorism and have resolved to work
together for adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT)
in the UN.
• During the visit of then President Hollande in January 2016, India and France also issued a
Joint Statement on Counter Terrorism in which the two countries resolved to step up their
bilateral cooperation in this field.
3.3. Recent Visits

• Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi visited France on 2-3 June 2017. The Paris Climate
Accord and the climate issue was prominently discussed.

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• Earlier Prime Minister Modi had paid an official visit to France in April 2015 in what was his
first visit to a European country.
• Prime Minister Modi visited Paris on 29-30 November 2015 to attend the inaugural
Leaders’ Event at the COP-21 Climate Change Summit. He launched the International Solar
Alliance jointly with President Francois Hollande in the presence of UN Secretary General
Ban Ki Moon. Along with President Hollande, US President Obama and Microsoft Chairman
Bill Gates.
• President Hollande, during his Presidency twice visited India. During his visit in February
2013 and in January 2016 as the chief guest of the Republic Day celebration. In a historic
first, a French military contingent also marched on Rajpath on the Republic Day and thus
France became the first ever foreign country to have been invited to participate in the
march
• President Emanuel Macron of France visited India in March 2018.
3.4. Dialogue Mechanism

• India and France have a range of regular institutional dialogues:
• India-France Strategic Dialogue takes place between NSAs from both sides.
• Annual Foreign Office Consultations
• The bilateral dialogue on Maritime Cooperation
• Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism
• Track 1.5 Dialogue (led by Joint Secretary (PP&R), MEA) with the participation of the
Observer Research Foundation from our side and the Strategy and Policy Planning Division
of the French MFA called CAPS and the Centre for International Studies and Research (CERI
as the French acronym stands) are the other active mechanisms.
3.5. Security and Defence

• Regular exchange of visits at the level of Services Chiefs takes place.
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• The three services also have regular defence exercises; viz. Exercise Shakti (Army); Exercise
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Varuna (Navy); Exercise Garuda (Air Force.

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• The Varuna exercise has been taking place since 1983.

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• Apart from service-level staff talks, the two sides have a High Committee on Defence
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Cooperation (HCDC) which meets annually at the level of Defence Secretary and the French
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Director General of the Directorate of International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS).

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• Apart from this, various staff courses, training programmes etc. also regularly take place.
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•
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Major on-going defence-related projects are the following:

o Rafale Deal: The Inter-governmental agreement for purchase of 36 Rafale jets by India
in flyaway condition was signed in New Delhi on 23 September 2016 by RM Manohar
Parrikar and French Defence Minister Le Drian.
o P-75 Scorpene Project: The contract for six Scorpene submarines from M/s DCNS was
signed in October 2006. All six vessels will be built under technology transfer at the
Mazagaon Docks Ltd. The first two submarine Kalvari and Khanderi have been built.
• During the 2018 Visit of the President Emmanuel Macron the two countries issued Joint
Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean region.
• In 2018, the two sides also signed agreement on reciprocal logistics support for armed
forces; agreement will facilitate the reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies and
services between the armed forces of the two countries during authorised port visits, joint
exercises and joint training among others.
• Two countries also signed an agreement on exchange and reciprocal protection of
classified or protected information.

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3.6. Technology: Space

• India and France have a rich history of cooperation in the field of space going back to fifty
years with ISRO and the French Space Agency, CNES carrying on various joint research
programmes and launch of satellites. A joint stamp was released to commemorate fifty
years of bilateral space cooperation during the visit of PM Modi to France in April 2015.
• M/s Antrix and M/s Airbus Defence and Space also have signed an MoA for commercial
cooperation in June 2016.
• GSAT-18 was launched from Arianespace, Kourou on 5 October 2016 which was the
twentieth ISRO satellite launched by Arianespace. GSAT-17 was launched from Kourou on
28 June 2017.
• France continues to be a major supplier of components and equipment for the Indian
space programme.
• During the visit of President Hollande to India in January 2016, ISRO and CNES signed an
Implementing Arrangement (IA) for the joint development of a thermal infrared satellite
mission; payload of French Argos-IV instrument on India’s Oceansat-3 satellite and a Letter
of Intent for cooperation in planetary exploration.
• The jointly developed MeghaTropiques satellite Mission was launched in 2011. It is an
Indo-French Joint Satellite Mission for studying the water cycle and energy exchanges in
the tropics. The main objective of this mission is to understand the life cycle of convective
systems that influence the tropical weather and climate and their role in associated energy
and moisture budget of the atmosphere in tropical regions.
• A joint Ka-band propagation experiment is also under implementation.
• During the Asia Pacific Remote Sensing Symposium held in New Delhi, CNES and ISRO
jointly organized a reception of heads of space agencies on 3 April 2016. The meeting
attended by 60 countries came up with a “New Delhi Declaration” which identifies various
international satellites contributing as space segment for monitoring climate change.
3.6.1. Civil Nuclear Cooperation
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• A landmark agreement on civil nuclear cooperation was signed between India and France
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on 30 September 2008 during the visit of Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to France.
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•
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Subsequently, during the visit of President Nicolas Sarkozy to India in December 2010, the
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General Framework Agreement and the Early Works Agreement between NPCIL and M/s
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AREVA for the implementation of EPR for the Jaitapur Nuclear Power Project (JNPP) were
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signed. The power plant will have six reactors with a capacity of 1,650 MW each.
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• During Prime Minister Modi’s visit to France in April 2015, M/s L&T and M/s AREVA signed
an MoU to maximize localisation for manufacturing of critical and large forgings involved
in EPR technology for JNPP (including Reactor Pressure Vessel) and M/s AREVA and NPCIL
signed a pre-engineering agreement.
• Following M/s AREVA’s restructuring, French utility EDF has now been designated as the
lead agency from the French side for negotiations and implementation of the JNPP.
• During the 2018 visit of the French president India and France signed an agreement to
expedite the Jaitapur nuclear power. NPCIL (Nuclear Power Corporation) and EDF France
have signed an industrial way forward agreement. This indicates that negotiations
between entities of France and the Indian government would conclude by 2018-end and
construction can begin.
• Once installed, the Jaitapur project will be the largest nuclear power plant in the world,
with a collective capacity of 9,900 MW.

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3.7. Economic and Trade Cooperation

• Both India and France have important bilateral investments and trade and commercial
cooperation.
• In 2016, the total trade in goods between India and France stood at Euro 8.58 billion,
registering an increase of 0.49% from 2015.
• The trade surplus remains in India’s favour for the past ten years with Indian exports to
France in 2016 standing at Euro 4.67 billion and French exports to India at Euro 3.90 billion.
However, the overall volume of bilateral trade remains low with Indian exports to France
being a meagre 1.06% of France’s total imports. Bilateral trade in services stood at Euro
3.41 billion in 2015 which remains in India’s favour with India’s share of Euro 1.72 billion of
exports.
• Almost 1000 French companies are present in India with a total turnover of US$ 20billion
and employing 300,000 people in India. French companies have more than 25 R&D centres
in India.
• France is the ninth largest foreign investor in India with cumulative investment of US$ 5.15
billion from April 2000 to May 2016 which represents 1.5% of the total FDI inflows in India.
• In France, about 120 Indian companies are present with an estimated investment stock of
Euro one billion and employing 7000 people.
• A Joint Economic Committee exists at the level of Ministers of Commerce and Foreign
Trade from both sides.
• Seven bilateral joint working groups in various fields exist which are: (i) IT &
Telecommunications;(ii) Roads; (iii) Sustainable Urban Development; (iv) Agriculture and
Food Processing; (v) Mineral Exploration and Development; (vi) Energy; and (vii) Post.
• An India-France CEOs’ Forum exists at the level of top CEOs from both sides meeting
annually and presenting their reports to the Prime Minister of India and President of
France.
• The Bilateral Investment and Protection Agreement between India and France expired in
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2010, ten years after coming into force. GoI would like to replace it with a Bilateral
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Investment Treaty. A model text of the agreement was proposed by the Indian side in
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2015. French response has been pending.

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• Almost all the major French companies are present in India including Renault, Saint Gobain,
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Veolia, Michelin, Capgemini, Sanofi, EDF, Airbus, Lactalis, Sodexho, Total and others. Alstom
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has won a major project worth Euro 3.2 billion of manufacturing 800 locomotives in
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Madhepura, Bihar.
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• India’s Reliance, Tata, Mahindra and other big companies have tied up joint cooperation
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with major French companies like Dassault, SAFRAN, Thales and others in the defence
sector. French infrastructure companies are looking forward to major opportunities in
Indian projects including in smart cities and renewable energy.
4. India-Germany
4.1. Background
• India was amongst the first countries to establish diplomatic ties with the Federal
Republic of Germany after the Second World War. Relations grew significantly following
the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany.
• In the last decade, both economic and political interaction between India and Germany
has enhanced. Today, Germany is amongst India's most important partners both bilaterally
and in the global context.
• India and Germany have a 'Strategic Partnership' since 2000, which has been further
strengthened with the Intergovernmental Consultations (IGC) between the two

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Governments which allows for a comprehensive review of cooperation and a platform to

identify fresh areas of engagement.
• India is among a select group of countries with whom Germany has such a dialogue
mechanism.
• Germany and India cooperate closely on the issue of UNSC expansion within the
framework of G-4. Both countries consult each other in G-20 on global issues such climate
change, sustainable development.
• India's current priorities in most areas match with German expertise, such as renewable
energy, skills development, smart city, water and waste management
• German President Joachim Gauck had visite India was in February 2014.
• German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier visited India from March 22 to 25, 2018
4.2. Dialogue Mechanism

• The two countries have several institutionalized arrangements to discuss bilateral and
global issues of interest viz.
o Joint Commission on Industrial and Economic Cooperation,
o Foreign Office Consultations (FOC),
o High Technology Partnership Group (HTPG),
o High Defence Committee,
o Indo-German Energy Forum, Indo-German Environment Forum, India-Germany
Committee on S&T and
o Joint Working Groups (JWG) on various fields, including skills development,
automotive, agriculture, coal, tourism, water, waste management, etc.
o JWG on Quality Infrastructure for Cooperation on Standardisation, Conformity
Assessment and Product Safety took place in Berlin from 5-8 March 2017.
4.3. Defence Cooperation

• India-Germany Defence Cooperation Agreement (2006) provides a framework for bilateral
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defence cooperation. The High Defence Committee (HDC) meetings at the Defence
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Secretary level take place annually, alternately in New Delhi and Berlin.
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•
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Chief of German Navy Admiral Andreas Krause participated in the International Fleet
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Review held in Vishakhapatnam in February 2016.

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4.4. Economic Cooperation

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• Germany is India's largest trading partner in Europe. Germany has consistently been
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among India's top ten global trade partners.

• India was ranked 24th in Germany's global trade during 2016.
• Bilateral trade in 2016 was valued at 17.42 billion Euros. Apart from traditional sectors,
knowledge-driven sectors hold good potential for collaboration.
• There is considerable scope for co-operation in the fields of IT, biotechnology, renewable
energy, green technology, urban mobility & development and the entertainment industry.
• Germany is the 7th largest foreign direct investor in India since January 2000. German FDI
in India in 2016 was to the tune of US$ 1.1 billion. April 2000 to December 2017 is USD
10.71 billion or 2.91 per cent of total FDI, according to official figures.
• At present, German investments in India is mainly in the sectors of transportation,
electrical equipment, metallurgical industries, services sector (particularly insurance),
chemicals, construction activity, trading and automobiles.
• Most of the major German companies have already entered the Indian market. German
automobile giants such as Daimler, Volkswagen, BMW, and Audi have established
manufacturing facilities/assembly plants in India. Other major German companies that have
significant operations in India include Siemens, ThyssenKrupp, Bosch, Bayer, BASF, SAP,

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Deutsche Bank, Metro, Lufthansa, Merck, Munich Re etc. Besides large companies, German
Medium Sized Enterprises are also showing greater interest in India.
• Indian investments in Germany have also shown a remarkable increase in the last few
years. Indian corporate entities have invested over US$ 7 billion in Germany.
• There are more than 200 Indian companies operating in Germany. IT, automotive, pharma
and biotech have received a chunk of Indian Investments. The penetration of Indian
software companies in German market is growing and major Indian software providers like
Infosys, WIPRO and TCS have operations in Germany.
• Companies like Bharat Forge Limited, Ranbaxy, Piramal, Samtel, Hexaware Technologies,
NIIT, Graphite India Limited, Hinduja Group, Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, Biocon, Hindustan
National Glass, Mahindra and others have either acquired German companies or started
their own subsidiaries.
4.5. Science and Technology

• Science & Technology: Indo-German Science & Technology cooperation started with the
signing of the Intergovernmental S&T Cooperation Agreement in 1971 and 1974.
• In terms of scientific output across all subjects, Germany is India's second largest
collaborator worldwide.
• For Indian scientists working abroad, Germany is among the top three destinations in the
world.
• So far, more than 2000 joint projects have been successfully completed, resulting in more
than 7000 exchanges of scientists, more than 2000 joint scientific publications and more
than 400 Indo-German workshops and seminars. At present, more than 170 projects are
being implemented.
• India's scientific establishments have close partnerships with premier German R&D
institutions, including the Max Planck Society, Fraunhofer Laboratories and the Alexander
von Humboldt Foundation.
•
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The jointly funded Indo-German Science & Technology Centre was set up in 2008 in
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Gurgaon with an annual contribution of 1 million from each side. The mandate of the
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Centre has been extended till 2022 with a contribution of 4 million per year by each side.
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5. India and United Kingdom

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5.1. United Kingdom: Background

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• United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The island of Great Britain
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includes England, Scotland, and Wales.

• The designation "Great Britain," in the sense of "Larger Britain," dates back to medieval
times and was used to distinguish the island from "Little Britain," or Brittany in modern
France
• 12 April 1927 (Royal and Parliamentary Titles Act established current name of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).
• The United Kingdom has historically played a leading role in developing parliamentary
democracy and in advancing literature and science. At its zenith in the 19th century, the
British Empire stretched over one-fourth of the earth's surface
• The Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, and the Northern Ireland
Assembly were established in 1998
• As one of five permanent members of the UN Security Council and a founding member of
NATO and the Commonwealth, the UK pursues a global approach to foreign policy.
• The UK has been an active member of the EU since its accession in 1973, although it chose
to remain outside the Economic and Monetary Union.

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• However, motivated in part by frustration at a remote bureaucracy in Brussels and massive

migration into the country, UK citizens on 23 June 2016 narrowly voted to leave the EU.
• The UK and the EU are currently negotiating the terms of the UK's withdrawal and will
discuss a framework for their future relationship ahead of the UK's scheduled departure
from the bloc on 29 March 2019.
5.2. India and UK Bilateral Ties

• Bilateral relationship was upgraded to a strategic partnership in 2004.
• During his tenure of British Prime Minister David Cameron visited India thrice in his first
term (July 2010, February 2013 and November 2013).
• The successful visit of Prime Minister Modi to the UK in November 2015 gave further
impetus to the bilateral relationship.
• Both Prime Ministers resolved to hold biennial PM-level Summits to advance the
partnership and agreed on a new Defence and International Security Partnership aimed to
intensify cooperation on defence and security, including cyber security, counter-terrorism
and maritime security
• UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s visit to India in November 2016, which was her first
overseas bilateral visit after assuming office in July 2016, reflects the continuity of
interactions at the highest political level.
• In the context of Brexit, the Commonwealth Summit scheduled in London in April 2018
presents another opportunity for both countries to infuse fresh momentum to the
bilateral engagement through a meeting at Heads of Government-level.
5.2.1. Dialogue Mechanism
• India and UK have a number of bilateral dialogue mechanisms in place, covering a wide
spectrum of areas including political, trade, education, science & technology, defence etc.
The important ones are:
o Economic and Financial Dialogue at Finance Minister-level Joint Economic & Trade
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Committee at Commerce Minister-level

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o Strategic Dialogue at NSA-level

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o Foreign Office Consultations at Foreign Secretary-level

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o Home Secretary-level Dialogue

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o Defence Consultative Group at Defence Secretary-level

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o Cyber Dialogue and

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o Counter Terrorism Dialogue.

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5.2.2. Economic Ties

• Trade: UK is among India’s major trading partners and during the year 2016-17, UK ranked
16th in the list of India’s top 25 trading partners.
• As per trade statistics of MoC&I, India’s trade with UK in 2016-2017 was US $12.21 billion.
• Investment: UK is the 4 th largest inward investor in India, after Mauritius, Singapore and
Japan with a cumulative equity investment of US $24.37 billion (April 2000- December
2016),
• 7% of all foreign direct investment into India.
• India continued to be the third largest investor in the UK and emerged as the second
largest international job creator with Indian companies having created over 110,000 jobs in
the UK. About 10% of these 800 Indian and India-focused companies based in the UK are
listed on the London Stock Exchange.
• According to the UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) in their ‘2015/16 Inward Investment
Annual Report’, Indian companies created 127 FDI projects in the UK in 2016-17, and
created 3,999 new jobs and safeguarded 7,645 jobs.

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5.2.3. Defence Ties

• Cooperation in defence sector is another important pillar of bilateral cooperation. At all the
three services level, joint exercises and wide ranging exchanges between the three services
are conducted regularly.
• The last Army Joint Exercise ‘Ajeya Warrior’ was held in Bikaner from 1-14 December,
2017.
• The Indian Air force participated in the Exercise ‘Indradhanush-IV’ in the UK from 21 July –
1 August, 2015.
• The Joint Navy Exercise ‘Konkan 2017’ was held in May 2017 at Plymouth in the UK that
witnessed participation by INS Tarkash.
• During Prime Minister’s visit to UK in November 2015, the two countries agreed to elevate
their Defence relationship by establishing capability partnerships in strategic areas.
• The institutionalised dialogue to discuss defence cooperation viz. Defence Consultative
Group Meeting, is held annually at Defence Secretary level. The 18th DCG meeting was held
on 9-10 October 2017 in London.
• Cooperation in defence intelligence commenced with the visit of Director General, Defence
Intelligence Agency and interactions with his counterpart in London on 3-5 December 2017.
5.2.4. Education, Science and Technology
• Education is an important plank of the India-UK bilateral relationship.
• Relationship has grown substantially with the introduction of bilateral mechanisms such as
the India-UK Education Forum, UK-India Education and Research Initiative (UKIERI), Joint
Working Group on Education, Newton-Bhabha Fund and Scholarship schemes.
• 35 British faculty members have visited India under the Global Initiative for Academic
Network (GIAN) programme.
• UK also supports the Skills India Mission and announced a fresh commitment of up to £12
million.
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• Joint investment in UK-India research has grown from less than £1 million in 2008 to over
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£200 million.
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• During UKPM Theresa May’s visit to India, a India-UK Clean Energy R&D Centre with a focus
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on solar energy storage and a collaborative R&D programme in energy efficient building
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materials were announced.

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New research partnerships worth £80 million including a new Joint Strategic group on Anti-
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Microbial Resistance (AMR) with a joint investment of up to £13 million have also been
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established.
5.2.5. Diaspora
• The Indian Diaspora in UK is one of the largest ethnic minority communities in the country.
• With the 2011 census recording approximately 1.5 million people of Indian origin in the UK.
• Almost 1.8 percent of the population and contributing 6% of the country’s GDP.
5.3. Brexit
• Brexit is a word that has become used as a shorthand way of saying the UK leaving the EU -
merging the words Britain and exit to get Brexit.
• On 23 June 2016 citizens of the United Kingdom (UK) voted in a referendum to leave the
European Union (EU). On 29 March 2017 the UK formally notified the European Council of
its intention to leave the EU by triggering of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. It is scheduled
to depart at 11pm UK time on Friday 29 March, 2019
• For the time being, the United Kingdom remains a full member of the EU and rights and
obligations continue to fully apply in and to the UK.

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• The UK and EU are negotiating on the "divorce" issues of:The first phase of negotiations
focussed on:
o issues related to citizens' rights
o the financial settlement
o the Northern Irish border
o other separation issues
5.3.1. 2nd Phase of Negotiations
On 29 January 2018, EU27 ministers adopted a new set of negotiating directives giving details
on the EU27 position on the transition period. The main points are:
• the proposed end date for the transition period in the negotiating directives is 31 December 2020
• during the transition period the whole of the EU acquis will continue to apply to the UK as if it were a
member state, and any changes to it would also apply in the UK
• the UK will remain bound by the obligations stemming from the agreements concluded by the EU,
while it will no longer participate in any bodies set up by those agreements
• the UK, as already a third country, will no longer participate in the institutions and the decision-
making of the EU
• all existing EU regulatory, budgetary, supervisory, judiciary and enforcement instruments and
structures will also apply, including the competence of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
• Predictions of immediate doom were wrong, with the UK economy estimated to have grown 1.8% in
2016, second only to Germany's 1.9% among the world's G7 leading industrialised nations. The UK
economy has continued to grow at almost the same rate in 2017.
5.3.2. India and Brexit

• Many Brexit supporters argued that the EU was the biggest obstacle to U.K.-India trade.
• India remains deeply vested in the outcome of the referendum for two reasons:
o The first concerns the welfare of a nearly three-million strong diaspora of Indian-origin
U.K. citizens,
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o second concerns the interests of a large moving population of Indians who come to
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Britain ever year as tourists, business people, professionals, students, spouses, parents
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and relatives.
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• Indian industry in the U.K. is thriving. There are 800 Indian companies in the country --
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more than the combined number in the rest of Europe. According to the India Tracker 2016
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commissioned by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), Indian companies generate

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110,000 jobs. The number of Indian companies growing at more than 10 per cent — the
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key benchmark for inclusion on the list — has nearly doubled this year over the last.
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• Work-related visa restrictions have already resulted in a fall in the number of Indian
students studying in British universities from 22,385 in 2012-13 to 18,320 in 2014-15,
according to the U.K. Council for International Student Affairs (UKCISA).
• Indian businesses and financial institutions are however hedging their bets. According to
a report by the State Bank of India's Economic Research Department, Brexit may actually
strengthen India's position. The significance of Commonwealth has increased in this
context.


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LECTURE-12
INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Contents
1. The United States of America ................................................................................................ 188
1.1. India and the United States: Current Status ................................................................... 188
1.2. Background ..................................................................................................................... 189
1.3. The Civil Nuclear Deal: A New Era ................................................................................... 190
1.3.1. The Civil Nuclear Deal: Opertaionalisation .............................................................. 190
1.3.2. India-US Cooperation on Nuclear Energy: Historic Background .............................. 191
1.4. The Mechanism of Cooperation...................................................................................... 191
1.5. Political Ties..................................................................................................................... 191
1.6. Defence Cooperation ...................................................................................................... 192
1.6.1. Expanding Scope of Defence Cooperation ............................................................... 192
1.6.2. Way Forward: The Foundational Agreements ......................................................... 193
1.7. Counter-terrorism and Internal Security......................................................................... 193
1.8. The Economy ................................................................................................................... 194
1.8.1. Trade......................................................................................................................... 194
1.8.2. Investment and Development .................................................................................. 194
1.8.3. Major issues of Contention in Economy .................................................................. 194
1.8.4. Major Issues: IPR ...................................................................................................... 195
1.9. Energy ............................................................................................................................. 196
1.10. Climate Change ............................................................................................................. 196
1.11. Education and Culture ................................................................................................... 197
1.12. Space ............................................................................................................................. 197
1.13. Science and Technology ................................................................................................ 198
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1.14. P2P: Diaspora ................................................................................................................ 198

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1.15. Global Public Health ...................................................................................................... 198

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1.16. Strategic Components of the Relationship ................................................................... 199

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1.17. The Pakistan Factor ....................................................................................................... 199

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1.17.1. Recent Trends ......................................................................................................... 199

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1.17.2. Pakistan Factor: What’s New? ................................................................................ 200

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1.18. The China Factor ........................................................................................................... 200

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1.19. The Indo-Pacific ............................................................................................................. 201

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1.20. The Russia Factor .......................................................................................................... 201

1.21. The Joint Declaration 2017 ........................................................................................... 201
1.22. Way Forward ................................................................................................................. 202
1.23. Policy Options ............................................................................................................... 202

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1. The United States of America

United States of America, U.S.A., is a federal republic of 50 states. It is bounded on the north by
Canada, on the east by the Atlantic Ocean, on the south by the Gulf of Mexico and Mexico, and
on the west by the Pacific Ocean. The United States is the fourth largest country in the world
in area (after Russia, Canada, and China). Its military capabilities, economic size, science and
technology base and active involvement in international affairs provide it a unique status. The
term ‘superpower’, as applied to the USA, is reflective of the role played by the US around the
world in the last century.
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1.1. India and the United States: Current Status

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• India-U.S. bilateral relations have developed into a "global strategic partnership", based
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on shared democratic values and increasing convergence of interests on bilateral, regional

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and global issues.

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• President Obama's visit to India in 2015 as the Chief Guest at Republic Day was a
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significant marker of these relations. During the visit, the two sides issued a Delhi
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Declaration of Friendship and adopted a Joint Strategic Vision for Asia-Pacific and the
Indian Ocean Region.
• The summit level joint statement issued in June 2016 termed India and the U.S.A as
“Enduring Global Partners in the 21st Century”.
• The June 2017 Joint statement called for Prosperity through Partnership.
• Today, the India-U.S. bilateral cooperation is broad-based and multi-sectoral, covering:
o trade and investment,
o defence and security,
o education, science and technology,
o cyber security, high-technology, civil nuclear energy, space technology and
applications,
o clean energy, environment, agriculture and health.
o Vibrant people-to-people interaction
• These relations have acquired sustained support across the political spectrum in both
countries

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1.2. Background
• For most of the period after India achieved independence in 1947, the U.S. viewed South
Asia as a region largely peripheral to its strategic needs.
• In two decades of independence, India depended on the supply of wheat under the PL 480
programme of the US, which was suspended in the mid 1960s over political differences.
Washington also provided India some economic assistance, particularly as the latter’s ties
with China deteriorated.
• During the 1962 Sino-Indian war, the U.S. publicly supported India’s interpretation of its
border with China in the eastern Himalayas.
• However, despite its potential and occasional periods of Indo-U.S. cooperation, it was
clear from early on that India would not serve as an active U.S. ally in the battle against
global communism.
• For its part, India refused to join either the American or the Soviet side in the Cold War
conflict and instead charted its own “non-aligned” course largely independent of either
superpower.
• From the U.S. perspective, the main problem with Indian policy was that “non-
alignment,” Which the US took for neutrality at a time when it was locked in a battle of
ideas.
• India attached much significance to autonomy in international matters.
• Circumstance in the late 1960’s, As Sino-Soviet rift deepened, the US gravitated towards
China and the USSR towards India. This was perceived to be the beginning of India’s tilt
towards the USSR, a process the gained momentum in the early 1970s.
• At the strategic level, the Soviet Union afforded India crucial protection against regional
adversaries. In 1971 New Delhi and Moscow signed a treaty of “peace, friendship, and
cooperation” under which the two parties promised to aid one another in the event of a
perceived military threat.
• India’s “non-aligned” foreign policy thus became a source of considerable irritation to the
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U.S. Not only did the Indians refuse to assist the U.S. in containing Soviet power, but they
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also actively cooperated with the Soviet Union in significant ways

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• Beyond these strategic problems, India was economically unattractive during the Cold
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War.
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• In essence, during the Cold War India refused to promote U.S. grand strategic goals and
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offered few economic benefits, while posing little direct military threat to American
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interests. India therefore was largely ignored.

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• The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War had profound
consequences for India’s foreign and security policies.
• The collapse of the Soviet Union required India’s policy makers to recalculate their
strategic options. No longer could they rely on their superpower ally’s military and
diplomatic protection. Nor, the Russians made clear, would the Indians be able to continue
purchasing arms under exceptionally favorable Cold War terms
• New Delhi realized that a closer relationship with Washington could help them fill the
vacuum left by the Soviet Union’s fall and also balance against rising power of Beijing.
• U.S., for its part, was no longer forced to view India in light of the latter’s friendship with
the Soviets and could re-evaluate Indo-U.S. relations on their own merits.
• In 2004 these countries converted the bilateral ties into strategic partnership.
• Since the end of Cold War and increasingly in the last decade common strategic interests
such as managing the rise of China, ensuring maritime security and confronting
international terrorism combined with shared values such as democracy have driven
these relations.

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1.3. The Civil Nuclear Deal: A New Era

• In 2005 India-USA announced their intention to conclude a bilateral civil nuclear
agreement. The bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreement was finalized in July 2007
and signed in October 2008 after the US congress passed the 123 agreement bill in
September of that year and the NSG agreed to exempt India from its rule requiring full
scope safeguards for nuclear trade with non-weapon states. The process also involved
negotiating India specific safeguards with the IAEA.
• The agreement:
o Provided for separation of India’s military and civilian facilities,
o allows India to reserve all its indigenous uranium for its weapons programme, and
o Gave India the sole authority for determining which future facilities will be
safeguarded.
• The U.S. law and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines forbid the sharing of nuclear
fuel and technology with countries classified as “non-nuclear weapons states” under the
NPT, unless those states accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is key in interntional cooperation in
the arena of civilian nuclear programs. Thus, this civil nuclear agreement provided India a
re-entry into international nuclear cooperation with exceptional arrangements with USA,
NSG and IAEA.
• The civil nuclear agreement has played an important role in:
o Facilitating the recent Indo-U.S. rapprochement.
o helped India make progress in developing clean energy options
o Ending isolation at the technology regimes such as the MTCR and the Wassenaar
Arrangement.
o Made nuclear commerce possible with other countries
1.3.1. The Civil Nuclear Deal: Opertaionalisation
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• However the operationalistaion of the agreement hinged on resolving:

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o issues related to some of the provisions of the Indian Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
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Act (CLNDA),
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o a successful negotiation of the administrative arrangements for the implementation of

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the India-US 123 nuclear agreement.

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• The issues in respect of CLNDA related to:

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o the conformity of CLNDA with the provisions of the Convention on Supplementary

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Compensation (CSC), signed in 2010– but ratified in 2016 - by India;

o Sec. 17(b) of CLNDA, which allowed for Right of Recourse against the supplier; and
o Sec. 46, which allowed for legal cases against the operator under Acts other than the
CLNDA.
• The administrative arrangements under discussion were with respect to the accounting
and tracking of US-supplied nuclear materials and materials produced with the use of US-
supplied.
• During Prime Minister Modi's visit to the U.S. in September 2014, the two sides set up a
Contact Group for advancing the full and timely implementation of the India-U.S. Civil
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and to resolve pending issues.
• During President Obama’s visit to India in 2015, it was the announced that India and the
United States had come to an understanding on the two major issues that stood in the
way of the successful full implementation of the Indo-US nuclear deal.
• The two sides started the preparatory work on site in India for six AP 1000 reactors to be
built by Westinghouse. Once completed, the project would be among the largest of its
kind.

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• The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd, and Westinghouse are in talks toward finalizing
the contractual arrangements, and addressing related issues.
• The Westinghouse however, on 29 March 2017, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in New
York. This perhaps is a bottleneck in the progress of its projects in India that both countries
would have to overcome. The deal is being reworked now.
1.3.2. India-US Cooperation on Nuclear Energy: Historic Background
• More than a thousand Indian scientists between 1955 and 1974 participated in the US
nuclear energy research projects;
• The sale of US heavy water to India in the 1960s that was used in the unsafeguarded CIRUS
reactor that produced plutonium for India’s first nuclear explosion;
• Design work for the Trombay reprocessing facility provided by Vitro International, a US
company; and
• US assistance in the building and fuelling of the Tarapur reactors.
• The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (now usually referred to as the NNPA), was
signed by President Jimmy Carter in March 1978, this put a legal break to nuclear
cooperation with India.
1.4. The Mechanism of Cooperation

• There are more than 50 bilateral dialogue mechanisms between the two governments.
• The Strategic and Commercial Dialogue at the level of EAM and MoS (Commerce &
Industry) were held in Washington DC in September 2015 and New Delhi in August 2016.
• This apex-level dialogue has added a commercial component to the five traditional pillars of
bilateral relations on which the erstwhile Strategic Dialogue of Foreign Ministers had
focused, namely:
o Strategic Cooperation;
o Energy and Climate Change,
o Education and Development;
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o Economy, Trade and Agriculture;

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o Science and Technology;

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o and Health and Innovation.

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• A Policy Planning Dialogue has also been started between the two sides in September
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2015.
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• In addition, there are Ministerial-level dialogues involving home (Homeland Security

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Dialogue), finance (Financial and Economic Partnership), commerce (Trade Policy Forum),
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HRD (Higher Education Dialogue), Science & Technology (Joint Commission Meeting on
S&T) and energy (Energy Dialogue).
• There have been regular contacts at political and official levels on bilateral, regional and
global issues.
1.5. Political Ties

• The frequency of high-level visits and exchanges between India and the U.S. has gone up
significantly in recent years.
• Prime Minister Modi visited the U.S. on 26-30 September 2014;
• President Obama's visited India on 25-27 January 2015 as the Chief Guest at India's
Republic Day.
• Prime Minister Modi again visited the U.S. on 23-28 September 2015.
• In 2016, Prime Minister visited the U.S. for the multilateral Nuclear Security Summit hosted
by President Obama in Washington D.C. on 31 March-1 April. This was soon followed by an
official working visit by Prime Minister on 6-8 June, during. The PM addressed a Joint

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Session of the U.S. Congress, he was the sixth Indian Prime Minister to address the U.S.
Congress.
• A hotline was established in 2015 between the Prime Minister's Office and the U.S. White
House. It was the only new hotline that was established during the eight years of Obama
Administration. India is only the fourth country after Russia, Britain and China with which
the US has a hotline. In 2004, India and Pakistan agreed to establish hotlines at the level of
foreign secretaries, and in 2010 New Delhi and Beijing announced to establish a hotline at
the foreign ministry level.
• The PM visited the United States to meet President Donald Trump in June 2017.
1.6. Defence Cooperation

• Bilateral dialogue mechanisms in the field of defence include
o Defence Policy Group (DPG),
o Defence Joint Working Group (DJWG),
o Defence Procurement and Production Group (DPPG),
o Senior Technology Security Group (STSG),
o Joint Technical Group (JTG), Military Cooperation Group (MCG), and
o Service-to-Service Executive Steering Groups (ESGs).
• Defence relationship has emerged as a major pillar of India-U.S. strategic partnership with
the signing of ‘New Framework for India-U.S. Defense Relations’ in 2005. The Defence
Framework Agreement was updated and renewed for another 10 years in June 2015.
• This has resulted in intensification in defence trade, joint exercises, personnel exchanges,
collaboration and cooperation in maritime security and counter-piracy, and exchanges
between each of the three services.
• Joint strategic vision statement for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian ocean region-2015:
which called for “safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and
over-flight” throughout the Asia-Pacific region.
• RIMAPC: The two countries now conduct more bilateral exercises with each other than
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they do with any other country. India participated in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise
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in July-August 2016 for the second time with an Indian Naval Frigate. The two countries
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now conduct more bilateral exercises with each other than they do with any other
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country.
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•
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Malabar Exercise-India-USA-Japan trilateral naval exercises. The annual Malabar exercise

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started in 1992 as a bilateral event between the navies of India and the United States. In
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2015 Japan became a permanent participant in the Malabar exercises.

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1.6.1. Expanding Scope of Defence Cooperation

• The agreements signed during the past two year include:
o Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Association (LEMOA) signed in August 2016,
o Fuel Exchange Agreement signed in November 2015,
o Technical Agreement (TA) on information sharing on White (merchant) Shipping signed
in May 2016 and
o Information Exchange Annexe (IEA) on Aircraft Carrier Technologies signed in June
2016.
• Aggregate worth of defence acquisition from U.S. has crossed over US$ 13 billion (MEA
2016).
• Defence Technology Trade Initiative (DTTI): India and the United States launched a Defence
Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) in 2012, aimed at simplifying technology transfer
policies and exploring possibilities of co-development and co-production to invest the
defence relationship with strategic value.

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• The DTTI Working Group and its Task Force will expeditiously evaluate and decide on
unique projects and technologies which would have a transformative impact on bilateral
defence relations and enhance India's defence industry and military capabilities.
• During President Obama's visit in January 2015, the two sides agreed to start cooperation
on 4 DTTI pathfinder projects and 2 pathfinder initiatives, which are currently at various
stages of execution.
• During RM's visit in December 2015, the two sides also identified opportunities for bilateral
cooperation in production and design of jet engine components. During Secretary Ashton
Carter's visit in April 2014, two more G-2-G DTTI projects were added to the list.
• The DTTI meeting in Delhi in July 2016 decided to broaden its agenda by setting up five new
Joint Working Groups on: Naval Systems; Air Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance; Chemical and Biological Protection; and Other Systems.
• During the visit of Prime Minister to the U.S. in June 2016, the U.S. recognised India as a
"Major Defence Partner", which commits the U.S. to facilitate technology sharing with
India to a level commensurate with that of its closest allies and partners, and industry
collaboration for defence co-production and co-development.
• In December 2016, US Congress passed an amendment, Section 1292 titled “Enhancing
Defense and Security Cooperation with India”, to the National Defense Authorization Act
of 2017 (NDAA) — an annual bill that allocates funding to the US military.
• Section 1258 of the NDAA 2018 moves the ball forward by institutionalising the
relationship. The bill, titled “Advancements in defence cooperation between the United
States and India”, directs the departments of state, defence and commerce to “jointly
produce a common definition that recognises India’s status as a ‘Major Defence Partner’ for
joint use” by the three departments.
1.6.2. Way Forward: The Foundational Agreements
• The three agreements are referred to as the foundational agreements which the U.S. signs
with countries with which it has close military ties:
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o Logistics Support Agreement (LSA),

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o Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA)

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and
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o Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA).

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• India and USA signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in
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2016, is a tweaked India-Specific Version of the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA).

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• India had signed- the General Security Of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in
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2002.
• Since 2005, the US has urged India to sign an agreement called the Communications
Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), which lays down
stringent safeguards for sensitive radio equipment provided by America.
• As negotiations have progressed India objects to some safeguards, like inspections of
CISMOA-protected equipment on Indian military bases.
• Washington has agreed to rename the agreement COMCASA, or Communications
Compatibility and Security Agreement, to allow India a country-specific agreement.
1.7. Counter-terrorism and Internal Security

• Cooperation in counter-terrorism has seen considerable progress with intelligence sharing,
information exchange, operational cooperation, counter-terrorism technology and
equipment.
• India-U.S. Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Initiative was signed in 2010 to expand
collaboration on counter-terrorism, information sharing and capacity building.

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• A Homeland Security Dialogue was announced during President Obama's visit to India in
November 2010 to further deepen operational cooperation, counter-terrorism technology
transfers and capacity building.
1.8. The Economy

1.8.1. Trade
• India-US bilateral trade in goods and services increased from $104 billion in 2014 to $114
billion in 2016.
• Two-way merchandise trade stood at $66.7 billion. Of this, India’s exports of goods to the
US were valued at $46 billion and India’s imports of goods from US were valued at $21.7
billion. India-US trade in services stood at $47.2 billion. Of this, India’s exports of services to
the US were valued at $26.8 billion and India’s imports of services from US were valued at
$20.3 billion.
• During Prime Minister's visit to the U.S. in September 2014, the two sides set a target to
increase bilateral trade in goods & services to $500 billion.
1.8.2. Investment and Development
• According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, US direct investments in India stood at
$ 28.33 billion in 2015. As per Indian official statistics, the cumulative FDI inflows from the
US from April 2000 to December 2015 amounted to about $ 17.94 billion constituting
nearly 6% of the total FDI into India, making the U.S. the fifth largest source of FDI into
India.
• In recent years, growing Indian investments into the US, has been a novel feature of
bilateral ties. According to CII and Grant Thornton survey released in August 2015, 100
Indian companies have made $ 15 billion worth of tangible investments across 35 states,
creating more than 91,000 American jobs.
• Among large Indian corporations having investments in the U.S. include Reliance Industries
Limited, Tata Consultancy Services, Wipro, Essar America, Piramal, Mahindra, Lupin,
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SunPharma, etc.
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• There are several dialogue mechanisms to strengthen bilateral engagement on economic

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and trade issues, including a Ministerial level Economic and Financial Partnership.
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• For greater involvement of private sector in discussion on issues involving trade and
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investment, there is a bilateral India-U.S. CEO's Forum.

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• India and the US have set up a bilateral Investment Initiative in 2014. Special focus on
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facilitating FDI, portfolio investment, capital market development and financing of

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infrastructure.
• U.S.-India Infrastructure Collaboration Platform has also been set up to deploy cutting
edge U.S technologies to meet India’s infrastructure needs. U.S. firms will be lead partners
in developing Allahabad, Ajmer and Vishakhapatnam as Smart Cities.
1.8.3. Major issues of Contention in Economy
• Major issues between the two countries that need attention-
o Barriers to the movement of goods and services, and deeper integration into global
supply chains, thereby creating jobs and generating prosperity in both economies
o The doubling of H-1B & L1 visa fees by USA which is expected to adversely impact
Indian IT companies in USA.
o The recent decision by the Trump Administration in US to make the extension of H-1B
and L1 Visas stringent as part of immigration reforms. If the proposal passes, 500,000
to 750,000 Indian H-1B visa holders could be forced to leave the U.S., according
to IndiaToday. Recently, on 10 January 2018, media reports suggested that the US has
assured India that there would be no changes in the H-1B Visa Programme.

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o Annual cap of 85,000 H-1B visas: India wants this to be raised, event the the US
multinational corporations have urged the same.
o India-USA solar dispute: The US trade complaint at WTO Dispute Resolution Body
(DSB) in 2013 made the case that the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission
subsidies were available only if developers used equipment produced in India, violating
a key global trade rule. The US considers the program as discriminatory points out that
the U.S. solar exports to India had fallen by 90 percent from 2011.
o The United States won the case in 2016, when WTO appeals judges ruled India had
broken the trade rules by requiring solar power developers to use Indian-made cells
and modules. India had until Decemeber 14, 2017 to comply with the ruling and it told
the DSB last week that it had done so.
o However, the US has complained that that India has failed to comply with the ruling,
triggering a fresh round of litigation.
o Public Food Stockholding Issue at the WTO: The talks at the WTO’s 11th ministerial
conference, at Buenos Aires in Argentina in December 2017 collapsed after the US
went back on its commitment to find a permanent solution to the public food
stockholding issue, a key matter for India.
o Export Subsidies: In March 2018, USA filed a complaint at the WTO about India’s
export subsidy programmes claiming them to harm American workers.
1.8.4. Major Issues: IPR
• India-US Intellectual property Rights tussle: Intellectual Property protection is a key issue
for India-US relationship. International Intellectual Property for the US Chambers of
Commerce has been putting pressure on the US administrations to push India to tighten its
IPR regime. IPR has been flagged as the biggest concern that the US has with India during
the trade policy review.
• The main difference between the two sides stems from the fact that while the US sees IPR
purely from the commercial point of view, India sees it as a development measure.
•
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In its Special 301 report, 2017, the United States Trade Representative’s office said: Despite
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positive statements and initiatives upon which the Modi Administration has embarked, the
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pace of reform has not matched high-level calls to foster innovation and promote creativity.
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India has yet to take steps to address longstanding patent issues that are affecting
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innovative industries. The report retained the India under the priority watch list.
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• In 2016 the US raised the issue at the WTO. What the US and the EU have against India’s
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intellectual property legislation is a particular provision (Section 3(d) of Indian Patents act )
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which allows the Indian Patents Controller to deny patents on items that are not
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significantly different from their older versions. This prevents pharmaceutical majors from
getting fresh patents on medicines with expired patents by making just cosmetic changes in
its formulation.
• The US and Switzerland are also pushing the WTO for allowing ‘non-violation’ complaints
on TRIPS-related issues which would mean that complaints could be lodged on IPR matters
even if the multilateral pact is not violated.
• Many developing countries, on the other hand, want a Ministerial decision of excluding
such disputes permanently.
• New Delhi has teamed up with Brazil, China and South Africa to initiate a discussion on a
recent report by a high level UN panel on access to medicines that stresses on the
importance of using flexibilities in the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
pact to achieve the objective.
• New Delhi is also holding on to its right-to-issue compulsory licences for manufacture of
copies of patented drugs to address situations of national emergency, another flexibility
that the TRIPS pact allows.

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• There is a clear divide between developed and developing countries on their reaction to
the UN report on the issue with Egypt, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Bolivia, supporting the
panel’s recommendations and the EU, Switzerland, Japan and South Korea criticising it for
being “narrow in scope’’.
1.9. Energy
• The U.S.-India Energy Dialogue was launched in May 2005 to promote trade and
investment in the energy sector.
• There are six working groups in oil & gas, coal, power and energy efficiency, new
technologies& renewable energy, civil nuclear co-operation and sustainable development
under the Energy Dialogue.
• The 40-year-old ban on export of American oil was lifted by the then US President Barack
Obama in December 2015. During the meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi
and US President Donald Trump on June 26 2017 when the two leaders agreed to deepen
the engagement in the energy sector.
• India received its first crude oil cargo of 1.6 million barrels from the US at the Paradip
Port, Odisha on 2 October 2017.
• Investment by Indian companies like Reliance, Essar and GAIL in the U.S. natural gas
market is ushering in a new era of India-U.S. energy partnership. Four Indian public and
private sector companies have invested approximately USD 5 billion in shale assets in the
US.
• The U.S. Department of Energy has so far given its approval for export of LNG from seven
liquefaction terminals in the U.S., to countries with which the U.S. does not have a free
trade agreement (FTA).
• Two of these terminals, the Indian public sector entity, Gas Authority of India Limited
(GAIL) has off take agreements, totaling nearly 6 million metric tonnes per annum (MTPA).
1.10. Climate Change

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• India and the U.S. are advancing cooperation and dialogue on climate change through a
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high level Climate Change Working Group and a Joint Working Group on
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Hydroflurocarbon.
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• As a priority initiative under the PACE (Partnership to Advance Clean Energy), the U.S.
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Department of Energy (DOE) and the Government of India have established the Joint Clean
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Energy Research and Development Center (JCERDC) designed to promote clean energy
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innovations by teams of scientists from India and the United States, with a total joint
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committed funding from both Governments of US$ 50 million.

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• In November 2014, an MoU between U.S. EXIM Bank and Indian Renewable Energy
Development Agency (IREDA) was concluded to provide US$ 1 billion in financing for India’s
transition to a low-carbon economy.
• A new U.S.-India Partnership for Climate Resilience has been agreed to, in order to
advance capacity for climate adaptation planning, as also a new U.S.- India Climate
Fellowship Program to build long-term capacity to address climate change-related issues.
• To further collaboration in the area of clean energy and climate change, in June 2016, the
two sides announced finalization of a package to provide concessional finance to support
clean energy projects on track, to coordinate U.S. Government efforts on clean energy
investment in India jointly with leading Indian financial institutions, and to provide liquidity
to small scale renewable energy investors.
Challenges in Climate Change Cooperation
• Under President Trump the USA has embarked on a different path on the issue of Climate
change.

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• President Trump, on 1 June 2017, announced the US withdrawal from the Paris Climate
Change Accord. While doing so he accused India of demanding billions of dollars to
comply with its commitments under the Paris Pact. This was resolutely refuted by External
Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj. This divergence poses challenge to future climate change
cooperation.
1.11. Education and Culture

• Cooperation in education sector has been made an integral part of the strategic
partnership between the two countries.
• Since 2008, India became an equal partner in the financial support of the Fulbright
Program in India. All awards in India are now titled Fulbright-Nehru fellowships, with
enhanced mandate and joint funding, to provide more student and scholar exchange
grants. India now has the largest U.S. Fulbright Scholar Program in the world with nearly
200 awards annually.
• About 130,000 Indian students are pursuing advanced degrees in the U.S.
• The Higher Education Dialogue, which has had four meetings since 2011 , laid out the road
map for promoting strategic institutional partnerships, deepening collaboration in research
and development, fostering partnerships in vocational education and focusing on junior
faculty development.
• India is learning from the U.S. experience in community colleges in order to meet our
demands for skill-development.
• It has been agreed to collaborate with U.S. institutions in the area of Technology Enabled
Learning and Massive Open On-line Courses (MOOCs) to extend the reach of education in
India.
• Under the Global Initiative of Academic Networks (GIAN) launched by India, upto 1000
American academics will be invited and hosted each year to teach in Indian universities at
their convenience.
• The two sides have also collaborated to establish a new Indian Institute of Technology in
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Ahmedabad/Gandhinagar.
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1.12. Space
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• A bilateral Joint Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation provides a forum for discussion
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on joint activities in space, including:

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o (i) exchange of scientists; (ii) OCM2, INSAT3D collaboration; (iii) Cooperation on Mars
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mission; (iv) nano-satellites; (v) carbon /ecosystem monitoring and modeling; (vi)
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feasibility of collaboration in radio occultation: (vii) Earth Science Cooperation: (viii)

international space station; (ix) global navigation satellite systems; (x) L&S band SAR;
(xi) space exploration cooperation; (xii) space debris mediation.
• India and USA are collaborating on India's Mars Orbiter Mission and for a dual-band NASA-
ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR). The second mission to Mars is tentatively slated
for a 2021-2022
• In June 2016, ISRO successfully launched record 20 satellites onboard PSLV rocket, which
included 13 satellites from the United States.
• Many U.S. companies continue to provide ISRO with satellite technology and
components, and Raytheon is playing an important role in India’s GAGAN navigation
system.
Space Cooperation: A historical Background
• In 1963 when India first launched a U.S.-manufactured sounding rocket – sometimes
called a “research rocket” – from Thumba to study the atmosphere above Earth’s magnetic
equator.

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• In the 1970s, ISRO and NASA conducted the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment
(SITE). SITE used NASA’s first direct broadcasting satellite to beam television programs to
more than 2,400 villages across India.
• The first four INSAT satellites were built by U.S. industry, and three of them were put into
orbit by U.S. launch vehicles.
• Chandrayaan-1, India’s first mission to the moon, was launched successfully in October
2008. The spacecraft carried several scientific instruments built by international partners,
including two by NASA.
• In September 2014, both nations had spacecraft arrive in Martian orbit. NASA’s Mars
Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN spacecraft – popularly known as MAVEN – arrived at
Mars on September 21 and is the first spacecraft dedicated to exploring the upper
atmosphere of Mars. ISRO’s Mars Orbiter Mission – or MOM – arrived only two days later
and made India the first Asian nation to “go to Mars.”
1.13. Science and Technology

• The India-U.S. S&T cooperation has been steadily growing under the framework of U.S.-
India Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement signed in October 2005.
• There is an Indo-U.S. Science & Technology Joint Commission, co-chaired by the Science
Advisor to U.S. President and Indian Minister of S&T. The U.S. attended as the partner
country at the Technology Summit 2014 at New Delhi.
• In 2000, both the governments endowed the India-U.S. Science & Technology Forum
(IUSSTF) to facilitate mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation in science, engineering, and
health
• India's contribution of $250 million towards Thirty-Meter Telescope Project in Hawaii and
Indian Initiative in Gravitational Observations (IndiGO) with U.S. LIGO Laboratory are
examples of joint collaboration to create world-class research facilities.
1.14. P2P: Diaspora

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• The 3.5-million-plus strong Indian American community is an important ethnic group in

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the U.S., accounting for about 1% of the total population in the country.
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• Indian American community includes a large number of professionals, business

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entrepreneurs and educationalists with increasing influence in the society.

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• With two Indian Americans occupying high level posts of Governor and several
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representatives of the people, the Indian Diaspora has assimilated into their adopted
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country and is acting as a catalyst to forge closer and stronger ties between India and the
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U.S.
• The two countries have been working together to facilitate travel of their respective
citizens, and to this end an MOU has been signed in June 2016 to facilitate India's joining
of the Global Entry Programme for expedited immigration for eligible Indian citizens at U.S.
airports.
• During the visit of Prime Minister to the U.S. in June 2016, the two countries also
announced their decision to celebrate 2017 as Travel and Tourism Partner Countries.
1.15. Global Public Health

• Under the 2010 U.S.-India Health Initiative, four working groups have been organized in
the areas of Non-Communicable Diseases, Infectious Diseases, Strengthening Health
Systems and Services, and Maternal and Child Health.
• In order to build up the disease surveillance and epidemiological capacity in India, Global
Disease Detection-India Centre was established in 2010 and an Epidemic Intelligence
Service program launched in Oct 2012.

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• U.S. National Institutes of Health, the Indian Council of Medical Research, and India's
Department of Biotechnology have developed a robust relationship in the biomedical and
behavioral health sciences, research related to HIV/AIDS, infectious diseases, diabetes,
cardiovascular diseases, eye disease, hearing disorders, mental health, and low-cost
medical technologies.
• In the first meeting of the Health Dialogue in September 2015 in Washington DC, both
sides agreed to collaborate institutionally in the new areas of mental health and regulatory
and capacity-building.
1.16. Strategic Components of the Relationship

• As reflected in the PM’s visit to the United Sates in June 2017 the Strategic contents of the
relationship revolve around the following:
o Situation in Afghanistan, North Korea, Middle East, Pakistan, Indo-Pacific Region,
o India's membership in export control agreements and UN Security Council,
o Cyber space,
o Malabar naval exercises,
o Reaffirmation of India's designation as a Major Defence Partner,
o United States to join as an Observer in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
• These are key for the future of the global relationship. The South Asia Strategy, issued in
August 2017, and the National Security Strategy, released in November 2017, both bring
the US and India into a closer alignment on multiple issues.
1.17. The Pakistan Factor

• Traditionally, any strategic interest that the U.S. perceived in South Asia lay primarily with
India’s arch-rival, Pakistan. Pakistan, at least notionally, supported American grand
strategic goals, including participating in anti-communist military alliances such as the
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
• Pakistan has allowed Washington to use its territory as a base for overflights to eavesdrop
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on the Soviet Union, in addition to serving as a vital conduit for American arms shipments
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to anti- Soviet forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s.

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• In return, the Pakistan received substantial American economic and military assistance. U.S.
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ties with Pakistan exacerbated Indo-U.S. estrangement.

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America’s support for Pakistan was apparent during the 1971 Bangladesh war, when
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President Nixon “tilted” toward the Pakistan and dispatched the aircraft carrier USS-
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Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal.

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• India viewed this move as an attempt to deter it from taking further action against Pakistan.
The close relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan thus had an exceedingly negative
impact on Indo-U.S. relations.
• US provided multi-billion dollar military aid to Pakistan and Islamabad is a Major Non-NATO
Ally.
1.17.1. Recent Trends
• During the PM’s visit to the US in June 2017, the biggest takeaway in substantive terms was
the stern language against Pakistan and the designation of Syed Salahuddin, the ‘supreme
commander’ of the Kashmiri militant outfit Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, as a Specially Designated
Global Terrorist because of his pronouncements about wreaking havoc in Kashmir and
making it a graveyard for Indian forces.
• In August 2017, while unveiling his new South Asia strategy, Mr. Trump had accused
Pakistan of giving “safe haven to agents of chaos, violence, and terror,” and said the time
had come “for Pakistan to demonstrate its commitment to civilisation, order, and to peace.”

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• The United States is keeping “all options” on the table to deal with Pakistan if it does not
take decisive action against the Taliban and the Haqqani network and dismantle their safe
havens, the White House warned on 6 January 2018.
• In the First week of January 2018, the US suspended about $2 billion in security aid to
Pakistan for failing to clamp down on terror groups. This includes Foreign Military Funding
(FMF) and the Coalition Support Fund (CSF)
• The freezing of all security assistance to Pakistan comes after President Donald Trump in a
New Year’s Day tweet (2018) accused the country of giving nothing to the US but “lies and
deceit” and providing “safe haven” to terrorists in return for $33 billion aid over the last 15
years.
• Some policy-makers have been asking the White House to revoke the non-NATO ally
status of Pakistan and put pressure on the country through multilateral institutions like the
International Monetary Fund and the United Nations, Pentagon generals have indicated
unilateral actions.
• Mr. Trump’s new policy, according to the official, is driven by the desire to have a
successful strategy in Afghanistan. However, India’s primary concern has been regarding
cross border state sponsored terrorism emanating from Pakistan.
• Meanwhile, Defence Secretary Jim Mattis said the US would restore the suspended
security assistance to Pakistan if it takes action against terrorist groups. Mr. Mattis had
travelled to Pakistan in December 2017for talks with the top Pakistani leadership. Secretary
of State Rex Tillerson also travelled to Pakistan in recent months to deliver tough message.
1.17.2. Pakistan Factor: What’s New?
• China now appears set for an even tighter embrace of its already “iron
brother” Pakistan, following a New Year slide in ties between Islamabad and Washington.-
Atul Aneja- The Hindu, 8 January 2018.
• In the First Week of 2018 Pakistan’s central bank swiftly announced that it would use the
Chinese Yuan (CNY) to settle bilateral trade and investment with China.
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• Critics argue that, Mr. Trump’s tweet also played into the hands of the religious right, now
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harbouring political ambitions in Pakistan's elections next year. The Hafiz Saeed-led Jamaat-
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ud-Dawa (JuD) demanded the expulsion of the U.S. Ambassador during street protests in
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Lahore.
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• In January 2018, according to media reports, it emerged that China plans to build its second
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military base overseas — after Djibouti at the mouth of the Red Sea — in Jiwani. Only 90
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km to the east is the Gwadar deep sea port.

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• The Global Times, A Chinese news paper, signaled that Pakistan would be justified in
defining a new geopolitical calculus that covers China and Russia.
1.18. The China Factor

• A distinctive pattern of triangular interaction has emerged in relations among China, India,
and the United States during the post–Cold War period. China was one significant factor in
the emergence of the new Indo–U.S. relationship.
• Each actor apprehends alignment of the other two against itself. This fear exists for all
three actors but is especially strong for the two weaker state actors, China and India.
• China is an emerging challenger to the global influence of the United States. It is also a key
neighbour of India. Thus the triangle acquires new salience in the changing geopolitics. All
three a member of G-20. India and China cooperate in BRICS and AIIB but diverge on OBOR.
India and USA converge on the OBOR.
• Pivot to Asia: President Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia”, announced in 2011, involved an
attempt to rebalance U.S. foreign policy away from the Middle East and toward East Asia.

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The Obama administration spent eight years formulating a foreign policy vision, Known as
the “rebalance to Asia”. The policy involved coordinated efforts to boost U.S. defense,
diplomatic, and economic ties with the Asia-Pacific.
• American strategic partnerships have generally expanded in the Asian region, as they did
from 2001 to 2008. There is more continuity and bipartisan consensus around Asia policy in
the United States.
• Flip Flops: In 2009, president Obama emphasized his intention to respect China’s “core
interests” in Asia, to the alarm of American allies. Then, in 2011, after an emboldened
China began throwing its weight around, the administration announced its “rebalance” to
Asia with new military deployments to Australia, to the alarm of China.
• Then, in 2013, the Obama administration shook American allies again by walking away from
the “red line” on Syria and announcing support for Xi Jinping’s “New Model of Great Power
Relations” — a proposed condominium of the United States and China in Asia that looked
very much like the earlier pledge to respect China’s core interests.
• With President Trump there are both elements of continuity and change e.g. His visit to
China in November 2017 and his praise of China in light of his previous criticism of Beijing.
1.19. The Indo-Pacific

• It was first brought up by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007 in a speech to the
Indian Parliament to represent the vast swathe of water that connects the Pacific and the
Indian Oceans.
• It has recently got some traction after Rex Tillerson, the US Secretary of State, used it in a
major policy speech in Washington. Trump in his visit to China also referred to the Indo-
Pacific.
• The first ever use of the term in the recently released National Security Strategy
Document of the USA, in 2017, has provided the term new salience.
• Against this backdrop, efforts to rejuvenate the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or the
“Quad”) between Australia, India, Japan and the US on the sidelines of the Association of
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South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Manila, in 2017, are of
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notable significance.
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1.20. The Russia Factor

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• Russia is largest military competitor of the USA. It has been getting closer to China. Russia
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has been is largest military supplier to India.

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• USA is the largest military supplier in the World. India one of the largest military buyers
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in the world.
• Now Moscow seems to be pivoting towards Islamabad as New Delhi becomes closer to
Washington.
• In June 2015 Russia had lifted its embargo on arms supply to Pakistan and negotiated
supply of combat Helicopters
• Russia signed gas pipeline pact with Pakistan in 2015, an estimated investment of 2 billion
US$.
• Russia and China are collaborating closely. In 2014 both signed a 30 year Gas deal estimated
to be over 400 billion US$.
• The US NSS identifies both Russia and China as national security challenges. President
Trump remains ambivalent about Russia and President Putin.
1.21. The Joint Declaration 2017

• Actions identified by the Joint Statement include increased intelligence sharing,
operational-level counterterrorism cooperation, exchange of information on known and

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suspected terrorists for travel screening, strengthening information exchange on plans,

movements and linkages of terrorist groups and their leaders, terror financing, etc.
• On the subjects of regional connectivity and South China Sea (although the latter is not
mentioned by name), India's position has been fully reflected. The Joint Statement declares
the necessity of transparent development of infrastructure, use of responsible debt
financing practices, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, rule of law, and
environmental protection.
• Principles of freedom of navigation, unhindered over flights, and commerce throughout
the region as well as the need to resolve territorial and maritime disputes peacefully and in
accordance with international law have been reiterated.
• This reaffirms that India and USA are on the same page with respect to dealing with the
rapidly growing influence and presence of China in the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific
region.
• The real test of the commitments assumed by the two countries will lie in action taken by
them in the coming time.
1.22. Way Forward

• Defence has emerged as a major area of cooperation with USA emerging as the second
largest supplier, after Russia, of sophisticated equipment to India. The sale of 22 Guardian
surveillance drones is on the cards and is likely to be announced shortly. Also, reports have
emerged about a possible tie-up between Lockheed Martin and the Tata group to locally
manufacture F16 aircraft in India. This could provide a significant impetus to the Make in
India initiative.
• In his op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, referring to his statement about having overcome
the “hesitations of history” during his address to the US Congress a year ago, PM Modi
affirmed it once again and expressed his confidence with regard to the growing
convergence between the two nations.
• However, the concerns regarding implications of close cooperation with USA in defence,
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especially the signal it gives to Russia or China is a factor that needs consideration and
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adequate policy preparedness.

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• Similarly, the impact on foundational agreements on India’s strategic autonomy requires

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careful and skilled diplomatic and political engagement.

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On issues at WTO and climate change differences would persist as India needs to
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safeguard its national interests. These issues require careful management.

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1.23. Policy Options

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• Cooperate wherever possible, compete wherever necessary, avoid Conflict and defend
strategic Autonomy.
• Engage multiple partners through, bilateral and multilateral instruments.
• Act as a bridge wherever possible. E.g. Iran, Russia.
• Remain strategic and avoid the temptations of tactical gains e.g. destabilising Pakistan or
antagonising China is not a strategic goal for India.


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LECTURE-13
LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA
Contents
1. India and Latin America......................................................................................................... 204
1.1. History and Geography ................................................................................................... 204
1.2. India and South America: Current Imperatives and Historical Dynamics ....................... 205
1.2.1. History of Relations .................................................................................................. 206
1.2.2. Trade and Investment .............................................................................................. 206
1.2.3. Some interesting Facts ............................................................................................. 207
1.2.4. Food and Energy Security......................................................................................... 208
1.2.5. Defence .................................................................................................................... 208
1.2.6. China Factor ............................................................................................................. 208
1.2.7. What Can Drive Cooperation? ................................................................................. 209
1.2.8. Regional Institutions ................................................................................................ 209

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2. India and Africa ...................................................................................................................... 211

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2.1. Background and Evolution .............................................................................................. 211

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2.1.1. Understanding India-Africa Synergy......................................................................... 212

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2.1.2. Recent Dynamic ....................................................................................................... 213

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2.2. Economy .......................................................................................................................... 213
2.2.1. Investments in Africa................................................................................................ 214
2.3. Development Partnership ............................................................................................... 215
2.4. Security ........................................................................................................................... 216
2.5. Challenges and Opportunities ......................................................................................... 216
2.5.1. What Should India Do? ............................................................................................ 217
2.5.2. The Asia Africa Growth Corridor .............................................................................. 217

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1. India and Latin America

Map12.1Latin America
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Image Source: https://media1.britannica.com/eb-media/30/108730-004-C0FE33B5.jpg

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1.1. History and Geography

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Latin America is generally understood to consist of the entire continent of South

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America in addition to Mexico, Central America, and the islands of the Caribbean whose
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inhabitants speak a Romance language.

• The peoples of this large area shared the experience of conquest and colonization by the
Spaniards and Portuguese from the late 15th through the 18th Century as well as
movements of independence from Spain and Portugal in the early 19th century.
• Since the Spanish and Portuguese element looms so large in the history of the region, it is
sometimes proposed that Iberoamerica would be a better term than Latin America.
• Lesser Antilles, long arc of small islands in the Caribbean Sea extending in a north-south
direction from the Virgin Islands to Grenada. A number of other islands—Trinidad and
Tobago, off the northeastern coast of Venezuela, and the east-west island chain
from Margarita Island to Aruba, off the northern coast of Venezuela—are physiographically
part of the South American continental shelf but are usually included in definitions of the
Lesser Antilles.
• The Greater Antilles is a grouping of the larger islands in the Caribbean Sea: Cuba,
Hispaniola (containing Haiti and the Dominican Republic), Puerto Rico, Jamaica, and
the Cayman Islands.

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Map12.2 The Caribbean

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factbook//graphics/ref_maps/political/jpg/central_america.jpg
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• The Spaniards from the first had concentrated on the Greater Antilles, leaving the smaller
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islands virtually unoccupied. As developments passed the Spanish Caribbean by, even
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portions of the larger islands were left under-occupied. Thus, in the course of the 17th
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century, the French and English, aided by buccaneers of their respective nationalities, were
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able to take over the small islands, Jamaica, and the western end of Hispaniola to grow
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tropical crops, above all sugar, for themselves.

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• After three centuries of colonial rule, independence came rather suddenly to most of
Spanish and Portuguese America. Between 1808 and 1826 all of Latin America except the
Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico slipped out of the hands of the Iberian powers
who had ruled the region since the conquest
• On 2 December 1823, the USA issued the Monroe Doctrine. This was a policy of
opposing European colonialism in the Americas. It stated that further efforts by European
nations to take control of any independent state in North or South America would be
viewed as "the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.”
President James Monroe first stated the doctrine during his seventh annual State of the
Union Address to Congress. The term "Monroe Doctrine" itself was coined in 1850.
1.2. India and South America: Current Imperatives and Historical

Dynamics
• It is essential to raise India’s global profile and expand the country’s footprints with the
region which boasts a combined GDP of $4.9 trillion and is home to 600 million

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inhabitants, nearly half the population of India, but with a landmass five times that of
India.
• Latin America, according to a report by Economic Commission for Latin America and
Caribbean of the United Nations, netted 179 billion dollars of FDI in 2013, the highest
record for any region in the world.
• The relations have been influenced in the past seven decades by Cold War Era, Global
Politics, Physical distance, Mutually divergent priorities. India and South America have
barely managed to maintain minimal bilateral ties for the last several decades. India’s
eminence is rising on the global stage but this has not yet found an expression in Latin
America.
• Absent strong ties in geography, what India and South America have instead is a shared
post-colonial history.
• Today, it is not only economics that creates the rationale for strong bilateral ties between
India and South America; there is also India's desire to diversify energy sources, and a
growing Chinese influence in the region. It is in India’s strategic interest to reduce its
dependency on West Asia for its energy security.
• India is looking to further diversify its trade to relatively newer markers in Latin America
and Caribbean Islands.
• Many believe that trading with Latin America is expensive and therefore should not be a
priority.
• However, Ministry of External Affairs has highlighted the potential of higher volumes of
trade: “India’s exports to Latin America are growing at a robust rate. Indian
pharmaceuticals, automobiles, textiles, chemicals, machinery and other value added
products have found dedicated customers all over the region. Indian companies – UPL,
Godrej, Hero and others – have bought local companies or invested in greenfield projects.
Over a dozen Indian software companies employ from a few dozen to several thousand
software professionals in development and delivery centres all over Latin America. Latin
America offers an essential alternative source for our raw material needs, and new markets
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for value-added exports of our goods and services, in an increasingly insecure and volatile
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international environment.”
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1.2.1. History of Relations

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• Perhaps the high point of Indian diplomacy with Latin America remains then Prime Minister
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Indira Gandhi’s visits to eight countries in the region in 1968.

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Prime Minster Narendra Modi during his visit to Brazil for the BRICS Summit in 2014 ,
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hinted at a promise of greater engagement.

• Prime Minister Modi has not visited any Latin American nation after the BRICS Summit of
2014, and in 2016 he became the first Indian PM to have missed the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) Summit, that year hosted by Venezuela.
• Political engagement, has been minimal both ways: only five visits have been made by
Latin American leaders to India since 2014.
1.2.2. Trade and Investment
• India’s trade with Latin America reached US$46 billion in 2013-2014. Since then it has not
shown significant improvement.
• India’s trade with Latin America in 2016-17 was $30 billion, of which export was $10.4
billion and imports $19.6 billion.
• Mercosur, a sub-regional bloc consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay,
remains India’s largest trading partner in the region with US$15.9 billion in trade in 2016.
• The trade has gone up slightly from $29.7 billion in 2015-16 but is down from $43 billion in
2014-15.

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• The main reasons for the decrease in trade are the fall in commodity prices imported by
India from Latin America and the recession of the region in 2015 and 2016.
• India’s import of crude oil from the region fell to $9.5 billion in 2016-17 from $20 billion in
2014-15, thanks to the decrease in oil prices from over $100 dollars to less $50. The volume
of crude imports had, in fact, increased.
• Brazil has overtaken Venezuela to become the leading trade partner of India with US$6.69
billion. Trade with Venezuela was US$5.8 billion, with Argentina US$3 billion, Chile US$2.6
billion, Colombia US$1.69 billion, and Peru US$1.52 billion.
• Venezuela has remained the largest source of imports in the region, with US$5.7 billion,
followed by Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Dominican Republic,
Bolivia and Paraguay.
• India’s bilateral trade with Cuba is minuscule at just $43.18 million in 2016-17. Of this,
India’s exports to Cuba were worth $41.87 million, and imports from that country were only
$1.31 million.
• The Indian government has provided Line of Credit to Cuba the tune of $173 million for
projects including milk powder processing plant, bulk blending fertiliser plant, power co-
generation project and wind farm.
• In May 2017, Ecuador expressed its interest in signing a preferential trade agreement
(PTA) with India to enhance trade linkages. Colombia has also shown interest towards
collaborating in industries like food processing and agriculture.
• Negotiations over a PTA have started between India and Peru.
• In 2016, PTA between India and Chile was broadened, with Chile offering concessions on
some 1,798 tariff lines and India offering concessions on 1,031 tariff lines
• India’s inroads have been significant to the extent that in 2016, its exports of
pharmaceuticals to Latin America beat China’s volumes. India’s exports were $651 million
in comparison to China’s $404 million in 2016.
1.2.3. Some interesting Facts1
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In 2016-17, India exported more to Mexico ($3.5 billion) than to neighbours such as
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Thailand ($3.1 billion), Myanmar ($1.7 billion) and Iran ($2.4 billion) or traditional trade
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partners Russia ($1.9 billion) and Canada ($2 billion).

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• India’s exports to Colombia ($787 million) were more than the exports to some West
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European countries such as Austria, Ireland and Scandinavian countries.

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• Guatemala imported more from India ($243 million) than some Central Asian and East
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European countries.
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• India’s trade with the Dominican Republic ($900 million) was more than the trade with
Portugal, Greece and some other European countries.
• Latin America was the leading destination of India’s vehicle exports with a share of 23%
of India’s global exports. Mexico continued to be the main buyer of Indian cars with $1.6
billion accounting for 25% of India’s global exports. Vehicle exports to Mexico have been
steadily increasing in the last three years and the increase from last year was an impressive
39%. Colombia, which was the number one buyer of Indian motorcycles came down to the
third rank in 2016-17 with imports of $185 million, after Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. In 2016-
17 Latin America imported motorcycles worth $354 million from India in 2016-17, which
was 25% of India’s exports to the world.
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R. Vishwanathan, the Wire, 21 July 2017, https://thewire.in/159810/trade-india-latin-america/

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1.2.4. Food and Energy Security

• Food security is another powerful factor that’s driving India to deepen its engagement with
the Latin America region, which has vast swathes of fertile land.
• Brazil, for example, is an agriculture superpower with not just rolling acres of arable land,
but is also equipped with cutting edge food storage technologies. Argentina, too, is a
leader in agricultural research. The two sides are poised to set up more joint ventures and
research collaborations in this area in days to come.
• Latin America has also emerged as an important source of hydrocarbons for India in the
last few years, with the region contributing around 10 per cent of India’s energy imports.
India is set to step up collaboration with Brazil in the area of eco-friendly ethanol.
Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico and Cuba are some of important suppliers of oil to India in
the region.
1.2.5. Defence
South America is also a lucrative defence market for India. Among the more prominent sales of
Indian defence products in the region have been:
• The sale of two Mahindra Rakshak armoured vehicles and one Mahindra Rapid Intervention
Vehicle to Guyana Police Force.
• 139 Ashok Leyland 4x4 trucks to the Honduran Army.
• Mahindra 4x4 vehicles to Argentina, Uruguay and Belize.
• 29 Mahindra Marksman vehicle to the Chilean Carabineros Special Forces
• Two civil model Dhruv helicopters to Peru.
• Seven Dhruv helicopters to Ecuador (now withdrawn from use following accidents), and
• Three Chetak helicopters to Suriname.
1.2.6. China Factor
• At a time when the world is witnessing the rise of China as a major global player, its
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steadily growing presence and influence should be enough of an incentive to drive the
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Indian government to take the necessary measures to bolster the country’s ties with
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South America.
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• In 2016, China’s exports to Latin American & Caribbean countries was US$ 113 billion,
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while imports stood at US$ 103 billion as compared to US exports of US$ 135,963.5 million
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and imports of US$ 107,651.7 million. India, on the other hand, exported US$ 7,258.30
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million and imported US$ 17,290.63 million worth of goods from Latin America and
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Caribbean.
• China overtook the US to become the largest export destination for Latin American
countries like Brazil, Chile and Peru, and replaced the European Union (EU) as the second
largest trade partner of the region in 2017.
• With a target of US$500 billion in trade and US$250 billion investment in the region by
2025, China is working to establish itself as the dominant economic power in the region.
• Massive infrastructure projects in the region have been announced by China, such as
the Bi-Oceanic Railway between the ports of Santos in Brazil and Callao in Peru, and
the Canal project in Nicaragua. Indeed, China is setting the bar high for other powers to
measure up to.
• As a manufacturing giant, China has huge requirements for raw materials of which Latin
America has reserves: among them, copper, iron, sliver and tin. Further, in order to meet
the demands of its growing population, China aims to import large quantities of agricultural
produce from Latin American countries, such as crops including soybean.

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• On the symbolic front, greater engagement with the Latin bloc serves to challenge the
hegemony long exercised by the United States in the region. Economically, Latin America
has a lot to offer: for one, Beijing looks to the region to meet its oil needs, with Venezuela
and Brazil becoming important elements in China’s oil strategy.
• The challenge for India is how to engage in a region that China has similarly set its eyes
on.
• There are certain instances from which lessons can be drawn. In April 2010, when
Argentina put restrictions on Chinese imports, China stopped buying Argentine soybean
oil. By promptly tripling their imports of this oil, India helped Argentina avert a serious
blow to its oil industry in monetary terms.
• Brazil, which is part of the BRICS grouping, is also confronting the realities of a much
more powerful China trying to make BRICS an extension of its own economic heft. India
can carve out a much more equitable partnership with Brazil that underscores its
credentials as a responsible global stakeholder.
• Further, if India could obtain membership to the Alianza del Pacífico (Pacific Alliance), it
could help enhance its economic ties with the bloc and assist in balancing China’s
aggressive Belt and Road Initiative.
• The Pacific Alliance, a Latin American trade bloc, currently has four member states—
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru—that all border the Pacific Ocean. India was granted
‘observer’ status in the bloc in 2014.
• India may find in Latin America a willing partner as nationalist and anti-immigration
sentiments sweep through the global North.
1.2.7. What Can Drive Cooperation?
• With culture as tool— language, food, and art, among them—people from India and Latin
America can strengthen their understanding of each other. Cultural exchanges between the
two regions have increased over the years, with several educational institutions offering
scholarships, for example, in dance and music.
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• The India-Latin America relations are increasingly acquiring strategic orientation. Building
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upon New Delhi’s dialogue with a troika of foreign ministers of the Community of Latin
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American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in July 2012.

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• the two sides should explore the possibilities of forging an India-Latin America and
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Caribbean Dialogue Mechanism similar to that of the India-Africa Forum Summit that
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started in 2008.
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• The region is also critical to multilateral diplomacy and the quest for reforming the global
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governance architecture, including the reform and expansion of the UN Security Council.
• Defence Manufacturing and Export is an area that India has some links to the region. This
arena has great potential for cooperation.
• NAM can be a good mechanism and platform to cooperate.
1.2.8. Regional Institutions
• Mercosur: Mercosur is a South American trade bloc established by the Treaty of Asunción
in 1991 and Protocol of Ouro Preto in 1994. Its full members are Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay. It is the largest trading partner of India in Latin America. Current
preferential trade agreement (PTA) between India and Mercosur was signed in 2009 and
since 2017 there are attempts to expand it. A PTA is a limited free trade agreement where
partner countries reduce import duties on a few identified products for the other. While the
PTA between India and Mercosur is presently limited to just 450 products, the two sides
have raised their ambitions manifold and are now aiming at providing preferential access to
about 3,000 items.

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• CARICOM: CARICOM came into being on 4 July 1973 with the signing of the Treaty of
Chaguaramas. The Treaty was later revised in 2002 to allow for the eventual
establishment of a single market and a single economy. The CARICOM is a grouping of
twenty countries: fifteen Member States and five Associate Members. The Community is
multi-lingual; with English as the major language complemented by French and Dutch and
variations of these, as well as African and Indian expressions. CARICOM rests on four main
pillars: economic integration; foreign policy coordination;human and social
development; and security.
• The First Meeting of the India-CARICOM Joint Commission was held in Georgetown,
Guyana on 2nd June 2015.
• CELAC: The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) is a regional bloc
of 33 Latin American and Caribbean states. It was formed at the Unity Summit, which
consisted of the 21st Summit of the Rio Group and the 2nd Latin American and Caribbean
Summit on Integration and Development (CALC), in the Mayan Riviera, Mexico on 23
February 2010. The organization aims to unite all of the Latin American and Caribbean
states in order to strengthen the political, social and cultural integration of the region,
improve its quality of life, stimulate its economic growth, and advance the well-being of all
of its people. CELAC is a successor of the Rio Group and CALC. The First Meeting of the
India-CELAC Troika Foreign Ministers was held in New Delhi on August 7, 2012.
• Andean community: The Andean Community is a customs union comprising the South
American countries of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. The trade bloc was called the
Andean Pact until 1996 and came into existence when the Cartagena Agreement was
signed in 1969.
• On June 2003, the Andean Community and India established a Political Dialogue and
Cooperation Mechanism
• Pacific Alliance: The Pacific Alliance is a Latin American trade bloc, formed by — Chile,
Colombia, Mexico and Peru, which all border the Pacific Ocean. These countries have
come together to form an area of integration with the purpose of ensure a complete
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freedom in the movement of goods, services, capital, and people. Together, these four
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countries have a combined population of 200 million people and about 35% of the region's
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GDP.
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• SICA: The Central American Integration System (Spanish: Sistema de la Integración

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Centroamericana, or SICA) has been the economic and political organization of Central
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American states since February 1, 1993.

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Two ministerial meetings have been held till now in 2004 and 2008 both in India.
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• Nuclear Free Zone: Opened for Signature: 14 February 1967, Entered into Force: 25 April
1969. On 23 October 2002, the Tlatelolco Treaty came into full force throughout the region
when Cuba, the only state which had not ratified the treaty, deposited its instrument of
ratification. Currently, all 33 states in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean have
signed and ratified the treaty. The Tlatelolco Treaty has served as a model for all future
nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) agreements. On 14 February 2017, the Treaty of
Tlatelolco celebrated its 50th anniversary.

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2. India and Africa

Map 12.3 AFRICA
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factbook/docs/refmaps.html
2.1. Background and Evolution

• Geologically, peninsular India was once part of Africa, the fused ‘Super-Continent’ called
‘Gondwanaland’. Some 200 million years ago when the continental drift started, the region
broke away from the African continent and pushed in a north-easterly direction till it joined
South Asia.
• Trade and contacts through the Indian Ocean route and Arabian Peninsula have
connected East coast of Africa and India for centuries.
• Trade relations between India and Africa can be traced back to the first century CE, when
the Aksum empire had been established in what is modern day Ethiopia and Eritrea.
• The Advent of European Colonialism brought a shared experience for both.
• The British took thousands of Indian workers to construct the Kenyan Railway and to
countries such as South Africa.

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• India has a large diaspora presence in African continent.

• Mahatma Gandhi, stayed and worked in South Africa and inspired the later African
National Congress and also led the freedom Movement in India.
• After Independence Prime Minister Nehru stressed on the Afro-Asian solidarity, this was
markedly visible in the Asian-African conference, Bandung, 1955.
• This led to large African participation in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
• Thus, the countries of Africa share solidarity in anti-colonial and anti-imperial sentiments.
• 1960 is referred to as the Year of Africa because of a series of events that took place
during the year—namely the independence of seventeen African nations—that
highlighted the growing Pan-African sentiments in the continent.
• India played a key role at the UN on behalf of the African colonies, also it played a
significant role through the Peacekeeping missions of the UN in Africa e.g in Belgian Congo
(ONUC 1960-64). And MONUSCO (since 2005)
• India also maintained a principled anti-apartheid stand through the years.
• The commonality in economic concerns and complementarities in resources and capacity
provide India and Africa unique opportunity to cooperate for mutual benefit
• Nonetheless, as India became mired in its own issues, relations with Africa lacked
momentum
• In the last two decades it is argued that China has stolen a march over India in Africa.
• The India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), since 2008 and the latest edition in2015, show
India and Africa relations have acquired momentum.
• In May 2017, India hosted the 52nd annual general meeting of the African Development
Bank (AfDB) at Gandhinagar.
• Founded in 2001, African Union is a continental Union comprising 55 African countries. It is
headquartered in Adis Ababa (Ethiopia).
• Africa's current integration landscape contains an array of regional economic
communities, including eight recognized as the building blocks of the African Union.
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These eight are namely: AMU, CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC.
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2.1.1. Understanding India-Africa Synergy

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• 54 countries, Second largest and Second most populous continent in the world. Total GDP
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in 2015 2.8 trillion US$.

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• Africa is called the only remaining El-dorado with

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o Fast growing population

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o Increasing prosperity
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o Untapped mineral and agricultural wealth

• Relations between world’s fastest growing continent and World’s fastest growing major
economy are key for the future of humanity
• In recent years growth in India's trade and investment has been partially affected by
global slowdown, yet the long term trajectory remains positive
• African countries can provide a major support for UN security council membership.
• Similarities: India and Africa have common colonial history, similar developmental profile
and challenges.
• Complementarities: India’s growing need for Africa’s Commodities, Africa’s need for
development.
• Multilateral partnership: BRICS, IBSA, BASIC
• Development Partnershi/Capacity building:
o Suitability of Indian technology and spirit of Jugaad for Africa
o India’s credentials as a uniquely suitable development partner for Africa have been
widely acknowledged.

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o Pan Africa E-Network

o ITEC scholarships
o India’s contribution towards Ebola, Public Health.
• Socio-economic similarities: Urbanisation, industrialisation, young population, poverty
• Relations largely driven by private operators: market forces, middlemen, has resulted in
steady but slow growth of the relations
• Solutions for the problems of India can provide a way forward to Africa in its developmental
trajectory
• India’s crude oil imports from Africa: the share of African crude fell to about 10.5 percent
October 2017, the lowest since November, 2012,
2.1.2. Recent Dynamic
• In October 2017, President Ram Nath Kovind’s first foreign was to the African nations of
Djibouti and Ethiopia.
• PM Modi Visited 4 African countries in 2016- Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and
Kenya
• The India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) that began in 2008 (New Delhi) is a much needed
intergovernmental attempt to give a direction an thrust to the bilateral synergy.
• 2011 Summit took place in Adis Ababa, Ethiopia
• 2015 summit in New Delhi, Invitation to all 54 heads of states
• India has committed unprecedented levels of resources in Africa:
o At IAFS-2 India promised soft loans of worth 5 billion US$,
o 500 million in grants
o Institution building and training fellowship to Africa
o At the IAFS-1 India had offered duty free market access to Africa’s least developed
countries
• Before 2015, the participation of African leaders in the summit process was done on the
basis of the Banjul formula, which entailed the participation of the leaders of around 12-14
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African countries, who were represented at the summit in their capacity as the chiefs of the
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Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

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• There is a surge in p2p contacts: Experts, students, patients and Entrepreneurs

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• Fillip to cultural and informational contacts

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2.2. Economy
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• The growth in India’s trade and investment in Africa has been partially affected by the
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global slowdown
• In 2014-15
o Bilateral trade India-Africa 70 billion
o China 200 billion
o US 100 billion
• Total trade between India and Africa increased almost five-fold between 2005-06 and
2015-16, and stood at US$ 52 billion in March 2016-17. India’s exports to Africa increased
from US$ 14 billion in 2007-08 to US$ 23 billion in 2016-17, registering an impressive
compound annual growth rate of 5.6 per cent. Indian exports to Africa were at a peak in
2014-15 at US$ 32 billion.
• Indian imports from Africa, on the other hand, increased from US$ 20 billion in 2007-08
to US$ 28 billion in 2016-17 accounting for 7.5 percent of total Indian imports. Indian
imports from Africa grew at a compound annual growth rate of around 4 per cent, reaching
a high in 2011-12 at US$ 44 billion.

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• Statistics cited in the African Economic Outlook 2017 show that India is ranked second
(after China) in terms of trade share with Africa.
• Africa exports Raw materials, India exports- Pharmaceutical, Mid and high-tech
manufactured products, Automobiles.
• 34 African countries enjoy duty-free access to the Indian market.
Figure 12.1: India’s trade with Africa
Image Source: https://ciiblog.in/new/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/image2.png

2.2.1. Investments in Africa
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Latest UNCTAD figures show China to be a much bigger player in FDI in Africa as compared
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to India.
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However, India’s sustained effort is making an impact on Africa… India’s share of

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announced greenfield projects grew from 3.3% in 2003-08 to 6.1% in 2009-15. In the same
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period, the investment from China decreased from 4.9% to 3.3%.

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• The 2017 African Economic Outlook, at the AfDB summit showed that China led
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greenfield investment in Africa for 2015-16 (USD 38.4 billion), while during the same year
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India invested USD 2.2 billion across 64 projects in Africa.

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• India was the fourth largest investor with 45 projects in 2015, after the United States,
United Kingdom and United Arab Emirates.
• Chinese FDI has been accused of bringing in a lot of Chinese labour, which means that a
large amount of earnings are repatriated, India’s relatively small presence does not show
this pattern as yet.

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Figure12.2 India and Chinese Investments in Africa
Image Source:
http://www.livemint.com/r/LiveMint/Period2/2017/05/29/Photos/Processed/w_plainfacts_chart_1.jpg
2.3. Development Partnership

• Many countries may have higher bilateral trade with Africa, but what sets apart India’s
engagement with Africa is its focus on innovative capacity building programmes and the
deployment of ICT, the country’s forte, to help build a knowledge economy in the African
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continent.
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• India launched Pan African e-Network Project (PAENP), in 2009, Conceived by former
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President of India, A.P.J Abdul Kalam the project, with a budget of approximately US$ 125
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million, is entirely funded by India and aims to provide satellite connectivity, tele-
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education and tele-medicine services to the African countries. It also supports e-

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commerce, e-governance, infotainment, resource mapping and various other services. The
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project has presently been commissioned in 47 countries.

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• During the IAFS- 3 in 2015, India offered Africa a concessional credit of $10 billion over
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five years and a grant assistance of $600 million.

• Grant assistance includes an India-Africa Development Fund of $100 million and an India-
Africa Health Fund of $10 million. It will also include 50,000 scholarships in India over the
next five years.
• India had committed $7.4 billion in concessional credit and $1.2 billion in grant since the
first India-Africa Summit in 2008, and creating:
o 100 capacity-building institutions, and developing infrastructure,
o public transport
o clean energy,
o irrigation, agriculture and
o manufacturing capacity across Africa.
• These are significant as resources available from traditional donors belonging to the OECD
and from multilateral financial institutions are diminishing precisely at a time when the
current United Nations session has adopted ambitious Sustainable Development Goals
(SDG) .

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• Whether or not SDGs are successfully achieved will critically depend upon what path
countries like India and those in Africa take as they grow their economies.
• African countries and India are extraordinarily rich in bio-diversity, with species of rare
flora and fauna which are threatened both by over-exploitation as well as by Climate
Change.
• The economic interests of India and African countries are best served by a universal,
multilaterally negotiated, rules based global trade regime under the WTO.
• India can contribute its capital, skills and technological capabilities to sustain Africa’s
growth.
Figure 12.3 Pan-African e-network
Image Source: http://www.mea.gov.in/images/Power3.jpg
2.4. Security
• Terrorism has affected a large swath of the continent.
• The proliferation of terrorist and extremist groups in the continent like Al-Qaeda in the
Maghreb, Nigeria-based Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab in Somalia, and their suspected
links with militants in other parts of the world entails a more proactive collaboration
between India and Africa on the issue of terrorism.
• Looking ahead to the next stage in the India-Africa partnership, one can, therefore,
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expect a deepening of security cooperation across a spectrum of areas, including

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terrorism, piracy, and maritime security.

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• Security has to be seen in its wider context: Thus it include issues such as
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o Climate Change but also global public health challenges,

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o drug-trafficking,
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o proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism.

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2.5. Challenges and Opportunities

• India is not the only one with Africa Strategy
o EU, China, Japan, US, all also have IAFS-type processes, often commit more resources.
o There is an emerging synergy between India and Japan, Competition between India
and China
o France uniquely suited for partnership in Francophone Africa
• Second, in recent years, new drivers of the putative African century have emerged; these
include which are both sources of opportunity and challenges
o lower commodity prices,
o greater democracy,
o rise in militancy,
o population growth,
o preponderance of youth and
o urbanization.

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• Last but not the least, although Africa has lost some of its economic attractiveness, the
long-term importance of the continent is undimmed.
• China has already established its first overseas military base in this Djibouti.
• India has a natural advantage over China in Africa in the form of a large Indian diaspora in
Anglophone African nations.
2.5.1. What Should India Do?
Though the actual delivery of projects and institutions has improved, it is still not
commensurate with the resources expended.
• We need to inject greater bilateralism for project implementation.
• Should not abrogate midstream and downstream delivery to the AU bureaucracy.
• Improve last mile delivery chain.
• Advertise our contribution adequately. E.g incredible India campaign or China’s can do
Chengdu campaign
• Leverage two strong assets private sector and Diaspora
• With increasing economic engagement, the fate of India-Africa ties would depend on not
just quantitative factors such as trade and investment, but also a strategy that convinces
the African people that economically engaging with India would be mutually beneficial.
2.5.2. The Asia Africa Growth Corridor
• 2017 summit meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Indian PM
Narendra Modi in Gujarat renewed impetus for an Indo-Japanese cooperation in line with
their calls for an Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) during their summit in November
2016.
• The vision, however, comes on the back of decades of cooperation amongst two of Asia’s
largest democracies, both seeking an alignment of interests be it under democratic security
cooperation or under Abe’s 2006 notion of an Asian ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.
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• Starting with India and Japan and then expanding to ASEAN and Africa, the AAGC is
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commonly portrayed as a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

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• The AAGC aims to pool together Indian and Japanese technology and skills to build high-
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quality infrastructure in Africa, which is to be complemented by digital connectivity.

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• Asia Africa Growth Corridor aims for people-centric growth strategy. It also takes a multi-
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stakeholder/participatory approach. The various entities including government, business

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and academia will contribute to AAGC.

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A Vision Document was relaesed during the African Development Bank Meeting at
Ahmedabad in May 2017
o According to the Vision documents AAGC may be based on four pillars:
o Enhancing Capacity and Skills.
o Quality Infrastructure and Institutional Connectivity.
o Development and Cooperation Projects.
o People-to-People Partnership.
o people-to-people partnerships
o The AAGC offers a benevolent alternative to the BRI that holds significant potential
for regional connectivity on a state-to-state level. Given Japan’s experience with mass
projects and expertise in developing cutting edge train networks, such as the
Shinkansen, there is room for cooperation. Despite prioritising less costly Chinese bids
for rail development, a lowering of costs would benefit Japan as it enjoys greater trust
within the region. Investing in strategic infrastructure projects such as ports, rails, and
telecommunications would find receptive customers in countries seeking to minimise
their dependence on individual trading partners.

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o With infrastructure projects providing local employment, both India and Japan’s
investments in foreign economies can garner greater regional support for their vision.
Japan’s own experience with setting up hospitals shows how this form of cooperation
can ensure a more permanent Japanese presence without fostering local perceptions of
foreign control. Matching Japan’s high skills and capital, India’s own size and experience
with economic development has challenged it to pursue key technologies - be they in
pharmacology or solar energy - on a mass scale.
o AAGC-led growth in Africa and Asia will be responsive to the collective commitment
to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
2.5.2.1. Challenges to be overcome by the AAGC
• Firstly, the African countries are in different stages of development. Adding to this is the
fact that Africa was colonised by different European powers in the past. This means that
there are huge differences in governance structures, languages and societal norms within
Africa. It would, therefore, not be possible for India and Japan to treat all of them with the
same stroke
• There are issues of infrastructure bottlenecks and coordination between New Delhi and
Tokyo. Unlike in Japan, decision-making process in India is far more complex and, at times,
painstakingly slow.
• China already has an advantage when it comes to trade with Africa – it has been Africa’s
biggest trading partner since 2009.Although there is some unhappiness among African
states on the manner in which China is reaching out to the continent, these states require
funding and development support, which China is happy to provide. India and Japan will
have to compete with China in the African market.
• Lastly, there is civil strife in a number of the African countries poses security challenges.
This could create hurdles for India and Japan in their infrastructure development plans in
the continent. The two countries will need to tread carefully. Despite increased military and
technological cooperation between Japan and India, both countries are at a disadvantage
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with regards to power projection across Asia and Africa. While it does not feature in the
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program of the AAGC, security plays a key role in foreign policy establishments across the
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Indo-Pacific.
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• Thus given its scope and ambition, the AAGC would require active cooperation from, and
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joint work among international community for its success

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In this context the vision of India was aptly expressed by the PM in 2017:
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“India’s partnership with Africa is based on a model of cooperation which is responsive to

the needs of African countries. It is demand-driven and free of conditions.”


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LECTURE-14
ORGANISATIONS, GROUPINGS AND
INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Contents
1. Organisations, Groupings and Institutions in International Relations ................................... 221
1.1. International Organisations............................................................................................. 221
1.2. United Nations Organisation ........................................................................................... 221
1.2.1. Charter and Mandate ............................................................................................... 221
1.2.2. The Principle Organs ................................................................................................ 221
1.3. The General Assembly..................................................................................................... 222
1.4. The Security Council ........................................................................................................ 222
1.4.1. Security Council: Step by Step Actions ..................................................................... 224
1.5. Economic and Social Council ........................................................................................... 224
1.6. Trusteeship Council ......................................................................................................... 224
1.7. Secretariat ....................................................................................................................... 225
1.8. The International Court of Justice ................................................................................... 225
1.9. Specialized Agencies, Programmes and Funds ............................................................... 225
1.9.1. Important Programmes and Funds .......................................................................... 226
1.9.2. Specialized Agencies ................................................................................................ 227
1.10. Other Bodies with UN Partnership ................................................................................ 229
1.11. A Case for UN Reforms .................................................................................................. 229
1.12. India and the United Nations ........................................................................................ 230
1.12.1. UN Reforms and India ............................................................................................ 230
1.12.2. India’s Case of Permanent Membership of the Security Council ........................... 231
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1.13. The Permanent Court of Arbitration ............................................................................. 231

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1.14. The International Criminal Court .................................................................................. 232

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1.15. The Bretton Woods Institutions: IMF and the World Bank ........................................... 232
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1.15.1 International Monitory Fund................................................................................... 233

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1.15.2. The World Bank ...................................................................................................... 234

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1.16. Washington Consensus ................................................................................................. 235

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1.17. The WTO........................................................................................................................ 235

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1.17.1. The WTO Mandate ................................................................................................. 235

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1.17.2. Dispute Resolution ................................................................................................. 236

1.17.3. The Doha Round ..................................................................................................... 236
1.17.4. Key Issues and Challenges: Developed Versus Developing Countries ................... 237
1.17.5. TRIPS....................................................................................................................... 237
1.18. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) .......................... 238
1.19. Asian Development Bank (ADB) .................................................................................... 238
1.20. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)............................ 238
2. Brics: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa ................................................................ 238
2.1. BRIC to BRICS................................................................................................................... 239
2.2. The New Development Bank........................................................................................... 239
2.3. Contingency Relief Arrangement (CRA) .......................................................................... 240
2.4. India’s Approach .............................................................................................................. 240
2.5. Significance and Challenges ............................................................................................ 240
2.6. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) ............................................................ 241
3. IBSA Forum ............................................................................................................................. 241

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3.1. Organisational Structure ................................................................................................. 242

3.1.1. Joint Working Groups ............................................................................................... 242
3.1.2. People-to-People Forums......................................................................................... 242
3.1.3. Focal Points .............................................................................................................. 242
3.1.4. Trilateral Commission ............................................................................................... 242
3.1.5. Summits ................................................................................................................... 242
3.1.6. IBSA Fund ................................................................................................................. 242
3.1.7. IBSA Business Forum ................................................................................................ 242
4. Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) .................................................. 243
5. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) ...................................................................... 243
6. The Commonwealth ............................................................................................................... 243
7. Important Groupings .............................................................................................................. 244
7.1. G-20 ................................................................................................................................. 244
7.2. G-7 ................................................................................................................................... 244
7.3. G-77 ................................................................................................................................. 245
8. Questions from Previous Years .............................................................................................. 245
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1. Organisations, Groupings and Institutions in

International Relations
1.1. International Organisations
International Organisations were created by common consent to enable and promote
cooperation among states in a number of domains (Saran 2017; 260). Thus, international
organisations transcend the boundaries of states. These bodies generally have founding
documents defining their goals, rules of procedure, secretariats etc.
Generally, a distinction is made between intergovernmental organisations e.g. the UN, NATO
etc and international non-governmental organisations e.g Amnesty international. There is a
third kind as well i.e. hybrid international organisations in which governments work with NGOs
e.g the International Red Cross. This kind of organisation admits as full member both NGOs,
companies and government or governmental bodies.
1.2. United Nations Organisation

• United Nations came into Existence on 24 October 1945. With 51 founding members
including India.
• Today the United Nations has 193 members, With South Sudan being the latest to join in
2011.
• The UN has six official languages i.e Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish.
• The mission and work of the United Nations are guided by the purposes and principles
contained in its founding Charter.
• The UN System involves the six Principle Organs along with Special Programmes and
Funds.
• Antonio Guterres from Portugal is the current Secretary General of the UN
• Four of the five principal organs are located at the main UN Headquarters in New York City.
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The International Court of Justice is located in The Hague, while other major agencies are
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based in the UN offices at Geneva, Vienna, and Nairobi. Other UN institutions are located
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throughout the world.

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• United Nation is funded by its member states through compulsory and voluntary
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• Any amendment in the charter requires 2/3rd vote of the General Assembly
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1.2.1. Charter and Mandate

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• According to the Charter, the United Nations has four purposes:

o to maintain international peace and security;
o to develop friendly relations among nations;
o to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human
rights;
o and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations.
1.2.2. The Principle Organs
• General Assembly.
• Security Council.
• Economic and Social Council.
• Secretariat.
• International Court of Justice.
• Trusteeship Council.

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1.3. The General Assembly

• The General Assembly is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of
the UN.
• All 193 Member States of the UN are represented in the General Assembly, making it the
only UN body with universal representation.
• It elects the Non-Permanent members in Security Council and also members for Social
and Economic Council.
• It elects Judges to International Court of Justice along with the Security Council.
• Each year, in September, the full UN membership meets in the General Assembly Hall in
New York for the annual General Assembly session, and general debate, which many heads
of state attend and address.
• Decisions on important questions, such as those on peace and security, admission of new
members and budgetary matters, require a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly.
• Decisions on other questions are by simple majority.
• The General Assembly, each year, elects a GA President to serve a one-year term of office.
• Pursuant to its “Uniting for Peace” resolution of November 1950 (resolution 377 (V), the
General Assembly may also take action if the Security Council fails to act, owing to the
negative vote of a Permanent Member, in a case where there appears to be a threat to or
breach of the peace, or act of aggression.
• The Assembly can consider the matter immediately with a view to making
recommendations to members for collective measures to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
• In October 2015 the UN general assembly (UNGA) agreed to adopt a negotiating text for
Security Council reforms.
1.4. The Security Council

Under article 24 of the UN Charter, the members of the UN conferred on the Security Council
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primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

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The functions of the Council fall mainly under two headings:

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o Pacific settlement of disputes

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o Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of
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aggression.
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• It has 15 Members (5 permanent and 10 non-permanent members). The non permanent

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members are elected to serve a two year term. The membership was last expanded in
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1965.
• 10 non-permanent members should be elected according to the following pattern: five
from African and Asia–Pacific states, one from Eastern European states, two from Latin
American and Caribbean states, and two from Western European and Other states.
• Five of the non-permanent members are elected each year by the General Assembly for a
term of two years.
• Decisions on procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of any nine members.
Decisions on other matters are made by an affirmative vote of nine members, including
the concurring votes of the five permanent members of the Council.
• Each Member has one vote. Under the Charter, all Member States are obligated to comply
with Council decisions.
• The Security Council has a Presidency, which rotates alphabetically, changes every month.
• The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or
act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and
recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement.

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• In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the
use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.
• The Security Council has three standing committees:
o Committee of Experts on Rules of Procedure
o Committee on Council Meetings away from Headquarters
o Committee on the Admission of New Members.
• Apart from these there are other committees and working groups.
• All existing committees and working groups are comprised of the fifteen members of the
Council.
• While standing committees are chaired by the President of the Council, rotating on a
monthly basis, other committees and working groups are chaired or co-chaired by
designated members of the Council who are announced on an annual basis by a Note of
the President of the Security Council.
• Counter-Terrorism Committee: Guided by Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and
1624 (2005), the CTC works to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to
prevent terrorist acts both within their borders and across regions.
• Non Proliferation Committee: It is a Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1540 (2004) which imposes binding obligations on all States to adopt legislation
to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of
delivery, and establish appropriate domestic controls over related materials to prevent their
illicit trafficking.
• Military Staff Committee: The Military Staff Committee helps plan UN military measures
and regulate armaments.
• Ad hoc committees are established for a limited time and to address a specific issue.
o Sanctions Committees (ad hoc): The use of mandatory sanctions is intended to apply
pressure on a State or entity to comply with the objectives set by the Security Council
without resorting to the use of forc e.g. Security Council Committee pursuant to
resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-
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Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities oversees the
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sanctions measures imposed by the Security Council.

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• Peacekeeping Operations and Political Missions

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o A peacekeeping operation consists of military, police and civilian personnel, who work
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o Political missions are part of a continuum of UN peace operations working in different

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stages of the conflict cycle.

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• Advisory Subsidiary Bodies: The Peacebuilding Commission is an advisory subsidiary body

of both the Security Council and the General Assembly.The Peacebuilding Commission plays
a unique role in:
o bringing together all of the relevant actors, including international donors, the
international financial institutions, national governments, troop contributing countries;
o marshalling resources and
o advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and
recovery and where appropriate, highlighting any gaps that threaten to undermine
peace.
• The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) established in 1993
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) established in 1994 are
subsidiary organs of the Security Council within the terms of article 29 of the Charter
• The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House,
Westminster, London. Since its first meeting, the Security Council has taken permanent
residence at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City. It also travelled to many

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cities, holding sessions in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1972, in Panama City, Panama, and in
Geneva, Switzerland, in 1990.
• A representative of each of its members must be present at all times at UN Headquarters
so that the Security Council can meet at any time as the need arises.
1.4.1. Security Council: Step by Step Actions
• When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Council’s first
action is usually to recommend that the parties try to reach agreement by peaceful
means. The Council may:
o set forth principles for such an agreement;
o undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases;
o dispatch a mission;
o appoint special envoys; or
o request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of
the dispute.
• When a dispute leads to hostilities, the Council’s primary concern is to bring them to an
end as soon as possible. In that case, the Council may:
o issue ceasefire directives that can help prevent an escalation of the conflict;
o dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force to help reduce tensions, separate
opposing forces and establish a calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought.
• Beyond this, the Council may opt for enforcement measures, including:
o economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel
bans;
o severance of diplomatic relations;
o blockade;
o or even collective military action.
• A chief concern is to focus action on those responsible for the policies or practices
condemned by the international community, while minimizing the impact of the measures
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taken on other parts of the population and economy.

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1.5. Economic and Social Council

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• The Economic and Social Council is the principal body for coordination, policy review,
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• It has 54 Members, elected by the General Assembly for overlapping three-year terms.
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• Eighteen members of ECOSOC are elected each year. Members generally serve three-year
terms, ending on 31 December
• The president of ECOSOC is elected for a one-year term.
• Voting is by simple majority and every member has one vote.
• It is the United Nations’ central platform for reflection, debate, and innovative thinking
on sustainable development.
• It serves as the central mechanism for activities of the UN system and its specialized
agencies in the economic, social and environmental fields, supervising subsidiary and
expert bodies.
• Subsidiary Bodies of ECOSOC: Functional Commissions; Regional Commissions; Standing
Committees; Expert Bodies; Other Subsidiary Bodies.
1.6. Trusteeship Council

• The Trusteeship Council was established in 1945 by the UN Charter, under Chapter XIII, to
provide international supervision for 11 Trust Territories that had been placed under the

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administration of seven Member States, and ensure that adequate steps were taken to
prepare the Territories for self-government and independence.
• By 1994, all Trust Territories had attained self-government or independence.
• The Trusteeship Council suspended operation on 1 November 1994.
• By a resolution adopted on 25 May 1994, the Council amended its rules of procedure to
drop the obligation to meet annually and agreed to meet as occasion required -- by its
decision or the decision of its President, or at the request of a majority of its members or
the General Assembly or the Security Council.
1.7. Secretariat
• The Secretariat comprises the Secretary-General and tens of thousands of international
UN staff members who carry out the day-to-day work of the UN as mandated by the
General Assembly and the Organisation's other principal organs.
• The Secretary-General is chief administrative officer of the Organisation, appointed by the
General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council for a five-year,
renewable term.
• UN staff members are recruited internationally and locally, and work in duty stations and
on peacekeeping missions all around the world.
1.8. The International Court of Justice

• The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It
was established in June 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations and began work in April
1946.
• The Court is composed of 15 judges, who are elected for terms of office of nine years by
the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council.
• Its seat is at the Peace Palace in The Hague (Netherlands). It is the only one of the six
principal organs of the United Nations not located in New York (United States of America).
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The Court’s functions are twofold.

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o First, it decides, in accordance with international law, cases that are submitted to it by
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states.
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o Secondly, the Court gives advisory opinions to the General Assembly and Security
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Council on legal questions, and advisory opinions to other organs of the UN and
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specialised agencies that are authorised by the General Assembly to request them.
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States entitled to appear before the Court fall into three categories:
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o States members of the UN

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o States not members of the UN that are parties to the Statute of the ICJ; Conditions are
to be determined in each case by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the
Security Council
o States not parties to the Statute to which the Court is open. The conditions upon which
the Court is open to such states are to be laid down by the Security Council, but they
must not place the parties in a position of inequality before the Court.
1.9. Specialized Agencies, Programmes and Funds

The UN system, also known unofficially as the "UN family", is made up of the UN itself and
many affiliated programmes, funds, and specialized agencies, all with their own membership,
leadership, and budget.
• The programmes and funds are established by and report to the United Nations General
Assembly. They are financed through voluntary rather than assessed contributions

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1.9.1. Important Programmes and Funds

• The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) works in nearly 170 countries and
territories, helping to eradicate poverty, reduce inequalities and build resilience so
countries can sustain progress. As the UN’s development agency, UNDP plays a critical role
in helping countries achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.
• The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) works in 190 countries and territories to save
children’s lives, to defend their rights, and to help them fulfil their potential.
UNICEF provides long-term humanitarian and development assistance to children and
mothers.
• United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF): The UN Capital Development Fund
makes public and private finance work for the poor in the world’s 47 least developed
countries (LDCs).
• United Nations Volunteers (UNV): UNV is based in Bonn, Germany. The UNV programme
contributes to peace and development through volunteerism worldwide. UNV is
administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and reports to the
UNDP Executive Board
• United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP): UNEP is the leading global
environmental authority that sets the global environmental agenda, promotes the
coherent implementation of the environmental dimension of sustainable development
within the United Nations system, and serves as an authoritative advocate for the global
environment. It is based In Nairobi, Kenya,
• United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA): UNFPA is the United Nations reproductive
health and rights agency. The organisation was created in 1969,
• United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT): is the United Nations
programme working towards a better urban future. Its mission is to promote socially and
environmentally sustainable human settlements development and the achievement of
adequate shelter for all. The headquarters of the UN-Habitat Secretariat are located in
Nairobi, Kenya.
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): UNCTAD is a

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permanent intergovernmental body established by the United Nations General Assembly

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in 1964. Its headquarters are located in Geneva, Switzerland, and has offices in New York
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and Addis Ababa. UNCTAD is part of the UN Secretariat. It reports to the UN General
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Assembly and the Economic and Social Council but has its own membership, leadership,
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economy more fairly and effectively. Together with other UN departments and agencies, it
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measure progress by the Sustainable Development Goals, as set out in Agenda 2030.
• Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): established on
December 14, 1950 by the United Nations General Assembly. The agency is mandated to
lead and co-ordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems
worldwide. Over the years it has provided vital assistance to refugees, asylum-seekers,
internally displaced and stateless people. UNHCR is governed by the UN General Assembly
and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
• United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS): UNOPS helps the UN and its partners
provide peace and security, humanitarian and development solutions. UNOPS headquarters
are located in Copenhagen, Denmark.
• United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA): UNRWA was established by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302
(IV) of 8 December 1949 to carry out direct relief and works programmes for Palestine
refugees. The Agency began operations on 1 May 1950. It is headquartered in Amman,
Jordan.

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• UN-Women- Formed in 2010 UN women is an organisation dedicated to gender equality

and the empowerment of women.
1.9.2. Specialized Agencies
• UN specialized agencies are international organisations that coordinate their work with
the United Nations through negotiated agreements.
• Unlike UN funds and programmes, which are established by and report to the United
Nations General Assembly, specialized agencies are legally independent of the United
Nations and have separate budgets, members, rules, and personnel.
• The bulk of their funding comes from voluntary contributions from governments,
institutions, and individuals. Some specialized agencies, such as the International Labour
Organisation (ILO), have been in existence longer than the United Nations.
• There are currently 15 specialized agencies:
o Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO): The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
is specialized agency of the United Nations that leads international efforts to defeat
hunger. It was formed in 1945 and has headquarter in Rome, Italy. It is linked to the
ECOSCO in the UN. Its goal is to achieve food security for all and make sure that people
have regular access to enough high-quality food to lead active, healthy lives. With over
194 member states, FAO works in over 130 countries worldwide.
o International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO): established by States in 1944 to
manage the administration and governance of the Convention on International Civil
Aviation (Chicago Convention). Its headquarters is in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. In
October 1947, ICAO became an agency of the United Nations linked to the ECOSOC.
ICAO works with the Convention’s 192 Member States and industry groups to reach
consensus on international civil aviation Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPs) and policies in support of a safe, efficient, secure, economically sustainable
and environmentally responsible civil aviation sector.
o International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD): IFAD is an international
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financial institution and specialized United Nations agency based in Rome, the UN’s
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food and agriculture hub. It invests in rural people, empowering them to increase
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their food security, improve the nutrition of their families and increase their incomes.
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It help them build resilience, expand their businesses and take charge of their own
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development. Since 1978, it has provided US$18.5 billion in grants and low-interest
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o International Labour Organisation (ILO): The only tripartite U.N. agency, since 1919 the
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ILO brings together governments, employers and workers of 187 member States , to
set labour standards, develop policies and devise programmes promoting decent
work for all women and men. In 1946, the ILO became a specialized agency of the
newly formed United Nations. Its headquarters is in Geneva Switzerland. In 1969, the
organisation received the Nobel Peace Prize for improving peace among classes,
pursuing decent work and justice for workers, and providing technical assistance to
other developing nations
o International Maritime Organisation (IMO): It is the United Nations specialized agency
with responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of
marine pollution by ships. In 1948 an international conference in Geneva adopted a
convention formally establishing IMO (the original name was the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organisation, or IMCO, but the name was changed in 1982 to
IMO). The IMO Convention entered into force in 1958 and the new Organisation met
for the first time the following year, 1959. IMO currently has 173 Member States and
three Associate Members. Its secretariat is base in London, U.K.

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o International Monetary Fund (IMF): see the entry on Bretton Woods institutions
below.
o International Telecommunications Union (ITU): ITU is the United Nations specialized
agency for information and communication technologies – ICTs. It allocates global
radio spectrum and satellite orbits, develop the technical standards that ensure
networks and technologies seamlessly interconnect, and strive to improve access to
ICTs to underserved communities worldwide. An organisation based on public-private
partnership since its inception, ITU currently has a membership of 193 countries and
almost 800 private-sector entities and academic institutions. ITU is headquartered in
Geneva, Switzerland, and has twelve regional and area offices around the world. ITU
was formed in 1865, in Paris, at the International Telegraph Convention; this makes it
one of the oldest intergovernmental organisations in the world. ITU became a United
Nations specialized agency in 1947
o United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO): It is
responsible for coordinating international cooperation in education, science, culture
and communication. The UNESCO was founded on 16 November 1945. UNESCO has
195 Members and eight Associate Members. It is governed by the General Conference
and the Executive Board. The Secretariat, headed by the Director-General, implements
the decisions of these two bodies. Its headquarters are located at Place de Fontenoy in
Paris, France. Through the Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural
and Natural Heritage , adopted by UNESCO in 1972, it encourages the identification,
protection and preservation of cultural and natural heritage around the world
considered to be of outstanding value to humanity. “Many Voices One World”, also
known as the MacBride report, was a 1980 UNESCO publication written by the
International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems.
o United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO): Established by a
General Assembly resolution in 1966 as an autonomous body within the UN, it
became a sepcialiesd agency in 1985. It is headquartered in Vienna, Austria. As of
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January 2018, 167 States are Members of UNIDO. The mission of the UNIDO, as
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industrial development (ISID) in Member States.

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o Universal Postal Union (UPU): Established in 1874, the Universal Postal Union (UPU),
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with its headquarters in the Berne, Switzerland, is the second oldest international
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organisation worldwide. With its 192 member countries, it is the primary forum for
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cooperation between postal sector players. It helps to ensure a truly universal

network of up-to-date products and services.
o World Bank: see the entry on Bretton Woods institutions below
o World Health Organisation (WHO): WHO began functioning with its Constitution
coming into force on 7 April 1948 – now celebrated every year as World Health Day. Its
headquarters is in Geneva, Switzerland. Working through offices in more than 150
countries, WHO Secretariat staff work side by side with governments and other
partners to ensure the highest attainable level of health for all people. WHO defines
health as Health as state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not
merely the absence of disease or infirmity. Its Publications include the World Health
Report, World Health Statisitics etc.
o World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO): WIPO is the global forum for
intellectual property services, policy, information and cooperation. It is a self-funding
agency of the United Nations, with 191 member states. Its mission is to lead the
development of a balanced and effective international intellectual property (IP) system
that enables innovation and creativity for the benefit of all. Its mandate, governing

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bodies and procedures are set out in the WIPO Convention, which established WIPO in
1967. Its headquarters is in Geneva, Switzerland
o World Meteorological Organisation (WMO): It is an intergovernmental organisation
with a membership of 191 Member States and Territories. It originated from the
International Meteorological Organisation (IMO), which was founded in 1873.
Established by the ratification of the WMO Convention on 23 March 1950, WMO
became the specialised agency of the United Nations for meteorology (weather and
climate), operational hydrology and related geophysical sciences a year later in 1951.
The Secretariat, headquartered in Geneva, is headed by the Secretary-General. Its
supreme body is the World Meteorological Congress.
o World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO): It is an agency responsible for the promotion
of responsible, sustainable and universally accessible tourism. UNWTO encourages
the implementation of the Global Code of Ethics for Tourism to maximize tourism’s
socio-economic contribution while minimizing its possible negative impacts. UNWTO’s
membership includes 158 countries, 6 Associate Members and over 500 Affiliate
Members representing the private sector, educational institutions, tourism associations
and local tourism authorities. On 27 September 1970, the International Union of
Official Travel Organisations (IUOTO) Special General Assembly meeting in Mexico City
adopts the Statutes of the World Tourism Organisation (WTO). From 1980 onwards,
this day is celebrated as “World Tourism Day”. It began functioning s the in 1975. In
2003, the WTO general council and the UN agreed to establish the WTO as a specialized
agency of the UN. Its headquarters is in Madrid.
1.10. Other Bodies with UN Partnership

• World Food Programme (WFP) (UN/FAO): Based in Rome it is the leading humanitarian
organisation fighting hunger worldwide, delivering food assistance in emergencies and
working with communities to improve nutrition and build resilience. It works closely with
its two Rome-based sister organisations, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the
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United Nations and the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

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International Trade Centre (ITC) (UN/WTO): Established in 1964, the International Trade
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Centre (ITC) is the joint agency of the World Trade Organisation and the United Nations.
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The ITC is involved in projects providing trade technical assistance in countries all over the
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world. It is the only development agency that is fully dedicated to supporting the
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Geneva Switzerland.
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1.11. A Case for UN Reforms

• Since the end of the Cold War, India has been spearheading a move for reforms at the UN
to make the world body more representative of the changing global realities while
enhancing its credibility and effectiveness.
• In 1992, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution. The resolution reflected three
main complaints:
o The Security Council no longer represents contemporary political realities.
o Its decisions reflect only Western values and interests and are dominated by a few
powers.
o It lacks equitable representation
• In view of these growing demands for the restructuring of the UN, on 1 January 1997, the
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan initiated an inquiry into how the UN should be
reformed. For instance how the members of the Security Council should be elected.

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• The following are just some of the criteria that have been proposed for new permanent
and non-permanent members of the Security Council. A new member should be::
o A major economic power
o A major military power
o A substantial contributor to the UN budget
o A big nation in terms of its population
o A nation that respects democracy and human rights
o Country that would make the Council more representative of the world’s diversity in
terms of geography, economic systems, and culture.
• A related issue was to change the nature of membership altogether. Some insisted, for
instance, that the veto power of the five permanent members be abolished. Many perceived
the veto to be in conflict with the concept of democracy and sovereign equality in the UN
and thought that the veto was no longer right or relevant.
• As the UN completed 60 years of its existence, the heads of all the member-states met in
September 2005 to celebrate the anniversary and review the situation.
• Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has made proposals to reform the United Nations since
beginning his term in January 2017. In A speech in September 2017 he said “Our shared
objective is a 21st century UN focused more on people and less on process…more on
delivery and less on bureaucracy.”
1.12. India and the United Nations

• Founding Member: Since 1945
• Peacekeeping: Historically largest troop contributor. 43 mission participations. Currently
third largest contributor
• Decolonisation: India was the co-sponsor of the landmark 1960 Declaration on UN on
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. India was also elected the
first chair of the Decolonization Committee (Committee of 24) where its ceaseless efforts to
put an end to colonialism are well on record.
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•
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Apartheid: Key role against the regime In South Africa: In fact, India was the first country
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to raise the issue in the UN (in 1946) and played a leading role in the formation of a Sub-
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Committee against Apartheid set up by the General Assembly. When the Convention on
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Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination was adopted in 1965, India was among the
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earliest signatories.
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• Terrorism: With the objective of providing a comprehensible legal framework to counter

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terrorism India took the initiative to pilot a draft Comprehensive Convention on

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International Terrorism (CCIT) in 1996 and continues to work for its early adoption
• Financial Contribution: With 0.7 percent of UN budge, India’s contribution is 24th largest.
• India’s status as a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77
cemented its position within the UN system as a leading advocate of the concerns and
aspirations of developing countries and the creation of a more equitable international
economic and political order.
• India strongly believes that the United Nations and the norms of international relations
that it has fostered remain the most efficacious means for tackling today's global
challenges.
1.12.1. UN Reforms and India
• India is today at the forefront of efforts on UN reform, including expansion of the Security
Council in both the permanent and nonpermanent categories to reflect contemporary
realities.

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• India supports an increase in the number of both permanent and non-permanent

members. Its representatives have argued that the activities of the Security Council have
greatly expanded in the past few years. The success of the Security Council’s actions
depends upon the political support of the international community.
• India has suggested that the UN reforms need to be “broad-based and all-encompassing”
and the changes should not be restricted to its secretariat only.
• India has been a member of the Security Council during 1950-51, 1967-68, 1972-73, 1977-
78, l984-85, 1991-92, and lastly, 2011-12
• The 193 member-United Nations adopted a consensus resolution in its 69th General
Assembly on September 14, 2015 to move from Inter-Governmental Negotiations (IGN) to
a Text-Based Negotiations (TBN) process for reforming the United Nations Security
Council.
1.12.2. India’s Case of Permanent Membership of the Security Council
• India itself also wishes to be a permanent member in a restructured UN. Following
arguments can be put forth in Support of India’s claim;
o India is the second most populous country in the world comprising almost one-fifth of
the world population.
o Moreover, India is also the world’s largest democracy.
o India has participated in virtually all of the initiatives of the UN.
o Its role in the UN’s peacekeeping efforts is a long and substantial one.
o The country’s economic emergence on the world stage is another factor that perhaps
justifies India’s claim to a permanent seat in the Security Council.
o India has also made regular financial contributions to the UN and never faltered on its
payments.
o Its military strength and responsible behaviour in terms of nuclear proliferation also
bolster its claims
• India is aware that permanent membership of the Security Council also has symbolic
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importance. It signifies a country’s growing importance in world affairs. This greater status
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is an advantage to a country in the conduct of its foreign policy: the reputation for being
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powerful makes one more influential.

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• India coordinates its position on the expansion of Security Council along with other
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claimants for a permanent membership such as Brazil, Germany and Japan in group called
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G-4.
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Despite India’s wish to be a permanent veto-wielding member of the UN, some countries
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question its inclusion. Neighboring Pakistan, with which India has troubled relations, is not
the only country that is reluctant to see India become a permanent veto member of the
Security Council. Some countries, for instance, are concerned about India’s nuclear
weapons capabilities. These views find common cause in the coalition known as Uniting for
Consensus or the Coffee club, which apart from Italy and Pakistan also includes Argentina,
Canada, Colombia, Malta, Mexico, San Marino, Spain, South Korea, and Turkey.
1.13. The Permanent Court of Arbitration

• The Permanent Court of Arbitration, established convention of 1899, is an
intergovernmental organisation providing a variety of dispute resolution services to the
international community. The 1899 convention was revised in 1907.
• The PCA has 121 Contracting Parties (States) which have acceded to one or both of the
PCA's founding conventions.
• The PCA has a three-part organisational structure consisting of an Administrative
Council that oversees its policies and budgets, a panel of independent potential arbitrators

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known as the Members of the Court, and its Secretariat, known as the International
Bureau, headed by the Secretary-General.
• The PCA provides administrative support in international arbitrations involving various
combinations of states, state entities, international organisations and private parties.
• The PCA’s functions are not limited to arbitration and also include providing support in
other forms of peaceful resolution of international disputes, including mediation,
conciliation, and other forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).
• The PCA is available to provide administrative support in fact-finding commissions of
inquiry involving various combinations of states, state entities, international organisations
and private parties.
• The Secretary-General of the PCA may be called upon to act as the appointing authority, or
to designate another appointing authority, for the appointment of arbitrators under the
PCA’s Rules of Procedure, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, or other rules of procedure.
1.14. The International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court (ICC) investigates and, where warranted, tries individuals
charged with the gravest crimes of concern to the international community: genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression.
• The treaty known as Rome Statute signed in 1998, effective since 2002, officially
established the ICC.
• The court is unique as it was created by a treaty and not by the UN. The ICC tries
individuals and not countries or organisations, for four crimes:
o Genocide,
o war crimes,
o crime against humanity and
o crime of aggression (once the 2010 amendment to Rome statute comes into effect).
• It does not have retrospective powers.
• It has jurisdiction:
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o on the territory State parties and countries that have accepted the jurisdiction
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o in other countries if crime are committed by the national’s of the state parties or the
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countries that have accepted the jurisdiction,

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o in other countries if crimes were referred to by the UNSC, pursuant to a resolution

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adopted under chapter VII of the UN charter.

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• ICC does not replace national courts but complements them. As a court of last resort it
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only prosecutes cases only when the country is either unwilling or unable to prosecute
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• The Rome Statute created Court, trust fund for victims, and Assembly of State Parties
• It has four organs- Presidency, Judicial divisions with 18 Judges divided in three division- pre
trial, trial and appeals, Office of Prosecutor, Registry.
• The Court has a cooperation agreement with the United Nations
• Countries such as India and the United States, are not members of the ICC.
1.15. The Bretton Woods Institutions: IMF and the World Bank
• The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were both created at an
international conference convened in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, United States in
July 1944. These are also referred to as the Bretton Woods institutions.
• They share the same goal of raising living standards in their member countries.
• Their approaches to this goal are complementary,
o with the IMF focusing on macroeconomic issues and
o the World Bank concentrating on long-term economic development and poverty
reduction

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• Both Institutions are based in Washington D.C., United States

• Both institutions include 189 members countries and have vast operations around the
world.
• Both have attracted criticism for being run by just a small number of economically
powerful countries (USA and Europe). These countries choose the leadership and senior
management, and so their interests dominate, despite the fact that the main borrowers
from the World Bank and IMF are developing countries.
• The long-standing arrangement, under which the IMF is usually led by a European, while
the World Bank is led by an American, has also been called into question.
1.15.1 International Monitory Fund
• The IMF’s mandate. The IMF promotes international monetary cooperation and
provides policy advice and capacity development support to help countries build and
maintain strong economies.
• The IMF also makes loans and helps countries design policy programs to solve balance of
payments problems when sufficient financing on affordable terms cannot be obtained to
meet net international payments.
• IMF loans are short and medium term and funded mainly by the pool of quota
contributions that its members provide.
• IMF staff primarily constitutes of economists with wide experience in macroeconomic and
financial policies.
• The SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement its
member countries’ official reserves. SDRs can be exchanged for freely usable currencies.
The value of the SDR is based on a basket of five major currencies—the US dollar, the
euro, the Chinese renminbi (RMB), the Japanese yen, and the British pound sterling.
• Quotas: A member country's quota determines its maximum financial commitment to the
IMF, its voting power, and has a bearing on its access to IMF financing. When a country
joins the IMF, it is assigned an initial quota in the same range as the quotas of existing
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members of broadly comparable economic size and characteristics. Quotas are

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denominated in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), the IMF’s unit of account.

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• The largest member of the IMF is the United States, with a current quota (as of March
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2017) of SDR82.99 billion (about US$118 billion) and 17.46 % of vote, and the smallest
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member is Tuvalu, with a quota of SDR2.5 million (about US$3.5 million).

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• India has a quota of 3,114.4 million SDRs, 2.76% of vote.

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• The IMF is accountable to its member country governments. At the top of its organizational
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structure is the Board of Governors , consisting of one governor and one alternate
governor from each member country, usually the top officials from the central bank or
finance ministry.
• For India, Minister of Finance acts as the Governor and the RBI governor acts as alternate
governor
• Since July 2011 IMF managing director is Christine Lagarde of France. She is the first woman
to head the IMF in organisation's history.
1.15.1.1. Reforms
• Though developing countries hold less than half the overall quota at the moment, with
their rapidly increasing economic heft they have demanded a greater share — with limited
success.
• The 15th General Review of Quotas (GRQ), the most recent attempt to revise the size and
composition of the system, was to be completed by October 2017, but the deadline has
now been extended to 2019.

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• This follows the poor precedent set by the long delay in adoption in 2016 of the previous
GRQ (originally approved in 2010). That had doubled the overall size of the quotas to $659
billion (from $329 billion) while allotting an additional 6% of quotas to the developing
world. In this round voting powers at the IMF had been revised to increase the voice of
developing countries, notably China, Brazil, India, South Korea and Mexico.
• The developing world is looking beyond the short-term crisis management tools that the
IMF, as the sole international lender of last resort, has traditionally offered them for
decades now — albeit in an unsatisfactory and politically biased way.
• With the rise of competing global institutions ready to meet the capital needs of the
developing world, the patience of countries such as India may be tested more easily.
1.15.2. The World Bank
• Together, IBRD and IDA make up the World Bank.
• The World Bank’s mandate: The World Bank promotes long-term economic development
and poverty reduction by providing technical and financial support to help countries
reform certain sectors or implement specific projects—such as building schools and health
centers, providing water and electricity, fighting disease, and protecting the environment.
• World Bank assistance is generally long term and is funded both by member country
contributions and through bond issuance.
• World Bank staff are often specialists on particular issues, sectors, or techniques.
• In 2010 voting powers at the World Bank were revised to increase the voice of developing
countries, notably China. The countries with most voting power are now the United States
(15.85%), Japan (6.84%), China (4.42%), Germany (4.00%), the United Kingdom (3.75%),
France (3.75%), India (2.91%), Russia (2.77%), Saudi Arabia (2.77%) and Italy (2.64%).
• Jim Yong Kim from the United States was chosen as the new president of the World Bank
in April 2012.
1.15.2.1. Five Institutions, One Group
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The World Bank Group consists of five organisations:

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• The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)

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o The IBRD lends to governments of middle-income and creditworthy low-income

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countries.
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• The International Development Association (IDA)

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o The IDA provides interest-free loans — called credits — and grants to governments of
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the poorest countries.

• The International Finance Corporation (IFC)
o IFC is the largest global development institution focused exclusively on the private
sector. It helps developing countries achieve sustainable growth by financing
investment, mobilizing capital in international financial markets, and providing advisory
services to businesses and governments.
• The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
o MIGA was created in 1988 to promote foreign direct investment into developing
countries to support economic growth, reduce poverty, and improve people’s lives.
MIGA fulfills this mandate by offering political risk insurance (guarantees) to investors
and lenders.
• The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
o The ICSID provides international facilities for conciliation and arbitration of
investment disputes.

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1.16. Washington Consensus

• This is a set of neoliberal economic prescriptions made by the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury to developing countries that faced economic
crises.
• It recommended structural reforms that increased the role of market forces in exchange
for immediate financial help.
• The term was coined by British economist John Williamson in 1989.
• Philosophy: the operation of the free market and the reduction of state involvement are
crucial to development in the global South.
• While some said that the Washington Consensus was used to impose harsh conditions
that were unhelpful for economic recovery, others have argued that although not perfect,
it was favourable to long-term economic growth in developing economies.
• By the late 1990s it was becoming clear that the results of the Washington Consensus
were far from optimal.
• Increasing criticism led to a change in approach that shifted the focus away from a view
of development as simply economic growth and toward poverty reduction and the need
for participation by both developing-country governments and civil society. That change of
direction came to be known as the post-Washington Consensus.
1.17. The WTO

• Formed in 1995 after the Uruguay Round to replace the replacing the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which commenced in 1948.
• Its secretariat is in Geneva. WTO Director General is Roberto Azevedo
• The WTO has over 160 members representing 98 per cent of world trade. Over 20
countries are seeking to join the WTO.
• The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is the only global international organisation dealing
with the rules of trade between nations.
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• At the heart of the system — known as the multilateral trading system — are the WTO’s
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agreements, negotiated and signed by a large majority of the world’s trading nations, and
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ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably
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and freely as possible.

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• The WTO's top decision-making body is the Ministerial Conference (MC).

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• The latest ministerial conference, MC-11, was held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, from 10 to
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13 December 2017.The Conference ended with a number of ministerial decisions, including

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on fisheries subsidies and e-commerce duties, and a commitment to continue negotiations

in all areas.
• Below this is the General Council (normally ambassadors and heads of delegation in
Geneva, but sometimes officials sent from members’ capitals) which meets several times a
year in the Geneva headquarters. The General Council also meets as the Trade Policy
Review Body and the Dispute Settlement Body.
1.17.1. The WTO Mandate
• There are a number of ways of looking at the WTO:
o It’s an organisation for liberalizing trade.
o It’s a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements.
o It’s a place for them to settle trade disputes.
o It operates a system of trade rules.
• Above all, it’s a negotiating forum. Essentially, the WTO is a place where member
governments go, to try to sort out the trade problems they face with each other. The first
step is to talk.

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• The bulk of the WTO's current work comes from the 1986-94 negotiations called the
Uruguay Round and earlier negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).
• The WTO is currently hosting negotiations, under the “Doha Development Agenda”
launched in 2001.
1.17.2. Dispute Resolution
• Resolving trade disputes is one of the core activities of the WTO.
• A dispute arises when a member government believes another member government is
violating an agreement or a commitment that it has made in the WTO. The WTO has one
of the most active international dispute settlement mechanisms in the world.
• Since 1995, over 500 disputes have been brought to the WTO and over 350 rulings have
been issued.
1.17.2.1 The Mechanism
• Settling disputes is the responsibility of the Dispute Settlement Body (the General Council
in another guise), which consists of all WTO members. The Dispute Settlement Body has
the sole authority to establish “panels” of experts to consider the case, and to accept or
reject the panels’ findings or the results of an appeal. It monitors the implementation of
the rulings and recommendations, and has the power to authorize retaliation when a
country does not comply with a ruling.
• First stage: consultation (up to 60 days). Before taking any other actions the countries in
dispute have to talk to each other to see if they can settle their differences by themselves. If
that fails, they can also ask the WTO director-general to mediate or try to help in any other
way.
• Second stage: the panel (up to 45 days for a panel to be appointed, plus 6 months for the
panel to conclude). If consultations fail, the complaining country can ask for a panel to be
appointed. The country “in the dock” can block the creation of a panel once, but when the
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Dispute Settlement Body meets for a second time, the appointment can no longer be
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blocked (unless there is a consensus against appointing the panel).

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Third Stage: Appeal-Either side can appeal a panel’s ruling. Sometimes both sides do so.
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Appeals have to be based on points of law such as legal interpretation — they cannot re-
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examine existing evidence or examine new issues.

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• Each appeal is heard by three members of a permanent seven-member Appellate Body

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set up by the Dispute Settlement Body and broadly representing the range of WTO
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membership. Members of the Appellate Body have four-year terms. They have to be
individuals with recognized standing in the field of law and international trade, not affiliated
with any government.
1.17.3. The Doha Round
• The Doha Round is the latest round of trade negotiations among the WTO membership.
• Its aim is to achieve major reform of the international trading system through the
introduction of lower trade barriers and revised trade rules.
• The work programme covers about 20 areas of trade. The Round is also known semi-
officially as the Doha Development Agenda as a fundamental objective is to improve the
trading prospects of developing countries.
• The Round was officially launched at the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha,
Qatar, in November 2001. The Doha Ministerial Declaration provided the mandate for the
negotiations, including on agriculture, services and an intellectual property topic, which
began earlier.

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• In Doha, ministers also approved a decision on how to address the problems developing
countries face in implementing the current WTO agreements.
1.17.4. Key Issues and Challenges: Developed Versus Developing Countries
• The WTO's efforts have increased global trade expansion, but a side effect has been a
negative impact on local communities and human rights.
• Advocates of the WTO consider the stimulation of free trade and a decline in trade
disputes as beneficial to the global economy. Critics of the WTO point to the decline in
domestic industries and increasing foreign influence in some cases as negative impacts on
the world economy.
• The Doha Development round remains incomplete and multiple issues are pending.
• The mini-ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) New Delhi (March
19-20, 2018) was an attempt to rejuvenate the spirit of negotiations that have been
pending for long between the developed and the developing countries. It indicated that
there remains key difference s between the developed and developing countries on
prioritising issues for negotiations at WTO
• The issue that was central to this mini-ministerial is the debate on agricultural trade. India
has made it amply clear through various rounds of Doha Development Agenda that
agriculture being the mainstay of the food security and livelihood for developing countries,
settlement on agricultural trade is important for multilateralism to succeed.
• It is key to understand the intricacies of agricultural trade and how this trade is currently
highly asymmetrical in nature and needs to be settled in a manner that provides a level-
playing field to the developing countries. Agricultural trade needs to be understood in the
perspective of market access, domestic subsidy and export competition, which are the
main planks of this contentious issue.
• From the perspective developing of countries, the key issues that need to be settled are
the designation of Special Products (SP) and the agreement over the coverage of Special
Safeguard Mechanism (SSM). The developing countries want to designate a set of SPs,
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which are critical from the viewpoint of their food security, livelihood and rural
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development. In addition, the SSM may be available to them as a defence against a sudden
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surge in imports or the fall in international commodity prices. At the Hong Kong ministerial
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in 2005, WTO members in principle agreed to these demands.

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• The developing countries argue that the slow implementation of the Agreement on
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Agriculture (AoA) has resulted in a negative impact on food security, livelihood and rural
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development in poor countries, as it has enhanced exports from the developed countries
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rather than promoting imports by them.

• The motive of the developed countries is to bring in new issues such as e-commerce,
micro, small and medium enterprises, investment facilitation, etc, to the fold of the WTO
negotiations. The developed countries are interested to ignore the so-called Doha
Development Agenda and include other trade issues that are of primary importance to
them and will provide better trade gains to the developed economies.
1.17.5. TRIPS
• "Intellectual property" refers to creations of the mind. These creations can take many
different forms, such as artistic expressions, signs, symbols and names used in commerce,
designs and inventions. Governments grant creators the right to prevent others from
using their inventions, designs or other creations — and to use that right to negotiate
payment in return for others using them. These are “intellectual property rights”.
• The WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
negotiated during the 1986-94 Uruguay Round, It is adhered by all member of the WTO
and is effective since 1995.

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• Introduced intellectual property rules into the multilateral trading system for the first
time. The TRIPS Agreement covers five broad areas:
o how general provisions and basic principles of the multilateral trading system apply
to international intellectual property
o what the minimum standards of protection are for intellectual property rights that
members should provide
o which procedures members should provide for the enforcement of those rights in
their own territories.
o how to settle disputes on intellectual property between members of the WTO special
transitional arrangements for the implementation of TRIPS provisions.
1.18. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law

(UNCITRAL)
• Established in 1966, it is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly of the United Nations
with the general mandate to further the progressive harmonization and unification of the
law of international trade.
• It is the core legal body of the United Nations system in the field of international trade
law. The issues dealt with by the WTO and UNCITRAL are different.
• The WTO deals with trade policy issues, such as trade liberalization, abolition of trade
barriers, unfair trade practices or other similar issues usually related to public law, whereas
UNCITRAL deals with the laws applicable to private parties in international transactions.
As a consequence, UNCITRAL is not involved with "state-to-state" issues such as anti-
dumping, countervailing duties, or import quotas.
1.19. Asian Development Bank (ADB)

• Based in Manila, Philippines it opened on 19 December 1966
• ADB assists its members, and partners, by providing loans, technical assistance, grants, and
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equity investments to promote social and economic development.

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• From 31 members at its establishment in 1966, ADB has grown to encompass 67

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members—of which 48 are from within Asia and the Pacific and 19 outside.
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• India has been a member of ADB since its inception in 1966.

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1.20. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

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(OECD)
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• Established in 1961 the OECD is based in Paris and has 35 members

• The OECD's origins date back to 1960, when 18 European countries plus the United States
and Canada joined forces to create an organisation dedicated to economic development.
Today its membership spans North and South America to Europe and Asia-Pacific. They
include many of the world’s most advanced countries but also emerging countries like
Mexico, Chile and Turkey.
• The mission of the OECD is to promote policies that will improve the economic and social
well-being of people around the world.
• In May 2007, the Council, meeting at ministerial level, invited the Secretariat to strengthen
OECD cooperation with Brazil, India, Indonesia, the People's Republic of China and South
Africa through "Enhanced Engagement" programmes.
2. Brics: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

• BRICS brings together five major emerging economies, comprising 43% of the world
population, having 37% of the world GDP and 17% share in the world trade.

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• The acronym BRIC was first used in 2001 by Goldman Sachs in their Global Economics
Paper, "The World Needs Better Economic BRICs" on the basis of econometric analyses
projecting that the four economies would individually and collectively occupy far greater
economic space and would be amongst the world's largest economies in the next 50 years
or so.
• As a formal grouping, BRIC started after the meeting of the Leaders of Russia, India and
China in St. Petersburg on the margins of G8-Outreach Summit in July 2006. The grouping
was formalized during the 1st meeting of BRIC Foreign Ministers on the margins of UNGA in
New York in September 2006.
2.1. BRIC to BRICS

• The 1st BRIC Summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, on 16 June 2009. The
Yekaterinburg summit’s final resolution outlined the group’s preference for multilateralism
and multipolar world, with UN playing a central role in dealing with global challenges and
threats”.
• It was agreed to expand BRIC into BRICS with the inclusion of South Africa at the BRIC
Foreign Minister’s meeting in New York in September 2010.
• South Africa attended the 3rd BRICS Summit in Sanya on 14 April 2011.
• The inclusion of South Africa affirmed its political ambitions & its desire for gaining
greater political legitimacy by roping in the largest economy of Africa. South Africa’s
inclusion cannot be explained on the basis of economic consideration given the relatively
small size of its economy as compared to other members.
• Nine BRICS Summits have taken place so far. The 8th BRICS Summit was hosted by India
during its Chairmanship in 2016. the 9th Summit took Place in Xiamen, China and the 10th
Summit is slated to take place in Johannesburg, South Africa.
• This desire for a multipolar world and reforming multilateral institutions took the
concrete form for reforming international financial institutions to “reflect changes in the
global economy” & that “emerging and developing economies must have a greater voice
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and representation in international financial institutions whose heads should be appointed

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through an open, transparent & merit based process”.

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2.2. The New Development Bank

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• At the fourth BRICS Summit in New Delhi (2012), the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China
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and South Africa considered the possibility of setting up a new Development Bank to
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mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and
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other emerging economies, as well as in developing countries.

• At the fifth BRICS summit in Durban (2013), the leaders agreed on the feasibility of
establishing the New Development Bank and made the decision to do so. It was also
agreed that the initial contribution to the Bank should be substantial and sufficient for it to
be effective in financing infrastructure.
• During the sixth BRICS Summit in Fortaleza (2014), the leaders signed the Agreement
establishing the New Development Bank (NDB).
• In the Fortaleza Declaration, the leaders stressed that the NDB will strengthen cooperation
among BRICS and will supplement the efforts of multilateral and regional financial
institutions for global development, thus contributing to collective commitments for
achieving the goal of strong, sustainable and balanced growth.
• Fortaleza Declaration provided that:
o The Bank shall have an initial authorized capital of US$ 100 billion.
o The initial subscribed capital shall be US$ 50 billion, equally shared among founding
members.

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o The first chair of the Board of Governors shall be from Russia.

o The first chair of the Board of Directors shall be from Brazil.
o The first President of the Bank shall be from India.
o The headquarters of the Bank shall be located in Shanghai.
o The New Development Bank Africa Regional Center shall be established in South Africa
concurrently with the headquarters.
• More than the establishment of the NDB, the Fortaleza Declaration is remarkable for
adoption of ‘one-nation one-vote’ prescription for the proposed bank.
• In comparison the Bretton-Woods institutions — the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund — have structures that aren’t equitable, to say the least.
• The inaugural meeting of the Board of Governors of the NDB was chaired by Russia and
held on the eve of the Ufa Summit on 7 July 2015, when the Bank formally came into
existence as a legal entity. During the meeting, the appointment of the President, Mr. K.V.
Kamath, as well as four Vice Presidents and the Board of Directors took place.
• With the Headquarters being setup in Shanghai China, on 27 February 2016, the NDB
became fully operational.
• The Bank has committed USD$1.5 billion in loans to member countries so far, with a strong
emphasis on renewable energy. Furthermore, plans are on track to reach the target $2.5
billion of loan commitments by end of 2017. This will pave the way to reach between $10
billion and 15 billion of loans by 2021.
• The creation of the NDB happened in the context of a real and continuing power shift in the
international system from the developed industrialized world towards emerging market
economies.
2.3. Contingency Relief Arrangement (CRA)

o The Durban summit (2013) announced the setting up of a US$100 billion contingency relief
arrangement (CRA).
o China would is the largest contributor, contributing US$ 41billion, while Brazil, India &
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Russia contribute US$ 18 billion each and South Africa contribute the remaining US$ 5
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o The aim of CRA would be to “forestall short term liquidity pressures, provide mutual
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support & further strengthen financial stability” of these countries.

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2.4. India’s Approach

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• India hosted the 8th BRICS Summit during its Chairmanship from 15-16 October 2016 in
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Goa. The theme of India’s BRICS Chairmanship is Building Responsive, Inclusive

and Collective Solutions.
• During India’s BRICS Chairmanship, five-pronged approach:
o Institution building to further deepen, sustain and institutionalise BRICS cooperation;
o Implementation of the decisions from previous Summits;
o Integrating the existing cooperation mechanisms;
o Innovation, i.e., new cooperation mechanisms; and
o Continuity, i.e., continuation of mutually agreed existing BRICS cooperation
mechanisms.
• In short, the Indian approach towards its BRICS Chairmanship could be captured by ‘IIIIC or
I4C’.
2.5. Significance and Challenges

• While some are skeptical about the BRICS formation, there is no doubt that this group of
countries along with a number of others at similar levels of development is playing an

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increasingly important role in the global economy. The contribution of BRICS countries to
global GDP has increased from 8% in 2000 to 24% in 2017. Being home to 43% of the
world’s population, three of the BRICS economies are ranked in the top 10 by GDP size,
namely China (2nd), India (7th) and Brazil (9th).
• Many challenges lie ahead for the BRICS
• Each of these emerging economies are presently on divergent growth paths, which in turn
translate into differing priorities and the lack of a unified agenda.
• Nevertheless, since these five countries cumulatively hold considerable weight in global
economics and politics, their continuing engagement serves well for stable growth
prospects in the regions they encompass.
• This is why overcoming individual ambitions is a prerequisite if the trends toward
deepening through institutionalization (via the year-old New Development Bank and the
proposed ratings agency) are to actually materialize.
• In that sense, it makes more sense for the BRICS quintet to subscribe to a well-defined
economic scope to avoid getting caught in the quagmire of geopolitical rhetoric.
• Though such a mandate would be necessarily limited, seeking exclusively to promote
investments and commercial collaboration, they would also invariably reflect the dynamism
of these five powerful economies.
2.6. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

• A Chinese initiative, the AIIB is a multilateral development bank with a mission to improve
social and economic outcomes in Asia and beyond.
• Headquartered in Beijing, it commenced operations in January 2016 and has now grown
to 84 approved members from around the world.
• The Bank has an authorised capital of USD 100 billion.
• China is the largest shareholder with 26.06 per cent voting shares in the bank. India is the
second largest shareholder with 7.5 per cent followed by Russia 5.93 per cent and
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• It lent $1.7 billion in 2016, which increased to $2.5 billion in 2017.

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India is the first country where the Bank has committed more than $1 billion of financing.
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3. IBSA Forum
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IBSA is a unique tripartite forum which brings together India, Brazil and South Africa,
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three large democracies and major economies from three different continents, facing
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similar challenges. All three countries are developing, pluralistic, multi-cultural, multi-
ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious nations.
• The idea of establishing IBSA was discussed at a meeting between the then Prime
Minister of India and the then Presidents of Brazil and South Africa in Evian on 2 June
2003 on the margins of the G-8 Summit.
• The grouping was formalized and named the IBSA Dialogue Forum when the Foreign
Ministers of the three countries met in Brasilia on 6 June 2003 and issued the Brasilia
Declaration.
• Cooperation in IBSA is on three fronts:
o first, as a forum for consultation and coordination on global and regional political
issues, such as, the reform of the global institutions of political and economic
governance, WTO/Doha Development Agenda, climate change, terrorism etc.;
o second, trilateral collaboration on concrete areas/projects, through fourteen working
groups and six People-to-People Forums, for the common benefit of three countries;
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o third, assisting other developing countries by taking up projects in the latter through
IBSA Fund.
3.1. Organisational Structure

3.1.1. Joint Working Groups
• Joint Working Groups to promote sectoral cooperation have been established. There are 14
Joint Working Groups in areas, Transport; Health; Education; Defence; Science &
Technology; Trade & Investment; Culture; Agriculture; Energy; Public Administration and
Governance, Revenue Administration, Human Settlement, Environment and Social
Development.
3.1.2. People-to-People Forums
• There are six People-to-People Forums under IBSA. These are, Parliamentary Forum,
Women's Forum, Academic Forum, Local Governance Forum, Business Forum, and Editors'
Forum. There is also a Tri-nation Forum on MSME.
3.1.3. Focal Points
• Senior Officials from the Foreign Offices of the three countries dealing with IBSA are the
designated Focal Points; Secretary (West), assisted by Joint Secretary (MER), Ministry of
External Affairs, is the IBSA Focal Point for India. Focal Points meet once a year for a
standalone meeting and also meet prior to the Trilateral Commission.
3.1.4. Trilateral Commission
• The Brasilia Declaration established a Trilateral Commission at the level of Foreign
Ministers. The Commission meets regularly; the first meeting of the Trilateral Commission
was held in New Delhi on 4 - 5 March 2004. In addition, Foreign Ministers meet regularly
before every IBSA Summit as well as on the sidelines of UNGA in New York.
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3.1.5. Summits
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Five IBSA Summit have been held so far: 1st IBSA Summit in Brasilia on 13 September
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2006; the 2nd in South Africa on 17 October 2007, the 3rd in New Delhi on 15 October
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2008, 4th in Brasilia on 15 April 2010 and the 5th in Pretoria on 18 October 2011.
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3.1.6. IBSA Fund

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• An innovative work of IBSA is the establishment of IBSA Facility Fund for Alleviation of
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Poverty and Hunger through which development projects are executed with IBSA funding in
fellow developing countries. An annual amount of US $ 1 million is contributed by each
IBSA member country. IBSA Fund received the 2010 MDG Award for South-South
cooperation on 17 September 2010 in New York recognizing the work of the three countries
in using innovative approaches to share development experiences in other parts of the
world.
3.1.7. IBSA Business Forum
• An IBSA Business Forum was launched in Cape Town in March 2005. From India, CII, FICCI
and ASSOCHAM are represented on the Council; CII coordinates India's participation.
• IBSA has also nitiated a trilateral Naval Exercise since 2008

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4. Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

(OPEC)
• OPEC is a permanent intergovernmental organization of 14 oil-exporting developing
nations that coordinates and unifies the petroleum policies of its Member Countries.
• It was established at the Baghdad Conference on September 10–14, 1960
• OPEC Secretariat located in Vienna, Austria, it also functions as the Headquarters of the
Organization. The Secretariat was originally established in 1961 in Geneva, Switzerland. In
April 1965 it was shifted to Vienna.
5. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)

• OIC is inter-governmental organization with a membership of 57 states spread over four
continents. It was established in 1969.
• Its headquarters is in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
• The Organization is the collective voice of the Muslim world. It endeavors to safeguard and
protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and
harmony among various people of the world.
6. The Commonwealth
• Formed through the 'London Declaration‘adopted in 1949 which agreed that all member
countries would be "freely and equally associated". It also meant the adjective 'British' was
junked. The declaration stated the Commonwealth members were "free and equal
members of the Commonwealth of Nations, freely co-operating in the pursuit of peace,
liberty and progress”.
• It has 53 members, prominent ones inculde India, Canada, Australia, The UK etc.
• Commonwealth Secretariat in London was set up in 1965. The Commonwealth is
represented by the secretariat at the UN General Assembly as an observer.
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• The Secretary-General is elected by Commonwealth heads of government for a maximum

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of two four year terms.

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In 1971, the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting ( CHOGM) process was set
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up and the meetings of the Commonwealth heads of governments, which until then only
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took place in the UK, travelled out of London. The first CHOGM was held in Singapore in
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1971.
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A CHOGM has a two tier format - a) Executive Sessions, where the the heads of government
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interact in a more formal manner and they make statements, and are accompanied by
ministers or officials, and (b) a Retreat, where the heads of government interact informally
with their counterparts without the presence of any aides.
• The Commonwealth has no written constitution, members reach decisions through
consultations.
• The 14 points Singapore Declaration dedicated the members to the principles of world
peace, liberty, human rights and equality.
• India, the Commonwealth's largest member state, has once hosted CHOGM. New Delhi
was the venue for the seventh CHOGM Summit under the then PM Indira Gandhi's
leadership in 1983.
• India is the fourth largest contributor to the Commonwealth budget but has played an
important role in the Commonwealth's important landmarks
• Next Summit CHOGM, is Scheduled to be held in London in April 2018.

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7. Important Groupings
7.1. G-20
• G-20 the Group of Twenty was established in 1999 as a forum in which major advanced and
emerging economies discuss discuss global financial and economic matters
• The G20 membership comprises a mix of the world’s largest advanced and emerging
economies, representing about two-thirds of the world’s population, 85 per cent of global
gross domestic product and over 75 per cent of global trade.
• The objectives of the G20 are:
o Policy coordination between its members in order to achieve global economic stability,
sustainable growth;
o To promote financial regulations that reduce risks and prevent future financial crises;
and
o To create a new international financial architecture.
• The members of the G20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany,
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union.
• Since its inception, it has held annual Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
Meetings and more recently Summits of Heads of State.
• G20 was raised to the Summit level in 2008 to address the global financial and economic
crisis of 2008.
• G-20 leaders Summits have been held in Washington in 2008 and in London and Pittsburgh
in 2009. 2017 it was held in Hamburg Germany.
• The G20 Presidency rotates annually according to a system that ensures a regional balance
over time. Reflecting its nature as an informal political forum, the G20 does not have a
permanent secretariat. Instead, the G20 president is responsible for bringing together the
G20 agenda in consultation with other members and in response to developments in the
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• To ensure continuity, the presidency is supported by a “troika” made up of the current,

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immediate past and next host countries. The Current Troika is China, Germany and
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Argentina.
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• India hosted a meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors in 2002.
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The preparatory process for the G20 Summit is conducted through the established Sherpa
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and Finance tracks that prepare and follow up on the issues and commitments adopted at
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the Summits.
• The Sherpas’ Track or development track focuses on non-economic and financial issues,
such as development, anti-corruption and food security, while addressing internal aspects
such as procedural rules of the G20 process. The Sherpas carry out important planning,
negotiation and implementation tasks continuously.
• The Finance Track focuses on economic and financial issues. The Sherpa and Finance tracks
both rely on the technical and substantive work of a series of expert working groups.
7.2. G-7
• Established in 1975 as G-5 (France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the USA).
• Subsequently expanded as the G-7 to include Canada (1976) and Italy (1978) and the G-8
to include Russian Federation (1998).
• However Russia was ejected from the G8 political forum in March 2014 following
the Russian annexation of Crimea, thus again becoming G-7.
• TheG-7 conducts semi-formal collaboration on world economic problems.

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• Government leaders meet in annual G-7 Summits, while Finance ministers and/or their
leading officials periodically hold other consultations.
7.3. G-77
• Established in 1964 by a group of 77 developing countries in the United Nations.
• It is the largest intergovernmental grouping of developing countries in the UN. Established
on 15 June 1964, the group today has 134 members including India.
• Still in existence the G-77 aims to promote collective economic interests, mutual
cooperation for development and negotiating capacity on all major international
economic issues within the United Nations system.
• Since January 2018, Egypt is the new Chair for the group.
8. Questions from Previous Years

• The World Bank and the IMF, collectively known as the Bretton Woods Institutions, are the
two inter-governmental pillars supporting the structure of the world’s economic and
financial order. Superficially, the World Bank and the IMF exhibit many common
characteristics, yet their role, functions and mandate are distinctly different. Elucidate.
(2013/ 200 words/10/ GS2)
• India has recently signed to become a founding member of New Development Bank (NDB)
and also the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). How will the role of the two Banks
be different? Discuss the strategic significance of these two Banks for India. (2014/ 200
words/ 12.5/ GS2)
• WTO is an important international institution where decisions taken affect countries in a
profound manner. What is the mandate of WTO and how binding are their decisions?
Critically analyse India’s stand on the latest round of talks on food security. (2014/200
words/ 12.5/GS2).
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LECTURE-15
KEY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Contents
1. Treaties/Conventions/Protocols/Agreements........................................................................ 248
2. Global Commons .................................................................................................................... 248
2.1. United Nations Convention on The Laws of The Sea (UNCLOS)...................................... 249
2.2. UNCLOS Maritime Zones ................................................................................................. 249
2.2.1. Territorial Sea ........................................................................................................... 249
2.2.2. Contiguous Zone ...................................................................................................... 250
2.2.3. Exclusive Economic Zone .......................................................................................... 250
2.2.4. Continental Shelf ...................................................................................................... 250
2.2.5. High Seas .................................................................................................................. 250
2.2.6. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) ....................................... 251
2.2.7. Ocean Garbage Patches: A Case for Multilateral Action .......................................... 251
2.3. The Outer Space Treaty ................................................................................................... 252
2.4. The Antarctica Treaty ...................................................................................................... 253
2.5. The Arctic Council............................................................................................................ 254
2.6. Atmosphere..................................................................................................................... 255
2.6.1. UNFCCC .................................................................................................................... 255
2.6.2. COP21 ....................................................................................................................... 256
2.7. The International Solar Alliance ...................................................................................... 257
2.8. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) .................................................... 258
2.9. Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) ....................................... 258
2.10. International Energy Agency (IEA) ................................................................................ 258
2.11. Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21) ................................ 258
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3. Security................................................................................................................................... 259
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3.1. India’s Nuclear Policy ...................................................................................................... 259

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3.2. MECR ............................................................................................................................... 259

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3.2.1. Wassenaar Arrangement.......................................................................................... 259

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3.2.2. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) ......................................................................... 260

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3.2.3. The Australia Group (AG) ......................................................................................... 260

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3.2.4. MTCR ........................................................................................................................ 260

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3.3. The NPT ........................................................................................................................... 261

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3.3.1. NPT Review Conferences.......................................................................................... 261

3.4. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) ............................................................ 262
3.5. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons............................................................... 262
3.6. Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty......................................................................................... 262
3.7. Disarmament Miscellaneous ........................................................................................... 263
3.7.1. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) ...................... 263
3.8. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ............................................................. 263
3.9. Nuclear Security Summit................................................................................................. 264
3.10. Terrorism ....................................................................................................................... 264
3.10.1. International Efforts ............................................................................................... 264
3.10.2. Four Pillars of Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy ................................................. 265
3.10.3. Key UN Steps .......................................................................................................... 265
3.10.4. Security Council Counter Terrorism Committee .................................................... 265
3.10.5. Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism ............................................................. 265
3.10.6. Key Conventions ..................................................................................................... 266

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3.10.7. Financial Action Task Force (FATF).......................................................................... 266

4. Humanitarian Issues: Human Rights/Migration/ Refugees .................................................... 266
4.1. Human Rights .................................................................................................................. 266
4.1.1. Human Rights Council .............................................................................................. 267
4.2. Migration/Refugees ........................................................................................................ 267
4.2.1. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)................ 269
4.2.2. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) ............ 269
4.2.3. The Rohingya Issue ................................................................................................... 270
4.2.4. International Organisation for Migration (IOM) ...................................................... 271
5. Key Issues/Conflicts ................................................................................................................ 271
5.1. The North Korean Issue ................................................................................................... 271
5.1.1. Why is North Korean Nuclear Capability a Concern................................................. 272
5.1.2. India and North Korea .............................................................................................. 273
5.2. The Syrian Issue............................................................................................................... 273
5.2.1. India and Syria .......................................................................................................... 274
5.3. Yemen Conflict ................................................................................................................ 275
5.3.1. Implications .............................................................................................................. 275
5.3.2. India.......................................................................................................................... 276
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1. Treaties/Conventions/Protocols/Agreements
• The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1969, defines a treaty as:
o ‘an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed
by international law’ (VCLT article 2(a) )
• Treaties can be referred to by many terms, including ‘agreements’, ‘conventions’,
‘protocols’, ‘charters’, ‘accords’, and ‘amendments’.
• According to the VCLT, whether an agreement constitutes a treaty does not depend on its
title, but on whether the parties intended the instrument to be governed by international
law.
• Treaties can usually be distinguished from non-legally binding instruments by the
inclusion of ‘final clauses’, addressing issues such as how states express their consent to
be bound (for example, through ratification or accession) and the requirements for entry
into force – provisions that would not make sense in an instrument not intended to be legal
in character.
• Under the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, a treaty must be:
o a binding instrument, which means that the contracting parties intended to create legal
rights and duties;
o concluded by states or international organizations with treaty-making power;
o governed by international law and
o in writing.
• A framework convention or agreement describes a type of legally binding treaty which
establishes broader commitments for its parties and leaves the setting of specific targets
either to subsequent more detailed agreements (usually called protocols) or to national
legislation. In essence, a framework agreement serves as an umbrella document which lays
down the principles, objectives and the rules of governance of the treaty regime. e.g. the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
• Treaties often contain a mix of mandatory and non-mandatory elements. For example,
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Article 4.1 of the UNFCCC establishes legal obligations, because it specifies what parties
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‘shall’ do to address climate change. By contrast, Article 4.2 formulates the target for
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Annex I parties to return emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 as a nonbinding ‘aim’,
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rather than as a legal commitment.

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• The Convention took effect in 1994. The text of the Kyoto Protocol was adopted
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unanimously in 1997; it entered into force on 16 February 2005.

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thus synonymous with the generic term ‘treaty’. Conventions are normally open for
participation by the international community as a whole, or by a large number of States.
• Usually the instruments negotiated under the auspices of an international organization
are entitled conventions (e.g. the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1989).
2. Global Commons
• The ‘Global Commons’ refers to resource domains or areas that lie outside of the political
reach of any one nation State. Thus international law identifies four global commons
namely:
o the High Seas;
o the Atmosphere;
o Antarctica; and,
o Outer Space.

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• These areas have historically been guided by the principle of the common heritage of
humankind - the open access doctrine or the mare liberum (free sea for everyone) in the
case of the High Seas. Despite efforts by governments or individuals to establish property
rights or other forms of control over most natural resources, the Global Commons have
remained an exception. These are governed by multiple treaty arrangements and
conventions
2.1. United Nations Convention on The Laws of The Sea (UNCLOS)

• UNCLOS is an international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place between 1973 and 1982.
• The Convention, concluded in 1982, replaced four 1958 treaties. UNCLOS came into force
in 1994.
• It has been ratified by 168 parties (167 states+ EU).
• The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea lays down a comprehensive regime
of law and order in the world's oceans and seas establishing rules governing all uses of
the oceans and their resources.
• It enshrines the notion that all problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need
to be addressed as a whole.
• It also established three institutions: the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS), the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (CLCS).
2.2. UNCLOS Maritime Zones

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Image Source: https://mainelaw.maine.edu/faculty/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/Maritime-

Zones.png
2.2.1. Territorial Sea
• Under the Convention, a coastal State is entitled to a territorial sea not exceeding 12
nautical miles measured from its baselines. Within its territorial sea, the coastal State
exercises sovereignty, including over its resources.
• Subject to the provisions of the Convention, ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent
passage through the territorial sea.

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2.2.2. Contiguous Zone

• The Convention also grants a coastal State the right to establish a contiguous zone not
extending beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines.
• Within its contiguous zone, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to
prevent and punish infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations that have occurred within its territory or territorial waters and to control, in
specified circumstances, the trafficking of archaeological and historical objects.
2.2.3. Exclusive Economic Zone
• In addition, a coastal State may establish an exclusive economic zone not extending
beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines.
• Here, the coastal State has sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing natural living or non-living resources of the waters superjacent
to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and
• With regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone,
such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds.
• In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has jurisdiction with regard to the
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, marine scientific
research and protection and preservation of the marine environment.
2.2.4. Continental Shelf
• Pursuant to the Convention, the continental shelf comprises the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond the territorial sea of coastal States up to 200
nautical miles from the baselines.
• In the cases in which the continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the
baselines, coastal States are required by the Convention to submit information on the
outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles to the Commission on the
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Limits of the Continental Shelf for its consideration.

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2.2.4.1. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CCLS)

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The purpose of the CLCS is to facilitate the implementation of the United Nations
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Convention on the Law of the Sea (the Convention) in respect of the establishment of the
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outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (M) from the baselines
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from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

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• It has 21 Members with a term of five years.

• It is based in Geneva, Switzerland.
2.2.5. High Seas
• All parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, the territorial
sea or the internal or archipelagic waters of a State, are known as the high seas.
• On the high seas all States have the freedom of navigation, of overflight, to lay submarine
cables and pipelines, to construct artificial islands and other installations, of fishing, and
of scientific research.
• These freedoms must be exercised with due regard for the interests of other States in
their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.
• The seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
constitute the “Area”. The Convention provides that the Area and its resources are the
“common heritage of mankind”.

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• In this context, the Convention defines “resources” as “all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral
resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed, including polymetallic nodules.”
• No State can claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area or
its resources, nor can any State or natural or juridical person appropriate any part thereof.
On the contrary, all rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole.
2.2.5.1. International Seabed Authority
• An organization established by the UNCLOS, the International Seabed Authority, organizes
and controls activities in the Area, particularly with a view to administering resources in
the Area.
• It is based in Kingston, Jamaica,
• The Convention provides that activities in the Area shall be carried out for the benefit of
mankind.
• Both the high-seas and the Area can only be used for peaceful purposes.
2.2.6. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
• ITLOS is an independent judicial body established by the UNCLOS to adjudicate disputes
arising out of the interpretation and application of the Convention.
• It is based in Hamburg Germany.
• The Tribunal is composed of 21 independent members, elected from among persons
enjoying the highest reputation for fairness and integrity and of recognized competence in
the field of the law of the sea.
• The Tribunal has jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or application
of the Convention, and over all matters specifically provided for in any other agreement
which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal (Statute, article 21).
• The Tribunal is open to States Parties to the Convention (i.e. States and international
organisations which are parties to the Convention).
• It is also open to entities other than States Parties, i.e., States or intergovernmental
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organizations which are not parties to the Convention, and to state enterprises and
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private entities "in any case expressly provided for in Part XI or in any case submitted
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pursuant to any other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is accepted
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by all the parties to that case" (Statute, article 20).

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2.2.7. Ocean Garbage Patches: A Case for Multilateral Action

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• Ocean cover more than 70 percent of earth’s surface, they act as major resource for
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humanity and support great biodiversity.

• The world's oceans are full of trash, causing "tremendous" negative impacts on coastal
life and ecology. Plastic makes up about 80 percent of the ocean trash collected in some
areas of the world
• Most of the garbage accumulates in five little-explored "patches" found in the doldrums
of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans.
• The largest is the Great Pacific Garbage Patch, which starts a few hundred miles off the
coast of North America and stretches to a few hundred miles off the coast of Japan; a more
concentrated area lies between California and Hawaii.
• In these cases the harm to fish and other sea creatures is increasing.
• Only about 20 percent of ocean plastic comes from marine sources, such as discarded
fishing equipment or cargo ship mishaps. About 80 percent of it washes out to sea from
beach litter or was carried downstream in rivers.

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Ocean Garbage Patches
Image Source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Ocean_garbage_patch#/media/File:Oceanic_gyres.png
• There is an increasingly urgent need to approach the issue of marine litter through better
enforcement of laws and regulations, expanded outreach and educational campaigns, and
the employment of strong economic instruments and incentives
• Creating incentives to help reduce littering can be a political challenge.
2.2.7.1. Solutions
• There are several solutions offered by UN Environment Programme in a report titled
"Marine Litter: A Global Challenge.":
o Countries and regions should adopt long-term plans to prevent litter from ending up
in the oceans.
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o Countries should monitor marine litter using international standards and

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methodologies.
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o Ports should encourage fishing boats not to discard nets at sea.

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o Efforts to reduce marine litter should get more funding.

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Thus, the issue requires international attention and cooperation to be resolved.

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2.3. The Outer Space Treaty

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• Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
• The Treaty was opened for signature by the three depository Governments (the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) in January 1967, and it
entered into force in October 1967.
• 107 countries are parties to the treaty, while another 23 have signed the treaty but have
not completed ratification.
• The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS)
oversees these treaties and other questions of space jurisdiction.
• The Outer Space Treaty provides the basic framework on international space law,
including the following principles:
o the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the
interests of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind;
o outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States;
o outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means
of use or occupation, or by any other means;

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o States shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit
or on celestial bodies or station them in outer space in any other manner;
o the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes;
o astronauts shall be regarded as the envoys of mankind;
o States shall be responsible for national space activities whether carried out by
governmental or non-governmental entities;
o States shall be liable for damage caused by their space objects; and
o States shall avoid harmful contamination of space and celestial bodies.
• However, the treaty fails to define what exactly constitutes outer space and its limits.
Also, there is ambiguity on what constitutes peaceful use. There has been tremendous
changes in the use of space and States with Space capability. Thus, there have been calls for
a new space treaty for contemporary times.
2.4. The Antarctica Treaty

• The Antarctic Treaty was signed in Washington on 1 December 1959 by the twelve
countries whose scientists had been active in and around Antarctica during the
International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957-58.
• It entered into force in 1961 and has since been acceded to by many other nations. The
total number of Parties to the Treaty is now 53.
• Some important provisions of the Treaty:
o Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only (Art. I)
o Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end …
shall continue (Art. II).
o Scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made
freely available (Art. III).
• No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a
basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or
create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing
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claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in
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force.
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Among the signatories of the Treaty were seven countries - Argentina, Australia, Chile,
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France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom - with territorial claims, sometimes
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overlapping. Other countries do not recognize any claims. The US and Russia maintain a
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“basis of claim”.
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2.5. The Arctic Council
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factbook//graphics/ref_maps/political/jpg/arctic_region.jpg
• The Arctic Council is the leading intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation,

coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, Arctic indigenous communities and
other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular on issues of sustainable
development and environmental protection in the Arctic.
• The Ottawa Declaration (1996) lists the following countries as Members of the Arctic
Council: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian
Federation, Sweden and the United States.
• In addition, six organizations representing Arctic indigenous peoples have status as
Permanent Participants. The category of Permanent Participant was created to provide for
active participation and full consultation with the Arctic indigenous peoples within the
Council. They include: the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan
Council, Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Association
of Indigenous Peoples of the North and the Saami Council.

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• Observer status in the Arctic Council is open to non-Arctic states, along with inter-
governmental, inter-parliamentary, global, regional and non-governmental organizations
that the Council determines can contribute to its work. Arctic Council Observers primarily
contribute through their engagement in the Council at the level of Working Groups.
• The standing Arctic Council Secretariat formally became operational in 2013 in Tromsø,
Norway. It was established to provide administrative capacity, institutional memory,
enhanced communication and outreach and general support to the activities of the Arctic
Council.
• In 2013 India achieved the observer Status in the Arctic Council, along with China, Italy,
Japan, Republic of Korea and Singapore
• India would contribute its scientific expertise, particularly its polar research capabilities, to
the work of the Arctic Council to support its objectives.
• India also looking for partnership in hydrocarbon exploration by by joining hands with one
of the five countries gearing up for the purpose — the U.S., Canada, Norway, Russia and
Denmark. Russia can be the most suitable partner geographically in this endeavour.
2.6. Atmosphere
• First Sustainable Development Summit in Stockholm 1972, marked the emergence of
environment as a key issue in IR.
• UNFCCC is one of the three Rio-Conventions, adopted at the “Rio Earth Summit” in 1992.
Its sister Rio Conventions are the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and the
Convention to Combat Desertification.
• UNFCCC came into existence in 1992 and has 197 parties. It took effect in 1994.
• Conference of Parties (CoP) is in place since 1995, it is the supreme decision-making body
of the Convention. All States that are Parties to the Convention are represented at the
COP, at which they review the implementation of the Convention and any other legal
instruments that the COP adopts and take decisions necessary to promote the effective
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implementation of the Convention, including institutional and administrative

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arrangements.
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Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCC came into existence in 1997.

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• UNFCC borrows from the Montreal Protocol, in 1987 on CFCs i.e. it bound member states
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to act in the interests of human safety even in the face of scientific uncertainty.
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2.6.1. UNFCCC
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• The ultimate objective of the Convention is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations "at
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a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (human induced) interference with the
climate system.
• Puts the onus on developed countries to lead the way.
• The idea is that, as they are the source of most past and current greenhouse gas
emissions, industrialized countries are expected to do the most to cut emissions on home
ground.
• They are called Annex I countries and belong to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). They also include 12 countries with "economies in
transition" from Central and Eastern Europe. Annex I countries were expected by the year
2000 to reduce emissions to 1990 levels.
2.6.1.1. Kyoto Protocol
• The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997. Due to a complex
ratification process, it entered into force on 16 February 2005.
• The Kyoto Protocol is what “operationalizes” the Convention. It commits industrialized

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countries to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions based on the principles of the

Convention. The Convention itself only encourages countries to do so.
• Sets binding emission reduction targets for 37 industrialized countries and the European
community in its first commitment period. Overall, these targets add up to an average five
per cent emissions reduction compared to 1990 levels over the five-year period 2008 to
2012 (the first commitment period).
• It only binds developed countries because it recognizes that they are largely responsible
for the current high levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere, which are the result of
more than 150 years of industrial activity.
• It places a heavier burden on developed nations under its central principle: that of
“common but differentiated responsibility”.
• Its architecture involved:
o Reporting and verification procedures;
o Flexible market-based mechanisms, which in turn have their own governance
procedures; and
o A compliance system.
• Market based mechanisms are: International Emission trading, Clean Development
Mechanism, Joint implementation. These created what is now known as the “carbon
market.”
• In Doha, Qatar, on 8 December 2012, the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol was
adopted. This launched a second commitment period, starting on 1 January 2013 until
2020.
2.6.2. COP21
• CoP21 was held in Paris from 30 November to 12 December 2015.
• The Paris Climate Agreement is a pact within the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) dealing with greenhouse gas emissions mitigation, adaptation and
finance starting in the year 2020.
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• According to the agreement, each country determines, plans and regularly reports its own
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contribution it should make in order to mitigate global warming.

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The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016, thirty days after the date on
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which at least 55 Parties to the Convention accounting in total for at least an estimated 55
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% of the total global greenhouse gas emissions deposited their instruments of ratification,
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acceptance, approval or accession with the Depositary.

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• India is the world’s third largest emitter of greenhouse gases after the China and the
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United States.
2.6.2.1. Paris Agreement
• The Paris Agreement’s aim is to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate
change by keeping a global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius
above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even
further to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
• Additionally, the agreement aims to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the
impacts of climate change. To reach these ambitious goals, appropriate financial flows, a
new technology framework and an enhanced capacity building framework will be put in
place, thus supporting action by developing countries and the most vulnerable countries, in
line with their own national objectives.
• The Agreement also provides for enhanced transparency of action and support through a
more robust transparency framework. There will be a global stocktaking every 5 years to
assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of the Agreement and to
inform further individual actions by Parties.

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2.6.2.2. Nationally determined contributions

• The Paris Agreement requires all Parties to put forward their best efforts through
“nationally determined contributions” (NDCs) and to strengthen these efforts in the years
ahead. This includes requirements that all Parties report regularly on their emissions and
on their implementation efforts.
2.6.2.3. Key terms
• Mitigation: Mitigation refers to efforts to reduce or prevent emission of greenhouse
gases. Mitigation can mean using new technologies and renewable energies, making older
equipment more energy efficient, or changing management practices or consumer
behavior.
• Adaptation: Adaptation means anticipating the adverse effects of climate change and
taking appropriate action to prevent or minimise the damage they can cause, or taking
advantage of opportunities that may arise.
• Finance: The operation of the Financial Mechanism was initially entrusted to the Global
Environment Facility (GEF). Established in 1992. The World Bank serves as the GEF
Trustee, administering the GEF Trust Fund (contributions by donors).
• At COP 17, Durban 2011, Parties decided to designate the Green Climate Fund (GCF) as an
operating entity of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, in accordance with Article
11 of the Convention. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a fund established within the
framework of the UNFCCC to assist developing countries in adaptation and mitigation
practices to counter climate change. The GCF is based in the new Songdo district of
Incheon, South Korea. It is governed by a Board of 24 members and initially supported by
a Secretariat.
• The Financial Mechanism is accountable to the CoP, which decides on its climate change
policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria for funding.
• In addition to providing guidance to the GEF, Parties have established four special funds:
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the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), both
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managed by the GEF, and the GCF under the Convention; and the Adaptation Fund
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(AF) under the Kyoto Protocol.

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2.7. The International Solar Alliance

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The International Solar Alliance is a treaty based international inter-governmental alliance

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of 121 solar resource rich countries lying fully or partially between the Tropics of Cancer
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and Capricorn.
• It aims to execute innovative and concerted efforts to reduce the cost of finance and
technology for the immediate deployment of assets for solar power generation. In other
words, to tap solar energy at more affordable prices through aggregating both demand and
risks bringing down costs and securing investments of solar developers.
• The International Solar Alliance (ISA) initiative was launched at the UN Climate Change
Conference in Paris on 30 November 2015 by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the then
French President Francois Hollande.
• The finalized ISA framework agreement, which seeks to establish ISA as a treaty based
organization, was opened for signature at the 22nd CoP of the UNFCCC at Marakech,
Morrocco in 2016. And it entered into force in on 6 December 2017 following ratification
by Guinea as the 15th country.
• India hosted the first international Solar Alliance Summit on 11 March 2018 in New Delhi.
The aim was to mobilise $1 trillion of investments needed by 2030 for massive
deployment of solar energy to achieve the target of over 1,000 GW of solar generation
capacity.

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• ISA’s headquarters and Secretariat is in Gurugram, Haryana.

• The Alliance contributes towards the mutual goal of increasing utilization of solar energy
and solar applications to help the world transition to a low carbon and greener society.
• It aims not duplicate or replicate the efforts that others (like International Renewable
Energy Agency (IRENA), Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership(REEEP),
International Energy Agency (IEA), Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century
(REN21), United Nations bodies, bilateral organizations etc.) are currently engaged in, but
will establish networks and develop synergies with them and supplement their efforts in a
sustainable and focused manner.
2.8. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)

• IRENA is an intergovernmental organisation that supports countries in their transition to a
sustainable energy future, and serves as the principal platform for international
cooperation, a centre of excellence, and a repository of policy, technology, resource and
financial knowledge on renewable energy.
• The proposal for an international agency dedicated to renewable energy was made in 1981
at the United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, held in
Nairobi, Kenya. IRENA was officially founded in Bonn, Germany, on 26 January 2009.
• The Agency is Headquartered in Abu Dhabi, UAE.
• As of 2018 it has 156 members.
2.9. Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)

• REEEP is an international multilateral partnership that works to accelerate market-based
deployment of renewable energy and energy efficient systems in low- and middle-income
countries.
• It invests in clean energy markets in developing countries to reduce CO2 emissions and
build prosperity.
• It was originally launched by the government of the United Kingdom, along with other
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partners, at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in

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August 2002.
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In June 2004, REEEP obtained formal, legal non-profit status as an international NGO and
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2.10. International Energy Agency (IEA)

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• The IEA is an autonomous body within the OECD framework.

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• The IEA works to ensure reliable, affordable and clean energy for its 30 member countries
and beyond.
• Its mission is guided by four main areas of focus: energy security, economic development,
environmental awareness and engagement worldwide.
• The IEA was founded in 1974 to help countries collectively respond to oil supply
disruptions.
• It is based in Paris.
• Chile is currently a candidate country for IEA membership and seven countries – Brazil,
China, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Singapore, and Thailand are Association countries.
2.11. Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century

(REN21)
• REN21 is the global renewable energy policy multi-stakeholder network that connects a
wide range of key actors. The network was launched in June 2004 as an outcome of the
International Conference for Renewable Energies in Bonn.

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• REN21 brings together governments, nongovernmental organisations, research and

academic institutions, international organisations and industry to learn from one another
and build on successes that advance renewable energy.
• REN21’s goal is to facilitate knowledge exchange, policy development and joint action
towards a rapid global transition to renewable energy.
• It is based at the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in Paris.
3. Security
3.1. India’s Nuclear Policy
• India is a de facto nuclear power as well as a long term user of nuclear energy.
• In terms of nuclear weapons India’s policy is spelt out by the May 1998 speech of the PM in
Parliament, the 1999 Draft of the National Security Council and the January 2003 Press
release of the Cabinet Committee on Security.
• These spell out what is sometimes known as India’s nuclear doctrine. Perhaps it would be
better to consider them as the outlines of India’ nuclear policy
• Following are the key elements of India’s nuclear policy:
o Maintaining Credible Minimum Deterrence
o No first use
o No use against non nuclear states
o Not engaging in nuclear armed race
o Deter nuclear blackmail and aggression
o Civilian command and control of nuclear weapons
o Universal global nuclear disarmament under international verification
• India reserves the right to nuclear retaliation “in the event of a major attack against India,
or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons”
• These elements have developed through the various phases of India’s engagement with
nuclear technology.
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India is against discriminatory nature of current regimes such as the NPT and CTBT.
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• India also seeks to become member of technology export control regimes such as the
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NSG.
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3.2. MECR
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A Multilateral Export Control Regime (MECR) is an international body that states use to
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organize their national export control systems.

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• It includes:
o The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use
Goods and Technologies
o The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), for the control of nuclear related technology
o The Australia Group (AG) for control of chemical and biological technology that could
be weaponized
o The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) for the control of rockets and other
aerial vehicles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction
3.2.1. Wassenaar Arrangement
• It is the successor to the Cold War-era Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls, and was established on 12 July 1996, in Wassenaar, the Netherlands, which is
near The Hague.
• A Secretariat for administering the agreement is located in Vienna, Austria
• 42 participating states including many former Comecon (Warsaw Pact) countries.

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• Participating States apply export controls to all items set forth in the List of Dual-Use
Goods and Technologies and the Munitions List, with the objective of preventing
unauthorized transfers or re-transfers of those items.
• Every six months member countries exchange information on deliveries of conventional
arms to non-Wassenaar members that fall under eight broad weapons categories: battle
tanks, armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), large-caliber artillery, military aircraft, military
helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, and small arms and light weapons.
• It is not a treaty not legally binding.
• India’s membership approved in December, 2017.
3.2.2. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
• NSG is a group of nuclear supplier countries that seek to prevent nuclear proliferation by
controlling the export of materials, equipment and technology that can be used to
manufacture nuclear weapons.
• The NSG was founded in response to the Indian nuclear test in May 1974. As of 2017 the
NSG has 48 participating governments.
• Overall responsibility for activities lies within NSG Plenary meetings that are held once a
year.
• A rotating Chair has the overall responsibility for coordination of work and outreach
activities.
• The Zangger Committee, also known as the Nuclear Exporters Committee, sprang from
Article III.2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which entered
into force on March 5, 1970. Under the terms of Article III.2 International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards must be applied to nuclear exports.
3.2.3. The Australia Group (AG)
• The Australia Group is an informal group of countries (now joined by the European
Commission) established in 1985 (after the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in 1984) to
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help member countries to identify those exports which need to be controlled so as not to
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contribute to the spread of chemical and biological weapons.

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With the incorporation of India in January 2018, it now has 43 members.

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• Delegations representing the members meet every year in Paris, France.

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Members of the group maintain export controls on a uniform list of 54 compounds,

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including several that are not prohibited for export under the Chemical Weapons
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Convention (1993), but can be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons.

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• In 2002, the group took two important steps to strengthen export control.
• The first was the "no-undercut" requirement, which stated that any member of the group
considering making an export to another state that had already been denied an export by
any other member of the group must first consult with that member state before approving
the export.
• The second was the "catch-all" provision, which requires member states to halt all exports
that could be used by importers in chemical or biological weapons programs, regardless of
whether the export is on the group's control lists
• China is not a member.
3.2.4. MTCR
• MTCR is a multilateral export control regime. It was established in April 1987 by
the G7 countries:
• It is an informal and voluntary partnership among 35 countries. India joined on 27th of
June 2016. Prior to this India was adhering to the MTCR Guidelines unilaterally.

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• Aims to prevent the proliferation of missile and unmanned aerial vehicle technology
capable of carrying above 500 kg payload for more than 300 km.
• Prohibited materials are divided into two Categories, which are outlined in the MTCR
Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex.
• The People's Republic of China is not a member of the MTCR but has agreed to abide by
the original 1987 Guidelines and Annex, but not the subsequent revisions.
3.3. The NPT

• Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the
Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including
the five nuclear-weapon States.
• More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament
agreement, a testament to the Treaty’s significance.
• India along with Israel and Pakistan are the only non signatories, nuclear weapons states.
North Korea had originally signed the treaty but later withdrew from it.
• The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and
complete disarmament.
• The NPT's rests on three pillars:
o nonproliferation,
o the peaceful use of nuclear energy,
o and disarmament.
• The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of
disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States.
• To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between
States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of
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the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

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• Conferences to review the operation of the Treaty have been held at five-year intervals
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• Each conference has sought to find agreement on a final declaration that would assess the
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further strengthen it.

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Prominent conference were in 1995, 2005, 2010 and 2015. The Conference is a once every
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five year opportunity to stabilize and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The
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Review Conference is tasked with evaluating how well the terms of the NPT have been
implemented and to chart a path forward to tackle unfinished business.
3.3.1. NPT Review Conferences
• The 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, held in New York from 27 April to 22 May, ended without the adoption
of a consensus substantive outcome.
• At the 2010 Review Conference the States parties agreed to a final document which
included conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions, including the
implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.
• The 2015 outcome constitutes a setback for the strengthened review process instituted to
ensure accountability with respect to activities under the three pillars of the Treaty as part
of the package in support of the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995.

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3.4. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

• The CTBT is the Treaty banning all nuclear explosions - everywhere, by everyone.
• The Treaty was negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly. It opened for signature on 24 September 1996.
• Since then, the Treaty has reached near-universality. 183 countries have signed the Treaty.
• 164 countries have ratified the Treaty.
• The Treaty’s entry into force depends on 44 specific States, mentioned in Annex 2, that
must have signed and ratified the Treaty. These States had nuclear facilities at the time the
Treaty was negotiated and adopted. 36 of these States have ratified the Treaty.
• Eight States still need to do so: China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt,
India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and the United States.
• India, North Korea and Pakistan have not yet signed the Treaty.
• The Treaty established a CTBT Organization (CTBTO), located in Vienna, to ensure the
implementation of its provisions, including those provisions for international verification
measures.
3.5. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

• Draft adopted at a UN conference in July 2017 by a vote of 122 in favor with one country
voting against.
• Opened for signature in September 2017 and would come into force once 50 countries
ratify it.
• None of the nine countries that possess nuclear weapons — the United States, Russia,
Britain, China, France, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel — took part in the
negotiations or the vote.
3.6. Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty

• A fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) is a proposed international agreement that would
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o highly-enriched uranium (HEU), and

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o plutonium.
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• An FMCT would provide new restrictions for the five recognized nuclear weapon states
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(NWS—United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China), and for the four
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nations that are not NPT members (Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea).
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• Discussions on this subject are being held within the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD),
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a body of 65 member nations established as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on

disarmament. The CD requires consensus for action to take place. Consequently,
o Negotiations for an FMCT have not taken place, though preliminary discussions are
ongoing.
o Those nations that joined the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-weapon
states are already prohibited from producing or acquiring fissile material for weapons.
o In order for negotiations to begin on an FMCT, Pakistan will have to remove its
opposition vote, and a consensus to move forward with negotiations must be
reached. Pakistan has been primarily concerned that an FMCT would lock them into a
disadvantageous position relative to India’s superior nuclear stockpile.
o Consequently, Islamabad would like an FMCT to include current fissile material
stockpiles, instead of just capping future production, a position shared by several other
countries.

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3.7. Disarmament Miscellaneous

• Conference on Disarmament, Highest platform of the UN on disarmament issues. It has 65
members and it works through consensus
• January United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA): UNODA was established
in 1998 as the Department for Disarmament Affairs which was part of the SG’s programme
for reform in accordance with his report to the General Assembly (A/51/950). It was
originally established in 1982 upon the recommendation of the General Assembly’s second
special session on disarmament (SSOD II).
• In 1992, its name was changed to Centre for Disarmament Affairs, under the Department of
Political Affairs. At the end of 1997, it was renamed Department for Disarmament Affairs
and in 2007, it became the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.
3.7.1. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
• Formed in 1997, the OPCW is an independent, autonomous international organisation
with a working relationship with the United Nations.
• OPCW is the implementing body of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which
entered into force in 1997. Its headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands
• It has 192 Member States, who are working together to achieve a world free of chemical
weapons.
• To this end, the Convention contains four key provisions:
o destroying all existing chemical weapons under international verification by the OPCW;
o monitoring chemical industry to prevent new weapons from re-emerging;
o providing assistance and protection to States Parties against chemical threats; and
o fostering international cooperation to strengthen implementation of the Convention
and promote the peaceful use of chemistry.
• for their "extensive work to eliminate chemical weapons", the OPCW was awarded the
Noble Peace Prize in 2013
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3.8. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

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• IAEA is an international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear
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energy, and to inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons.
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• The IAEA was established as an autonomous organisation on 29 July 1957.

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• Though established independently of the United Nations through its own

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international treaty, the IAEA Statute, the IAEA reports to both the United Nations General
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Assembly and Security Council.

• The IAEA has its headquarters in Vienna. The IAEA has two "Regional Safeguards Offices"
which are located in Toronto, Canada, and in Tokyo, Japan.
• It has 169 member states
• The IAEA serves as an intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in
the peaceful use of nuclear technology and nuclear power worldwide.
• Three main pillars – or areas of work – underpin the IAEA's mission:
o Safety and Security;
o Science and Technology; and
o Safeguards and Verification.
• The IAEA has three main bodies: The Board of Governors, the General Conference, and
the Secretariat.

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3.9. Nuclear Security Summit

• The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) is a world summit, aimed at preventing nuclear
terrorism around the globe.
• The first Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, DC in 2010, and was followed
by additional Summits in Seoul in 2012 and The Hague in 2014. The fourth summit was held
in Washington, D.C. on March 31–April 1, 2016.
• In 2009, U.S. President Obama delivered a speech in Prague in which he called nuclear
terrorism one of the greatest threats to international security.
• Under the NSS process, countries work to improve their nuclear security on the basis of
the Washington Work Plan, which contains numerous measures and action points.
• The NSS process is ongoing, and since 2009 has required world leaders and diplomats to
devote extra attention to the issue of nuclear security.
• The negotiators for the various countries, known as sherpas and sous sherpas, discuss the
progress made and confer on key themes, work plans and measures.
• Gift basket diplomacy is an approach to multilateral negotiation aimed at pushing forward
progress on a particular issue without the requirement of consensus.
• The United States first implemented a policy of Gift Basket Diplomacy between the 2010
and 2012 Summits.
• These Summits have achieved tangible improvements in the security of nuclear materials
and stronger international institutions that support nuclear security.
3.10. Terrorism
• The Global Terrorism Index 2017 released by the Australia-based Institute for Economics
and Peace provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in
terrorism over the last 17 years in covering the period from the beginning of 2000 to the
end of 2016.
• India, which ranks eighth on the list.
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• India displaced Pakistan on a list of countries facing terror attacks in 2016, with higher
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fatalities and injuries than its restive neighbour, according to data compiled by the US state
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department.
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• Out of 11,072 terror attacks in 2016 worldwide, India bore the brunt of 927, 16% more than
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2015 (798).
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• The number of deaths in India also rose 17% from 289 in 2015 to 337 in 2016while the
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number of injured increased from 500 in 2015 to 636 last year. On the other hand, the
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number of terror attacks in Pakistan reduced by 27% to 734 in 2016 from 1,010 in 2015.
3.10.1. International Efforts
• Key difficulty has been in defining terrorism for common action.
• The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy on 8
September 2006.
• Through its adoption that all Member States have agreed the first time to a common
strategic and operational approach to fight terrorism, not only sending a clear message that
terrorism is unacceptable in all its forms and manifestation but also resolving to take
practical steps individually and collectively to prevent and combat it.
• Those practical steps include a wide array of measures ranging from strengthening state
capacity to counter terrorist threats to better coordinating United Nations system’s counter-
terrorism activities.
• 2016 marked the 10th anniversary of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

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3.10.2. Four Pillars of Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

• The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the form of a resolution and an annexed Plan of
Action (A/RES/60/288) composed of 4 pillars:
o Addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism
o Measures to prevent and combat terrorism
o Measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen
the role of the United Nations system in that regard;
o Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the
fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism.
3.10.3. Key UN Steps
• Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, contained in the annex
to General Assembly resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994,
• the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism, contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 51/210 of
17 December 1996, and
• the 2005 World Summit Outcome, in particular its section on terrorism.
3.10.4. Security Council Counter Terrorism Committee
• Guided by Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), the CTC works to
bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to prevent terrorist acts both within
their borders and across regions.
• It was established in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States.
• In addition to the Counter-Terrorism Committee and CTED, the Council has established:
o the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989
(2011) and 2253 (2015) and its Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring
Team concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and
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entities; and
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o the Non-proliferation Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution

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1540 (2004) and its Expert Group.

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o The Council also established a Working Group on the victims of terrorism, pursuant to
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its resolution 1566 (2004).

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3.10.5. Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism

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• Proposed first by India in 1996. There are at least 14 conventions on terrorism.

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• CCIT provides a legal framework which makes it binding on all signatories to deny funds and
safe havens to terrorist groups. Its Objectives are
o To have a universal definition of terrorism that all 193-members of the UNGA will adopt
into their own criminal law
o To ban all terror groups and shut down terror camps
o To prosecute all terrorists under special laws
o to make cross-border terrorism an extraditable offence worldwide
• the completion of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism is in a limbo
due to opposition from the US and OIC countries as well as Latin American countries.
• All three have objections over the “definition of terrorism” (the most divisive of the issues)
and seek exclusions to safeguard their strategic interests. For example, the OIC wants
exclusion of national liberation movements, especially in the context of Israel-Palestinian
conflict. The US wanted the draft to exclude acts committed by military forces of states
during peacetime.

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• The CCIT is currently being discussed at the Sixth Ad Hoc Committee of the United Nations.
The committee is the primary forum for the consideration of legal questions in the UNGA.
• India, on its part, has lobbied overtime, especially with the OIC countries and GCC.
3.10.6. Key Conventions
• Although consensus eludes towards adoption of the terrorism convention, but discussions
have yielded three separate protocols that aim to tackle terrorism:
• International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted on 15
December 1997;
• International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted on 9
December 1999;
• and International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted on
13 April 2005.
3.10.7. Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
• The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established in July 1989 by a Group of Seven (G-
7) Summit in Paris, initially to examine and develop measures to combat money laundering.
It is an intergovernmental body with 37 members including India. Israel and Saudi Arabia
are its observer members.
• Its objectives are to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal,
regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing
and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system.
• The FATF is therefore a “policy-making body” which works to generate the necessary
political will to bring about national legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas.
• The FATF has developed a series of Recommendations that are recognised as the
international standard for combating of money laundering and the financing of terrorism
and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They form the basis for a co-ordinated
response to these threats to the integrity of the financial system and help ensure a level
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playing field. First issued in 1990, the FATF Recommendations were revised in 1996, 2001,
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2003 and most recently in 2012 to ensure that they remain up to date and relevant, and
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they are intended to be of universal application.

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• The FATF monitors the progress of its members in implementing necessary measures,
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reviews money laundering and terrorist financing techniques and counter-measures and
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promotes the adoption and implementation of appropriate measures globally.

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• In collaboration with other international stakeholders, the FATF works to identify national-
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level vulnerabilities with the aim of protecting the international financial system from
misuse.
• The FATF's decision making body, the FATF Plenary, meets three times per year.
4. Humanitarian Issues: Human Rights/Migration/

Refugees
4.1. Human Rights
Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality,
ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status. Human rights include the right to life and
liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to work
and education, and many more. Everyone is entitled to these rights, without discrimination.
• International human rights law lays down the obligations of Governments to act in certain
ways or to refrain from certain acts, in order to promote and protect human rights and
fundamental freedoms of individuals or groups.

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• The foundations of this body of law are the Charter of the United Nations (1945) and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948).
• The UDHR, together with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its
two Optional Protocols (on the complaints procedure and on the death penalty) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its Optional Protocol,
form the so-called International Bill of Human Rights.
• A series of international human rights treaties and other instruments adopted since 1945
have expanded the body of international human rights law.
o They include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (1948),
o the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(1965),
o the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(1979),
o the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and
o the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006), among others.
4.1.1. Human Rights Council
• The Human Rights Council, established on 15 March 2006 by the General Assembly and
reporting directly to it, replaced the 60-year-old UN Commission on Human Rights as the
key UN intergovernmental body responsible for human rights.
• The Council is made up of 47 State representatives and is tasked with strengthening the
promotion and protection of human rights around the globe by addressing situations of
human rights violations and making recommendations on them, including responding to
human rights emergencies.
• The most innovative feature of the Human Rights Council is the Universal Periodic Review.
This unique mechanism involves a review of the human rights records of all 192 UN
member states once every four years. The Review is a cooperative, state-driven process,
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under the auspices of the Council, which provides the opportunity for each state to
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present measures taken and challenges to be met to improve the human rights situation
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in their country and to meet their international obligations. The Review is designed to
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ensure universality and equality of treatment for every country.

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• UN High Commissioner for Human Rights principal responsibility for UN human rights
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activities. The High Commissioner is mandated to respond to serious violations of human

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rights and to undertake preventive action.

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• The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is the focal point for
United Nations human rights activities. It serves as the secretariat for the Human Rights
Council, the treaty bodies (expert committees that monitor treaty compliance) and other
UN human rights organs. It also undertakes human rights field activities.
4.2. Migration/Refugees
• The term migrant applies to anyone moving from one country to another with the
intention to stay in that place for some period of time.
• A refugee is someone who is outside of their home country who cannot return to their
home country because there is a real chance that they will be seriously harmed for
reason of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or because they belong to a
particular social group.
• An asylum seeker is someone who says he or she is a refugee, but whose claim has not yet
been definitively evaluated, has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution, serious human rights violations and other serious harm.

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• All asylum seekers are potential refugees until their case has been determined by UNHCR
or government.
• Internally displaced persons (IDP), While they may have fled for similar reasons, IDPs stay
within their own country and remain under the protection of its government, even if that
government is the reason for their displacement. As a result, these people are among the
most vulnerable in the world.
• A “stateless person” is someone who is not considered as a national by any state under
the operation of its law.
• The 1951 Refugee Convention is the key legal document in this context. Ratified by 145
State parties,
o it defines the term ‘refugee’ and
o outlines the rights of the displaced,
o as well as the legal obligations of States to protect them.
• UN’s 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees, in response to mass persecutions
and displacements of the Second World War. It defines a refugee as someone outside the
country of their nationality and is unable to return to their home country because of well
founded fears of being persecuted.
• UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) serves as the ‘guardian’ of the 1951
Convention and its 1967 Protocol.
• International law recognises only those fleeing conflict and violence as refugees.
• While more than 50 percent of refugees are in cities, often the first stop for a person
fleeing his conflict is a refugee camp, these are temporary structures usually run by the
United Nations Refugee Agency or local governments, until inhabitants can safely return
back to their homes or rehabilitated in the host country or resettle in another country.
• Resettlement and long term integration options are limited so many refugees are left with
no choice but to stay in the refugee camps for years or decades.
• Once in a new country the first legal step for a displaced person is to apply for asylum.
• At this time they are asylum seekers and not officially recognised as refugees until their
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application is processed.
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While countries by and large agree on one definition of a refugee, every host country is
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responsible for examining all requests for asylum and deciding whether applicants can be
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granted the status of refugee.

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Guidelines of different countries can vary substantially. India is not a signatory of either
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the Convention of 1951 or its 1967 protocol. Host countries have certain duties towards
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treatment and non-discrimination.

• The most basic obligation towards refugees is non-refoulement, a principle preventing a
state from sending an individual back to a country where their life and freedom are
threatened. In realty refugees are often victim of inconsistent and discriminatory
treatment. They are often not permitted to enter the workforce and are fully dependent on
humanitarian aid.
• Roughly half the world's refugee are children.
• Many refugee children are out of school due to lack of funding for education programme

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UNHCR Key Figures
Image Source:
http://www.unhcr.org/images/infographics/(English)_FiguresAtAGlance_Infographic(4JULY2017)_StaffNumberUpdate.png
4.2.1. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
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• UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, established on December 14, 1950 by the United Nations
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General Assembly, is a global organization dedicated to saving lives, protecting rights and
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building a better future for refugees, forcibly displaced communities and stateless people.
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UNHCR is governed by the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council
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(ECOSOC).
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The High Commissioner is responsible for the direction and control of UNHCR. Elected by
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the UN General Assembly for a five year term.

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• The UNHCR Executive Committee approves the agency's biennial programmes and the
corresponding budget. These are presented by the High Commissioner, who is appointed by
the UN General Assembly.
• Its mandate is defined by the 1950 UNHCR Statute. In 2003, the General Assembly
extended the organization's mandate "until the refugee problem is solved." The High
Commissioner reports annually to ECOSOC and the General Assembly on the work of
UNHCR.
• It has10,966 national and international staff working in 130 countries.
• Its headquarters is in Geneva, Switzerland.
4.2.2. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA)
• Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, UNRWA was established by United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 to carry out direct relief and
works programmes for Palestine refugees. The Agency began operations on 1 May 1950.
• UNRWA is funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions from UN Member States.

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• UNRWA also receives some funding from the Regular Budget of the United Nations, which
is used mostly for international staffing costs.
• The Agency’s services encompass education, health care, relief and social services, camp
infrastructure and improvement, microfinance and emergency assistance, including in
times of armed conflict.
• UNRWA is one of the largest United Nations programmes, with over 30,000 personnel
working across five areas of operations and is unique in that it delivers services directly to
beneficiaries.
• UNRWA Headquarters are located in Amman and in Gaza.
4.2.3. The Rohingya Issue
• The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), places the Rohingya’s among the “the most
vulnerable groups of the forcibly displaced”.
• Rohingya are an ethnic group, largely comprising Muslims, who predominantly live in the
Western Myanmar province of Rakhine. They speak a dialect of Bengali, as opposed to the
commonly spoken Burmese language.
• Myanmar considers them as persons who migrated to their land during the Colonial rule.
• So, it has not granted Rohingyas full citizenship. According the 1982 Burmese citizenship
law, a Rohingya (or any ethnic minority) is eligible for citizenship only if he/she provides
proof that his/her ancestors have lived in the country prior to 1823.
• Else, they are classified as “resident foreigners” or as “associate citizens” (even if one of
the parent is a Myanmar citizen).
• Myanmar state, which was ruled by the military junta until 2011, has been accused of
ethnic cleansing in Rakhine by the United Nations.
• It deported thousands of Rohingya to Bangladesh in the seventies and the citizenship law
was also enacted by the junta.
• Things changed little for the Rohingya even after the political reforms in 2011 that
eventually led to the first general elections in 2015, as the democratically-elected
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government-headed by President Htin Kyaw has been unwilling to grant citizenship.

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Sectarian violence between Rohingyas and Rakhine’s Buddhist natives began flaring up in
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June 2012, following the rape and murder of a Rakhine woman in a Rohingya-dominated
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locality
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Another round of riots broke out in October, due to which the government moved around
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a million Rohingyas to refugee camps. Thousands of Rohingyas fled their homes and
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sought refugee in neighbouring Bangladesh, a Muslim-majority nation. Some of them

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sought asylum in South East Asian nations of Thailand, The Phillipines, Indonesia and
Malaysia
• This ethnic conflict flared up as religious violence spreading to the other provinces of
Myanmar. It was finally contained in 2013 after military intervention.
4.2.3.1. Current Status: 2017
• Muslim militants in Myanmar staged a coordinated attack on 30 police posts and an army
base in Rakhine state on August 25.
• The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), a group previously known as Harakah al-
Yaqin, which instigated the October attacks, claimed responsibility for the attacks. In the
counter attacks launched by Army at least 59 of the insurgents and 12 security personnel
were killed.
• The ARSA is an armed guerilla outfit, which is active since 2016, claiming to fight for a
“democratic Muslim state for the Rohingya.” The group has been targeting Myanmar armed
forces. Bangladesh and India have also claimed ARSA is creating trouble in their soil too.

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• The “clearance operations” to root out ARSA launched by the Myanmar military has once
again affected the lives of Rohingya, many of whom have been living in relief camps since
2012.
• An estimated 87,000 Rohingya have fled Myanmar to Bangladesh since late 2016.
• About five lakh Rohingyas have already taken shelter in Bangladesh over the last two
decades and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is clearly unwilling to take in more.
• She has even urged the United States to put pressure on Myanmar to stop the exodus of
Rohingyas.
• The country has opened its border for Rohingyas upon UNHCR’s request and continues to
shelter Rohingya in over-crowded refugee camps at Cox Bazar.
4.2.3.2. India and the Rohingya Issue
• According to the Ministry of Home Affairs there are approximately 40,000 Rohingyas
living in India. They have reportedly reached India from Bangladesh through the land route
over the years.
• Home Ministry in an advisory to states said “infiltration from Rakhine State of Myanmar
into Indian territory…besides being burden on the limited resources of the country also
aggravates the security challenges posed to the country.”
• December 2017, socio-economic MoU, woth US$ 25 milllion, with Myanmar to help in the
Rakhine province.
• India is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol and does not have
a national refugee protection framework.
• However, it continues to grant asylum to a large number of refugees from neighbouring
States and respects UNHCR’s mandate for other nationals, mainly from Afghanistan and
Myanmar.
• While the Government of India deals differently with various refugee groups, in general it
respects the principle of for holders of UNHCR documentation.
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4.2.4. International Organisation for Migration (IOM)

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• Established in 1951, IOM is the leading inter-governmental organization in the field of

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migration and works closely with governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental

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partners.
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It was initially established in 1951, as the Intergovernmental Committee for European

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Migration (ICEM). In 2016, it became a related organization of the United Nations

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• With 169 member states, a further 8 states holding observer status and offices in over 100
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countries, IOM is dedicated to promoting humane and orderly migration for the benefit of
all. It does so by providing services and advice to governments and migrants.
• Its headquarters is in Geneva, Switzerland. Among its publications is the WORLD
MIGRATION REPORT-2018.
5. Key Issues/Conflicts
5.1. The North Korean Issue
• Over the past year, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has accelerated his country’s rush
toward nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles.
• Kim Jong-un is the third supreme leader in the Kim dynasty, founded by his grandfather Kim
il-Sung, the country's leader at the time of its establishment. Kim Jong-un took over from
his father Kim Jong-il when he died from a heart attack in December 2011.
• North Korea’s isolated dictators have long believed that nuclear weapons will ensure
regime survival against U.S. military power, enabling it to unite the Korean Peninsula on its

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terms. Successive U.S. Administrations have tried various strategies to thwart the
dangerous trajectory of the regime.
• North Korea has made development, deployment and the capability to deliver nuclear
weapons a national aspiration. With its accelerating intercontinental ballistic missile
program, it has made clear that it seeks a capacity to strike targets far from the Korean
Peninsula, namely the continental U.S.
• In the region South Korea and Japan are wary of growing belligerence of North Korea,
both these countries are allies of the United States.
• In October 1994 North Korea and the US sign an Agreed Framework under which
Pyongyang commited to freezing its nuclear programme in return for heavy fuel oil and
two light-water nuclear reactors.
• In January 2002 - US President George W Bush labels North Korea, Iraq and Iran an "axis of
evil" for continuing to build "weapons of mass destruction".
• In 2003 North Korea exited the NPT which it has joined in 1985.
• 2003 also marked the beginning of six-party talks involving China, the Koreas, the US,
Japan and Russia to try to resolve the nuclear issue.
• In October 2006 North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapons test at an underground
facility. The UN imposed economic and commercial sanctions on North Korea.
• In July 2007 North Korea shut down its main Yongbyon reactor after receiving 50,000 tons
of heavy fuel oil as part of an aid package.
• In May 2009 North Korea carried out its second underground nuclear test. UN Security
Council condemns move in June.
• In February 2013 UN approved fresh sanctions after North Korea stages its third nuclear
test, said to be more powerful than the 2009 test.
• 2014 March - North Korea test-fired two medium-range Rodong ballistic missiles for the
first time since 2009,
• In December 2015 - US imposed new sanctions on North Korea over weapons
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proliferation, targeting the army's Strategic Rocket Force, banks and shipping companies.
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In November 2016 UN Security Council further tightend sanctions by aiming to cut one of
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North Korea's main exports, coal, by 60 per cent.

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• China announced its plan to implement the UN sanctions against North Korea agreed
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earlier this month, banning imports of coal, minerals and sea food.
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• In January 2018 First talks in two years between North and South Koreas show signs of a
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thaw after heightened tension. The North said it will send a team to the Winter Olympics
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in the South.
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• In March 2018, it was announced by the South Korea’s national security director Chung
Eui-yong that Kim Jong Un wished to meet US President Donald Trump. The Invitation
was accepted by President Trump.
• If the meeting takes place it would be the first ever between leaders of the two countries.
Pyongyang has long sought a summit with the US to reflect what the regime sees as its
status as a regional military power. Bill Clinton came close to agreeing to a meeting with
Kim’s father, Kim Jong-il, in 2000, but arrangements had not been made by the time he left
office in January 2001.
5.1.1. Why is North Korean Nuclear Capability a Concern
• India, Israel and Pakistan developed and tested nuclear weapons with little international
reaction. Why can’t North Korea do the same?
• The answer lies in the essence of the North Korean state:
o North Korea has little interest in being a member of the international community,
o It does not belive in having allies or in collective security.

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o Its trade linkages are limited to a series of bargaining transactions, and

o It does not pay heed to international standards of behavior.
• Some argue that North Korea wants nuclear weapons for regime security, an analysis that
would suggest that North Korea is simply warning predatory states to stay away or else.
• However, North Korea’s contempt for its neighbors suggests that it would hold them
hostage with its nuclear weapons. North Korea notoriously threatened to reduce South
Korea’s capital city to a “sea of fire.” Such a threat takes on new meaning when a country
holds nuclear weapons.
5.1.2. India and North Korea
• North Korea is on relatively friendly terms with India, with both states maintaining
embassies in their respective capital cities.
• While India is a critic of North Korea’s aim of becoming a nuclear power, the country still
exports millions of dollars worth of goods to the hermit state every year.
• A BBC survey in 2014 revealed almost one-quarter of all Indians believe North Korea is
having a positive impact on the world.
• In recent months the US has been pushing for India to cut ties with North Korea.
• Minister for External Affairs Sushma Swaraj has argued India only conducted “minimal”
trade with North Korea and its embassy staff had already been pared down in recent
years.
• And in April 2017, in line with UN sanctions due to North Korea’s nuclear tests, India
banned almost all trade with the North Korea.
• But in 2017 India refused to shut down its embassy, which is located in Pyongyang, a move
which angered the US.
• As per the Directorate General of Foreign Trade, India’s export to North Korea was $76.52
million and import stood at $132.53 million in 2014-15. While India largely exported
oilmeals, cotton yarn and machinery, Pyongyang exported iron and steel.
• From $209.05 million, the bilateral came down $130.38 million in 2016-17.
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• In April, India banned all trade with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), except
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for food and medicine – in line with United Nations Security Council sanctions.
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• In September 2017, India endorsed the BRICS Xiamen declaration which called for a
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“direct dialogue” involved in the Korean Peninsula crisis.

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5.2. The Syrian Issue

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Syria has been engaged in civil war since 2011, with different groups trying to seize control
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of the country.
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• The trouble began in 2011 in the Syrian city of Deraa.

• In July 2012, the International Red Cross said the violence in Syria had become so
widespread that it was in a state of civil war.
• The fighting is between:
o Soldiers who support the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, supported by Russia and
Iran
o fighters known as rebels, who don't want Assad to be in power anymore, and
o the group that call themselves the Islamic State.
• The group, called the opposition, who want the president to step down is made up of
several kinds of people. These include groups of rebel fighters, political parties who
disagree with Assad, and those living in exile who cannot return to the country.
• According to the United Nations (UN), almost five million Syrians have had to leave the
country. Many have gone to neighbouring countries, like Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey or Iraq.
Six million more people have tried to find safety elsewhere in Syria as internally displaced
people.

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• Many refugees made the decision to try to reach Europe. This is because some countries in
Europe said they would accept refugees who wanted to start a new life here.
• More than 400,000 people have been killed in this civil war.
• In August 2013, it was reported that chemical weapons were used in the war in Syria,
which caused anger around the world. Both the rebels and the Syrian government denied
that they were responsible.
• In September 2013, Russia and the US reached an agreement which said the Syrian
government should give up its chemical weapons and destroy them so they can never
again be used. This was important as Russia and the US support different sides in the Syrian
war.
• The process of destroying the weapons began in October 2013 and the people working on
this project, monitors from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize later that month.
• But in April 2017, there was reportedly another chemical weapons attack on a town in
north-west Syria, which killed and injured many people. This was denied by the Syrian
government as well as Russia.
• The US has responded with military action by carrying out missile attacks on Syria, which
the UK has said it supports.
• IS had taken over large parts of Iraq and then moved into eastern Syria. In the chaos of
the war they were able to gain land and power there too.
• Raqqa was the first big city captured by IS in Syria in early 2014. The group went on take
over large parts of the country towards Aleppo in the north, and along the Turkish border.
• In 2017 an alliance of Syrian Kurdish and Arab fighters, backed by America, took back the
city of Raqqa in the north-west from IS.
• In December 2017, President Vladimir Putin of Russia declared victory in Syria and
announced partial withdrawal from Syria.
5.2.1. India and Syria
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India has a number of interests and values which underpin its position on Syria.
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• Opposition to foreign intervention and support for state sovereignty (regardless of regime
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type) are long-held principles that by default make India’s position favorable to the Assad
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government.
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• These principles are underpinned by anti-colonialism, Third World solidarity, interest in

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preventing foreign intervention in Kashmir, and cultural values such as pluralism, non-
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violence (at the interstate level) and tolerance. India can justify not criticizing Russia’s
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involvement as this was at the invitation of the Assad regime.

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• Delhi also has major interests in stability in the Middle East given its increased
dependency on oil and gas imports.
• A clean victory for the rebels in Syria will give a morale boost to certain other regional
insurgents, potentially causing further instability.
• India had to, along with its consortium partners, abandon oil investments due to security
concerns in 2013.
• Instability also threatens India’s migrant workers.
• The risk of radicalisation through actors such as the ISIS is also a key concern.
• India has abstained from most UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on Syria—and
having supported one Arab League sponsored resolution.
• India—along with other BRICS states—resolutely opposes the regime change narrative
• India believes that societies cannot be re-ordered from outside and that people in all
countries have the right to choose their own destiny and decide their own future. In line
with this, India supports an all-inclusive Syrian-led process to chart out the future of Syria,
its political structures and leadership.

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5.3. Yemen Conflict

• Yemen’s history is marked by foreign interventions that have failed to reckon with the
complexity of the country’s politics. In the nineteen-seventies, the country was divided into
South Yemen and North Yemen.
• In 1978, Ali Abdullah Saleh, took power in the North, when the two Yemens unified, in
1990, it was under Saleh’s leadership.
• The conflict has its roots in the failure of a political transition supposed to bring stability to
Yemen following an Arab Spring uprising that forced its longtime authoritarian president,
Ali Abdullah Saleh, to hand over power to his deputy Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, in 2011.
• Disillusioned with the transition, many ordinary Yemenis - including Sunnis - supported
the Houthis and in late 2014 and early 2015, the rebels took over Sanaa.
• Yemen’s most recent conflict began in early 2015, when Houthi rebels, from the country’s
northern highlands, overran Sana’a and a Saudi-led coalition began bombing them.
• Coalition ground troops landed in Aden in August 2015 and helped drive the Houthis and
their allies out of much of the south over the next few months.
• The Houthi movement takes its name from the Houthi family, whose home province,
Saada, in the north of Yemen, has always enjoyed a degree of autonomy. They are Zaydi
Shias.
• The Houthis allied with a former President Saleh and co-opted tribal networks in an effort
to solidify and expand their power. They have received the Support of Iran.
• The Saudi coalition is made up of nine Middle Eastern and African countries, and is
supported by the United States.
• Yet the U.S. and Great Britain have continued to support the coalition, mainly with
weapons sales and logistical help.
• The launch of a ballistic missile towards Riyadh in November 2017 prompted the Saudi-led
coalition to tighten its blockade of Yemen.
• The coalition said it wanted to halt the smuggling of weapons to the rebels by Iran - an
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accusation Tehran denied - but the UN said the restrictions could trigger "the largest
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famine the world has seen for many decades".

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• Although the coalition eased its restrictions on rebel-held ports after several weeks, the
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extended closures resulted in a sharp increase in prices of basic commodities, accelerating

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food insecurity and the collapse of already basic services.

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• In Novemebr 2017, Mr Saleh offered to "turn a new page" with the Saudi-led coalition if it
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stopped attacking Yemen and ended its blockade. The Houthis responded by accusing him
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of a "coup" against "an alliance he never believed in".

• In December 2017 it was announced that Mr Saleh had been killed in an attack on his
convoy as he attempted to flee the capital.
5.3.1. Implications
• Almost three years of fighting appears to have entrenched both sides, while three UN-
organised efforts to negotiate a peace deal have failed.
• The situation in Yemen is, the UN says, the world's worst man-made humanitarian
disaster.
• More than 9,245 people have been killed and 52,800 injured since March 2015, the
UN says.
• At least 5,558 of those killed, and 9,065 of those injured up to 14 December 2017
were civilians. Saudi-led coalition air strikes were the leading cause of overall civilian
casualties.
• According to the UN Human Rights Council, civilians have repeatedly been the victims
of "unrelenting violations of international humanitarian law".

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• What happens in Yemen can greatly exacerbate regional tensions. It also worries the West
because of the threat of attacks emanating from the country as it becomes more unstable.
• The conflict between the Houthis and the government is also seen as part of a regional
power struggle between Shia-ruled Iran and Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia.
• Jihadist militants from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and rival affiliates of the
Islamic State group (IS) have taken advantage of the chaos by seizing territory in the
south and carrying out deadly attacks, notably in Aden.
• Yemen is strategically important because it sits on the Bab al-Mandab strait, a narrow
waterway linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden, through which much of the world's oil
shipments pass.
5.3.2. India
• Delhi’s immediate focus is naturally on evacuating its citizens in the region. It completed
Operation Rahat In 2015. In a matter of days, the Navy, the Air Force, and Air India were
able to rescue thousands of Indians from the heart of Yemen’s war-zone, in an effort
coordinated by the Ministry of External Affairs.
• The government showed magnanimity by rescuing non-Indians of about 17 nationalities,
including Pakistan, a gesture reciprocated by Pakistani forces.
• Until there is a UN mandate for the external intervention in Yemen, it will serve India’s
citizens better if the government retains its impartiality on events in the region, which is
ridden with fault-lines. Stability and regional security remains a chief concern for India in a
region that is significant for it.
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LECTURE-16
THE DIASPORA
Contents
1. The Diaspora: Indian’s Around the World .............................................................................. 278
1.1. Defining the Diaspora...................................................................................................... 278
1.1.1. Pattern...................................................................................................................... 278
1.2. Indian Diaspora: Characteristics ...................................................................................... 278
1.3. Waves of Migrations: The Old and New Diaspora........................................................... 279
1.3.1. The Old Diaspora ...................................................................................................... 280
1.3.2. The New Diaspora .................................................................................................... 280
1.3.3. The Gulf Diaspora: The Persian Gulf Countries ........................................................ 282
1.4. Status, Success and Future .............................................................................................. 282
1.5. Issues and Challenges ..................................................................................................... 283
1.5.1. Rights and Changing Policies in Gulf ........................................................................ 283

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1.5.2. Protectionism and Nationalist Sentiments in USA ................................................... 284

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1.5.3. Xenophobia and Violence ........................................................................................ 284

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1.5.4. Ethnic Ties in the Old Diaspora Countries ................................................................ 284

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1.6. The Future ....................................................................................................................... 285

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1.7. Government Policy and Steps ......................................................................................... 285
1.8. What Needs to Be Done? ................................................................................................ 286
1.9. The Overseas Citizen of India .......................................................................................... 286

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1. The Diaspora: Indian’s Around the World

There are 31.2 million people of Indian origin around the world out of this about 13 million are
Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) and about 17 million are NRIs. This Diaspora is a diverse group
both economically, historically and in terms of qualifications. Nonetheless, this group is a
strategic asset for India and is often considered to be the unofficial ambassadors of India in
their host countries. They contribute resources, advocate India’s cause and contribute to the
development of their own country thus generating goodwill for India. Remittances sent by the
Indian Diaspora accounts for 3 percent of the GDP.
1.1. Defining the Diaspora

Migration, a fundamentally essential ingredient of global social change, is a phenomenon that
has been taking place for thousands of years and continues to take place all over the world.
In earlier periods, people migrated from one place to another in search of food, shelter, and
safety from persecution. Today, people tend to migrate in search of better career
opportunities and better quality of life.
1.1.1. Pattern
a) Ancient and Medieval migration to colonial powers.
b) Migration to the industrial nations immediately after World War II.
c) Recent migration to developed countries for better career opportunities and better living
condition, where the Internet, affordable airfare, and cheap communications help to
maintain close ties with one’s homeland for people migrating to these countries.
Diaspora is a word of Greek origin that means scattering or sowing of seeds. It is used to refer
to people who leave their native lands to live in other parts of the world for employment,
business or any other purpose.
The term originally referred to the dispersion of Jews after their exile from Babylon in the 6th
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Century BC, and later to describe all the Jewish people scattered in exile outside Palestine.
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Today, the word has evolved to classify any group of people who are dispersed or scattered
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away from their home country with a distinct collective memory and a myth of return.
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1.2. Indian Diaspora: Characteristics

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Indian Diaspora is a generic term used for addressing people who have migrated from the
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territories that are currently within the borders of the Republic of India. It constitutes NRIs
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(Non-resident Indians) and PIOs (Persons of Indian origins). The Indian Diaspora is estimated
to be over 31 million. The Government of India recognizes the importance of Indian Diaspora
as it has brought economic, financial, and strategic benefits to India. The Indian Diaspora
today constitutes an important, and in some respects unique, force in world culture. A Diaspora
is also characterized by the role played collective memory in preserving history and culture.
Thus one can find the Indian Diaspora is characterized by the following:
1. It maintains family traditions of origin, but also is gradually subject to social, cultural, and
political integration into the host nation.
2. It is acutely aware of Indian (and regional) origins, but do not go much further than a
sympathetic curiosity about them. However, our personal identity is significantly affected
by that awareness.
3. It takes an active interest in the general fate of India, and in important events in India.
4. It perpetuates significant aspects of Indian culture like language, tradition, and religion. For
example:

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• Most speak Hindi, as well as our mother tongues like Telugu, Gujarati, etc.
• Maintains tradition for weddings, birth and cremations etc.
• Maintain religions like Hinduism, Sikhism, Islam, and other India based religions.
5. It maintains regular communications with family and friends in India.
6. It sends remittances back home on a regular basis. India is number one in the world with
over $69 billion in annual remittances constituting 3 percent of the GDP.
7. It attempts to influence our host country’s government to pursue policies favorable to India.
For example, the intense lobbying by the Indian diaspora in the US that persuaded a
recalcitrant US Senate to approve the Nuclear Treaty a few years ago.
From the 1920s onward, the Indian nationalist movement had acknowledged and lauded the
contribution of overseas Indians to the struggle for freedom. After all, the “Father of the
Nation,” Mohandas K. Gandhi, had been prominent in the Diaspora and had begun his
experiments with civil disobedience movements while in South Africa.
1.3. Waves of Migrations: The Old and New Diaspora

The history of migration from India dates back at least two thousand years. The first migration
from modern-day India took place at around the time of the reign of Emperor Kanishka
(around the 1st century AD). This group was the Romani people, now known all around the
world as “gypsies”, from what today is the Indian state of Rajasthan. They emigrated from India
towards the northwest and eventually settled in Eastern Europe.
Another major migration from the Indian subcontinent started in around 500 AD, when a
group emigrated to Southeast Asia. The Cholas, a great naval power, conquered what is today
Indonesia and Malaysia as well as the so-called ‘Indianized’ kingdoms of Southeast Asia. The
influence of Indian culture is still felt strongly in Southeast Asia. This is particularly evident
amongst the royal Brahmins kings of Thailand, the archeological wonders of the Angkor
Kingdoms of Cambodia, and in Indonesia, especially in Central Sumatra and Bali.
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However, in all these early migrations, the label of “Indian Diaspora” is not applied to the
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descendants of those emigrants who left India many centuries ago. The intermixing of these
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groups with the local population over the centuries has been so great that they eliminated all
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traces of such “Indian” identity. Therefore, these people are no longer considered PIOs (“People
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of Indian Origin”).
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However, over the past two centuries, India has achieved arguably the most diverse and
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complex migration histories, forming the Modern Indian Diaspora. Spread across all six
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continents and 125 countries, it is estimated that about 31 million people now comprise the
Indian Diaspora.
The characteristics of this diversified group vary to an astonishing degree – yet all are part of
the same Indian Diaspora. It varies to such an extent that it is defined in three subsets of our
Diaspora:
• the Old Diaspora,
• the New Diaspora, and
• the Gulf Diaspora.
However, there is one consistent theme to all three categories. They were, and continue to be,
created by a labor migration – unskilled labor starting two centuries ago, and highly skilled
labor after the mid-1960s.

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1.3.1. The Old Diaspora

The first wave of the Indian Diaspora is what we call the “Old Diaspora.” It began during the
early 19th century and continued until the end of the British Raj.
Britain abolished slavery in 1833 and other colonial powers such as France, the Netherlands,
and Portugal followed suit. Without the labor of African slaves, their colonies then desperately
needed manpower to work the sugar and rubber plantations. To meet this demand, the British
established the system of “Indentured Labor Migration” from the Indian subcontinent.
In 1834, Britain began exporting bonded Indian labor to Mauritius. The Dutch and French
replicated the British system and also exported Indian workers to their colonies.
Conditions of absolute poverty in many parts of India, in addition to the prospect of gaining
wealth overseas, motivated Indians to sell themselves and become bonded laborers. The
conditions on these journeys were extremely difficult. Mortality was high on British, Dutch and
French boats from the sub-continent to these colonies.
1.3.1.2. The Plantations in Islands
Workers for plantations in Mauritius, Suriname, Trinidad and Fiji arrived mainly from the
present-day states of Bihar and UP. In Guyana and East Africa, laborers originated primarily
from Punjab and Gujarat. Given the proximity of Tamil Nadu to French possessions in India like
Pondicherry, the workers in most French colonies, such as Guadeloupe, Martinique, and La
Reunion, were Tamils. The majority of these migrants were males. This brutal indenture system
lasted until World War I, abolished in 1916-1917. By that time, more than 1.5 million Indians
had been shipped to colonies in the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia.
1.3.1.3. Labour in South East Asia
However, during roughly the same period, another form of labor migration developed. Tapping
into the labor surplus of South India, mostly in the modern-day Indian state of Tamil Nadu, the
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Colonial bosses of tea, coffee, and rubber plantations in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Burma
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authorized Indian headmen to recruit entire families and ship them to plantations. About five
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million Indians, mostly poor Tamils, migrated to these three countries until the system was
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abolished just prior to World War II. Today, Malaysia and Singapore have local Indians who
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comprise 7 and 9.1 % of the total population respectively, and are seen as a minority in both.
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Around that same time, merchants and traders from Gujarat and Sindh settled in British
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colonies in the Middle East, and South and East African. For example, Gujarati and Sindhi
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merchants became shop owners in East Africa, and traders from Kerala and Tamil Nadu were
involved in retail trade and money lending to poor Indian peasants in Burma, Ceylon and
Malaya. By the time of Second World War, the Indian Diaspora included approximately six
million migrants. Out of this total, over one million Indians were in Burma. At that time, there
were only 6,000 Indians in United States.
Today this “Old Diaspora” constitutes 60% of Indian Diaspora, or approximately 18 million
PIOs. The Old Diaspora is primarily a pre-WWII phenomenon.
1.3.2. The New Diaspora
The New Diaspora, consists of migrants who left India in large numbers from the mid-1960s
onwards – primarily to developed countries like the UK, US, Canada, Australia, and Western
Europe.
Around 1900, there were less than a thousand Indians in both the UK and the United States. By
World War II, the number had grown to about 6,000 in each country.

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• In Britain, this population consisted mostly of unskilled workers for low wages.
• In the US, this population consisted mostly of Sikhs who worked in agriculture in California.
Many factors contributed to this small number of migrants from India to these developed
countries. Draconian legislation in the United States had banned immigration to the US from
all but a handful of Western European countries. The Johnson–Reed Act of 1924, probably the
most overtly racist immigration law in the world at the time, served to limit the annual number
of immigrants to the US from any country to 2% of the number of people from that country
who were already living in the US dating back to 1890.
The year ‘1890’ is not a completely arbitrary benchmark. The US established the law in order
to stop Eastern Europeans Jews who had migrated in large numbers to the US after 1890 to
escape persecution in Europe. Though aimed at Eastern Europeans, this law had the collateral
effect of prohibiting the entry of Middle Easterners, East Asians, and Indians to the US.
According to the U.S. Department of State at the time, the purpose of the act was “to preserve
the ideal of American homogeneity.”
Similarly, at the turn of the century in Canada, also part of the British Empire at that time,
there were about 100 Indians. This number rose to 5,000 by 1907, before a restrictive new law,
the Continuous Passage regulation, stopped any further immigration. This law required that all
migrants who intended to immigrate to Canada make a continuous journey from the
countries of their citizenship. This law stopped Indian immigration in its tracks, since no
steamships traveled directly from India to Canada. This became most evident in the
“Komagatamaru” incident of 1914, when more than 350 immigrants from India sent back from
Vancouver, as the ship carrying them, the Komagatamaru, had not travelled continuously form
India to Canada.
1.3.2.1. After Independence
The landscape began to change after Indian independence. A group of unskilled (and some
skilled) workers, mostly male Punjabi Sikhs, migrated from India to the United Kingdom. After
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the war, Britain had a demand for low-skilled labor. Given India’s postcolonial ties and the
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UK’s Commonwealth immigration policy, which allowed any citizen of a Commonwealth

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country to live, work, vote, and hold public office in the United Kingdom, Indians came to the
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UK. Many settled in London as well as industrial cities like Leicester and Birmingham. At the
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time (from 1947 till 1962), Indian nationals, as Commonwealth citizens, had an unrestricted
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right to enter the United Kingdom.

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In 1962 and again in 1968, the British Commonwealth Immigration Acts rescinded these rights
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for Indians. However, 20 years later, when the UK was faced with a shortage of highly skilled
labor, the UK reversed itself, and Indian migration to the UK picked up considerably.
Additionally, during the mid-1960s, anti-Indian discrimination developed in African countries
like Kenya and Uganda. This also resulted in a large-scale “Secondary Migration” of PIOs to the
UK. Of the current Indian diaspora in the UK, one-fifth is as a result of this secondary
migration from East African countries and South Africa.
The dividing line for Indian immigration to the United States, and the significant Diaspora
formation that resulted, is the year 1965. It was in 1965 that President Lyndon Johnson and
the US Congress passed the historic Hart-Celler Act. This legislation:
• terminated the racist 1924 Johnson-Reed Act,
• abolished national-origins quotas, and
• Made it possible for high-skilled immigrants, including Indians, to gain legal, permanent
residence in the United States.
• The migrants were able to bring their family members as well.

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As in the United States, new immigration legislation that opened the doors to highly-skilled
immigrants triggered significant immigration of Indians to Canada. In 1968, Canada introduced
its points system, which assigns value to qualifications rather than a person’s ethnic or
national background. As a result, Indian immigration to Canada boomed.
The 1990s software boom and rising economy in the US attracted Indians by the boatload. The
US Immigration Act of 1990, effective from 1995, facilitated this process further by introducing
the H-1B temporary worker program, allowing US businesses to hire foreigners with a
minimum of a bachelor’s degree in “specialty occupations” including doctors, scientists,
engineers, and IT specialists.
Indian citizens are far and away the top recipients of H-1B visas each year. As a result the
Indian diaspora in the US is highly-skilled. The US Census Bureau estimates that 75% percent
of all ethnic Indians working in the US hold at least a bachelor’s degree, and 69% percent
work in management and professional occupations.
US, UK and Canadian census data from 2010 estimates that the Indian Diaspora grew to three
million in the US, 1.5 million in the UK, and one million in Canada – a twentyfold increase in
half a century. Today, Indians are the fourth largest immigrant group in the United States after
the Mexicans, Filipinos, and Chinese.
Also, since the 1990s, Australia and New Zealand have become important destination
countries for Indians. Both countries look to attract English-speaking, highly-qualified
professionals, often to supply their IT industries. The Indian diaspora in Australia numbers
more than 400,000, almost two percent of Australia’s total population.
1.3.3. The Gulf Diaspora: The Persian Gulf Countries
The most recent development of the Indian Diaspora is the “Gulf Diaspora”. The 1970s oil
boom in the West Asia/Middle East ended up triggering significant migration from India to the
Persian Gulf. An increasing number of semi-skilled and unskilled workers, primarily from South
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India, have worked in the gulf countries on temporary schemes in the oil industry and in
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With modern air transportation, this was on a contractual basis rather than the permanent
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basis that was the case in the 19th century. More than 8 million Indians reside in Gulf today; an
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estimated 70% of them are blue collar workers. These workers are responsible for running
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oilfields, businesses, transport and household work.

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1.4. Status, Success and Future

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• Ethnic Indians are a small but wealthy minority in the US, UK, and the countries of the
New Diaspora.
• In terms of number they constitute 40 percent of the populations in Fiji, Trinidad, Guyana,
Reunion and Suriname, and 70 percent of Mauritius – all Old Diaspora countries.
• In Gulf they are more than 50 percent of all the immigrant workers.
The New Indian Diaspora, especially in the United States, is highly organized with many
regional and pan-Indian cultural, professional, religious, and charity organizations. In recent
years, Indians have demonstrated their increasing political influence examples being- Louisiana
Governor Bobby Jindal, South Carolina Governor and US representative to the United States
Nikki Haley, NY Attorney General Preet Bharara, California Senator Kamla Harris and the
formation of the India Caucus in both the Congress and the Senate.
In Canada, 19 Indian-origin MPs were elected to the Canadian parliament in 2015 and four
were appointed in the cabinet of PM Justin Trudeau. In the UK, a record number of 12 Indian

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Mps, were elected to the British Parliament in 2017, and eight members of the House of Lords
are People of Indian Origin. With the Appointment of Rishi Sunak and Suella Fernandes in
January 2018 the UK has three Indian-origin Ministers in the government.
If Indians appear to have done well for themselves within the economic domain of these Old
Diaspora countries, their affluence in new Diaspora countries like the United States is even
more pronounced, as is our presence within top professions. Though our share of the
population in the US is less than 1%, Indians account for well over 5% of the scientists,
engineers, and software specialists, and almost 10% of all the doctors. No group, not whites,
not the Chinese, nor the Jewish people, has a higher median household income than Indians,
which is almost double that of the overall average of the United States.
Diaspora has contributed to India’s ascendency in the world. In all of the countries to which
Indians have migrated, Indians have achieved in the fields of entrepreneurship, business,
academia, science, arts, and culture.
The success of Indian entrepreneurs, CEOs, scientists, academics, media personalities,
filmmakers and IT professionals in the US has created trust in India’s intellectual abilities
abroad. This success has been a major factor in branding India as a source of well-educated
and hard-working professionals. This new “Brand India” explains the increased interest in
recruiting Indian graduates and professionals in several countries.It also contributes to the
willingness of US and other companies to collaborate with, and outsource to, Indian companies.
Ethnic Indians, particularly in New Diaspora countries, have become known for their
economic, professional, academic, scientific, and artistic successes, as well as for their
generally peaceful integration.
In the Old Diaspora, Indians have become integral part of their countries. In countries such as
Mauritius names such as Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Anerood Jugnauth, Navin Chandra
Ramgoolam and Pravind Jugnauth are prominent in politics serving as the heads of state and
governement. Similalry, Trinidad and Tobago has seen two Indian origin prime ministers-
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Basdeo Panday and Kamala Persad Bissessar. Another Indo-Trinidadian VS Naipaul is much
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celebrated author and Nobel Laureate.

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In Malay Peninsula the Indian Community played a key part in the decolonization process and
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Malaysian Indian Congress had been a key part of the ruling alliance coalition of the Alliance
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Party (BN- Barisan Nasional). In Singapore Tamil is an official language along with English,
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Mandarin and Malay. Indians have served as two out of eight Presidents of Singapore, most
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recently Mr. S.R. Nathan (1999-2011).

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The Gulf Diaspora has increased to more than 8 million. It’s is source of more than 50 percent
of remittances received by India. In the economy of countries like the UAE, Indians have
achieved a notable presence as entrepreneurs and managers. The Indian community in gulf is
more than fifty percent of the total immigrant workers in the Gulf countries and this number
has doubled since 2000.
1.5. Issues and Challenges

1.5.1. Rights and Changing Policies in Gulf
More than 70 percent of Indian workers in the gulf are blue collar workers and are on
temporary contracts. Certainly, many of them face discrimination, have limited rights, and face
future challenges in the indigenization or Arabisation policy of these states that seeks to
include more Arabs in the workforce. The Nitaqat policy of Saudi Arabia is a specific example of
government policy aiming at changing the composition of the work force. These Gulf countries
have a common policy of refusing to naturalize non-Arabs, even if they are born in the Gulf

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Student Notes:
Countries. Thus, members of the Diaspora in these countries are relegated to a kind of “second
class” status.
On the other hand threats emanating from regional instability have resulted in large scale
evacuation from the Gulf countries in 1990 and more recently from Yemen in 2015 (operation
Raahat).
Indian Missions in Gulf countries receive various types of complaints from Indian workers:
• including non-payment/delayed payment of wages,
• sudden closure of companies,
• ill treatment, excessive working hours,
• filing false charges with police authorities,
• withholding of passports, dishonouring terms of the contract,
• exit visa issues
The economies of Gulf countries have been facing an economic downturn due to fall in crude oil
prices. In particular, those employed in oil & gas and construction sectors are among the most
vulnerable where downsizing and lay-offs have been reported. There are some reports of
Indian workers being asked to leave before completion of their existing contracts. Instances of
unpaid salaries for last few months and non-availability of food in some labour camps of two
big companies in Saudi Arabia have also been reported by Indian workers.
Indian Missions and Posts have been pro-active in liaising with the host countries in resolving
difficulties faced by Indian workers. In addition, the institutional framework for supporting the
welfare of Indian community abroad has been considerably strengthened during the last few
years. The Indian Community Welfare Fund has been extended to all our Missions and Posts
abroad to meet contingency expenditure for welfare activities for overseas Indian citizens who
are in distress on a means tested basis. Multilingual helplines have been set up in India and in
Gulf countries. Indian Worker Resource Centre (IWRC) has also been set up in Dubai, UAE that
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provides toll-free helpline and walk-in counseling facilities. Four more IWRCs have been
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approved in Sharjah, UAE, Riyadh and Jeddah in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Kuala Lumpur
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in Malaysia.
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1.5.2. Protectionism and Nationalist Sentiments in USA

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The protectionist measures as a result of rise of nationalist, protectionist and anti-immigration

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politics in the west poses a major future challenge in this context. The proposed restrictions on
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the renewal of H-1b visas in the USA are case in point to be watched closely.
1.5.3. Xenophobia and Violence
The attacks on Indian students in Australia from 2008 to 2010 and the recent murder of Indian
engineer in the USA are examples of the threat from xenophobia and racism that the Indian
community faces abroad.
1.5.4. Ethnic Ties in the Old Diaspora Countries
The removal of Mahendra P. Chaudhary in Fiji in the coup of 2000, and the ensuing ethnic strife
are symbolic of the issues of domestic politics in the Old Diaspora countries. Similarly the issue
of rights of the people Indian origin in Malaysia has been a recurrent domestic issue in that
country. In November 2007, the Hindu Rights Action Force, a coalition of NGOs, gathered more
than 50,000 minority Indians in the streets of Kuala Lumpur to announce a symbolic lawsuit
against the British government, the former colonial ruler, for bringing them to the region as
indentured labourers.


Student Notes:
Incidents of ethnic tensions exist all across our diaspora; for instance, in Old Diaspora countries
such as, Malaysia, where despite some political representation, Indians faces discrimination
exacerbated by religious tensions between the Malays (Bhumiputras) and the Indians.
Fiji, where ethnic Indians comprise over 40% of the population, anti-Indian resentment
resulted in an ethnic Fijian coup d’état in 2000, which removed from office the
democratically-elected Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry. Trinidad, where the Speaker of
the House, Occah Seapual, an Indian woman, was unseated by the People’s National
Movement (PNM), the black party which had held power for most of the recent history of
Trinidad. The PNM did it by promulgating a state of emergency in the dead of night, placed
Seapual under house arrest, and eventually removed her as Speaker of the House.
This discrimination persists not just in countries like Malaysia, Fiji and Trinidad, but also in the
New Diaspora countries like the UK and Germany, where skinhead Brits and Germans have
violently clashed with people from South Asia. In Australia, attacks on Indian students have
occurred at an alarming rate. Even in the US, a country where Indians have made immense
strides in all fields, Indians are not immune from hate crimes, such as those committed by the
Dot-buster gangs of New Jersey or the massacre of worshipers at the Sikh Gurdwara in
Wisconsin.
Success of the Indian community as entrepreneurs, educators, innovators and doctors has also
attracted certain threat perception. For instance, the portrayal of Indian’s having achieved their
success at the cost of the local population. Thus, such threats need to be taken into
consideration for making any Diaspora policy.
Indian migrants have lived in conditions of appalling poverty in many places around the world,
where they were first taken as indentured labor many years ago. Still, a number of remarkable
transformations have taken place over the past generations. Through thrift, dogged
perseverance, hard work, and most importantly by a withdrawal into their own culture, these
Indians successfully labored to give their children and grand-children better economic futures.
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In time, these descendants came to capture the trade, commerce and business leadership of
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their new homelands.

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This was equally true in South Africa, Kenya, and Uganda as it was in Trinidad, Mauritius,
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Suriname and Burma, in spite of the resentment and discrimination of the local populace and
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political establishments.
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1.6. The Future

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According to prediction in the near future India will overtake China as the most populous
country. The young population would be highly mobile. Given the conundrum of an expanding
middle class in India, juxtaposed against the continuing abject poverty of over half a billion
Indians, migration patterns will accelerate. In spite of discrimination, xenophobia, and exclusion
in many countries, our Diaspora grew by over 10 million people during the last decade alone.
The migration of highly-skilled professionals, the continuing export of labor, and illegal
immigration to New Diaspora countries are likely to add to those numbers.
1.7. Government Policy and Steps

• Pravasi Bhartiya Divas Conventions
• OCI card
• Know India Programme
• VAJRA scheme for returning Indian scientists
• India has signed labour agreements with Jordan, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait and Oman.
• Social Security agreements with countries of Europe


Student Notes:
• Indian Community Welfare Fund at all Missions and Posts abroad.

• Indian Worker Resource Centre (IWRC) has also been set up in Dubai, UAE that provides
toll-free helpline and walk-in counselling facilities. Four more IWRCs have been approved in
Sharjah, UAE, Riyadh and Jeddah in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Kuala Lumpur in
Malaysia.
• Special provision for NRIs to invest in the National Pension Scheme.
• Prime Minister’s Global Advisory Council (PMGAC) was set up as a high level platform, to
draw upon the experience and knowledge of eminent people of Indian origin in diverse
fields from across the world in January, 2009. So far five meetings have taken place.
1.8. What Needs to Be Done?

• Proactive response to unfolding policies such as Nitaqat
• Involving states in managing the immigrants
• Strategic evacuation Policy
• Curbing red-tapism and easing investment environment.
• Training to the immigrant workers in line with the example of countries such as Philippines.
1.9. The Overseas Citizen of India

An Overseas Citizen of India is a lifetime visa status with some added benefits.
Who can be an OCI?
• A person who used to be an Indian citizen
• A person with at least one parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent who is/was an Indian
citizen
• A person married to an Indian citizen or an existing OCI for at least two continuous years
The following groups of people cannot have OCI status:
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Anyone who was ever a citizen of Pakistan or Bangladesh

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• Anyone whose parents or grandparents were citizens of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh,

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China, or Sri Lanka

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• Anyone who served in a foreign military or worked in a foreign defense department

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What are the benefits of being an OCI?

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•
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Lifelong multiple entry visa to India

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• No need to report to the FRRO regardless of the length of your stay

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• One can eventually become a citizen of India if you remain an OCI for 5 years and live in
India for at least 1 year.
• special counters during immigration
• No requirement of a student visa to study in India
• No requirement of an employment visa to get a job
• One can open a special bank account in India, just like an NRI
• make investments in India
• One can buy non-farm property and exercise property ownership rights
• OCI card can be used to apply for a driver’s license, open a bank account, or get a PAN card
• same economic, financial, and education benefits as NRIs (e.g. reserved admission quotas),
and you can adopt children like an NRI
• Fee equivalent to Indian resident when visiting a national parks, monuments, museums or
wildlife sanctuary (of course it is ultimately up to the discretion of the man issuing tickets)


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Student Notes:
What are the limitations?

• Cannot purchase agricultural land or farm houses
• Cannot vote
• Cannot hold a government job
• Cannot be elected to a political position
• Cannot travel to restricted areas without permission
How do you become an OCI?
• One can apply through the Indian embassy in your country of residence or within India at
the local FRRO.
• The entire process can take several months in some cases. Fees vary from nationality to
nationality.
Sources:
• Ministry of External Affairs
• World Migration report 2018
• Report of the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora,
http://indiandiaspora.nic.in/contents.htm
• Ashok Rao, 6 February 2013,
https://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/indian-diaspora-past-present-
and-future-part-iii/
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5. India and SEA 90-109

7. India and Indian Ocean 122-130

9. India and Central Asia 152-160

11. India and Europe 170-186

1 6. The Diaspora 277-287

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4.2. Reasons for Non-Alignment .............................................................................................. 17

4.3. The Non-Aligned Movement ............................................................................................. 17

DELHI JAIPUR PUNE HYDERABAD AHMEDABAD LUCKNOW

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• Feel Free to add your Own Notes in blank Spaces

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1. India’s Relations: Evolution of India’s Foreign Policy

1.2. Determinants: Actors and Factors Shaping India’s Foreign

for India’s security.

foreign policy choices and both in terms of means and ends.

• Domestic Milieu: Institutions, political atmosphere and consensus on National Interest,

needs, ambitions and capabilities, Leadership, bureaucracy.

2. Evolution of India’s Foreign Policy

DELHI JAIPUR PUNE HYDERABAD AHMEDABAD LUCKNOW

(a) Promote international peace and security;

a significant role in multilateral institutions and particularly in United Nations peacekeeping

operations. Second, it also emerged as a critical proponent of the nonaligned movement.

DELHI JAIPUR PUNE HYDERABAD AHMEDABAD LUCKNOW

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

was proved to be ill conceived.

DELHI JAIPUR PUNE HYDERABAD AHMEDABAD LUCKNOW

2.1.4. A brief overview of the Non Aligned Movement

countries from great power or block influences and rivalries;

• the struggle against imperialism in all its forms and manifestations;

• the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, foreign occupation and

• rejection of the use or threat of use of force in international relations;

2.2. 1962-1991: Period of Self Help Approach

DELHI JAIPUR PUNE HYDERABAD AHMEDABAD LUCKNOW

on its own nuclear options was a key consideration.

2.2.2. Changes with Continuity

DELHI JAIPUR PUNE HYDERABAD AHMEDABAD LUCKNOW

program even after it 1974.

DELHI JAIPUR PUNE HYDERABAD AHMEDABAD LUCKNOW

Chandrasekhar as well as the balance of payment crisis. These developments accompanied by

2.3. 1991 and After: Era of “Pragmatic” Foreign Policy

DELHI JAIPUR PUNE HYDERABAD AHMEDABAD LUCKNOW

the clandestine nuclear programme of Islamabad concerns regarding conventional military

balance played large on India’s security calculations.

DELHI JAIPUR PUNE HYDERABAD AHMEDABAD LUCKNOW

DELHI JAIPUR PUNE HYDERABAD AHMEDABAD LUCKNOW

• Recognised Nuclear capability

Space Intentionally Left Blank

DELHI JAIPUR PUNE HYDERABAD AHMEDABAD LUCKNOW

3. Let Us Address A Key Question

3.2. Arguments in the Context of Irrelevance of NAM

convenience among disparate countries. This criticism gained significance as the

membership of NAM grew over the years.

DELHI JAIPUR PUNE HYDERABAD AHMEDABAD LUCKNOW

economic, political, and nuclear hierarchies.

DELHI JAIPUR PUNE HYDERABAD AHMEDABAD LUCKNOW

4.1. India’s Policy of Non-Alignment