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A lot with an area of 17,311 sq.m. situated in Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna and 20 meters from the
shore of Laguna de Bay; was purchased by Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on 19 April 1909. The
Deed of Sale evidencing said purchase is duly recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
The land was declared for tax purposes beginning the year 1918, and the realty taxes thereon had been
paid since 1948. When Benedicto del Rio died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned his estate and
the subject parcel passed on to his son, Santos del Rio, as the latter's share in the inheritance. Santos del
Rio filed his application for registration of said parcel on 9 May 1966. The application was opposed by
the Director of Lands and by private oppositors, petitioners. Petitioner Director of Lands claims that the
land sought to be registered is part of the public domain and therefore not registerable.

The CFI Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a favorable
judgment from the Court of Appeals, setting aside that of the trial court. The Director of Lands and the
private oppositors filed their respective Petitions for Review of said decision.



Whether the parcel of land in question is a public land.



The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment affirmed from, and ordered the registration of the land
described in the application in favor of Santos del Rio, applicant private respondent.

The Director of Lands claimed that since a portion of the land sought to be registered is covered with
water four to five months a year, the same is part of the ¦
  of Laguna de Bay, or is at least, a

 land, which brings it within the enumeration in Art. 502 of the New Civil Code quoted above
and therefore it cannot be the subject of registration.

However, the extent of a lake bed is defined in Art. 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, as follows:


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The phrase "highest ordinary depth" in the above definition has been interpreted in the case of
Government of  ¦   to be the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during
the dry season, such depth being the "regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time
during the year."

As aptly found by the Court , the submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to
the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources. Since the inundation
of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land
within the meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to be
registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the
Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided
that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title.
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On 11 October 1951, Melitona, Carmen, Justo, Carlos, Librada, Demetrio, and Antonio, all with surname
Alagad, filed an application for registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga, Pila,
Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares, which was amended after the land was divided into two parcels,
namely, Lot 1 with an area of 5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares. The Republic
opposed the application on the ground that applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession
of the land openly, continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since 26
July 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the public domain. It appears that barrio folk also
opposed the application. By virtue of a final judgment in said case and supplemented by orders, the
Alagads were declared owners of Lot 1 and the remaining portion, or Lot 2, was declared public land.
Decree N-51479 was entered and OCT 0-401, dated 18 October 1956, was issued in the names of the
Alagads.

The Republic filed a petition for ³annulment of title and reversion, insofar as the 1.42 hectare
northwestern portion on end of Lot 1 is concerned, contending that said portion had since time
immemorial, been foreshore land reached and covered by the waters of the Laguna de Bay. The Court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Alagads from selling, mortgaging, disposing or
otherwise entering into any transaction affecting the area. The court dismissed the complaint. The
Republic filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the court. Appeal was made to the Court
of Appeals, which sustained the trial court for failure to show in the record on appeal that the appeal was
perfected on time. Hence, the appeal.



Whether the properties in question are foreshore lands.



Under Article 74 of the Law of Waters, The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools is the ground
covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth. And in which case, it forms part of the
national dominion. When Laguna de Bay's waters are at their highest ordinary depth has been defined as:
the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the regular,
common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year«

Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to the extraordinary action of nature, rainfall for instance,
the portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body of water in question.

It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the public dominion, and land capable
of registration as private property.

A foreshore land, on the other hand, has been defined as that part of the land which is between high and
low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. The strip of land that lies between the high and
low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. If the
submergence, however, of the land is due to precipitation, it does not become foreshore, despite its
proximity to the waters.
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Jose de la Rosa filed application for registration of a parcel of land consisting of 9 lots situated in Tuding,
Itogon, Benguet Province. The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., Atok
Big Wedge Corporation and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry
Development. Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering a portion of the
land in question was sold to it by James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it
on October 14, 1909. While, Atok also alleged that a portion of land were covered by the Emma and
Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January
2, 1931. The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought
to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217.
Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and
1973.

The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of
possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. The applicants appealed to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time
reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The
Republic has filed a petition for review and argued that neither the private respondents nor the two mining
companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not alienable and registerable.


?
Whether the land in question is alienable and registerable.


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There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral claims of Benguet and the
"Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and
Emma mineral claims of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the
Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become private properties of
Benguet and Atok.

It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for, for all physical purposes of
ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the
mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by
patent.

We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the requirements of the mining laws,
the claims were removed from the public domain, and not even the government of the Philippines can
take away this right from them. The reason is obvious. Having become the private properties of the
oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law. The perfection of the mining
claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public
domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government,
without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the
land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did,
to Benguet and Atok.
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The Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation entered into an Agreement for the reclamation of
the foreshore lands in Pasay City.

The Republic of the Philippines filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages on the
grounds that the subject-matter of such Agreement is outside the commerce of man, that its terms and
conditions are violative of RA 1899. In the Answers of RREC and Pasay City, they averred that the
subject-matter of said Agreement is within the commerce of man, that the phrase "foreshore lands" within
the contemplation of RA 1899 has a broader meaning than the cited definition of the term in the Words
and Phrases and in the Webster's Third New International Dictionary and the plans and specifications of
the reclamation involved were approved by the authorities concerned.

The trial court issued an Order refraining the defendants from further reclaiming or committing acts of
dispossession or dispoilation over any area within the Manila Bay or the Manila Bay Beach Resort.
Dissatisfied with the said judgment, the Republic appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the Republic. From the Decision and Amended Decision of the Court
of Appeals the Republic of the Philippines, as well as Pasay City and RREC, have come to this Court to
seek relief.

It is the submission of the Republic of the Philippines that there are no foreshore lands along the seaside
of Pasay City; that what Pasay City has are submerged or offshore areas outside the commerce of man
which could not be a proper subject matter of the Agreement between Pasay City and RREC in question
as the area affected is within the National Park, known as Manila Bay Beach Resort, of which area it has
been in open, continuous and peaceful possession since time immemorial.


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Whether the petition is meritorious on the ground that the subject land is a not foreshore lands.


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The Petition is impressed with merit. Erroneous and unsustainable is the opinion of respondent court that
under RA 1899, the term "foreshore lands" includes submerged areas.

To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:

The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide. (Words and Phrases, "Foreshore")
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the
low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at
high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New International Dictionary)

There is nothing in the provision of RA 5187 which can be interpreted to broaden the scope of "foreshore
lands."

We reiterate what was said in (L-21870) and (L-22669) that the
term "foreshore" refers to "that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left
dry by the ordinary flow of the tides."
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Then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084
tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve,
acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." Also, PD No. 1085 was issued transferring to PEA the
"lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). Then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517,
granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP. Subsequently, on
April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
"Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.

PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding which the Board of
Directors of PEA confirmed. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.

The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560
dated September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks
to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title
covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.

Petitioner Frank I. Chavez filed the a Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to
lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA
publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section
7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.



Whether the transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate the 1987
Constitution.

=
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution allows private
corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.

Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the
reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not
make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.

To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will
sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. This scheme can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain since PEA can "acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands."

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.

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Proclamation No. 369 was issued to establish the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.

Camilo Banad and his group, who claimed to have first discovered traces of gold in Mount Diwata, filed a
Declaration of Location for six mining claims in the area. Apex Mining Corporation entered into
operating agreements with Banad and his group.

Marcopper Mining Corporation filed mining claims for areas adjacent to the area covered by the DOL of
Banad and his group. MMC abandoned the claims and instead applied for a prospecting permit with the
Bureau of Forest Development. BFD issued a Prospecting Permit to MMC covering an area within the
forest reserve under Proclamation No. 369. The permit embraced the areas claimed by Apex and the other
individual mining claimants. MMC filed before the BMG a Petition for the Cancellation of the Mining
Claims of Apex and Small Scale Mining Permits. MMC alleged that the areas covered by its EP 133 and
the mining claims of Apex were within an established and existing forest reservation.

Apex filed a motion to dismiss MMC¶s petition alleging that its mining claims are not within any
established or proclaimed forest reserve, and as such, the acquisition of mining rights thereto must be
undertaken via registration of DOL with the BMG and not through the filing of application for permit to
prospect with the BFD. However, Supreme Court rendered a Decision against Apex holding that the
disputed area is a forest reserve; hence, the proper procedure in acquiring mining rights therein is by
initially applying for a permit to prospect with the BFD and not through a registration of DOL with the
BMG.

DENR issued Department Administrative Order No. 66 declaring areas covered by the Agusan-Davao-
Surigao Forest Reserve as non-forest lands and open to small-scale mining purposes. A portion of the
contested area open to small scale miners, several mining entities filed applications for Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement.

Monkayo Integrated Small Scale Miners Association (MISSMA) filed an MPSA application which was
denied by the BMG on the grounds that the area applied for is within the area covered by MMC EP 133
and that the MISSMA was not qualified to apply for an MPSA.

MMC assigned EP 133 to Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation. BMG accepted and registered
SEM¶s MPSA application and the Deed of Assignment over EP 133 executed in its favor by MMC.
SEM¶s application was designated MPSA Application No. 128 (MPSAA 128).

The PA rendered a resolution that EP 133 was valid and subsisting. It also declared that the BMG
Director, under Section 99 of the Consolidated Mines Administrative Order implementing Presidential
Decree No. 463, was authorized to issue exploration permits and to renew the same without limit. The
validity of Expoloration Permit No. 133 was reiterated and all the adverse claims against MPSAA No.
128 are DISMISSED.

Undaunted by the PA ruling, the adverse claimants appealed to the Mines Adjudication Board. In a
Decision, the MAB considered erroneous the dismissal by the PA of the adverse claims filed against
MMC and SEM over a mere technicality of failure to submit a sketch plan. It argued that the rules of
procedure are not meant to defeat substantial justice as the former are merely secondary in importance to
the latter. Dealing with the question on EP 133¶s validity, the MAB opined that said issue was not crucial
and was irrelevant in adjudicating the appealed case because EP 133 has long expired due to its non-
renewal and that the holder of the same, MMC, was no longer a claimant of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao
Forest Reserve having relinquished its right to SEM. After it brushed aside the issue of the validity of EP
133 for being irrelevant, the MAB proceeded to treat SEM¶s MPSA application over the disputed area as
an entirely new and distinct application. It approved the MPSA application, excluding the area segregated
by DAO No. 66, which declared 729 hectares within the Diwalwal area as non-forest lands open for
small-scale mining.

Dissatisfied, the Villaflor group and Balite appealed the decision to this Court. SEM, aggrieved by the
exclusion of 729 hectares from its MPSA application, likewise appealed. Apex filed a Motion for Leave
to Admit Petition for Intervention predicated on its right to stake its claim over the Diwalwal gold rush
which was granted by the Court. These cases, however, were remanded to the Court of Appeals for proper
disposition pursuant to Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals consolidated
the remanded cases as CA-G.R. SP No. 61215 and No. 61216.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the PA and declared null and void the MAB
decision. Hence, the instant Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed
by Apex, Balite and MAB.

During the pendency of these Petitions, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 297.
This proclamation excluded an area of 8,100 hectares located in Monkayo, Compostela Valley, and
proclaimed the same as mineral reservation and as environmentally critical area. Subsequently, DENR
Administrative Order No. 2002-18 was issued declaring an emergency situation in the Diwalwal gold
rush area and ordering the stoppage of all mining operations therein. Thereafter, Executive Order No. 217
was issued by the President creating the National Task Force Diwalwal which is tasked to address the
situation in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.
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Whether the subsequent acts of the executive department such as the issuance of Proclamation No. 297,
and DAO No. 2002-18 can outweigh Apex and Balite¶s claims over the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.
?
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Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the State assumed a more dynamic role in the exploration,
development and utilization of the natural resources of the country. With this policy, the State may pursue
full control and supervision of the exploration, development and utilization of the country¶s natural
mineral resources. The options open to the State are through direct undertaking or by entering into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with foreign-
owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development and utilization.

Recognizing the importance of the country¶s natural resources, not only for national economic
development, but also for its security and national defense, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942 empowers
the President, when the national interest so requires, to establish mineral reservations where mining
operations shall be undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor.

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