Journal of Psychology and Christianity Copyright 2009 Christian Association for Psychological Studies

2009, Vol. 28, No. 1, 22-35 ISSN 0733-4273

Foundations for a Psychotherapy of Virtue:

An Integrated Catholic Perspective
Frank J. Moncher Craig Steven Titus
The Institute for the Psychological Sciences

This article discusses the possibility of founding a psychotherapy of virtue on a Roman Catholic anthro-
pology and on an Aristotelian–Thomist virtue theory. We explore the common ground, the diversity, and
the therapeutic pathways in a life of virtue. The common ground is rooted in the normativeness of human
nature according to cognitive, volitional, emotional, and relational domains, where we find the basic virtue
areas identified in the cardinal and theological virtues. The diversity is manifest at the level of human devel-
opment in which associated virtue strengths and supporting practices are historically and culturally embed-
ded. The therapeutic pathways revisit these levels with a goal of healing. It is argued that the therapeutic
process must prioritize attention to emotional wounds to stabilize the foundation for growth in the capacity
to become free and responsible agents. In addition, for clients who bring an intention to employ Christian
spiritual resources, this psychotherapy concurrently seeks not only symptom reduction and the develop-
ment of acquired virtue strengths and practices, but also the concomitant development of spiritual ones.

Recent efforts have explicated Catholic anthro-
pological foundations for clinical psychology
(Brugger & the faculty of the Institute for the
Psychological Sciences, 2008), incorporating a
positive developmental and therapeutic psychol-
ogy paradigm in terms of three levels: basic
virtues, character strengths, and practices (Titus
& Moncher, in press). In this article, we consider
a psychology of virtue, which draws from a
virtue-tradition with its achievements in philo-
sophical and theoretical psychology (see, e.g.,
Aristotle, trans 1941; Aquinas, 1270/trans 1981;
Hauerwas, 1981; John Paul II, 1998; McIntyre,
1981; Pinckaers, trns 1995, 2005; Titus, 2006).
From within this tradition, we have identified
certain anthropological principles relevant to the
task of psychotherapy that spring from theologi-
cal and philosophical sources (Moncher, 2001).
Inasmuch as we take an explicitly Catholic-
Christian perspective, we differ from other
recent efforts to re-appropriate virtue in psy-
chology, both those that assert a non-normative
framework and those that take a relativistic
approach to moral norms. On the one hand, the
positive psychology paradigm of character
strengths and virtues has attempted to abstract
itself not only from particular religious tradi-
tions, but also from moral norms as such (e.g.,
This manuscript is based on a paper originally present-
ed at the Society for Christian Psychology Conference,
Chattanooga, TN, October 2006. Correspondence
regarding this article should be addressed to Frank J.
Moncher, Ph. D., The Institute for the Psychological
Sciences, 2001 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 511,
Arlington, VA 22202; fmonch@ipsciences.edu
Seligman, 2002; Peterson & Seligman, 2004;
Joseph & Linley 2006; Snyder & Lopez, 2007).
For example, Peterson and Seligman (2004)
claim their “richer psychological content and
greater explanatory power” (p. 88) is descriptive
of character strengths, but without normative ref-
erence. While seeking moral references for good
character in a pre-empirical moral anthropology
(through the construal of the nature of virtue
and the notion of positive human nature), they
distance the inner motivation of the virtues from
moral considerations (laws and principles) and
from the normativeness of human nature. Such a
separation of virtue and ethical sources (moral
inclinations, sentiments, law, and principle) ren-
ders both psychological guidance and moral
agency indecisive. While this approach may give
some clues for positive growth, we find that it
has not yet succeeded in understanding the role
of virtue in psychotherapy (Titus & Moncher, in
press; Titus, 2008). On the other hand, others
see psychotherapy as moral discourse (e.g.,
Cushman 1990, 1993) and affirm the necessity of
moral borders. Cushman (1993) sees the psy-
chotherapist as a resource in the patient’s dis-
cernment of moral issues (see also Tjeltveit,
1999), and claims that “It is the job of a psy-
chotherapist to demonstrate the existence of a
world constituted by different rules and to
encourage patients to be aware of available
moral traditions that oppose the moral frame by
which they presently shape their lives” (p. 109).
Moreover, he postulates an empty self, which is
filled by ambient historical, cultural, and moral
contexts, but only with relativistic references.

22

What the Catholic anthropology of this essay
expresses, on the contrary, is a humble confi-
dence in a moral framework that is sure enough
to offer clear guidance and large enough to
include room for faithful creativity and cultural
differences. First, as part of a philosophical
effort, an understanding of the human person is
reached through the use of reasoned observation
about human nature as embedded in culture and
particular communities but also in a world that
instantiates a deeper orderliness that underlies
the relative disorders and the particularities of
history. This work of theoretical psychology (or
a philosophical anthropology) identifies the
human person as embodied, relational, rational,
and volitional. Second, the theological aspects
draw upon the faith-based understanding of the
human person, rooted in revelation as expressed
in Judeo-Christian Scripture and tradition, partic-
ularly in a Roman Catholic perspective. This rev-
elation of the origin and finality of human
persons aids in distinguishing the numerous
well-ordered means of pursuing ultimate human
ends from various disordered similitudes.
It is not insignificant when Catholic and secular
psychology texts differ in the content, categoriza-
tion, and hierarchy of virtuous qualities. However,
secular and such religious formulations are not
necessarily at complete odds concerning issues of
justice, respect, basic dignity, and so on; and in
various psychosocial domains there is a possibility
for cross-fertilization and mutual understanding.
The content of the virtues get played out in vari-
ous ways across cultures with different accents.
Although the basic virtue areas are operative
across cultures, the associated virtue strengths and
practices are necessarily expressed with marked
personal and cultural variations.
In contemporary thought, the related classical
notions of the developmental originality and nor-
mative constancy of virtue are often misrepresent-
ed. Virtue theory is commonly perceived in the
light of one or another of two common extremes.
On the one hand, each virtue is perceived as an
“ideal” norm that must be instantiated in the same
way or not be considered virtue at all. On the
other hand, there is the notion that virtue theory
charts a developmental path that is absolutely
unique to each person, therefore, lacking an ulti-
mate normative grounding or goal. On the con-
trary, in Aquinas’ Christian virtue perspective both
elements (normativeness and development) are
held in a mutually dependent unity, which offers
a stable yet dynamic basis for psychotherapy.
MONCHER AND TITUS 23
An important characteristic of the Catholic
virtue tradition is that it recognizes human
potential and natural development which are
central to the process of psychotherapy. In par-
ticular, we suggest that psychotherapy might
seek not only the reduction of symptoms, but
also growth in the positive human capacities at
three levels (major virtues, associated virtues
and character strengths, particular practices)
—in fact, we assert that there is a concomitant
movement in symptom reduction and in virtu-
ous practices and development. With due con-
sideration of its neuro-biological bases,
psychological health ultimately is related to
being able to choose “goods” that are objective-
ly adequate for human flourishing and acting in
a consequent manner; at this level, there is a
convergence between psychology and what has
classically been called natural acquired virtue.
As patients become increasingly free to act and
make choices in their lives, encouraging the
exercise of related virtues and practices can
have a dramatic impact on their mental health
in terms of self-knowledge and self-mastery,
but also of self-acceptance and trusting that
they are worthy of love (Moncher, 2001). Fur-
thermore, in order for the therapist to provide
this encouragement coherently and effectively,
it is also important that he or she be focused
on living and learning the developmental path-
ways of the different groups of virtues in his or
her own life.
Within this understanding of virtue, we will
now focus on specific clinical applications utiliz-
ing a focus on emotions in psychotherapy. Many
clients seeking psychological help are suffering
in ways that require immediate and compassion-
ate attention at preliminary levels of emotional,
relational, and motivational well-being. These
issues must be resolved in order to best prepare
the person to pursue a fuller growth in virtue
and related practices. Moreover, on a clearly
spiritual level, we will consider briefly how the
theological virtues of charity (i.e., love), faith,
and hope, can be operative in the therapy pro-
cess and provide a framework for understanding
suffering and recovery.
The Case of Sister Lydia: Brief Family History
and Background1
In order to make concrete the clinical applica-
tion of this theory, we will present an overview
of a case study that we will re-visit throughout
the article.
24 FOUNDATIONS FOR A PSYCHOTHERAPY OF
Lydia, a consecrated member of a
Catholic religious congregation, is
the oldest female of several children
born in an intact family. She came
from a middle class, Mid-western
background, with a traditional fam-
ily arrangement of father working
outside the home and mother staying
with the children. The family was
raised in the Catholic Church but
was not active outside of the Sunday
obligation. Lydia often took on the
role of protector and guide for her
younger siblings who were at times
physically abused by her father. Her
mother would disappear when the
father erupted in rage, and would
even at times tell the father things
that would predictably cause vio-
lence to her children. One remark-
able aspect of the environment of her
family life is that her parents were
kind and gentle with people in the
world, but angry and critical within
the family. Sister Lydia learned that
it was dangerous to relax, to trust in
other’s goodwill, and so developed an
independent style and an assertive
self-reliance, stuffing her feelings as
a habitual response that kept her
emotionally safe. Within her current
‘family’ of the convent, however, she
is surrounded by others who are not
dangerous to her physically or emo-
tionally, but still she has difficulty
shifting her stance in these relation-
ships to allow for more intimate
relating appropriate to the circum-
stances. In the living of community
life, Sister and her superiors realized
that there was something amiss in
how she was pursuing holiness.
Somehow, the human virtues she was
trying to enact were not bearing the
expected fruit.
The Human Person and the
Virtue Perspective
Any psychotherapy that seeks to have a stable
anthropological footing must answer some cru-
cial questions: How does a general notion (such
as virtue) accommodate diverse times and cul-
tures, different ages of life, and the distinct bio-
logical sexes? Moreover, how do we explain
VIRTUE
human capacities for excellence, continuity, and
creativity, along with the contrary human expres-
sions of mediocrity, instability, and rote repeti-
tion? Virtue-based anthropology attempts such
an account by recognizing the human person
has an origin and a goal, as well as a need for
personal development in the process, without
denying a certain diversity in defining associated
virtues. First, although not uncontroversial, it
accepts from philosophical argument (e.g., D.
McInerny, 2006) and empirical findings (e.g.,
Ekman, 1992, 2003) that human persons have a
nature, a given structure that specifies the
species by not only physiological traits but also
natural inclinations toward fitting human life-
goals broadly-speaking. Second, it recognizes a
developmental perspective that distinguishes var-
ious large areas in which human beings need to
grow, in order, third, to approach the goal of
mature flourishing, becoming free and responsi-
ble agents. That is, the anthropological vision
identifies a structure of human origins, pathways
for development, and fitting expressions of
maturity (Schmitz, 2009).
In psychotherapy, Lydia’s difficulty
was conceptualized as a result of the
virtues not being interiorly formed,
but instead being performed primari-
ly out of duty to the exterior law;
thus, she was seen to express an emo-
tional and virtue profile blocked at
the stage of a beginner (dependent on
duty and external rules), with the
incumbent difficulties, dryness, and
lack of spontaneity. This conceptual-
ization was put forth by the therapist
in the context of their shared faith
background, along with minor yet
significant self-disclosure of his own
experiences of this process. This inter-
vention normalized her experiences
and also enabled Sister to under-
stand why she is exhausted when
going about her daily routine in the
convent trying to do the right things;
she has reflexively and habitually
stuffed her emotional reactions as
they arise in order to not become
overwhelmed by them and possibly
behave inappropriately. As a result,
she has tended to resist all emotions
even if consequent to the goods that
she seeks to pursue.

The Person on the Natural Level: Embodied,
Relational, Rational, and Volitional
We would argue that the determinant qualities
of human life, of the whole person, can be spec-
ified in terms of four philosophical anthropologi-
cal areas: embodiment, relationality, rationality,
and volition, expressed in a unified, develop-
mental manner (Brugger & the faculty of the
Institute for the Psychological Sciences, 2008).
First, ‘embodiment’ involves not only the
motoric, perceptual, and biological sex of per-
sons, but also the neuro-biological substrate for
human life that is expressed in malleable sense
cognition and emotion (see Lakoff & Johnson,
1999). At the level of embodied cognition, we
have not only external, but internal senses; for
we engender preconscious thoughts (such as
judgments of attraction or repulsion) and con-
scious thoughts (such as memories and imagin-
ings). At the level of embodied affectivity, we
have emotions that relate to attraction proper:
love, desire, pleasure, and joy, as well as hatred,
repulsion, pain, and sorrow; moreover there are
emotions related to goods that are difficult to
attain, namely, fear, daring, despair, hope, and
anger (Titus, 2006; on diverse classifications of
emotion, see Ekman, 1992, 2003; Evans & Cruse,
2004; Griffiths, 1997).
Second, ‘relationality’ involves the socio-cultur-
al dimensions that are necessary for healthy
human development and flourishing, but that
also can be at the source of some disorders and
pathology. The human person has a species-spe-
cific nature, which needs to be interpersonally
nurtured in order not only to merely survive, but
also to attain capacities and to thrive in different
forms of excellence. Such nurturance begins in
the family and involves socio-cultural practices
and interaction with others. The web of relations
affects the person for better or worse, from the
beginnings already in the mother’s womb, until
one’s death bed.
Next, two other cognitive and affective capaci-
ties are proper to human ‘intelligence;’ namely
reason and will. They pertain to the intuitive and
discursive qualities that develop throughout a
person’s life. Intelligence—in its various reasoned
and willed forms—is the realm of wisdom,
understanding, and commitment, the deepest
form of love and self-giving. Quite often, distinc-
tively human intelligence is identified by expres-
sions of conceptual analysis and linguistic
expression, tool making and use, complex laws
and social relationships, etc. While the capacity
MONCHER AND TITUS 25
for intelligence is shared by the species, its rea-
soned and freely willed applications are also indi-
vidual, since the pathways for constructive work
and problem-solving are manifold, often marked
by cultural propensities and personal limitations.
The intellectual affect (will) can be distinguished
from sense affects (emotions) inasmuch as the
will collaborates with reason in a more direct
manner; I can directly will my left hand to rise.
The type of collaboration between reason, will,
and the emotions is more indirect though
nonetheless real; while I cannot will myself so
easily to feel anger (although actors have ways of
doing so), when I do feel anger there are reasons
for it and also reasoned ways to deal with it.
Virtue: A Disposition, Act, or Norm?
The notion of virtue has often been reduced by
modern thinkers to a static concept that simply
refers either to an act (a single choice or deed) or
a moral norm for action. However, the basis of
the classic Aristotelian-Thomist approach is the
conception of virtue understood as developmen-
tal, as an acquired disposition to act (at emotion-
al, cognitive, and volitional levels) in a way that
contributes long-term to human flourishing.
Aristotle (trans., 1941) says that virtue involves
a firm “state of character which makes a man
good and which makes him do his own work
well” (n. 1106a23). Aquinas (1270/1981, I-II 55.4)
employs an Augustinian definition that includes
not only acquired but also infused virtues; it
says: “virtue is a good quality of the mind, by
which we live righteously, of which no one can
make bad use.” Concerning the internal potency
and causes of virtue that exist in the moral
agent, Aquinas (I-II 63.3) moreover argues that
all acquired virtues (intellectual and moral) “arise
from certain natural principles pre-existing in
us.” This vision of virtue, as a disposition, resists
identification with a tendency for static, rote rep-
etition. It involves rather the life-long training of
capacities that tend toward general types of
good acts. Through the work of practical reason,
people shape their inclinations. In time, well-
ordered acts create emotional, relational, ratio-
nal, and volitional dispositions which find
harmony when exhibiting a twofold order: the
dispositions ordered among themselves, and
ordered to the person’s ultimate end (D. McIn-
erny, 2006). Thus, through the virtuous disposi-
tions the person seeks to employ his whole array
of strengths for the sake of personal flourishing,
the good of the community, and the glory of God
26 FOUNDATIONS FOR A PSYCHOTHERAPY OF
(a three-fold love). Such a developmental view of
virtue is consistent with psychological models
that are sensitive to a patient’s human potential
for change both for better, in the case of positive
growth, and for worse, in the case of psychologi-
cal disorders, as well as consistent with Catholic-
Christian training models for psychologists
(Sweeney, Titus, & Nordling, in press).
It should be noted that a practical approach to
the virtues involves working on their particular
matters (namely emotions, relationships, willing,
and reasoning—and the interaction thereof) as
well as their formal contents. Talking about
virtue, however, is mostly a practical language
involved in describing the course of strength or
difficulty: growth or decay in the life of emotions
like fear and love; the demands and potential in
interpersonal relationships; and in the types of
choices and reasons that we pursue or avoid.
Each type of matter has multiple types of direc-
tionality and consequences, as well as correla-
tions with the other matters. For example, the
emotions embody diverse manifestations: from
exaggerated moments, to timid expressions, to
well-managed dispositions. However, each
expression of emotion involves some past or
present interaction with reasons, choices, and
interpersonal relationships.
The timing with which a therapist introduces
the language of virtue is important and must
consider several factors. First, the patient’s level
of stress and general emotional health should be
assessed. While a discussion of the matter of
virtue will be needed, an explicitly normative
language of virtue is most often not advised dur-
ing times of crisis as it would be difficult for the
patient to process the information discussed.
Second, a patient’s ability to successfully enact
their intentions must be assessed, because some
measure of self-control (volitional health) is nec-
essary so that early success can be achieved to
build upon in therapy. Third, account should be
taken of the cultural expectations that have influ-
enced the patient’s understanding of fitting
expressions of care, affection, anger, fear, mas-
culinity, femininity, and so on. Finally, the
patient’s history of spiritual guidance and experi-
ences should be assessed, as some people have
been problematically (though perhaps inadver-
tently) shamed by others intending to encourage
their religious and moral growth by challenging
them to overcome weakness through spiritual
means, when a privation at the natural or social
level was a barrier to being able to do so.
VIRTUE
Sister Lydia’s Virtue: Inclined to,
Pursued, but Imperfect
Because Lydia had not acquired a
disposition towards virtue in the
complete sense, she was unable to
function easily (that is, with prompt-
ness, ease, and joy) in her religious
community. Still, as a youth, despite
lacking formation, Lydia possessed a
proclivity towards virtuous choices
as an act or nor m. Her natural
inclinations ar e manifest in an
example fr om her adolescence:
Lydia had arisen early one morning
to clean house before going to bas-
ketball practice, attended a full day
of classes, and did homework dur-
ing study hall when most peers were
non-pr oductive. Following her
game, she helped clean the bus,
accidentally leaving her books in the
process. Upon arriving home, she
called the bus depot, learned she
could not get her books until the end
of the following school day, and so
was unable to finish her homework.
She put her younger siblings to bed,
and did further chores in the home.
The next day, her teacher berated
her in front of the class for not hav-
ing her homework, being irresponsi-
ble, an example of “what’s wrong
with youth these days.” She calmly
but firmly told him that it was inap-
propriate to talk to her in that man-
ner and left class, reflecting on how
she had not actually been irrespon-
sible the day before, but had simply
made a mistake. Because of the vio-
lence and chaos in her home, she
had adapted a style of not attending
to her emotional state, instead stuff-
ing her feelings and focusing on
actions. So here she knew, intellectu-
ally, that she had not committed the
error of which she was accused, and
took reasonable actions to escape
from the unjust accusation. She then
did not process the event emotional-
ly and obtain full satisfaction, but
rather remained bewildered at best,
and grew in cynicism about adults
at worst.

Catholic Theological Anthropology and the
Virtue Perspective
A Catholic-Christian theological foundation for a
psychotherapy of virtue identifies a particular con-
tent within the general, philosophical form of the
virtues as embodied, relational, rational, and agen-
tive. That is, the difference that Christianity makes
for understanding the origin, goals, and develop-
mental pathways of a psychotherapy of virtue is
found in the content of the related virtues that
constitute the authentic character of the human
person seen in the perspective of Christ, who
“fully reveals humanity to itself and makes our
supreme calling clear,” as recalled by the Second
Vatican Council (Baum, 1965, Gaudium et Spes,
n.22). This perspective is neither a kind of mod-
ernism, nor essentialism, nor individualism; if any-
thing, it demands a dialogue with contemporary
sciences and culture. Although some Christian
thinkers have preferred to mark a complete break
between Biblical and non-biblical sources (Tertul-
lian, Luther, Kierkegaard), others have noted the
commonalities in the distinct traditions and the
potential that humanist (non-Biblical) sources have
in aiding Christian understanding of the human
person and society (Justin Martyr, Aquinas). Our
position is that different sources (scientific and
sapiential) should be integrated into an anthropol-
ogy according to their proper competencies, dis-
tinguishing human expressions, scientific
descriptions, philosophical norms, and religious
authority (Ashley 2006; John Paul II, 1998).
The Person at the Transcendent Level:
Created, Fallen, Redeemed
A Catholic variant to and fulfillment of a
virtue-based anthropology considers properly
theological doctrines which conceive the human
person as: (1) created in God’s image, (2)
marked by the effects of sin, and (3) redeemed
by God’s initiative in Jesus Christ. First, a key
basis for understanding Catholic theological
anthropology is the doctrine of the human per-
son being created in the image and after the
likeness of God (Gn 1:26–27; 1 Cor 11:7; Eph
4:24; Col 3:10). Human persons, being of human
nature, are an imperfect image, or even created
“toward” the image of God. Nonetheless, this
type of image dynamically tends towards perfec-
tion, who is God (Mt 5:48). This tendency is not
automatically self-fulfilling or imposed by God;
in cooperation with God’s grace and in imitation
of God’s goodness, it demands that as intelligent
creatures we move and grow into God’s image,
MONCHER AND TITUS 27
by exercising our intelligence, free-will, and self-
movement in aiming toward personal and social
maturity in Christ (cf. Aquinas, ST I 35.2, ST II-II
23.1).
Next, from the first sin on, human beings have
disfigured themselves and the above-mentioned
image. The resulting structures of sin are many
different kinds of personal and relational disor-
der. But in the human person these nonetheless
remain secondary to the goodness of God’s cre-
ation. For through God’s good pleasure, His
dynamic image and basic human dignity still
remain after sin. To understand this potential for
good and evil, for health and illness, for virtue or
vice, we need to understand the whole human
person in the light of how the Good News of
Christ influences our practices relating to our
embodiment, relationality, reason, and will.
Finally, we understand that through redemp-
tion in Christ, human beings are restored to a
right relationship with God. Instead of annulling
human nature, Christ
“restores the divine likeness which
had been disfigured from the first sin
onward … He Who is ‘the image of
the invisible God’ (Col 1:15; cf. 2 Cor
4:4), is Himself the perfect man….
Since human nature as He assumed it
was not annulled, by that very fact it
has been raised up to a divine digni-
ty in our respect too.” (Baum, 1965,
Gaudium et Spes, n. 22).
Christ offers a way of adoptive sonship, holiness
in the Spirit, and a promise of blessedness. In this
last regard as attested to by poets and philoso-
phers, humans seek flourishing, especially ulti-
mate beatitude, as the primary goal of their lives.
Although understandings of what makes us happy
differ, the Catholic Christian vision revolves
around the blessedness that is engendered by
faith, hope, and love, and that is founded in
Christ’s teaching on the Beatitudes (Mt 5; Lk 6).
In summary, when Catholic theological anthro-
pology speaks of development, it can deny nei-
ther human nature nor divine grace nor human
differences in development thereof. Rather it
construes a potential growth in natural capacities
that is assured by grace, which builds upon,
instead of destroying or replacing, human natu-
ral capacities and developmental processes
(Baum, 1965, Gaudium et Spes, n. 22). With a
willing Christian client, a conscious appeal to
their faith, hope, and charity can aid the therapy
28 FOUNDATIONS FOR A PSYCHOTHERAPY
process through cognitive and motivational sup-
ports. A therapist’s understanding of and ability
to utilize these resources will depend to some
extent on their own formation, and the willing-
ness and eagerness to reflect on virtue in their
own life course. These virtues serve to provide a
framework for understanding suffering, hoping
for recovery, and a motivation for a better life,
even as a primary emphasis is placed on an eter-
nal perspective that does not offer ready-made
solutions for problems and pathologies.
Sister Lydia: Theological Virtues
Why would this young woman, not
formed to be virtuously inclined either
by parent or by her peer group, be of a
mind to stand on principles? We know
that even before feeling the call to her
religious vocation, Lydia did not
ascribe to the family pattern of mis-
treating each other. She instead spent
her days and nights trying to order the
house. This might be the result of not
only a natural inclination to good-
ness, but also the super natural,
infused virtue of hope. She certainly
shows charity in the sense that she
makes a selfless gift to others [e.g.,
making sure younger siblings are
cared for when mother is “too busy” to
do so]. When she reports praying to
God that her life and death would be
used for the conversion of her family
[prior to knowing exactly what this
might mean], she shows the virtue of
faith. If these supernatural virtues are
operative, we could conjecture about
the influence of her attending Mass,
for there she was exposed to scripture,
the prayers of the liturgy, and in a
real sense catechized by Christ’s model
of self-giving and hope. Theologically
we can also speak of the effects of bap-
tism with its graces that come in seed-
form and develop over time under
divine guidance.
Psychotherapeutic Processes, Emotions,
and a Christian Virtue Anthropology
Emotions and Virtue
Some philosophers and theologians have a
great deal of suspicion concerning the emotions,
as sometimes accommodating but unreliable at
best (Bonaventure, Kant), or as consistently dis-
OF VIRTUE
ruptive or evil at worst (Stoics). However, Aristo-
tle and Aquinas and the Catholic tradition (Cate-
chism of the Catholic Church, 2003, n. 1767)
affirm that the emotions are potentially positive
energies, which are subject to developmental
processes. On the one hand, they express pre-
rational or instinctive judgments that come
through sense knowledge of various sorts. The
emotions thus provide signs of intelligibility
(within beings, interactions, and events) through
attractions and repulsions, fears and hopes,
angers and loves, and so on. On the other hand,
the Aristotelian-Thomist approach to the emo-
tions—which is a foundation for the Catholic tra-
dition—also correlates emotional expression and
development with reasoning, willing, and inter-
personal relationships.
Aquinas considers emotions to be good in two
ways (cf. Aquinas, 1981; I-II, qs. 58-60 and q. 24,
art. 3). First, as virtuously shaped emotive capaci-
ties, particular emotions express the reasons
behind themselves and can point us toward act-
ing in ways that are consistent with goals we
have chosen in the past. They express intelligibil-
ity at a pre-rational or instinctive level. That is,
emotions are good when, as reactions antecedent
to reasoning, they tend towards a properly-
focused response; for example, when we have a
fitting reaction of pity for those who suffer. Sec-
ond, emotions are good as felt reactions conse-
quent to an intellectual evaluation of a situation,
where emotions can build upon rational deci-
sions, or at least be kept from going to the
extremes that blind and disable action. For exam-
ple, the emotions consequent to a choice to recti-
fy an injustice, can emotionally incline us to
anger (1) which is restrained, lest it lead us to
commit an additional wrong or (2) which is righ-
teous, that can motivate us to act decisively. This
conscious type of emotion exemplifies the signifi-
cance of being able to read the intelligibility of
emotions and to control the focus of one’s emo-
tional energy, even if emotions are only under a
type of indirect and dialogical influence of rea-
son, will, and social influences.
In contemporary psychological studies, emo-
tion is construed as part of a rapid-action mean-
ing system that informs individuals of the
significance of events to their well-being. The
functionality of an emotion is impacted by multi-
ple factors associated both with the appraisal that
gives rise to the emotion (e.g., its accuracy) and
the response it generates (e.g., how modulated it
is). Although emotions are not always functional,

their benefits on average exceed their costs (Par-
rott, 2001). The anthropology presented here is
consistent with theories of emotion that incorpo-
rate reason and will (see, e.g., Frijda, 1986;
Lazarus, 1991; Levenson, 1999), since emotion
depends upon perception and appraisal in an
integrated view of the person capable of respon-
sible action.
Case of Lydia: Regarding Justice
The challenge of recognizing the rea-
sons within emotions and of integrat-
ing emotions with reasoned judgment
occurred when Lydia began her first
job after college. She happened upon
an irate customer yelling at a fellow
employee who was overwhelmed and
apparently frightened. Lydia confront-
ed the customer calmly, stating that
“we don’t allow anyone to speak in
that tone here” followed by “perhaps I
can escort you out of the building”.
This in her mind being a statement of
justice or “how people should treat
each other.” In the crisis, Lydia per-
forms reasonably, making behavioral
choices based upon her logical dis-
cernment of the circumstance. Howev-
er, she neither reports feeling the
natural accompanying emotions, nor
recognizes that underlying the cus-
tomer’s expressed anger may be an
even more pressing issue of justice.
Lydia appears to miss the cues both of
her own emotions and those of others,
likely because she has learned not to
attend to these sensations and senti-
ments; for in her family experience,
emotions would not be explored, cared
for, or understood, but instead might
be seized upon as a vulnerability and
ridiculed at minimum, if not used
against her.
Emotions in Psychotherapy
Recent psychological literature provides a basis
for our thesis that a priority on emotional,
embodied healing is at times critical to the suc-
cess of a therapy of virtue. Certain factors have
been put forth as important elements in treat-
ment outcome: the working alliance, the depth
of experiencing, differences in individuals’
capacity for engaging in treatment, and emotion-
al processing, which includes both emotional
MONCHER AND TITUS 29
experiencing and working with the emotional
significance of things in therapy (Pos, Greenberg,
Goldman & Korman, 2003). This last factor has
gained attention as researchers of basic emotion
processes appear to be moving toward a consen-
sus that emotions are adaptive, emphasizing the
utility of emotions in terms of responding to
events and circumstances. Emotions are viewed
as informing people about their cares and con-
cerns; they prepare the body for action, as direct-
ing cognition into modes of operation likely to
be optimal for the conditions at hand; and they
signal and manipulate others in ways that suit the
emotional person's needs (Parrott, 2001). Being
disconnected from emotional experience, there-
fore, means being cut off from adaptive informa-
tion (Pos et al., 2003).
Furthermore, virtually all theories of psy-
chotherapy give central importance to dealing
with clients’ emotions in some manner: on the
one hand, cognitive and behavioral approaches
focus on control or elimination of anxiety or
other unwanted emotion; alternatively, psycho-
dynamic, interpersonal and experiential
approaches often implicate the avoidance of
painful emotion in the etiology and maintenance
of psychological disorder (Mackay, Barkham,
Stiles, & Goldfried, 2002). Furthermore, multiple
schools of thought have found empirical support
that facilitating in-session emotional experience
is both potent and efficacious (Wiser & Goldfried
1998). For example, standard reviews of human-
istic and psychodynamic therapy outcome (e.g.,
Orlinsky, Ronnestad, & Willutzy 2004) suggest a
strong relationship between emotional experi-
encing in the treatment session and positive ther-
apeutic outcome. Similarly, positive outcome in
cognitive therapy has also been found to be cor-
related with emotional experiencing (Cas-
tonguay, Goldfried, Wiser, Raue, & Hayes, 1996;
Wiser & Goldfried, 1998).
Relationship between Symptom Reduction
and the Capacity for Virtue
Treatment goals in a psychotherapy of virtue
have been described generally as management
of emotional life, so one can better live in rela-
tionships with others, leading towards the devel-
opment of further rational and volitional virtues
(Moncher, 2001). Ultimately the goal is the ability
to live a responsible, happy, fulfilling life, which
is to say, the morally good life. In contrast, psy-
chological symptoms: inhibit freedom, inasmuch
as they promote compulsively consistent
30 FOUNDATIONS FOR A PSYCHOTHERAPY OF
(dys)function; are motivated by excessive fear,
anxiety, or some similar dysfunctioning emotion;
or, are not rationally successful in solving a prob-
lem or promoting social relationships. Moreover,
symptoms can be concretely effective in reducing
the perception of psychological needs, and once
they are habitual, allow much less opportunity to
practice and to enjoy virtuous behavior.
Because the psychological symptoms of an
individual provide an apparent, albeit temporary
and dysfunctional, solution to one’s difficulties
(and distort perception), it is critical that these be
addressed prior to considering how the individu-
al might explicitly grow in virtue. Further, while
virtue (at a basic level) as defined in Catholic
anthropology has an objective character that can-
not be changed by either the therapist or the
patient, the expression of the virtue (its associate
virtue strengths and practices) will vary cross-
culturally. Therefore, the therapist must be aware
of his or her own formation and cultural views
about how particular virtues might be expressed.
This includes not only ethnic or racial considera-
tions, but also gender, as the expression of virtue
strengths and practices acceptable for or tolerat-
ed of males and females will vary by culture (see
Ashley, 2006; Dueck & Parsons, 2004). Healing
of symptoms and growth in virtues are on corre-
lated continua: a person cannot be healed on the
one dimension without in some way exploring
growth on the other. Therefore, it is helpful con-
ceptually, for both the therapist and the client, to
realize that failure to address psychological barri-
ers creates a real obstruction to genuine work on
growing in virtue strengths. In other words, not
only is it important and helpful to assist clients in
reducing emotional distress and related symp-
toms for their own comfort, it also is necessary
to help them understand (rational virtue) and
manage (volitional and social virtue) their emo-
tional life (emotional virtues) in order to free
them for growth in developing virtue strengths
that might be underdeveloped or disordered.
Why and When a Priority on
Emotional/embodied Healing?
Within its concerns for overall psychological
health, which include relational, cognitive, and
volitional domains, psychotherapy often needs to
give a priority to emotional/embodied healing
for a number of reasons. First, on the anthropo-
logical level, the biological based embodiment of
cognition and affection influence reason, will,
and all practical action. Of particular interest for
VIRTUE
our purpose are both the emotions and the bio-
cognitive functions (classically called the inner
senses); these latter include imagination, memo-
ry, the synthetic sense, and the evaluative sense
that underlie our pre-rational (and pre-con-
scious) attraction or repulsion to something or
some person. Lack of development or psy-
chopathology at this embodied level negatively
influence human capacity to read emotions and
to enact one’s rational plans and desires with
appropriate promptness, ease, and pleasure. It is
difficult for some and impossible for others to
access fully this capacity to reason responsibly
and choose freely without formative attention to
their emotional life. “Training our emotions to
respond to the direction of reason is a most diffi-
cult task, and its achievement is called virtue” (R.
McInerny, 1999), which, we would stress, is an
ongoing, developmental process. However,
again, this is not to suggest that emotions do not
have their own unique, positive contribution to
human understanding and flourishing.
Second, on the clinical level, this anthropology
points to a preferred sequence of intervention.
Because we are first bodily-emotional and rela-
tional from the moment of conception (prior to
the development later in life of the rational and
volitional aspects), often the more serious
woundedness in a person occurs at the emotion-
al and relational levels. In other words, for a
therapeutic process to continue to fruition, it
must address sensitively the natural developmen-
tal processes and the healing of emotional
wounds, in order to lay a firm foundation for the
pursuit of growth in the free and responsible use
of rationality and will. Clinicians observe that
clients who struggle with mental disorder (e.g.,
addictions, phobias, compulsive behavior) rou-
tinely report a problematic gap between their
intellectual understanding of the objects and
events around them and their habitual emotional
reactions to those objects and events. An impor-
tant component of psychotherapy is the devel-
opment of the client’s ability to disengage from
rapid, pre-conscious associations (found in their
body and expressed in emotions) and to consid-
er their perceptions from a more objective and
sophisticated perspective. However, this cannot
be accomplished strictly through rational and
discursive procedures. The automatic and habit-
ual manner of a client’s emotional life must be
experienced and recognized by the client before
they can become more insightful regarding
themselves (Palmer, 2005).

Theoretical work in experiential-humanistic ther-
apy outlines two ways in which emotions are rele-
vant in treatment. First, providing an empathetic,
validating relationship and a collaborative alliance
creates the safe environment in which clients can
experience their emotions. Second, engaging in
evocative, explorative, and meaning-making
reflections, as well as emotionally stimulating
tasks, gives clients deeper and immediate contact
with emotions and helps clients make sense of
them. An empathic, strong, therapeutic alliance is
needed to create a safe atmosphere such that it is
possible to have a specific focus in the clinical task
of understanding, accepting, and healing the emo-
tional wounds which bind people to the past and
prevent them from the free exercise of their will in
the present and future. Therefore, it is not acciden-
tal that the “talking cure” that has developed in
psychotherapy is person-to-person, relational, and
that the therapeutic alliance is frequently identified
as one of the common factors in positive therapy
outcome (Lambert & Ogles, 2004). The therapeutic
alliance includes not only a personal bond
between therapist and client in which the client
views the therapist as caring, understanding, and
knowledgeable, but also an agreement with regard
to the goals of treatment and the means by which
these goals are achieved, which should be appro-
priate to the dignity of the human person (Gold-
fried & Davila, 2005). The effectiveness of therapy
is impacted greatly by the trust that the patient
has in the therapist and his or her character and
motivations. At this juncture, the therapist’s char-
acter formation is an issue inasmuch as the
patient must trust that the therapist not only
knows the psychology but also is a proper guide
as the process moves toward growth. Having a
shared faith perspective (or even a more general
recognition of spiritual resources) with the patient
may facilitate this process and accelerate the
readiness of the patient (as was the case with Sr.
Lydia) to take the emotional and interpersonal
risks necessary for healing.
While the therapeutic approach discussed here
can be effective with non-Christians if modified
to be consistent with the patient’s worldview, the
therapist’s understanding of and attention to for-
mation in growing virtue in his or her own life
would be necessary to maintain as objective a
view of the subject matter as possible, given the
impact of sin and the consequent personal frail-
ties and social injustices that occur. Rooted in the
Christian anthropology discussed here, clinicians
should come to understand themselves as well
MONCHER AND TITUS 31
as their patients in terms of the types of com-
plete flourishing and freedom that are necessary
to actively pursue a good life. Sweeney et al. (in
press) stress the importance of the person of the
therapist in light of the traditional Catholic teach-
ing on vocation. In addition to referring to the
general call to holiness (Baum, 1965, Lumen
Gentium) and one’s state in life (as married, con-
secrated religious, or ordained), vocation also
reflects the unique and personal work to which
God calls each person. For example, clinicians
can love and serve God and neighbor through
the profound gift and responsibilities that
becoming a mental health professional brings:
(T)herapists understand that their
encounter with the client is providen-
tial and not random…. Such a sense
of vocation and service motivates
therapists not only to observe the
ethical principles existing within the
mental health professions, but also to
put into practice Christian love and
self-giving for the good of the client.
Thus, Catholic therapists have a
sense of responsibility for the client
and a holy accountability to God for
the service rendered or withheld the
person in need (Matthew 25:31ff).
(Sweeney et al, in press, p. 6)
In this way, the therapist’s orientation toward
their own growth and development is significant
in the treatment process.
Sister Lydia: Treatment Goals
The goals of treatment with Sister Lydia
included helping her to integrate her emotional
life with the consciously willed, but forced ‘vir-
tuous’ external acts which came at a cost to
herself; this cost arose because the acts were
not supported by the emotions she experi-
enced, which were primarily remnants from
past unresolved conflicts and fears, but also the
result of underdeveloped virtues. Reaching this
goal requires: (a) healing the emotional wounds
through a more accurate reflection of the reality
of what she was living, along with (b) emotion-
al/psychological forgiveness of the parents
[who have already been spiritually forgiven],
and subsequently (c) separation clarity regard-
ing what was past and what is present, with
respect to the meaning of the emotions she per-
ceives. In the short term, she needed to access,
allow herself to experience, and in an appropri-
ate way express her feelings in the context of a
32 FOUNDATIONS FOR A PSYCHOTHERAPY OF
trusted therapeutic relationship which prepares
her to process more clearly her emotions out-
side of the therapy session (as we see below).
In the long term, she can achieve a more tem-
perate ideal as is expected from her in the con-
vent, but in order to facilitate this growth, she
will first need to experience, reflect upon, and
heal in the present, the pain from the past.
(This is naturally a typically extensive process,
and only the highlights of her transformation
are noted here).
During a visit home, Sister Lydia
experienced a difficult time with her
family. She was most interested in
connecting with her youngest sister,
now a teenager whose only interest
seemingly is shopping for clothing,
which only infrequently expressed
any degree of modesty. This outing
became a family affair, with the
usual criticism, hostility, and anger
being expressed between members.
Further, ther e was an incident
where she was being harassed by
some men. At this point she chose to
return to the car and wait for the
others in order to process her emo-
tions, allowing herself to identify the
frustration she felt at not being able
to spend time alone with her sister
which would have allowed for more
intimate, serious sharing between
the two, as well as her frustration
with her father’s lack of protection of
her from the scandal of being insult-
ed by the men. Processing this, Sister
Lydia became aware that her ‘frus-
tration’ was in fact disguised hurt
and sadness. She realized that the
scandal and injustice she experi-
enced was coming from outside of
her, that is, from her family mem-
bers. Therefore, she became focused
more so on sadness for her loved
one’s who must be suffering greatly
themselves to have treated her this
way; she then was able to let go of
her upset. In this way, her initial
narrower focus on practicing the
faith and modestly protecting her
chastity resulted in her more foun-
dational expression of the love she
had for her family.
VIRTUE
Psychotherapy Processes as Preparation for
Growth in Virtue
We have argued that the therapeutic process
must at times prioritize healing embodied/emo-
tional wounds in order to stabilize the person’s
foundation for growth in the capacity to become
free and responsible agents. Because of their
ability to motivate and energize, the cultivation
of emotions in developing virtue is importantly
correlated with the education of reason and the
strengthening of the will. Although we may act
badly under the influence of disordered emo-
tions, emotions themselves are not inherently
disordered and an important range of virtue
(such as perseverance, patience, courage, mod-
esty, hope) stems from the knowledge attained
by and the controlled employment of emotion.
Further, the mere repetition of external acts does
not guarantee the growth of virtue: for example,
an adult working with children may control her
anger much of the time, but she will often lose
her temper too, at least until she has learned to
understand her emotions differently and take a
constructive emotional posture when offended
by children’s antics. A person who suddenly errs
after long years of apparently virtuous behavior
might do so for at least two reasons. First,
because she never had these habits and for years
she had been depending upon external factors
to keep control of herself (Klubertanz, 1965).
Second, she may simply err, which means that
her dysfunctional emotional outburst or isolated
bad act or mistake neither destroys the disposi-
tion to act well nor demonstrates that it never
existed; but the untypical event does mean that
even virtuous dispositions are not inerrant and
that people need to continue to forge them in
new and challenging situations, including times
of distraction, fatigue, and other trials at cogni-
tive, volitional, relational, and emotional levels,
as we see in later events in Sister’s therapy:
Sister Lydia had been on a pastoral
assignment working with young chil-
dren from disadvantaged homes, and
she observed how they were sponta-
neous and intense in their expres-
sions, both joyful and otherwise. She
marveled at the clarity with which
they expressed their emotions, recog-
nizing their deep, bodily knowledge of
their experienced emotions. During
therapy, she reflected on how, despite
these strengths, the children did not
have the ability to modulate their

emotions, this not having been nur-
tured in their families. In contrast,
Sister Lydia, as an adult and with her
education and religious formation,
has been able to learn to identify fit-
ting responses and is able to perform
them often. Further, having begun to
discuss these issues in therapy, on this
assignment she was able to recognize
more clearly her own interior emo-
tions. For example, she reflected on
how the Sisters often live in close
quarters with each other. She reported
constantly feeling as if she was a bur-
den to others, while not thinking at all
they were a burden to her when they
were in her space. This lack of atten-
tion to her own natural, affective
reaction is able to be traced back to
how in her family of origin she was
never comfortable coming into close
proximity of others, always feeling as
if she was going to be attacked or oth-
erwise met with a negative response.
These two experiences, being with
the spontaneous emotionally intense
children and experiencing herself to
be a negative burden without the nat-
ural recognition of the corresponding
burden imposed, led Sister Lydia to
reflect on how it is typical for her to
feel as she does during times of
duress. Through processing this in
therapy sessions with her natural
expression of emotions accepted and
validated by the therapist, she was
able to discover that it is not shameful
to have these feelings, and further that
she can allow herself private emotion-
al r elease [e.g., crying during
Eucharist adoration]. Having allowed
herself to process the natural emo-
tions, she then feels self-possessed to go
about her day, having neither denied
her experience nor acted it out as was
the norm in her family of origin. As
she recognizes her emotions more
clearly, differentiating when they are
accurate and helpful, and when they
are not, she can also recognize how
she can internalize her life goals and
progress in reading her emotions, in
affective self-mastery, and in respon-
sible spontaneity.
MONCHER AND TITUS 33
Conclusion
A Catholic-Christian anthropology provides
insights into psychotherapy as a means to: (a)
assist in positive growth in dispositions, that is,
developing emotional, relational, rational, and
volitional virtue strengths and related practices;
(b) understand the disorder and negative expres-
sions of our human nature, that is, the destructur-
ing practices and vice; or, what is most frequent,
(c) understand the mixture of positive growth and
weakness (an intermediate state) in a life-long
pathway punctuated with times of peace and oth-
ers of struggle. A psychotherapy of virtue requires
a therapist who is attentive to the importance of
his or her own person in the therapeutic relation-
ship and employs the most effective psychothera-
peutic techniques, but who also has the sensitivity
to recognize the therapeutic potential of spiritual
resources within the client (in terms of generosity
and self-giving, pardon and reconciliation,
courage and daring, patience and justice) in the
midst of human weakness and pathologies.
Further work on a coherent Catholic-Christian
anthropological foundation for a psychotherapy
of virtue should assist the therapist to help the
client, on the one hand, to be freed from his
psychological pathologies for a healthier human
life, and on the other, to be freed in order to be
able to participate more fully in the complete
flourishing offered only by God. Even if the
word ‘virtue’ is never mentioned, we believe
that symptom reduction is facilitated by at least
a preparation for, if not also an outright growth
in virtue as a coherent part of psychotherapy.
For the client who brings with him an intention
to employ spiritual resources, this involves the
transformation of the human virtues and the
Christian ones as well.
Note
1. The case study is an actual patient of the first
author who was seen in psychotherapy over the
course of several months. She was referred by a col-
league who responded to the patient’s request for a
therapist who shared and understood her faith commit-
ments. In accord with ethical practice, certain descrip-
tive facts and unessential details are disguised in order
to protect anonymity.
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Authors
Frank J. Moncher (Ph.D. in Clinical-Community Psy-
chology, University of South Carolina, 1992) is Associate
Professor of Psychology and Director of the Psy.D. Pro-
gram at the Institute for the Psychological Sciences. Dr.
Moncher’s interests include integration of Catholic
thought into psychotherapy, child and family develop-
ment issues, assessment of candidates for religious life,
and the understanding of living consecrated religious life.
Craig Steven Titus (STD/Ph.D. in Moral Theology, Uni-
versity of Fribourg (Switzerland) is Research Professor at
the Institute for the Psychological Sciences. He is author
of Resilience and the Virtue of Fortitude: Aquinas in Dia-
logue with the Psychosocial Sciences (Catholic Universi-
ty of America Press, 2006). He has also edited (2009, in
press) The Psychology of Character and Virtue (Arling-
ton, VA: The Institute for the Psychological Sciences Press)
and Philosophical Psychology: Psychology, Emotion,
and Freedom (Arlington, VA: The Institute for the Psycho-
logical Sciences Press).