Rudin 1956

Diplomacy, Democracy, Security: Two Centuries in Contrast
Author(s): Harry R. Rudin

Source: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Jun., 1956), pp. 161-181
Published by: Academy of Political Science
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2145022
Accessed: 21-12-2015 08:36 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Academy of Political Science and Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political
Science Quarterly.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 165.190.89.176 on Mon, 21 Dec 2015 08:36:10 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
VolumeLXXI June 1956 Number2
POLITICAL SCIENCE
QUARTERLY
DIPLOMACY, DEMOCRACY, SECURITY:
TWO CENTURIES IN CONTRAST
T The Problem
century
facingthediplomatin thetwentieth
HE problems
are givingrise to questionsthat concernthe futureof our
democracy,our culture,even of man himself. A volume
of literature is growing on the question whether democracy
will be able to deal successfullywith these problems. Impetus
to the discussion was given in the pro's and con's of debate
about the mannerin which the United States became involved
in the Second World War. Political leaders promised in the
election campaign of 1940 that they would keep the country
out of war if elected to office,only to dismiss these promises
lateras campaignoratory. The failureor therefusalofPresident
Roosevelt to take the Americanpeople into his confidenceduring
1940 and 1941 by informingthem about what was actually
going on has been defendedby some historiansas that kind of
justifiable deception practiced by a physician for the good of
his patient. It was openly acknowledged that foreignpolicy
could not be discussed publicly, only the very naive and in-
nocent believing with Woodrow Wilson that diplomacy should
"proceed always franklyand in the public view." Again and
again the assertion was made that totalitarian governments
have a greatadvantage over democraticones in theirunhampered
freedomto formulateand execute foreignpolicy.
It is also being said that our diplomatslack the skills of their
predecessors;and a longingis expressedfor the returnof those
happier days in the past when diplomats were men of great
intelligenceand wide experience,able to handle with efficiency
and success the great tasks assigned to them by their govern-
161
162 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol,. LXXI
ments. Little considerationis given to the possibleexplanation

that otherreasonsthan superiorintelligenceand richerexperience
may account fortheirsuccess; and leftout of reckoningare the
many instanceswhen such diplomatsfailedin theirassignments.
The diplomat of our time faces greater difficultiesthan his
fortunate predecessor. Foreign policy now involves military
and economic questions of so complex and technicala character
that neitherthe masses of people nor all membersof Congress
can comprehendthem. No longeris it possible foran ambassa-
dor, however able, to keep himselfinformedon all phases of
policy. At his side there must be a large staffof experienced
experts to advise him-economists, commercial and military
attaches, and area specialists.
Anothercomplicatingfactoris the increasedtempo of activity.
Critical situations arise daily to call for immediate decisions.
At timesdecisionshave to be made beforeour vaunted methods
ofcommunicationcan speed homethe information that is needed.
So closelyconnectedwithmattersof foreignpolicyis the security
of our countrythat nervous people in Congress or outside get
quickly excited. A Pearl Harbor attack with atomic weapons
can well have a greater success than one with conventional
arms. The pleas of the Department of State to keep foreign
policyout of politicaldebate are easily disregarded,forCongress-
men of greatestintegrityand sincerityfind themselveson oc-
casion under a patriotic compulsion to speak when convinced
that the securityof the countryis at stake. Some self-appointed
patriotsdo not hesitateto base a criticismor a recommendation
ofpolicyon an incompleteradio or newspaperaccountofspeeches
made in Paris or London. Most unfortunateare the conse-
quences when a concernfor the country'ssecurityseems to be
overshadowedby a concernforone's immediatepolitical future,
and the real objective is to stir up an emotional tide better
calculated to lift a man into officethan to remove difficulties
involving the country's fundamental interest. Whatever the
motives of some political leaders, it happens all too frequently
that speeches are made without the slightestregard to the ill
willthat may resultin remotecornersof the globe among peoples
whose good will is essential to American security. Risks like
No. 2] DIPLOMACY, DEMOCRACY, SECURITY 163
these multiplyin an election year, when foreigngovernments

have to be cautioned by American ambassadors against taking
campaign oratorytoo seriously. With a House of Representa-
tives elected every two years in the United States, a foreign
policy has little time to justifyitselfwith voting citizens while
our friendsand allies findthemselvesin perpetualbewilderment
regardingwhat America will do next.
In a democracy,diplomacyis also handicapped by short-range
economic interests able to establish an immediate or remote
connectionbetween the advantages they seek and the national
security. Here the tariffplays a usefulr6le. AlthoughBritain
and Denmark are formalallies of the United States in NATO
for maintainingpeace and security,and although in Article II
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organizationthe signatorystates
promised that they "will seek to eliminate conflictin their
internationalpolicies and will encourage collaborationbetween
any or all of them," the insistentdemands of local economic
interestsin the United States have led to tariffsagainst Danish
cheese and English bicycles. Britain and Denmark may well
wonder whether Americans regard them as allies working in
co6peration with us in a great internationalcause or as com-
mercial rivals in a competitionthat we must win at all costs.
At the presentmoment some Americansare findingit hard to
determinewhetherJapan is to be treatedas a land whose friend-
ship and support are essential against communismin the Far
East or whetherJapan is a countrywhose textiles and other
manufacturesmust be kept out of American markets even if
the effectis to drive her into the arms of the Communists.
These are onlya fewof the difficulties
facingthe United States.
Other countries face similar problems. This situation is far
wide of the goal those who worked for the establishmentof
democraticprinciplesin pre-democratictimes expectedto reach.
Such people hoped that most problems, whetherdomestic or
foreign,would finda relativelyeasy solution when the general
will supplantedthe arbitrarywill of a select few. The situation
today is a defeat also for those who entertainedthe hope a
centuryago that mass education would make people intelligent
and cooperative, their policies constructive. If anything,it
164 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL.LXXI
seems that internationalrelations have become more difficult

after these great innovations; certainlythey seem to be worse
than they were when schools and universitiesbegan the study
of such relationsin the hope of improvingthem. Our perplexing
situation is anythingbut the fulfilmentof hope for those who
believed that a solution of internationalproblems would be
facilitated by a recognitionof laboring classes in our society.
Indeed, the situation is equally a defeat forthose who believed
that religionwould enable Christiancountriesto get along better
with one another.
The simple truthis that the most serious problemsof inter-
national relations throughoutthe centuries have been those
between countriesthat have regarded themselvesas Christian,
enlightened and, in our time, democratic. These countries
have fought the most devastating wars, and have invented
war's most dreaded weapons despite oft-repeatedpromises of
steps to rid the world of the horrorof war. Those promises
may be near the time of involuntaryfulfilmentnow that the
major Powers have weapons for eliminatingeach other. Often
one gets the uneasy feelingthat intelligencehas proved to be a
betterservantof war than of peace.
and TwentiethCenturies
BetweentheNineteenth
Differences
Writerswho have persuaded themselvesthat the diplomats
of the nineteethcenturywere abler than theirtwentieth-century
counterpartsshould take a closer look at history. Their view
findssupportin the selectionof instancesof successfuldiplomacy
duringthe nineteenthcenturyand in the disregardofthe warsand
the diplomaticfailuresof the eighteenth. There is an uncritical
assumption that the success of the diplomats selected was due
to superiortalent and broader experience. Omitted fromcon-
sideration is the fact that successfuldiplomacy was relatively
simple duringthe past century,when a numberof safetyvalves
existedto keep economicpressuresfromreachingthe point where
they might explode into open war. The nineteenthcentury
was a period when economic problemscould be solved without
relianceon diplomacyor arms. In the worldbeyondthe borders
of European states were found unlimitedeconomic possibilities
forsolvingEuropean problems. The lands and resourcesof the

worldbecame available to European use as never before. Such
were these possibilities abroad that people believed economic
laws could operate with a minimumof regulatoryintervention
of government.
It was easy for diplomats to be successfulin a world that
solved the most serious problems before they became acute.
These men appear to be intellectual giants to our generation
only because they stand out against a backgroundof relatively
small problems, whereas, in the twentiethcentury,diplomats
of equal ability tend to appear small against a backgroundof
overwhelmingand virtuallyinsoluble problems. Our estimate
of diplomatsis largelyin the nature of an ocular illusion. It is
also true that the diplomats of the last centurywere less ham-
pered by politicsand by public opinionthan are those of today.
It is of the firstimportanceto take note of the differences
betweenthe two centuriesthat are beingcontrasted. By under-
standingthese differences we shall learn much to help us to an
understandingof the problems facing us in the middle of the
twentiethcentury. Furthermore,the nineteenthcenturyoffers
some clues as to how we might approach the fatefulproblems
of our day.
The overshadowingdifferencebetween the two centuries so
far as Europe is concernedis that in the decades between 1815
and 1914 Europeans enjoyed the greatestmilitaryand economic
securityin theirlong and troubledhistory. It was a time when
Europeans got along withoutany ofthosedevastatingcontinental
and world-widewars that werenormalin earlierhistoryand have
become normalagain in our day. To be sure,it was not a time
of perfectpeace. There werewars,but these werelocal conflicts
as theirnames indicate,limitedin durationand confinedin area.
They had little of the long-rangerevolutionaryeffectswhich
historyhas associated with earlierand later wars.
During most of the centuryafter 1815 no one countrywas
strong enough to dominate or to threaten to dominate the
continentand consequentlyto force other countriesto devote
theirattentionand theirresourcesto preparingforwar by build-
ing up armies and navies and by formingpowerfulmilitary
alliances. In this one very important respect governments

did not have the great preoccupation with military security
that forced them into regulatingthe lives of men and their
economies. Here is the basic differencesbetween our century
and the earlierone.
The disappearanceof the fearof aggressionwas a greatliberat-
ing factorin European historyas the centurywas to show. As
the decades went slowly by after the defeat of Napoleon and
men acquired a sense of securityagainst threateningaggression,
from their minds and from their parliamentarydeliberations
there gradually disappeared those fears that for generations
had dictated the foreignand domesticpoliciesof the mercantilist
state, which had to be kept strong in both the militaryand
economic sense in order to meet attack and competition. As
men lost these fears,they discovereda freedomto employ their
time and to expend their wealth for purposes other than war.
The eighteenth-century dreams of human emancipation finally
had a chance to findfulfilment in institutionalform.
During this same centuryEuropeans experiencedan economic
security unknown before or since. Prior to the nineteenth
century,European historyhad recorded a famine about every
ten years, a recordthat had caused Malthus to hail the arrival
of the nineteenthcenturywith direfulforecastsof war, famine
and disease because of the inabilityof European lands to produce
food in quantitiessufficient to maintaintheirexpandingpopula-
tions. Contrary to these gloomy predictions,the nineteenth
century was to see the virtual elimination of famine; more
astonishinglyit saw a risingstandard of livingwhilethe popula-
tion of Europe morethan doubled itself.
There were areas in Europe whereeconomicdistresscontinued
or where political oppression made life intolerable. Here the
nineteenthcentury had another safety valve. Distant lands
of the worldofferedasylumon a scale that permittedthe greatest
mass movementin history,when 66 millionpeople left Europe.
One of the advantages of the centurywas the opportunitygiven
people to move. They were welcome in many lands which
needed theirlabor. One of the strikingfeaturesof the century
was the perennialdiscussionas to what foreignland in America
or Asia was the land of promise and of opportunity,a feature

that has disappeared fromthe worldof our day.
By conferring on Europeans this comfortingsense of security,
military and economic, the nineteenth century became the
great period of emancipation for man. Serfs and slaves were
liberated; men's minds were delivered from ignorance and
superstitionthroughmass education and throughthe freedom
of science and philosophyto thinkwhat theydesiredabout man
and his universe; men were freedfromrestraintson their eco-
nomicactivitiesas theundemocraticmercantiliststate abandoned
the practice of definingthe ends of governmentand of directing
affairsto those ends; Jew and Catholic were emancipated from
the civil disabilitiesthat earliertimes had imposed upon them;
through the extension of the franchisemasses of men were
liberated from the authorityof others and entrustedfor the
firsttimewitha say concerningthat part oftheirdestiniessubject
to the human will. In a very real sense the European world
had become safe fordemocracy.
This new sense of securityand this new freedomcame about
as the resultof a happy coincidenceof events and factorsrather
than as the resultof men's planning. The historyof the century
has many monuments to the essential decency and nobility
of men who knew themselvesto be secure. By contrast,the
twentiethcentury contains the ugliest monumentsin history
to recordthe brutalityof men who had become insecure. Prior
to the nineteenthcentury,people were also insecure and lived
in a kind of perpetual emergencyin which fear of famine and
of war was the preoccupationof theirminds. These insecurities
were such that state action was required in order to deal with
them. That necessity led to centralization of authority in
the hands of a fewwho assumed fullresponsibilityfordefending
the national interest. To Cardinal Richelieu has been ascribed
the assertionthat the securityof the nation is endangeredwhen
the councilorsof the king exceed fourin number. And it is of
interestthat the Cardinal also had the same slogan as Hitler,
namely, that the common good must take precedenceover the
good of the individual. In times of insecurityit seems that
the individual can have little or no liberty;he and his activities
168 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VoL. LXXI
have to be fittedinto a plan forkeepingthe state ready to meet

any attack or competition.
For Europeans the nineteenthcentury was the time when
democracybecame an institutionalrealityand was nurturedinto
strength. This period of historysays, in effect,that men can
become freewhen they are secure. This truthhas been vaguely
recognized in the corollary of the somewhat trite statement
that in times of crisis individuals should be allowed only that
measure of freedomthat does not endangerthe securityof the
state; the greaterthe securityofthe state,the morefreedommay
men have. Adam Smithand otherlaissez-faireeconomistsfound
it necessaryto admit that economicfreedomhad to be qualified
in the event of a war threateningthe existence of the state.
If democracyand otherlibertiesdepend in this fashionand in
this degree upon a sense of security,it naturally followsthat
democracyshould face peculiar difficulties in a time fullof crises
threateningthat security. This is what we have been seeing in
the world since 1920. Just as restrictionson the freedomof
individualsfound justificationin the existenceof threatsto the
public interestin the era of mercantilism,so in our time the
threats to national securitylead to growinginterferencewith
the libertiesmen acquired duringthe past century. Obviously,
therehas been no abolitionof these liberties,forthe freedomsof
of men have constitutionalanchors and cannot be easily taken
away. Yet restrictionsare occurringin the name of national
security,a phrase in frequentuse today. By means of loyalty
tests governmentshope to reconcilethe freedomof individuals
with the securityof the state, only the loyal having the rightto
be completelyfree.
This dilemma of freedomand securityis a most serious one.
On occasion one has the uneasy feelingthat the securityof the
West would be easier to maintain if the twentiethcenturyhad
been preceded by any centurybut the nineteenth. One cannot
escape the fact that the freedomsthat became traditionalduring
the last centurystand in a kind of opposition to the policies
demanded by national securityin the twentieth. The frequent
invocation of the word "security" in our day is an omen of ill
forthefutureofour freedoms.
The InternationalBase ofDemocracy

The relativepeace and securityof the nineteenthcenturywere
foundedon a base that was international. The defeatof Napo-
leon in 1815 left Europe in a situation where no countrywas
strongenough to dominate the continentand thus to constitute
a threat to other nations. France had shown such remarkable
powers of recoveryduring the wars of the Revolution and of
Napoleon that an alliance was formed in 1815 to prevent a
renewalof the French threatto the peace and repose of Europe.
This precautionarymeasure was abandoned withina few years,
England beingconvincedby 1818 that it was no longernecessary.
Britain's moated island found it possible to maintain security
by a policy of isolation and non-commitment. As the years
wentby, it became less and less necessaryto be concernedabout
armies and navies, about military budgets and alliances; it
became less necessaryto regulate the activities of men toward
the goal of a strongstate ready to meet any aggressor. Parlia-
mentarybodies were freeto deal with otherissues than national
securityand to take up at last thosesubjectsplaced on the agenda
of theirmindsby generationsof dreamingmen-extension of the
franchise,abolition of slavery, factorylegislation,laissez faire,
legal toleration of Jew and Catholic, freedom of trade, the
liberation of colonies, emigration, and so on. It seems as
though men became generousand toleranttoward theirfellows
as they feltthemselvesto be secure.
This feelingof militarysecuritylasted until Germanybecame
unifiedand accumulated the economic and militarypower that
was to revive the ancient fear that the continent might be
dominatedby a singlestate. Revivinginsecuritybroughtback,
mutatis mutandis, what had been more or less the standard
practiceof earliertimesin Europe formeetingthe fearof aggres-
sion. In 1914 Europe returnedto normalcy.
The economic securityof Europe in the nineteenthcentury
rested also in large measure on the internationalizationof the
European economy. With the comingof the industrialrevolu-
tion Europeans curtailed agriculturalproduction,preferringto
devote themselvesto the manufactureof goods that could be
exchangedin lands near and far forthe food and raw materials
needed by the growingappetites of multiplyingmen and ma-

chines. Commerce expanded rapidly as high tariffsand other
restrictionson trade were found to be contraryto the national
interest, increasingly defined in economic terms by men of
business. Agreementsfor lower tariffsand other international
commercialarrangementsmade it possibleforgoods to move from
country to country with a new freedom. Food imports rose
steeply while agricultural production in European countries
declined. The population grew,people gatheredinto cities and
worked in factories; despite the greater number of people in
Western Europe, the standard of living went up, with people
enjoyingthe best economicconditionsof theirhistory.
Wheremen sufferedfromeconomicdistressor politicaloppres-
sion, they could migrate,needingonly to pack theirfew belong-
ings in a carpetbag and to take passage to whatever country
they believed to be the land of opportunity. By admitting
36 millionsof Europeans, the United States made a great con-
tributionto European security. Never were national borders
so little obstructiveof the freemovementof men and of goods
as in the nineteenthcentury. Here one had somethingapproach-
ing a real economicinternationalism.
The depression of the 1870's, caused essentiallyby the in-
ability of European countries to consume the goods being
produced in ever larger quantity by their new industries,led
to a serious economic crisis. To protecthome marketsagainst
foreign dumping, nations revived policies of high tariffs;to
protect their overseas markets in Africa and Asia, it became
necessaryto occupy and annex territories. These policies were
far from adequate as measures for disposing of unconsumed
surpluses,for which new markets had to be found. Overseas
trade now underwent a huge expansion, merchant marines
rapidlyenlargedto keep pace with the quantitiesof goods being
importedand exported. From the economic point of view this
expansion of European commercewas of far greatersignificance
to the European economy than was the more exciting and
dramaticseizureof coloniesso attractiveto writersof the peridd.
In these ways a broad base, colonial and commercial,was
placed underthe European economy. The continent'sfactories
No. 2 DIPLOMACY, DEMOCRACY, SECURITY 171
crowded cities, growing population, high standard of living,

and even some of the culture and basic libertiesof the people
restedheavily on this internationalfoundationof commerceand
empire, of peace and security. It should be noted, however,
that this securitywas not extendedto the people in the colonies
and to otherpeople overseas. Here the emphasis is on Europe.
What is of prime importanceto European historyis the fact
that Europe had foundin farawaylands the long-desiredsolution
of age-old problems of economic security. No other solution
had been foundpossible.
This economic structurehousing European security was a
fragile one. It was not internationallyorganized. For the
strengthit had it depended on narrow lines of tandem ships
moving over great marine distances with cargoes of manu-
facturedgoods fromEurope to be exchanged for indispensable
food and raw materials. It depended on the capacity of coun-
tries to support navies to guard these tenuous supply lines.
It depended on the whim of good will and self-interest of many
peoples in other nations, on commercialcooperation,on agree-
ments regarding the internationalgold standard, and so on.
In so far as it rested on an overseas territorialempire,it had
established itself on the economic insecurityof peoples living
in colonial and underdevelopedareas, peoples suddenly trans-
formedby a mysteriousceremonyof treaty-signingand flag-
raising into involuntary servants of some distant European
economy.
From the economic point of view the colonies contributed
little to the securityof European metropolitancountries. The
heavy costs of administrationmade them an economicliability,
and the goods exportedin earlydecades had littleof the strategic
importance of those found in many colonies today. Their
chiefeconomiccontributionwas to the individualswho succeeded
in making a profitin this or that colonial venture. A change
has taken place in the last two or three decades, duringwhich
metallurgicaladvances have made many mineralsin the colonies
essential to industryand to war, to securityand to economic
well-being.
If the colonies contributedrelativelylittle to the economic
172 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VoW.LXXI
security of their mother countries before 1914, they made a

contributionto European peace and securitythat is oftenover-
looked. Even if imperialistrivalries led on occasion to very
serious diplomatic crises, war between the rival Powers over
theseissues did not follow. These crisescould be settledwithout
resortto war. Furthermore,the existenceof these unoccupied
or loosely held territoriesoutside Europe made a direct con-
tributionto the friendlyrelationsof European states with one
another. The Anglo-French Entente of 1904 was possible
because Britain and France could agree to recognizeeach other's
special interestin Egypt and Morocco and base a diplomatic
cooperation on the arrangement. It is hardly necessary to
point out that the peoples of Egypt and of Morocco were not
consulted in this decision about theirdestinies. In a very real
sense they were the innocent victims sacrificedby the two
European Powers on the altar of an internationalfriendship.
One can point to numerous similar instances of alliance and
internationalfriendshiparranged around an agreementto take
what belongedto thirdand unconsultedparties. In the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance of 1902-1905 Korea was the innocentvictim;
in the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 Persia was the victim.
The diplomacy of imperialismduringthe generationafter 1885
contains other such arrangementsfor promoting,at least for
a time, the peaceful relations of European countrieswith one
another. In the secret treaties of the First World War this
practice acquired a new significanceas a diplomatic device for
keepingthe Entente Powers and theirallies in militarycoopera-
tion by giving substantial meaning to the victorythey sought
over theirenemies.
Collapse of Internationalism
Although this internationalbase of European economy and
securitylacked the cement of organization,thereis no escaping
the fact that internationalismwas a real thing prior to the
First World War. It is true that the growthof navies, rising
tariffs,developing military alliances, and magnifyingfears
began to weaken the system long before 1914. Still, it was a
far better example of successful internationalismthan what
existed beforein centuriesof European historyor has existed
since. Goods and people moved about with a freedomthat

has now disappeared. Travelers needed no briefcase crammed
with documentsas is the need today forthose makinga tour of
the world. More areas of the world were accessible then than
now. One can say that Europe before1914 had internationalism
withoutorganizationwhereas since 1920 we have had organiza-
tions withoutany internationalism.
The tragedy of our time is that this intricateinternational
structure erected by commerce, empire and diplomacy fell
apart along national divisionsas a resultof the First World War.
It was then discoveredthat dependenceon distant parts of the
worldforfood and resourcescould be made into a great military
liability. Such dependence by Germany guaranteed the suc-
cess of a blockade against a countrylacking the naval power
to preventthe throttlingof its economiclifelines. Hitler and a
few Germans before him argued that Bismarck's Weltpolitik
weakenedGermanyand made herdefeatpossible;theyrecognized
the militarydisadvantage of Germany'sworld-wideconnections.
The naval blockade was successful; and the First World War
ended in the overthrowof Germany's internationaleconomy
with the treaty taking from the defeated nation the colonies
she had acquired, the merchant marine she had constructed,
the navy and the other instrumentsfashioned to guard her
militaryand economic security. Guided by a principle with
a long tradition behind it, the victor Powers sought in the
treatyof 1919 to establishtheirown securityon the destruction
of what had given Germanyher economicand militarysecurity.
The Returnof Insecurity

The fear-inspiredpolicies adopted by the winning Powers
toward Germanyin the Treaty of Versaillescame in the course
of time to affecttheir security and their relations with one
another. The FirstWorldWar starteda processthat eventually
weakened all Powers, whether on the winningor losing side
in the wars of our century. Althoughno single documentlike
the Versailles Treaty convenientlyitemizes the separate stages
of this processin the case of the victorPowers in 1918,the trend
is nonethelessa clear one.
So successfulhad been the blockade in bringingGermanyto

her knees in 1918 that the principle of this useful economic
weapon was made part of the armoryof the League of Nations,
in ArticleXVI of the Covenant with its provisionforeconomic
sanctions. This provision,whichmay be regardedas the charter
forthe internationaleconomicanarchyprevalentsince the First
World War, transformedan economic securityonce obtained
by tradewithforeignlands intoa frightening economicinsecurity.
No country in the world is immune to the deadly use of this
weapon because everycountryneeds,in varyingdegree,materials
available only through trade. This League policy made in-
evitable a trend toward a kind of strictlynational economy of
self-sufficiency known as autarchy. Here is the formalend of
the kind of economicinternationalism that had done so muchfor
European well-beingand securityin the immediatepast. And
what a paradoxical thingit was foran internationalagencyto do!
Withouttoo much thoughtas to the far-reaching implications
of what they were doing, the victor Powers somewhat light-
heartedly adopted this revolutionarypolicy. The shoe is on
the other foot now. During recent United Nations debates on
the rightofself-determination, argumenthas arisenas to whether
that rightshould include sovereigncontrolover resources. The
colonial Powers who favored economic sanctions in 1919 now
speak against the inclusion of such control,knowingthat the
recognitionof the principle will place a powerful economic
weapon in the hands of colonies now seeking independence.
Clearly involved in the debate are those strategicmineralsnow
so essentialto national security.
If Article XVI was not enough to slow down the flowof in-
ternational trade, the adoption by many states since 1920 of
high tariffs,exchange restrictions,quotas, and other devices
for controllingand restrictingimportshas done much to make
it difficult
for Europe to get needed food and resources. Such
imports are a greater need than before the First World War
because of the larger European populations, for whom the
possibilityof large-scaleemigrationhas disappeared,and because
of the larger demand for non-European minerals for civilian
economiesand defenseindustries.
No. 21 DIPLOMACY, DEMOCRACY, SECURITY 175
From the standpointof European commercialneeds the two

world wars of our centurywere unfortunate. Twice, and for
long periods of time, European countriesdevoted their econo-
mies to war purposes,and wereunable to manufacturethe goods
exportedoverseas for the food and resourcesformerlyobtained
by such trade. Thus Europeans cut themselvesofffromtheir
own breadbaskets; they committedthe errorof making them-
selves temporarilyunnecessaryto thosecountrieswhoseproducts
they needed. Because of the long duration of these two wars
the countriesthat had been accustomed to trade with Europe
found themselves forced either into the manufactureof the
goods formerlyimportedin returnforfood or into a realignment
of commercein orderto get manufacturedgoods fromcountries
moredependable than the warringones of Europe.
In recent years there has been another sort of interference
with trade. European countries are now discovering that
domestic purchasingpower has been greatly enhanced by the
success of workers' demands for higher wages and that local
consumersare biddingforthe goods needed forthe exporttrade.
The only way Britain can adjust civilianproductionto domestic
demand and still have enough of a surplus for essential export
trade is to curtail national militaryserviceto get a largerlabor
force in the country's factories. This is a difficultchoice for
Britain (it likewisefaces other countries),for it is a weakening
of militarysecurityin favorof an economicsecurity;it is butter
versuscannon.
The United States is the only countryin the world capable
of producingenough goods to meet both civilian and military
needs. Russia, on the other hand, simply disregardscivilian
needs. But the United States faces another curious problem
involvingthe economicsecurityof its farmers. The highstand-
ard of livingnow foundin most classes of Americansocietyhas
flourishedbehind high tariffsand has resultedin such produc-
tion costs for agriculturethat the possibilityof selling agricul-
tural commoditiesin overseas marketshas nearly disappeared.
Prices demanded are too high for needy people outside the
countryto be able to purchase the cotton,rice and wheat that
are being stored in accumulating surplus. The American
governmenthas had to assume the r6le of the foreignmarket

withoutknowingwhere or how to dispose of these costly agri-
culturalproducts. While efforts are beingmade to beginsolving
the problemby restrictingfutureagriculturalproduction,other
countriesare expandingthe productionof the very commodities
we have in large and idle supply.
One may well wonderwhetherAmericansmightnot also lose
foreignmarkets for manufacturedgoods if it should happen
that the governmentceased to be a purchaserof heavy goods
for defense. It is possible that the governmentwould be ex-
pected to purchase unsalable manufacturedgoods as it now
acquires unmarketableagriculturalgoods. Such trends would
give the world a curious picture of a new kind of collectivism,
with the producerforcingthe governmentto buy, instead of the
Russian system where the governmentforces the producer to
sell.
In our worldof dissolvingempiresand emergingindependent
nation-statesin Asia and Africa,markets will inevitablygo to
those producers whose economic and commercial policies are
adjusted to a level of cost and a standard of living different
fromtheir own. In the long run even a rich countrylike the
United States will see its economic securitythreatenedif its
establishmentis sought in tariffisolation and without adjust-
ment to the purchasing power available beyond its borders.
Germany'sloss of colonieswas justifiedat the end of the First
World War by arguments that have contributed powerfully
in the last two or threedecades to the dissolutionof the empires
of those who won that war. The substance of those arguments
was a kind of acid that still eats at the seams of empires all
over the world-self-determination. Now the Communists
have proclaimedthemselvesthe apostles of anti-imperialism and
the protagonistsof the principlethat the peoples of the world
should governthemselves. This principleof self-determination,
invoked against Germany,Austria-Hungaryand Turkey during
1914-18, has become a principledissolving all empires. It is
possible that in 1917 the Communistswere sincereand idealistic
in preachingthe end of empire; now, duringthe cold war, the
hard-headedand realisticapplicationof the principlehas become
a useful weapon against the West. Success with it means the

independenceof colonies,theirneutralityas independentstates
in the struggle between East and West, their unavailability
as a source of strategicmineralsand as militarybases at a time
when those minerals and bases are of the utmost importance
to the securityof the West.
So far as one can tell,Russia may be the countryin the world
best able to get along withoutan empireto supplyit withminer-
als, a position that serves as an ideal pulpit to preach the doc-
trines of anti-imperialismand self-determination and to pro-
claim the death of empires. Thus Western Powers are faced
with the loss of their overseas territoriesat a time when their
need of such territoriesis greatest. Apart from the value of
colonies for their minerals and bases, they constituteone area
to which surplus populations in the metropolitancountriescan
migrate,there being no other since the extra-Europeanworld
has ceased to be the asylum it had been forcenturies.
Even without aid or inspiration from Russia, nationalism
would sooner or later destroy existing empires. Peoples to
whom religionhad given an ideology of beliefs and a body of
practicesmore concernedwithsecurityin anotherworldthan in
this world have, within the last generationor so, become con-
cernedwiththe worldthat is present. They are demandingfood,
shelter,good health, employment,and the like. In this respect
theyare shiftingthelocus oftheirstrongestconcernsas Christians
did centuries ago. The fatalism that once accepted without
question whatever happened has melted before programs of
purpose and of action aiming at political independence for
the achievementof securityhere and now.
Thus the internationalismof commerce and of empire that
existed prior to 1914 steadily contracts. As a result men no
longer enjoy the sense of securitywhich they had before the
First World War. While our generation talks much about
internationalism, it is the talk ofmenwho hardlyrealizethat they
talk of somethingtheyhave lost and need, ratherthan of some-
thingthat is real and alive. It is a disturbingparadox that men
should think they have inaugurated an era of internationalism
when actually this period of historyis one of the most intense
nationalism. Neither the League of Nations nor the United

Nations has been able to restorethe internationalarrangements
that gave people and goods their great freedomof movement
and produced a feeling of confidentsecurity. Actually, the
buildings erected for the League at Geneva have become the
tomb of an internationalismthat is dead ratherthan the home
of one that is livingand positive.
There are some countriesin the Western World where large
masses of people are now betteroffeconomicallythan formerly.
Over themhangs, however,the insecurityof a modernwar with
the crushingeconomicburden of preparingforit. In the middle
of the nineteenthcenturyJohnBrightargued at lengthagainst
the waste of war, 170 years of whichhad cost Britaintwo billion
pounds sterling,an astronomicalsum in his objecting opinion.
In our day one year's preparationfor war costs that amount
and much more. It involves an increased tax load. Not so
long ago people could pay their taxes with a few days of work
each year; theynow findthemselvesforcedinto monthsof labor
to earn enough for taxes. Industriesmust produce for defense
and forexport,leaving less and less forthe domesticconsumer.
Defense costs are sure to increase as the weapons of modern
war become more expensive during this race of civilized men
toward self-mutilation and suicide.
Beyond all this economicinsecurityis the terrifyinginsecurity
produced by these new weapons of war. A sneak attack by
an aggressorarmed with atomic bombs will make Pearl Harbor
appear by comparisonlike the strikingofa match. The imagina-
tion cannot comprehend what the heart fears in the horror
likely to result from the use of radioactive weapons. The
exposure of this generationto radiation will cripple the bodies
and blight the minds of people yet to be born, possibly taking
from them those qualities that are the essence of humanity.
These weapons of man's most recentinventiongive war a new
dimensionreaching far into the future,to work through the
genes theirdestructiveand cancerousconsequencesin the spirits
and bodies of human beings. These limitless possibilitiesof
harm make almost trivial any discussion about freedomand
securityas the main issues of our time.
The Consequencesof RevivedInsecurityafter1919

The return of military insecurity to the European world
enhanced the r6le of the state far beyond anythingthat the
first democrats could possibly imagine. The state must tax
as neverbefore,it must employmorepeople,trainmore soldiers,
build up defenseindustries,restrictthe freedomof the individual,
establish the loyalty of its subjects, and so on. Government
pressesus on every side. The situationshows clearlythat men
cannot be freewhen dominatedby the fearthat they are threat-
ened by the aggressionof a Power capable of destroyingthem.
Rarely has it appeared so self-evidentas now that men who
desire to retain their freedomsshould not permit a situation
to arise in which theirchoice is between freedomand security.
It is inconceivablethat men will place freedomahead of funda-
mental securityin our time. Securityhas become the concept
beforewhichmen must bend theirminds and wills today.
The new economic insecuritythat came to Europe afterthe
FirstWorldWar has had profoundeconomicand politicaleffects.
These problems were so overwhelmingin their character and
scope that only the most extreme measures could deal with
them, measures so costly that men favoring them and men
opposing them became divided into hostile parties of political
extremists. There was no middle ground. Those who believed
that they could stand in the middle sooneror later foundthem-
selves disappearinginto the extremewings of Right and Left.
The domestic political struggleassumed the character of civil
war when armed political parties made their appearance. So
intense was this strugglethat the victoriousparty treated the
defeatedone like an enemynot to be tolerated. In fact,it was
easy to identifypolitical opponents as men workingin alliance
withthe nation's externalenemies. In this atmospherepolitical
victorsproceededto make the state theirtotalitarianagent and
to find justificationfor any brutality against their enemies.
Masses of followerswere attractedto leaders who had panaceas,
men in whom blind devotion to an ideology and a programof
action that seemed to give them securitydestroyedany moral
scruple leading to leniencyin dealing with opponentsand their
programs.
180 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Voz..LXXI
The historyof the twentiethcentury,which once regarded

itself as the Century of Progress, has revealed fundamental
and forgotten truthsabout man and his nature. What happened
in Nazi Germany on a large scale, and in other countrieson a
smaller scale, shows that insecure people become primitivein
their brutal savagery toward those they look upon as enemies
of their security,regardlessof the duration of their exposure
to the civilizinginfluencesof either education or Christianity.
Since there is no transmissionof acquired moral or other char-
acteristicsfromone generationto another,it must follow that
all men are primitiveat birth,whetherborn on the banks of the
Congo, the Rhine, or Long Island Sound. Men who regard
themselvesas civilizedare, in the finalanalysis,primitivepeople
who have acquired a fewyears of conditioningin theirparticular
environment,influenceswhose beneficial effectsvanish when
their sense of fundamentalsecurityis suddenly lost. Modern
civilized man is only one generationremoved from the cave
man, a fact that can never be out of mind in an age of growing
insecurity.
A Few Suggestions
The past hundred years have shown European man at his
civilized best and at his barbaric worst. Feeling secure, man
is a rather noble being, capable of treating his fellows with
considerabledecency. What he will do when he feels insecure
is revealed in what has occurredin the last thirty-five years in
many parts of the world. Enabling man to recover his sense
of fundamentalsecurityin our worldis the basic problemof our
time,a problemwhichinvolves the psychologist,the economist,
the sociologist,the historian and experts from other fields of
study found in a university. For scholars to neglect what
they regard as a nonacademic responsibilitytoward man and
civilizationis to make Nero appear an enlightenedrulerutterly
devoted to the well-beingof Rome.
As the presentstate of affairscalls forurgentaction,the study
of history during the last three generations can offersome
principlesof relevancewhen action has to be taken.
1. The greatestinsecurityis that arising fromthe threat of
modern war. To place other considerations ahead of that
threatwill be to lose all.
2. Since it is clear that no country is capable of achieving

and maintainingits own economic securityexcept with the aid
of lands outside its borders,the lands and resourcesof the world
must be made available for the peoples of the world as the
Atlantic Charterstates.
3. No people's militaryor economic securitycan be success-
fully based on the insecurityof others,whetherthe latter are
Russians, Asians, or Africans. The behavior of German Nazis,
of the Mau Mau in Kenya, of the Black Hand Society in Serbia
before1914,of Fascists and Communists,and of otherextremists
shows man's barbaric capacities when he findshimselfinsecure.
4. Men must be warned against attaching their sense of
security to existing political and economic institutionsin the
beliefthat these institutionswill serve in the futurethe security
needs they serve at the presenttime. Men must learn that no
institutionis proofagainst the changes that time sooneror later
produces in them. No matter how beneficialthey may be in
conferringa sense of security,they cannot be made permanent,
however reverentialthe awe in which they are held, however
great the sacrificesmay be that are made for them. To bind
one's securityto what must change will be fatal to all hope.
To blame adherents of other ideologies and practices for the
changes wroughtby passing time in our institutionsand beliefs
is a dangerous superstitionthat may lead to wars destructive
of everything. Men must learn the simpletruththat the whole
of the present cannot be carried unchanged into the future.
This is history'smost obvious lesson, and the hardest one to
learn.
HARRY R. RUDIN
YALU UNIVERSITY

Rudin 1956

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Rudin 1956

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Diplomacy, Democracy, Security: Two Centuries in Contrast

Author(s): Harry R. Rudin

ments. Little considerationis given to the possibleexplanation

these multiplyin an election year, when foreigngovernments

seems that internationalrelations have become more difficult

forsolvingEuropean problems. The lands and resourcesof the

alliances. In this one very important respect governments

or Asia was the land of promise and of opportunity,a feature

have to be fittedinto a plan forkeepingthe state ready to meet

The InternationalBase ofDemocracy

needed by the growingappetites of multiplyingmen and ma-

crowded cities, growing population, high standard of living,

security of their mother countries before 1914, they made a

since. Goods and people moved about with a freedomthat

The Returnof Insecurity

So successfulhad been the blockade in bringingGermanyto

From the standpointof European commercialneeds the two

governmenthas had to assume the r6le of the foreignmarket

a useful weapon against the West. Success with it means the

nationalism. Neither the League of Nations nor the United

The Consequencesof RevivedInsecurityafter1919

The historyof the twentiethcentury,which once regarded

2. Since it is clear that no country is capable of achieving

You might also like