Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology © 2011 American Psychological Association

2012, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1–9 1068-8471/11/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0025819

Placing Virtue and the Human Good in Psychology

Blaine J. Fowers
University of Miami

This article contextualizes and critiques the recent increase in interest in virtue ethics
and the good life (eudaimonia) in psychology. Theoretically, psychologists’ interests in
virtue and eudaimonia have followed the philosophical revival of these topics, but this
work has been subject to persistent, disguised commitments to the ideologies of
individualism and instrumentalism. Moreover, psychologists’ tendency to separate the
topics of virtue and eudaimonia is described and critiqued as theoretically misguided,
particularly because Aristotle, the originator of these concepts, saw them as mutually
entailing one another. Historically, psychology turned away from the topic of virtue in
tandem with the popular cultural interest in favor of personality rather than character.
The article concludes with a brief overview of Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia as the
overarching human good consisting of participation in characteristically human goods
(e.g., knowledge, belonging) through virtuous activity.

Keywords: eudaimonia, virtue, goods, ideology, Aristotle

The first decade of the 21st century saw a
tremendous upsurge in interest in virtue and the
good life among psychologists. Part of this interest
is directly connected to the positive psychology
movement, but it is important to remember that
there are many theorists and researchers who are
interested in these topics who have limited or no
ties to that movement. At this point, the psycho-
logical literatures on the topics of virtue and the
good life are extremely fragmented, lacking cohe-
sion in either domain and exhibiting precious few
connections between these two growing and
deeply interconnected areas of interest. This frag-
mentation is partly due to the novelty of psychol-
ogists’ interest, and it would take some time for
these literatures to cohere even in the absence of
enormous conceptual confusions. Unfortunately,
there is deep and widespread conceptual confu-
sion, and these literatures will remain disordered
until theoretical clarity can be established (Fow-
ers, 2010a).
This special issue was designed to contribute
to the theoretical systematization of these liter-
atures. The authors of the articles in this issue
This article was published Online First October 10, 2011.
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to Blaine J. Fowers, PhD, Department of Educa-
tional and Psychological Studies, University of Miami, P.O.
Box 248065, Coral Gables, FL 33124. E-mail:
bfowers@miami.edu
1
address two of the most vexing confusions.
First, some notable psychologists remain sur-
prisingly ambivalent about acknowledging that
virtue and the good life are inherently moral
concepts that cannot be investigated solely from
a detached, value-neutral perspective if they are
to be studied scientifically (e.g., Peterson &
Seligman, 2004). This oxymoronic approach to
inextricably moral concepts has required ex-
treme lexical and conceptual gymnastics,
thereby obfuscating more than it has revealed.
Richardson (this issue) and I (Fowers, this is-
sue) address the singular inappropriateness of
the attempt to maintain the fact-value dichot-
omy in inquiries about virtue and the good life
(cf. Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999;
Slife & Williams, 1995; Taylor, 1985).
Second, psychologists who theorize about
and investigate virtue seldom tie their work to
an explicit theory of the good life. Similarly,
those who theorize about and study the good life
generally neglect the virtues. This disconnect is
remarkable because Aristotle’s (1999) philoso-
phy forms the basis for most of this work in
psychology, whether that is explicitly acknowl-
edged or not. From an Aristotelian perspective,
virtues are simply the excellences that make it
possible to live the good life, meaning that these
two concepts mutually entail one another. All of
the contributions to this special issue address
the connections between virtue and the good.
2 FOWERS
(see Fowers, 2005, 2008, 2010a for additional
commentary).
In setting the stage for the special issue, I
briefly recount arguments by prominent theo-
rists that psychology’s efforts to account for
human action have been hamstrung by the im-
plausible attempt to sharply separate facts and
values (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Gadamer, 1975; Hab-
ermas, 1970; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon,
1999; Slife & Williams, 1995; Taylor, 1985).
The articles in this issue build on this extensive
literature critiquing the attempt to avoid ques-
tions of what is valuable, choiceworthy, and
good in psychology. I highlight ontological
hermeneutics as one of the key sources of this
critique, but note its shortcomings as a source of
an alternative framework for a positive theory
of the human good. Interestingly, the authors of
this special issue suggest that a systematic un-
derstanding of virtue and the good life can point
the way to overcoming the fact-value antinomy.
Among the many possible perspectives from
which such a positive framework can be devel-
oped, the articles in this issue will focus on
Aristotle’s ethical philosophy. Following this, I
provide a brief history of the waxing and wan-
ing of virtue theory in psychology and conclude
with a description of contemporary virtue the-
ory and eudaimonism.
The Critiques of Individualism and
Instrumentalism
A sustained and detailed series of critiques
has illuminated the prominent ideologies of
individualism and instrumentalism in psycho-
logical theory, research, and practice (Bellah,
Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985;
Cushman, 1995; Danziger, 1990; Fowers, 1998;
Fowers, 2010b; Richardson et al., 1999). Indi-
vidualism takes the individual to be the ultimate
social reality and views the autonomous pursuit
and satisfaction of individually defined ends as
the ultimate goods in life (Bellah et al., 1985).
This perspective is termed individualism be-
cause all human phenomena tend to be inter-
preted in terms of the individual. The predom-
inant understanding is that individuals pursue
their chosen goods instrumentally, which means
that they have subjectively predetermined ends,
and they select the best strategies, techniques,
and skills to attain those ends. The means are
separate from the ends and can be taken up or
discarded based on effectiveness. This view-
point is termed instrumentalism because all hu-
man behavior tends to be portrayed as instru-
mental. Indeed, rationality is often defined in
terms of the ability to recognize and utilize
means that will help in achieving one’s aims.
These theorists have shown the profound in-
fluence of individualism and instrumentalism in
the conceptualization of persons, research meth-
ods, and practice approaches. A few illustra-
tions can indicate the pervasive influence of
these ideologies. Interested readers can find
many examples and clear demonstrations of
these ideologies in the literature cited above.
One prominent example of the ideology of in-
dividualism is evident in self-determination the-
ory (Ryan & Deci, 2000), which posits three
universal individual needs: autonomy, compe-
tence, and social relatedness. Individual auton-
omy and personal ownership of goals and
behaviors are the core of this theory, with
competence and social relatedness seen as dem-
onstrations of and supports for autonomy. Indi-
vidualism is also apparent in that this theory
suggests that the business of life is satisfying
these three individual needs, and a good life is
one in which this satisfaction is consistently
obtained. The ideology of instrumentalism is
apparent in the widespread use of concepts such
as technique, strategy, skill, manipulation,
mechanism, and effect, all of which imply uni-
lateral action and a separation of means and
ends. The most prominent theories of interper-
sonal relationships, social exchange theory
(Cook & Rice, 2003) and interdependence the-
ory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), are built on an
economic exchange model construing the es-
sential reality of relationships as an economic
model of exchange. These theories portray in-
dividuals as traders and relationships as quid
pro quo interactions to be continued as long as
the individuals believe they are getting a rea-
sonably good relationship “deal.”
The mainstream portrayal of the individual as
a strategic actor in pursuit of need and desire
satisfaction through instrumental activity is per-
vasive in psychology, and it is seldom ques-
tioned in mainstream circles. Although critical
perspectives are available from many sources,
including critical theory (Habermas, 1970),
postmodern perspectives (e.g., Foucault, 1980),
and feminism (e.g., Fox-Genovese, 1991), the
most sustained critique of these ideologies
 VIRTUE AND THE HUMAN GOOD IN PSYCHOLOGY
within psychology has originated in ontological
hermeneutics (e.g., Richardson et al., 1999;
Taylor, 1985). In spite of psychology’s la-
bored attempts to maintain a detached objec-
tivity about human behavior, the discipline
has adopted an individualistic view of human
life in which individuals perpetually pursue
need and desire satisfaction through strategic
means. Ironically, neutrality about individual
ends was adopted in the service of maintain-
ing objectivity. This supposed neutrality is
belied, however, because taking a neutral
stance on what is needed or desired by leav-
ing it to the individual is at the core of indi-
vidualism and viewing behaviors as mere
means to individual ends is the definition of
instrumentalism. Therefore, the idea that hu-
man life amounts to satisfying individual
needs and desires through instrumental action
does not free psychology from having a vision
of the human good. Rather, it means that
psychology has unwittingly built individual-
ism and instrumentalism into its understand-
ing of the good throughout its theory, re-
search, and practice. As the articles in this
special issue will argue, not only does psy-
chology fail to attain the desired detached
objectivity, it fails rather miserably by pro-
moting a distinctly thin and grubby vision of
the human good.
The takeaway lesson from this array of the-
oretical critiques of disguised ideology is that
the strenuous efforts of a great many intelligent,
dedicated, and visionary psychologists have
been insufficient to separate psychological sci-
ence from commitments to a vision of the good.
The hermeneutic recommendation is to ac-
knowledge that the ideal of detached objectivity
has failed and recognize that commitment to
some set of goods and goals is inescapable in
any human endeavor, including science. Then
we can begin to reveal, discuss, and critique the
hidden commitments to particular goods in our
discipline. Instead of settling for a set of unac-
knowledged culturally guided goods, it seems
preferable to explicitly explore the systematic
frameworks that are available for understanding
human goods. The purpose of this special issue
is to explicate an understanding of Aristotle’s
framework of virtues and the good life as one
promising way to explicitly incorporate the
good in psychology.
3
From Hermeneutics to Aristotle’s Ethics
Before exploring Aristotle’s perspective on
human goods, I want to describe how this proj-
ect got off the ground. The critiques of individ-
ualism and instrumentalism that laid the
groundwork for this special issue were formu-
lated through the application of ontological
hermeneutics to psychology (e.g., Richardson et
al., 1999). Hermeneutic philosophy addresses
human goods by clarifying that people are al-
ways living out a vision of the human good
every day, both personally and professionally.
All people inherit a set of ethical commitments
from and are shaped by ongoing historical com-
munities with their understandings of the good.
In this milieu, we perceive and move within a
moral space oriented to particular goods (Tay-
lor, 1989). We are not trapped by our inherited
values because the human capacity for reflec-
tion on the valuable allows us to call these
traditions into question and reinterpret them.
These reinterpretations arise from many differ-
ent perspectives within a given tradition. For
these reasons, all traditions are multivocal.
Moreover, our appreciation of what is valuable
can be deepened and broadened through dia-
logue with our historical forbearers and with
contemporaries who espouse differing view-
points. Ontological hermeneutics argues power-
fully that claims about the human good are
inescapable in psychological practices and in
ordinary life. Much can be said about the human
good with the hermeneutic framework, but the
full-bodied, substantive account of the human
good one would like has remained elusive. As a
result, hermeneutically oriented critiques of dis-
guised ideologies in psychology begin strongly,
but frequently peter out to vague generalities in
conclusion, typically providing relatively ab-
stract and contentless comments regarding the
human good. In other words, hermeneutics calls
for a substantive theory of the good, but does
not seem to have the resources to provide such
a theory. In this special issue, the contributors
take up the challenge of developing a substan-
tive theory of the good by exploring the re-
sources of Aristotle’s ethics.
Among the background sources of hermeneu-
tics, Aristotle (1999) is the premier guide re-
garding a substantive perspective on the human
good. He begins by making the good the chief
priority of ethics in the opening paragraph of the
4 FOWERS
Nicomachean Ethics. The orienting statement of
this central text is “every action and choice
seem to aim at some good” (1094a 2). Although
one can be mistaken or misguided about the
good, Aristotle located the good at the center of
human action because it orients all choice and
activity. Just so it is clear that he did not aban-
don this position in his characteristic back-and-
forth style of inquiry, he repeats this point sev-
eral times. For example, in book 6 he states:
“For the originating causes of the things that are
done consist in the end at which they are aimed”
(1140 b 20 –21).
There are four reasons that Aristotle provides
a good beginning for the exploration of human
goods. First, the Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle,
1999) has been a primary source for Western
explorations of the good life, having stood the
test of time by remaining relevant over the
course of two millennia. Although Plato’s
works provide a similarly valuable set of
sources, they have not enjoyed the same degree
of interest that Aristotle’s more straightforward
and systematic approach has. Second, there is
widespread interest in appropriating Aristotle’s
ethics to contemporary concerns among philos-
ophers and psychologists, with rapidly expand-
ing literatures in both disciplines. Third, as the
articles in this issue show, Aristotle provides
excellent resources for transcending the individ-
ualism and instrumentalism in which psychol-
ogy is currently mired. Finally, Aristotle’s eth-
ics is directed toward living a good life, but he
does not commit himself to a narrow or pre-
scriptive understanding of a single form of the
good life. This allows for the incorporation of a
diversity of goods, which is an essential feature
of an acceptable ethics in our time. Clearly,
Aristotle’s is not the only perspective on human
goods that is worth exploring, but this special
issue focuses on his thought in the service of
depth of presentation. Explorations of other per-
spectives and comparisons among them have
great value, but doing them justice will require
a similar depth of presentation.
The Waxing and Waning and Waxing of
Virtue Theory in Psychology
Character and virtue were very prominent
topics in the early decades of psychology, and
character training was seen as very important
(Leahey, 1994; Sussman, 1973). Sussman
(1973) recounts a significant shift in American
culture from character to personality beginning
in the late 19th century. Psychologists followed
as much as led this shift in emphasis away from
character and toward the more “expressive,
adaptable, and morally unencumbered” self that
seemed necessary for a more “industrialized and
urbanized age” (Nicholson, 1998, p. 52). By the
mid-20th century, personality research had en-
tirely eclipsed interest in character.
Character and virtue fell into disfavor as the
discipline attempted to split scientific fact from
moral value in its drive to become an accepted
social science (Nicholson, 1998; Ross & Nis-
bett, 1991). Two key moments in the waning of
character are particularly important. First, All-
port (1937) engaged in a sustained critique of
character as a fitting subject for psychology. His
pointed couplet is emblematic for this move:
“Character is personality evaluated, and per-
sonality is character devaluated” (p. 52, em-
phasis in original). This devaluation of charac-
ter has been an important part of psychology’s
attempt to exclude evaluative and popular terms
from personality psychology. In the service of a
science of personality, Allport frequently as-
serted the necessity of rigidly separating person-
ality traits as scientific from character and virtue
as normative elements of ethics (Allport, 1921;
Allport & Vernon, 1930). Nicholson (1998)
suggests that “Allport’s goal was not to destroy
the traditional ethical foundations of America
but to revitalize them” through scientific rigor.
His rationale for this approach was that “he was
convinced that the solution to America’s ethical
dilemmas lay not in history, culture, or religion,
but in science, in particular, psychology” (p.
64). Allport had difficulty fully effecting the
separation of character and personality partly
because he worried that psychologists would
not do “justice to the richness and dignity of
human personality” (Allport, 1937, p. vii, em-
phasis added). His commitment to a morally
informed understanding of living well is even
clearer in his description of “the mature person-
ality” who is loyal, dignified, devoted, and who
eschews egoism, self-seeking, vanity, and self-
justification.
Allport’s theory of personality illustrates the
difficulty in separating description and prescrip-
tion. This difficulty of separating moral ideals
from detached, objective descriptions of person-
ality was not limited to Allport’s theorizing,
 VIRTUE AND THE HUMAN GOOD IN PSYCHOLOGY
however. Character remains embedded in the
most widely accepted and best documented
contemporary understanding of personality: the
Five Factor Model (Costa & McCrae, 1991).
McCrae and John (1992) comment that two of
the famed Five Factors are clearly related to
traditional virtue terms: Agreeableness (A) and
Conscientiousness (C). “Like A, C is a highly
evaluated dimension: indeed, A and C are the
classic dimensions of character describing
‘good’ versus ‘evil’ and ‘strong-willed’ versus
‘weak-willed’ individuals. Perhaps it was these
moral overtones that often led scientific psy-
chologists to ignore these factors, but in fact,
both represent objectively observable dimen-
sions of individual differences” (p. 197, empha-
sis added).
The second important moment in psychology’s
move away from character was the publication of
Hartshorne and May’s celebrated studies of hon-
esty among schoolchildren (Hartshorne & May,
1928; Hartshorne, May, & Maller, 1929; Hart-
shorne, May, & Shuttleworth, 1930). The stan-
dard interpretation of their results (Doris, 2002;
Emler, 1999; Ross & Nisbett, 1991) has been
that children are typically dishonest when given
the opportunity, even those students who were
rated as honest by peers and teachers. Because
many students exploited experimenter contrived
opportunities for dishonesty, these authors con-
cluded that situational factors were more impor-
tant for moral behavior than character. This
interpretation has been extremely influential.
Hartshorne and May’s results have been sub-
sequently reinterpreted theoretically and empir-
ically. Virtue theory does not suggest that the
majority of adult individuals will act virtuously
in all situations, much less the majority of chil-
dren. The finding that some children acted hon-
estly in spite of incentives not to, suggests the
presence of a character strength. Statistical re-
analyses have also cast doubt on Hartshorne and
May’s conclusions (Burton, 1963; Epstein &
O’Brien, 1985; Rushton, 1984).
Virtue ethics was also marginal in philosophy
until a dramatic upsurge in interest in recent
decades (Anscombe, 1958; Broadie, 1991; Ma-
cIntyre, 1984; Rorty, 1980). This renewal has
spurred theoretical and empirical work on virtue
and the good life in psychology as well (Fow-
ers, 1998, 2005; Meara, Schmidt, & Day, 1996;
Tjeltveit, 2003). Contrary to earlier dismissals,
Baumeister and Exline (1999) have argued that
5
virtue concepts are entirely amenable to empir-
ical research with available methods. The ad-
vent of positive psychology, with its interest in
virtue has also contributed to this literature (Pe-
terson & Seligman, 2004). There is a growing
empirical literature on virtue in general (Caw-
ley, Martin, & Johnson, 2000; Hawkins, Fow-
ers, Carroll, & Yang, 2006; Walker & Pitts,
1998) and specific virtues such as gratitude
(Emmons & Crumpler, 2000; McCullough, Em-
mons, & Tsang, 2002), courage (Pury & Kow-
alski, 2007), and practical wisdom (Kramer,
2000; Staudinger, Lopez, & Baltes, 1997). In
addition, some investigators have studied per-
ceptions of what makes a life good (King &
Napa, 1998; McGregor & Little, 1998).
This recent upsurge of theoretical and empir-
ical interest in virtue and the good life demon-
strates a waxing interest in these topics. Unfor-
tunately, the vast majority of authors in this
emerging literature in psychology has only a
rudimentary and fragmented understanding of
the rich theory available on virtue and the good
life (Fowers, 2005, 2008, 2010a). One of the
primary purposes of this special issue is to ad-
dress that lack of knowledge.
A Précis of Virtue and the Human Good
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (NE) (1999)
is the locus classicus on virtue and the good life.
In addition, Aristotle had much to say about
these topics in his other works, and there is a
voluminous secondary literature. I will provide
an extremely brief, but close interpretation of
what Aristotle said about these topics here, and
encourage the reader to study Aristotle’s works
and recent philosophical scholarship for greater
depth of understanding.
The central concept of the NE is eudaimonia,
which is Aristotle’s term for the highest form of
human life. It can be translated as happiness or
flourishing. Translating it as happiness can be
misleading, however, as happiness generally
connotes an affective state, particularly in psy-
chology. Aristotle understood eudaimonia as liv-
ing a complete human life that is fully realized
through virtuous activity. For these reasons, I pre-
fer the term flourishing as a translation. I will rely
primarily on the term eudaimonia, but occasion-
ally employ flourishing as a synonym.
Aristotle begins the NE with eudaimonia be-
cause, as MacIntyre (1984) noted, “the concept
6 FOWERS
of the good life is prior to the concept of a
virtue” (p. 184, emphasis in original). The rea-
son for this is that virtues are the character
excellences that make it possible to pursue the
good life. Aristotle defined eudaimonia as
the best, most complete form of human life and
he highlighted a number of features that com-
prise this kind of life. The first and most basic
point about eudaimonia is that it is an inextri-
cably ethical concept because it is about living
the best kind of life. Aristotle understood the
best kind of life in terms of human nature,
defining eudaimonia as realizing one’s full hu-
man potential given the particular kind of nat-
ural beings we are. This formulation, wherein a
being’s good is a matter of the full expression of
its nature, is known as the function argument.
Throughout the NE, Aristotle emphasized that
eudaimonia is a form of activity.1 That is, eu-
daimonia is a way of living and cannot be
limited to a mental state or process. The every-
day activities that constitute eudaimonia are de-
voted to the pursuit of characteristically human
goods such as friendship, knowledge, and the
best form of politics. He made the case that
eudaimonia is comprised of a broad set of such
choiceworthy ends. Aristotle argues that one
can pursue these ends and live a eudaimonic life
in so doing only through virtuous action. This
means that, for Aristotle, a good human life is
inextricably tied to being a good person. This is
one of the key reasons that eudaimonia cannot
be studied in a value-neutral way. Aristotle also
saw eudaimonia as inherently pleasant because
excellent activity is pleasant. He distinguished
noble pleasures (e.g., learning) from base plea-
sures (e.g., gluttony), but he clearly saw both
virtuous activity and a eudaimonic life as deeply
pleasurable.
Aristotle defined eudaimonia as the ultimate
and sufficient end for human life. This means
that it is chosen for itself and not for the sake of
some other end and that there is nothing that can
be added to a flourishing life to make it better.
Finally, eudaimonia is comprised by a complete
life, meaning that eudaimonia is a matter of how
one’s life comes together as a whole rather than
being comprised of a series of transitory states
such as emotions, moods, or experiences.
Psychologists who theorize about and study
virtue generally do so by focusing on a single
virtue or a list of virtues. Although these ap-
proaches have some merits, they are deeply
problematic because these scholars seldom have
a clear, systematic conceptualization of what a
virtue is. The original Greek term for virtue was
arête, best translated as excellence. Virtues are,
simply, human excellences or character
strengths that make it possible for individuals to
pursue characteristically human goods (e.g., so-
cial connections, knowledge) that allow them to
flourish as human beings. Broadie (1991) put it
simply: “an excellence or virtue . . . is nothing
but a characteristic which makes the difference
between functioning and functioning well”
(p. 37, emphasis in original). The capacities to
act generously, loyally, courageously, and justly
allow individuals to fulfill their potential as the
rational social beings we are.
Virtues are multidimensional characteristics
that include a cognitive understanding of the
character strength and its relationship to the
good life, which creates a strong and spontane-
ous motivation to enact the virtue, a reliable
disposition or habit of enacting the virtue, and
the practical wisdom to know how to enact the
virtue. The ability to make wise decisions about
how best to pursue one’s aims, which character
strengths to employ and in what way is also
essential to a virtue framework and is known as
practical wisdom. The cognitive, emotional,
dispositional, behavioral, and wisdom aspects
of character strengths comprise a seamless
whole. Individuals who have developed good
character want to act ethically out of an attach-
ment to what is good.
A brief illustration of the necessary role of
virtue in pursuing human goods can clarify the
features of virtue and the relationship between
virtue and what is good. The sustained interest
in and peculiar kinds of knowledge that humans
pursue makes knowledge a characteristically
human good. There are many ways to pursue
knowledge, with science as one of the paradig-
matic approaches. The pursuit of scientific
1
Through most of the NE, Aristotle describes rational,
social, and political activity as it takes place in everyday
life. In part of Book X of the NE, however, he discusses
contemplation as the highest human activity. There is a
good deal of controversy regarding how this concept is to be
integrated into the rest of Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia.
I have downplayed this concept and the controversy here
because it is beyond the scope of this special issue due to its
complexity. For more on this fascinating, but vexing ques-
tion, see Broadie (1991), Nussbaum (1986), and Rorty
(1980).
 VIRTUE AND THE HUMAN GOOD IN PSYCHOLOGY
knowledge cannot proceed unless scientists ex-
ercise the virtue of honesty in reporting their
procedures and findings accurately, and science
is utterly dependent on this kind of honesty.
From time to time, spectacular cases of scien-
tific fraud remind us that we cannot take this
honesty for granted. Moreover, there are enor-
mously powerful incentives for fabricating re-
sults, misrepresenting findings, or “massaging”
data, including academic tenure and promotion,
grant funding, public notoriety, and political
influence. Although honesty could be a matter
of conventional rule following or the avoidance
of negative consequences, a more powerful and
appealing reason for honesty is an enduring
interest in truthfulness that grows out of a per-
sonal devotion to seeking knowledge. At their
best, scientists are engaged in a genuine search
for the best ways to understand the phenomena
of interest. Dishonesty about one’s results is not
merely an error. Rather, it is a kind of bad faith.
Deception is inherently contradictory to science
because it is destructive to the very possibility
of pursuing the most accurate account of a phe-
nomenon by distorting or fabricating one’s find-
ings. Scientists who willingly and consistently
report procedures and findings accurately are
enacting the virtue of honesty. Scientific hon-
esty serves the good of expanding human
knowledge and is the only way to pursue this
good. The pursuit of knowledge and other char-
acteristically human goods through virtuous ac-
tion is what makes for a eudaimonic life. It is
essential that theorists and investigators recog-
nize the central and ineliminable theoretical
connection between virtue, human goods, and
eudaimonia.
Deep friendship provides a more everyday
example as a key good in human life that can
only come into being through an extended his-
tory of loyalty and honesty. Such a friendship is
called into question and perhaps fatally under-
mined by acts of betrayal, manipulation, or
abandonment because those actions contradict
the constitutive elements of deep friendship.
Perhaps the unwillingness of psychologists to
address the virtue terms so elemental to deep
friendship helps to explain why psychological
accounts of friendship (e.g., social exchange
theory) so blithely include manipulation and
potential abandonment as defining features of
friendships and why such accounts seem so
7
thoroughly to misdescribe and distort the expe-
rience of cherished friendships.
This special issue makes the case for the
systematic theorizing of virtues in psychology.
Richardson (this issue) begins by laying bare
the pretensions of psychology to value-neutral
inquiry and suggests that attention to substan-
tive moral issues is inescapable for the disci-
pline. He argues that a virtue framework pro-
vides a promising approach to this challenge. I
follow this line of thought in arguing that eu-
daimonia is constituted by the consistent pursuit
of characteristically human goods, which are, in
turn, a matter of virtuous activity (Fowers, this
issue). Slife (this issue) provides an extended
and compelling account of the role that teaching
virtues plays in encouraging troubled girls to-
ward a flourishing life in a residential school.
Aho (this issue) reflects on the contribution of
the articles in this issue and suggests critical
questions and future directions for psychologi-
cal theory and research on virtue and the human
good.
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Received March 20, 2011
Revision received June 27, 2011
Accepted August 18, 2011 䡲