FUNDAMENTAL POWERS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Lopez
Topic: Governmental Powers and Individual Rights and Freedoms; Bill of Rights;
Fundamental Powers of the State

211. Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD)

DOCTRINE: The Expanded Senior Citizens’ Act is a legitimate exercise of police power
which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police
power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
benefits.

FACTS: The Expanded Senior Citizens’ Act was signed into law, which provided senior
citizens with a 20% discount when they utilize the services of hotels and similar lodgings
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and when they purchase medicines. The
law also includes the same discount for funeral services upon their death. Such law, on the
other hand, granted such establishments the right to claim the discounts granted as a tax
deduction from their income tax for the year when the discount is granted.

The petitioners, all engaged in the business of selling medicines as drugstores, questioned
the constitutionality of such law as it constituted as deprivation of private property.

ISSUE: WON the assailed provision (Sec 4[a]) of the Expanded Senior Citizens’ Act is
constitutional

RULING: Yes, the assailed provision of the Expanded Senior Citizens’ Act is constitutional.

Petitioners argue that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes
deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the
discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of
only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby
drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.

The discount herein is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is subtracted

from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income. Stated otherwise, it is an
amount that is allowed by law to reduce the income prior to the application of the tax rate to
compute the amount of tax which is due. Being a tax deduction, the discount does not
reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes
owed.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The
word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea
that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full
and ample. A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen
discount. As such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation.

1
Nonetheless, the Expanded Senior Citizens’ Act is a legitimate exercise of police power
which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general
terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room
for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the
greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.” It is “[t]he power
vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without,
not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.” For this reason, when the conditions so
demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of
police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to
general welfare. Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted
considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and
capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence
demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis
for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor.

While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of
business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a
business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process. Also, it is unfair
for petitioners to criticize the law because they cannot raise the prices of their medicines
given the cutthroat nature of the players in the industry. It is a business decision on the part
of petitioners to peg the mark-up at 5%. Selling the medicines below acquisition cost, as
alleged by petitioners, is merely a result of this decision. Inasmuch as pricing is a property
right, petitioners cannot reproach the law for being oppressive, simply because they cannot
afford to raise their prices for fear of losing their customers to competition.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.

Murao
Topic: Governmental Powers and Individual Rights and Freedoms; Fundamental
Powers

212. Drugstores Association of the Philippines v. National Council on Disability

Affairs et al. (2016)

DOCTRINE: The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons has a lawful purpose to support the
well-being of PWDs and facilitate their integration to society and a lawful means by providing
that the 20% discount directly related to such purpose, complying with requisites of valid
legislative exercise of police power.

FACTS:
In 1992, RA 7277 or the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was enacted and the same was
amended in 2007 by RA 9442, which introduced the change in terminology from ‘disabled
persons’ to ‘persons with disability’, granted a 20% discount on purchase of medicine, and a
tax deduction scheme. Particularly, all drugstores, hospitals, pharmacies, and clinics selling
medicine were required to provide the 20% discount to PWDs. PWDs merely had to submit
their ID card issued by the LGU, passport of the PWD, or the transportation discount fare ID
card issued by the National Council for Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP) to be entitled
2
to the discount. The IRR of RA 9442 was jointly promulgated by the DSWD, DOF, DILG and
accompanying administrative issuances by the National Council on Disability Affairs, DOF,
and DOH followed.

The controversy arose when petitioner Drugstores Association of the Philippines filed a
petition for Prohibition with application for a TRO or Preliminary Injunction with the CA to
annul RA 7277, its IRR, and the 3 accompanying administrative issuances.

The CA upheld the constitutionality of the law as well as the DOH administrative order and
revenue regulation but suspended the effectivity of the NCDA AO No.1 pending proof of
compliance with the publication requirement. Upon MR, the CA lifted the suspension with the
NCDA providing proof of publication in the Philippine Star, the Daily Tribune, and a
certification of filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR). Hence
this petition for review on certiorari.
.
ISSUE1: W/N the CA erred in classifying the PWD discount as an exercise of police
power and not an exercise of eminent domain?

RULING1: NO. The CA aptly cited the Carlos Superdrug case where a similar 20% discount
on the purchase of medicine of senior citizens was characterized as a valid exercise of
police power with general welfare as the objective. Here, the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons, as amended, was enacted to support the well-being of PWDs and facilitate their
integration to society. Also, the 20% discount was directly related to such purpose with the
tax deduction scheme for participating drugstores and establishments making it reasonable.
Thus, the Magna Carta possess a lawful purpose and lawful means required for the exercise
of police power.

ISSUE2: W/N the Magna Carta, as amended, is unconstitutional for violating the due
process clause for providing that PWDs were entitled discount upon submission of ID
cards without any relation to medical disability and determined by non-competent
persons?

RULING2: NO. RA 7277 must be read with its IRR, which stated that, the National Council
for Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP) would adopt an ID Card issued by the LGUs,
which shall be issued after a medical certificate from a licensed physician confirms the
applicant’s disability. Moreover, the National Council for Disability Affairs (NCDA)
Administrative Order allowing for teachers, heads of establishments, and heads of NGO’s to
confirm a medical disability only refers to apparent and clearly visible disabilities. Lastly, the
DOH Administrative Order also provides that the PWD must not only present his ID but also
the doctor's prescription stating, among others, the generic name of the medicine, the
physician's address, contact number and professional license number, professional tax
receipt number and narcotic license number, if applicable and a purchase booklet issued by
the local social/health office.

ISSUE3: W/N the definition of disabilities in the law is vague and ambiguous?

3
RULING3: NO. Under RA 7277, ‘disability’ was defined as (1) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more psychological, physiological or anatomical
function of an individual or activities of such individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or
(3) being regarded as having such an impairment. This definition is enhanced definitions in
the NCDA Administrative Order that listed at least 8 conditions and the DOH administrative
order that detailed 7 categories of disability.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED.

NOTE: The SC addressed the issue on equal protection by citing Carlos Superdrug on the
right to property having a social dimension and PWDs forming a distinct class with a
substantial distinction merited.

Ong
Fundamental Powers and the Bill of Rights

PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS INC V CIR

Doctrine: Articles II and XIII of the Constitution seeks to promote the health of its people and
would seek to provide health services at a lower cost in following such guiding principles the
court found that the HMOs are not liable to DST.

HMOs are not liable to DST because they are not in the business of insurance and the
contracts involved are not policies of insurance or of indemnity.
Facts:

The petitioner is a domestic corporation whose primary purpose is to provide health care
agreements
the CIR sent the petitioner a formal demand letter and the assessment notices demanding
deficiency taxes for not payment of the documentary stamp tax and VAT for the years 1996-
1997 worth 224,702,641.18
The petitioner protested the assessment but the CIR did not respond.
A petition for review was filed with the CTA for the cancellation of the deficiency
assessments
The CTA partially granted the appeal which cancelled the assessment for the DST but not
the VAT
The respondent appealed to the CA for the cancellation of the DST
The CA granted the appeal and reversed the ruling of the CTA.
It held that petitioner’s health care agreement was in the nature of a non-life insurance
contract subject to DST
Issue: whether HMO’s are subject to DST
Held: No, they are not

HMOs Are not Subject to DST

Section 185 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC of 1997) provides:

Section 185. Stamp tax on fidelity bonds and other insurance policies. – On all policies of
insurance or bonds or obligations of the nature of indemnity for loss, damage, or
liability made or renewed by any person, association or company or corporation
transacting the business of accident, fidelity, employer’s liability, plate, glass, steam boiler,
4
burglar, elevator, automatic sprinkler, or other branch of insurance (except life, marine,
inland, and fire insurance), and all bonds, undertakings, or recognizances, conditioned for
the performance of the duties of any office or position, for the doing or not doing of anything
therein specified, and on all obligations guaranteeing the validity or legality of any bond or
other obligations issued by any province, city, municipality, or other public body or
organization, and on all obligations guaranteeing the title to any real estate, or guaranteeing
any mercantile credits, which may be made or renewed by any such person, company or
corporation, there shall be collected a documentary stamp tax of fifty centavos (₱0.50) on
each four pesos (₱4.00), or fractional part thereof, of the premium charged. (Emphasis
supplied

From the language of Section 185 of the NIRC, it is evident that two requisites must concur
before the DST can apply, namely: (1) the document must be a policy of insurance or an
obligation in the nature of indemnity and (2) the maker should be transacting the
business of accident, fidelity, employer’s liability, plate, glass, steam boiler, burglar,
elevator, automatic sprinkler, or other branch of insurance (except life, marine, inland, and
fire insurance).

the petitioner is engaged in the dispensation of preventive, diagnostic and curative medical
services as such it is a health maintenance organization.
Health Maintenance Organizations Are Not Engaged In The Insurance Business

Section 2 (2) of PD 1460 (otherwise known as the Insurance Code) enumerates what
constitutes "doing an insurance business" or "transacting an insurance business:"

a) making or proposing to make, as insurer, any insurance contract;

b) making or proposing to make, as surety, any contract of suretyship as a vocation

and not as merely incidental to any other legitimate business or activity of the surety;

c) doing any kind of business, including a reinsurance business, specifically

recognized as constituting the doing of an insurance business within the meaning of
this Code;

d) doing or proposing to do any business in substance equivalent to any of the

foregoing in a manner designed to evade the provisions of this Code.

An HMO it is not considered as doing an insurance business

Various courts in the United States, whose jurisprudence has a persuasive effect on our
decisions, have determined that HMOs are not in the insurance business.
Applying the "principal object and purpose test," there is significant American case law
supporting the argument that a corporation (such as an HMO, whether or not organized for
profit), whose main object is to provide the members of a group with health services, is not
engaged in the insurance business.
As an HMO, it is its obligation to maintain the good health of its members. Accordingly, its
health care programs are designed to prevent or to minimize the possibility of any
assumption of risk on its part. Thus, its undertaking under its agreements is not to
indemnify its members against any loss or damage arising from a medical condition but, on
the contrary, to provide the health and medical services needed to prevent such loss or
damage meaning that there is no indemnity being insured.

Here, petitioner appears to provide insurance-type benefits to its members (with respect to
its curative medical services), but these are incidental to the principal activity of providing
5
them medical care. The "insurance-like" aspect of petitioner’s business is miniscule
compared to its noninsurance activities. Therefore, since it substantially provides health care
services rather than insurance services, it cannot be considered as being in the insurance
business.

It is important to emphasize that, in adopting the "principal purpose test" used in the above-
quoted U.S. cases, we are not saying that petitioner’s operations are identical in every
respect to those of the HMOs or health providers which were parties to those cases. What
we are stating is that, for the purpose of determining what "doing an insurance business"
means, we have to scrutinize the operations of the business as a whole and not its mere
components.
A Health Care Agreement Is Not An Insurance Contract Contemplated Under Section
185 Of The NIRC of 1997

The primary purpose of the parties in making the contract may negate the existence
of an insurance contract

even if a contract contains all the elements of an insurance contract, if its primary purpose is
the rendering of service, it is not a contract of insurance:

But it must be noted here that not all the necessary elements of a contract of
insurance are present in petitioner’s agreements.

The petitioner, as an HMO, undertakes a business risk when it offers to provide health
services: the risk that it might fail to earn a reasonable return on its investment. But it is not
the risk of the type peculiar only to insurance companies. Insurance risk, also known as
actuarial risk, is the risk that the cost of insurance claims might be higher than the premiums
paid. The amount of premium is calculated on the basis of assumptions made relative to the
insured.

However, assuming that petitioner’s commitment to provide medical services to its members
can be construed as an acceptance of the risk that it will shell out more than the prepaid
fees, it still will not qualify as an insurance contract because petitioner’s objective is to
provide medical services at reduced cost, not to distribute risk like an insurer.

In sum, an examination of petitioner’s agreements with its members leads us to conclude

that it is not an insurance contract within the context of our Insurance Code.

Hence in this case the HMO is not engaged in an insurance business nor it involves
an insurance policy involving an indemnity as such not subject to DST

Blue Cross and Philamcare case was abandoned

the Court pronounced that a health care agreement is in the nature of non-life insurance,
which is primarily a contract of indemnity. However, those cases did not involve the
interpretation of a tax provision. Instead, they dealt with the liability of a health service
provider to a member under the terms of their health care agreement. Such contracts, as
contracts of adhesion, are liberally interpreted in favor of the member and strictly against the
HMO. For this reason, we reconsider our ruling that Blue Cross and Philamcare are
applicable here.
There Was No Legislative Intent To Impose DST On Health Care Agreements Of HMOs
the law imposing the DST was first passed, HMOs were yet unknown in the Philippines.
However, when the various amendments to the DST law were enacted, they were already in
existence in the Philippines and the term had in fact already been defined by RA 7875. If it
6
had been the intent of the legislature to impose DST on health care agreements, it could
have done so in clear and categorical terms. It had many opportunities to do so. But it did
not. The fact that the NIRC contained no specific provision on the DST liability of health care
agreements of HMOs at a time they were already known as such, belies any legislative
intent to impose it on them.

The guiding principle for the ruling:

ARTICLE II
Declaration of Principles and State Policies

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.

ARTICLE XIII
Social Justice and Human Rights

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers

It is a matter of common knowledge that there is a great social need for adequate medical
services at a cost which the average wage earner can afford. HMOs arrange, organize and
manage health care treatment in the furtherance of the goal of providing a more efficient and
inexpensive health care system made possible by quantity purchasing of services and
economies of scale. They offer advantages over the pay-for-service system (wherein
individuals are charged a fee each time they receive medical services), including the ability
to control costs. They protect their members from exposure to the high cost of hospitalization
and other medical expenses brought about by a fluctuating economy. Accordingly, they
play an important role in society as partners of the State in achieving its
constitutional mandate of providing its citizens with affordable health services.

The rate of DST under Section 185 is equivalent to 12.5% of the premium charged. Its
imposition will elevate the cost of health care services. This will in turn necessitate an
increase in the membership fees, resulting in either placing health services beyond the reach
of the ordinary wage earner or driving the industry to the ground. At the end of the day,
neither side wins, considering the indispensability of the services offered by HMOs.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The August 16, 2004 decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70479 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 1996
and 1997 deficiency DST assessment against petitioner is hereby CANCELLED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent is ordered to desist from collecting the said tax.

215. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. SAN MIGUEL

CORPORATION, respondent. G.R. No. 205045. January 25, 2017.

DOCTRINE: Any reclassification of fermented liquor products should be by act of Congress.

… Based on the legislative intent behind the classification freeze provision, petitioner has no
power to do this. A reclassification of a fermented liquor brand introduced between January
1, 1997 and December 31, 2003, such as “San Mig Light,” must be by act of Congress.

7
FACTS: The issues involve an application of Section 143 of the 1997 National Internal
Revenue Code (Tax Code), as amended, on the definition of a variant, which is subject to a
higher excise tax rate than a new brand. This case also applies the requirement in Rep. Act
No. 9334 that reclassification of certain fermented liquor products introduced between
January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2003 can only be done by an act of Congress.

This petition assails the CTA En Banc’s decision affirming the Third Division’s grant of
SMC’s refund claim and the resolution denying reconsideration. The CIR prays for the
reversal and setting aside of the assailed Decision and Resolution, as well as the issuance
of a new one denying San Miguel Corporation’s claim for tax refund or credit.

In Oct 1999, a letter request from SMC was granted by BIR where SMC was allowed to
register and manufacture “San Mig Light,” to be taxed at P12.15 per liter. Thus, SMC was
allowed to register, manufacture, and sell “San Mig Light” as a new brand, had been paying
its excise tax for a considerable length of time, and that the tax classification and rate of
“San Mig Light” as a new brand were in order.

However, in May 2002, BIR issued Notice of Discrepancy against San Miguel Corporation.
The Notice stated that “San Mig Light” was a variant of its existing beer products and must,
therefore, be subjected to the higher excise tax rate for variants. Specifically, for the year
1999, “San Mig Light” should be taxed at the rate of P19.91 per liter instead of P9.15 per
liter; and for the year 2000, the 12% increase should be based on the rate of P19.91 per liter
under Section 143(C)(2) of the Tax Code. Hence, the Notice demanded payments of
deficiency excise tax in the amount of P824,750,204.97, exclusive of increments for years
1999 to April 2002.

In its defense, SMC stated, among other things, that “San Mig Light” was not a variant of any
of its existing beer brands because of “the distinctive shape, color scheme, and general
appearance”; and the “different alcohol content and innovative low calorie formulation.”

To prevent the issuance of additional excise tax assessments on San Mig Light products and
the disruption of its operations, San Miguel Corporation paid excise taxes as demanded by
BIR. SMC then filed refund claims for the erroneous excise taxes collected on San Mig Light
products. The refund claims covered the periods from 2004-2005 and 2005-2007.

The CTA sided with SMC; hence, this petition by the CIR with the SC.

Petitioner argues that “San Mig Light,” launched in November 1999, is not a new brand but
merely a lowcalorie variant of “San Miguel Pale Pilsen.” Thus, the application of the higher
excise tax rate for variant products is appropriate and respondent should not be entitled to a
refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate.

Respondent counters that “San Mig Light” is a new brand; the classification of “San Mig
Light” as a new and medium-priced brand may not be revised except by an act of Congress;
and the Court of Tax Appeals did not err in granting its claim for refund or issuance of tax
credit certificate.

ISSUE: Whether the BIR may reclassify “San Mig Light” as a variant which would result to
SMC being subjected to a higher tax rate, and thus SMC is not entitled to its tax refund
claim?

RULING: NO. SMC is entitled to a tax refund. The Bureau of Internal Revenue’s actions
reflect its admission and confirmation that “San Mig Light” is a new brand. When
respondent’s October 19, 1999 letter requested the registration and authority to manufacture
“San Mig Light,” to be taxed at P12.15 per liter, the Bureau of Internal Revenue granted the
8
request. The response dated February 7, 2002 of the LTAD II Acting Chief confirmed that
respondent was allowed to register, manufacture, and sell “San Mig Light” as a new brand

Any reclassification of fermented liquor products should be by act of Congress. Section 143
of the Tax Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 9334, provides for this classification freeze
referred to by the parties:

“Provided, however, that brands of fermented liquors introduced in the domestic market
between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2003 shall remain in the classification under
which the Bureau of Internal Revenue has determined them to belong as of December 31,
2003. Such classification of new brands and brands introduced between January 1, 1997
and December 31, 2003 shall not be revised except by an act of Congress.
....

The classification of each brand of fermented liquor based on its average net retail price as
of October 1, 1996, as set forth in Annex ‘C,’ including the classification of brands for the
same products which, although not set forth in said Annex ‘C,’ were registered and were
being commercially produced and marketed on or after October 1, 1996, and which
continue to be commercially produced and marketed after the effectivity of this Act, shall
remain in force until revised by Congress.”

In any event, petitioner’s letters and Notices of Discrepancy, which effectively changed San
Mig Light’s brand’s classification from “new brand to variant of existing brand,” necessarily
changes San Mig Light’s tax bracket. Based on the legislative intent behind the classification
freeze provision, petitioner has no power to do this. A reclassification of a fermented liquor
brand introduced between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2003, such as “San Mig
Light,” must be by act of Congress. There was none in this case.

DISPOSITIVE: PETITION DENIED.

NOTES: Because the Bureau of Internal Revenue granted respondent’s request in its
October 27, 1999 letter and confirmed this grant in its subsequent letters, respondent cannot
be faulted for relying on these actions by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

While estoppel generally does not apply against government, especially when the case
involves the collection of taxes, an exception can be made when the application of the rule
will cause injustice against an innocent party.

Respondent had already acquired a vested right on the tax classification of its San Mig Light
as a new brand. To allow petitioner to change its position will result in deficiency
assessments in substantial amounts against respondent to the latter’s prejudice.

The authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to overrule, correct, or reverse the mistakes
or errors of its agents is conceded. However, this authority must be exercised reasonably,
i.e., only when the action or ruling is patently erroneous or patently contrary to law. For the
presumption lies in the regularity of performance of official duty, and reasonable care has
been exercised by the revenue officer or agent in evaluating the facts before him or her prior
to rendering his or her decision or ruling — in this case, prior to the approval of the
registration of San Mig Light as a new brand for excise tax purposes. A contrary view will
create disorder and confusion in the operations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and open
the administrative agency to inconsistencies in the administration and enforcement of tax
laws.

DUE PROCESS
9
Valdez
Topic: Due Process
#216. Republic v. Cagandahan (2008)

DOCTRINE: In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as one's sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much
less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to
CAH. S/he will not be considered as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in
order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo
treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly
currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of
health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development and maturation.

FACTS:
 Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before
the RTC of Siniloan, Laguna.
 She1 alleged that she was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while
growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted
possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was
diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an
ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age 13, tests revealed
that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no
breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she
prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from
female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
 To prove her claim, she testified and presented the testimony of a psychiatrist and a
medical certificate stating that respondent's condition is known as CAH (that genetically
she is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not
develop normally and she has two sex organs - female and male).
 RTC granted petition. The OSG sought its reversal.

ISSUE/S: Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in her birth
certificate

RULING: NO.
 There is substantial compliance with R108 when respondent furnished a copy of the
petition to the local civil registrar.

1
“He”, after the resolution of the case
10
 The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and
the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.
(Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.)
 The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth.
 She undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate"
appearance of male characteristics. A person with this condition produces too much
androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH
usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous
genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the
female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child
grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial
hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000-18,000 children are born
with CAH. CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy (neither male
nor female).
 Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies,
intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender
role. Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex
people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to
resemble either male or female genitals. More commonly, an intersex individual is
considered as suffering from a "disorder" which is almost always recommended to be
treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the
individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or female.
 The compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations
should not be subject to outright denial. The current state of Philippine statutes
apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this
Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates
such rigid classification.
 If she is determined to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth
certificate entry for gender. But if, based on medical testimony and scientific
development showing her to be other than female, then a change in the subject's birth
certificate entry is in order.
 Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex.
 She has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or
interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, she has already ordered his life to
that of a male. She could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He

11
 chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in Cagandahan’s
development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
 In the absence of a law on the matter, SC will not dictate on respondent concerning a
matter so innately private as one's sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on
whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH.
SC will not consider Cagandahan as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment
in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will SC force her to undergo treatment
and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently
knows this gender of the human species. Cagandahan is the one who has to live with his
intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of
health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to
take along the path of his sexual development and maturation.
 Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent
deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case.

DISPOSITIVE: The petition is dismissed.

Baba
Topic: Due Process
217. Quiao vs. Quiao 675 SCRA 642 , July 04, 2012

DOCTRINE:
 The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due
process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new
obligations created after the right has become vested. Rights are considered vested
when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect
or fixed and irrefutable."
 While one may not be deprived of his "vested right," he may lose the same if there is
due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
FACTS:
 Respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against herein
petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido)
 On October 10, 2005, RTC issued a decree of legal separation. Neither party filed a
motion for reconsideration and appeal.
 On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution which the trial
court granted in its Order dated December 16, 2005.
 On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the
Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking
the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
 To resolve the petitioner’s Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an Order dated
August 31, 2006, which held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of
each [of the] spouse and the debts.” The Order further held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children
12
 because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits
earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
 Not satisfied with the trial court’s Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on September 8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued another
Order dated November 8, 2006, holding that although the Decision dated October 10,
2005 has become final and executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification
because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of “net profit earned.”
 On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying
for the correction an reversal of the Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on
January 8, 2007, the trial court had changed its ruling again and granted the
respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration whereby the Order dated November
8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated August 31, 2006.

ISSUE/S:
 Whether the motion for clarification should have been entertained.
 Whether the decision is a void judgment
 Whether petitioner’s vested right over half of the common properties of the conjugal
partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children
pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code

RULING:
NO, IT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN.
 Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
 “Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal.—The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a
record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.”
 In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The
petitioner neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On
December 16, 2005, or after 67 days had lapsed, the trial court issued an order
granting the respondent’s motion for execution; and on February 10, 2006, or after
123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of execution. Finally, when the writ
had already been partially executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days
had lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the “net profits
earned.” From the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to question
the RTC’s Decision dated October 10, 2005.

NO, IT IS NOT.
 “A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to grant
the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both.” In
other words, a court, which does not have the power to decide a case or that has no

13
 jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, will issue a void judgment or a
coram non judice.
 The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment. For
sure, the trial court has jurisdiction over a case involving legal separation. Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon an RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city,
the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others, complaints or
petitions relating to marital status and property relations of the husband and wife or
those living together.
 “[as] long as the public respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him
or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment
which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal.”37 Granting without admitting
that the RTC’s judgment dated October 10, 2005 was erroneous, the petitioner’s
remedy should be an appeal filed within the reglementary period. Unfortunately, the
petitioner failed to do this. He has already lost the chance to question the trial court’s
decision, which has become immutable and unalterable. What we can only do is to
clarify the very question raised below and nothing more.

NO, IT IS NOT.
 Petitioner’s claim of vested right is not one which is written on stone. In Go, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, we define and explained “vested right” in the following manner:
o “A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend
upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no
obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not
dependent upon a contingency. The term “vested right” expresses the
concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice,
should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and
imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and
irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal or equitable—to the
present or future enjoyment of property.”
 In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List
Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita,
o “The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional
guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in
right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state
action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of
a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the
right has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right
to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect
or fixed and irrefutable.”
 From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his
“vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.

14
  In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he
was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal
properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial
court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as
circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the
community properties of the parties.66 Second, when the Decision dated October 10,
2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling
forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the
Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due
process.
 Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner’s “vested
right” is one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176
of the Civil Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the
forfeiture of the guilty spouse’s share in the conjugal partnership profits. The said
provision says:
o “Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her
share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the
children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage.
However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or entirely from the
work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the
separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the
net profits.”
 From the foregoing, the petitioner’s claim of a vested right has no basis considering
that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership
profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after
trial and after the petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the
petitioner’s vested right claim may in fact be set aside

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is Denied.

Cadiz
Topic: Due Process
218. Anonymous v. Victoria Radam (2007)
AM No. P-07-2333

DOCTRINE:. An employee must be informed of the charges preferred against him, and the
normal way by which the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the
charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that cannot be dispensed with
and still remain consistent with the constitutional provision on due process. The second
minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance
must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his
defenses against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his
defenses.
15
FACTS:
 In an anonymous letter-complaint, respondent Ma. Victoria Radam, utility worker in the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC Alaminos, was charged with immorality. The
unnamed complainant alleged that respondent was unmarried but got pregnant and gave
birth sometime in October 2005. The complainant claimed that respondent's behavior
tainted the image of the judiciary.
 In connection with the complaint, Judge Elpidio N. Abella conducted a discreet
investigation to verify the allegations against respondent. Judge Abella made the
following recommendation:
o Since respondent admitted that she is single and that she got pregnant and gave
birth to a baby boy without being married to the father of the child, albeit she
advanced the reason for her remaining unmarried, it being that she and her boyfriend
had a mutual plan to migrate to Canada, this Investigating Judge considers that such
conduct of the respondent fell short of the strict standards of Court personnel and
contrary to the Code of Judicial Ethics and the Civil Service Rules. A place in the
judiciary demands upright men and women who must carry on with dignity, hence
respondent is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct which cannot be
countenanced by the Court. Certainly, the image of the Judiciary has been affected
by such conduct of the respondent.
 After reviewing the findings and recommendation of Judge Abella, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommended that, in accordance with Villanueva v. Milan,
respondent be absolved of the charge of immorality because her alleged misconduct
(that is, giving birth out of wedlock) did not affect the character, nature and the
performance of her position as a utility worker. However, it proposed that she be held
liable for conduct unbecoming a court employee and imposed a fine of P5,000 for stating
in the birth certificate of her child Christian Jeon that the father was “unknown” to her.

ISSUE/S: Whether the OCA is correct in holding her liable for stating in the birth
certificate that the father was unknown to her

RULING: NO, because she was not informed of such charge. The OCA correctly
exonerated respondent from the charge of immorality. However, its recommendation to hold
her liable for a charge of which she was not previously informed was wrong.

For purposes of determining administrative responsibility, giving birth out of wedlock is not
per se immoral under civil service laws. For such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the
same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. For a particular
conduct to constitute "disgraceful and immoral" behavior under civil service laws, it must be
regulated on account of the concerns of public and secular morality. It cannot be judged
based on personal bias, specifically those colored by particular mores. Nor should it
be grounded on “cultural" values not convincingly demonstrated to have been
recognized in the realm of public policy expressed in the Constitution and the laws. At

16
the same time, the constitutionally guaranteed rights (such as the right to privacy) should be
observed to the extent that they protect behavior that may be frowned upon by the majority.

In this case, it was not disputed that, like respondent, the father of her child was unmarried.
Therefore, respondent cannot be held liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct simply
because she gave birth to the child out of wedlock. Respondent was indicted only for
alleged immorality for giving birth out of wedlock. It was the only charge of which she
was informed. Judge Abella's investigation focused solely on that matter. Thus, the
recommendation of the OCA that she be held administratively liable in connection
with an entry in the birth certificate of Christian Jeon came like a thief in the night. It
was unwarranted.

Respondent was neither confronted with it nor given the chance to explain it. To hold her
liable for a totally
different charge of which she was totally unaware will violate her right to due process. The
essence of due process in an administrative proceeding is the opportunity to explain one's
side, whether written or verbal. This presupposes that one has been previously apprised of
the accusation against him or her. Here, respondent was deprived of both with regard to her
alleged unbecoming conduct in relation to a certain statement in the birth certificate of her
child

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DISMISSED.

Chua
Topic: Bill of Rights – Due Process

219. Office of the Court Administrator v. Indar (2012)

DOCTRINE: Notice and hearing are not indispensable in administrative investigations. While
a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is
otherwise since they rest upon different principles. In certain proceedings, therefore, of an
administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a
notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law.

FACTS: The Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City reported to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming number of decisions,
resolutions, and orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Cader P.
Indar. The OCA conducted a judicial audit in RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 and RTC-
Cotabato Branch 14, and it was found that the annulment decisions did not exist in the
records of courts. An administrative case was filed against Judge Indar and he was placed
under preventive suspension.

The case was set for hearing on several dates and notices of hearing were sent to the last
known addresses of Judge Indar, particularly his official stations in RTC-Cotabato and RTC-
17
Shariff Aguak and his residence. The first notice of hearing was sent to his official stations
and received by Mustapha Randang. The hearing was postponed and reset, and notice of
postponement was again sent to his official stations and received by Mustapha Randang.

Judge Indar failed to attend the rescheduled hearing and to submit the required affidavit. An
Order was therefore issued by CA Justice Gacutan for Judge Indar to explain his non-
appearance and to reset the hearings. The Order was sent to his residence in Cotabato City
and was received by a certain Mr. Asok. A letter was likewise sent to Atty. Umaima Silongan,
Acting Clerk of Court of RTC-Cotabato, to serve the notice of hearing to Judge Indar.
However, Atty. Silongan submitted a Return of Service, indicating that the notices were
unserved as Judge Indar had left Cotabato City and his location was since unknown.

During the hearings, the Civil Register of Manila submitted copies Decision, Orders and
Resolutions signed by Judge Indar in 43 cases for annulment of marriage, correction of
entry, and other similar cases from RTC-Cotabato, Branch 15, accompanied by
corresponding letters of Atty. Silongan affirming the Decisions as true and authentic based
on the records, with 36 containing Atty Silongan’s certification affirming the genuineness of
Judge Indar’s signatures. Similarly, 25 Decisions, Orders and Resolutions were submitted by
the Civil Register of Quezon City, with certificates of finality and affirming the genuineness of
Judge Indar’s signature signed by Atty. Silongan. Judge Jabido, the Acting Presiding Judge
of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, was directed to verify the authenticity of the Decisions.

Atty. Silongan, despite notice, also failed to attend the hearing, as she claimed to have failed
to receive the notice since she was on leave. The hearing was reset, but Atty. Silongan still
failed to appear. Justice Gacutan sought the assistance of the NBI to locate the whereabouts
of Judge Indar and Atty. Silongan, and their residential addresses were provided by the NBI.
Justice Gacutan was transferred to Manila and the administrative matter was re-raffled to
Justice Borreta, who sent notices of hearing to the addresses provided by the NBI, but the
notices were returned, stating they had moved to an unknown address.

During hearing, Judge Jabido testified that the Records of the RTC were bereft of evidence
to show that regular and true proceedings were had on the cases, that no docket fee was
paid, there was no scheduled hearing as calendar, no record that a hearing was conducted,
no stenographic notes of proceedings, and the cases were not calendared to be submitted
for decision.

In a report dated Sept. 2, 2011, Justice Borreta first determined whether the requirements of
due process had been complied with since there was no proof that Judge Indar personally
and actually received any of the notices sent to him in the course of the investigation. Justice
Borreta differentiated administrative due process with judicial due process. He stated that
"while a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in
administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles." He noted that all
possible means to locate Judge Indar and to personally serve the court notices to him were
resorted to. The notices of hearing were sent to Judge Indar’s known addresses, namely, his
sala in RTC-Cotabato Branch 14 and RTC-Shariff Aguak Branch 15, and at his residence
address. None of the notices appeared to have been personally received by Judge Indar,
18
but, Justice Borreta concluded that the requirements of due process have been complied
with. Justice Borreta stated that Judge Indar was aware of a pending administrative case
against him. The notice of this Court’s Resolution of 4 May 2010, preventively suspending
Judge Indar, was mailed and sent to him at his sala in RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15.

Judge Borreta found Judge Indar’s act of issuing decisions on annulment of marriage cases
without complying with the stringent procedural and substantive requirements of the Rules of
Court for such cases clearly violates the Code of Judicial Conduct for making it appear that
the annulment cases underwent trial, when the records show no judicial proceedings
occurred.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty

RULING: Yes, Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.

In Cornejo v. Gabriel, the Court held that notice and hearing are not indispensable in
administrative investigations. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings,
in administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon different principles. In
certain proceedings, therefore, of an administrative character, it may be stated, without fear
of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law.

Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative
proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict judicial sense. It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the
case against him is decided. Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of due
process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the
opportunity to be heard.

In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to controvert the charges against him.
While there is no proof that Judge Indar personally received the notices of hearing issued by
the Investigating Justices, the first two notices of hearing were received by one Mustapha
Randang of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato, while one of the notices was received by a
certain Mrs. Asok, who were presumably authorized and capable to receive notices on
behalf of Judge Indar. He cannot feign ignorance of the administrative investigation against
him because aside from the fact that the Court’s Resolution suspending him was mailed to
him, his preventive suspension was reported in major national newspapers. Moreover,
Judge Indar was repeatedly sent notices of hearings to his known addresses. Thus, there
was due notice on Judge Indar of the charges against him. However, Judge Indar still failed
to file his explanation and appear at the scheduled hearings. Consequently, the investigation
proceeded ex parte in accordance with Section 4, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

The Court defines misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to
violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial
evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent
19
to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of
grave misconduct.

In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases which
do not exist in the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that (1)
proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been paid; (3) the
parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been
conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision. As found by the Audit Team, the list
of case titles submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City are not
found in the list of cases filed, pending or decided in RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, nor in
the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. In
other words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on
the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such cases
underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential requisites for voiding
marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.

The Court defines dishonesty as a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;

untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."

In this case, Judge Indar issued Decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases when
in fact he did not conduct any judicial proceedings on the cases. Not even the filing of the
petitions occurred. Judge Indar made it appear in his Decisions that the annulment cases
complied with the stringent requirements of the Rules of Court and the strict statutory and
jurisprudential conditions for voiding marriages, when quite the contrary is true, violating
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge "perform official
duties honestly."

Moreover, this is not Judge Indar’s first offense. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953, the Court
imposed on him a fine of ₱10,000 for violating Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court,
when he issued a preliminary injunction without any hearing and prior notice to the parties. In
another case, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2069, the Court found him guilty of gross misconduct for
committing violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and accordingly fined him ₱25,000.
Since this is his 3rd offense, the Court imposes on Judge Indar the ultimate penalty of
dismissal from service, with its accessory penalties, pursuant to Section 11, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court.

In addition, Judge Indar’s dishonest act of issuing decisions making it appear that the
annulment cases underwent trial and complied with the Rules of Court, laws, and
established jurisprudence violates the lawyer’s oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court." Such violation is also a ground for disbarment. Considering that Judge
Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty, constituting violations of the Lawyer’s
Oath, and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Judge
Indar deserves disbarment.

20
In so far as Atty. Silongan, is concerned, we adopt Justice Borreta’s recommendation to
conduct an investigation on her alleged participation in the authentication of the questioned
Decisions.

DISPOSITIVE: Judge Indar is dismissed form service and disbarred. The OCA is ordered to
investigate Atty. Silongan on her alleged participation in the authentication of the questioned
Decisions.

First Class Cadet Aldrin Cudia, rep. by his father Renato Cudia v. Superintendent of
PMA

GR No. 211362, February 24, 2015, Peralta, J

DOCTRINE:
Compared to other higher learning institutions, the mission of the military is unique in the
sense that its primary business is to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise,
and that “overproceduralizing” military determinations necessarily gives soldiers less time to
accomplish this task. Extensive cadet investigations and complex due process hearing could
sacrifice simplicity, practicality, and timeliness. A cadet facing dismissal from the military
academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected private interests (life, liberty, or
property); Disciplinary proceedings conducted within the bounds of procedural due process
is a must.

FACTS:
Cadet 1CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of PMA, premiere military
academy in Baguio. He was supposed to graduate with honors, receive the Navy Saber and
be commissioned as an ensign of the Navy. However, the following occurred:
 Cudia was part of a class which had a lesson exam (LE) on Operations Research
under Dr. Costales. This was the 4th period from 1:30PM to 3:00PM. Meanwhile,
Prof. Berong handled the 5th period from 3:05PM to 4:05PM. After a few days, Prof.
Berong issued a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cudia for being late for 2 mins.
 Major Hindang, of the Company Tactical Officers (CTO), who handled the
explanations of the concerned cadets, penalized Cudia for 11 demerits and 13
touring hours, upon finding that Cudia’s statement that the previous professor
dismissed the class late was denied because Dr. Costales denied such allegation.
The matter was elevated before Maj. Leander, Senior Tactical Officer (STO) who
affirmed the penalty.
 Due to an Honor Report stating that Cudia violated the Honor Code due to lying, and
after Cudia submitted his written explanation, PMA Honors Committee (HC)
constituted a team for preliminary investigation. Later, a hearing commenced where
a vote of 8-1 was in favor of a guilty verdict.
 Cudia filed an appeal to the HC Chairman, which was denied. Eventually, PMA HQ
issued a special order for the separation of Cudia from PMA. Cudia sought for
reinstatement, alleging that he was ostracized.
 The case was referred to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB), which
eventually affirmed the HC findings, the parents of Cudia filed a letter-complaint
before Commission on Human Rights-Cordillera Admin. Region (CHR-CAR) against
HC members for violation of human rights (due process, education and privacy of
communication). CHR-CAR’s Resolution was in favor of Cudia for reinstatement.
 The matter was elevated to President Aquino and the Dept of National Defense
(DND), which handled the investigation of the Cudia’s case. To conclude, the OP
sustained the findings of AFP Chief of Staff and CRAB

21
Days after the 2014 graduation, the father of Cudia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus. The mother filed a petition-in-intervention.

ISSUE:
Whether the PMA, Honor Committee and CRAB committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing Cadet 1CL Cudia from the academy in utter disregard of his right to due process

RULING: NO

On the allegation of Cadet’s relinquishment of certain civil liberties –

Respondents assert that the standard of rights applicable to a cadet is not the same as that
of a civilian because the former’s rights have already been recalibrated to best serve the
military purpose and necessity, citing Gudani v. Senga and Kapunan v. De Villa cases. This
assertion is untenable.

A student at a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private interests for the
proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater
degree than a student at a civilian public school. Here, the Honor Code and Handbook
expresses this.

Adopting US jurisprudence, a cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for
misconduct has constitutionally protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence,
disciplinary proceedings conducted within the bounds of procedural due process is a must.
Here, the PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process.

On the Academic Freedom of PMA –

School-student relationship is contractual in nature. Once admitted, a student’s enrolment is

not only semestral in duration but for the entire period he or she is expected to complete it.
An institution of learning has an obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete
the course they seek to pursue. The relationship has also been held as reciprocal.

Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee cited US jurisprudence which enumerated the “four
essential freedoms” of a university: to determine for itself on academic grounds (1) who may
teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted to
study. An educational institution has the power to adopt and enforce such rules as may be
deemed expedient for its government, this being incident to the very object of incorporation,
and indispensable to the successful management of the college. It can decide for itself its
aims and objectives and how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or interference
except when there is an overriding public welfare which would call for some restraint. The
schools’ power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom.
The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after graduation for
any act done by the student prior thereto. Under the rubric of “right to education,” students
have a concomitant duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school. In this case, PMA
is not different. It has the right to invoke academic freedom to enforce internal rules and
regulations, particularly Honor Code and Honor System.

Procedural Safeguards in a student disciplinary case –

Guzman v. National University provides minimum standards to satisfy demands of

procedural due process: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause
of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence
against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5)
the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated
22
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. The proceedings for students are not
the same as those before courts. The proceedings may be summary. What is crucial is that
official action must meet minimum standards of fairness to the individual, which generally
encompass the right of adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard

Compared to other higher learning institutions, the mission of the military is unique in the
sense that its primary business is to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise,
and that “overproceduralizing” military determinations necessarily gives soldiers less time to
accomplish this task. Extensive cadet investigations and complex due process hearing could
sacrifice simplicity, practicality, and timeliness. Due to the issue with Cudia being one of first
impression before the Court, US jurisprudence should be used as guidance. US courts have
uniformly viewed that “due process” is a flexible concept, requiring consideration in each
case of a variety of circumstances and calling for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.

In this case, the investigation of Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed prescribed procedure
and existing practices of PMA. Cudia was informed of the Honor Report. He was given
opportunity to explain.

As to the contention that Cudia is entitled to right to counsel, there is nothing in the 1987
Constitution stating that a party in a nonlitigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by
counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is not indispensable. Here, records
show that Cudia was given the option and was able to seek legal advice from PAO when
CRAB reviewed and reinvestigated the case.

As to confidentiality of records of proceedings –

Petitioners have not specifically indicated the nature of the concealed evidence, if any, and
the reason
for withholding it. What they did was simply supposing that Cadet 1CL Cudia’s guilty verdict
would be overturned with the production and examination of such documents, footages, and
recordings

As to Petitioners’ allegation of ostracism in PMA –

While not something new in a military academy, ostracism’s continued existence in the
modern times should no longer be countenanced. It practically denies the accused cadet’s
protected rights to present witnesses or evidence in his or her behalf and to be presumed
innocent until finally proven otherwise in a proper proceeding.

As to Cadet 1CL Cudia’s stay in the Holding Center, the Court was in favor of Respondents’
discretion. The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook provides that, in case a cadet has
been found guilty by the HC of violating the Honor Code and has opted not to resign, he or
she may stay and wait for the disposition of the case. In such event, the cadet is not on full-
duty status.

As to Petitioners’ allegations of late and vague decisions of admin. agencies, sham

trial, and unjust punishment –

While there is a constitutional mandate stating that “[no] decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based, such provision does not apply to Cudia’s case. The Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook also has no written rule on the matter. Even if the provision applies, nowhere
does it demand that a point-by-point consideration and resolution of the issues raised by the

23
parties are necessary. Cudia was still properly informed of the decisions of the reviewing
body.

As to the allegations of a sham trial by admin. agencies, the Court disagrees. Partiality, like
fraudulent intent, can never be presumed. Absent some showing of actual bias, petitioners’
allegations do not hold water. The HC is given leeway on the voting procedures in actual
cases taking into account the exigency of the times. What is important is that, in the end,
there must be a unanimous nine votes in order to hold a cadet guilty of violating the Honor
Code.

As for the issue of whether Cadet 1CL Cudia committed lying is an issue of fact.
Unfortunately for petitioners, the Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot pass upon factual
matters as it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the
proceedings below.

The Court noted that evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear Cudia. While his
Transcript of Records (TOR) may reflect not only his outstanding academic performance but
his excellent grade in subjects on Conduct during his four-year stay, it does not necessarily
follow that he is innocent of the offense charged. Considering that Cudia in truth and in fact
lied and his acceptance that violation of the Honor Code warrants the ultimate penalty of
dismissal from the PMA, there is actually no more dispute to resolve

PETITION DENIED
“The dismissal of Cadet 1CL Cudia from the PMA did not effectively deprive him of a future.”

Other notes:

Mandamus is improper. For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a
ministerial act or duty. In this case:
 the plea to direct PMA to include Cudia in the list of graduates was rendered moot
and academic when the graduation already commenced.
 The plea directing PMA to restore Cudia’s rights and entitlements as graduating
cadet cannot be granted pursuant to academic freedom. The power to confer
degrees at PMA, grant awards, and commission officers in the military service are
discretionary acts on the part of President as AFP Commander-in-Chief.
 The plea to require a specific course of conduct against HC and CRAB cannot be
granted. These agencies’ findings were under exercise of discretion and mandamus
does not lie.

Doctrine of exhaustion of admin. remedies –

no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted. However, as an exception, a party may
directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the following is present: (1) violation of
due process, (2) purely legal questions, (3) admin. action is illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, (4) estopped on the part of admin. agency, (5) irreparable injury, (6)
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as alter ego of president bear implied
approval of latter, (7) required exhaustion is unreasonable, (8) amounts to a nullification of a
claim, (9) subject matter is private land in land case proceedings, (10) rules does not provide
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) urgency of judicial intervention.

Courts to intervene in military affairs –

The Constitution entrusts the political branches of the government, not the courts, with
superintendence and control over the military because the courts generally lack the
competence and expertise necessary to evaluate military decisions and they are ill-equipped

24
to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority
might have. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the scope of judicial
power. The Constitution declares it as a matter of principle that civilian authority is, at all
times, supreme over the military. The proceedings of the HC can, for purposes of the
Due Process Clause, be considered a governmental activity. The effect of the
committee’s procedures and determinations on the separation process is sufficiently
intertwined with the formal governmental activity which may follow as to bring it properly
under judicial review

The nature of CHR findings –

The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are merely recommendatory and,
therefore, not binding to this Court. The reason is that the CHR’s constitutional mandate
extends only to the investigation of all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights

Jackson

Topic: Due Process

221. Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission (2004)

DOCTRINE: The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a
system of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings
of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire
history. Due process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair and right
and just. It is a constitutional restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and
judicial powers of the government provided by the Bill of Rights.

FACTS:
Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing
ornamental and construction materials. It employed Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as
gypsumboard and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they
were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and payment of money claims

Agabons claim, among others that Riviera violated the requirements of notice and hearing
when the latter did not send written letters of termination to their addresses.

Riviera admitted to not sending the Agabons letters of termination to their last known
addresses because the same would be futile, as the Agabons do not reside there anymore.
However, it also claimed that the Agabons abandoned their work. More than once, they
subcontracted installation works for other companies. They already were warned of
termination if the same act was repeated, still, they disregarded the warning.

LA: ruled in favor of the spouses and ordered Riviera to pay them their money claims.
NLRC: reversed the LA, finding that the Agabons were indeed guilty of abandonment.
CA: modified the LA by ruling that there was abandonment but ordering Riviera to pay the
Agabons’ money claims.

ISSUE: W/N the violation of the procedural requirements of notice and hearing for
termination of employees a violation of the Constitutional due process.

RULING: No.
25
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of
rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our
people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire
history. Due process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair and right
and just.  It is a constitutional restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and
judicial powers of the government provided by the Bill of Rights.

Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, has two aspects:
substantive, i.e., the valid and authorized causes of employment termination under the Labor
Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal. Procedural due process requirements
for dismissal are found in the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code of the Philippines.  
Breaches of these due process requirements violate the Labor Code. Therefore, statutory
due process should be differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional due process.

Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of
his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found in
the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated
without just cause after notice and hearing.

Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer
must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if
requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the
grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after
hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the
dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give
the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to
the effectivity of his separation.

In this case, the dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners
abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not
follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known
addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore.
Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law
mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee's last known address. Thus, it
should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.

Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due
process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the
employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights. The
indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of "dismiss
now, pay later," which we sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in
the nature of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, taking
into special consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer.

The violation of the petitioners' right to statutory due process by the private respondent
warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages.

DISPOSITIVE: The petition is DENIED. 

CASE TITLE: 222. Michael H. v. Gerald D. - 491 U.S. 110, 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989)

FACTS:
26
 In 1976, Carole D. and Gerald D. were married. In 1978, Carole became involved in
an adulterous affair with Michael H.
In 1980, Carole, conceived a child, Victoria. Gerald was listed as the father on the
birth certificate and has always held the child to be his daughter. But after the delivery of the
child, Carole informed Michael that she believed he might be the father. In 1981 Gerald
moved to New York.
For a time, Carole and Gerald went separate ways; and Carole and Michael lived
together where Michael held Victoria as his daughter. Blood tests revealed that there’s
98.07% probability that Michael was the father of Victoria. Later on, Carole left Michael.
In November of 1982 Michael filed a filiation action in California to establish his
paternity and right to visitation. In 1983 the court appointed an attorney and a guardian ad
litem to represent Victoria’s interests.
Carole reconciled with Gerald and they lived together. In May 1984, Michael then
sought visitation rights pendent lite.
A court appointed psychologist recommended that Carole retain sole custody, but
Michael be allowed continued contact with Victoria pursuant to a restricted visitation
schedule. The court concurred.
In October 1984, Gerald moved for summary judgment on the ground that under
California law there were no triable issues of fact as to Victoria’s paternity. The law provides
that “the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.” The presumption may only be
rebutted by blood tests, and a motion for such tests must be made within two years of the
birth by the husband, or by the wife if the natural father has filed an affidavit acknowledging
paternity.
In 1985 the Superior Court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that
Carole and Gerald were cohabiting at the time of conception and birth and that Gerald was
neither sterile nor impotent.
ISSUE: Does the presumption established by the law infringe upon the due process
rights of a man who wishes to establish his paternity of a child born to the wife of another
man?

RULING: NO.

As to procedural due process:

Michael claims that the California law, in that such presumption provided by the law
violated his right to procedural due process by not affording him an opportunity to
demonstrate his paternity in an evidentiary hearing.
As the Court of Appeal phrased it:
“The conclusive presumption is actually a substantive rule of law based upon
a determination by the Legislature as a matter of overriding social policy, that given a
certain relationship between the husband and wife, the husband is to be held
responsible for the child, and that the integrity of the family unit should not be
impugned.'"
Of course the conclusive presumption not only expresses the State's substantive
policy but also furthers it, excluding inquiries into the child's paternity that would be
destructive of family integrity and privacy.

Here, Michael's contention that procedural due process requires that he be afforded
an opportunity to demonstrate his paternity in an evidentiary hearing fundamentally
misconceives the nature of § 621. Although phrased in terms of a presumption, § 621
expresses and implements a substantive rule of law declaring it to be generally irrelevant for
paternity purposes whether a child conceived during, and born into, an existing marriage
was begotten by someone other than the husband and had a prior relationship with him,
based on the state legislature's determination, as a matter of overriding social policy, that the
husband should be held responsible for the child and that the integrity and privacy of the
27
family unit should not be impugned. Because Michael's complaint is that the statute
categorically denies all men in his circumstances an opportunity to establish their paternity,
his challenge is not accurately viewed as procedural.

We therefore reject Michael's procedural due process challenge.

As to substantive due process:

Michael contends as a matter of substantive due process that, because he has

established a parental relationship with Victoria, protection of Gerald's and Carole's marital
union is an insufficient state interest to support termination of that relationship. This
argument is, of course, predicated on the assertion that Michael has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in his relationship with Victoria.
The presumption of legitimacy was a fundamental principle of the common law.
Traditionally, that presumption could be rebutted only by proof that a husband was incapable
of procreation or had had no access to his wife during the relevant period.

Here, there is no merit to Michael's substantive due process claim that he has a
constitutionally protected "liberty" interest in the parental relationship he has established with
Victoria, and that protection of Gerald's and Carole's marital union is an insufficient state
interest to support termination of that relationship. Michael has failed to meet his burden of
proving that his claimed "liberty" interest is one so deeply imbedded within society's
traditions as to be a fundamental right. Not only has he failed to demonstrate that the interest
he seeks to vindicate has traditionally been accorded protection by society, but the common
law presumption of legitimacy, and even modern statutory and decisional law, demonstrate
that society has historically protected, and continues to protect, the marital family against the
sort of claim Michael asserts.

In other words, historically, the marital family has been protected rather than the
potential father outside of the marriage. The presumption of legitimacy was fundamental at
common law, and could be rebutted only by a husband who was incapable of procreation or
had no access to his wife during the relative period. The policy rationales were the aversion
to declaring children illegitimate and the peace and tranquility of the States and families. No
modern or historical precedent similarly recognizes the power of the natural father to assert
parental rights.

Michael must establish not that society has traditionally allowed a natural father in his
circumstances to establish paternity, but that it has traditionally accorded such a father
parental rights. To provide protection to an adulterous natural father is to deny protection to
a marital father.

Note:
JUSTICE STEVENS, although concluding that a natural father might have a
constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with a child whose mother was married
to, and cohabiting with, another man at the time of the child's conception and birth, also
concluded that the California statutory scheme, as applied in this case, is consistent with the
Due Process Clause, since it did not deprive Michael of a fair opportunity to prove that he is
an "other person having an interest in the welfare of the child" to whom "reasonable
visitation rights" may be awarded in the trial judge's discretion under § 4601. The plurality's
interpretation of § 621 as creating an absolute bar to such a determination is not only an
unnatural reading of the statute's plain language, but is also not consistent with the reading
given by the courts below and California courts in other cases, all of which, after deciding
that the § 621 presumption barred a natural father from proving paternity, have nevertheless
gone on to consider the separate question whether it would be proper to allow the natural
father visitation as an "other person" based on the best interests of the child in the
28
circumstances of the particular case. Here, where the record shows that, after its shaky start,
the marriage between Carole and Gerald developed a stability that now provides Victoria
with a loving and harmonious family home, there was nothing fundamentally unfair in the trial
judge's exercise of his discretion to allow the mother to decide whether the child's best
interests would be served by allowing the natural father visitation privileges.

Lopez
Topic: Governmental Powers and Individual Rights and Freedoms; Bill of Rights; Due
Process

223. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)

DOCTRINE: Respondents’ asserted “right” to assistance in committing suicide is not a

fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The Court’s
established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: First, the
Court has regularly observed that the Clause specially protects those fundamental rights
and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition. Second, the Court has required a “careful description” of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest. The Ninth Circuit’s and respondents’ various descriptions of
the interest here at stake - e.g., a right to “determin[e] the time and manner of one’s death,”
the “right to die,” a “liberty to choose how to die,” a right to “control of one’s final days,” “the
right to choose a humane, dignified death,” and “the liberty to shape death”- run counter to
that second requirement. Since the Washington statute prohibits “aiding another person to
attempt suicide,” the question before the Court is more properly characterized as whether
the “liberty” specially protected by the Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself
includes a right to assistance in doing so. This asserted right has no place in our Nation’s
traditions, given the country’s consistent, almost universal, and continuing rejection of the
right, even for terminally ill, mentally competent adults. To hold for respondents, the Court
would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the
considered policy choice of almost every State.

FACTS: It has always been a crime to assist a suicide in the State of Washington. The
State’s present law makes “[p]romoting a suicide attempt” a felony and provides: “A person
is guilty of [that crime] when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide.”

Respondents, four Washington physicians who occasionally treat terminally ill, suffering
patients, declare that they would assist these patients in ending their lives if not for the
State’s assisted-suicide ban. They, along with three gravely ill plaintiffs who have since died
and a nonprofit organization that counsels people considering physician-assisted suicide,
filed this suit against petitioners, the State and its Attorney General, seeking a declaration
that the ban is, on its face, unconstitutional. They assert a liberty interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause which extends to a personal choice by a
mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician-assisted suicide.

Relying primarily on Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey and Cruzan v.

Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, the Federal District Court agreed, concluding that
Washington’s assisted-suicide ban is unconstitutional because it places an undue burden on
the exercise of that constitutionally protected liberty interest. The en banc Ninth Circuit
affirmed.

ISSUE: WON the State of Washington’s law that makes promoting a suicide attempt a felony
is constitutional

RULING: Yes, the State of Washington’s law that makes promoting a suicide attempt a
felony is constitutional
29
Washington’s prohibition against “caus[ing]” or “aid[ing]” a suicide does not violate the Due
Process Clause.

(a) An examination of our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices demonstrates that
Anglo-American common law has punished or otherwise disapproved of assisting suicide for
over 700 years; that rendering such assistance is still a crime in almost every State; that
such prohibitions have never contained exceptions for those who were near death; that the
prohibitions have in recent years been reexamined and, for the most part, reaffirmed in a
number of States; and that the President recently signed the Federal Assisted Suicide
Funding Restriction Act of 1997, which prohibits the use of federal funds in support of
physician-assisted suicide.

(b) In light of that history, this Court’s decisions lead to the conclusion that respondents’
asserted “right” to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause. The Court’s established method of substantive-due-
process analysis has two primary features: First, the Court has regularly observed that the
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. E.g., Moore v. East Cleveland (plurality
opinion). Second, the Court has required a “careful description” of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest, e.g., Reno v. Flores. The Ninth Circuit’s and respondents’
various descriptions of the interest here at stake - e.g., a right to “determin[e] the time and
manner of one’s death,” the “right to die,” a “liberty to choose how to die,” a right to “control
of one’s final days,” “the right to choose a humane, dignified death,” and “the liberty to shape
death”—run counter to that second requirement. Since the Washington statute prohibits
“aid[ing] another person to attempt suicide,” the question before the Court is more properly
characterized as whether the “liberty” specially protected by the Clause includes a right to
commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so. This asserted right has
no place in our Nation’s traditions, given the country’s consistent, almost universal, and
continuing rejection of the right, even for terminally ill, mentally competent adults. To hold for
respondents, the Court would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice,
and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every State. Respondents’
contention that the asserted interest is consistent with this Court’s substantive-due-process
cases, if not with this Nation’s history and practice, is unpersuasive. The constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition that was discussed in Cruzan, was
not simply deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy, but was instead
grounded in the Nation’s history and traditions, given the common-law rule that forced
medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse
unwanted medical treatment. And although Casey recognized that many of the rights and
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy, it does not
follow that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected. Casey
did not suggest otherwise.

(c) The constitutional requirement that Washington’s assisted-suicide ban be rationally

related to legitimate government interests is unquestionably met here. These interests
include prohibiting intentional killing and preserving human life; preventing the serious
public-health problem of suicide, especially among the young, the elderly, and those
suffering from untreated pain or from depression or other mental disorders; protecting the
medical profession’s integrity and ethics and maintaining physicians’ role as their patients’
healers; protecting the poor, the elderly, disabled persons, the terminally ill, and persons in
other vulnerable groups from indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial
pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a possible slide toward voluntary and perhaps even
involuntary euthanasia. The relative strengths of these various interests need not be
weighed exactingly, since they are unquestionably important and legitimate, and the law at
issue is at least reasonably related to their promotion and protection
30
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is REVERSED and remanded.
Manotok
Topic: Governmental Powers and Individual Rights and Freedoms; Due Process

224. Lawrence v. Texas (2002) J. Kennedy

DOCTRINE: The fact a State's governing majority has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice, and
individual decisions concerning the intimacies of physical relationships, even when not
intended to produce offspring, are a form of “liberty” protected by due process. 

FACTS: The Under Texas statute, "A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate
sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex." Police officers were sent to a
private residence to respond to a reported weapons disturbance. They entered the
apartment resided by petitioner John Geddes Lawrence. They caught Lawrence and another
man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a sexual act. The two petitioners were arrested, held in
custody over night and charged and convicted by a Justice of Peace. In their appeal to the
Harris County Criminal Court, petitioners challenged the validity of the statute. They allege
that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause. Their contentions were rejected. In the
Court of Appeals, the constitutional arguments under Equal Protection and Due Process
Clause were rejected. Petitioners file a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court grants certiorari.

ISSUE Whether petitioners' criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy
in the home violate their rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?

RULING1: YES. The Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to
engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause.

Laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for
these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.

Petitioners' right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage
in private conduct without government intervention. The case involves two adults who, with
full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct
a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to
engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. It is a promise of the
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.

31
The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
individual's personal and private life.

DISPOSITIVE: The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.

NOTES:

Introduction:

At the outset it should be noted that there is no longstanding history in this country of laws
directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter. Beginning in colonial times there were
prohibitions of sodomy derived from the English criminal laws passed in the first instance by
the Reformation Parliament of 1533. The English prohibition was understood to include
relations between men and women as well as relations between men and men… Thus early
American sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as such but instead sought to
prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally…Laws prohibiting sodomy do not
seem to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in private. A substantial
number of sodomy prosecutions and convictions for which there are surviving records were
for predatory acts against those who could not or did not consent, as in the case of a minor
or the victim of an assault.

The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured
or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It
does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter…
The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual.

On the Bowers Case:

The CA, in denying petitioners’ appeal, applied the Bowers v. Hardwick ruling. In Bowers v.
Hardwick, the Court sustained the Georgian law, making it a criminal offense to engage in
sodomy. The difference between the two cases is that the Georgia statute prohibited the
conduct whether or not the participants were of the same sex, while the Texas statute, as we
have seen, applies only to participants of the same sex.

Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) is now overruled. The foundations of Bowers have sustained
serious erosion from our recent decisions in Casey and Romer.

In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, (1992), the Court reaffirmed the
substantive force of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. The Casey decision
again confirmed that our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education. These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
32
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State. Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek
autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers
would deny them this right.

On Equal Protection Clause:

In Romer v. Evans (1996), the Court struck down class-based legislation directed at
homosexuals as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Romer invalidated an
amendment to Colorado's constitution which named as a solitary class persons who were
homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexual either by "orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships," and deprived them of protection under state antidiscrimination laws.

The Court does not hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. because
some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit
the conduct both between same-sex and different sex participants. Were we to hold the
statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might question whether a prohibition
would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and
different sex participants.

Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by
the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects. If protected conduct is
made criminal and the law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its
stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons.
When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and
of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public
and in the private spheres.

Murao
Topic: Governmental Powers and Individual Rights and Freedoms; Due Process

225. Obergefell v. Hodges et al. (2015) J. Kennedy

DOCTRINE: The 4 underlying principles of marriage (See Ruling1) are not hinged upon
marriage between the opposite sexes and past cases that have expanded the interpretation
of marriage as a legal concept demanded for the right to marry to be recognized as a
fundamental right not as a specific right to have an interracial marriage or same-sex
marriage.

FACTS:
The following is a consolidation of 4 suits filed by 14 same-sex couples and 2 men whose
partners are deceased against the governors of Tennessee, Michigan, and Kentucky as well
33
as Ohio DOH Director Richard Hodges filed in the Federal District Courts in their home
States. Petitioners demand that the liberty to marry someone of the same sex be deemed
lawful in light of the definition of marriage in the aforementioned States being between a man
and a woman. Pertinently, petitioners cited the 14 th Amendment that expressly provides that
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens” as well as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The District Courts of
Tennessee, Michigan, and Kentucky and Ohio all ruled in favor of petitioners.

However, the CA, which consolidated the cases, reversed the District courts’ decision and
ruled that the State has no Constitutional obligation to license or recognize same-sex
marriages within or out of its State.
Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE1: W/N the 14th Amendment requires a state to recognize same-sex marriage
licensed and performed in a State that grants such right? (Ohio, Tennessee, and
Kentucky Issue)

RULING1: YES. The Due Process Clause provides that no State shall ‘deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law’. Among those liberties are personal
choices that are central to individual dignity and autonomy. The right to marry established in
jurisprudence under the assumption that said marriage is between individuals of the opposite
sex but more instructive are the 4 essential attributes of the right to marry, to wit:
1) Right to marry is a personal choice inherent in the concept of individual autonomy
2) Right to marry supports a two-person union of intimate association
3) Marriage safeguards children and families from the stigma of not having the recognition,
stability, and predictability of marriage
4) Marriage is at the center of many facets of the legal and social order
Here, the 4 cited underlying principles of marriage from jurisprudence do not discriminate
whether the marriage is between the same or opposite sex. Excluding same-sex couples
from the benefits of marriage conflicts with a central premise of the right to marry being a
fundamental right that has overturned prohibitions on interracial marriage and against fathers
behind on child support from marrying without judicial approval. Maintaining such exclusion
effectively teaches that gays and lesbians are unequal to heterosexual citizens.

ISSUE2: W/N the 14th Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between the
same sex? (Michigan and Kentucky issue)

RULING2: YES. Recognition bans inflict substantial and continuing harm on same-sex
couples as they are left open to the instability and uncertainty in neighboring States as to
their rights now recognized in all States. The Court, in this decision, holds same-sex cou-
ples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States. It follows that the Court also
must hold—and it now does hold—that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to
recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-
sex character.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is GRANTED, CA decision REVERSED.

34
NOTES:
On the Introduction
The US SC started with a brief history of marriage and how its sacredness promised nobility
and dignity to all persons regardless of their station in life. Marriage has existed for millennia
and across civilizations binding societies together and it is fair to say that marriage has been
conventionally understood as a union between persons of the opposite sex.
The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change from being viewed as a
transaction by the couple’s parents, to being a male-dominated legal entity, to the strong and
voluntary union it is now. This history is akin to that of homosexuality that was initially seen
as immoral, illegal, and even as an illness to eventually being seen as a normal expression
of human sexuality. Eventually, in 2013, the US v. Windsor case invalidated the Defense of
Marriage act of 1996 that barred Federal Government from treating same-sex marriages as
valid.
Petitioners do not seek to devalue marriage but seek its revered idea and reality for
themselves. James Obergefell wanted his Maryland marriage with his then ailing from ALS
and now deceased partner John Arthur to be recognized even as to the latter’s death
certificate.

On Constitutional Interpretation
Although identification of fundamental rights from which liberties are rooted in has not been
reduced to any formula, courts are guided by broad principles in the Constitution that allow
leeway to learn from the past but not let it rule the present. The generations that wrote and
ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent
of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter
protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight
reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture,
a claim to liberty must be addressed.

On awaiting legislation
CA was improper to allude to further legislation since there have been referenda, legislative
debates, and grassroots campaigns, as well as countless studies, papers, books, scholarly
writings, and extensive litigation in state and federal courts on same-sex marriage.
Moreover, when the rights of persons are violated, the Constitution requires redress by the
courts notwithstanding the more general value of democratic decision-making. Petitioners in
this case have displayed the ill effects of waiting for legislation. Were the Court to stay its
hand to allow slower, case-by-case determination of the required availability of specific
public benefits to same-sex couples, it still would deny gays and lesbians many rights and
responsibilities intertwined with marriage.

Chief Justice Roberts Dissent, joined by Scalia and Thomas: For the past six years, voters
and legislators in eleven States and the District of Columbia have revised their laws to allow
marriage between two people of the same sex. But this Court is not a legislature. Whether
same-sex marriage is a good idea should be of no concern to us. Under the Constitution,
judges have power to say what the law is, not what it should be. Five lawyers have closed
the debate and enacted their own vision of marriage as a matter of constitutional law.
35
Stealing this issue from the people will for many cast a cloud over same-sex marriage,
making a dramatic social change that much more difficult to accept.

Olivo
Topic: DUE PROCESS
226. White Light Corporation v. City of Manila (2009)

DOCTRINE: Due process evades a precise definition. The purpose of the guaranty is to
prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of
individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their
property is concerned.

FACTS:
City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance which prohibits short
time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments in the City of Manila and imposes a fine to any person or corporation who
shall violate any provision of this ordinance.

Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to
privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an
unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. Petitioners allege that as
owners of establishments offering “wash-up” rates, their business is being unlawfully
interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection
rights of their clients are also being interfered with.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance violates the due process clause under the
Constitution.

RULING: YES.

The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed
under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition. The
purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life,
liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against
arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the
guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.

The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but
distinct restrictions on government, “procedural due process” and “substantive due process.”
Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.49 Procedural due process concerns itself with
government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the
private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a
hearing.
36
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld
in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:
“Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed
to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his
Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare. “In
accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to
pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. The U.S. Supreme
Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of “liberty.” It
said: While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed
[by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
“liberty” must be broad indeed.”

It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual
behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments “have gained
notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution, adultery and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ‘ideal
haven for prostitutes and thrillseekers.’

Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that
legitimate sexual behavior among consenting married or consenting single adults which is
constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. As
held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life,
liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the
vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is granted and the Ordinance is declared as unconstitutional.

227. GSIS vs. MONTESCLAROS. G.R. No. 146494. July 14, 2004.

DOCTRINE: Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires
a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a
protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-
existing law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as
provided under the terms of the public employees’ pension statute. No law can deprive such
person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice and
opportunity to be heard.

37
FACTS: Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros, 72-year-old widower, married
Milagros Orbiso, then 43, on 10 July 1983

Nicolas filed with the GSIS an application for retirement benefits effective 18 February 1985
under PD. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977, designating
Milagros as his sole beneficiary. His last day of actual service was on 17 February 1985.

On 31 January 1986, GSIS approved Nicolas’ application for retirement “effective 17

February 1984,” granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a
monthly annuity thereafter.

Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension
under PD 1146.

On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the
surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension

Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory relief questioning the
validity of Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension

RTC declared Milagros eligible ruling that, based on Art. 115 and 117 of the FC, retirement
benefits are onerous acquisitions and hence are conjugal property and that Sec. 18 of PD
1146 is deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the Family Code

CA affirmed, hence this petition for review

ISSUE: Whether the proviso in Sec. 182 of PD 1146 which prohibits the dependent spouse
from receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within
three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension is valid.

RULING: NO, it is invalid for being contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which
provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”  The proviso is unduly
oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouse’s claim for survivorship pension if the
dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited
period. There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without
giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard.  The proviso undermines the
purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive and integrated social security and
insurance benefits to government employees and their dependents in the event of sickness,
disability, death, and retirement of the government employees.

Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a
vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a
protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-
existing law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as
2
SEC. 18.  Death of a Pensioner.  Upon the death of a pensioner, the primary beneficiaries shall
receive the applicable pension mentioned under paragraph (b) of section seventeen of this
Act:  Provided, That, the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage
with the pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.  When the pensioner dies within the period covered by the lump sum, the survivorship
pension shall be paid only after the expiration of the said period.  This shall also apply to the
pensioners living as of the effectivity of this Act, but the survivorship benefit shall be based on the
monthly pension being received at the time of death. 
38
provided under the terms of the public employees’ pension statute. No law can deprive
such person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice
and opportunity to be heard.

ON ITS VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: The surviving spouse of a

government employee is entitled to receive survivor’s benefits under a pension system. 
However, statutes sometimes require that the spouse should have married the employee for
a certain period before the employee’s death to prevent sham marriages contracted for
monetary gain.  In Sneddon v. The State Employee’s Retirement System of Illinois, the
Appellate Court of Illinois held that such classification was based on difference in situation
and circumstance, bore a rational relation to the purpose of the statute, and was therefore
not in violation of constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.

Here, however, the proviso does not satisfy the requirements for a reasonable classification.
It proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the
pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the
proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before
the pensioner’s death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if
the marriage took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The
object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any
reason or purpose for such a prohibition.

If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent “deathbed marriages,” then we do not see why
the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for
pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on
substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within
three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily
for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits.

Hence, for being against the due process and equal protection clause, the proviso in Sec. 18
of PD 1147 is invalid.

DISPOSTIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit. We declare VOID for
being violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
law the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146.
Ong
Due Process(there is no due process issue in the case )

#228. Republic v Albios 2013

DOCTRINE: Limited Purpose Marriages are still valid Marriages if it follows the essential and
formal requisites of a marriage

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for
dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s
marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not
void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties

39
FACTS:

Albios filed with the RTC an petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage

 She alleged that after the marriage that they separated and never lived as husband
and wife because she that the marriage is one made in jest and as such should be
null and void despite complying with the requisites of marriage.

 Fringer did not attend the proceedings despite the summons served.

 The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and
determine the existence of a collusion.

 the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a
determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.

 At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not
attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial,
hearing on the merits ensued.

She testified that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer
returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she
did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship.

The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio

The Republic of the Philippines represented by the OSG filed for a motion for
reconsideration, the motion was denied and the CA affirmed the Ruling of the RTC on
supposed lack of consent of the parties to marry due to the intent of the parties.

The OSG filed for petition for review on certiorari

 it was argued that both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and
consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be
distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

 The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a
marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American
citizenship would be rendered futile.

ISSUE/S: whether the marriage is null and void

RULING: No, it is a valid and subsisting marriage

Us jurisprudence shows that limited marriages are still valid

40
 In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose
or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages. A
common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.
Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration
law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage, and it
attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been
recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit,
a legal marriage is first necessary. At present, United States courts have generally denied
annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a
particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.

The requisites of marriage were compiled with and consent was evident.

consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because
it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent
was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage
so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full
and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no
real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that
the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a
purpose to enter into such a relation

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer
had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow
the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would
allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the
actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent
was, therefore, clearly present.

It is the state’s principle that marriage is a violable social institution as such to be

protected by the state

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have
no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage
freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.
A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law.
There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than
what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present,
and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle

41
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to
love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited
or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that
they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for
dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s
marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not
void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave
the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the
parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-
06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

Valdez
Topic: Due Process
#229. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council
(2010)

DOCTRINE: American jurisprudence instructs that “vagueness challenges that do not

involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at
hand and not with regard to the statute’s facial validity”.

FACTS:
 6 petitions challenging constitutionality of Human Security Act3 (RA 9372)

ISSUE/S: Whether or not HSA is unconstitutional

RULING: NO.

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain
rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted.

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the
crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and

3
Now repealed by Anti-Terror Law
42
panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand"
are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited
acts.

Respondents counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no

application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and
that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "when
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as
a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate
that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem
effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason
alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct.
In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one
to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the
ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations
in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce
facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the
ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy
requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual
settings and in sterile abstract contexts.

"On its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to
be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In
determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to
43
have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the
defendant is charged.

Still, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same
plane.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The overbreadth
doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected.

A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge.

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real
litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.

The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the
"chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be
abridged. This rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an "in
terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid
and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from
diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.

The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a criminal statute may be
challenged" and "underscored that an `on-its-face' invalidation of penal statutes x x x may
not be allowed."

The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal
statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a
penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution
would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of
penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal
requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be
44
appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous
and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not
before it. Such a test will impair the State's ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there
would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the State's power to prosecute
on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad,
notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.

Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a
limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them.

In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause
has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three
cases, the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-
payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under
Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, were actually charged
with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case.

There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial
analysis of its validity

From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the
following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under any of
the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special
penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is
actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners
contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must necessarily
be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause.

What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate
crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other
elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful
demand." Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting
the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected
conduct into a protected speech.

Petitioners' notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly

focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime
entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt

45
criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in
negotiating a deceitful transaction.

Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter
neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole
act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case where the
expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element of coercion
perceptible.

It is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances brought
about through speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an abridgement of
freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct
was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken,
written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of
speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against
agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies
deemed injurious to society.

Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they merely
evidence a prohibited conduct. Since speech is not involved here, the Court cannot heed the
call for a facial analysis.

Petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution
under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is
thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither
contemplates speculative counseling on a statute's future effect on hypothetical scenarios
nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.

DISPOSITIVE: The petitions are dismissed.

EQUAL PROTECTION

Baba
Topic: Equal Protection
230. Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 637 SCRA 78 , December 07,
2010

DOCTRINE:
 The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the
legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying
equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
 What the EPC simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to
a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test
has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
46
 germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
FACTS:
 Executive Order No. 1 of President Noynoy Aquino created the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 which is mandated to investigate the corrupt practices in the
Arroyo administration.

ISSUE/S:
 Whethe EO No. 1 violates the EPC by singling out the Arroyo administration

RULING:
YES, IT DOES.
 According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.” It “requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner.” “The purpose of the equal protection clause
is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.” “In other words,
the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially,
and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.” The equal protection clause is
aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political
and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal
protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
 It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of
the same class. “Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.”
 Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and
find out the truth “concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration” only. The intent to single out the previous administration
is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three
portions of the questioned executive order. In this regard, it must be borne in
mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a
class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly

47
 reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is granted

Cadiz
Topic: Equal Protection
231. Garcia v. Ray Drilon (2013)
GR No. 179267

DOCTRINE: RA. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence
against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners. It is
constitutional. It does not violate the guaranty to due process and equal protection of laws.
First, RA 9262 rests on substantial distinctions - the fact that women are more likely than
men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against
women. Second, the classification is germane to the purpose of the RA 9262 which is
to address the violence committed against women and children. Third, the
classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and apply equally to all
members – it applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse, as
well as to future conditions. It does not single out the husband or father as the culprit
because by definition, VAWC may be committed "against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship.

FACTS:
 Rosalie Garcia married Jesus Garcia, a Filipino-Chinese who controls the family
business and is the president of three corporations. They had three children.
 In the course of their marriage, Jesus forbade Rosalie to pray, and deliberately isolated
her from her friends. He also trivialized her ambitions to become a lawyer when she took
up law. Jesus then had an extramarital affair with one of his son’s godmother. His
infidelity resulted to a series of fights where Rosalie is physically and emotionally
wounded (to the point she suffered bruises and hematoma). Also, Jesus was accused of
hurting their daughter when she read the text messages between the petitioner and his
paramour. At one point, Rosalie attempted suicide by cutting her writ. Instead of bringing
her to the hospital, Jesus fled the house and did not bother to visit nor apologize to her.
When Rosalie said that she was filing charges against the paramour, Jesus packed his
things and told Rosalie he was leaving her for good. Although she is determined to
separate from her husband, Rosalie is afraid that he would take the children from him
and deprive him of financial support.
 In 2004, R.A. 9262 also known as An Act Criminalizing Violence Against Women and
Children, was enacted. And in 2006, Rosalie filed a petition for the issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband.
 The RTC issued a 30-day TPO against the petitioner and ordered him to comment as to
why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. However, the petitioner did not file an
answer as it would be futile according to him. Upon reapplication by Rosalie, the TPO
was extended.
48
 With the case pending in the RTC, the petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with the
Court of Appeals claiming that R.A. 9262 is unconstitutional as it is violative of due
process and equal protection clause, hence the issued TPO are invalid. The CA
dismissed the petition because the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the first
instance in the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether RA 9262 is unconstitutional for being violative of due process and
equal protection clause

RULING: NO. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of due process and equal
protection of the laws.

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence
against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e,
husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or
with whom the woman has a common child. The law provides for protection orders from the
barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines
the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, et al. in responding to
complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.

Men are deliberately excluded from the protection under RA 9262. During the
deliberations, the sponsor of the bill Senator Loi Estrada recognized the unequal power
relations between men and women. She proffers that if the scope of the law is broadened to
include even men, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for women. The
fact remains that it is mostly women and children who are victimized, compared to men. She
also reiterates that the laws then are inadequate for they do not provide protection orders for
women and children.

At this juncture, the Supreme Court reiterated that it is not concerned with the
wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute.  Congress has made its choice and it is
not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The remedy against it is to seek its
amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the
legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.

RA 9262 is constitutional. It does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the
laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union is instructive:

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows

classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or
practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with
one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality.
The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that
49
 the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All
that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of
the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary.

I. The Supreme Court held that RA 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are
more likely than
men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women
all make
for real differences justifying the classification under the law.

The United Nations adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979, and passed its Resolution 48/104 on
the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women in 1993 stating that “violence
against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and
women. No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of
women in nation building. The Senate has also ratified the CEDAW and finally enacted RA
9262 or Anti VAWC in 2004.

At the time of the presentation and deliberation of the Senate Bill for RA 9262,
statistics show that female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse, and
90% of these are committed by their husband or partner. On the other hand, no reliable
estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against men in the Philippines
because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many men will not even
attempt to report the situation.

Moreover, from the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and
sentencing, crimes against women are often treated differently and less seriously than other
crimes (violence within the family is often treated by the police as a private matter to be
settled by the parties themselves). Our own courts have exhibited prejudices and biases
against our women.

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by
biases and prejudices against women. Addressing or correcting discrimination through
specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against men. Petitioner's
contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an “anti-male,” “husband-
bashing,” and “hate-men” law deserves scant consideration. Justice Puno correctly pointed
out that “the paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair
to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police,
the prosecution and the judges.”
50
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the RA 9262 which is to address the
violence committed against women and children

In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines
ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also
ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003. This Convention mandates that State parties
shall accord to women equality with men before the law and shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and
family relations on the basis of equality of men and women. The Philippines likewise ratified
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. It is, thus, bound by said
Conventions and their respective protocols.

III. The classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and apply equally to all
members

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it
was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of
women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse. R.A. 9262 applies equally
to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Violence include: physical, sexual,
psychological violence and economic abuse. There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that
is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or
father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the
gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman
encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender
be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).

IV. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against

women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary
reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any
disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their
life.

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection
order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to
present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being “stripped of family, property, guns,
money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without
an inkling of what happened” is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of
due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
51
evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to
be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.

Here, the trial court gave petitioner 5 days within which to show cause why the TPO
should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing
that it would just be an “exercise in futility,” conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the
questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent
the continued renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED.

Notes:
1. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the
constitutionality or validity of a law not only with the Supreme Court, but all the RTCs.
Therefore, the constitutionality should have been raised at the first instance with RTC,
not CA.
2. Under RA 9262, protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their
children from acts of violence. They cannot be enjoined because to do so will defeat the
very purpose of the law against VAWC.

Chua
Topic: Bill of Rights – Equal Protection

232. Republic v. Manalo (2018)

DOCTRINE: There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated
foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of
his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered
as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to
their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a
distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated
the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to
one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

FACTS: On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition
for cancellation of Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue
of a judgment of divorce Japanese court. The City Prosecutor appeared in behalf of the OSG
and a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition
considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended
Petition alleged:
52
1. That Manalo was previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named
YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract
2. That a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after the proceedings,
a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court;
3. That by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband
are no longer living together; and
4. That there is a need to have the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry to be cancelled so it
would no longer appear that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no
longer her husband or is no longer married to her.

The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by
Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New
Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether
they are in the country or living abroad. On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It
held that Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for
divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter
no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. It ruled that it would be the
height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national who is no
longer married to her.

ISSUE 1: Whether a Filipino has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating
a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry.

RULING 1: Yes.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a

foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity
of the dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts
cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under
the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of
foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the
children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the
law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse
is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
53
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable
decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will
have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites of the equal protection
clause. Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by
the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical
classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is
married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between
them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities
imposed. On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the
instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are
considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are
still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to
make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they
initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue
favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

ISSUE 2: Whether the Petition of Manalo should be granted

RULING 2: No. Manalo failed to prove the Japanese law authorizing her former husband to
remarry.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. The fact of divorce must still first be
proven. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law
validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her.
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino
judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is denied.

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency v. Joy Cabiles

GR 10139, August 5, 2014, Leonen, J

DOCTRINE:
54
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., this court ruled that the clause “or for three
(3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional
for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.

FACTS:
 Responding to an ad Sameer published, Joy Cabiles submitted her application for a
quality control job in Taiwan. Joy’s application was accepted and was later asked to
sign a 1-year employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. She alleged
that Sameer required her to pay a placement fee of P70K when she signed the
employment contract. She was asked to work as a cutter in Taiwan.
 Sameer claims that a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior
notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to their office
to get her salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.”
 Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total
of NT$9,000. According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to
Manila.
 Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against Sameer and
Wacoal. She also asked for the return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for
repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary
damages.
 Sameer alleged that Joy was inefficient and negligent. Petitioner added that Wacoal's
accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred to the Pacific Manpower
& Management Services, Inc. Pacific moved for the dismissal of the case against it and
asserts that the claims against it were outside the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
because of the absence of ER-EE relationship.
 LA dismissed. NLRC reversed and ruled that Joy was illegally dismissed. The CA
affirmed NLRC’s decision and remanded the case back to NLRC to address
allegations against Pacific.

ISSUE:
Whether there was a violation of equal protection clause, upholding the award based on an
unconstitutional reinstated clause in Section 10 RA 8042

RULING: YES
Section 10 RA 8042, Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, states that
overseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause “shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three
(3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.”

CA affirmed the NLRC decision to award Cabiles NT$46,080.00 or the three-month

equivalent of her salary, attorney’s fees of NT$300.00, and the reimbursement of the
withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for her repatriation. SC upholds Cabiles is
entitled to all of these awards. The award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s

55
salary should, however, be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term
of the employment contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., this court ruled that the clause “or for three
(3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional
for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process. A statute or provision
which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.
Such clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less” was reinstated in RA 8042 upon promulgation of RA 10022 in 2010.

RA 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the reinstatement of the
clause in RA 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of respondent’s termination from work in
1997. RA 8042 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 10022 governs this case.

Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling
within the same class are treated alike, in terms of “privileges conferred, and liabilities
enforced.” It is a guarantee against “undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.” In creating laws, the legislature has
the power “to make distinctions and classifications.” In exercising such power, it has a wide
discretion. The equal protection clause does not infringe on this legislative power. A law is
void on this basis, only if classifications are made arbitrarily. There is no violation of the
equal protection clause if the law applies equally to persons within the same class and if
there are reasonable grounds for distinguishing between those falling within the class and
those who do not fall within the class. A law that does not violate the equal protection clause
prescribes a reasonable classification.

A reasonable classification “(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must
apply equally to all members of the same class.”105 The reinstated clause does not satisfy
the requirement of reasonable classification.

SC reiterates the finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime. The case distinguished between
fixed-period overseas workers and fixed-period local workers. It also distinguished between
overseas workers with employment contracts of less than one year and overseas workers
with employment contracts of at least one year. Within the class of overseas workers with
at least one-year employment contracts, there was a distinction between those with at
least a year left in their contracts and those with less than a year left in their contracts
when they were illegally dismissed.

In Serrano that before the passage of RA 8042, the money claims of illegally terminated
overseas and local workers with fixed-term employment were computed in the same
manner. Their money claims were computed based on the “unexpired portions of
their contracts.” The adoption of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 8042
subjected the money claims of illegally dismissed overseas workers with an
unexpired term of at least a year to a cap of three months’ worth of their salary. There
56
was no such limitation on the money claims of illegally terminated local workers with
fixed-term employment.

SC observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers whose employment contracts had a
term of less than one year were granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of
their employment contracts. Meanwhile, illegally dismissed overseas workers with
employment terms of at least a year were granted a cap equivalent to three months of their
salary for the unexpired portions of their contracts. Observing the terminologies used in the
clause, SC also found that “the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination
among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who are
illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to
their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally
dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the
reinstated clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three
months only.”

Overseas workers regardless of their classifications are entitled to security of tenure, at least
for the period agreed upon in their contracts. This means that they cannot be dismissed
before the end of their contract terms without due process. If they were illegally dismissed,
the workers’ right to security of tenure is violated.

Putting a cap on the money claims of certain overseas workers does not increase the
standard of protection afforded to them. Along the same line, we held that the reinstated
clause violates due process rights. It is arbitrary as it deprives overseas workers of their
monetary claims without any discernable valid purpose.

PETITION DENIED. The CA decision is AFFIRMED with modification. Sameer

Overseas Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay Joy Cabiles the amount equivalent
to her salary for the unexpired portion of her employment contract.

Others: Justice Brion’s concurring and dissenting opinion

Jackson
Topic: Equal Protection

234. U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. (No. 12-307, 26 June 2013)

DOCTRINE: DOMA violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to
the Federal Government. The Constitution’s guarantee of equality “must at the very least
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot” justify
disparate treatment of that group.

FACTS:
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), enacted in 1996, states that, for the purposes of
federal law, the words "marriage" and "spouse" refer to legal unions between one man and
one woman. Since that time, some states have authorized same-sex marriage. In other
57
cases regarding the DOMA, federal courts have ruled it unconstitutional under the Fifth
Amendment, but the courts have disagreed on the rationale.

Edith Windsor is the widow and sole executor of the estate of her late spouse, Thea Clara
Spyer, who died in 2009. The two were married in Toronto, Canada, in 2007, and their
marriage was recognized by New York state law. Thea Spyer left her estate to her spouse,
and because their marriage was not recognized by federal law, the government imposed
$363,000 in taxes. Had their marriage been recognized, the estate would have qualified for a
marital exemption, and no taxes would have been imposed.

On November 9, 2010 Windsor filed suit in district court seeking a declaration that the
Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional. At the time the suit was filed, the
government's position was that DOMA must be defended. On February 23, 2011, the
President and the Attorney General announced that they would not defend DOMA. On April
18, 2011, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives filed a
petition to intervene in defense of DOMA and motioned to dismiss the case. The district
court denied the motion, and later held that DOMA was unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

ISSUE: Does the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines the term "marriage" under federal
law as a "legal union between one man and one woman" deprive same-sex couples who are
legally married under state laws of their Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection under
federal law?

RULING: Yes.

By seeking to injure the very class New York seeks to protect, DOMA violates basic due
process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government. The
Constitution’s guarantee of equality “must at the very least mean that a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot” justify disparate treatment of that group.
DOMA cannot survive under these principles. Its unusual deviation from the tradition of
recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage operates to deprive same-sex
couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with federal recognition of their
marriages. This is strong evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of a
class recognized and protected by state law. DOMA’s avowed purpose and practical effect
are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into
same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.

DOMA’s history of enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference with the equal
dignity of same-sex marriages, conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign
power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal statute. It was its essence. The
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the House of Representatives arguments are
just as candid about the congressional purpose. DOMA’s operation in practice confirms this
purpose. It frustrates New York’s objective of eliminating inequality by writing inequality into
the entire United States Code. DOMA’s principal effect is to identify and make unequal a
subset of state-sanctioned marriages. It contrives to deprive some couples married under
the laws of their State, but not others, of both rights and responsibilities, creating two

58
contradictory marriage regimes within the same State. It also forces same-sex couples to
live as married for the purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, thus
diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it
proper to acknowledge and protect.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

CASE TITLE: 235. LAUD vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 199032. November 19, 2014.

FACTS:
 On July 10, 2009, the PNP applied with the RTC-Manila Br. 50 for a warrant to search 3
caves located inside the Laud Compound, Davao City, where the alleged remains of the
victims summarily executed by the so-called “Davao Death Squad” may be found.
 In support of the application, a certain Avasola was presented to the RTC and there
testified that he personally witnessed the killing of 6 persons in December 2005, and
was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims.
 Judge Peralta, acting as Executive Judge of the Manila-RTC, found probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant, and thus, issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which
was later enforced by the elements of the PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group,
 The search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results for the presence of
human remains.
 petitioner, retired SPO4 Laud, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally
Seized Evidence[ premised on the following grounds, among others, that
o a) the People failed to show any compelling reason to justify the issuance of a
search warrant by the Manila-RTC which was to be implemented in Davao
City where the offense was allegedly committed, in violation of Section 2, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court
o b) the fact that the alleged offense happened almost four (4) years before the
search warrant application was filed rendered doubtful the existence of
probable cause
 RTC granted the motion, CA reversed holding that the requirements for the issuance of a
search warrant were satisfied, pointing out that an application therefor involving a
heinous crime, such as Murder, is an exception to the compelling reasons
requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as explicitly
recognized in A.M. No. 99-20-09-SC
 CA also found that probable cause was established since, among others, witness
Avasola deposed and testified that he personally witnessed the murder of six (6) persons
in December 2005 and was actually part of the group that buried the victims – two bodies
in each of the three (3) caves
o it observed that the Manila-RTC failed to consider the fear of reprisal and natural
reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case, stating that these are
sufficient reasons to justify the delay attending the application of a search warrant

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the search warrant was correctly filed in RTC-Manila despite its implementation
in Davao City pursuant to AM 99-20-09-SC which provides an exception to the “compelling
reasons” in Sec. 2, R. 126 of the Rules of Court

59
(2) Whether the requirements of probable cause and particular description and the one-
specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court were complied with

RULING: (1) Yes. R. 126, Sec. 2 of the RoC states that: “An application for search warrant
shall be filed with the following: b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any
court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.”

As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, the rule on search
warrant applications before the Manila and Quezon City RTCs for the special criminal cases 4
“shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.” Perceptibly, the fact
that a search warrant is being applied for in connection with a special criminal case already
presumes the existence of a compelling reason; hence, any statement to this effect
would be superfluous and therefore should be dispensed with. By all indications, Section
12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City RTCs to issue
warrants to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as the
parameters under the said section have been complied with, as in this case. Thus, on
these grounds, the Court finds nothing defective in the preliminary issuance of Search
Warrant No. 09-14407. Perforce, the RTC-Manila should not have overturned it.

(2) YES. In order to protect the people’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) provides that no search
warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a search warrant
shall not be issued except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Here, the facts and circumstances established from the testimony of Avasola, who was
personally examined by Judge Peralta, sufficiently show that  more likely than not the crime
of Murder of six (6) persons had been perpetrated and that  the human remains in
connection with the same are in the place sought to be searched. The Court finds that the
quantum of proof to establish the existence of probable cause had been met.

That a “considerable length of time” attended the search warrant’s application from
the crime’s commission does not, by and of itself, negate the veracity of the
applicant’s claims or the testimony of the witness presented. As the CA correctly
observed, the delay may be accounted for by a witness’s fear of reprisal and natural
reluctance to get involved in a criminal case. Ultimately, in determining the existence of
probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be personally examined by the judge in
their totality, together with a judicious recognition of the variable complications and
sensibilities attending a criminal case. To the Court’s mind, the supposed delay in the search
warrant’s application does not dilute the probable cause finding made herein. In fine, the
probable cause requirement has been sufficiently met.

4
involving heinous crimes (MURDER IS A HEINOUS CRIME), illegal gambling, illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended,
and other relevant laws
60
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 25, 2011 and the
Resolution dated October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

OTHER ISSUE:
 Whether the administrative penalties imposed on Judge Peralta invalidated Search
Warrant No. 09-14407: NO, it must be qualified that the abstraction of such authority
would not, by and of itself, result in the invalidity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407
considering that Judge Peralta may be considered to have made the issuance as a de
facto officer whose acts would, nonetheless, remain valid.
o the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a  de
jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned

Lopez
Topic: Governmental Powers and Individual Rights and Freedoms; Bill of Rights; Due
Process

236. Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609 (2007)

DOCTRINE: The Fourth Amendment allows warrants to issue on probable cause, a

standard well short of absolute certainty. Valid warrants will issue to search the innocent,
and people like Rettele and Sadler unfortunately bear the cost. Officers executing search
warrants on occasion enter a house when residents are engaged in private activity; and the
resulting frustration, embarrassment, and humiliation may be real, as was true here. When
officers execute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect themselves from
harm, however, the Fourth Amendment is not violated. As respondents’ constitutional rights
were not violated, ìthere is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.

FACTS: Deputies of the Los Angeles County Sheriff Department obtained a valid warrant to
search a house suspected to be used by four suspects who were African-Americans. The
suspects were allegedly involved in a fraud and identity-theft crime ring.

Deputy Dennis Watters the implemented the search warrant. What Watters did not know
was that one of the houses (the first to be searched) had been sold to a Max Rettele. He had
purchased the home and moved into it three months earlier with his girlfriend Judy Sadler
and Sadler’s 17-year-old son Chase Hall. All three, respondents here, are Caucasians.

On the morning of December 19, the day of implementing the search warrant, Watters
briefed six other deputies in preparation for the search of the houses. Watters informed them
they would be searching for African-American suspects, one of whom owned a registered
handgun. The possibility a suspect would be armed caused the deputies concern for their
own safety. Watters had not obtained special permission for a night search, so he could not
execute the warrant until 7 AM. Around 7:15, Watters and six other deputies knocked on the
door and announced their presence. Chase Hall answered. The deputies entered the house
after ordering Hall to lie face down on the ground.

The deputies announcement awoke Rettele and Sadler. The deputies entered their bedroom
with guns drawn and ordered them to get out of their bed and to show their hands. They
protested that they were not wearing clothes. Rettele stood up and attempted to put on a
pair of sweatpants, but deputies told him not to move. Sadler also stood up and attempted,
without success, to cover herself with a sheet. Rettele and Sadler were held at gunpoint for
one to two minutes before Rettele was allowed to retrieve a robe for Sadler. He was then
permitted to dress. Rettele and Sadler left the bedroom within three to four minutes to sit on
61
the couch in the living room. By that time, the deputies realized they had made a mistake.
They apologized to Rettele and Sadler, thanked them for not becoming upset, and left within
five minutes.

They proceeded to the other house the warrant authorized them to search, where they found
the suspects. Those suspects were arrested and convicted.

Rettele and Sadler, filed this suit against Los Angeles County, the Los Angeles County
Sheriffís Department, Deputy Watters, and other members of the sheriff department.
Respondents alleged petitioners violated their Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining a
warrant in reckless fashion and conducting an unreasonable search and detention.

The District Court held that the warrant was obtained by proper procedures and the search
was reasonable. It concluded in the alternative that any Fourth Amendment rights the
deputies violated were not clearly established and that, as a result, the deputies were
entitled to qualified immunity. On appeal respondents did not challenge the validity of the
warrant; they did argue that the deputies had conducted the search in an unreasonable
manner.

ISSUE: WON the search and seizure was validly conducted

RULING: Yes, the search and seizure was validly conducted

In Michigan v. Summers, this Court held that officers executing a search warrant for
contraband may detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. In
weighing whether the search in Summers was reasonable, the Court first found that
detention represents only an incremental intrusion on personal liberty when the
search of a home has been authorized by a valid warrant. Against that interest, it
balanced preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found; minimizing the
risk of harm to the officers; and facilitating the orderly completion of the search. In executing
a search warrant, officers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure
their own safety and the efficacy of the search.

The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is an objective one. Unreasonable
actions include the use of excessive force or restraints that cause unnecessary pain or are
imposed for a prolonged and unnecessary period of time.

The orders by the police to the occupants, in the context of this lawful search, were
permissible, and perhaps necessary, to protect the safety of the deputies. Blankets and
bedding can conceal a weapon, and one of the suspects was known to own a firearm,
factors which underscore this point. The Constitution does not require an officer to ignore
the possibility that an armed suspect may sleep with a weapon within reach. The reports are
replete with accounts of suspects sleeping close to weapons. The deputies needed a
moment to secure the room and ensure that other persons were not close by or did not
present a danger. Deputies were not required to turn their backs to allow Rettele and Sadler
to retrieve clothing or to cover themselves with the sheets. Rather, the risk of harm to both
the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned
command of the situation. This is not to say, of course, that the deputies were free to force
Rettele and Sadler to remain motionless and standing for any longer than necessary. We
have recognized that special circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention might render
a search unreasonable. There is no accusation that the detention here was prolonged.
The deputies left the home less than 15 minutes after arriving. The detention was shorter
and less restrictive than the 2-to3-hour handcuff detention upheld in other cases. And there
is no allegation that the deputies prevented Sadler and Rettele from dressing longer
than necessary to protect their safety. Sadler was unclothed for no more than two
62
minutes, and Rettele for only slightly more time than that. Sadler testified that once the
police were satisfied that no immediate threat was presented, ìthey wanted us to get dressed
and they were pressing us really fast to hurry up and get some clothes on.

The Fourth Amendment allows warrants to issue on probable cause, a standard well short of
absolute certainty. Valid warrants will issue to search the innocent, and people like Rettele
and Sadler unfortunately bear the cost. Officers executing search warrants on occasion
enter a house when residents are engaged in private activity; and the resulting frustration,
embarrassment, and humiliation may be real, as was true here. When officers execute a
valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect themselves from harm, however, the
Fourth Amendment is not violated. As respondents constitutional rights were not violated,
there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.

DISPOSITIVE: The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Manotok
Topic: Governmental Powers and Individual Rights and Freedoms; Searches and
Seizures

237. Miguel v. People (2017)

DOCTRINE: While the Bill of Rights under Article III of the 1987 Constitution generally
cannot be invoked against the acts of private individuals, the same may nevertheless be
applicable if such individuals act under the color of a state-related function. The acts of the
Bantay Bayan — or any barangay-based or other volunteer organizations in the nature of
watch groups — relating to the preservation of peace and order in their respective areas
have the color of a state-related function.

FACTS: Reynaldo Bahoyo and Mark Anthony Velasquez are the Bantay Bayan of Brgy San
Antonio Village, Makati City. They saw petitioner Jeffrey Miguel y Remegio, intoxicated,
urinating and displaying his private parts while standing in front of a gate enclosing an empty
lot. BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez approached petitioner and asked him where he lived and
the latter answered Kaong Street. BB Bahoyo then said that he also lived in the same street
but petitioner looked unfamiliar to him, so he asked for an identification card, but petitioner
failed to produce one. BB Velasquez then repeated the request for an identification card, but
instead, petitioner emptied his pockets, revealing a pack of cigarettes containing one (1)
stick of cigarette and two (2) pieces of rolled paper containing dried marijuana leaves,
among others. This prompted BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez to seize the foregoing items,
take petitioner to the police station. The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged; it found that BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez conducted a valid
warrantless arrest, as petitioner was scandalously showing his private parts at the time of his
arrest. The CA affirmed petitioner’s conviction; it held that the search made on petitioner was
done incidental to his arrest for exhibiting his private parts on public.

ISSUE1: Whether the search was valid?

63
RULING1: NO. The Bantay Bayan operatives conducted an illegal search on the person of
petitioner.

The arresting officers, i.e., BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez, as mere Bantay Bayan operatives
of Makati City, are civilian volunteers who act as “force multipliers” to assist the law
enforcement agencies in maintaining peace and security within their designated areas. While
the Bill of Rights under Article III of the 1987 Constitution generally cannot be invoked
against the acts of private individuals, the same may nevertheless be applicable if such
individuals act under the color of a state-related function. The acts of the Bantay Bayan have
the color of a state-related function. As such, they should be deemed as law enforcement
authorities for the purpose of applying the Bill of Rights under Article III of the 1987
Constitution to them.

Petitioner went out to the street to urinate when the Bantay Bayan operatives chanced upon
him. The latter then approached and questioned petitioner, and thereafter, went on to search
his person, which purportedly yielded the marijuana seized from him. The Court finds highly
implausible the prosecution’s claim that a valid warrantless arrest was made on petitioner on
account of the alleged public display of his private parts because if it was indeed the case,
then the proper charge should have been filed against him. No charge was filed against
petitioner on account of his alleged public display of his private parts. Clearly, these
circumstances do not justify the conduct of an in flagrante delicto arrest, considering that
there was no overt act constituting a crime committed by petitioner in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer. Neither do these circumstances necessitate a “hot pursuit”
warrantless arrest as the arresting Bantay Bayan operatives do not have any personal
knowledge of facts that petitioner had just committed an offense.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is GRANTED, CA decision REVERSED.

Murao
Topic: Governmental Powers and Individual Rights and Freedoms; Searches and
Seizures

238. Riley v. California; US v. Wurie (2014)

DOCTRINE: A balancing of interests between the degree of intrusion to the arrestee’s

privacy and need to promote governmental interests must accompany a warrantless search.

FACTS of Riley Case:

David Riley was stopped by a police officer for driving with expired registration tags. In the
course of being stopped, the officer learned that Riley’s license was suspended and
pursuant to department policy, impounded Riley’s car and conducted an inventory search
thereof. The search yielded 2 concealed and loaded handguns under the car’s hood and
items that linked Riley to the ‘Bloods’ gang like his smart phone, which labeled him as a ‘Crip
Killer’ in texts. The detective testified that he checked Riley’s phone because gang members
would often capture themselves with guns as was the case in Riley’s phone where videos of
men sparring and photos of Riley standing in front of a car involved in a suspected shooting
64
weeks before. The search ultimately resulted to Riley being charged with the earlier shooting
for firing at an occupied vehicle, assault with a semi-automatic firearm, and attempted
murder.

For his part, David Riley moved to suppress all evidence obtained from his smart phone
citing the 4th Amendment or the provision on unreasonable searches and seizures since the
search was without a warrant and not justified by exigent circumstances. However, the trial
court rejected Riley’s motion and convicted Riley on all 3 counts for a sentence of 15 years
to life in prison. The California CA affirmed citing a previous case where a cell phone was
allowed to be subjected to a warrantless search so long as it was immediately associated
with the arrestee’s person. California SC also affirmed.

FACTS of Wurie Case:

Meanwhile, a police officer performing routine surveillance suspected Brima Wurie of making
a drug sale from his car. Upon taking him to the police station, his 2 cell phones were seized
and his filp phone repeatedly received calls from a source identified as ‘my house’ with a
photo of a woman and a baby as its wallpaper. When the policed traced the phone number
to an apartment, they saw Wurie’s name on the mailbox and observed the woman in the
phone’s wallpaper through the apartment’s window. After securing a search warrant for the
apartment, they seized 215 grams of cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm and
ammunition, and cash. There after Wurie was charged with distributing and possessing to
distribute cocaine as well as possession of a firearm with ammunition.

Similar to Riley, Wurie’s move to suppress the evidence as fruits of an unconstitutional

search was denied and he was latter convicted on all 3 counts and 262 months in prison.
The First Circuit reversed the denial of Wurie’s motion and vacated Wurie’s conviction on the
ground that cell phones are distinct from other physical property that may be searched
incident to an arrest since a phone has a plethora of personal data. Hence this petition for
certiorari by the US. Cases were then consolidated before the SC.

ISSUE/S: W/N arresting officers can search the contents of cellphones of accused
pursuant to a valid arrest?

RULING: NO. Jurisprudence has held that a balancing of interests between the degree of
intrusion to the arrestee’s privacy and need to promote governmental interests must
accompany a warrantless search. Particularly, US v. Robinson has little application since no
concern as to safety of officers or destruction of evidence can be extended to digital data of
cell phones. Digital data cannot be used to harm the arresting officer or allow the arrestee to
escape. Police officers may freely examine the physical aspect of a phone to ensure that it
cannot be used as a weapon but data inside should not be tampered with. Here, the officers
in both the Riley and the Wurie cases focused on the prevention of destruction of evidence
but the same could have been remedied by a warrant on the phones. Also, the US and
California argument that information on the phones may be vulnerable to remote wiping and
data encryption are found wanting since the concerns pertain to matters irrelevant to the
present arrest nor are they prevalent. Data found in the phone can prove to be not saved or

65
stored therein, leaving ‘searches’ of the same more susceptible to abuse. Court holds that
the cell phone is not immune to search but a warrant over it must first be obtained.

DISPOSITIVE: Riley California CA judgment REVERSED, Wurie judgment AFFIRMED.

NOTES: Here, as a precursor to its decision, the US SC cited 3 cases of searches as

incidents to lawful arrests shaped the scope of such searches.

In Chimel v. California (1969), the SC disallowed police officers the entirety of a 3-bedroom
house when the accused was arrested inside such house since only the search of arrestee’s
person and the area within his immediate control must be search for safety of the officers
and for evidence of the crime.

In US v. Robinson (1973), Court allowed the search/ pat down of the arrestee’s coat pocket,
which yielded 14 capsules of heroin inside a cigarette packet even if there was no concern of
loss of evidence or that Robinson might be armed but the concern for safety and evidence
are present in all custodial arrests.

In Arizona v. Gant, the SC reverted to Chimel in that the search of the arrestee’s vehicle for
officer safety and evidence underlie a search incident to an arrest. The Court explained
however that such reversion did not stem from Chimel but from the ‘circumstances unique to
the vehicle context.

Also, the Court acknowledged that defendants concede that some extreme hypotheticals like
a suspect texting an accomplice to detonate a bomb may justify a warrantless search.

People v. Comprado
People v. Sapla
People v. O’Cochlain

239. Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Dangerous Drugs Board (2008)

Facts: Several petitions were filed assailing the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and
persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.

Issue: Whether mandatory drug testing is constitutional

Ruling: NO, for public officers. YES, for students of secondary and tertiary schools. YES, for
employees of both public and private sector. NO, for the accused.

NO, for public officers. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the
assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution; Whether or not the drug-free bar set up
under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no
moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-
compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
66
YES, for students of secondary and tertiary schools. The Court is of the view and so
holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing of students are constitutional. Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court
is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable
school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is
subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

A random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable
but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a
legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected.

YES, for employees of both public and private sector. The mandatory but random drug
test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private
offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard
that petitioner SJS, other than saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing,
without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to
privacy, has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicion-less drug testing
under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful
and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.

If RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that
it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be
accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and
efficiency. Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy
on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search,
and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of
the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited
context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional. Like their counterparts in the
private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision
and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all
enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.

NO, for the accused. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s
office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicion-less; To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a
tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658
and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and
158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its
Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently
enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.

Chua
Topic: Bill of Rights – Searches and Seizures

240. Dela Cruz v. People (2014)

67
DOCTRINE: The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not
included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence, the
assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against
self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself
through a testimonial act.

FACTS: Petitioner Jaime Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Sec. 15, Art. II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 resulting from an entrapment operation where he was found
positive for the use of shabu.

According to the prosecution, Ariel Escobar was picked up by several unknown male
persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. Complainants, Ariel’s live-in
partner and his son, hey were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office in Cebu
City, where “James” demanded Php 100,000, later lowered to Php 40,000 in exchange for
the release of Ariel. Complainants proceeded to the NBI Central Visayas Regional Office to
file a complaint. Then, in an entrapment conducted in a Jollibee branch in Cebu, NBI officers
nabbed Dela Cruz using a pre-marked Php 500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder. Dela
Cruz was also required to submit his urine for drug testing, which yielded a positive result for
the said drug.

Dela Cruz denied the charges and testified that while he was eating at the Jollibee branch,
he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he
was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be
done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His
request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the
taking of his urine sample, but to no avail.

The RTC found Dela Cruz guilty, and was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether the drug test conducted was legal

RULING: No, the drug test was not legal.

First, the drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any
unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165. "A person
apprehended or arrested" cannot literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for any
crime. The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165.
Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of the law.

In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on
the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs.
Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of
custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or
68
for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been
charged under Sec. 14.

Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15

applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A.
9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons
apprehended or arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of this provision would
run counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency that “To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a
person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.”

Second, the drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion. Since Dela
Cruz never raised the alleged irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment and raises the
issue only before the Supreme Court, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the
validity of his arrest. However, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of

physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not
included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence, the
assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against
self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself
through a testimonial act.

In this case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge of
extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of
petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling
outside the concept of a custodial investigation." What the Constitution prohibits is the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion
of his body in evidence, when it may be material.

In the case of Gutang, the provision of a urine sample was a mechanical act the accused
was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain
physical attributes determinable by simple observation. However, contrary to the present
case, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug case, and volunteered to give his urine.
There were also other pieces of evidence pointing to his culpability of the crime charged. In
this case, Dela Cruz was arrested for extortion, he refused to have his urine taken, and the
urine sample is the only available evidence used as basis for his conviction for the illegal use
of drugs.

Third, the drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination.
69
Dela Cruz refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a
lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts
proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances.

In the face of the Constitutional guarantee of right to privacy under Sec. 2 and right against
self-incrimination under Sec. 17 of Art. III of the Constitution, the Court cannot condone drug
testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being
made. While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they vigorously
track down offenders in their laudable effort to curb the pervasive and deleterious effects of
dangerous drugs on our society, they must, however, be constantly mindful of the
reasonable limits of their authority, because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge
society of its lawless elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the
protected rights of its citizens including even members of its own police force.

DISPOSITIVE: Petitioner is acquitted.

Olivo
Topic: SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

241. Kyllo v. United States (2001)

DOCTRINE: The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated." "At the very core" of the Fourth Amendment "stands the right of a man
to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."

FACTS:
In 1991 Agent William Elliott of the United States Department of the Interior came to suspect
that marijuana was being grown in the home belonging to petitioner Danny Kyllo. Indoor
marijuana growth typically requires high-intensity lamps. In order to determine whether an
amount of heat was emanating from petitioner’s home consistent with the use of such lamps,
at 3:20 a.m. on January 16, 1992, Agent Elliott and Dan Haas used an Agema Thermovision
210 thermal imager to scan the triplex. Thermal imagers detect infrared radiation, which
virtually all objects emit but which is not visible to the naked eye.

The scan of Kyllo's home took only a few minutes and was performed from the passenger
seat of Agent Elliott's vehicle across the street from the front of the house and also from the
street in back of the house. The scan showed that the roof over the garage and a side wall of
petitioner's home were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially
warmer than neighboring homes in the triplex. Agent Elliott concluded that petitioner was
using halide lights to grow marijuana in his house, which indeed he was. Based on tips from
informants, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a
warrant authorizing a search of petitioner's home, and the agents found an indoor growing
operation involving more than 100 plants. Petitioner was indicted on one count of
70
manufacturing marijuana, in violation of 21 U. s. C. § 841(a)(1). He unsuccessfully moved to
suppress the evidence seized from his home and then entered a conditional guilty plea.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing
regarding the intrusiveness of thermal imaging. On remand the District Court found that the
Agema 210 "is a non-intrusive device which emits no rays or beams and shows a crude
visual image of the heat being radiated from the outside of the house"; it "did not show any
people or activity within the walls of the structure"; "[t]he device used cannot penetrate walls
or windows to reveal conversations or human activities"; and "[n]o intimate details of the
home were observed." Based on these findings, the District Court upheld the validity of the
warrant that relied in part upon the thermal imaging, and reaffirmed its denial of the motion to
suppress.

The Court of Appeals held that petitioner had shown no subjective expectation of privacy
because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home, id., at 1046,
and even if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the
imager "did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life," only "amorphous 'hot spots' on the
roof and exterior wall

ISSUE: Whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public
street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

RULING: YES. The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated." "At the very core" of the Fourth Amendment "stands the right of a man
to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."
Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961). With few exceptions, the question
whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be
answered no.

The antecedent question whether or not a Fourth Amendment "search" has occurred is not
so simple under our precedent. In assessing when a search is not a search, we have applied
somewhat in reverse the principle first enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S.
347 (1967). Katz involved eavesdropping by means of an electronic listening device placed
on the outside of a telephone booth-a location not within the catalog ("persons, houses,
papers, and effects") that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches.
We held that the When the Fourth Amendment was adopted, as now, to "search" meant
"[tJo look over or through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine by
inspection; as, to search the house for a book; to search the wood for a thief." 

Fourth Amendment nonetheless protected Katz from the warrantless eavesdropping

because he “justifiably relied” upon the privacy of the telephone booth. As Justice Harlan’s
oft-quoted concurrence described it, a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the
government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as
reasonable. We have subsequently applied this principle to hold that a Fourth Amendment
71
search does not occur–even when the explicitly protected location of a house is concerned–
unless “the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the
challenged search,” and “society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.” It
would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.

While it may be difficult to refine Katz when the search of areas such as telephone booths,
automobiles, or even the curtilage and uncovered portions of residences are at issue, in the
case of the search of the interior of homes–the prototypical and hence most commonly
litigated area of protected privacy–there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common
law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be
reasonable. To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit police
technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. We think that
obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical “intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area,” constitutes a search–at least where (as here) the technology in question is
not in general public use. This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. On the basis of this
criterion, the information obtained by the thermal imager in this case was the product of a
search.

Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion,
the surveillance is a “search” and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.

DISPOSITIVE: The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed; the case is remanded for
further proceedings.

Ong
Searches and Seizures

Estrada v Sandiganbayan

Doctrine: there was no violation of search and seizure since there was no actual seizure of
property only an inquiry to the transactions made.

Unless a law or rule is annulled by a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity
stands
Due process was not violated since AMLC was exercising its power of investigation it was
not exercising any quasi-judicial powers which is subject to due process
The right to privacy respecting bank deposits is statutory not constitutional
Facts:
During the PDAF scandal in 2013 the Whistle blowers Benhur K. Luy, Merlina P. Sunas,
Gertrudes K. Luy, Nova Kay Batal-Macalintal, Elena S. Abundo and Avelina C. Lingo
executed their Pinagsamang Sinumpang Salaysay about the pork barrel scam relating to the
Priority Development Assistance Fund where certain legislators misused or illegally diverted
their allocations of the PDAF with Janet Lim Napoles.

the NBI filed a criminal complaint in the office of the ombudsman for plunder, malversation ,

72
direct bribery and graft and corrupt practices against the legislators involved. Senator Jose
“JINGGOY” Estrada was one of those included.
The Anti Money Laundering Council was also asked by the Office of the Ombudsman to
conduct a finical investigation of the bank accounts of the petitioners
the Anti money laundering council found the need to investigate the bank accounts of
Estrada and an ex parte application for bank inquiry pursuant to RA. 9160, the anti-money
laundering act with the CA
 the CA granted the ex parte application
the AMLC found that there was also a need to investigate the accounts of his wife since
there were transfer of substantial funds by Estrada form his account to the account of his
wife Ma. Presentacion Vitug Ejercito.
The AMLC filed a supplemental ex parte application for the bank inquiry of Ejercito’s account
 The supplemental ex parte application was granted as well
The AMLC’s bank inquires were contained in the Inquiry Report on the Bank Transactions
Related to the Alleged Involvement of Senator Jose "Jinggoy" P. Ejercito Estrada in the
PDAF Scam.
Estrada filed a motion to suppress the inquiry report

The Sandiganbayan denied the motion and the motion for reconsideration for denying the
motion to suppress was denied
Hence a petition for Certiorari , prohibition and mandamus was filed due to the denial
of the motion to suppress
the petition further questions constitutionality of Section 11 of RA 9160 that allowed the ex
parte application to investigate the accounts of Estrada and his wife led to A violation of the
constitutional right against search and seizure and arrest, right to privacy of communication
and correspondence and Due process.
The petition also RA 10167 which amended Sec 11 of RA 9160 as an ex post facto
legislation because it applies retroactively to bank transactions made prior to the effectivity of
the amendment and imposes new legal burdens to already-completed transactions
in regards to the method of assailing the constitutionality :

The petitioners mainly questioned the grave abuse of discretion on denying the motion to
suppress and then stated the reason why it was a grave abuse of discretion was due to the
constitutionality of RA 9160
the petitioners' assailing herein the constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160, as
amended, constitutes a collateral attack against such legal provision. A collateral attack
against a presumably valid law like R.A. No. 9160 is not permissible. Unless a law or rule is
annulled by a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity stands.

Issue: whether Sec 11 of RA 9160 was constitutional

Held: Yes, it was

the case of Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices v. Court of Appeals
provides that
The right against unreasonable searches and seizure was not violated

the AMLC's ex parte application for the bank inquiry order based on Section 11 of R.A. No.
9160, as amended by R.A. No. 10167, did not violate substantive due process because the
physical seizure of the targeted corporeal property was not contemplated by the law. There
was no physical seizure of the property it merely looked into the bank accounts.
Right to due process was not violated
the AMLC, in investigating probable money laundering activities, does not exercise quasi-
judicial powers, but merely acts as an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation

73
similar to the functions of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Hence, the ex parte
application for the bank inquiry order cannot be said to violate any person's constitutional
right to procedural due process.
The right of privacy was also not violated
the source of the right to privacy respecting bank deposits is statutory, not constitutional;
hence, the Congress may validly carve out exceptions to the rule on the secrecy of bank
deposits, as illustrated in Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160.

Issue : whether there was a ex post facto legislation

Held; No there was not
An ex post facto law is a law that either: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage
of the law that was innocent when done, and punishes such act; or (2) aggravates a crime,
or makes the crime greater than it was when committed; or (3) changes the punishment and
inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; or (5) assumes
to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a
right for an act that was lawful when done; or (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of
some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty
the petitioner relied on Republic v Eugenio where It was held that ex post facto
investigations transactions made prior to the passage of RA 9160 was would be
constitutionally infirm and offensive to the ex post facto clause
here by analogy the case involves bank transactions from 2005-2013 which were made prior
to the amendment in RA 10167.
The petitioners' reliance on Republic v. Eugenio, Jr. is misplaced. Unlike the passage of R.A.
No. 9160 in order to allow an exception to the general rule on bank secrecy, the amendment
introduced by R.A. No. 10167 does away with the notice to the account holder at the time
when the bank inquiry order is applied for. The elimination of the requirement of notice, by
itself, is not a removal of any lawful protection to the account holder because the AMLC is
only exercising its investigative powers at this stage. Indeed, R.A. No. 10167, in recognition
of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution, explicitly provides that "the penal provisions
shall not apply to acts done prior to the effectivity of the AMLA on October 17, 2001."
Furthermore, the AMLC's inquiry and examination into bank accounts are not undertaken
whimsically based on its investigative discretion. The AMLC and the CA are respectively
required to ascertain the existence of probable cause before any bank inquiry order is
issued. Section 11 of R.A. 9160, even with the allowance of an ex parte application therefor,
cannot be categorized as authorizing the issuance of a general warrant. This is because a
search warrant or warrant of arrest contemplates a direct object but the bank inquiry order
does not involve the seizure of persons or property.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
for being moot and academic, without pronouncement on costs of suit.

Notes:

Recourse of the bank account holder:

the holder of a bank account subject of a bank inquiry order issued ex parte is not without
recourse. He has the opportunity to question the issuance of the bank inquiry order after a
freeze order is issued against the account. He can then assail not only the finding of
probable cause for the issuance of the freeze order, but also the finding of probable cause
for the issuance of the bank inquiry order

Valdez

74
Topic: Search and Seizure
#243 Pollo v. Constantino-David, 659 SCRA 189 (2011)

DOCTRINE: In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the
invasion of the employees' legitimate expectations of privacy against the government's need
for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace. Public employer
intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for
non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related
misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances.

FACTS:
 Briccio “Ricky” Pollo is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC RO IV and
also the OIC of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the
"Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na" program of the CSC.
 An unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David which was marked "Confidential" and sent through LBC from a
certain "Alan San Pascual" of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by CSC
Central Office.
 Part of the letter contains: “… I would like to ask from you personally if it is just alright for
an employee of your agency to be a lawyer of an accused gov't employee having a
pending case in the CSC. I honestly think this is a violation of law and unfair to others
and your office.” Pollo was identified but not named.
 David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information
technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and
specifically "to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna
(PALD) and Legal divisions."
 The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services
Division (LSD) was witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and
Unite who closely monitored said activity. Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner
and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the time, informing them of the
ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair. Pollo
replied that he will leave the matter to Unite.
 The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of
preserving all the files stored therein. Several diskettes containing the back-up files
sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to
Chairperson David. 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters in connection
with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals.
 David observed that these draft pleadings were obtained from the computer assigned to
Pollo invariably raises the presumption that he was the one responsible or had a hand in
their drafting or preparation since the computer of origin was within his direct control and
disposition. To her, the one who prepared them was knowingly, deliberately and willfully
aiding and advancing interests adverse and inimical to the interest of the CSC. Pollo was
then on-leave.

75
 Pollo denied that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint, because
he is not a lawyer and neither is he "lawyering" for people with cases in the CSC. He
accused CSC officials of conducting a "fishing expedition" when they unlawfully copied
and printed personal files in his computer, and subsequently asking him to submit his
comment which violated his right against self-incrimination. He asserted that he had
protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave.
 He alleged that he files in his computer were his personal files and those of his sister,
relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing,
copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy
and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure.
 CSC charged him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service and Violation of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees). Pollo was later placed on preventive suspension.
 He thereafter files an Omnibus Motion (MR, MTD, Defer) assailing the formal charge as
without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of
the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. CSC denied the motion.
 Formal investigation was commenced. He’s found guilty. On the paramount issue of the
legality of the search conducted on petitioner's computer, the CSC cited AmJur cases as
authority for the view that government agencies, in their capacity as employers, rather
than law enforcers, could validly conduct search and seizure in the governmental
workplace without meeting the "probable cause" or warrant requirement for search and
seizure. With the foregoing American jurisprudence as benchmark, the CSC held that
petitioner has no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the computer he was
using.
 CA (under R65) found no grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the search on his computer is legal. [(1) Did petitioner have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files? and (2) Was the search
authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner's
computer reasonable in its inception and scope?]

RULING: YES.
 The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
"unreasonable" searches and seizures.
 Some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no
expectation of privacy is reasonable. Given the great variety of work environments in the
public sector, the question of whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of
privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
 In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion
of the employees' legitimate expectations of privacy against the government's need for
supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.
 A probable cause requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose
intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the employee
misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will

76
 be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency's work, and
ultimately to the public interest.
 The special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make the probable-
cause requirement impracticable, for legitimate, work-related non-investigatory intrusions
as well as investigations of work-related misconduct.
 Public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of
government employees for non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for
investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of
reasonableness under all the circumstances. Both the inception and the scope of the
intrusion must be reasonable.
 a search of an employee's office by a supervisor will be "justified at its inception" when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that
the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a
non-investigatory work-related purpose.
 The search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature
of the misconduct."
 The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the
company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by
management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace.
 Pollo failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his
office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. He didn’t
allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that
his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he
allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from
accessing his computer files. He even admitted having visitors in his office.
 Nevertheless, their Computer Use Police explicitly provides that they have no
expectation of privacy.
 Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioner's computer was justified at
its inception and scope. The Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a
government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation
involving a work-related misconduct. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was
grievously disturbing. Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the
Commission had to act fast. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search
was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and
store documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out
incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is,
they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate
action.
 (It’d be different if he uses his personal computer cf. case of Anonymous Letter-
Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila)
 On the charge, he was found guilty by the SC respecting CSC’s findings since he’s
presumed to have the control of his computer.

77
DISPOSITIVE: The petition is denied.

Baba
Topic: Searches and seizures
244. Lucas vs. Lucas 650 SCRA 667 , June 06, 2011

DOCTRINE:
 A court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which, under their
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order
to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility,
was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The
Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained -
o "Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may
order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed
regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions
have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made
before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity
cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may
issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that
there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in
cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses
to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held
in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order
for blood testing "
FACTS:
 Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing).
 Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to
Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain “Ate Belen (Belen)” who worked in a
prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to work. On
one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belen’s
workplace, and an intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually
got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas.
The name of petitioner’s father was not stated in petitioner’s certificate of live birth.
However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is respondent. On August 1,
1969, petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay City.
Respondent allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a period
of about two years. When the relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie
refused to accept respondent’s offer of support and decided to raise petitioner on her
own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several attempts to introduce
petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in vain.
78
  After summons by publication, Jesse filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try
and Hear the Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be
sufficient in form and substance, issued the Order setting the case for hearing and
urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his opposition. The court
also directed that the Order be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in
any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and that the Solicitor General
be furnished with copies of the Order and the petition in order that he may appear
and represent the State in the case.
 After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, Jesus filed a motion for
reconsideration. He averred that the petition was not in due form and substance
because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged
therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation
pointing to respondent as petitioner’s father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled
on the acceptability of DNA evidence.
 On July 30, 2008, the RTC, acting on respondent’s motion for reconsideration, issued
an Order dismissing the case. Upon MR, RTC reversed the dismissal for being
premature.
 CA reversed.

ISSUE/S:
 Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing
order

RULING:
YES, IT IS.
 Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed
to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states:
 “SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order.—The appropriate court may, at any
time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due
hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA
testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the
results may require confirmation for good reasons
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is
relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as
potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at
the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or
proceeding is commenced.”
 This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of
right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.

79
 
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a
show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause”
for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is
considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in
civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court
of Louisiana eloquently explained —
o “Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a
court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions
have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those
jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be
made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in
paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the
court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must
show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the
action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing
must be held in which the court can determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants
issuance of a court order for blood testing “
 The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the
putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion
for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a
reasonable possibility of paternity.
 Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order
remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether
there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of
evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative,
the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is granted (for being prematurely dismissed).

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE

Cadiz
Topic: Privacy of Communications and Correspondence

245. Marynette Gamboa v. Marlou Chan (2012)

GR No. 193636

80
DOCTRINE: Privacy is not an absolute right. When the right to privacy finds tension with a
competing state objective, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or
overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.

FACTS:
 Gamboa was then Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Former President Arroyo issued AO
No. 275 which created an independent commission to address alleged existence of
private armies in the country (it was later on referred as the Zenarosa Commission) with
view to eliminate them before the May 2010 elections.
 Gamboa alleged that the PNP Ilocos Norte conducted a series of surveillance operations
against her and her aides and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army
Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte
forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing
her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.
 ABS CBN Broadcasting reported this list and several newspapers show this as well. As a
result, she claimed that the malicious inclusion in the enumeration in PNP’s list made her
susceptible to harassment.
 Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP Ilocos Norte.
 PNP maintain that Gamboa failed to present substantial evidence to show that her right
to privacy in life, liberty or security was violated. Gamboa argues that the gathering and
forwarding of unverified information on her is unlawful and violative of due process.

ISSUE/S: Whether the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper

RULING: NO, it is not proper.

The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion
or constraint. However, privacy is not an absolute right. When the right to privacy finds
tension with a competing state objective, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to
an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted,
there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other.

The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed
groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the
establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in character and is

81
controlled and administered by a national police commission. Here, pursuant to the state
interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions accorded to the
Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected
of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities including Gamboa.

Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the forwarding of the information by PNP to
Zenarosa was lawful as the former was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence
regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the
existence of these notorious groups. The fact that the PNP released information to the
Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the
opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to
privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and
investigation. Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system,
which was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure
that the data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in place to make
sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.

As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
The state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life
of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against
her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data
must be denied. Nonetheless, this Court cautions these investigating entities that
information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be
released exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. After
all, inherent to the right to privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of one’s
person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to
a person’s ordinary sensibilities.

In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its
confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even
warranting reproach but it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents
were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs
available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED.

Notes:

1. Right to Privacy - Prof. Emerson said that the ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a
system of limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual. Protection of this private sector (and of the dignity and integrity of the
individual) has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the
forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization —
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
82
 capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between
a democratic and a totalitarian society.
2. Habeas data – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

Chua
Topic: Bill of Rights – Privacy of Communication and Correspondence

246. Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College (2014)

DOCTRINE: The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce
one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents.

FACTS: Julia Daluz and Julienne Suzara, both minors, were graduating high school
students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. In January 2012, while changing into
their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, they took digital pictures of
themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were uploaded by Angela Tan
on her Facebook profile.

Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher, learned of the photos, and was shown the photos by
some students. Photos included Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking
cigarettes inside a bar and along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show
virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. The photos were viewable by any Facebook
user.

Escudero showed the photos to Kristine Tigol, STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, who found them
to have violated provisions in the student handbook concerning (1) Possession of alcoholic
drinks outside the school campus; (2) Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
(3) Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places; (4) Apparel that exposes the
underwear; and (5) Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains
sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures
on the Internet that entail ample body exposure.

The students were made to report to the office of Sr. Purisima, STC’s high school principal
and ICM Directress, where they were allegedly castigated and verbally abused by STC
officials. As part of their penalty, they were barred from joining the commencement
exercises.

Angela’s mother, Dr. Amenia Tan, filed a petition for injunction and damages before the RTC
of Cebu. Phonda Vivares, Julia’s mother, intervened. A TRO was issued to allow the
students to attend the graduation ceremony, but STC filed a motion for reconsideration,
83
and ,still barred the students from participating, arguing that the motion for reconsideration
on the TRO was not yet resolved.

Petitioners filed a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Habeas Data, arguing, among others,
that the privacy settings in the Facebook accouns was set to “Friends Only”, thus, there was
a reasonable expectation of privacy, and that there was an intrusion into such privacy when
Escudero saved digital copies of the photos. The RTC dismissed the petition for habeas
data, claiming the petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened
violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data. It held that since the photos were uploaded on Facebook withot restrictions as
to who may view them, they lost their privacy in some way, and that the photographs were
gathered through legal means for a legal purpose. Petitioners appealed to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE: Whether there was an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life,
liberty, or security of the minors

RULING: No. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary remedy designed
to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual,
and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It
seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends.

The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to
information about a person. Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between
the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the
other. Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least
by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be
extended. Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational
privacy, a habeas data petition will not prosper.

Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being
an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is,
nonetheless, erroneous. Nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection
shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of
gathering, storing, and collecting of data. However, petitioners are nevertheless not entitled
to the writ of habeas data.

84
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary
that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain
posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility. Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being
violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded
copies of the pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the
minors’ privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only
Friends" setting safeguarded with a password.

However, the failure to question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves
their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence
to corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and
without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the
photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.
Escudero’s students, who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using
their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to
view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their
Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised that
the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. That the photos are
viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. In this
regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain
to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy.

Setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be
viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The
user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend
thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with
the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective
Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post,
the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."

Even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy
invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful
means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the
minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.

Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original
uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been
85
screened to limit access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have
been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post,
instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse,
becomes more manifest and palpable.

STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to be
responsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, when it
enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absent a showing that,
in the process, it violated the students’ rights. OSN users should be aware of the risks that
they expose themselves to whenever they engage in cyberspace activities. Accordingly, they
should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion
regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to give up.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is denied.

Dr. Joy Margate Lee v. P/Supt. Neri Ilagan

GR 203254, October 8, 2014, Perlas-Bernabe, J

DOCTRINE:
In a petition for issuance of Writ of Habeas Data, it must show that there exists a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the
other. The allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing
an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.

FACTS:
 In a petition for issuance of Writ of Habeas Data, Ilagan alleged that he and Dr. Lee
were former common-law partners. One day, he visited Dr. Lee at the latter’s condo,
rested for a while and proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, he noticed his digital
camera was missing. After a few weeks, Dr. Lee confronted Ilagan regarding a
purported sex video with another woman which she discovered from the camera.
Ilagan demanded for the camera but to no avail.
 Dr. Lee utilized the video as evidence for filing various complaint against Ilagan such
as a criminal complaint for violation of RA 9262/VAWC before the Makati Office
Prosecutor and an administrative for grave misconduct before NAPOLCOM.
 Ilagan claimed that Dr. Lee’s acts of reproducing the video and threatening to
distribute the same to NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only
his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman.
 Dr. Lee claimed that she did utilize the memory card but for evidence purposes
against Ilagan. She also averred that the issuance is aimed at suppressing evidence
and she is not engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the
person of Ilagan.
 RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data, directing Dr. Lee to produce the
digital camera and the copies.

ISSUE:
Whether RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data

RULING: NO
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC (Habeas Data Rule) was conceived as a response, given the lack of
effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings
and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right

86
to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals, which is
defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data
about oneself.”

As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ stands as “a remedy available to
any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to
support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule
essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the
right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must adequately show that
there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other. The allegations in the petition must be supported by
substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security of the victim.

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right
to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan
purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video — which he fears would somehow
find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption — he failed to
explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or
security. Even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be
dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that
Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets
the substantial evidence requirement

Dr. Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the
subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and
administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan.

PETITION GRANTED.

87