Cities, State and Globalisation

This book investigates the ways in which city-regions view themselves as single
entities, how they are governed, what is meant by ‘governance’, why the question
of city-regional governance matters and the extent to which the balance between
internal and external factors is important for finding governance solutions.
Examples from North America and Europe are compared and contrasted to gain a
better understanding of what matters ‘on the ground’ to people and policy-makers
when seeking answers to the challenges of a globalised, rapidly changing world.
In order to analyse the conditions involved in making local decisions, the author
looks at the impact of established policy-making practices, socio-economic patterns
among the population, existing views of the ‘local’ and the ‘regional’ and their
respective roles among the electorate and policy-makers, and the scope for building
city-regional governance under given statutory and fiscal provisions. The complex
interaction of these factors is shown to produce place-specific forms and modi
operandi for governing city-regions as local–regional constructs.
This book will be of interest to urban and regional policy-makers and scholars
working in the fields of economic geography and political geography.

Tassilo Herrschel is Reader in Urban and Regional Development and Governance

at the University of Westminster, UK.
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and Caroline Chapain
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50. Just Growth
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Regional, national and
the Crisis
international perspectives
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in Latin America
53. Regional Development in 59. Regional Development

Peripherality, marginality
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and border issues Networking, knowledge

Generation?

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and Peter De Souza Edited by Nicola Bellini,
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in the evolving region 62. Re-framing Regional

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Edited by Philip Cooke
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Networks
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69. The Creative Class Goes
Global
Edited by Charlotta Mellander,
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67. The Economic Geography of 70. Cities, State and Globalisation

the IT Industry in the Asia City-regional governance in
Pacific Region Europe and North America
Edited by Philip Cooke, Tassilo Herrschel
Glen Searle and
Kevin O’Connor

68. Entrepreneurial Knowledge,

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Transformation of Regions
Edited by Charlie Karlsson,
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This page intentionally left blank
Cities, State and Globalisation
City-regional governance in Europe
and North America

Tassilo Herrschel

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

L O N D O N A N D N E W YORK
First published 2014
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2014 Tassilo Herrschel

The right of Tassilo Herrschel to be identified as author of this work has been
asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act
1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the
publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or

registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Herrschel, Tassilo, 1958-
Cities, state and globalization : city-regional governance in Europe and
North America / Tassilo Herrschel.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. State-local relations--Europe. 2. State-local relations--North America.
3. Local government--Europe. 4. Local government--North America. I. Title.
JS3000.H467 2013
320.8094--dc23
2013025689

ISBN: 978-0-415-48938-6 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-85756-5 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman

by Fish Books Ltd.
Contents

List of illustrations xii

Preface xiii

1 Introduction: Cities between state and globalisation – towards

city-regional governance 1

2 Defining city-regions: cities between urban and state theories 14

3 Cities and the global: changing relationship between ‘inside’

and ‘outside’ 39

4 Cities, city-regions and the state: Locating trans-local governance 65

5 City-regional governance: Between state hierarchy and

‘inter-local assemblages’ 89

6 City-regional governance as product of impetus, milieu

and structure – comparing policies 116

7 Summary, conclusions, outlook 160

Bibliography 169
Index 191
Illustrations

Figures
1.1 Key determinants of city-regional governance 7
1.2 Scenarios of urban policy-making through combinations of
varying intensities of globalisation effects and state involvement 10
2.1 City-regions as urban-centric CITY-regions and regionalised
city-REGION 17
2.2 The two main dimensions of city-regional governance:
institutionalisation and territorialisation 22
2.3 Two types of definitions and descriptions of city-regions 33
3.1 Cities vis-à-vis globalisation: between nodes on flows and places
as attraction. Reflections in debate 57
4.1 Intersection of the two main conceptual dimensions of forming
city-regional governance 73
5.1 City-regional governance between internal and external determinants 90
5.2 Types of city-regionalisation between institution and geography 94
5.3 Governance models (strategies) between state and capital interests 100
5.4 Approaches to regionalisation: vertical and horizontal initiatives 104
5.5 Comparative analytical framework: dimensions of constructing
(metropolitan) regions 113
6.1 Multi-scalar spatiality and territoriality in the Lyon city-region 133
6.2 Hamburg Metropolitan Region – seeking membership to avoid
marginalisation and global ‘invisibility’ 140
7.1 Scenarios of Conditions for city-regional governance between
‘state’ (structure and action), and ‘globalisation’ 166

Table
6.1 Participation by municipalities in regional policy fields in
metropolitan Turin 126
Preface

This book was inspired by many discussions of the policy responses to globali-
sation and the continuing pressures for finding answers to the demand for greater
competitiveness in different cities in Europe and North America, each with their
particular experiences of globalisation, and the questions of how best to respond
– individually or collectively – as a city-region. The balancing of local interests in
the wider regional, national and international context was of particular interest. As
part of that, the three main ‘voices’ listened to by the author belonged to local and
city-region-wide organisations: (1) economic development, for the strategic,
‘imageneering’ point of view; (2) the planners’ perspectives to capture the more
technocratic, governmental-administrative angle; and (3) the Chambers of Com-
merce as the business voice, with their different degrees of institutionalisation.
Engaging with these three sources of policy-making offered insights into different
institutional contexts and cultures, all exercising important influences on policy-
making. Admittedly, the main view listened to, and explored, is institution-centric.
Yet, although forming just one part of city-regional governance, institutions are a
very important and effective part, also in the policy field of economic develop-
ment, which sits at the centre of interest here; a policy field that has gained further
prominence since the 2008 financial crash and subsequent ruptures to capitalism
in its spatial expression.
Many different places were visited as part of the research, in order to gauge and
gain a bit of insight into the particular local circumstances, discussions and
anxieties about shifting borders and as descriptors of state territories and forms of
regulation. Only a selection of places could be explored here in detail, but gaining
such more detailed insights was the main purpose in order to point out the
complexities and intricacies of the process of finding policy responses at a city-
regional level to the ever more rapidly altering challenges by globalisation. These
individual localities find increasingly difficult to confront effectively on their own,
and thus look for collaborations with like-interested others.
At this point, the author would like to acknowledge, with gratitude, the receipt
of an ESRC Research Seminar Series grant (no RES-45126-0315), which was
instrumental in enabling policy-makers from the case study cities, and scholars
working in the field to be brought together to explore the challenges of city-region-
alisation. Gratitude is also owed to friends, colleagues and family for their support
xiv Preface

and understanding when writing mania resulted in my ‘disappearance’, as well as

to three anonymous referees for their very helpful comments on the original book
proposal – some time ago now. And last, but not at all least, my particular gratitude
goes to the publisher and the editorial team for their magnificent understanding,
and accommodating and encouraging support all along, putting up with all those
‘fuzzy’ deadlines, and the copy editor for his excellent work in spotting ‘missing
bits’ and inconsistencies.

Tassilo Herrschel, June 2013

Introduction
Cities between state and globalisation –
towards city-regional governance

This book is about the ways in which city-regions view themselves as single
entities, how they are governed, what they mean by ‘governance’, why the question
of city-regional governance matters, and how important the balance between
internal and external factors is for finding governance answers. Examples from
North America (Vancouver, Seattle, Detroit and Atlanta) and Europe (Lyon, Turin
and Hamburg) are compared and contrasted to gain a better understanding of what
matters ‘on the ground’ to people and policy makers when seeking answers to the
challenges of a globalised, rapidly changing world. How do the concerns,
conditions for making decisions and relating regional to local interests and agendas,
compare? Answers are sought through looking at the impact of established policy-
making practices, socio-economic patterns among the population, held views of the
‘local’ and the ‘regional’ and their respective roles among the electorate and policy
makers, and the scope for building city-regional governance under the statutory
and fiscal provisions found. The complex interaction of these factors to produce
place-specific forms and modi operandi for governing city-regions as local-
regional constructs – with all the scalar ambivalence implied by the ‘fuzzy’ term
‘local-regional’ – plays out in the power field between state interests and require-
ments, and global economic patterns and the growing local selectivity of globalised
flows of capital.
The 2008 financial crisis abruptly brought to an end the widely accepted and
pursued neo-liberal notion that an ‘invisible state’ with light-touch regulation
would be best suited to facilitate maximum economic returns, although much less
was said about where these would appear and where they would go. Suddenly,
with the potentially immanent collapse of the global financial system, especially
after the highly symbolic bankruptcy of the banking house Lehman Brothers, all
eyes were back on nation states as saviours of last resort. They appeared, and were
projected as, the financial rocks in a quicksand of ever-mounting bad debt and
losses in the corporate banking sector with all the wider dramatic economic
dangers. We know, of course, that this notion turned out to be much of a fallacy,
as the ongoing sovereign debt crises, especially in the European Union’s eurozone,
demonstrates. Initially, at least, there was no more of the notion of the ‘hollowed-
out nation state’, as suggested by Jessop (1993), with its powers lifted upwards to
international and global institutions, and downwards and sideways through
2 Introduction

devolution of powers and processes of privatisation of assets and resources. While

global institutions continued to matter, especially the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the main backstops of the crisis were, again, the traditional nation states,
claiming territorial control and the capacity to bring order to, and take care of, the
– once more national – economy.
Public and political discourse projected the world as a sum of individual nation
states, busy dealing with the fallout of the financial crisis of 2008. This includes
the projection of clear borders and responsibilities, and scope for action, while at
the same time, constant reference was made to the likely catastrophic effects of a
crisis that originated in one country, and within one specific economic sector, yet
was seemingly spreading like wildfire through the global economy. At the same
time, in the media, this global-national nexus, much of which operated in the
world of virtual capital – although with ‘real’ effects – manifested itself in real
places. Banking houses collapsed, companies went bankrupt and people
demanded answers, and all this gave the nature of capital accumulation, and its
rapid re-valuing and restructuring, a very real local face. Large cities, capital cities
and global finance centres, became the primary arenas for acting out of the inter-
face between global capital and the role and regulative aspirations, and democratic
obligations, of the state. Cities and their localness mattered, it seemed, and proved
so when it came to popular opposition to globalisation generally and national
responses, in particular. The scalar position of cities in the economic sphere has
become much less clear, with obvious interdependencies between, and ‘reaches
across’, the local and the global via the national. This trans-scalarity includes the
need to find answers at the sub-national level to the rapidly and fundamentally
changing economic and political conditions, both globally and nationally, with
large cities – and city-regions – at the forefront of these challenges. These con-
ditions include: (1) continuing and heightened competitive pressures; (2) the
growing role of major cities as the main nuclei of national economies and thus
major strategic national economic and political relevance; and (3) increasingly
complex and fluid scalar relationships between local and regional interests,
economic processes and policy requirements, placed within the particular
structural contexts and socio-economics of the relevant population and provisions
for government.
The ‘austerity budgets’ proclaimed across the Western world to tackle the
mountain of debt accumulated as a result of bailing out failing banks in the
aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, have had a big impact on local
policy-making. In particular, the curtailment of state expenditure, perhaps
welcomed by those following a strict neo-liberal agenda, has brought a danger of
reinforcing underlying gaps of opportunities between cities and rural areas, as well
as among the cities themselves. It is a process known from eastern Europe after the
exchange of state-managerial communism for neo-liberal capitalism. Underlying
geographic inequalities in economic capacity were quickly unearthed and
resurrected. The sharp reduction in spending on public policy at the national level
as a sign of withdrawal of the state, has put greater onus on the regional (sub-
national) level to find and formulate responses to an even more competitive
 Introduction 3

environment. The central role of the larger cities, and metropolitan areas, as foci
of economic activity, political debate and decision making was reinforced.
In many ways, certainly in public perception, the increasingly central role that
cities had taken in the representation of the political-economy of ‘their’ respective
states became evident. Scalar differences mattered little, it seemed. They were the
place where national, regional and local fates converged and seemingly fused into
one. Indeed, in London’s case, the fate and prospects of the City of London, just a
small part of the whole conurbation, became synonymous with that of the country
as a whole (Oxford Economics 2011), guiding Britain’s policies about any further
regulation of the finance sector at international (EU) level (Financial Times 2013).
Cities very visibly demonstrated their strategic position between state and global-
isation; shaped by the actions of both, responding to both and providing a platform
for both to act out their interests and respective strategic objectives. The main
economic and finance centres like London and New York especially, demonstrated
their multi-scalar nature by highlighting both the interplay between the localised
effects of global processes and the ‘counter-flow’ of the globalising effects of local
decisions and corporate cultures. At the same time, this demonstrated their vital role
as active ‘switchboards’ of key decision-making processes and negotiations
between representatives of national and global interests, as well as their own – as
in the case of the City of London. And this pursuance of local agendas, while also
connecting political and economic interests and relations at the supra-local level,
is the reason for describing cities, especially those of global relevance, as active
switchboards. It is at this point where cities become nodes in networks that they are
able to utilise these connections to boost their own standing and generally promote
local self-interest by balancing between ‘globalisation’ and ‘state’ as external
factors, while being shaped by a specific ‘local milieu’ and local leadership
capacity (see Figure 1.1). In other words, cities sit at the confluence of globalised
capital interests pushing for competitiveness and efficiency, and state structure and
political agenda, seeking to balance them in pursuit of local self-interest, as circum-
scribed by local, place-specific milieux, and implemented through local leadership
capacity.
As fiscal constraints affected state political agendas, including the perceived
benefit of intervening in local and regional development, scope for addressing
underlying inequalities by subsidising economic activity has become more
restricted. During the immediate crisis, when it came to bailing out key failing
banks to avoid a threatened break-down of the global finance system, the position
of the state had gained substantially in standing vis-à-vis the globalised economy
(especially the finance sector). This relationship has been discussed from different
discursive angles (see Ardalan, 2008; Macdonald 2012): globalisation and its effect
on state power (functionalist and interpretative paradigms), division of power
within the state (radical humanist) and the power relationship between states as
part of a ‘world order’ based on relative hegemonic positions (radical struct-
uralist).Yet it did not take long before, in the safe knowledge of being considered,
as a systemic threat ‘too big to fail’, the pendulum swung back again, and it was
the financial sector that claimed back the driving seat. In particular, quite
4 Introduction

symbolically, it is the wagging of the proverbial finger by the ratings agencies,

which causes instant actionism and confusion among politicians about how best to
satisfy market expectations. The indebted states, with their added financial burden
from bailing out failed banks, seem at the mercy of the global finance markets. All
this illustrates the rapidly varying relationship between globalised capital and the
state; changing from collusion to conflict to coercion. Such changes also affect the
role and scope of cities and city-regions as local-regional arenas for the outcome
of these developments, and the equally changing threats and opportunities, this
entails for city-regional economies. The ball is then in the court of policy makers
in these places to fashion policy responses that address local, national and interna-
tional (global) requirements, demands and opportunities. This requires developing
and best utilising ‘appropriate’ governance structures and modi operandi, through
sufficient flexibility and learning capability, so as to be able to respond effectively
to these dynamically changing circumstances and demands, both inside and outside
the city. This includes both its functions as local place as well as part of a wider
city-region.
Now, where does that leave the cities and city-regions? For once, they face a
tougher competitive economic climate, not just between cities, but also between
them, suburbs and non-urbanised areas, as more limited capital has become more
cautious and selective about where to invest. The ‘gap’ between ‘winners’ and
‘losers’ in this competition game threatens to become wider, and this in turn means
that differences in attractiveness will become more accentuated and more localised,
in effect undermining the spatial cohesiveness of regional and national scale
territories. The result is a de facto ‘perforation’ of state territory into a number of
urban centres with bigger and smaller development capacities through their local
appeal to globalising capital, separated by the ‘rest’ of a state’s territory with lesser
such opportunities. Scope, capacity and ability to respond depends fundamentally
on a combination of ‘context’ – economic and statutory – and of local factors, such
as economic circumstances, political ‘milieu’ (experience, expertise, expectations),
political leadership and socio-economic composition of the electorate (Molotch
1976; Fischer 2000).
Increased competition under more challenging economic circumstances may,
at first, be interpreted as leading to more non-cooperative localism, with every
place fighting for its own economic survival, thus placing more emphasis on the
local scale of policy-making, opposite national decision making and policy
processes, leaving little room for any other scales of governing and policy-making
in between. Yet, such a scenario ignores functional relationships that transgress
administrative and governmental territories and boundaries at all levels, local to
national. The underlying origins of the financial crisis have illustrated quite clearly
the close interrelation and interdependence of economic spaces at whatever scale,
and the difficulty, at times even inability, state governmental structures face to
formulate and implement adequate, effective policies. Globalised financial flows,
for instance, whether actual or virtual as speculative expectations, proved extreme-
ly volatile, with governmental and political structures struggling to ‘keep up’. This
highlighted the mismatch in behaviour and characteristics between territorially
 Introduction 5

fixed and firmly institutionalised structure, and spatially mobile, ad hoc forming,
variable flows of capital interests. Alternative ways of responding are required with
greater flexibility and more innovative capacity to find and implement quickly
suitable policy answers. And this includes the geographic scale at which such
answers are pitched: the regional level as ‘inbetween scale’. This label refers to the
position of the regional level of governance as ‘somewhere’ between the local and
national (state) levels as key platforms for political decision making, especially in
a democratic setting. Local representation and community-oriented decision
making contrast with the ‘bigger picture’ responsibilities and perspectives at the
national level. Both meet at the regional scale, bringing together locally defined
interests and decisions that reach beyond the local level – whether intended or not
– and national decisions that are either ‘handed down’ as part of a state govern-
mental hierarchy, or altered by the operating context shaped by policies decided at
the national level, the local implications of which may or may not be considered.
The regional level of governing embraces both the narrower governmental
actors from within the state machinery, and governance as broader church of policy
makers, which also include non-state actors, provides the geographic expression of
this ‘in between’ scale. As such, it brings together downward flows of policies
from the top, and upward flows as locally defined ambitions, agendas and
initiatives. There is thus potential for conflict and competition between policy
pressures and directions, including goals, purpose and perspectives of agendas.
The relative positions in terms of power and influence between ‘top’ and ‘bottom’
matter in this, with the ‘bottom’ more variable than the ‘top’ in reflection of
differences in local capacities, political capabilities and economic relevance (see
Figure 1.1). And here, the cities outflank the non-urban areas, even if not all to the
same extent. City-regional governance thus acquires a particularly interesting
standing as an arena of strong urban localism, able and willing to engage beyond
city limits, whether individually or in co-operation with other localities, being met
by national policies that are increasingly aware of the particular (national)
importance of cities as locales of globally acting capitalism.
Localities have increasingly become responsible for their own fates, without any
state-funded ‘safety-nets’ in the shape of regionally effective redistributive policies.
Imagination and experimentation with policy-making to achieve ‘more for less’ –
or at least no ‘less for less’ – are in danger of further exacerbating underlying
unevenness in opportunity, and the ability to utilise existing potentials, and to
formulate new policy agendas and ways of doing things in the light of the changed
circumstances. This applies across spatial scales: from (1) intra-locality differen-
tiation as reflection of spatial socio-economic patterns, via (2) the regional level
with differences between city and its more or less urbanising hinterland, and (3) at
national level, with variations between ‘core’ and, peripheral, regions – including
both urban and rural areas. Attempts at positioning urban places by projecting a
clear ‘quality profile’ and recognisability as a place (placeness) matter even more
under such competitive, economically selective conditions. Relying on established
structures and status, including being supported and maintained as part of a state
territory (thus receiving state support) as a matter of course, no longer suffices.
6 Introduction

State territoriality as a secure bedrock for local and regional economic prospects
becomes increasingly less potent and effective, developing more and more holes
and gaps through which inactive places may fall and lose their economic rationale
and viability, even sinking into marginality and economic obscurity. Finding new
alliances and constructing, promoting and projecting new policy spaces based on
collaborative networks and mutual support for the achievement of agreed goals,
need to complement increasingly patchy state territories in terms of support policies
and economic opportunities (Brenner 2004b). Effectively, these strategic, ambi-
tioned, policy spaces sit on top of the fragmenting territories of state public policy.
And as such, they provide new, bottom-up defined and essentially self-organising,
support structures for local development to attach to. Conventional, fixed (state)
territoriality is thus complemented by – and may even give way to – spatiality as
strategic projections of inter-locality agreed, regionally scaled, virtual spaces of
ambition to guide and benefit local – and that matters – prospects
The changes over the last five or so years have reinforced a process of a growing
focus on urban areas as most promising foci of economic development and thus
most effective targets of reduced public spending on economic development sup-
port. In Europe, this goes right to the international level of EU policies (Atkinson
2001). Effectively, cities are being taken to task, and are expected to deliver
positive impetus on national economic development. By contrast, trying to keep all
‘on board’ by supporting peripheral and disadvantaged areas, has become less of
a priority. As a consequence, cities need to find ‘their’ positions – actual or desired
– in the power field between, on the one hand, the aura of the state – comprising
political action, territorial structures, implementational powers and obligation of
public representation (visibility) – and, on the other, the sphere of globalisation,
with its trans-border reach, weakening of state control of ‘its’ territory’s economic
development/prospects, and increased pressures on places to compete directly at
local and regional levels – and do so globally. Tensions between the two poles have
increased as they exercise their pressures on urban development and require
relevant policy answers.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the fourfold relationship between the (1) state structure as
overarching context for local policy makers to act, establishing their statutory and
fiscal scope to implement policies, power balances in inter-local relationships, and
societal values and discourses as (2) city-regional milieu. (3) Actor characteristics,
such as leadership and political capability, matter, as do (4) economic prospects
found in a locality or region, as defined by global capital. While the state is about
maintaining an organisational principle and structure with allocated powers
(territories, organisations, representations), globalisation, by its nature, seeks to
transcend state borders, powers and structures, albeit for the narrower defined
benefit of capital interest. Globalisation has no such stopgaps and questions of
legitimacy, as it is not fixed to, and based on, particular territories and the interests
and concerns anchored to those. By its very nature, globalisation is mobile and
dynamic, with little (long-term) interest in, and attachment to, particular places
beyond extracting economic advantages as opportune at a particular time. There are
thus different perspectives, priorities and values – internal and external –
 Introduction 7

intersecting and overlapping, within which cities find themselves and need to
define and create their own strategic agendas. This includes projecting wider spatial
perspectives beyond local boundaries as a scenario of ambition, however ‘real’ or
virtual that may be in its manifestation ‘on the ground’. By definition, such broader,
regionally scaled perspective, involves other municipalities and local actors who
need to be ‘brought on board’, and thus be convinced of their advantage from doing
so.

City-regional
milieu: Established
Governmental
practices and
attitudes to
‘regionalism’
Internal
factors

State City-regional Actor

structure: governance: characteristics:
Vertical allocation Structure and Leadership quality,
of power and modus operandi institutional
resources learning

External
factors
Economic
prospects
and position:
Competitiveness,
connectivity

Figure 1.1 Key determinants of city-regional governance

Following from the above, the conceptual design of this book revolves around
three main dimensions.

1 Structural and cultural conventions and understandings (interpretations) of the

role of the ‘local’ both as part of the governmental hierarchy and as expression
of community (democratic) processes and arrangements. It is here that the case
studies help illustrate the role of such variability at national and international
level, including between European and North American (New World)
8 Introduction

traditions and ways of doing things. This includes the differing definitions and
understanding of ‘city’ and its relationship to ‘country’.
2 The theoretical argumentations in their varying balancing between ‘market’
and ‘state’ in policy-making and thus as expression of degrees of democratic
legitimacy as found in the rationales of neo-liberalism versus regulationism.
While in the former, the state is viewed retreating to benefit capitalists’ inter-
ests, in the latter instance, it is understood as the arbiter of society, managing
varying interests including, and especially, those of capital.
3 The challenges between policy with their political contradictions confrontat-
ions and questions of legitimacy (at least from an ideological point of view).

The increasingly dominant globalisation processes have, over the last 30 to 40

years, through discourse and technology-driven changes in the economic ways of
doing things, redefined the roles of the state vis-à-vis economic interests and
locational preferences. And this, in turn, as will become evident, has changed the
roles, position and relevance of, and responses by, cities, as they seek to shape
economic policies between protecting and securing established positions, and
finding new roles and ways of engaging with, and benefiting from, a globalising
economy. Routes ahead may be more or less obvious, and may require bigger or
smaller changes to established expectations, ambitions and ways of doing things.
With diminishing certainties about the meanings and boundaries of territoriality
(Brenner 2004b; Taylor 2008), the allocation of responsibilities across scales of
governance and the roles, instrumentation, actors involved and modi operandi of
governance, cities have increasingly been required to be more than mere loci of
spatial processes and dynamics allocated from the global level downwards. Instead,
they become actors in their own right, as they seek to take greater control of their
destinies.
Scope for acting independently, however, varies, as it is circumscribed by the
underlying ‘realities’ of available locational circumstances, combined in the ‘local
milieu’, as well as local leadership capacity and capability to identify, justify and
implement ways in which existing resources can be brought to best effective use.
Such a ‘milieu’ brings together local political–economic and socio-political
legacies, capabilities and perceptions of the ‘natural’ role the locality has in its
regional and national context. Furthermore, this may include local innovativeness
in finding new ways of working with established institutional structures, so as to
answer more effectively to an increasingly mobile and dynamic economic scenario
which cannot be responded to effectively enough simply through the moving of the
territorial goal posts by reorganisation and restructuring government alone. Novel,
more imaginative ways of policy-making may include engaging with neighbouring
locales within a metropolitan area, or city region. The difference between these
two terms here is in the nuance. The former, ‘metropolis’, very much embedded in
the North American literature and debate, envisages a more or less continuous,
‘sprawling’ expansion of a large city into the presumed rather less developed
surroundings. The latter term, ‘city-region’, while also addressing this phenomenon
of urban expansion, is more ‘neutral’, as it refers to the urban ‘reach’ of a city,
 Introduction 9

without immediately matching physical manifestation, such as suburbanisation. A

city-region may thus imply a greater land-use heterogeneity, including open spaces
and semi-rural parts, than a metropolitan area, and this suggests a comparatively
lesser physiognomic impact of the city on its hinterland. This broader, less value-
laden understanding of ‘city region’ is the primary reason for its adoption in this
book.
Scope and necessity – actual and/or perceived – vary, of course, as they are
shaped by the confluence in a city of local and supra-local political–economic and
social-historical factors, geographic structures and functional relationships. These
combinations change ever more rapidly and fundamentally as they are increasingly
subjected to a result of globalising effects through the reduced roles of borders for
global capital.
The result has been a dynamisation of territory towards a continuously changing
patchwork of functional and policy spaces with their associated time-limited and
purpose-driven characteristics. They have not so much simply hollowed out the
nation state by shifting powers up and down territorial scales, but rather have added
more profoundly a perception of geography that, in its nature, is essentially virtual,
imagined, projected and little-institutionalised. And it is in this sense, that ‘space’
is understood in this book. Both co-exist, each with its own role, purpose and
characteristic. And they may be more or less complimentary in their roles. So, one
could argue that the state has in some ways been confronted with elements of
hollowing out, but only when it comes to its autonomy and sovereignty over
conventional, territorial developments and structures, as is illustrated by the
current ongoing sovereign debt crisis, especially in the eurozone.
Yet, alternative roles and tasks have emerged, triggered by, or forced upon, the
changing dynamics and underlying spatio-functional relationships initiated by
globalisation. For once, the state has responded in conventional ways by restruc-
turing the scalar organisation of governing its territory, but then it went beyond
that and developed alternative geographic vehicles for policy by making, projecting
virtual policy spaces. These are constructed for specific policy agendas as defined
by a group of territorial governments (at one or more scalar levels) as a virtual
space for mapping out strategic policy agendas and representations of a city-region
to the outside world as a competitive market-place. Virtual spaces (Herrschel
2007a) serve as platforms for projecting policy goals and mechanisms, agreed by
the participating actors, to explicitly cross-established territorial and institutional
boundaries in the interest of achieving more effective, ‘scaled-up’ representation
and policy outcomes. Yet, underneath these virtual constructs, often not even
publicly advertised, but used solely intra-governmentally, continue to sit estab-
lished governmental territories with clearly defined administrative powers,
including fiscal and statutory responsibilities and sources of legitimacy. It is
through these that the virtual spaces become effective ‘on the ground’, while
linking territories through agreed common agendas as ‘glue’ between them. While
the state operates through territory and the hierarchical control of the scalar
allocation of powers and responsibilities, globalisation has pushed for a rising
importance of the ‘virtual’ space, defined around collaborative policy goals by a set
10 Introduction

of actors, all with their ‘own’ territories of representation attached. And these they
bring into the spatial ‘marriage of convenience’.
It is this shift, this change in the nature and composition of the geographic
expression of the political economy of cities under the competing impact of a
globalising economy and a responding state polity, that sits at the centre of the
discussions in this book. Its comparative analysis of different local scenarios
from Europe and North America allows variations to be taken into account in
state structure, the allocation of permitted and expected urban policy-making,
established views of, and experiences with, cities as policy makers in their own
right, notions of ‘city’ and ‘suburb’ and their respective nature, roles and
functions, and public attitudes to regionalisation as part of state structure vis-à-
vis local interests and autonomy.

Globalisation + Cities face limited or no ‘safety Cities maximise their

High degree of net’ through state regional
exposure to policies. ‘Entrepreneurial’ policies
globalisation increases and governance are needed and
pressures for greater expected to find innovative ways
competitiveness. of restructuring local governance
through new forms of
collaboration and policy
co-ordination between territories,
institutions and sectors. The
motto is ‘self help’.
competitive potential through
new policies in combination
with targeted state investment
in infrastructure and/or support
for new (innovative) urban
policy initiatives. State
recognises cities as integral, if
leading, parts of regional and
national economic spaces with
particular (systemic) relevance.

Globalisation – Continued limitation of economic Cities remain a firm and integral

Low degree of opportunities (limited element of national and regional
exposure to competitiveness) for cities is economic and policy spaces,
globalisation further exacerbated by reduced supported by a strong ‘safety
generates limited state support and public net’ of spatial policies and
pressures for greater investment (eg austerity agenda). investment. Yet, they possess
competitiveness and This reaffirms and reinforces only limited scope and capacity
thus adoption of latent disadvantages and (and incentive) to ‘stick out their
new forms and inequalities, as well as stagnation necks’ and develop own
practices of (or merely sluggish development) initiatives to utilise any latent
governance of prospects and ways of doing specific local advantages over
(stagnation). things. their surrounding regions and
hinterlands.

State –
Low degree of state involvement
under neo-liberal public choice
agenda, with emphasis on
competitiveness, ‘small state’
and market forces.
Cities ‘put on the spot’ to
become architects of their own
fortunes.
State +
High degree of state
involvement through
Keynesian-style
state-managerial regulation, to
maintain spatial economic
cohesion and (im-/ex-plicit)
facilitation of urban policy
innovation (cities as declared
‘champions’ of national
economy).

Figure 1.2 Scenarios of urban policy-making through combinations of varying

intensities of globalisation effects and state involvement
Source: Author
 Introduction 11

Figure 1.2 shows four scenarios for modes of city-regional governance, and how
they differ in their balances between greater or lesser influence by ‘state factors’
and ‘globalisation factors’. This leads to varying forms and degrees of pressures
and expectations, expressed as an equally varying emphasis on government within
the wider array of actors collectively forming governance arrangements.
Under Scenario I (top left box), cities face high competitive pressure in a neo-
liberal environment, requiring them to act ‘entrepreneurially’. Relative success
will depend on indigenous factors, such as locational qualities, existing reputation
and accessibility, as well as local political culture, or milieu. Localist, self-help
policies of the ‘survival of the fittest’ may be the result. Scenario II (top right box)
combines both strong state and globalisation influences; while competitive
pressures are high, there remains state presence in the shape of a ‘safety net’
through structural policies, including regional initiatives. The state may expect
cities to ‘do their bit’ and lead national economic competitiveness and success.
Scenario III (bottom left box) leaves cities more or less to their own devices,
exercising few incentives to respond. The result may be inward looking local
policies with little interest in external engagement, not even regionally. Last,
Scenario IV (bottom right box) represents something of a statist environment,
where state intervention through regulation and/or financial intervention produces
an artificial economic environment that creates some protection from globalisation
pressures. Again, local policies may be rather unimaginative and stagnant, as there
are few challenges and thus incentives to change. Indeed, the state may be tempted
to directly engage with local policy-making.
These four scenarios, with their varying balances between ‘state regulation’ and
‘globalisation’ with its neo-liberal market rules sit against the backdrop of the
fundamental ideological argument whether – and if so, how far – inequalities
within, and across, territories and societies are acceptable as a reflection of
underlying ‘real’ differences in economic parameters. Ultimately, of course, this is
a political-ideological decision and based on public discourse, established values
and experiences. Accordingly, the role of the state, its structuration, and the benefit
of its action to economic development and competitiveness, may be judged in
different light, depending on the predominant public political discourse on local
versus regional interests as guidance to policy makers.
The balance between ‘more state’ or ‘more market’ in terms of regulatory
intervention translates into different references to their geographic manifestation:
territoriality versus spatiality. Under a more interventionist, government-centric
regime, territorial boundaries and fixity matter, as they provide clear reference
points for the application of power and control, while also offering jurisdictional
stability and legitimacy. On the other hand, a more governance-oriented approach
is more likely to adopt more flexible and virtual spatiality. Here, the state is just
one among several actors, albeit an important player, and focuses on negotiations,
collaborations and other forms of ‘soft’ government (Lawn 2006), with associated
more flexible, short-term, ad hoc and temporary, imagined spaces. Thus, put
simply, a government-centric form of regulation goes with fixed territoriality, and
more universal purpose, while a shift to multi-actor governance involves more ad
12 Introduction

hoc, constructed and negotiated, purpose-specific spaces for set policy agendas.
The more emphasis on the governance approach, the more complex the picture of
spaces and territories becomes. But it also offers more varied opportunities –
because of a greater need and readiness – for informal, negotiated policy spaces.
The widely proclaimed shift from government to governance (see Rhodes 1997),
thus goes in tandem with a changing approach to, and utilisation of, geography:
from fixed, bounded state territories with associated institutional scope and
capacity, to variable, constructed, more or less virtual, policy-based spaces.
This book is organised into seven chapters, exploring the role and position of
cities as economic locales and active policy makers vis-à-vis state structure, power
and agendas, and the economic impact of globalisation, and how they identify and
operationalise ‘appropriate’ forms of governance, which embrace both the local
and regional scales. This first chapter introduces the book’s rationale and structure,
as well as key arguments. These revolve around the changing meanings and roles
of city-regions in their national and international contexts vis-à-vis globalisation-
induced perceptions of economic competitiveness, as well as (nation) state-
formulated conditions under which city-regions can form, operate and govern. This
refers not only to technical, administrative-institutional terms, but also, and
especially, to the backdrop of national attitudes to cities, city-regions and ‘regions’
in their respective roles, their desirability, qualities (urban culture) and accepted
scope for shaping their own governance. How are city-regions allowed and
expected to take shape and operate? This, obviously, revolves around issues of the
standing of the local vis-à-vis the (national) state, but also varying concerns about,
and understanding of, urban–rural contrasts, the very meaning of ‘rural’ or ‘non-
urban’ (e.g. in relation to ‘suburban’), and the ‘gap’ between them. Does the
growing focus on city-regions as ‘leaders’ in national development perhaps create
new marginalities for, and exclusions of, any spaces (left) ‘in between’?
Chapter 2 sets out to explore and analyse the many facets of the theoretical
debates surrounding the notion of city-regions in their varying emphases on parti-
cular aspects: physiognomic, administrative, governmental, cultural, economic,
etc. This will be explored against the background of a ‘time series’ of leading
theories, such as localism, new regionalism, neo-Marxism, regulationism, the
question of state scale and, the most recent, cultural political economy (Jessop and
Oosterlynck 2008; Jessop 2010). Discussions will centre on their varying views of
the roles of state, capital, the locale, political elites, and culture and society in the
shaping of city-regions. Can they be ‘real’ or are they more likely to remain
opportunity-driven imaginations?
The third chapter deals with city-regions vis-à-vis globalisation, and explores the
interface between globalisation trends and the development of local forms of
governance and (economic) policy. Focusing mainly on the debates around
economic competitiveness, it adopts the policy field most closely associated with
the notion of ‘globalisation’. Following on from that, Chapter 4 looks at the role
of the state as ‘the other’ external determinant (next to globalisation) of city-region
building and its governance. Contrasts between Europe and North America will
be shown to illustrate how values and past experiences matter in the shaping of
 Introduction 13

city-regions and their governance. There is the ‘old’ western (EU) tradition of
Keynesianism and a strong emphasis on planning and state regulation in the interest
of equal economic development, and city-regional governance is driven by these
agendas, often reluctantly ‘submitting’ to the pressures of globalisation. The
relationship between capital and government within local governance again looks
differently in North America. There, not only has ‘city’ often a very different
meaning and underlying notion from its European use, but also different roles and
rationales exist about urban governance and its reach into the ‘region’. Thus, policy
issue-based alliances and collaborations for the implementation of clearly, often
narrowly, defined tasks are widespread, much driven by business (economic) or
civic interests. Government has taken a lower profile approach. Yet more recent
concerns about ‘sprawl’ have somewhat altered that situation, and ‘planning’ and
government intervention seem to become more acceptable.
Chapter 5 looks at the debates on the nature and operation of the governance of
city-regions, including the differing nature of alliances between actors. This
includes the balance between ‘capital’ (business) and government, as illustrated
by the conditions in North America and Europe respectively. Different traditions
in the role of the business community as local actors matter here. Also discussed
will be the nature of city-regionalism – whether administrative territories, or
‘virtual’ and imagined spaces – and the associated debates. Is there evidence of a
‘modular’ regionalism emerging, with varying geometries of collaborating
localities whose territories make up the new (virtual) city-region (for a particular
policy field)? And how do varying local economic and political standings matter
in the formulation and implementation of city-regional governance? What is the
importance of specific types of actors?
This is followed in Chapter 6 by a detailed discussion of several case studies of
city regional governance, and surrounding discussions, in Europe and North
America with their different ‘state cultures’ and preferred ‘models’ of dealing with
city-regions. These will be examined according to a set of key criteria developed
in the earlier chapters. They include degree of formality (institutionalisation),
impact of local as against external interests, breadth of purpose of city regional
alliances and co-operation, and expansionist as against defensive concerns as
drivers of city regionalisation and governance. Finally, Chapter 7 pulls together
the main findings on the building of city-regions and their governance between
global pressures and local interests, aspirations and anxieties, all within the
confines of (national) state structures, established practices and ‘regulative
cultures’. In so doing, case study observations will be linked back to the review and
discussion of theoretical debates of the earlier chapters.
2 Defining city-regions
Cities between urban and state theories

The term ‘city-region’ emerged in the 1960s to capture and conceptualise the
functional city-centric interrelations in urbanising regions. ‘It is strongly oriented
towards processes’ (Lambooy 1972: 133), and goes back in principle to Walter
Christaller’s Central Place Theory (Christaller 1972) with its functionally driven,
relational patterns of urban economic spatiality within regions. In fact, the sum of
functionally related urban areas adds up to a functional economic region. Thus,
while cities are part of functional regional relations, simultaneously they are a
region’s composite elements and building blocks. It is here where the notion of
city-region as urban-defined and regionally-scaled space comes into being, as also
projected by Dickinson (1972). Dickinson thus similarly introduces the term ‘city-
region’ to mark a larger area (such as a region) as functionally associated to a city.
He emphasises that this is a ‘mental construct’, rather than a ready-made recipe to
be implemented as new reality on the ground. Instead, he proposes city-regions as
purpose-based associations between the territorial representations of local interests,
including those of the main city/cities. Functional connectivities as suggested
drivers of a notional, or ‘virtual’, region (Herrschel 2009) are in particular sought
to be identified and assessed through transport linkages and population densities.
Specific structural features and functional geographic reach are the main variables
used to quantify connectivity between city and surrounding region, and thus, using
threshold values, the geographic delimitation of such a functionally defined city-
region.
Similar to the method used by the US statistical office to identify and delimit its
Standard Metropolitan Regions (SMSAs), such effort reflects the concerns at the
time with matching such functional spatialisation to governmental-administrative
territorialisation in the interest of effective policy-making. Dickinson (1972) distin-
guishes four types of relations which, in varying combinations, he proposes as
tying a city-region to a city: economic, social, mobility (population movement as
commuting), and visible external impact (reach) of the city in terms of land-use,
i.e. physical manifestation of urbanisation. It is on the basis of those that common
interests can be identified as the basis of city-region-wide policy agendas. In these,
hierarchy and complementarity of interests matter as key elements of such
functional-relational understanding of city-region, as Lambooy (1972) points out.
While ‘hierarchy’ has attracted considerable attention across disciplines, not least
 Defining city-regions 15

as it corresponds with administrative structuration and organisation of state

functions and power, the latter, ‘complementarity’, has been less visible in debates.
It is only recently that it has re-emerged in discussions of urban-rural linkages as
complimentary functional economic entities (Caffyn and Dahlström 2005; Frey
2008; Böcher et al. 2008). Hierarchy is very closely linked to the notion of
‘centrality’, a quality intrinsically tied to ‘city’ and ‘urban’ and implies order for
specific indicators. Indeed, Christaller’s system of central places and associated
‘reach’ – expressed as market areas – was strictly hierarchical (Christaller, 1966).
The implied gradation of the relative importance of central places also suggested
inherent differences in administrative, and ultimately, governmental capacity.
‘Complementarity’, introduced by Dickinson (1972) as ‘town-country symbio-
sis’, by contrast, allows for places of lesser centrality to also exercise influence on
a city-region’s development (and economic appeal), rather than being merely per
definition sub-ordinate to the interests and reaches of the dominant central city.
This notion mirrors the concepts of mono- and poly-centrality (Herrschel and
Newman 2002) with their different degrees of exclusiveness and selectivity of
which place matters and which does not. In Christaller’s case, places of lesser
centrality lost their visibility as de facto integral part of the influential ‘hinterland’
of economically and administratively more important central city. This, in turn,
implied dependency and lesser voice at the city-regional scale. With Lambooy’s
complementarity, however, there is an implicit notion of a symbiotic, if uneven,
relationship. It suggests a win–win relationship based on functional interde-
pendency, and an understanding that relationships and scope for mutually
beneficial engagement in a regional agenda need not necessarily be hierarchically
led in a top-down fashion.
City-regions, by their very nature, straddle the scale of the ‘local’ and the
‘regional’ which, in themselves, are difficult to define and quantify. What is ‘local’
and what is ‘regional’ depends on perceptions of distance and thus reachability
which, in turn, shapes people’s notion of immediate lived-in space versus a
somewhat more distant and thus less immediately life-shaping spatial context.
Then, of course, there are legal definitions and distinctions, such as administrative
structures, legislative responsibilities and statutory distinctions between munici-
palities or ‘local government’ and large-scale regional or national spheres of power
and political legitimacy. In essence, the concern with city-regionalism is a contin-
uation, and also re-evaluation and re-interpretation, of a long-established concern
with the phenomenon of urban expansion into the ‘region’. Whether called
‘Stadtregion’ (Boustedt 1970), ‘Regionalstadt’ (Leibholz and Lincke 1974),
‘Megalopolis’ (Gottmann 1964), ‘communeauté urbaine’ (Booth 2003) or, indeed,
city-region (Dickinson 1947; Parr 2005; Harrison 2012), they are attempts at
coming to terms with functionally defined groupings of local entities. With no clear
boundaries around them, but, instead, overlapping administrative areas of different
delimitation, they are difficult to capture for analytical and administrative, govern-
mental purposes. What has attracted attention and interest in the phenomenon of
city-regionality, is on the one hand, the observed mismatch between the physical
and functional ‘reality’ of a regionally scaled urban area, and, on the other, the
16 Defining city-regions

underlying smaller patterned, administrative structures, with their local focus,

about how best to govern such variable, dynamic and often merely temporary
‘flowing’ spaces within the existing fixed territorial structures of government.
With city-regions as a concept and experienced ‘reality’ sitting somewhere –
and this varies with circumstances and over time – in between the local and
regional dimension, their definition and scalar description is at least as uncertain
and vague. Their nature, role and interpretation varies between localisation and
regionalisation. The former relates first and foremost to urban localities, be that a
single larger city as central focus of a wider region, or a cluster of cities as joint
centre. Here, the urban core expands outwardly into the wider region, be that
through highly visible suburbanisation processes or less immediately visible funct-
ional relations between city and ‘hinterland’. In such cases, the term ‘urbanising
region’ may capture this process. The latter, by contrast, refers to the regional scale
as starting point, looking inwardly towards the urban centre, be that a single city
or a group. Here, the region encapsulates, and thus claims, the ‘core city’ as its
functional, or historic, or identity focus. The term ‘regionalising the city’ is
suggested here to capture this differing region-to-city perspective with its varying
emphasis on either, describing a city-region or city-region respectively. This is
illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Reflecting the variable meaning and conceptual fuzziness of city-regions as
phenomena, discussions about them have shifted over the last decades in response
to changing analytical perspectives and interests between an urban-centric
perspective, and one emanating from a concern about regional processes and
administration. In addition, as a second analytical dimension (see also Figure 2.1),
interests and approaches have varied between a primary concern about functional
patterns and relationships, and questions about administrative structures and
governmental powers to accommodate and steer the observed processes at the
interface between both local and regional scales.
The question of ‘scale’ is central to the conceptualisation and practical operation-
alisation of city-regions, as they link, and stretch across, the ‘local’ and the
‘regional’. Scale is a concept central to geographic notions of space and territo-
riality, and serves as vehicle to organise territory (Smith 1996), while offering
different resolutions of detail of observed phenomena (Gibson et al. 2000). Scale
defines the balance between detail and bigger picture, and thus the ‘density’ of
objects and the visibility of associated characteristics. Scale thus inherently
embraces a hierarchical arrangement, a vertical ordering (Marston et al. 2005), while
also including horizontal arrangements (size, spatial extent). Both dimensions are
interdependent, with greater detail tending to go with smaller spatiality/territoriality.
Conventionally (Brenner 1999, 2004a), hierarchically ordered spaces are considered
to be nested, with individual ‘layers’ of space becoming more detailed as one ‘zooms
in’. Yet, such implicit spatial contiguity and cohesion is increasingly challenged by
an economic, competitiveness-driven agenda.
Brenner (2004a) understands scale primarily as a spatially-focused organiser of
economic, societal and political phenomena and processes in a hierarchical
arrangement, in relation to the nation state as main point of reference. He views
 Defining city-regions 17

CITY-region City-REGION

Characteristics:
• urban-centric perspective
• outward looking
• usually mono-centric with dominant
central city
• city-to-hinterland perspective: region
viewed as dependent hinterland
• region-based, ‘regionalist’ perspective
• inward looking towards city
• often poly-centric with two or more
competing, but connected urban
centres

Typical processes:
• urbanising region • regionalising city/cities through
• outward expansion of the city growing and intensifying
• suburbanisation interconnectivity
• ‘urban sprawl’ • city/cities integrated with wider region
• metropolitanisation • exurbs tied in with core city via
‘suburban sprawl’ inbetween
• symbiotic relation between city
and region
• fusion of urban and regional features

Examples:
• Regionalstadt (Region-City)
(Leibholz and Lincke 1974),
• ‘Communeauté Urbaine’ (Booth 2003)
• Global City (Sassen 1991)
• Mega City (Hall and Pain, 2006)
• Stadtregion (Boustedt 1970)
• Megalopolis (Gottmann 1964)
• Polyopolis (Hall and Pain, 2006)
• Northern Way (Lyddle 2009)
• Mega-City-Region (Todorovic 2009)

Figure 2.1 City-regions as urban-centric CITY-regions and regionalised city-REGION

Source: Author

scale as shaped by four dimensions: social processes as producers of scalarity, the

inter-relationality of scale (they are not separate layers in a nested model), the
mosaic nature of related institutions and organisations (meaning also inefficiencies
through overlappings, ‘in between’ left outs, etc.), and scalar fixes as outcomes of
large-scale processes and developments that ‘fix’ existing and/or produce new
scales of organising functional social, economic and political space. Scale is thus
relative, as well as absolute in its territorial expression, possessing fixed and fuzzy
boundaries, depending on its role and nature as either product of fluid processes
and interrelations, or spatial ‘containers’ for institutional capacity, legitimacy and
representationality.
It is here that cities are faced with changing conditions around them, which seek
to define their prospects and challenge their policy makers, yet also having the
scope to find responses that shape the external social, economic and political
dynamisms. This, however, may adopt varying shapes and forms, each with assoc-
iated degrees of territorial fixity and clarity of boundedness. Such new spaces may
be ‘real’, in a territorial–administrative sense, or virtual, as mere spaces of collab-
orative intent between institutions and organisations. This is an expression of, as
18 Defining city-regions

well as determinant for, governance structures and principles, whereby past

experiences, governmental arrangements and territorial structures and scalar
arrangements, matter (see Brenner 2004a: 11; and here Chapters 3 and 5). ‘The
new political economy of scale does not (therefore,) involve a pre-given set of
places, spaces or scales that are merely being reordered. Instead, new places are
emerging, new spaces are being created, new scales of organization are being
developed and new horizons of action are being imagined’ (Jessop 2002: 179). Yet,
places and spaces are also ‘victims’ of such reorganisation by losing their economic
relevance and ‘appeal’, and potentially falling between the gaps of relational
‘flows’ and linkages between cities as the confirmed foci of the spatial organisation
of economic and policy spaces and state territories.
Viewing city-regionalisation as a process of urbanisation projects a city’s
functional and administrative reach onto the wider region in the sense of metropol-
itanisation. This takes a city-regional perspective, with the city-region becoming
the ‘backyard’ of the respective urban centre. Yet, relationships are not necessarily
as one-sided, and the region may be given much more credit as a functional
economic, but also a political and conceptual support for a city’s political–
economic stature and development. City and region appear in this understanding
much more as a symbiotic relationship, where both elements of a city-region
contribute specific features, which add up to the whole construct as a stronger unit
than each of them could be individually. The region is not merely a dependent
backyard, but offers development capacity for the urban centre, something
addressed in the economic concepts of Christaller’s Central Place Theory (1972)
or Alexander’s (1954) distinction between ‘basic’ and ‘non-basic’ industries. The
former are viewed as supporting a city’s development through export, while the
latter are locality serving with few growth impulses. Such a notion of a mutually
beneficial ‘win-win’ situation matters for the attitudes and expectations among
either ‘side’ about the value of engaging with each other. As will become clearer
later, such a shared sense of mutual benefit from engaging in a city-regional
arrangement – economic and/or political – matters for the viability and
operationality of a city-region. And this includes the willingness to engage in more
formal agreements about joint action and shared resources and ‘benefits’.
Many of the questions revolve around the spatial and political organisation and
operationalisation of governing such constructs, and this will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter 4. The differing internal arrangements and structures, focusing on
one main metropolitan centre or several, such as in a mono-centric or polycentric
arrangement respectively, will influence the structure and operation of government.
The particular challenge is seeking to ‘match’ fluid, dynamic functionalgeographies
to inherently static political-administrative geographies. This applies in particular
to city-regions with more than one urban centre and thus inter-urban competition
for influence at the regional level. In addition, the growing attention that national
governments have given to urban areas as the main foci and likely drivers of
national economic development and competitiveness, has resulted in attempts at
influencing urban policies. National and international context thus matters, as the
examples discussed in Chapter 6 illustrates.
 Defining city-regions 19

Given the composite nature of city-regions, this chapter looks at the varying
foci in theoretical deliberations on their nature as trans-scalar phenomena,
straddling local and regional features, and combining fixed structural features with
fluid process and relations. On the one hand, these variations reflect shifting
perspectives on an essentially introvert, locally and regionally centred perspective,
focusing on city-regions as social, economic and political places per se, being
shaped by their own dynamics and internal structures and divisions. On the other
hand, cities and city-regions have been portrayed as mere localised versions of
national and international political–economic structures and processes, be they
based on capitalism, especially in the context of globalisation, as discussed in
Chapter 4, or communism. Both have fundamentally affected how cities and city-
regions developed physically, functionally, politically and socially, and this has
had implications for attitudes to, and modi operandi in, building and operation-
alising city-regions. The balance between internal and external factors, and
between structure and process, matters both inside and outside of a city-region as
functionally circumscribed phenomenon. It defines the ways in which a city-region
can and does develop, gain acceptance and thus is able to manifest itself both in the
minds of the local population and policy makers ‘inside’, and the broader political–
economic and societal context, ‘outside’. This is reflected in the relevant debates
which thus sit, on the one hand, between a broader discourse, be that neo-liberal,
market-based with its focus on competitiveness, comparative advantages and
economic opportunity, or a Marxist analysis, which understands cities as mere local
arenas of the societal class struggle within global capitalist structures and flows of
capital, or simply an acceptance of difference and inequality at the more detailed,
intra-regional level (see Chapter 3).
These contrasting perspectives and interpretations have followed ‘waves’ in
academic debate, at times with overlaps, thus adding a varied discussion (e.g.
Castells 1977; Dunleavy 1980). These, in their varying portrayals of, and post-
ulations about, the position of the city vis-à-vis the region, view the city and
city-region in quite different ways: as a mere local – among many other local –
platform for international and global processes of capital accumulation to act out,
reducing the city to a mere passive role in the working out of networks and capital
flows (Olds 1995; Budd 1998; Taylor 2005). On the other hand, cities and city-
regions are portrayed as places of mobilising social capital, as foci of innovation
in capital accumulation and places of democratic debate and legitimation. They
are not just mere receptacles of capital interests, as they happen to ‘flow along’, but
rather sources of creativity, seeking to reach out into the wider region and even
world. Yet, not all cities have such capacity, with structural, yet also political,
institutional and personal leadership capabilities playing a decisive role. In this
view, attention revolves around cities as lived places, defined and operated and
shaped by the people living there, yet also shaping those very people. This
community or societally focused perspective sees cities largely as an expression of
local social capital, tied in with political–economic arguments about urban develop-
ment and government (Cox 1993; Brenner 1999), with the latter underlining an
implicit state-centric angle. In the instance of the broad picture analyses and
20 Defining city-regions

conceptualisations Schumpeter and Marx, cities are viewed primarily as local

arenas (stages) for wider processes, encapsulated and shaped by these processes
and structural parameters.
These contrasts, illustrated by some of the main ‘strands’ of debates, especially
in urban economics, planning and urban geography, are illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Pointing to the last four decades, this portrays the city/-region on a scale between
a locality-centric, introspective view, and a more outward looking, regionalising,
expansive perspective. The table suggests that there is no clear, continuous shift
from one view of the city vis-à-vis state and economic structures both within the
immediate region and further outside. Instead, interpretations overlap. Still, the
overarching political–economic dimension, especially the growing scale of
operations reaching right down to the global level, is clearly evident. Globalisation
and – especially in Europe – inter-governmental relation and the inclusion of the
city in multi-level administrative and governmental structures, becomes evident.
This reflects a growing recognition of, and interest in, the relevance and impact of
the external relations of cities and city-regions, i.e. their participation and position
in state administrations, territorial government, and role in economic development
at the national and international and, in some instances, global level.
Discussions recognise the interface between the urban-regional and higher
scales of politics, economics and societal development. Cities are being challenged
and develop response strategies – based on local capacities and political-adminis-
trative and leadership capabilities and established ways of doing things. Local
variations matter, and thus also any influence – albeit to varying degree – on
external conditions and dynamics through their political linkages and functional
connections. Depending on local conditions and factors, scope for, and efficacy
in, doing so varies, and this, in turn, feeds back to local-regional (i.e. internal)
political and functional relations and processes. The focus on local alliance building
as a means to boost local standing and thus scope for responding to global capital
structures and ‘flows’, as argued by Molotch (1993) as part of the Growth Machine
concept introduced in the 1970s (Molotch 1976), is a good expression of this notion
of empowerment through collective action. This interpretation views cities and
city-regions as dynamic actors responding to, and communicating with, the
external circumstances and pressures, processes and powers. At the same time, it
is also about internal factors, and thus an interface between the ‘internal’ and
‘external’ of a city-region. Here, the city-region itself provides both scales of a
local–regional ‘inside’ and a national–international ‘outside’. But it also entails a
focus on, and role for, specific groups within society, exercising particular impact
(power) on policy-making processes, as some groups or individuals are able to
acquire more influence than others. That may also apply to groups of munici-
palities, where the larger ones, for instance, seek to control the agenda, causing
resentment and defensive action among the others.
Analyses and interpretations of city-regional development follow, in essence,
two main perspectives: (1) inward looking, concerned with societal, functional
economic and governmental structures within a city-region; and (2) outward
looking, tying in city-regional development and governance with the wider
 Defining city-regions 21

processes of political–economic development, especially in the context of ‘global-

isation’. While the former thus refers to the relationship between local and regional
interests and their expressions in societal and political–economic structures,
processes and relations, the latter focuses on the effects of the outside world with
its state structures and increasingly borderless flows of capital, on the internal
arrangements and developments of city-regions, including the links and mechan-
isms of connecting local to regional interests and perspectives. Here, the
local–global interface matters in political–economic terms. On that basis, as will
be discussed below, interpretations have viewed the city as more or less active,
somewhere between developing its (pro-active) response strategies and policies, or
taking on a rather passive role as mere arena for the manifestation of supra-local
processes (Begg 1999). Accordingly, not only the scalar perspective has varied,
but so has the presumed role of institutions as primary expression of a presence and
engagement of the state. And this it does to varying degrees between taking a more
visible, leading role, or one in the background as mere ‘enabler’ of private sector
actors as preferred agents of public service delivery.
Figure 2.2 illustrates this broad analytical framework between ‘globalisation
studies’, questions of local interests versus international capital interests (political
economy theories) and the role of the state (urban politics and public adminis-
tration). The city-centric perspective focuses in particular on the means and
mechanisms of local interest representation by local government, its service
provision, and thus the quality of ‘local democracy’ (usually presuming a western
democratic model). The introspective view is much concerned with local service
delivery, the cost and control of it, and the degree of local politics being decided
by a local community. It is a perspective very much part of US discussions.
Theoretical perspectives on city-regions draw on a variety of disciplines, such
as urban planning, political economy, urban and political geography, and political
sciences. Disciplinary boundaries, however, are not hard and fast, and common
issues require a look across such divisions and adoption of a broader, interdisci-
plinary view. The strong interest in the social and economic impacts on cities and
regions of wider structural changes in a globalising world, as well as the role and
responses of cities on such, stems from that. Perhaps it is not surprising that
perspectives on these changes are not fixed, and there is considerable debate about
the usefulness of differing theoretical frameworks (see also Aschauer 2000).
Different strategic approaches exist to ‘match’ dynamically changing functional
spaces and static government–administrative territories. Key concerns thus revolve
around the ways the two are linked, i.e. how virtual spaces and ‘real’ territories
are interconnected to allow the invisible to become manifested in reality matters.
On the one hand, structures may seek to ‘catch up’ with the functional realities
through an attempted ‘matching’ of the two by restructuring governmental terri-
tories. On the other hand, a mere lose association between existing and unchanged
municipalities may be sought as a way of matching dynamics to structures. This
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, illustrated by a number of case
studies in Chapter 6. Here, the next sections look further at the concept of ‘city-
region’ in its varied, including historic, interpretations. This includes their varying
22 Defining city-regions

High degree of Characteristic 1: Characteristic 2:

Institutionalisation:
governmental, Institutionalised and Institutionalised and merely
statutory bodies territorially manifested virtually spatialised (e.g.
(‘real’) (e.g. local authority, formally established inter-
Institutional dimension

Local State, county) municipal development

agency with no ‘own’ territory

Low degree of Characteristic 3: Characteristic 4:

institutionalisation:
Virtual forms of Associational (virtual,
organisation, loose) organisation,
associations but territorially
manifested (‘real’):
e.g. inter-municipal
organisations (marketing
body for city region)
Associational (virtual, loose)
organisation, with merely
virtual spatial manifestation
(‘office, secretary and
website’ presence)

Territorialisation Spatialisation

Geographic dimension

Figure 2.2 The two main dimensions of city-regional governance: institutionalisation

and territorialisation

reconciliations of the local and regional dimensions and associated features,

qualities, perspectives and interests. The inherent multi-scalarity across a range of
factors points to the crucial role of geography in the nature and working of city-
regions. And this is expressed in the distinction between territoriality and spatiality,
i.e. the virtual, non-institutionalised, and institutionalised and fixed ‘real’ geo-
graphic pattern.

Cities and city-regions: conceptualisations between intraspection

and external perspectives
The rise of ‘city-regions’ as a phenomenon may be viewed in the context of the
general re-emergence of the regional scale in discussions on the effects of global-
isation. This has set in train shifts to economic spatiality (Parr 2005; Metkowski et
al. 2011), and these have been addressed as part of the ‘new’ version of regional-
ism: ‘new regionalism’ (Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones 2001; MacLeod 2001).
The ‘new’ refers in particular to the changing nature of territoriality as part of an
observed growing dynamisation of economic space as circumscribed by functional
relationality. This has highlighted the need for corresponding new, equally more
dynamic forms of governance arrangements, so as to maintain relevance (Herrschel
2009; Harrison 2010). This involved developing a particular ‘functional and issue-
oriented approach to addressing problems’ (Hamilton 2000: 74). In this instance,
 Defining city-regions 23

this means extending locally focused (urban) perspectives to a wider, regional

focus.
City-regions are the product of the interaction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’.
Cities draw on the resources of the wider region, including neighbouring cities,
while also contributing to the pool of resources within the surrounding region. The
balance between the two may vary, leading to different outcomes of local assess-
ments of ‘what’s in it for us’ from ‘going regional’. Thus, for instance, Leeds City
Council, in northern England, saw no reason in the summer of 1997 to engage
with, or even acknowledge in its strategic development documents the very
existence of, the regional context of West Yorkshire: ‘what’s in it for us’, an officer
in the economic development unit commented to the author on a visit. Likewise,
the surrounding region may see little advantage from engaging with the central
city, if it doesn’t offer economic or reputational advantages. This is particularly
evident in North America with its stark division between urban core and extensive
suburban development, some of which gains city status in its own right – based on
population number, and local politics, rather than physiognomy and ‘urbanity’.
Suburban cities – or edge cities or exurbs – emerged as a chosen alternative
to the old city (Garreau 1991; Beauregard 1995), although there are distinct quali-
tative differences in social–economic, functional and physiognomic respect
between their North American and European ‘versions’ (Bontje and Burdack,
2005). But differences go even further, reflecting particular local-regional and
national contexts (Phelps and Parsons 2003). Underlying socio-economic partic-
ularities, associated with varying political preferences and inherent views of, and
expectations from, the role of local government (and the state) (Walks 2004)
circumscribe the degree to which any inter-municipal cooperation at a regional
level may be accepted and thus politically possible. Many ‘suburbanites’ wanted
to leave the old city behind, and that often translated into mutual distrust between
suburban and urban residents with, as Walks (2004) found for Canadian cities, a
tendency to drift apart in their respective preferences for the political ‘right’ and
‘left’. Building collaborative bridges is not easy under such conditions. Detroit
or Atlanta are examples of this underlying antagonism (see Chapter 6), with a
distinct racial dimension included, as is also clearly reflected in voting prefer-
ences (Bullock and Campbell 1984; Murray and Vedlitz 1977). The result has
been a heightened sense of difference and mutual exclusion. Yet also in such
politically and socially less fragmented, and more ‘benevolent’ city-regions, as
around Vancouver in western Canada, intense competition exists between the
established old city of Vancouver and the new, rapidly growing suburban cities
of Surrey or Richmond (interviews, City of Surrey economic development unit
and Surrey Chamber of Commerce (26 Oct 2004)). The suburban cities – in
essence, a contradiction in terms – are now of the same size as the old city in
terms of population numbers. Mutual distrust and competitive thinking between
the ‘old hand’ and the ‘new kids on the block’ make collaboration not easy, at
times even seemingly impossible, yet increasingly, pragmatism seems to prevail.
Under socio-economic and politically more divisive conditions, finding agree-
ment is even more difficult, as discussed in Chapter 6 of this book. In many
24 Defining city-regions

city-regions, especially in the USA, suburban interests become dominant in local

and national politics (Thomas 1998).
Theoretical explanations of city-regionalism vary in their approach to, and
consideration of, city-to-region relationships as key determinant of city-region
building (Smetkowski et al. 2011). Mostly, especially in Europe with its continued
presumption of cities as centres, and suburbs as associated fringes (Halbert et al.
2006; Davoudi 2008), a city-centric perspective is adopted. This reflects the long-
established historic role of cities in the political, economic and cultural
development of Europe and continues to shape Europeans’ understanding of spatial
development.
The concern with city-regions – or metropolitan areas – gained in attention and
also urgency in the 1950s, when a rapid increase in personal mobility through the
spread of the automobile, especially in North America, accelerated an already
growing dispersion of cities. This happened on a much broader front than evident
in pre-war years, when public transport in the shape of trolley buses, trams and
local trains, were the primary arteries along which cities grew into their hinterlands.
Especially in North America, this process attracted much attention in the context
of suburban ‘sprawl’, which obscured administrative borders and the edge of cities,
while syphoning off growth potential from the mostly rather young North
American cities.
This observation led to new conceptualisations of city-regional development
and attempts at identifying what has mostly been qualified as ‘metropolitan’, such
as the SMSAs in the USA (Rosenwaike 1970), or Boustedt’s (1953) Stadtregion in
Germany. They demonstrate the realisation that city-regions are the expression of
a dynamic process that questions the utility of established administrative structures,
as well as the widespread simple categorical divisions between ‘urban’ and ‘non-
urban’ (rural). SMSAs (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas) were drawn up
by the American Bureau of the Budget (Weiler 1971). As the name implies,
establishing SMSAs was driven by a concern in the post-war USA with capturing
the phenomenon of urbanisation – and suburbanisation – through the growth of
cities into region-sized metropolitan areas. The phenomenon of ‘metropolis’ thus
drew on a rather positivist approach to capturing functional spatial relationships
through statistical indicators, threshold values and calculations. The main criterion
used for delimiting a metropolitan area was functional relationality between a core
city and further out-lying municipalities. Travel-to-work linkages were chosen as
a measure of connectivity in terms of both physical and imagined linkages. The
whole concept is thus based on functional relations alone, while administrative
structures appear as little more than the backcloth to the identified and circum-
scribed functional metropolitan spaces. Yet, it was the need to find ways of
addressing these new functional spaces through tailored policies, which was behind
these efforts. So it was the United States Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations that published a number of reports in the early 1960s (USACIGR,
1961, 1962, 1965) on governmental questions relating to the newly identified
metropolitan areas, or ‘clusters of urbanisation’ (USACIGR, 1961), all based on the
SMSA criteria.
 Defining city-regions 25

The growing regional expansion of urban areas was thus clearly seen as a
governmental challenge, because it transgressed existing administrative boundaries
seemingly ‘at will’. This resulted in a growing complexity of inevitably overlap-
ping and intersecting socio-economic and service delivery (education, police, fire)
spaces, and governmental territories. This went along with a growing separation
between city and suburb, also in political terms, as a more distinct suburban
lifestyle and consciousness emerged. Statistical analysis, however, made no such
differentiation and treated metropolitan areas as complete entities, almost like black
boxes. The relatively coarse territorial delimitation of such SMSAs, using counties
rather than municipalities as smallest ‘modules’ of such identified metropolitan
areas, meant that larger tracts of less urbanised areas around the outer edges of a
city-region were likely to be included and labelled ‘metropolitan’. But little interest
may exist among the people in such ‘edge locations’ among their population to be
part of an agglomeration (and pay for it in taxes), and their attitudes may reflect that
rejection.
Intra-city–regional differences were given better recognition in an adaptation
of the SMSA concept in Germany by Boustedt in the 1950s, for instance, using
the name Stadtregion, lit. City Region, instead of metropolitan area (Boustedt
1960). This used local government (municipal) entities, and thus produced an
inherently more accurate, sharper, delimitation of urbanised (metropolitan) areas
than the county-based SMSAs could. Consequently, internally, the Stadtregion
concept permits greater differentiation, as it uses several categories to capture
different degrees of urbanisation from the core outwards. The American SMSA
allows merely for a simple dichotomic division into ‘Central City’ and ‘Outside
Central City’, which easily translates into core city and suburb respectively. The
German Stadtregion, however, was less socio-economic than physiognomic-
functionally based in its differentiation, reflecting the fact that the expansion of
cities was not understood as merely capturing undeveloped ‘open land’, but
expanding into an existing cultural and economic landscape and thus being likely
to incorporate existing settlements, including smaller towns. The result was thus
more complex in historic, socio-economic and local identity terms, than a simple
dichotomy between ‘urban core’ and ‘rest’, as adopted by the SMSA concept,
would permit. In communist Eastern Europe, of course, suburbanisation in the
Western sense did not occur, as all building activity was state controlled, and there
was – for ideological as well as economic reasons – a preference for large block
development on the edges of existing towns and cities in the form of prefabricated
tenement flats. Often, they accommodated a similar size population as that of the
existing old town/city (Smith 1996), affecting local identities and agenda setting.
Walter Christaller’s Central Place Theory (Berry and Garrison, 1958) is quite
clear in its city-to-region perspective; the city is the dominant player as locus of
central functions that are understood as inherently urban, projecting the city’s
influence and ‘reach’ over a wider, rural, hinterland. This takes a supply-led view.
Yet, implicitly, demand emanating from the regions supports and circumscribes a
city’s functional development potential. Subsequent conceptualisations, including
the ‘growth pole’ concept of the 1960s and 1970s (Lasuen 1969; Thomas 1975),
26 Defining city-regions

which has had a major influence on spatial planning (Parr 1999) or later, network
theories (Murdoch 1998; Bryson et al. 2009;), acknowledge a more explicitly two-
way, symbiotic relationship between core city/cities and the surrounding region.
The latter is thus treated as more than a mere background (backstop) ‘hinterland’
for the cities. What these two concepts share is a functionally, economically led
perspective of city-region relationships. Yet, this is largely devoid of references to
administrative structures and governmental allocation and implementation of
powers. In this sense, they represent ‘virtual city-regions’, with no clear, fixed and
demonstrable, a priori boundaries, but rather entities that are circumscribed by
functional relationships, their intensity and geographic reach being a sign of
‘strength’ of link. Yet, linking this to actual ‘real’ power of the administrative–
governmental structures and political systems, marks out a particular challenge.
How best to reconcile the different geographies – functional and governmental,
and societal – to allow them to be in sufficient harmony for effective, relevant and
accepted policy-making. This questions much of the nature of city-regions between
mere virtual imaginary and actually existing governmental structure ‘on the
ground’. This is the focus of the subsequent sections.

City-regions: between relational and structural manifestation

(territoriality and spatiality)
The concept of city-regions, and especially its governance, has over the last 10 to
15 years attracted considerable – and growing – attention both among academic
commentators (OECD 2001; Herrschel and Newman 2002; Salet et al. 2003; Parr
2005; Rodriguez-Pose 2008; Hall 2009; Neumann and Hull 2009; Roy 2009;
Healey 2009) and policy makers (URBACT 2011; Leeds City Council, 2011) at
local, national and international levels. Yet, understandings and conceptualisations
vary, especially also in the policy field, where political–ideological considerations
play an important role. One most recent example is the current British govern-
ment’s decision to abolish all manifestations and rhetoric of ‘regions’ and replace
them with ‘Local Enterprise Partnerships’ as a locally led, self-organisation into
regional clusters of shared economic interests and structures. The word ‘region’
does not appear, as it is seen as an unnecessary layer of state bureaucracy and thus,
from a neo-liberal perspective, an inherently inefficient piece of administration
(HM Government 2010; Mellows-Facer 2011). The emphasis here is clearly on
the local perspective of regionalisation, where the regional scale is seen as an
extension of local interests and policies, which have been combined by agreement.
Inevitably, it is the cities that are in the ‘driving seat’ of such a process of selective,
opportunity-driven regionalisation of policy strategies, as it is them with the most
developed political and institutional capacity and economic interest and influence.
This marks a reversal of the previous decade of New Labour policies of regional-
isation ‘downwards’ the traditional way, where top-down mechanisms install a
regional territorial corset within which local policies – urban and non-urban – need
to ‘fit in’. Under this conventional view, city-regions sit within a regional frame-
work and are approached from that outward-in perspective. Such understanding
 Defining city-regions 27

also sits behind the city-regional agendas in France and Germany, where there is
particular emphasis on the term ‘metropolitan’ (Lefèvre 1998; Blotevogel 2000).
In Germany, the intended internationality of city-regions became official policy,
when in the mid 1990s, the national strategic development plan explicitly
designated ‘European Metropolitan Regions’ (Blotevogel 2002).
At the European level, the European Union’s Lisbon Agreement of 1996
explicitly recognises city-regions (referred to as ‘metropolitan areas’) as centres
and drivers of national and EU economic development (Adam and Göddecke-
Stellmann 2003; Wiechmann 2009). These discussions and arguments interrogate
in particular the underlying mechanisms, legitimacies, modi operandi and
geographic references of city-regions in their political–economic standing and
relevance nationally and internationally. This signalled at least a questioning of
the continued adherence to the notion of spatial cohesion and territorial contiguity
(Atkinson 2001; Davoudi 2007), and ‘poly-centricity’ is now being championed as
a compromise, trying to promote localization and regionalization at the same time
(Davoudi 2003). While focusing on cities as presumed growth centres with inherent
development capacity, the narrative of poly-centricity is to project the casting of a
wider net to avoid sharp differences appearing between a limited number of
designated city-regions with growth potential, and the rest. The financial crisis of
2008 has reinforced this perspective of uneven opportunities and inequalities in
spatial development, with city-regions seen as being in an advantageous, strategic
position as beacons of national competitiveness (Wallis 1996). And it is on those
that development policies are increasingly being targeted for greater ‘return on
investment’ than can be expected – based on past experience – from subsidising
more peripheral areas.
Attempts at defining city-regions as a phenomenon have focused either on the
physiognomic and qualitative features of an urbanised environment, contrasting it
with a non-urban (‘rural’) wider hinterland, or its functional characteristics as
turntable of intersecting linkages and networks. In the former instance, the primary
interest is in defining boundaries between ‘urban’ and ‘non-urban’, as well as
between urban localities. In order to draw these up, structures need to be largely
static. Indicators used to distinguish different structural features tend to favour
‘densities’ as a sign of ‘urbanity’, be that buildings, population, economic and
service functions, or functional relationships and network connections (see Sassen
1999; Taylor 2001). In the latter instance, it is the functional relevance – i.e. the role
and position within a relational network – that provides the underpinning for the
development and the internal structure and degree of ‘cohesion’ of a city-region.
Consequently, metropolitan areas, as a form of city-region, are circumscribed by
these criteria: administrative territoriality, functional spatiality, locational cluster
qualities, and political connectivity and cohesion as expression of a metropolitan
or city-regional sense (see e.g. Schulze and Blotevogel 2009). It is at this point
that the notion of ‘metropolitanity’ may be introduced, embracing physiognomic,
functional and political–administrative elements. Together, these qualities reflect,
but also produce in a reciprocal way, a sense of togetherness, of shared agenda
interest and, importantly, benefits resulting from joint action. Yet, this will vary
28 Defining city-regions

over time, and in response to different degrees of social–economic cohesion at the

local–regional scale. Such may be found within cities, and between cities and
surrounding suburban(ised) areas. It is what Tosics (2007) refers to as the ‘double
challenge’ faced by urban areas generally, including city-regions: external
challenges through globalisation and changing conditions, including greater
pressure for more competitiveness, and internal challenges through functional and
structural differentiation, such as between inner and outer areas, or city and suburbs
(Homan et al. 2007).

City and city-region: meanings in Europe and North America

The different histories, or more specifically, their varying depth and varieties of
cities in Europe and North America also matter for the perceived meanings of ‘city’
in its characteristics and distinguishing qualities in relation to non-urban spaces, be
those suburban or rural. This also matters for the perception of ‘region’ as a spatial
as well as territorial construct. The former, ‘spatial’, refers to a supra-local scale
of aggregate features of, and relationships between, a group of local areas. The
latter, ‘territorial’, by contrast, is much more effectual ‘on the ground’, as it is an
expression of state power and administration, as well as the hierarchical context.
Thus, using the adjective ‘spatial’ suggests somewhat latent, implicit and vague,
employing ‘territorial’ suggests more realness in terms of fiscal and administrative
powers and responsibilities as an extension of a governmental hierarchy. Similarly,
the meaning of ‘city’ has a notional and a ‘real’ dimension. The notional quality
encapsulates ‘city-ness’ – more usually expressed as urban-ness or urbanity – a
qualitative description of particular ways of life in an urban setting (environment).
The North American planning discourse of ‘new urbanism’ draws on this
perceived, experienced notional quality of ‘urbanity’ (Talen 1999; Ellis 2002;
Dierwechter 2011).
The other dimension is the legal, technocratic one, where ‘city’ is a technical
and/or legal term granted to a municipality on the basis of satisfying a set of
statistical indicators, and possessing specific administrative and fiscal powers,
especially vis-à-vis a less ‘empowered’ non-urban hinterland (Frug 1979). Thus, in
Europe, city status involved special liberties for its burghers (citizens) from feudal
conditions outside, with many cities, especially in Italy and Germany, enjoying
statal sovereignties granted by royal charter, with special rights for its citizens
(Baubock 2003). Cities were clearly delimitated centres of economic and political
power, physically manifested by the medieval city walls. They developed at the
intersections and confluence of trading routes, as well as being military outposts
and royal seats within a less secure, contested territory of claimed power and
control. In Europe, city status and the opportunity (and permission) to live within
city limits (and the walls) entailed political, economic and social privileges not
available to the non-urban population ‘outside’. Cities have thus not only been
‘prestige symbols for civilisation’, as stated by Mumford in 1938 (cited in Pierre
2011: 12) – from an American perspective – but they acted, in Europe, as the
crystallisation points of civic life and state-building processes. Cities came first,
 Defining city-regions 29

states later, and it was controlling them that permitted claims to control over wider
territories. Cities have been the main foci of economic development, innovation
and migration (social capital), and that has equipped them with the capacity and
capability to shape their development and fortunes in a more proactive way than
non-urban areas. They are thus inherently more than mere arenas for the playing
out of national and global interests and economic processes. Rather, cities – and
city-regions – are interfaces between an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ – i.e. the local
and (inter-)national – a position that shapes urban development, and requires
negotiation and compromise across spatial scales and their respective actors and
interests.
In North America, cities emerged as settlements through the clustering of people
in places with economic opportunities. Some – the oldest – originated as port cities,
while others evolved from fortresses and/or as railheads during the rapid shift west
and settlement of the ‘frontier’ during the second half of the nineteenth century. For
many cities, a history of 100–150 years is as far as physical evidence goes back,
and ‘historic centre’, as advertised along major highways, especially in the central
and western parts of the North American continent, often refers to just a few blocks
of buildings of that era. There is thus none of the historic layering and depth
associated with European cities, where special political and economic status has
produced multiple roles and recognition of cities as centres of political, economic
and cultural development, underpinned by enhanced administrative and govern-
mental roles (Bagnasco and Le Galès 2000).
As a result, in Europe, cities and metropolitan areas have come to be associated
with, and investigated as, part and foci of statal structures and hierarchies where,
especially since the Westphalian concept of the territorial state was established,
local, community-based concerns intersect with higher tier, bigger-scale interests
and power structures, both politically and economically. By contrast, as Pierre
(2011) points out, for North America, urban politics was primarily concerned with
urban societies and elites and their impact on urban policy-making. They have thus
been first and foremost seen as local places, with few notable exceptions, such as
New York. It is therefore a much more introspective, local perspective with cities
and urban government seen as primarily an extension of local interest. In Europe,
by contrast, cities – both east and west – have been examined and discussed much
more in the context of economic restructuring from a Marxist-structuralist
perspective (Duncan and Goodwin 1988), than their North American counterparts.
Globalisation became the new dominant discourse in the late 1980s and early 1990s
generally, and was seen as a corset surrounding cities and city-regions, requiring
them to adjust to the created differential economic opportunities that these
structures prescribed. In response, concern with local responses for once focused
on community and its ‘resilience’ – to use the currently ‘trendy’ term – especially
in North America. On the other hand, especially in Europe, the governmental–
organisational dimension of urban governance and politics attracted particular
attention, as part of an established ‘statist’ perspective.
The European perspective is thus much more multi-level and multi-scalar in
nature, and concerned with government responses. This mirrors the tradition of
30 Defining city-regions

multiple roles held by cities over the centuries, as they function as local places
with specific local characteristics and capacities, yet also as arenas of supra-local
processes and responsibilities. Cities in Europe thus possess a firmly established
dual role as originators, as well as recipients, of external effects, developments and
influences. They matter in European discourse as functional, political, social and
economic entities. In North America, by contrast, that position is much less taken
for granted and accepted, and has become much more muddied by the shortage of
time that cities have had to establish their central roles as ‘automatic’ and ‘natural’,
vis-a-vis concurrently developing other areas, especially a rapid suburbanisation
process that limited – and reduced – their scope to establish themselves as the
‘natural focus’ for political and economic and social activity. Suburbs grew with,
and around them, and cities have not the historic tradition and established accept-
ance as ‘special’ to refer back to. This is, inter alia, reflected in the rather inflated
use of ‘city’ as descriptors of suburban settlements that show few, if any of the
signs a European understanding of the term would automatically associate with a
locality labelled as such. Instead, it has become purely a legally and statistically
based distinction, with often little added ‘value’ as far as imaginations of ‘urbanity’
are concerned.
The decline of many of the ‘oldest’ cities in the industrial heartland of the ‘Rust
Belt’ in northeastern USA and the, until quite recently, continuous abandonment
of the ‘old’ urban cores for the new suburban expansions, has contributed to a sense
that cities are an outdated phenomenon of a different technological era, now past
their sell-by dates. It is only the success of some of these cities to reinvent
themselves, especially in New England (Baltimore, Boston), or great cities like
Chicago, that the particular features of urban living, of urban space in a more
European sense, has been (re)discovered. Often, it comes down to a block or two
of original, nineteenth century housing being highlighted by street furniture and
external improvement, and given urban functionality through a few restaurants and
coffee places. Such developments can be found even in smaller cities, where, as the
author could observe in a number of places with a small nineteenth-century core,
residents from the suburban areas drive to these superficially urban and thus
‘different’ places for a restaurant meal or coffee.
Very much associated with the process of gentrification, and set in a globalised,
market-led context (Smith, 2002), such developments have much to do with life-
style, and create their particular forms of shaping and consuming space. At times,
this may appear as Disneyfication (Eeckhout 2001; Bélanger 2012), especially
from a European angle. But it serves to distinguish specific ‘urban’ space from
unspecific, seemingly ubiquitous, ‘suburban’ counterpart space.
‘Urbanity’ (Zijderveld 1998; Montgomery 1998), so much at the heart of the
growing agenda of ‘new urbanism’ (Leccese and McCormick 2000), albeit in many
instances more a constructed, produced, rather than inherent urban feature, serves
to differentiate space in a seeming sea of indistinguishable continent-wide suburb-
anity. Even older suburban ‘cities’ are now seeking to emphasise a version of
‘urbanity’ as part of the currently much discussed ‘smart growth’ agenda, so as to
distinguish themselves from the ‘lesser’ and more uniform replications of suburbia.
 Defining city-regions 31

Yet, such ‘urbanism’ is considered an inherent expression of the local community’s

desire for such qualities and the willingness to pay for them through taxation. It is
thus a response to socio-economic differentiation and the desire to manifest that
spatially. Richard Florida’s (2005), ‘creative class’ comes to mind.
This affirms the impression that, as Pierre (2011) points out, North American
cities are considered inherently an expression of current local interests and
community involvement and engagement. They are an environment shaped for,
and by, local living with, if available, a few historic features added to provide an
element of place authenticity (Jivén and Larkham 2003). Much of this is also part
of place marketing attempts to develop economic opportunities. Local economic
development has thus been viewed first and foremost as an ‘endogenous process’
(Pierre 2011), as something that reflects local choices, charcteristics and societal
structures, rather than mainly an adjustment to externally imposed conditions by
shifting global economic changes, and state policies and politics, as is so often
found dominant in European local economic policy-making.
‘Urban’, ‘city’ and, by implication, also city-region, all raise different conno-
tations in Europe and North America, reflecting the different developmental
histories and state-building processes. Cities in Europe have enjoyed strong
autonomous state function, even substituting statehood, while such a thing never
existed in North America as an inherently modern society and urban culture. It is
these different backgrounds, especially in the experienced status and perceived
role, purpose and relevance of cities in Europe and North America, that has
impacted on the understanding, and interpretation of urban government – and
governance. Against this, response strategies have been devised to address the
universally, so it seems, accepted discourse of competitiveness, with their different
degrees of reliance on institutional changes or ‘restructuring’, with associated
territorial changes and forms of management. The latter includes, in particular,
private sector management methods and a growing role of non-state actors. As part
of that process, territoriality and institutionalisation in local government are closely
interrelated. They both complement each other in the execution and manifestation
of power and influence over developments. Such include the degree of relative
competitiveness or the balancing of competing, even conflicting, policy agendas.
All these interdependent and intertwined processes and agendas circumscribe a
city’s government scope to act.
In North America, especially the US, based on its New World history, a liberally
inclined, pioneering-inspired mentality dominates, which is inherently against state
regulation, especially where it affects personal opportunities in shaping one’s life.
This finds its expression in a strong sense of community-based control (rather than
government control) where, so the public discourse, groups of like-interested and
like-minded citizens can take control of their way of life at the local level. The
rationale of ‘home rule’ as manifest reaffirmation of local self-government, is an
expression of that, whether city, suburb or rural setting (Vanlandingham 1968;
Barron 2003). Often, this leads to a distinctly localist agenda, seeking control (and
protection) of a specific territory as claimed by an identified community. Inevitably,
boundaries are drawn up to demarcate the territory controlled (for a specified
32 Defining city-regions

purpose) by one group from those controlled by others. It is the resulting fragmen-
tation that undermines a broader, cohesive perspective for the relationship and
interdependence between the individual entities. There is a growing trend.
Mitchell-Weaver et al. (2000), for instance, show that the number of municipalities
in the US has grown from 16,400 in 1932 to 19,300 in 1997.
For instance, while in rural areas such a division is not quite as immediately
visible and effective, given the more spread out distribution of people and
settlements, such sharp divisions in control (and responsibility) matter much more
in more densely built-up areas, such as metropolitan regions, where functional and
communicative relationships easily stretch across boundaries of responsibility.
Here, divisions and separations can thus easily develop a counterproductive effect.
It is in those areas, therefore, where locality doesn’t just ‘sit within’ a wider regional
context, but, instead, is itself an immediately effective composite element, that a
regional agenda has gained in importance. It is about keeping a functionally
interconnected entity also linked up at the governance level. Only then can
decisions be taken in consideration of ‘the bigger picture’, rather than being
drowned in individualised, ultimately atomised, interests.
The challenge is to raise awareness of the potential local/personal benefit of
looking at the bigger picture, rather than limiting oneself to the shorter, more confined
perspective. It is here that the politics of territorial responsibilities and agendas comes
into play, something referred to by Dierwechter (2008) as local–regional geopolitics.
While his focus is on the challenges from a planning perspective of uneven growth
in city-regions between core and suburbs, a broader perspective may be adopted,
going beyond planning, and including strategic policy-making, especially in
economic development. Thus, while he refers to state territoriality of urban growth
management as the particular policy-making expression of development planning,
this notion may be extended to include a broad range of policy agendas: economic
development, housing, competitiveness or sustainability. In that direction, Scott
(2001) views metropolitan economies as ‘spatial platforms’ of state territoriality. He
suggests cities taking on different shapes for different agendas, each overlaying, if not
necessarily in a congruent way. There is thus more to the questions of shape and
empowerment of state territoriality than planning, although this is an integral (and
important) part of the ‘contested politics of spatial governance at various scales’
(Scott 2001: 5). Cties sit within the governance structures and practices of a bigger
spatial entity, be it a region – including a federal state as in the USA or Germany –
or unitary state respectively. This includes particular historic legacies, experiences
and established practices, and ways of doing things, such as, for instance, in the
south-eastern USA, a strongly held tradition of localist ‘home rule’ with its far-
reaching devolution of governmental responsibilities to the local (community) level.
It is under such conditions that a regional agenda is on the one hand needed to retain
an overall cohesion of developments, while on the other, resisted by local interests
as an undue interference with their self-governing powers. In the Pacific northwest,
by comparison, there is a stronger sense of shared responsibility for maintaining the
natural resources as a key ingredient of a generally much valued quality of outdoor
life, which, in turn, provides a crucial factor in economic development. Yet, different
 Defining city-regions 33

perspectives on these exist between the main urban centres, with varying priorities
for, and appraisals of, the utility of nature as an economic resource versus its value
as a key contributor to quality of life and ‘amenity’ (Seltzer 2004; Dierwechter 2008).
The understanding of what makes a ‘city-region’ is thus varied and reflects the
different backgrounds and objectives of those seeking to define them, whether
adopting an economic, planning, administrative or social perspective. Figure 2.3
summarises some examples of attempts at defining and/or describing city-regions.
The picture thus remains somewhat of an ‘object of mystery’ (Harrison 2007).

Explanations of city-regions (CRs)

1 CRs as (passive) locales of wider political-economic structures and processes

• City-regions are ‘enlarged territories from which core urban areas draw people for
work and services’. (ODPM 2006)
• ‘Global city-regions constitute dense polarized masses of capital, labour, and social
life … as such, they represent an outgrowth of large metropolitan areas’. (Scott 2001)
• ‘While the city-region has become a key territorial–scalar arena for national economic
advancement … there has not been a discernable detachment from its territorial
relationships to the national economy … there is little autonomy here’. (McGuirk
2007)
• ‘City-regions form a global mosaic that now seems to be over-riding … the spatial
structure of core-periphery relationships’. (Scott 2001)
• City-regions are ‘urbanised landscapes’ or ‘cities as landscapes’ (‘verstädterte
Landschaft’ or ‘verlandschaftete Stadt’). (Sieverts 2003)
• ‘City-regions are both made up of smaller-scale communities and embedded in
larger-scale ones’. (Purcell 2007)
• ‘City-regions … understood as part of wider economic systems, networks and
resource flows, rather than self-contained units’.(Turok 2004)

2 CRs as active, strategic actors, collaborating at regional scale

• City-regions as signs of the rise of the regional state. (Harrison 2007)
• ‘A City Region is the official realisation that a municipality’s economic, cultural and
demo-graphic reach can extend beyond the political boundaries of the city itself’.
(NLGN 2005)
• ‘City Regions need to develop a variable geometry of autonomous authorities’ and
‘provide clear lines of leadership together with … civil society’. (NLGN 2005)
• Inter-local agreements as overlapping social networks: picket-fence regionalism.
(Thurmaier and Wood 2002)
• ‘Rather than promoting “city regions” as an “institutional fix”, it is perhaps more
helpful … to use the idea of … positive synergies of co-existence in shared spaces’.
(Healey 2009: 841)
• ‘We see city regions [Stadtregionen] as cooperative networks … as living spaces
shaped by a concentration of interactions and interrelations’. (Krau 2005, translated)
• ‘Cities are discovering the virtues of the city-region as a space in which collaboration
rather than competition can provide development advantages’. (Kearns and
Paddison 2000).
• ‘Emergence of the “city–region” as the future arena for partnership, capacity building
and intervention on planning matters?’ (Tewdwr-Jones and McNeill 2000)

Figure 2.3 Two types of definitions and descriptions of city-region

Source: Author
34 Defining city-regions

What they all share, despite their differences, is the recognition of the dynamic,
functionally and relationally defined nature. This involves a virtual presence, rather
than likely ‘real’ manifestation in institutional and territorial terms as part of a
government hierarchy and machinery. They are defined – or virtually imagineered
– through intense, albeit varied – both over time and across places – inter-relation-
ships between three dimensions of development (Salet 2007): social–economy,
‘reach’ (extent) and physiognomy of urban development, and the institutional
arrangements and modi operandi of governance.
The very concept of a regionally scaled city is not just a concern of the last 15
or so years. Rapid urban development in the wake of industrialisation in western
countries, and subsequently the increasing concentration of people and economic
activity in growing – or, in a North American context, sprawling – metropolitan
areas, raised the spectre of urbanisation well beyond local areas into regions. These
develop around individual, or groups of, cities which act as regional foci, and from
where links and connecting relationships may spread out as part of a suburbani-
sation process which blurs administrative boundaries and often also physical
landscape features; in the former instance, a mono-centric city-region emerges, in
the latter, a polycentric arrangement around a group of cities, which may be similar
or more dissimilar in size and functionality (see also Herrschel and Newman 2002).
This structural difference matters for subsequent attempts at finding governing
arrangements, as they affect degrees of likely localism, even parochialism. This is
because inter-municipal and especially inter-urban competition develops about
shaping the whole city-region’s agenda in the interest of likely maximum local
benefits.
Already in 1964, before the term became fashionable, Dickinson, from a clearly
city-centric perspective, described the city-region as an inherently difficult to
capture phenomenon, because of ‘the problem of defining and analysing the
functions and limits of the city and its unifying relationships with the surrounding
area’ (Dickinson 1972: 54). And these relationships, he acknowledges, work both
ways, with individual functions developing their ‘own’, specific relationships.
These, in turn, determine ‘regions’ as functional areas, i.e. as outward-reaching
‘zones of influence’. Analysing a city-region will thus require, so he postulates, a
twofold approach: (1) assess the resources and capacity of the region surrounding
a city to have an effect on the city itself; and then (2) assess the impact of the city’s
resources on the character and prospects of the region. But city-regions do not
necessarily contain merely one dominant central city as a mono-centric arrange-
ment (see Herrschel and Newman 2002), but could instead possess two or more
cities functioning as a cluster of bi- or poly-polar centrality respectively (Welsh
Government 2012: 9). This difference in centrality matters for any likely intra-
local competition within the ‘shared’ region, which, in turn, shapes the nature and
scope of internal negotiations about common policy agendas as drivers of a
regional perspective, because of a latent distrust about the commitment of
individual localities to any joint approach.
Yet, all these various functions have a common reference to the central city as
shared, unifying denominator, and it is this ‘functional association’ that
 Defining city-regions 35

circumscribes the city-region as a pragmatic, tailor-made project. As such, as he

further elaborates, city-regions are inherently ‘mental constructs’, rather than ‘as
some planners and scholars seem to think, an area which can be presented on a
platter to suit their general needs’ (Dickinson 1972: 54), and these include an area’s
administrative and governmental, as well as organisational interests. ‘The extent
of the area they need will depend on the specific purpose for which it is required’
(54), and the related specifically formed relationships and connections between
city and surrounding region. Despite this variety, Dickinson (1972) identifies four
key functional types: (1) ‘trade area relations’ as measurement of functional
economic linkages; (2) ‘social relations’ (including education and culture); (3)
‘movement of population’ as expression of commuting links; and (4) ‘land use
effects’ of the central city on the surrounding areas, e.g. suburbanisation. This
variety makes attempts at measuring and clearly bounding the geographic extent
of such city-regions difficult, and with it the assemblage of required clearly
demarcated, ‘matching’ administrative territories. Any such attempts to instru-
mentalise an inherently fluid relational interdependence between city and
surrounding region is prone to inevitable imprecision. Nevertheless, attempts have
been made, such as in the USA with the introduction of the SMSAs in the 1950s,
and are still being made with definitions of ‘city-region’ by the OECD and the
European Commission (EC 2011), because any state involvement requires clearly
defined territorial boundaries for the application of powers and policies. Yet, as
Hawley (1963) observes: ‘The application of indexes thus far brought into use
[however] reveals that the boundaries of modern community, instead of precise
lines, are blurred, if not indeterminate.’ Different indices produce different
descriptions of a community’s spatiality, ultimately resulting in a confusing array
of intertwined lines as imprecise boundaries. Defining ‘matching’ territories of
governmental power and responsibility to capture these spaces will thus be
inherently difficult. Not only are they different in shape and reach, but they also
change over time. But is such ‘catching up’ with functional spatialisation really
needed? Alternative ways of linking the two exist in the form of inter-municipal
alliance building and co-operation with multiple ways and varying degrees of
formalisation, as discussed below in Chapter 5.
For businesses, city-regions offer distinct cluster (agglomeration) advantages,
which reinforce their appeal and lead to further agglomerations and strengthening
of economic capability, competitiveness and appeal. It is the sum of a city-region’s
internal locational factors, plus its joint connectivity as a business location, that
defines its strength. In effect, it is the combination of all local location factors that
are ‘pooled’ in a city-region. The degree of their complementarity and cohesion
decides on how far this leads to further (joint) economic capacity that may, ideally,
benefit all. As Parr (2002) points out, business-relevant agglomeration advantages
in a city-region are a combination of different economies of scale, each relating to
individual policy fields. The size of an agglomeration thus has implications for the
likely variety of functions and their links to the ‘outside’. And this in turn, as he
further argues, is closely related to ‘economies of scope’ as an expression of the
existence of additional capacity gained from sharing interest and objectives among
36 Defining city-regions

economic activities in a place, and ‘economies of complexity’ as a reflection of

organisational arrangements.
Economic structure thus provides an important variable for city-regionalisation:
a more integrated, complementary and interconnected economy may be expected
to facilitate a city-regional agenda not just at the political level, but also in public
awareness as a prerogative for continued political willingness to engage in collab-
orative action. It is a sense of shared economic benefit and inter-connectedness, that
is capable of strengthening a city-regional agenda across socio-economic and
political divisions and associated parochialism and introspection, and instead
encourages a regional perspective. Discourse of commonality matters (Paasi 1986),
but underlying ‘real’ advantages of such a regional engagement need to be there as
well. Salet and Thornley (2007) thus include ‘economic structure’ as a key deter-
minant in the shape of business-oriented ‘Private Sector Networks’. They suggest
this as one of three intersecting pillars of relation-based city-regional spatialisation,
with the other two being ‘Intraregional Networks’ and ‘Transregional Networks’.
These are meant to reflect the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions of city-
regionalisation respectively, or as Salet and Thornley put it, ‘domains of
metropolitan action space’ (192). This choice of terminology clearly points to the
inherent dynamism of the proposed city-regions with their transient spatial
expression, and their changing demands for responses by the local population,
including policy makers.
Notions attached to the term ‘city-region’ are very much shaped by functional
and physiognomic characteristics associated with urbanisation, whereby economic
relationships and processes are of particular prevalence. Yet, administrative
structures and territorialities also matter, driven by concerns about effective
governing and avoidance of unco-ordinated – and thus potentially inefficient –
duplications of efforts and/or counter-effective overlaps in local policy-making.
Ways to address this problem may vary between on the one hand, top-down
imposed re-scaling of administrative territorial structures, and, on the other, a mere
co-ordination of otherwise essentially locally defined policies. The former, top-
down imposed restructuring, works through the merger – and so de facto abolition
– of existing municipalities, through the creation of an additional, regional tier of
dedicated governing capacity. Such may be equipped with varying strength and
with greater or lesser fixed territoriality. The latter, by contrast, works through
mere co-ordinative associations formed by a set of municipal policy makers with
– at least temporarily – shared agendas. All this aims at increasing size, economies
of scale in service delivery, and obtaining greater policy-making capacity of
government, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. The label ‘city-region’ does
not really reflect this difference in the internal organisation of the city-regional
scale of governance, although some attempts have been made at distinguishing
between the two main modi operandi of governing: state restructuring with institu-
tional-territorial reorganisation and associated re-scaling, versus collaborative,
self-organising arrangements on an agenda-based ad hoc basis. And this is shaped
by, and shapes, the balance between the local and the regional scale of interests,
perspectives and modi operandi in city-regions.
 Defining city-regions 37

Regional city or city-region: linking the ‘local’ and the ‘regional’

The balance between urban and regional features in the process of urbanisation in
functional and, especially, subsequent administrative terms, has varied in concep-
tualisation as well as terminological usage. Adopting either a more functionally
led, economic and service delivery perspective, or a more administrative, govern-
mental angle, conceptualisation has varied between the regionalising city on the
one hand, and the urbanising region, on the other. In the former instance, it is the
city which usurps the regional scale and imposes its functional and physiognomic
dominance, and in the process, disguising (even burying) underlying differences,
and this may involve both functionality and administration. In the latter instance,
the region maintains much of its underlying characteristics and features vis-à-vis
the expanding pressure of leading city/cities. The ‘regional’ sits next to the ‘urban’,
albeit likely modified and moderated in its distinctiveness and seeming separate-
ness. In that instance, city-regionalisation clearly draws on both components, local
and regional, with the urban element embedded in the regional context, rather than
in complete domination of it. This applies to the functional and physiognomic, as
well as political-administrative dimension. A city-centric regionalisation – i.e. a
regionalising city – corresponds with a penchant for government–territorial, institu-
tional reorganisation. In other words, the regionalised city is the CITY-region (with
the emphasis on the former) as functionally-defined, relationally organised, urban-
ised space, where institutionalisation and regulation are less pre-eminent. Indeed,
they are presumed to ‘somehow’ follow to encapsulate the city-dominated region.
By contrast, in a city-REGION (with emphasis on the ‘region’ component),
structure is defined through function, and governmental territoriality gives way to
functional spatiality as ordering principle. Such an urbanising region more likely
adopts a collaborative approach, in which both city and region are negotiating city–
regional policy agendas. The regionalising city looks at the interconnection
between city and the outside world, be that within the immediate region or the
world. This form of the city-region is thus more about the wider area fusing with
the city in functional geographic, physiognomic and organisational terms, rather
than being in toto defined by it. A domination of the ‘regional’ by the ‘urban’ is thus
much less evident.
In Germany, for instance, the term ‘Regionalstadt’ (lit. Regional City) has been
introduced to denote the formal, restructuring approach with extensive govern-
mental–territorial reorganisation at the city-regional level to match administrative
territoriality to functional spatiality (Heinz 2000). ‘Regionalstadt’ is thus an institu-
tional-centric construct, addressing governmental capacity, rather than a more or
less loose descriptor of functionally linked urban spaces (Männle 2008). The
‘Regional City’ concept thus stands for political–administrative territoriality and
institutionalisation at the city-regional level, following the notion of an urbanising
region. This, it does, by seeking to establish a conventional form of governing
within the state-administrative hierarchy. ‘Regional City’ thus represents conven-
tional state hierarchical; multi-level government with fixed, static territoriality. In
other words, it is about urbanising the region, subordinating the region to the
dominant functionality of ‘its’ city or group of cities. This implies that such
38 Defining city-regions

territoriality meets the requirements of effective government, including regulation,

administration and service provision, as well as provides avenues of democratic
legitimacy for policies. Yet, such expectations are increasingly ambitious, if not
futile, given the accelerating dynamism of functional relations, economic geo-
graphies and reorganisation of space.

Summary: different meanings of ‘city-region’ between regionalised

city and urbanised region
The term ‘city-region’ has become quite fashionable as a term to capture the pheno-
menon of regionally scaled urban development. Yet, discussions and policy
responses have a longer history, going back to the first half of the twentieth century.
The focus has variably been on questions of administrative structure in relation to
functional urbanisation and city-hinterland interdependencies. This includes
structural differences of city-regions between mono- and poly-centric arrange-
ments. The perspective has varied between a city-centric view of the city-region as
a single urbanised space – much as in the term ‘metropolis’ – and a more regional
angle, maintaining a difference between city and hinterland, while focusing on the
interconnecting mechanisms between them. Underlying meanings and assumptions
associated with ‘city-region’ vary, and this needs to be taken into account when
using the term. The understanding here adopts the broader perspective, where city-
regions are composite of urban centre/s and more or less semi-urban hinterland.
3 Cities and the global
Changing relationship between
‘inside’ and ‘outside’

Cities have historically been the primary locales of social, economic, cultural
and political development and innovation. Some of these developments were
demanded from the ‘outside’ in the form of shifting circumstances through
structural, technological or political changes, others were generated from ‘within’
through changes to socio-economics, the urban environment or economic
specialisms. These processes have accelerated through ever more rapid techno-
logical innovations, especially in communications, creating new ‘winners’ and
‘losers’ in the inter-local competition game. The result is a mosaic of uneven
connectivity and involvement, with three principal consequences: for once, cities
may be in key positions by operating as a node in a global network, and thus
participating in shaping it. Then, as a second category, cities are striving to gain
more influence and become competitive to gain attention and status. Lastly, in a
third category, cities suffer from a relative disadvantaged location on the
economic periphery, such as the outskirts of what constitutes the economic heart
of Europe, that space contained between London, Paris and Frankfurt. In
addition, cities also show internal divisions – as do city-regions, of course – such
as between old city core and suburban developments, a process of particular
significance in North America.
Ever since the rise of ‘globalisation’ as a distinct label and discourse a quarter
of a century ago, when the emerging IT revolution around the PC and the then
infant Internet promised a new era of unlimited communication and interaction at
will, ‘borderless-ness’ and ‘shrinking world’ have been signifiers of a future new
way of doing things and relating to space and distance. Much of the focus has been
on the economic, especially financial, aspect of globalisation, which effectively
meant ‘opening to trade or liberalization’ (Streeten 1998: 56) by removing the
‘obstructive’ barriers of borders around national economies. Borderless-ness has
almost become a synonym for globalisation, where ‘in place of the old local and
national seclusions and self-sufficiency, we have … universal interdependence of
nation’ (1996 Human Development Report, cited in Streeten 1998: 51). The
collapse of the communist world in 1989–91, and its opening to the neo-liberal,
Western-based free trade agenda, promoted by the IMF and World Bank as part of
the Washington Consensus (J. Williamson, 2000), removed many closed borders
that had epitomised nearly half a century of the Cold War.
40 Cities and the global

While much of the discussion focused on the role of the state as the most
obvious bulwark to ‘openness’ for fear of losing power and control over territory
to some imaginary globalisation process, other actors, within and outside govern-
ment, as well as other scales of governing, saw opportunities – and challenges – for
cities and regions to directly interact with counterparts around the world, without
having to go via their respective nation states. The technological advancement of
digital communication since the beginning of the 1990s added additional impetus
to the notions and interpretations of a globalised world. Yet, these developments
have affected state responses in both ways – enabling and disabling – in corres-
pondence with state-specific structures and modi operandi. Consequently, as
Ardalan points out quite clearly:

Of course national governments are partly constrained by various pressures

coming from international interdependence and economic openness. [Yet] In
order to understand how national governments respond to globalization one
needs to understand what goes on inside the nation-state. The global
economy not only constrains but also enables governments to pursue their
national policy objectives. The extent of the outcome depends on the dom-
estic institutional context, including its normative and organizational aspects.
The domestic institutions of governance mediate the challenges of openness.
(Ardalan 2004: 218)

The dialectic matters here between ‘inside’ structures and processes, values and
practices, and ‘outside’ changing dynamics and growing interdependencies, and
the resulting pressures on competitiveness across all scales, not just ‘global cities’
and their city-regions. The adjective ‘global’ in this context, however, suggests a
degree of hegemony not just within the urban hierarchy, but also vis-à-vis the
respective nation states.
Borders have changed in role and nature, adding new dynamics to the concept
of spatial relations. Networks and lines of communication, with preferred connec-
tivity and relational interaction, have replaced homogenous state territories that
simply ‘contained’ localities and regions. A location that offers fast, plentiful and
efficient connections is thus able to bring together a wider range of input factors
and, as a consequence, offer higher rent on a broader range of economic activities
than a location with lesser quality of connectivity, ceteris paribus. In other words,
time is indeed money, as well as a wider range of economic opportunities. So, it is
external relations and their quality in terms of range and capacity (speed) of
connectivities that circumscribe a locality’s competitive potential and thus
economic scope. Time, and through it, predominant available technology, define
and re-define inclusions and exclusions of places in the network arrangements
shaped by the logic of the ‘competitiveness game’ of market capitalism. Yet, places
also possess their own dynamics and capacities, albeit in varying forms and of
varying effectiveness, as they seek to respond to external pressures. Responses
may be about resistance to a potential loss of opportunities through shifting connec-
tivities and their changing qualities as a result of changing interests and priorities
 Cities and the global 41

and ways of doing things (technological innovation). Or, they may be about
identifying and carving out new opportunities – with, or despite – the nature of
quality change in connectivity.
This reflects a change in the main organising principle of political economic
geography from a mosaic of clearly defined, static state territories – or ‘containers’
– with relationships between them defined by governments for selected reasons, to
the notion of global flows of economic – capitalist – interest cutting across this
mosaic. These ‘flows’ (Castells 1991) produce new spatial differentiations and
fragmentations of state territories by determining linear corridors of preferential
interaction and involvement. And here the main cities and city-regions have
attracted particular interest. And while state governments could seek to prevent
this in an attempt to claim and retain full control and authority over their territories
and all its ‘contents’, such would fundamentally weaken their overall appeal as a
place for capital to engage as it searches specific locales for attractive return for
investment. And so, globalisation has challenged the accepted notion of a closed
box nature of states by questioning state bordering and territorial segregation, and
offering new spatial roles for communication and – subsequently – interaction from
within a city-region right up to the global scale. This new perspective and eval-
uation has accentuated and utilised, as well as manifested, intra-state inequalities
and differences in economic opportunities, and these are changing over time as
assessment criteria used by international capitalism change in response to markets
and technology.
The result is a spatially selective differentiation of more – or less – ‘attractive’
cities and regions, from an investor’s point of view. Those connected the most and
the farthest are deemed the most lucrative and thus appealing, others are ignored
and ‘left outside’ the spaces of interest. It is this, as argued in this book, that
establishes the challenges for urban and regional governance: responding to the
selective process of international capital in the form of ‘competitiveness’ and
boosting ‘appeal’, while also finding new forms of governance to identify and pur-
sue local interests effectively in a broader spatial context, for some right up to the
global level. So, what are the possibilities, the scope and capacities that cities and
city-regions can mobilise to respond to these changing positions and functional
and communicative linkages?
Bartelson (2000) distinguishes between three roles and workings of ‘globali-
sation’ as a process in relation to states. This is based on the flow of ‘impact’ and
mutual influence in the dialectic between national and – that is the argument here
– also sub-national actors in the wake of the changing quality of ‘borderness’. In
other words, city-regional governance is influenced by, but also actively shapes,
policy-making interaction and ways of doing things across boundaries and borders,
be they political, administrative, or imagined, identity-based, in nature. And this
can go up and down the geographic hierarchy. The three types of mutual engage-
ment and interaction identified by Bartelson (2000) are:

1 Transference: initiatives extending from the ‘inside’ to the global ‘outside’;

2 Transformation: influences from the global ‘outside’ impacting on the statal
‘inside’;
42 Cities and the global

3 Transcendence: an intense interaction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ that

effectively ‘fuzzies’, or even dissolves, the boundary between the two spheres
(scales).

In its simplest, basic form, globalisation initiates cross-border ‘transference’ as

‘exchange across existing unit boundaries and between units and system’ (Bartelson
2000:184). Sub-global territorial entities are thus clearly separated from the system
of globalisation by a boundary that any interaction needs to transcend. ‘Hence,
according to the logic of this concept, globalization takes place inside out’ (184). It
is the ‘inside’ that experiences perceptions of the ‘outside’, and thus alters its
responses and external interactions. Typical examples are internationalisation strat-
egies and associated linkages between local and regional actors. They seek to extend
an actor’s political and geographic ‘reach’ – be that a locality, region, institution or
organisation – to the desired international sphere/level. The result is a ‘superficial
integration’ (185); superficial, because border and boundaries remain in place. They
are just more porous and thus seemingly less divisive. But the actual structure of
territorial ‘boxes’ remains unaltered and in place. It is their interaction/intercon-
nection that has changed, although such is mostly informal and selective, so as to not
undermine the autonomy and self-governance of the respective units. This, in effect,
two-way manner of exercising influence mirrors the ‘principle of counterflow’ in
public administration in Germany between the local, state and federal (national)
levels of governance through formal and also informal (party–political) avenues
(Schmitz 1995; Herrschel and Newman 2002; Wollmann 2004).
The second perspective on globalisation, ‘transformation’, takes the opposite
view, and looks at the impact of globalisation on actors, organisations and places
at the sub-global level, national to local. Here, the emphasis is on a ‘conditioning’
of the actors ‘inside’ by changes on the ‘outside’. The focus is on the external,
global, conditions and circumstances, the externally based economic processes and
their reach around the world; i.e. their impact on the internal arrangements and
modi operandi of a locality or business unit. In other words, sub-global actors are
being conditioned by this pressure for greater competitiveness in order to maintain
a place ‘at the table’ of globalising economic interests and capital accumulation.
There is thus some conceptual borrowing from structuration theory (Giddens
1990). This interpretation puts localities, regions and states, and other, non-
territorial actors, in a much more passive, responding role than suggested by the
first interpretation of globalisation as ‘transference’. There, actors are portrayed
as more proactive, and engage in a two-way interaction ‘upwardly’ in scale, and
through which they seek to change conditions for themselves. ‘Yet this world is still
compartmentalised into distinct dimensions of causality’ (Bartelson 2000: 189),
an ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, i.e. a global and sub-global arena respectively. But, both
scale levels – global and sub-global – cannot remain limited to their respective
territories alone (Cerny 1999). For cities this means engaging with the regional
scale, be that neighbouring cities or suburban or non-urban localities. ‘Keeping
oneself to oneself’ and protecting narrowly defined self-interest, is no longer
feasible, nor opportune, even from a localist perspective.
 Cities and the global 43

The third mode of globalisation suggested, ‘transcendence’ effectively removes

the distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ a unit, with boundaries all invisible
and ineffectual. In such a scenario, globalisation is both inside and outside a
territorial or organisational unit, and thus eliminates the (need for) distinction
between the two spheres. This has fundamental implications for the identity and
self-perception of the different units, as they are ‘borderless’ and thus no longer
provide a dominant, hegemonic – and safe and familiar – reference point. This
affects the very existence and raison d’être of each unit, and may well produce
anxieties, resentment, defensiveness and even hostility among those ‘within’
towards the ‘outside’ deemed to threaten the notion of being in control of one’s
local affairs. In effect, ‘globalization thus despatializes and detemporalizes human
practices as well as the conditions of human knowledge and it projects them onto
the global as a condition of its existence’ (Bartelson 2000: 189). In this understand-
ing, globalisation develops its own dynamic, its own hegemonic presence, and
becomes the dominant reference point for the identities and actions of all actors.
Place and territory then no longer matter. This, however, as will be shown in later
sections, denies the fact that globalisation in itself identifies, evaluates and
reproduces inequalities and variations in economic opportunities at different scales.
New borders will emerge, new boundaries, based on capitalist evaluations of
opportunities in different places and business units. There is no simple production
of an amorphous ‘borderless’ global space where identities, context and ambitions
fuse into something vaguely globalised common (Herrschel 2011).
One important question about the nature and concept of globalisation as a
separate phenomenon in its own right, is whether ‘we can conceptualize the world
as something more than the sum of its constituent parts’ (Bartelson 2000: 187).
Does it add any specific ‘global qualities’ in its own right in addition to merely
being the sum of all territories? One effect has certainly been an increased speed
and ease of communication in terms of flows of people, physical goods, and of
ideas and information. Being connected and ‘reachable’ thus fundamentally matters
as prerogative for competitiveness and economic development. This is because
‘while capital must on one side strive to tear down every spatial barrier to
intercourse, i.e. to exchange, and conquer the whole earth for its market, it strives
on the other side to annihilate this space with time, i.e. to reduce to a minimum the
time spent in motion from one place to another’ (Marx and Nicolaus 1993: 539).
A growing speed of linking the factors of production means less unproductive
idleness and thus higher profitability.
This served as backdrop to David Harvey’s conceptualisation of globalising
capitalism as experiencing a time-space compression (Harvey 1999) as a conse-
quence of faster and more ubiquitous connectivity aided by reduced obstruction
through physical and political–economic barriers (borders). This idealised, and
inherently hypothetical, conceptualisation of space as essentially being undiffer-
entiated and homogenous through technological advances, led to the proclamation
by economists of a ‘flat world’ (Friedman 2006), and the obsolescence of
geography (O’Brien 1992) as a descriptor of difference and similarity; here related
to economic opportunity and dis-opportunity. This understanding of globalisation
44 Cities and the global

as producing and reflecting ‘one world’ – the name chosen as a programmatic state-
ment about connectivity by British Airways for its airline alliance – gained wide
prevalence in academic as well as public policy discourses, fuelled by the revolu-
tionary developments in information technology since the end of the 1980s and
the emergence of the Internet as ubiquitous source of information, communication
and connectivity.
Yet, the underlying shift from territorial, locational thinking, to relational
connectivity, irrespective of location of those connected and connecting, as, for
instance, advocated by O’Brien (1992) in relation to the flow of finance, was,
perhaps, taking things too far. As Sheppard (2002) points out, such conclusions
are based too much on the rather particular example of finance with its inherently
virtual nature of movement. Doreen Massey (1999), in her place-conscious
perspective of relational geography, criticises a simplistic understanding of space
as a mere ether for flows of electronic information as an inadequate (and thus
unrealistic) space-time imaginary; while others see it as becoming a ‘placeless
world’ (Hardt and Negri 2001), shaped by the logic of globalising capitalism as the
hegemonic ordering principle of space, which knows no structured territoriality
and no unevenness, merely a homogeneous space where place, as an expression of
particular localised characteristics, no longer matters (Hardt and Negri 2001;
Corbridge 2003). This interpretation of globalisation is fundamentally an econo-
mist’s view as also found in the idealising hypothetical uniform spaces in the
Weberian and Christallerian tradition, although both later gave recognition to the
‘distorting effects’ of preferential connectivity through improved, yet selective,
connectivity, by the time, the railways. The result was seen in ‘disturbances’ to the
regular patterns of economic activity in response to regular changes to time-space
comparative advantages (Christaller 1972; Hall 1997).
The ease with which a digitally constructed virtual world can be constructed
and brought to economic use through electronic information exchange, most visibly
illustrated by the parallel universe of the Internet, led to an enthusiastic embrace
of the concept of globalisation as leading paradigm of a time dominated by a neo-
liberal discourse as the ‘only show in town’. This was especially so after the
collapse of the communist world in 1989 (Fukuyama 2006; Herrschel 2007). A
new belief in the possibilities opened up by technology has also been seen as a
new version of modernism, becoming the new hegemonic paradigm, where ‘time
trumps space’ (Sheppard 2002: 309), as predominant organising principle for the
interaction between people, economic factors and places. And for this, the link
between the inside and outside of a place matters for a locality’s role and relevance
in a globalised economy. Sheppard (2002) refers here to ‘positionality’ ‘as a way
of capturing the shifting, asymmetric, and path dependent ways in which the futures
of places depend on their interdependencies with other place’ (308). The result is
a growing inequality between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, whereby relative centrality
and peripherality matter, albeit not in simple geographic terms of spatial location,
but in terms of accessibility expressed (and measured) as time cost.
Scope, capacity and capability to do something about this will vary, reflecting
the political–institutional and statutory framework as a key (but not the only)
 Cities and the global 45

descriptor of the local political milieu as a composite of the effects of internal and
external factors. Thus, while globalisation has changed the notion and utilisation
of space, even in the world of finance, as Martin (1999) emphasises, ‘it has by no
means undermined the significance of location, of place’(16); places are more than
mere local arenas for the acting out of a Fordist-style spatial division of economic
activity. Rather, their differences in opportunities offered add to a growing diversi-
fication and differentiation of economic processes and evaluation of opportunities,
creating a plethora of variable spatialities at the local and regional level, which are
increasingly merely temporary, changing rapidly and thus representing a more ad
hoc, chaotic set-up.
These are qualities associated with post-modern conditions, and here the spatial
relationship between existing governmental territory and functional space matter.
How much of a good match are they, and how can an inherently more static structure
be dynamised to better respond to ever faster changing economic conditions and
modi operandi? What new forms of governance have been, and need to be, adopted?
Are new urban clusters in the form of evolving and mutating city-regions the answer,
such as morphing into ‘super-clusters’ (Scott 2000)? In response, different scalar
arrangements for powers and responsibilities and thus perspectives of territory and
spaces may be opportune, a process also referred to as ‘rescaling of institutional
flexibility’ (Hansen and Serin 2010). This refers to the variability both of spatial
functional scale and associated institutional representation.
To come back to O’Brien’s claim of geography becoming irrelevant for the
world of finance, the current debates about regulation of the City of London and
the importance of regulatory arrangements for the profitability of financial
institutions as a competitive consideration, clearly highlight that geography con-
tinues to matter at the point where the digital virtual touches down to meet the
conventional locational reality: the localisation of the virtual networks and connec-
tivities as expressed in flows. This realisation has increasingly cast the limelight on
the inherent unevenness within – and also through – the process of globalisation,
with cities and city-regions recognised as centres of political–economic processes
and the connections between them.
Sheppard (2002) framing of the term ‘positionality’ to mark out the different
positions that places can take within a relational network: on the linkages, at the
nodes and in between the flows of connectivity, thus ‘capturing the shifting,
asymmetric, and path-dependent ways in which the futures of places depend on
their interdependencies with other places’ (308). Whether there is a path
dependency is, however, not necessarily so clear, as such would presume that
places are merely passive objects waiting to be permitted to join the network and
be connected. Instead, a more proactive approach may involve raising the appeal
of a place to attract ‘flows’. And it is here, that the concept of ‘in-between-ness’
(see below, p. 48, 52) points to the differentiating effects of network-based relations
as lines of preferred interaction and relatedness. Yet, what about the places, and
actors, between these lines?
The growing attention accorded to network relations and communication
linkages as descriptors of ‘spaces of agendas’ has, as Sheppard (2010) observes,
46 Cities and the global

focused primarily on horizontal relationships across the same spatial scale. Much
less attention has been granted to vertical linkages up and down across scales, with
Brenner (2004a) one of the exceptions. In particular, interest has focused on the
nodal role of cities and city-regions in networks of communication – physical,
political, functional – serving as connectors between different networks of varying
purposes and, increasingly more recently, also at different scales, local to global.
Space is part of a growing recognition of the importance of relational spatiality
(Massey 1999, 2004), where points of reference (nodes) and linkages matter. These
sit next to conventional, bounded territoriality, with a presumed cohesive,
contiguous contents, defined by a surrounding, clearly recognisable, boundary.
Municipal territories, or administrative and/or planning regions, are examples of
such a territorial approach as geographic ‘containers’ of policy-making. Yet, cities
have effectively begun to step out of, first, their spatial economic regional and,
then, also national contexts, developing ‘on the way’ a growing visibility as places
of political decision making, institutional action and economic pressures. This was
accompanied by a challenging of institutionalised state hierarchies as part of scalar
governmental structuration (MacLeod and Goodwin 1999a; Brenner 2000, 2004a).
It is this tension between scales of linkages and relations, and the connection
between territory and space, as evident from the effect of globalisation on cities,
that is investigated in the remainder of this chapter.

Globalisation, territorial fragmentation and localising the virtual:

nodes, linkages and inbetween-ness
Globalisation is about the change of scale, both in imagination and practice. It is
about overcoming borders and divisions, seen as obstacles to interconnectivity,
and expanding perspectives and engagement from the local to, in extremis, world-
wide internationality. Much of the debate on globalisation revolves around
changing spatiality, i.e. the virtual global geography of networks and connections,
of ‘flows’ and linkages, rather than a much more contested and conflictual territo-
riality of states or their administrative entities. Examples include such global
images of flight connections on a map to illustrate an airport’s reach or an airline’s
global presence and capacity to (actually) connect, with no real consideration of the
underlying territories borders and divisions, or such expressions of global
governance as the ‘World Bank’ or the UN. This refers in particular to the growing
mobility and selectivity of capital when scouting out attractive locations in the
absence of fixed, ‘hard’ borders as obstacles.
‘Globalization is a multifaceted concept that refers, at core, to the extension of
spatial interdependencies on a worldwide scale’ (Brenner 2004a: 35), creating new,
while reshaping and also abandoning existing, spaces and places. The notion of a
global space has added a new scale to the otherwise so strong focus on nation states
as primary actors at the global level. The idea of a global space implies a degree
of liberation from the confines of the national perspective and its boundedness.
This permits sub-national actors – regions and localities – to reach beyond national
borders and engage directly with each other around the world. In effect, it is a
 Cities and the global 47

scaling up of local and regional perspectives, ambitions and engagement. Yet, there
will be considerable differences between these sub-national actors in their ability
and capability to utilise this opportunity. Especially the larger cities with a more
internationally oriented economy, may be expected to ‘reach globally’ more
enthusiastically and successfully.
The problem of the ‘shrinking cities’ (Hollander et al. 2009: Bontje 2005),
especially the quite extreme experiences of Detroit, illustrate the effects of such
abandonment. This shifting territoriality, with a combination of fixed and dynamic,
‘real’ and imagined ‘virtual’, spaces and territories challenges the state as a
regulative agent, as conventional certainties of territorial fixity and administrative
predictability and reliability no longer are necessarily in place.
‘Globalization is, in short, an intrinsically geographical concept: the recognition
that social relations are becoming increasingly interconnected on a global scale
necessarily problematizes the spatial parameters of those relations, and therefore
the geographical context in which they occur’ (Brenner 2004: 28). Yet it is not just
social relations that are affected. There are also economic and political links
between organisations and institutions, just as much as individuals, all of which are
reshaped by the need to respond to the new nature and functionality of space/
territory.
This includes its growing differentiation and re/establishment of unevenness in
connectivity, and thus inclusion/exclusion (i.e. marginality) of places, organi-
sations/institutions and people as actors. Space and spatiality are thus becoming
redefined, including an increasing inherent dynamic, and spatial fuzziness, as far
as boundaries (limits) and localisation of activity are concerned. They are
increasingly flexible, variable and time-limited, with shifting emphasis between
regions and cities, and between and within cities. So, as discussed and examined
in this book, it is not just the dynamisation of space through social relations, but
also through economic linkages circumscribing relevance and relations as drivers
of the reconfiguration of a geography of economic opportunity (and non-
opportunity). This requires adjusted ways and mechanisms of making politics and
policies, including an ‘increasingly obsolete, nation-centric configuration of
capitalist development’ (Brenner 2004a: 29). Yet, nation-states continue to matter
as translators of global processes and local/regional (urban) implications through
their regulatory provisions and interventions. They provide a framework of
established political values and modi operandi, views of the role of the state vis-
à-vis the economy and society, and power structures and administrative
arrangements circumscribing local (urban) policy-making responses and senses of
responsibility to engage and influence markets. This ‘impact’ will be discussed
here later on as a key element of ‘external impetus’ in its effect on the framing and
modi operandi of city-regional governance (Chapter 5).
The time–space compression claimed by Harvey (1989) as underpinning the
globalisation processes of capital, as it reaches ever further around the globe,
surmounting and reducing ever more borders and boundaries in the process,
including eventually the Iron Curtain, has produced a new context for economic
policy-making. This it did in terms of both agendas, as well as the scalar allocation
48 Cities and the global

of responsibilities and policy capacities, and such includes producing policy spaces
that correspond with economic spaces in their growing diversity, fragmentation
and complexity (layeredness). Hence, through capitalism’s inherent pressure and
ambition to overcome space through the expansion of markets and sources of
resources, new spatialities are produced (Harvey 1985). Here, cities offer increas-
ingly the most attractive foci of economic spaces, doing so through their
concentration of resources, including skills, innovative capacity, market access and
connectivity. As a result, other areas with less ‘on offer’ are increasingly margin-
alised as ‘in-between spaces’. So, while ‘flows’ certainly matter, places do as well,
as flows seek nodes to connect. In so doing, they get, in return, defined by the
nodes, while shaping those very nodes through increased (or decreased) connect-
ivity and thus economic relevance (MacLeod and Jones 2007). It is a symbiotic
relationship. David Harvey (1982) speaks of a dialectic of fixity and fluidity of
capitalism in its geographic manifestation; it is mobile in its search for the highest
rent on investment at any one time, yet also requires specific locations/localisations
for investments to meet resources and markets, and cities score here highest as
products of relations and relational ‘reach’, i.e. an expression of scalar relevance
(Massey 1991, 2011). Such ‘reach’, or scale, implies urban catchment areas in the
Christallerian interpretation.
Globalisation has thus changed not just the relationship between states as
containers of national economies, but also between the different scales/tiers of
economic spaces, local to national. This reconfiguration matters, as it challenges
established, hierarchical governance structures and distribution of political respon-
sibility, authority and capacity. Such, in turn, affects political efficacy and
efficiency of policy outcomes, and their appropriateness for the tasks identified.
This also affects the pool of actors related to a functional space, and thus the scope
for collaborations, generating competition and potential conflict, as well as scope
for ‘joining forces’ for greater visibility and scope through collaboration. ‘The
crucial point, therefore, is that territorialisation, on any spatial scale, must be
viewed as a historically specific, incomplete, and conflictual process, rather than
as a pre-given, natural, or permanent condition’ (Brenner 2004a: 42). It is rooted
in the varying specificities of places and territories, with differences serving the
construction and maintaining of identities and belonging.
The earth is not flat, and cannot be simply interpreted as a borderless, homo-
geneous space of infinite interaction in any direction. Differences matter and
produce variability tied to particular spatial qualities and conditions. Such a place-
centric view is also advocated by Lefebvre (1991), pointing to the social
constructedness of territory, and scale. This refers to the fact that territory (or space)
is a product of processes and political, economic and social routines, rather than a
fixed frame and determinant of such processes. Such a change in understanding
reflects a shift from an ontological to epistemological perspective (Jonas 1994;
Beauregard 1995a; Smith 1996; Delaney and Leitner 1997), with globalisation per
se interpreted as effectively a re/construction of scale, projecting values and
interests onto the supra-national space, rather than seeing it as ‘God-given’, ‘out
there’ to impose its dynamic and rationale on all else, as politicians like to claim
 Cities and the global 49

as an excuse for ineffective policies. Instead, globalisation, as Cox (1997) notes,

is shaped by a framework of social, political and economic ‘conditions’ as the sum
of power relations, choices and structural unevenness. It is, in effect, a multiscalar
version of Polanyi’s double transformation (Blyth, 2002): the tension between
embedding, here localising – economic processes and social relations (production),
on the one hand, and the dis-embedding dynamics and interests, exercised by the
globalisation process and the removal of the protective borders of state territories,
on the other. While this opens up new opportunities, it also requires new institu-
tional responses, although how they are tasked depends on the outcome of the
challenges between neo-liberal, market-led interests on the one hand, and more
state-regulated, socially oriented interests, on the other. It is in this balancing that
the different political–economic cultures and histories in Europe and North
America matter. Although both have been following neo-liberal arguments and
paradigms for three decades now, there is still an inherently more statist,
protectionist ‘streak’ in Europe, compared with the more business oriented,
entrepreneurial, but also more self-reliant tradition in the USA.
‘For a representation to have any purchase it must have some reference to
material social relations, and with the globalization of social processes these
relations have been in flux’ (Kelly 1999: 382). This becomes particularly evident in
the increasingly apparent and problematic mismatch between static territories of
power and representation – state-governmental territoriality – and variable, dynamic
spaces of functional relations and communicative interactions. This also applies to
the nature of city-regions as variably defined functional conglomerates of adjoining
municipalities. Each possesses its own governmental administrative status and
structures, which are separated by distinct boundaries, while the functionality of
the whole city-region knows no such boundaries. In response, either new,
appropriately variable governance structures need to be put in place, or existing
structures ‘dynamised’, to allow them to respond more effectively to shifting
challenges.
Yet the discourse of globalisation is also questioned in its seeming universality,
with critique focusing on five questions (Kelly 1999: 381), incl. the empirical
evidence of globalisation really becoming the predominant discourse and
prescriptor of political–economic developments, then, the role of the state and its
regulative capacity to intervene and seek to shape globalisation, and the role of
place and societal characteristics in modifying the presumed harmonising and
uniformising effect of ‘borderless’ global processes.
The outcome is inevitable tensions between the different forms and mechanisms
of producing and regulating spatial development. Swyngedouw’s concept of
‘glocalisation’ refers to these inherent conflicts between the processes of connect-
ion and connectivity through globally reaching relationships on the one hand, and
growing divisions and separations between those connected and those discon-
nected, whether locally or regionally, leaving the nation state as conventional main
arena of regulation effectively sitting between two stools. This, in turn, raises
important questions about representation and legitimacy, about ‘having a voice’,
especially in terms of political participation and thus scope for democratic
50 Cities and the global

participation. Discussions and debates around the EU’s democratic deficit

(Crombez 2003) go in this direction of critique. This matters in the face of the
marginalising effects of globally-driven connectivity. ‘What concerns Swynged-
ouw and others is that a broadly, or at least potentially, democratized national
political space is giving way to an undemocratic, autocratic and authoritarian
system of quasi-state regulatory processes at multiple scales’(Kelly 1999: 382),
with their unequal allocation of access to power and influence.
The notion of globalisation is thus more than discourse and imagination. It is a
technologically encouraged, and permitted, process of re-scaling functional and
strategic relations between actors and locations of (economic) opportunity and
interest. Much of this was led by expectations, imaginings and notions of universal
connectivity that makes place less important, such as in Saskia Sassen’s (1991)
account of technology-driven global city networks, proposed at a time when email
was still a novel, yet revolutionising phenomenon in communication. The implicit
importance of being connected and thus able to rise above the confines of
geography, suggests ‘that globalization is not an output of the “real” forces of
markets and technologies’ (Walck and Bilimoria 1995: 3). Instead, it has at least
as much to do with power structures, both institutionalised and merely relationally
projected through its selective inclusion and exclusion of actors and groups that
form them, solely based on (temporarily) shared agendas and interests.
One of the main outcomes of the concern with globalisation has been changes
to the quality of state borders which, in turn, represent the state as one of a number
of factors shaping policies. This, of course, has affected the ways in which policies,
and their spatial relevance and rootedness, have become defined, understood,
justified and formulated, leading to varying geometries of spatio-political linkages
and relationships. These, in turn, serve as basis of perceived and/or expected
opportunities and shared interests, leading to a ‘cherry-picking’ of potential
partners, based on their usefulness for the pursuit of one’s own policy agendas, be
they state or non-state institutions, organisations or actors – all with their associated
(represented) territories.
This ‘usefulness’ of engagement and partners has increasingly become syno-
nymised with the dominant neo-liberal discourse, encouraged by the notions of
connectivity, borderlessness and subsequent increased competitiveness, all in
conjunction with reduced state involvement. Inevitably, such competitiveness is
bound to expose variations in economic opportunity on the basis of an uneven
equipment with productive (economic) resources. The result is geographically
and socially uneven economic development through differing participation in
the opened up, globalised economic space. ‘Borderlessness’ thus needs to be
understood as a relative concept. This embraces here the reduced ‘obstacle
effect’ of national state borders and administrative territoriality. Yet, it does not
refer to the notion of a homogeneous space with equal opportunities and scope
for development and interaction everywhere. Instead, new borders emerge
between those areas and actors that are included in the expanding global
competitiveness game, and those that are not. So, where does that leave cities
and city-regions?
 Cities and the global 51

Theory and practice of globalisation have made the conceptualisation and

manifestation of territory more complex. A repeated re-definition of space,
vertically and horizontally, reaching across different scalar operations of insti-
tutions and actors, and, horizontally, across borders and boundaries, has resulted
in the impression of a very dynamic and, related to that, increasingly fragmented
quality of space, focusing around urban nodes and the linear connections (relations)
between them. In this effectively three-dimensional policy space, actors link up
to, or, where less ‘resilient’, owing to fewer opportunities and capacities, are tied
together by, the spatial and organisational selectivity of flows of capital. This may
involve being ‘dropped’, maintained or newly selected. The implications for a
locality and region are obvious: while the former scenario may well mean
economic crisis, possibly leading to the phenomenon of the ‘shrinking city’, the
latter implies the opposite – new development prospects on the basis of newly
acknowledged and desired characteristics. Yet, these shift over time in response to
changing technologies and resulting modified economic rationales and preferences.
The resulting reconfiguring, ever more differentiated, spatial economic manifes-
tation, combines global processes and perspectives with very specific local
opportunities and localisations of interest and investment. These, then produce a
dynamic context with differential opportunities.
With cities emerging as the main nodes (nuclei) of these co-ordinating and
policy restructuring (reorganising) processes, it is those which will be the main
connectors in this mostly horizontal, yet also, at times, vertical reconstellation of
linkages, connectivities and relations. Some will be more successful than others in
improving their prospects, managing to utilise inherent locational, structural
factors, but also local political cultures, institutional structures, leadership and ways
of doing things. They all fuse into locally and/or regionally specific milieux for
city-regional governance (see Chapter 5). In response, mechanisms ‘to adjust’
governance may adopt either spatio-institutional restructuring (reforms), such as
merging jurisdictions, which, however, is often contested by the affected local
population, or changing the ways in which existing territorial government units
work through established structures and arrangements.
Brenner draws two general conclusions with regard to these intersecting and
interdependent global-local (urban) processes (52), also referred to as the global-
local nexus (Brenner 2004a):

1 An emphasis on the global spatial scale does not necessarily lead to an

overcoming of state-centric epistemologies. Global territorial appro-
aches represent global space in a state-centric manner, as a pregiven
territorial container within which the process of globalization manifests,
rather than analyzing its historical production, reconfiguration, and
transformation.
2 State-centric conceptions of global space mask the national state’s own
crucial role as a site and agent of global restructuring processes. The
global-territorial approaches discussed above treat national state territo-
riality as a static institutional framework over and above which
52 Cities and the global

globalization occurs, and thereby bracket the profound transformations

of state territorial and scalar organization that have played a crucial
enabling role in the contemporary round of global restructuring.
(Brenner 2004a: 52–3).

What globalisation has done, is reduce the protective context of national political–
economic space and its attempt at projecting (and achieving) a degree of cohesion,
shared purpose and interest including all localities on its individual territory.
Differences in regulatory context are challenged just as much as geographic
parameters per se. What matters is the ability to maintain and/or develop local quality
profiles that create comparative advantage for particular economic activities, and
thus allows flows of virtual, hypothetical opportunities to become ‘real’ by localising
‘on the ground’. For this, virtual space and real, physical ‘lived’ territory need to
come together and do this in these nodes of urbanity, of urban living with its place-
based qualities and characteristics, innovative capacities and physical connectivities.
So, effectively, a perceived topography of spaces of economic opportunity and
dis-opportunity is projected onto the global surface through the very process of
globalisation as a new layer, cutting across established administrative borders and
boundaries, be they divisive state borders or ‘lesser’ subnational borders and
boundaries. This new ‘topography of opportunities’ is gaining in its volatility, its
extremes in peaks and troughs, marking out metropolitan areas, although not all,
as relative ‘peaks’ and the ‘lesser’, or non-urban, spaces in between as relative
troughs (some deeper than others). This increasingly more mountainous ‘land-
scape’, reflecting varying appeal vis-à-vis neo liberalism-informed choices,
remains in flux and morphs continuously in different ways. Such variability
challenges established administrative structures and perceptions of ‘owned’ and
‘controlled’ territory. It is certainly not ‘flat’ and static, subject merely to adminis-
trative fiat in its boundaries and control. Somehow, policy makers need to find
ways to attach themselves to these dynamics to remain relevant and be able to
define and implement effective policies. This includes finding, and seeking to
operationalise, new mechanisms for capturing the changing economic spatialities
that build up, in particular, around urban and wider metropolitan areas, and this
includes novel, more impromptu and transient forms of governance arrangements
through collaboration and self-organising associative agreements on jointly
pursuing identified shared objectives.
Globalisation thus maintains, even accentuates, difference, with states remaining
the main foci of first responses that matter internationally. The 2008 financial crisis
reasserted this prerogative of national states, including within the EU. Yet, states
are not the only ones acting internationally as a matter of course. There is more to
regulation and government-to-capital interrelations, than nation-state versus trans-
national capitalism. On the one hand, at the sub-national level, new forms of
governance have emerged in response to the dynamism of globalisation and its
rapidly changing, ever more selective, localisation of capital and thus opportu-
nities. The state is not just a black box, but consists of governance processes and
articulations at sub-national level, which operate within the framework set by
 Cities and the global 53

national parameters, but also shapes those as part of a learning process and policy
innovation. Thus, the territoriality of the nation state matters, but it is not just two-
dimensional. Instead, it also includes a third dimension: the layering of spaces –
Brenner refers to ‘plurilateral’ forms of state power (2004a: 61) – and territorial
regulation, which both communicate with, and mutually influence, each other as
part of a trans-scalar dialectic.
Cities and city-regions increasingly need, and want, to be seen as actors in their
own right within an increasingly fragmented and differentiated globalised economic
space. Cities are not in a mere passive role, forced to adjust, but are seeking to
become sources and platforms of policy responses in their own right. Yet, any
subsequent ‘reterritorializations and rescalings of state space cannot be understood
merely as defensive responses to intensified global economic competition, but
represent expressions of concerted political strategies through which state insti-
tutions are attempting, at various spatial scales, to facilitate, manage, mediate, and
redirect processes of geoeconomic restructuring’ (Brenner 2004a: 61).
Nevertheless, even global cities remain rooted in nationally and regionally
shaped cultures and political–institutional structures, practices and values. They
are, in effect, multi-scalar locations, combining all scales from local to global and
fusing them into globalised urbanism. They are local places as well as national and
international/global actors (Newman and Thornley 2002). Where global processes
and perceived opportunities are being localised and located, it is possible to identify
new roles in managing global markets or flows of labour, or cities having an inter-
nationally recognised cultural standing. But conceptualising cities and their
surrounding regions entirely in new international hierarchies of economic arenas
can overplay their functional positions and relevance at the expense of taking into
account their individuality. This includes historical and cultural roots in a national
context, which circumscribe local policy agendas and modi operandi (Abu-Lughod
2001).
In other words, national context matters as a conditioning framework, not at
least through the impact of national regulation and policies that circumscribe scope
and capacity for cities to act. This includes cultures and traditions found in different
global regions, such as Europe, Asia or North America. Le Galès and Lequesne
(1998) for example highlight the distinctive character of European cities, while
Abu Lughod (2001) underlines the specific characteristics of North American
cities. There are few direct comparisons, such as by Savitch and Kantor (2002).
They conclude that cities need not be merely ‘leaves in the wind’, but can make
choices and actively seek to influence their developmental prospects by drawing
on particular combinations of local cultural and political milieux and economic
factors.
Thus, despite all the debates and claims decrying the end of geography as a
relevant (key) economic parameter in the second half of the 1990s under the
impression of the emerging internet (Amin 1997; Greig 2002), territoriality con-
tinues to matter as an expression and manifestation of state power, governmental
responsibility and democratic accountability, but it takes on many more forms and
expressions, reaching from fixed, bounded territories to ‘fluffy’ imagined and
54 Cities and the global

projected virtual spaces which exist only in cyberspace or advertising material and
slogans (Herrschel 2009). These are related to, and expressions of, varying forms
of regulatory tasks and approaches, from coercive reorganisation of territory and
power through top-down fiat, to self-organising, loose, voluntary associations
among existing actors and organisations. Consequently, it is not just the state that
matters as initiator of governmental territorialisation vis-à-vis the challenges posed
by globalisation, but the widening range of actors across scales and institutions is
part of globalisation, too.

Globalisation – localising the regional and perforating contiguous

territoriality
Analyses of urban and urban–-regional development and, subsequently, political
and governmental responses, have been shaped by two main perspectives: (1) an
interrogation of the link between a globally scaled economy and its cutting across
territorial borders and boundaries, and (2) an investigation of a process reaching
out globally (at least as an ambition) from the local/regional level. This means
scaling up local and regional economic and political linkages as part of an outward-
looking perspective and ambition (Castells 2002). Thus, while the former focuses
on the aspect of place as ‘arena’, i.e. of a city/city-region being a specific locali-
sation of globally enacted processes, the latter examines response strategies around
the goal of economic competitiveness. These may include structural adjustment of
government and policy-making modi operandi to enhance governmental respon-
siveness to economic opportunities, including efforts at re/shaping a city’s role and
position in the globalising economy to strengthen its competitive hand. Such may
also include fostering an enterprising, ‘creative class’ as driver of innovation, new
image and new connectivity.
Cities have gained an increasingly more visible, even solitary, role in the process
of globalisation. They have achieved this either as ‘success stories’ or problem
cases, with the phenomenon of the shrinking cities particularly poignant. As a
result, they express and magnify, in a highly ‘concentrated’, localised way, two
things: the effects of the combination of scaled-up economic processes as powerful
external parameters, and an intensifying dynamic of shifting linkages and relations
between cities within and across spatial scales. The resulting picture is one of
increasingly rapidly changing brighter and darker (darkening) spots on the canvas
of national (and global) economic space, challenging established views of fixed
policy responsibilities, territorially based democratic legitimacies (and feedback)
and developmental certainties. The challenge – but also recipe for success – is their
interconnectivity. This refers to the link (the coupling) between fixed, firmly
institutionalised and empowered state territoriality, with its inherent focus on
technocratic, administrative solutions, and variable, functional relationally circum-
scribed spatiality with its strategic political outlook.
Some, like Brenner et al. (2003) or MacLeod (1999), have discussed this spatial
shift ‘up’ and ‘down’ the hierarchy as ‘relativisation of scale’. Yet, this process is
not continuous and gradual, like a sliding scale, but rather like viewing space
 Cities and the global 55

through a prism of varying scales, as Paasi (2004) explains. Each side of the prism
offers a different angle and thus perspective. This differs from the single lens of a
telescope with its continuous zoom from one and the same angle. Swyngedouw
(2004) describes this spatial reconfiguration, driven by scalar expansion and
increased differentiation, associated with globalisation in relation to the nation
state, as ‘glocalisation’. This tries to capture the inherent contradiction between a
general broadening of economic perspectives on the one hand, and, on the other,
a simultaneous homing in on particular local constellations and expressions of
economic opportunities. Yet, there are two different types of geography at work
here: spatiality and territoriality. Mostly, these two terms are being used inter-
changeably, although Agnew (1999b), for instance, refers explicitly to ‘spatiality
of power’ and ‘territoriality of the state’ (176), when he questions the conventional
state-centric approach of simply equating the two. This matters here, as it goes
right to the core of discussions about the role, power and legitimacy of informal
governance arrangements, based on networks and power relations, with no direct
territorial expression of their own. Only indirectly, through participating state
actors, local government, for instance, and being fused with state territoriality, can
such ‘virtual’ spaces of power become ‘real’. But the two are not immediately
congruent, and certainly not identical. This matters when examining governance
arrangements and practices in city-regions, where territories of state government
and administrative power, differ from spaces of interests and economic opportunity,
and their power over political agenda, i.e. ‘power over blocks of space’ (176). In
fact, power and agency may be seen as constituted through space, or as in the case
of city-regions, the assembly of spaces (Allen 1999).
This notion of power being produced through the interaction between actors,
may be acquired, formulated and implemented as a process, even if ultimately,
using structure for the implementation, is quite different from the understanding of
power being an integral part of state territoriality. It is an understanding going in
the direction of the Foucauldian perspective of social constructedness of space and
as such, is inherently more dynamic, yet also unpredictable and negotiable, than
fixed and bounded territory. Space underpins, and is created through, the rationale
of alliances and collaborations. The outcome is ‘assemblages of space’, as Allen
(1999) points out, with reference to Foucault’s argumentation: ‘If, for Foucault,
power is concerned with the techniques which govern the possible limits of action,
then the organization of space – the zoning, partitioning, enclosing and serializing
of activities – is critical to such a practice. The arrangement of space, the particular
assemblages of space which make up institutional complexes, are understood as
integral to the ways in which particular forms of conduct are secured’ (Allen 1999:
202). In other words, the territoriality of power follows (ideally) the spatiality of
strategic objectives and associated (social) actor relations.
The challenge is finding a suitable and feasible mechanism to link the two,
especially given their rather different inherent dynamics, static territoriality and
fluid, rapidly changing spatiality. The outcome is an assemblage (Allen and
Cochrane 2007), a mosaic of territorialities, whose pattern seeks to match that of
strategic and functional spaces, and this involves finding like-interested partners
56 Cities and the global

through building alliances and associations to pursue set goals and boost the
political capacity and capability of all those participating. Such power through
association-building, may extend laterally and vertically, seeking to link up actors
with shared objectives, and thus boost power. Inter-actor relations as the building
blocks of networks are important here. It is Foucauldian-style interest in ‘mutual
action’ that underpins such alliances. These may take on different forms and
‘intensities’, reflecting the conditions met at a particular time and the objectives
held, and such shared objectives, and thus sense of shared purpose, are required for
maintaining any associational arrangement. ‘Association, in this context, is thus
conceived neither as a form of resistance of the powerless, nor as a collective
endeavour of the powerful to bend another’s will’ (Allen 1999: 211). It is, instead,
driven by political opportunity and the realisation of potential win-win scenarios
(outcomes) for all those engaging in collaborative action.
The distinction between spatiality and territoriality marks out a central plank of
discussing the two geographic features associated with globalisation: ‘space’ and
‘territory’. They are expressions of the virtual, imagined characteristics of space
and their actual manifestation ‘on the ground’ in territorial, statal entities. Both co-
exist, intersecting and overlapping with their particular geographic characteristics,
and as such they have provided different references for the analysis and explanation
of the role of cities in the globalisation process. This involves both impacting on,
and being shaped by, these very processes of globalisation. Figure 3.1 illustrates
just some of the main proponents of the two ‘strands’ of conceptualising urban
development vis-à-vis globalisation, interpreting them for once as loci on capitalist
flows around the world, where these flows seek to drop anchor, at least for a time,
and interconnect. The other view sees cities much more active as pursuers of
connectivity in their own right, for which to achieve they change and modify in the
interest of greater attractiveness and ‘success’.
Almost 20 years ago, Agnew (1994) coined the phrase of the ‘territorial trap’ in
relation to the spatiality of statehood as viewed from political sciences and,
especially, the sub-discipline of International Relations. This term has found
frequent use in debates on the spatial dimension of policy-making, and the nature
of territoriality at different scales as viewed by different social sciences The two
main concepts of ‘space’ and ‘spatiality’ are understood by Agnew such that ‘space’
is the ‘presumed effect of location and spatial setting, or where political–economic
processes are taking place, upon those processes’ (55), while ‘spatiality ‘refers to
how space is represented as having effects’ (55).
Territory is thus perceived and approached as a multi-faceted, complex
construct. Elsewhere, territory is less the central phenomenon of investigation per
se, but rather more the (incidental) background to other questions. In political
sciences, for instance, key interests focus on democratic processes, the role and
nature of institutions and the exercise of state power. The state is viewed as a
territory-based power/organisation, where territory is the stage, the ground on
which political processes and institutions happen to be based, but which in itself,
has no real impact. There is relatively little concern about what is going on within
a state territory at the sub-national scale, despite the likely impact that tensions,
 Cities and the global 57

‘Aspirational urban globality’ Urban-shaping globality

• Outward looking: aspiring to engage • Self-centred, defensive, sees

at a higher spatial scale, possibly
even the global level as the top tier
• Pro-active: policy-making on
the basis of advantageous
local potential, qualities and
Characteristics:
globalisation as a threat through
increased competition, exposing
weak economic position
• Re-active, protective: policies to
overcome competitive weaknesses

policy-making capacities and • Limited indigenous potential makes

capabilities
• Indigenous potential: city benefits
from inherent qualities which attract
globalising interests
• Regionally dis-embedded: local
economic success encourages
‘divorce’ from less well doing
regional context
• Emphasis on cities as active nodes
on global ‘flows’ (network centrality)
city less attractive to globalising
trends,
• Marginalisation: limited appeal
threatens city with being ignored and
thus marginalised
• City no stronger than its region,
region may even be stronger than
city
• Cities subjected to positive or
negative (shadow) effects of the
selective routing of flows

• Global city networks • ‘Spaces of flows’

• Global cities • Cities in a world system
Debate (examples):

• Global city-regions • ‘Glocalisation’

• Megalopolis
• Cities as nodes in network
• Cities in growth coalitions
• Entrepreneurial city
• Creative city
• Urban ‘transference’ towards
globalization (Bartelson 2000)
• Cities as places of production
• Cities in network
• Restructuring for capital
• Cities as arenas for global capitalism
• ‘Positionality’ (Sheppard 2002)
• Urban ‘transformation’ by
globalization (Bartelson 2000)

Figure 3.1 Cities vis-à-vis globalisation: between nodes on flows and places as
attraction. Reflections in debate
Source: Author

negotiations, competitions, contestations, etc. at the local and regional levels may
well have. On that basis, ‘state and society are thus related within the [state]
boundaries, but anything outside relates only to other states’ (Agnew 1994: 54). In
fact, the ‘outside’ is considered anarchic, as a challenge to maintaining state
sovereignty. This division between orderly ‘inside’ and disorderly ‘outside’ reflects
somewhat a black and white perspective, as observed phenomena, such as political
or economic actors, may be part of either side, but are not expected to be some-
where ‘in between’, transcending the boundary between state territory and outside
world, however defined. But it just this trans-scalar in-between-ness that a growing
number of cities and city-regions are actively seeking to gain direct visibility and
‘voice’ on an international market, without needing to wait for the state government
to ‘hand down’ contacts and investment. Thus, globalisation and the associated
flurry of communication across boundaries and borders between people, business
and political institutions challenges this understanding.
58 Cities and the global

One of the effects of globalisation has been an empowerment of tiers of state

authority other than just the national level, including, in particular, the larger cities
and city-regions. Some have been more enthusiastic and adept than others at taking
on, and pushing forward, that new found ‘voice’ and opportunity to pursue their
interests also beyond state boundaries, although still based in state regulatory and
political context. Power is thus not something attached to territory per se, and the
automatic prerogative of the state, ‘but the application of agency inherent in all
social action to achieve chosen ends’ (Agnew 1999b: 177). This process has also
been shaped by the underlying purpose and rationale of state power as either
restrictive and controlling, such as found under authoritarian state rule in former
communist Eastern Europe, or a more pro-active, engaging form of power, as it is
more likely to be found in a competitive federal arrangement. Referring to political
power, Agnew (1999a) distinguishes here between ‘positive power’ with the
‘capacity to act, resist, cooperate, and assent’ (500), and ‘negative power’, as ‘the
ability to control, dominate, co-opt, seduce, and resent (500).
This emerging multi-scalar expression of statehood, giving sub-national entities
(scales) a more audible voice and presence, has been a key outcome of globali-
sation, as it challenges the notion that states act as black boxed internationally,
with no visible signs and, indeed, relevance, of internal spatial differentiation in
politics, culture or governance. The result of dragging sub-national entities – cities
and regions – onto the international, even global, arena in their own right, has been
what has been termed ‘perforated sovereignty’ (Duchacek 2001). This relates to the
‘perforation’ of the mutually exclusive nature of borders between states (Herrschel
2011). Yet, this concept may also be applied to other scales and qualities of borders,
such as administrative boundaries between competing municipalities within a city-
region, for instance, or boundaries between institutions – even within the same
administration, with quite different institutional cultures and agendas. Tentative
informal talks between actors on either ‘side’ of such a border may contribute to
its ‘perforation’, potentially leading to more trust and willingness to engage in
more formalised, more permanent collaborative agreements or forms of joint
action.
Functionally, but not administratively, defined city-regions are one such
example of the meeting of different scalar interests: sub-local to national. This
includes a power hierarchy between layers as well as actors within the networks
(Chase-Dunn 1999; Roberts and Grimes 2002). Some are more centrally positioned
and better connected than others, reflecting, and further manifesting, the former’s
status compared with the latter’s more peripheral standing. Global cities, for
instance are such key nodes, with London a typical example, being almost disem-
bedded from its national context when it comes to economic connections (Sassen
2001). In London’s case, for instance, the relative dis-embeddedness of its financial
sector, operating globally and being located in the city only technically, was
highlighted by the financial crash of 2008 and its aftermath. Most of the cost of this
is felt elsewhere in the country. Yet, the country as a whole is dependent on its
economic value, and thus the city’s interests become synonymised with those of the
country, and Europe, as a whole. Debates about potential costs of regulating the
 Cities and the global 59

financial sector in the City of London, and thus making the location less com-
petitive with other such globally relevant financial centres, illustrate this clearly
(Monaghan 2009).

Globalising the urban – global cities – global city-regions –

mega (city)regions
The connectivity between the local and global, conceptualised by Swyngedouw
(2004) as ‘glocalisation’ has over the past quarter century or so pointed to the
growing, albeit varying, role of cities as localisations of globalising economic
relations, strengthening the favoured places, while weakening the less attractive
ones. Economic restructuring, population loss and marginality are all indications
of such negative conditions. On the other hand (opposite scenario), the interplay
between globalisation and spatial transformation, especially urbanisation and the
development of city-regions, has pointed to the emergence of large urban regions.
McGee (1991), later referred to these as mega-urban regions (MURs), especially
in North America with its primarily car-based, transport arteries-defined, urban
development.
The international, including global, dimension to urban development, and
especially the varying roles and status cities have gained, go back a century now,
as Patrick Geddes – against the backdrop of rapid industrialisation, fundamentally
improved communication (railways, telephone, etc.) –pointed to the emergence of
world cities (Geddes 1915; see also Hall and Paine 2006) and international trade.
When Geddes refers to world cities in his Cities of Evolutions, he does so as an
urbanist, an urban planner. His main focus is thus on internal urban dynamics, such
as growth, economic activity and functional ‘buzz’ on the back of the great transfor-
mation of industrialisation with its rapid urbanisation. Economic development,
growth and functional (economic) status have thus grown together as perceived
signifiers of an important, even great, city. This gives the impression of relevance,
and of being the effective culmination of far-reaching, world-wide activities and
relations (Brown 1973). Certainly in Europe, this chimed well with the narrative
of open borders, integration and cross-border co-operation. In the US, by contrast,
a more introspective notion of national space prevails, especially now post-9/11.
The result has been reinforced, raised borders, and cities are still perceived as
firmly embedded in those, except a few ‘special cases’, such as New York or Los
Angeles, and for its particular function of course, Washington DC.
The global scale of cities is taken to the ultimate point in Doxiadis’s 1960s
vision of Ecumenopolis, which embraces the whole globe as an urbanised space,
guided by transport networks as manifestations of flows of connectivity. It is a
rather amorphous, ‘flowing’ arrangement whose internal structures differs by the
varying degrees of connectivity and thus intensity of ‘urban life’. Ecumenopolis,
just like Gottmann’s Megalopolis, is an entirely relationally defined and function-
ally driven construct, and reflects the spirit of the post-war technological era of
the automobile and the mobility it brought, with a seemingly unlimited scope for
connectivity right down to every person. Yet, at the other end of this individuality
60 Cities and the global

sits the bundling of flows of traffic – as sum of individual connections – responding

to, and reinforcing that way, a clustering of (mainly economic) activity. And the
size, form and relevance of these clusters vary with economic conditions and
opportunities, thus reconfiguring the flows of connectivity between them.
The concept of Megalopolis revolves around notions of national and interna-
tional flows of information, along which economic transactions occur between
cities. This connectivity between the urban nodes themselves, as well as with non-
urban areas left ‘in between’, is the ‘glue’ that brings clusters of cities together as
city-regions. Megalopolis revolves around ‘fluidity of urban life’ (Gottmann and
Harper 1990: 238). It is a transactional city-region, shaped by economic transaction
along preferential lines of communication.
In 1983, Gottmann observed that ‘the role of the nation-state has weakened,
new orbits shape up once more, largely structured by networks of transactions, by
communities of beliefs, and by interests between institutions and groups better
identified by the cities or regions where they are based’ (Gottmann 1990). Quite
clearly, Gottmann refers here not only to the changing nature of the international
organisation of city-regions, and their interdependencies, but also the challenges
posed to governance arrangements, as established formal structures no longer ‘fit’.
Implicitly, he refers to a shift towards a self-organising, bottom-up process of inter-
municipal collaboration within a metropolitan area. And he makes a specific point
of having such arrangements led by perceived interests within the region, rather
than by external interference. Just like Gottmann, Doxiadis (1968; 1969) envisages
effectively the post-industrial/post-modern city, ‘liberated’ from the legacies of
physical location factors and territorial fixities. Indeed, there is no reference to
administrative structures or governance arrangements. Instead, cities, as mere
economic loci, are seen as giving way to spatiality, circumscribed by underlying
flows and linkages as the new differentiating factor, following: varying degrees of
connectivity. The implications for the concept of territorially rooted and defined
state power and responsibility are challenges bysuch fluid urban spaces.
Some 20 years later, Manuel Castells, from a Los Angeles perspective, pro-
posed the interpretation of urban geography as ‘spaces of flows’ (1995). This
interpretation mirrors the images of traffic-clogged 10-lane freeways cutting
through the sprawling urban region that makes up Los Angeles. The city has little
in common with the European history and physiognomy of cities, such as Rome.
While Rome was a city state that expanded into a Mediterranean and Europe-
wide empire, Los Angeles clearly seems the culmination of intersecting highways
and endless flows of car traffic as bundled individualised forms of connectivity,
with the remaining urban structures fitting into the spaces between and along
these arteries of movement. It is this difference in urban spatiality, and its relation
to the wider state territoriality, that needs to be kept in mind when comparing the
European and North American experience and manifestation of ‘urbanity’, This
applies, for instance, when approaching the analyses and interpretations of
‘cityness’ by authors imbued in the experiences of either of the two continents.
Their respective notions of ‘city’ and ‘suburb’, for instance, may differ quite
considerably.
 Cities and the global 61

Referring to different types of spaces and functions, and the need to take a city-
regional perspective, Jean Gottmann’s megalopolis seeks to fuse these two urban
worlds, linking French notions of urbanisme and planning with the rapid mobili-
sation and individualisation of the young North American cities in the 1950s and
1960s. Their relative historic shallowness, with a maximum of – at the time – 350
years, compared with a plethora of European cities going back at least one
millennium, if not more (2 millennia for Rome or Athens), provides less resilience
to change of urban functionality and expected role. Cities in North America are
mostly an expression of the ‘here and now’, with few elements of a previous epoch
visible in merely relatively small sections, even in the older parts of urbanisation
on the North Atlantic Seaboard.
Notions of placeness there, even more so in the younger, more westerly cities,
quite easily give way to new ways of doing things, such as changed mobility, and
cities are an immediate expression of these changes. The rapid decline of the North
American city in the 1960s, with its near death decried (Jacobs 1961), was, from
a European perspective, something quite outlandish, something from a truly
different world, unimaginable in Europe. Recent experiences with shrinking cities
in parts of post-communist Eastern Europe, however, especially in eastern
Germany, point to the fact that such de-urbanisation is possible in the Old
Continent, too. But what does this tell us about the interpretation of urban
development between state and economic (globalisation) parameters?
In the 1980s, Allen and Massey (1988) presumed a mere passive role for cities
vis-à-vis the workings of global capitalism and its changing assessment of opportu-
nities, when speaking of local restructuring for (global) capital (Massey 1978;
1983a). Two decades later, cities are seen less as mere victims subjected to the
effects of decisions made elsewhere. For instance, in 1997, Jessop points to the
need for a change to government and policy-making, in the face of the changing
ways of how globalisation re-/allocates development prospects. Differences here
across space become more prevalent again, challenging in Europe the well-
established post-war consensus of Keynesian policy objectives (Muller 1996), with
its emphasis on counteracting spatial inequalities created through urbanisation.
Scope for regionally-scaled urbanism varies, depending on established practices
and attitudes towards a regional perspective in principle, and among voters and
policy makers, alike. The problem of the regional scale is its – by its very nature
– position somewhere (!) between the local and the national, reflecting the inherent
scalar fuzziness of what scale to locate the ‘regional’ between the sub-national (e.g.
Keating 1998; Norris 2002) and supra-national (e.g. Väyrynen 2003; Alagappa
1995). Both the local and national levels have been more successful with estab-
lishing a clear identity and identification among the electorate, and that gives them
a clearly defined mandate and political capital. The local as representation of
‘community’, and the state as representation and guardian of the ‘national’, seem
to possess a much stronger purpose and ‘following’, and (seemingly at least) a
clearer agenda and raison d’être. This applies in particular to the New World of
North America, where the local emerged as the basis of new (defensive)
communities, closely intertwined with the notion and experience of the frontier
62 Cities and the global

(Hine 1980). This applies in particular to the mid-western and western parts of the
US, where community is inherently about the local, while the state remains some-
thing rather abstract ‘out there’, and to be kept there.
Accordingly, Wheeler (2002) suggests inherent political challenges to the
adoption of a regional perspective, as this is seen as an additional layer of adminis-
tration, power and responsibility, which, of course, would need to be established
at the expense of powers among the existing political players, and there is resistance
to that. In addition, the sharp divisions between urban and rural, and between core-
urban and suburban, translated into differing political affinities and ambitions,
contrasting a more socially oriented with an inherently neo-liberal (look-after-
yourself) mentality between core urban and suburban/rural constituencies.
The sheer scale of these megaregions, first embodied by Gottmann’s concept of
the Megalopolis on the North Atlantic Seaboard (1964), went well beyond the
conventional city-suburb divisions and easily stretched across administrative
boundaries and notions of localness.
Now, how do megaregions fit into this as super-regional urban-centric con-
structs? This concept is driven by the recognition of a growing functional
interconnectedness, as well as competitiveness-enhancing opportunity, of a more
integrated, cross-municipal approach in political and policy-making terms. Such
would achieve positive spin-off effects through the positive side effects of co-
ordinating and agreeing policy measures across municipal boundaries. The growing
interconnection between urban areas, across the suburban (and rural) areas in
between, in a US context, brought about the concept of the urbanised megaregion,
advocated in the mid 2000s (Carbonell and Yaro 2005; Regional Plan Assoc. 2006,
2009; Todorovich 2009). Such ‘Megaregions are linked networks of metropolitan
areas that serve as a functional unit for economic activity’ and ‘consist of the areas
that are tied to these economic engines’ functionally and geographically (Content
and Leone de Nie 2008: 15). They are thus held together first and foremost by
connectivity (see Regional Plan Assoc., 2006), and may well include large tracts
of non-urban areas. They thus represent typical characteristics of virtual spatiality.
‘A megaregion contains the economic, social, and population core of a region and
delineates the natural, economic, and social connections between cities, metro-
politan areas, and rural places’ (Contant and Leone de Nie 2008: 15). But these
areas are connected only indirectly, via ‘their’ core areas, pointing to their own
relative marginality – and thus dependency – in relation to the metropolitan cores.
The latter possess connections among each other as primary connectivities, each
bringing along their respective areas of influence, the sum of which adds to the
megaregion. The megaregion is thus essentially a virtual territory, defined by a
functionally connected clustering of urban cores with their respective suburban/
semi-rural areas of influence. They are thus a combination of localised centrality
and spaces as sum of linear relationships.
Consequently, ‘the institutional and spatial organization of a megaregion as a
system of places can be conceptualised at two levels: as an interconnected network
of places that serves as a component of a regional “growth machine” … and as a
mosaic of autonomous political spaces created to exercise the sovereignty of
 Cities and the global 63

“public choice” but with an exclusionary and unegalitarian outcome. Whereas the
former construct has to do primarily with the nature of economic linkages and
hierarchies within a megaregion, the latter is mainly about institutions and
governance’ (Banerjee 2008: 90). Such megaregions are thus as much about pro-
grammatic conceptualisation and agenda-setting as a reflection of actually existing
linkages and shared connectivity.
‘In sum, the argument that market imperatives and business invariably dominate
cities is too simplistic. Market forces are powerful and exert strong pushes and
pulls, but they work in multiple ways. Localities can use market forces to enhance
their own bargaining with business and fulfil their own strategic purposes. How this
is achieved and what kinds of conditions are necessary for this to occur are
questions that require further examination’ (Savitch and Kantor 2002: 38).

Globalisation and city-regions: it is the ‘local’ that matters –

concluding comments
Interpreting globalisation as producing a ‘flat’ playing field for a competitive inter-
urban or inter-regional race for acquiring a place in the global economic network,
and seeking to ‘climb’ the hierarchy by acquiring global functions, needs to be
treated with caution. Cities are not mere passive objects ‘buffeted about’ by the
winds of globalisation. They are also, and increasingly so, actors in their own right,
shaping globalisation processes, whereby the global cities have the most impact.
Evidence accumulates of cities becoming increasingly more independent locali-
sations of economic activity and disembedding from regional/national economic
context. Lever’s investigation (1997), for instance, points to a gap between national
economic performance and the fate of urban economies. Globalisation has impli-
cations for city economies and a changing hierarchy of cities. This can be
economically led on the basis of a changing evaluation of opportunities, or can be
the result of politically driven repositioning of cities to boost their prospects in their
allocated roles as beacons of national economic competitiveness (and success).
This suggested notion of concerted city-regional economic capacity utilises, as
Scott (1998) argues, the capacities and economic opportunities attached to regional
agglomeration, so that these may be given the role of ‘regional motors’ of national
economic development. It is a view that was adopted by the French government in
the late 1990s, for instance, as the main conurbations were instructed to build, and
utilise, collaborative city-regionalism to boost their international standing and thus,
eventually feed back greater success to the national economy. The organisation of
Grand Lyon, for instance, is such an example of promoting a metropolitan interna-
tional image (see Chapter 6). An important part of this argument is the proposition
that cities and regions have become disconnected from their national contexts
(Barnes and Ledebur 1998; Scott 1998). National economic space has become less
significant in a regionalised view of economies tied into new global networks of
relationships. Thus, the significant impact of global economic change is at the
regional scale where we are asked now to imagine core cities as economic drivers
linked in regional clusters that dominate global networks.
64 Cities and the global

Yet, it needs to be pointed out, that these may be positive as well as negative.
Cities and city-regions may be leaders as well as laggards. The problem of
shrinking cities (Bontje 2005), such as Detroit, clearly falls into the latter category.
Cities and regions need to find their own, specific, and thus likely most effective,
responses to these changes of their position in a territory and its inter-relation with
functional and strategic space, be that constructed around economic competition or
some other functionality. Questions of sustainability, for instance, have, at least
until the 2008 global financial crisis, stood next to economic competitiveness as a
key policy field requiring to reach across spatial and administrative scales for
greater efficacy. This has put pressures on governance principles and practices to
respond by seeking to embrace all scales, from the local to the global. As part of
that, new forms of governance and policy-making need to be explored and
developed, so as to remain effective (Tisdell 2001; Marcotullio; 2001; Herrschel
2013). Here, it matters to what extent cities and regions are free to negotiate
relationships between the local and the global, including acting internationally in
parallel – or even in direct challenge – to national policies.
The Regional City approach is thus part of a conventional state-centric,
regulative perspective, which has its roots in the much more interventionist
tradition of European spatial policy, especially when compared with North
America. At the time of dominant neo-liberal, public choice-influenced political
discourse (see Chapter 3), such a view may appear somewhat anachronistic, but
reflects the ambivalent nature of European responses to the challenge of main-
taining shifting social–economic geographies. On the one hand, there is regulative
intervention to maintain the established paradigm of cohesion and equality of living
conditions, while on the other, there is the need to maintain competitiveness and
openness in the light of globalisation and a growing volatility and fluidity of capital
(see Chapter 4). Consequently, Regionalstadt is part of conventional ‘hard’ region-
alisation (Makarychev 2004; Kawasaki 2006), based on territories and fixed
borders, with associated powers and responsibilities and institutional capacities.
Such attempts are, however, increasingly more difficult to put into practice, given
the growing number of alternatives and fickleness of capital in response to a
‘borderless world’. This approach is about institutionalised responses to – with
emphasis on ‘control’ of – functionally driven processes, especially expansive
urbanisation, albeit with differences in underlying connotations. Regionalstadt is
about the state and its institutions as regulatory actors, each rooted in a clearly
defined territory as source of legitimacy of the application of power. As such, it
seeks to implement policies and agendas, rather than merely issue recommend-
ations and strategic guidance. The basis of this may be general democratic
representation (as under pluralism), or more elitist, group-specific interests, as
drivers of public policies (see Chapter 3).
4 Cities, city-regions and the state
Locating trans-local governance

The question of how cities relate to the state, and how this relationship changes
through functional shifts and scalar changes to their ‘reach’ and ‘centrality’, has
attracted much attention over the last century or so. Patrick Geddes’ (1915)
suggestion of the term ‘conurbation’ to capture the ever expanding role, presence
and impact of cities beyond the local scale in the aftermath of industrialisation (in
Dickinson 1967: 12), reflects the concern with capturing and understanding the
position of dynamically changing urban areas in the static scalar structure of the
hierarchically organised state, being aware of the inherent tensions that creates.
The term city-region, introduced about half a century ago as a “mental construct”
(Dickinson 1967: 95), continues this search for a conceptualisation of the
phenomenon of continuous urbanisation, and how to tie this in with existing
governmental structures and territories.
This chapter sets out to explore the interrelationship and, especially in economic
terms, growing interdependency, between state structure – expressed through
institutionalisation and territoriality – and regionally scaled urban development,
and economic centrality as ‘relevance’. This, in turn, raises questions about the
relative autonomy and political–economic capacity of such large cities and their
regions vis-à-vis external and internal power structures and relations which leads
to two main scenarios of state–city relationships: (1) cities as local agents of the
nation state and its governmental–administrative machinery with its hierarchically
scaled organisation; and (2) cities as representation of local interests and
communities, providing locally defined (and funded) services, expressing local
identities and challenging ‘big state’ interference with local matters. These political
scenarios find parallels in economic terms (see Chapter 3), with the role of cities
as mere locales for the acting out of global capitalism and requiring them to
‘restructure for capital’ (Beauregard 1995; Fagan and Le Heron 1994), portrayed
as a locally exploitative relationship from a Marxist perspective (Geddes, M. 1988).
This contrasted with the suggested role of cities as places of innovation, whose
local milieux (Maillat et al. 1994; Maillat 1998) have been portrayed as benefiting
from, and offer the setting for, Richard Florida’s (2005, 2012) ‘creative class’.
Here, cities shape, rather than are conditioned by, wider economic processes
outside its territory, nationally and beyond. It is a relationship already pointed out
by Mumford half a century earlier (Mumford 1944: 5). Losing appeal as ‘trendy’
66 Cities, city-regions and the state

and ‘innovative’ thus raises worries well beyond city limits (Florida 2010), and it
is these scenarios that are investigated in the following sections of the chapter.
City-regions have attracted a lively and extensive debate over the last decade or
so (OECD, 2001, Herrschel and Newman 2002; Hall 2009; Harrison 2010), which
has highlighted their complexity as locally specific products of changing
combinations of internal structure and external context. ‘Structure’ refers to the
internal structure of city-regions as an arrangement of one or more urban centres
and associated ‘in between’ – more or less suburbanised – spaces. In particular, it
refers to the distinction between a poly- and a mono-centric arrangement, and the
different competitive constellations and power relations associated with them.
‘Context’ includes state organisation – especially powers for local government –
economic conditions and societal values. With the growing attention given to
globalisation, ‘context’ has since the 1980s been discussed predominantly in
relation to a neo-liberal, globalised capitalism with its intense pressure on places
and states to improve the competitiveness of their economies (Begg 1999;
MacLeod 2001; Bristow 2005). This embraced the different spatial scales from the
firm to the state (Swyngedouw 2004; Ward and Jonas 2004; McGuirk 2007).
Cities, especially as city-regions, exercise a particularly strategic position as
interlocutors between scales, local to international. They draw on their particular
local qualities and expertise and link it to the externally prevailing circumstances
and, based on those, perceived opportunities. This has propelled the regional scale
generally to greater visibility and attention in discussions on the societal and spatial
effects of globalisation and how to govern (Parr 2005). Complexity, of course,
extends to any forms and mechanisms of governing these more or less fluid, virtual
or strategic constructs that straddle both the local and regional scales. This includes
the scalar position in the hierarchical organisation of the state, allocation of policy-
implementational powers and responsibilities, fiscal provisions, and routes of
democratic legitimation (see e.g. Jonas and Ward 2007).
The inherent complexity and scalar fluidity of city-regions as phenomena leads
to a multitude of attempts at forming ‘matching’ forms of ‘governance’ in the
search for the ‘best effective’ way of anchoring this growing variability and de
facto virtuality in the established, fixed state structures and governmental-adminis-
trative ‘reality’. Their explanation and interpretation reflects varying underlying
rationales, perspectives and experiences, as well as disciplinary backgrounds of
its protagonists. At one end of the scale of possibilities, these efforts embrace firm-
derived new institutional economics (Williamson 1998), with its striving for greater
efficiency by reducing transaction costs for the (formal, contractual) inter-relations
and inter-actions within and between organisations and institutions. Drawing on
business management models and corporate governance, closer co-ordination and
detailed management of different operational sub-units and actors is viewed as the
main instrument for ‘efficiency gains’, and such implies hierarchical organisation
and management, tailored to achieve one clearly defined goal. At the opposite end
of the scale, the primary focus is on principles of pluralist interest representation
through local democratic principles, where outcomes and priorities are varied,
changing over time, and inherently contested between different group interests.
 Cities, city-regions and the state 67

This makes it more difficult to define and identify – and also have accepted – single
strategies which please ‘everyone’. Their actual implementation is considered to
require the help of close managerial relations and hierarchies of co-ordination.
While the firm is the framework within which competing and different, even
divergent, interests and dynamics are brought together through central manage-
ment, all in the interest of the defined common good, such is not so easy to achieve
at the municipal, let alone city-regional, level. There, the recognition of a common
advantage for all participants through co-ordinated joint action is more difficult to
recognise and project among decision makers, both within and outside local
government. This matters fundamentally, when it comes to agreeing collaborative
action across boundaries, as the benefits from doing so are not always immediately
evident.
Yet, such agreement may challenge established ways of rationalising, justifying
and administering local politics, be that in response to local political cultures and
values, or externally prescribed political and economic circumstances, pressures
and opportunities. But it is the principle and practice of governance that faces the
challenges first and foremost to reconcile conflicting interests, perceptions and
shared concerns, ambitions and need for – technocratically defined – pragmatic
solutions. Yet, given this diversity of agendas and rationales and their associated
different geographic and time scales, the need for finding and engaging a broad
range of actors and representations of societal interests makes political leadership
particularly important. This becomes evident from the case studies discussed in
Chapter 6. Political capability and capacity is often symbolised by the abilities of
local mayors as key representatives of local communities, both in social and
political terms (Lowndes and Leach 2004). Consequently, as Le Gales emphasises,
‘governance has not replaced government. Linkages between networks are not just
a question of coordinating things at the lowest possible cost [the economists’ view].
This raises issues of collective choices, values, open debates, confrontation
between diverse interests, the common good – however situated – and legitimacy:
in short, political issues’ (Le Galès 2001: 17). Negotiation and communication are
thus needed to identify different frameworks and local conditions, and how they
interact and produce particular forms of governance.
The governance of city-regions is the negotiated product of a variety of
influential factors coming together in either congenial or conflictual ways. They
embrace different scales – both in terms of geography and time horizons of
envisaged goals and outcomes – range and relevance of actors, balance between
political, economic and social (also referred to as community (e.g. Castell 1983))
concerns, and degree and forms of institutionalisation and thus formalisation. This
includes different emphases on: (1) broader, strategic, yet by their nature, ‘fuzzier’
considerations; and (2) smaller-scale, more technocratic, project-based and shorter
term, implementation-oriented concerns. Such, on occasion rather precarious,
balancing act also responds (and needs to do so) to ‘changes of the times’ in terms
of general public and political discourse about desirable policy outcomes and ways
of doing things. Governance is thus essentially a continuing ‘work in progress’, as
it seeks to respond to – ever more rapidly – changing circumstances and resulting
68 Cities, city-regions and the state

challenges. Answers may involve keeping re-arranging structures – both institu-

tional and territorial – in an attempt to best match familiar, conventional static and
structured, governmental modi operandi to inherently more fluid conditions and
tasks emanating from functional, relationally focused, changes, be they triggered
locally or beyond. This is inherently about trying to make structures ‘keep up’ with
fluid, often intangible, relations, the ‘flows’ described by Manuel Castells almost
two decades ago (1996, 2011).
Alternatively, efforts may focus on ‘dynamising’ established structures and
patterns by finding new ways of combining interests and agendas through more
informalised, even ad hoc, forms of collaboration and co-ordination, while main-
taining the ‘old order’ and its associated powers and responsibilities as part of a
state structure, to implement agreed strategic objectives ‘on the (local) ground’.
This duality between strategic, more or less ‘virtual’, spaces, and ‘real’ govern-
mental (state) territories, has been addressed and articulated in different ways
over the last two or so decades, although concerns about how to govern metro-
politan(ised) regions go farther back, to the beginning of the twentieth century,
when the industrialisation–fuelled rapid growth of cities into urbanised regions
was seen as first and foremost a challenge to the ability to regulate, plan and
govern these new phenomena which so blatantly ignored existing administrative
boundaries, territories and institutional responsibilities (Geddes 1915; Mumford,
1938). Geddes pointed to the challenge faced by the city to reconcile local
individuality with broader ‘civilization’ as conditioning context, of which cities
are a part of, and function as ‘the specialized organ of social transmission’
(quoted in Mumford 1938: 7) This ‘transmission’ function reflects the inherent
inter-scalar position that cities occupy in the vertical organisation of the state.
Gottmann’s concept of megalopolis (Gottmann and Harper 1990), seeking to
capture the continuous urban landscape between Boston and Washington in the
USA, as already well established in the 1950s, epitomises the emerging, then
new, urban regionalism and the concern with its nature and governability in the
early twentieth century.
Debates on urbanised regions – or city-regions – have thrown up the contrast
between the two main approaches to the interrogation and explanation of city-
regions in their economic and governmental rationalities and modi operandi, and
associated forms and mechanisms of governing them: (1) a ‘strong’, quite conven-
tional option of a fundamental, top-down instigated territorial and institutional
reorganisation of governmental hierarchy and scalar territorial responsibilities; and
(2) a much ‘softer’, so-called ‘new regionalist’ (Hettne and Söderbaum 2000)
option of using virtual spaces as first and foremost conceptual–strategic spatial
rescaling of perspectives and relations between existing (local) jurisdictional and
governmental territories and organisational structures. The two approaches – fixed,
territorially ‘real’ versus variable and spatially ‘virtual’ – reflect differences in
values about the role and purpose of the state as regulator in the relationship
between social and economic interests and agendas. These two scenarios sit at
different spatial scales, and embrace a diverse number and range of actors – public
and private, state and business. The distinction made here between governmental
 Cities, city-regions and the state 69

territoriality and governance spatiality is thus a central plank in the exploration

and explanation of city-regions as functional and structural phenomena – com-
bining a variable spatial togetherness through functional interrelations with fixed
territorial integration through administrative structure. This will be discussed in
more detail in the following sections.

Territorial government – spatial governance

Seeking to provide a mechanism to overcome mismatches between dynamic
economic spatiality and static regulative territoriality, these strategic spaces stretch
across administrative and institutional boundaries both (mainly) horizontally and
also vertically. They result from self-organising collaborative inter-actor relations,
be they defined by localities, organisations (locally and externally based) or
individual policy makers, and embrace governmental and non-governmental actors
from both the public and private sectors. And these arrangements may be subject
to varying incentives, or forms of ‘impetus’, with differing degrees of ‘impact’.
This way, variable spaces of economic opportunity – and dis-opportunity – are
flexibly, if informally, linked to more rigid governmental structures (see also
Brenner 2004b, 2012), thus aiding the latter to show a degree of ‘adjustablity’ to
changing circumstances. They are thus part of a response strategy to the effects of
external structure, seeking to raise local capacity to respond more effectively.
Such a variable, essentially modular, approach (Herrschel 2000) seeks to work
through the projection of a common regionalised policy space as vehicle to ‘adjust’
– and the main focus in this is the virtually, rather than actually, existing govern-
mental geographic–institutional manifestation: territoriality gives way to functional
(economic) spatiality as geographic expression. The distinction is thus between, on
the one hand, the functionally, policy-based notion of space as a – variable and
imagined – product of processes and linkages, and, on the other, the firmly institu-
tionalised, government-focused nature of territory as expression of multi-purpose
state power, responsibility and legitimacy. As a consequence, the nature of the
respective external boundaries of city-regions (Parr 2005) also vary between
statutorily manifested, fixed and distinct on the one hand, and in a ‘new’ sense
projected, functionally derived, policy-driven and fuzzied, on the other.
This mirrors discussions in urban theory over the last 15 or so years, which
propose a shift from fixed territorial ‘containers’ (Agnew 1994) to relational,
dynamic ‘spaces of flows’ (Castells 1996). Yet, despite these distinct differences,
which go to the very heart of the phenomenon of ‘city-region’ (see Chapter 2) and
city–regional governance, ‘territory’ and ‘space’ are often used interchangeably,
such as in Brenner’s (2004a) excellent examination of ‘new state spaces’. City–
regional governance, in all its proclaimed and actual, diverse scalar and
structural–organisational manifestations, is thus the product of two concurrent,
intersecting, at times competing, processes: de-/re-territorialisation and ‘new’
spatialisation. The ‘new’ refers here to the concept of ‘newness’ in ‘new regional-
ism’ with its emphasis on variability, virtuality and policy-based nature of spatiality
(Jonas 1994; Storey 2001; Herrschel 2009).
70 Cities, city-regions and the state

This duality of government territory and policy space, with the former primarily
a determinant, and the latter a product, of city–regional governance, involves a
continued process of renegotiating their inter-relationship and thus democratic
legitimacy and implementational efficacy. It is here that both the production and
projection of city-regions as spatial entities seek to provide a mechanism to ‘match’
fixed governmental/democratic territoriality to increasingly fluid, dynamic and
spatially transient economic relations and localisations.
The distinction between ‘space’ and ‘territory’ as the two main geographical
references of city-regionalisation goes right to the core of the discussions about
the nature and organisational principle of city-regions and their governance: full
institutionalisation as part of a governmental hierarchy, with fixed, clearly bounded
territories and attached powers and responsibilities, versus more or less informal
arrangements and associated variable, ‘virtual’ spaces with somewhat hazy
boundaries. Often, these are essentially incidental projections from somewhat ad
hoc established network relations.
The mechanism that links ‘policy space’ and ‘administrative-governmental
territoriality’ thus gains particular relevance for the attempt by actors to maintain
democratic rootedness and legitimacy of their policies, although their legitimacy
draws on other governmental territorialities than the city–regional policy space as
a whole. This matters, for instance, for the likely political reward that may be
obtained for locally elected and/or locally based policy makers from ‘sticking their
necks out’ and engaging regionally. Likewise, it also means a potential political
cost as collateral of regional engagement. Here, the local political milieu (Maillat
1998) mentioned earlier, as product of political practices, socio-economic
structures, quality of leadership, societal values and governmental structures, acts
as a key descriptor. Finding and establishing a mechanism to link the virtual,
strategic dimension to the more technocratic, implementational, governmental
dimension is also a key aspect of the role and relevance of city-regions as locations
and manifestations of political-economic patterns and processes. This interface
provides an important element for the positioning of cities and city-regions as
‘nodes’ in the increasingly globalising urban-economic networks. The outcome is
a vertical dimension to the relational, usually horizontally perceived, nature of
functional spaces, which is described by their interconnections. This becomes a
key local factor, shaped by, while also shaping, local political–economic conditions
and circumstances.
While the external structural element circumscribes the conditioning of local
prospects and opportunities as part of a dependent, even exploitative, relationship,
as neo-Marxists would see it (Jaret 1983), city-regionalism as introduced by
Geddes and Mumford, does not per se view the urban level as mere passive arena
for the acting out of global capital trends, thus challenging the rather rigid
structuralist interpretations that emanated from a focus on fixed patterns of social
organisation (Marcuse 2002; Ward and Jonas, 2004).
By contrast, urban politics has concentrated on the implementation and
operationalisation of city-regions, and concerned itself primarily with the ways the
functional re-spatialisation of metropolitan areas relates to established geographic
 Cities, city-regions and the state 71

patterns of institutionalisation (Deas and Giordano 2003). Meanwhile, urban

geography has concentrated on the spatial-territorial dimension, i.e. the link
between ‘real’ governmental territorialisation, and ‘virtual’, imagineered and
constructed (for external consumption) functional spatialisation (Ward and Jonas
2004; Herrschel 2009). Projection of a city–regional space needs thus to be viewed
in the context of taking the initiative and responding to external, global processes,
rather than remaining in a mere passive state and receptive mode as, albeit
important, places of capitalist consumption (Castells 1977), shaped and chosen by
the selective processes of wider capitalist interests (Massey 1983a). The selective
nature of such relationally based, produced, and, in terms of state structures, largely
virtual spatiality leads to fragmented, more or less partial correlations with govern-
mental territoriality. The spatial utility and output circumscribed by inter-actor
network relations, effectively ‘floats’ atop the fixed, firmly anchored and institu-
tionally manifested territoriality of principles of state organisation and government.
It is a relationship with variable quality and mutual interdependency, putting
pressure on structures to become more responsive and flexible, while pushing
‘floating’ relational space to establish anchor points and tie in with underlying
‘real’ state territoriality. It is a point discussed in its implications in some detail in
Brenner’s New State Spaces (2004a). Yet, the selectivity of such connections,
establishing who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ of the network–relational game, generates
suspicions, resentments and distrust between different actor groups and their
respective networks. This is even more the case if arrangements about linking
functional ‘space’ and administrative ‘territory’ are the result of external coaxing
or internal pressurising through a dominant urban centre as lead actor.
The co-existence of these two geographic concepts and manifestations of the
phenomenon ‘city-region’ raises questions about the mechanisms employed to link
these two types of geographic entities and their governing principles, governance
and government respectively. This curiosity relates in particular to city-regions as
variable fusion between the local and regional scales of policy-making, stretching
across varying local conditions, experiences and ambitions. But it also points to the
seemingly growing, if varying, independence of cities as loci of economic compet-
itiveness (Amin and Thrift 2000). This allows them to effectively ‘step out’ of their
regional context and become policy-making actors in their own right outside state
structures and hegemonies. Hierarchical administrative structures and planning
regimes no longer possess the prerogative for providing the principle for
‘organising’ state territory with its inherent notion of fixity and universality. With
more recent discussions emphasising the relational perspective/dimension of city-
regions (Graham and Healey 1999; Harrison 2007), city-regions have become
inherently variably cross scalar, embracing not just regionally scaled (Leibowitz
2003; Harding 2007), but also supra-local, including global, inter-urban relations
(Sassen 1991; Smith 2003). Much of this shift in the understanding of both institu-
tional and scalar organisation of policy-making derived from the ever more
dominant neo-liberal agenda over the last thirty or so years, and thus pressure on
localities, especially cities, to compete on a one-by-one basis, rather than remain
embedded in a regional context and operate as an integral element of it. This is
72 Cities, city-regions and the state

part of the observed shift from a Westphalian notion of territorially bounded and
independent, sovereign ‘state’ to that of a much less clearly defined and empowered
post-modern understanding of state (Caporaso 1996); and city-regions provide a
key focus in this seeming ‘pick and mix’ reconfiguration and re-interpretation.
The changes in favour of a relationally-defined, agenda-based, ‘produced’
spatiality have been debated for a few years now under the conceptual umbrella of
‘new regionalism’, which some authors see as part of a shift towards ‘post-
positivist (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003), or ‘post-modern’ forms of governance
(Williams 1999). What they share is a much more flexible, broader understanding
of governing city-regions. Given a more explicit urban focus, a then ‘new’ city-
regionalism embraces two key ‘new’ qualities: (1) virtual spatiality as the ‘new’
manifestation of, and challenge to, conventional administrative territoriality; and
(2) governance as the ‘new’ version of conventional government. This may be part
of a ‘new spatial logic’ of global flows of capital (Castells 1989) as spatial
connectors, transcending, and organising, local entities. They form new functional
(capitalist) spaces with underpinning ‘new strategic roles’ (Sassen 1991) as raison
d’etre, and the, so to speak, tips of the underlying relational tentacles are city-
regions, with global cities at the top of the hierarchy. The mechanisms for defining
and operationalising these relationally linked, yet distinctly locally shaped, city-
regions vary in response to the combined effects of local circumstances, including
policy-making ‘milieu’, its degree of innovativeness (Camagni 1995), and national
institutional, statutory and political frameworks. This matters for nature and quality
of local political culture, and for the scope of local governments to define and
implement policies as, on the one hand, part of multi-level governance arrange-
ments, or, on the other, part of locally defined, ‘purposive assemblages’ (McCann
2011) of policy spaces to serve defined regionally scaled agendas. They project
virtual multi-municipal regional spatial entities, held together by common purpose
and pragmatic political calculation. Effectively, therefore, ‘new’ city-regional
governance involves a threefold fuzziness: spatially, governmentally and legiti-
mately (see Figure 4.1).
The governance of city-regions is fundamentally about finding and imple-
menting a negotiated formula to reconcile a variety of influential factors coming
together in either more congenial or conflictual ways. They embrace different
scales, both in terms of geography and time horizons of envisaged goals and
outcomes, range and relevance of actors, and balance between political, economic
and social factors. The latter have also been explored in connection with partic-
ularly locally specific manifestations of society, also referred to as community
(Putnam 1966). As (part of) the local electorate they matter in their views, expect-
ations and degree of ‘localness’ for the articulation and potential implementation
of local policy agendas, including the adoption of a city-regional perspective. This
includes different balancing of, for once, broader, strategic, yet by their nature,
‘fuzzier’ considerations and, on the other hand, smaller-scale, more technocratic,
project-based and implementation-oriented concerns. The, on occasion rather
precarious, balancing act between perspectives and priorities also needs to respond
to ‘changes of the times’ in terms of prevailing general public and political
 Cities, city-regions and the state 73

Impact of city-regional
context:
Spatiality of Governance,
Modernist, Society, Economy
HIGH functionalist,
consolidationist,
institution-centric, shapes
hierarchical,
Mode of
‘Statism’: Presence

Regulation: Varying
of the state

balance between
institution- & market-
centred perspective

Localist,
post-modern, Neo-liberal, public
federal choice,‘hollow state’,
LOW self-organising

LOW HIGH

Globalisation: Capitalism-driven Competitiveness

Figure 4.1 Intersection of the two main conceptual dimensions of forming city-regional
governance

discourses about desirable policy outcomes and ways of doing things. City-regional
governance is thus essentially a continuing ‘work in progress’, as it seeks to
respond to ever more rapidly changing circumstances and resulting challenges.
Answers may involve keeping re-arranging structures – both institutional and
territorial – in an attempt to match them to existing, conventional static and govern-
mental structures and modi operandi to increasingly more fluid, even transient
conditions and tasks emanating from the continuous changes effected by techno-
logical changes and globalising processes. Alternatively, efforts may focus on
‘dynamising’ established structures and patterns by finding new ways of combining
interests and agendas through more informalised, even ad hoc and/or unstructured,
forms of collaboration and co-ordination, while maintaining the ‘old order’ and its
associated powers and responsibilities as part of a specific position in the state
structure, and this includes scope and capacity – through allocated powers and
resources – to implement agreed strategic objectives on the (local) ground. The
observable duality between strategic, more or less ‘virtual’ spaces, and ‘real’
governmental (state) territories, has been addressed and articulated in different
ways over the last two or so decades. Analyses, interpretations and, of course,
conclusions and recommendations for ‘best effective responses’ to the rapid
development of cities into city-regions have varied, reflecting specific conceptual,
74 Cities, city-regions and the state

disciplinary and political paradigmatic discourses of the times, as illustrated in

Figure 4.1. These include a varying emphasis on quantitative versus qualitative,
discursive approaches, questions about the role of the state as regulator vis-à-vis
local interests and, more generally, the principal position of the state in relation to
capitalism. Different explanations and conceptualisations have been offered
between, Marxist-influenced structuralism on the one hand, and market-driven,
consumption-focused, neo-liberal paradigms, on the other.
The growing association of local government with ‘service delivery’, a key
feature of neo-liberal, market-oriented views of the role of the state, has shifted
attention from the role and impact of society and its internal organisation, to the
competitiveness of the state vis-à-vis the private sector in providing services cost-
effectively – and ‘effectively’ is usually propagated by policy makers as likely
future tax cuts.
This view has been particularly prevalent in the United States with its local
government tradition rooted in a strong sense of localism and providing services for
the local community. This contrasts with the much more state-centric perspective in
Europe – somewhat less so in the UK since Thatcherism in the 1980s – where local
government is understood as a local extension of the state, albeit with some (varying)
degree of local autonomy and discretion. The focus on efficiency and competi-
tiveness, borrowed from business management, then fused into a growing embrace
of ‘business ethics’ and practices in local government, including ‘market discipline’
and ‘consumer choice’. The implicit shift from government to governance, where
state government is considered merely one of a range of actors, has been accom-
panied by a rise of a neo-liberal agenda. This led to a growing involvement of the
private sector as funder and manager of local government projects and services
(Stephens and Wikstrom 2000; Savitch and Vogel 2009) through various contractual
arrangements. Such included pressure for, and expectation of, greater flexibility and
willingness to co-operate across institutional and administrative boundaries, as well
as organisational cultures and established ways of doing things. The growing use of
‘contracting out’ public services and functions to the private sector illustrates these
interlinkages and mixtures between agendas and practices.
This argument about the balance between centralised, dirigiste and more locally
driven, bottom-up (and self-organising) approaches to metropolitan governance
has continued to dominate discussions both in academia and among policy makers
about how best to match the functional and policy-making spatial scales to achieve
a ‘best match’. The main problem has been the lack of clarity in the distinction
between the local and the regional scale, allowing for differing interpretations and
claims to governmental, and wider, regulative responsibilities.
Politics to reconcile the different interests, groups and actors in a market-based,
competitive context has two main dimensions: (1) the interests of the business
community vis-à-vis public administration and government; and (2) the socio-
economic divisions between city and suburb. It is the latter that accounts for one
of the main differences between metropolitan governance issues in Europe and
North America, as the examples, presented in Chapter 6, illustrate. Yet, they all
share the fiscal dimension of local–regional interaction and distribution of
 Cities, city-regions and the state 75

responsibilities and entitlements, in terms both of raising and spending public

money. Bringing these often diverse inter-local – as well as intra-local – interests
and expectations together ‘under one hat’, requires evidence to be provided by
policy makers of likely advantages for all those affected as part of a proclaimed
win-win scenario. Only then, a locally-led and organised formation of city-regional
governance is likely to emerge and also work. Otherwise, in the absence of
agreement, and as a result, loss of competitiveness and fiscal viability, central
government dirigisme may be considered necessary, either in the form of fiscal
incentives, such as tax sharing or compensatory payments for potential revenue
deemed ‘foregone’ through collaboration, or direct regulatory intervention through
statutes. So, in essence, it is about the old question of bottom-up, self-managed
regionalisation of policies, versus top-down implementation of a set regional
agenda. In the latter case, the solution is thus considered to rest in state-adminis-
trative reorganisation by inserting a dedicated regional level of authority into the
state hierarchy.

City-regionalisation between integrational ‘consolidation’

and ‘locality-centric fragmentation’
Discussions about city-regional governance go back to the beginning of the last
century, when local government reformers were attracted by managerialist
practices in the business world, with their emphasis on finding the most efficient
and cost-effective way of organising administration and service provision. This
normative perspective contrasted diametrically with the public choice-based
propagation of competitive localism as a means to improve service delivery
efficiency, as advocated by Ostrom et al. (1961), for instance. Instead, it translated
into a proposed singular organisation of metropolitan government. The emphasis
clearly was on ‘government’, not just in more state-centric Europe, but also in
North America. For example, the 1970s brought a stronger voice for those who
advocated generally a more regionally-focused approach, linking metropolitan
governance with regionalism. Mathewson’s Regionalist Papers (1978), for
instance, sought to make a collective case for metropolitan regional government.
In this collection of a broad range of contributions, Mathewson uses the term
‘metropolitan region’ as synonymous to ‘city-region’. Indeed, metropolitan regions
are understood to be defined by de facto functional relationships, with all the
vagueness about boundaries and responsibilities this entails. As key determinant,
as ‘glue’, holding a metropolitan region together, he considers the prevalence of a
‘regional community’ as interdependent fusion of urban and suburban interests.
This ‘community’, he sees as defined by shared values and aspirations; a ‘regional
ethic’. In in other words, metropolitan regionalism is understood as comprising a
sense of togetherness and interdependency (Mathewson 1978: 8). These units
should be run on the basis of self-government, a regional version of ‘home rule’
(15). The focus was thus on adding another layer of government at the regional
level and shifting some local responsibilities to that level, while also subordinating
local, especially planning, responsibilities to the region-wide strategic objectives
76 Cities, city-regions and the state

formulated by that new governmental level. This involved re-structuring the territo-
riality of existing governments through either merging existing units, or inserting
an additional tier of metropolitan-wide (regional) government, immediately above
the existing layer of municipal government.
Such an interventionist approach, much favoured among US commentators in
the first half of the twentieth century, as also reflected in the collection of the
Regionalist Papers, inevitably created resistance and resentment among existing
local policy makers, as well as local communities. Their concern was about loss of
power and scope to manage own – local – matters, with an overbearing state
seeking to interfere and micro-manage. Such challenge was particularly evident
among those municipalities that possessed a tradition of local self-government in
conjunction with federal structures as context, e.g. as found in the US, Germany
or Italy. Most of the criticism brought forward by the advocates of governmental
regionalisation was directed at the perceived ‘atomisation’ of governmental respon-
sibilities, and thus inevitable inadequacies in government to cover service delivery
efficiently across a metropolitan area dissected by a multitude of boundaries and
policy-based spatialities. Thus, in 1922, a time at the height of the industrialisation-
driven rapid expansion of cities, Maxey pointed the finger at the ‘absurd and
anomalous’ political disunity in metropolitan areas, arguing instead for a greater
degree of centralisation, i.e. shift up a level in the scalar hierarchy of government
(Maxey 1922: 253, cited in Stephens and Wikstrom 2000: 34).
The focus among the advocates of state territorial and institutional reorgani-
sation was thus on government structure and its scalar manifestation to best
respond to functionally led city-regionalisation, so as to maintain homogeneity and
cohesion in conditions for the population in such urbanising areas. This interven-
tionist, reorganisational approach was echoed by other commentors at the time.
Studensky (1926), for instance, advocated a region-wide approach to governing
the Pittsburgh metropolitan area. Yet, while he lamented a lack of coherence in
responses to the new functionally defined regional reality of clustering urban areas
by the prevailing disunited, fragmented nature in which government – as a historic
legacy – was ‘dotted’ across a metropolitan area, he was concerned about
maintaining a voice for the smaller localities in any such regionalised response.
He thus proposed a federated, rather than centrally controlled, top-down managed
form of regionalisation. He therefore moves clearly in the direction of a multi-
level governance perspective, before such a thing became known by this name. In
the advocated ‘federated city’, smaller units continue to exist and hold responsi-
bility for some tasks, while joint metropolitan responsibility is delegated to
collaborative work. This provision matters for any likely acceptance of such region-
alising approach, as it suggests continued local autonomy in local – i.e. locally
confined – matters. Addressing the identified decentralised, scattered and spatially
fragmented, almost incidental, nature of governmental responsibility was viewed
as the main task for achieving effective ways of governing interconnected, shared
interest of regionally clustered local government.
Studenski (1926), in particular, emphasised the potential economic cost of any
divisions, including those between cities and suburbs, as economic spaces find no
 Cities, city-regions and the state 77

matching governmental territories to negotiate mutually beneficial forms of

regulation. His support for a higher tier centralisation of metropolitan-wide
government draws on the economic perspective, in that he views local entities as
inherently competitive, driven by fiscal considerations (e.g. locally raised taxes),
and thus unwilling to genuinely cooperate on a voluntary basis. In addition,
resentment between the ‘winning’ or gaining parts of a metropolitan region in terms
of investment, primarily the suburbs, and those parts that are doing comparatively
less well, especially the core cities, undermines the willingness to cooperate. Not
everyone gains locally from such a step. So, it is the need for a sense of win-win
for everyone, that allows collaboration to be sustained and successful (see
Hauswirth et al. 2003). Thus, he argued that the smaller, intra-metropolitan, terri-
tories could be re-defined and regrouped, with boundaries changing, in response
to shifting structures and requirements. But it is here where localism, including of
the defensive variety, makes such assumptions highly theoretical. Overcoming
such inherent localist fragmentation was identified as the key challenge to effective
(and competitive) metropolitan government. Indeed, such divisions may be seen as
good for competitiveness and improved governmental performance, such as
advocated by the public choice approach in competition with the more interven-
tionist ‘regionalists’ as far back as the early 1960s (Ostrom et al. 1961).
Those proposing territorial consolidation as a mechanism to rescale and ‘adjust’
local government to emerging functional spaces, adopt essentially a regulationist,
technocratically oriented, normative perspective. This favours centralisation and
hierarchical re-/organisation, very much in the mode of Fordist modernism
(MacLeod 1999; Brenner 2002). Such includes a concern with the impact of
governing structures on democratic control, accountability, transparency and
ownership of policy decisions (Kübler and Schwab 2007). Formal governmental
structures – territorial and institutional – offering a vertical organisation of govern-
ment with different scalar ‘pegs’, are seen as benefiting from clear lines of
responsibility, reduced incidents of overlapping between policy-making responsi-
bilities and activities, and thus inherently greater efficacy and effectiveness of
policy processes and outcomes. Each layer shows clear, transparent and visible
links to the public sphere and thus lays down democratic legitimation. Heinelt and
Kübler (2004) refer to this distinction as ‘traditional’ metropolitan governance,
with an explicit emphasis on government, contrasting with the ‘new’, post-Fordist
version (MacLeod 2001). It may well be that in such instances, as Stoker (1998a)
observes, ‘governance’ may be little more than trendy rhetoric, rather than a
substantial shift in perspective, seeking to disguise conventional ‘government’
which has become ‘a difficult word to sell in a privatized, market-oriented society’
(p. 18).
This conventional approach to shaping city-regional government through
territorial and institutional scalar reorganisation, may propose a simple horizontal
re-scaling of existing local entities through either merger and thus creation of
larger, regional-wide units, or through vertical rescaling by adding an additional
regional tier of government above the existing tier of municipal government, but
within the existing hierarchical structure of government. In so doing, protagonists
78 Cities, city-regions and the state

tend to draw on state-theoretical concepts of federalism (Elazar 1995), i.e. a

vertical, multi-tier arrangement of tasks and responsibilities. Between these,
linkages and relationships develop. This is of particular relevance if seen from a
more statist perspective, with its focus on fixed, clearly territorialised and hierar-
chically located powers, tasks and duties and responsibilities. The whole concept
of conventional, integrated metropolitan regional government is thus vertically
organised into clearly defined, stacked tiers of static territories, each equipped with
specific governmental powers and responsibilities, and associated institutional
manifestation. Typical proponents of such ‘consolidationism’ in US debate are the
so-called ‘progressive metropolitan reformers’ of the early twentieth century
(Maxey 1922; Studensky 1926) who advocated a merger of local government
entities through territorial restructuring (see also Keating 1998; Brenner 2004a) as
the most effective way of matching a regionally scaled functional metropolitan
area to its existing governmental structure and territoriality. This is a rather conven-
tional example of the territorial restructuring of the state and its government
arrangement in response to perceived changes of required tasks and their delivery.
The pursuit of greater government functionality chose state restructuring to
better match government territory to functional space, and this was effected from
varying levels and through choice of different mechanisms: top-down dirigisme
versus bottom-up negotiated collaborations by mutual inter-local agreement.
Which one is chosen, depends substantially on the respective form of existing state
organisation, contrasting a tiered federal negotiative culture, with a centralised,
top-down organised arrangement. In the former, such as in Germany, Italy or the
US and also Canada, decisions on reorganising government involve the local level
much more than in centralised systems, such as in Sweden, the UK or France. It is
an approach used repeatedly by reformers at central government level. Even under
federal systems, a latent penchant for state dirigisme seems to exist. Thus, in
federalised Germany, in the 1970s, functionalist state managerialism sought to
horizontally re-scale local government through administrative re-territorialisation,
essentially through top-down fiat by the respective Land government. Although,
just like in the US or Canada, it is the sub-national big regional governments (Land,
state, province), that act as de facto central government for the local level, such
greater local propinquity does not suggest automatically greater awareness of local
and city-regional issues, than held by national government. Dirigiste top-down
policy-making also finds its followers there. Greater hierarchical proximity to local
concerns alone does not per se appear to mean being more ‘in tune’ with the local
citizenry. Meanwhile, in the UK, at the beginning of the 1970s, local government
was both vertically and horizontally reorganised by re-drawing boundaries,
merging county and municipal functions, and creating metropolitan-wide author-
ities as a tier above existing local government within the respective city-regions
(Jones 1973). The new metropolitan county councils were drawn up to cover the
main conurbations as second tier local government, and remained in existence until
their abolition in 1986. Perceived by Margaret Thatcher as bastions of left-wing
opposition to her conservative government, their abolition was driven by both
ideology and political calculation.
 Cities, city-regions and the state 79

Such territorial–governmental restructuring as advocated by ‘consolidationists’,

draws on the view that there ought to be a central authority at a dedicated higher,
overarching level of metropolitan-wide government, clearly reflecting a hierarchy,
as the ‘best’ way of addressing regulative tasks at that regional scale. Yet, it is
precisely from those movements and their advocated resolutions, such as for
instance, effected by the state (here the Province of Ontario) for the Toronto
metropolitan area in the 1990s (Williams 1999; Boudreau 2005), that ‘to many,
regionalism entails traditional prescriptions for metropolitan areas such as central-
ization and consolidation of governments and functions, or the creation of regional
organizations’ (Feiock 2007: 4). It is this that generates resistance and resentment
at the local level about loss of rights to self-government and ‘big brother’ invasion.
Furthermore, it serves as a red rag to those imbued in a general public discourse
of neo-liberalism as guiding principle for shaping government.
In a similar context of forms and nature of city-regional governance arrange-
ments, Bache and Flinders (2004) add an explicit vertical scalar dimension through
reference to the layered nature of governmental structuration, when they discuss the
‘multi-level’ arrangement of governance. Hooghe and Marks (2003) differentiate
here quite prosaically into ‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’ multi-level governance. Yet, this
need not revolve around a single centre as central axis around which the different
layers of governmental territory revolve. Instead, they could be ‘multi-centred’
(Kincaid 2001) or ‘multi-jurisdictional compacts’ (Jonas and Pincetl 2006). This
implies that such territories need not be neatly nested, but could have different,
multiple centres and, consequently, overlap and intersect.
Thus, in Germany in the 1970s, municipal reorganisation was a big agenda on
grounds of administrative efficiency and cost-effectiveness (Wollmann 2004;
Bogumil and Jann 2005; Meckling 2009). Larger entities in most forms of public
administration and service delivery were simply considered as per se providing
automatic economies of scale. Planned governmental reorganisation in Germany
was enacted through legislation as a technocratic process, with little or no public
involvement. Only through the administrative courts, including the Constitutional
Court, could opposition to such redrawing of boundaries and thus elimination of
old, and reconstitution of unfamiliar new, local government areas be mounted
effectively.
One example illustrating the tensions between local and central government
perspectives is the case of the two neighbouring cities of Giessen und Wetzlar in
the federal state of Hesse. Both were merged in 1977 under the name of Lahnstadt
(City on the River Lahn), a non-descript name, based solely on a regional geo-
graphic feature, with little recognition value outside the region. Both ‘airbrushed’
cities challenged this state decision, especially the more industrial, smaller city of
Wetzlar which, in any case, had historically resented the prospect of being in the
shadow of the bigger university city of Giessen, some 15 km away. Heavy political
lobbying and public resistance led to a reversal of the merger just over two years
later. In the end, local identities, attached to centuries-old names, prevailed over
technocratic–economic rationale of increased efficiencies in public administration
(Frankfurter Rundschau 2009).
80 Cities, city-regions and the state

Much of the resistance came thus from the very municipalities affected,
concerned about state interference in local matters, even if ‘only’ indirectly. The loss
of name and therefore external visibility was regarded as a fundamental interference
into their established local rights and development prospects. The main objection
was the perceived muddying of the link between identities and their respective
government–territorial expression, with a loss of autonomy and self-government as
a place in its own right. Accordingly, much of the discussions were based on local
identities, histories and also civic pride, but such non-rational, non-economic consid-
erations were not heard at the centre, keen on driving through its administrative
rationalisation agenda, so much en vogue in the 1970s and its managerialist drive.
The name of the new, merged entity mattered a lot, too, as this had to be ‘neutral’ so
as not to favour one of the two competing cities over the other. It is a situation found
in many poly-centric city-regions (see also Chapter 6). Adopting the ‘lead’ city’s
name for the whole city-region is viewed as too much like succumbing to the
neighbour’s challenges. A new, neutral name, therefore, serves as a compromise
solution, so that neither city is seen as outcompeting the other and thus storing up
resentment undermining any future necessary collaboration.
Another example of top-down city-regional reorganisation, seeking to create a
new metropolitan-wide governmental entity, is Greater Toronto in Canada. Here,
too, the state – in form of the provincial government of Ontario – decided to enact
a reorganisation of the wider Toronto city-region to create a new regional govern-
mental unit through the merger of the city with surrounding municipalities. Such
intervention is permissible, as Canadian cities are, in essence, creatures of the
provinces as ‘their’ as central government (Courchene 2001). Seeking to enhance
Toronto’s global economic position, not at least to the advantage of Ontario as a
whole, the scaling-up of municipal government was seen by the the Province’s
policy-makers in the early 1990s as the most effective way of matching govern-
mental capacity to de facto functional regionalisation. This involved installing a
new, city-region-wide government tier above the existing plethora of munici-
palities, and, in the course, moving up some local powers, rather than pursuing a
horizontal rescaling of competencies through merger of existing local entities
(Williams 1999; Boudreau 2005). Reducing uneven local tax-raising capacity
across the region, to allow service provision to meet LOCAL demand, was one of
the considerations behind the scheme to ‘harden’ an existing ‘softer’, more virtual
regional strategic planning arrangement, here Greater Toronto Area (GTA), through
fixed institutionalisation and empowerment (Courchene 2001). This followed a
general, growing rediscovery in the early 1990s of the rising importance of the
regional level in response to globalisation and the reduced role of nation state
borders (Williams 1999). Yet, this realisation was counterbalanced by the
(continuing) strong neo-liberal argument about the advantages of the ‘small state’,
and this favoured localism as expression of local ‘choice’. In contrast to the
German case, the Provincial government sought to explicitly involve municipal
government in the regionalisation debate to avoid hostility and resistance (Williams
1999). The most contentious issue has been the envisaged regional pooling of
locally raised (business, property) taxes as the most potent sign of surrendering
 Cities, city-regions and the state 81

local autonomy. It was this, especially the proposed changes to allocating funding
between Toronto and the suburbs, and likely need for higher suburban taxation,
that caused much political contention. The challenge has been to maintain
economic competitiveness – read as less bureaucracy and less state – while also
seeking more inclusion (equalling more state and more intervention). Ten years
later, contention has remained, but also the amalgamation of the seven metropolitan
municipalities has ‘survived’ (James 2008), despite growing opposition. Just as in
Germany, the cities (municipalities) affected challenged the merger at the Consti-
tutional Court, but failed in their bid. The result has been a further poisoning of the
political atmosphere. From a central city perspective especially, the ‘creative class’
resisted the felt political ‘takeover’ by the more conservative suburbs (Williams
1999). The political decisions between core city and suburbs thus matter signifi-
cantly in North America, as discussed also in Chapters 5 and 6, The situation is not
as poignant in Europe, as evident from the German case of Giessen and Wetzlar;
here inter-urban competition and sense of local patriotism and identity mattered
most. Despite this distrust, the better co-ordination of services has led to cost
savings (as was promised), the sharing of funding has kept the metropolitan region
fiscally solvent and thus capable of providing the necessary services and invest-
ment. This, in turn, is considered crucial for boosting competitiveness and offering
more political–economic clout in a globalising world (James 2008).
The, at first firmly technocratically justified, but then increasingly politicised,
context to such rescaling of the state, caused much irritation and opposition. In
effect, it was viewed as the state operating at will over the heads of the respective
population and lower tier governments. In fact, anger was felt at what was
perceived as ‘big state’ action. Such top-down implementation of territorial restruc-
turing would be much more difficult to repeat today, as public sensitivity and
weariness of state interference in local matters are more developed and easier to
politicise. Necessary functional adjustments to changing requirements thus need to
be usually achieved through less controversial and ‘finite’, and therefore more
informal and negotiated, collaborative arrangements which work through, and with,
local government, as discussed below.
In the United States, for instance, public involvement and consultation is
compulsory, whenever municipalities are to be merged or otherwise modified in
their territoriality and capacity. Reflecting of the strong tradition of ‘home rule’
enshrined in the US constitution, which guarantees that local government remains
a local matter, to be run by, and for, the local community (Briffault 2004). This
makes such attempts of reorganisation, whether through horizontal merger, or addi-
tional vertical layers at the regional level, inherently more difficult and political.
Removing a locality from existence through merger, thus fundamentally contra-
venes the notion of localism as an expression of self-governing autonomy and a
historic right, and is resisted as unwanted external state interference with local
matters.
The issue of regionalising metropolitan government is therefore contested and
politically difficult, so that examples of actually institutionalising a city-region-
wide layer of government remain the exception by far; Minneapolis-St.Paul and
82 Cities, city-regions and the state

Portland in Oregon are the two examples. Informal, network-based and self-
organising principles of ‘scaling up’ local government to the city-regional level
have become the only ‘acceptable face’ of considering regionalisation, as it is
perceived as less intrusive, less non-reversible and not top-down, but locally
‘owned’. The view is of a pragmatic, workable and ultimately effective compro-
mise between the need for acting ‘bigger’, yet remaining locally controlled.
It is from that position, that the notions – and practices – of ‘virtual regions’
(Herrschel 2009) have emerged in metropolitan governance, allowing to operate at
flexible scales in almost seamless variability between the local and regional, but
also between different ‘modes’ on the scale between more public sector-oriented
government, and more neo-liberally oriented, public choice-style, multi-actor
governance with its explicit embrace of business ethics and practices. Variations in
scale and governmentality (Dean 2009) can translate into varying, locality-specific
and task-specific modularisation. Seeking to respond to the requirements of neo-
liberal, market-centric rationale, public choice-inspired arguments and perspectives
centre on a ‘cost-benefit’ evaluation of government systems as part of ‘efficiency’.
Much of this gets narrowed down to questions of local taxation levels, especially
where such taxation is locally controlled. Yet, an absence of fixed structures and
multi-purpose institutions to underpin region-wide policies and equip them with
implementational capacity, instead of a move towards reliance on public choice-
inspired variable geographies of coalitions and agreements between single purpose
organisations and their narrow political briefs and bases of legitimacy, makes it
more urgent to obtain a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms of
‘scaling up’ political perspectives, agendas and legitimacies. This includes the
consideration of external factors and their city-regional impact, such as globali-
sation, technological changes, and changing societal agendas and priorities. There
may be more reasons for collaborative action than competitive non-cooperation, in
order to maximise opportunities. Such competitive thinking encouraged sprawl
(van den Berg and Braun 1999) and non-co-operation between governmental
entities, each concerned about ‘looking at their best’ in terms of ‘value for money’
for political gain. Ultimately, however, this proved counter-effective and thus
inefficient. Opportunities for competition at the wider, supra-local level could not
be utilised without a boost in institutional capacity, reach and visibility. And that
suggests collaboration across institutional and territorial boundaries to allow each
participating player to punch above their respective individual weights by pooling
resources, capacities and external visibility.

Adjustment through the virtual regionalisation of modular

fragments of the local.
After the Second World War, a rising consumer culture with growing popular
affluence in the Western world also affected the view of public services as a visible
‘output’ of government, especially at the local level. The Public Choice approach of
the 1950s and 1960s epitomises this understanding. Very much drawing on neo-
liberal, free market ideology, the public choice school therefore advocates
 Cities, city-regions and the state 83

fragmented government as a means to enhance inter-governmental competitiveness

about service delivery and policy responsiveness to diverse, group-specific interests.
The idea of a marketplace of local service delivery comes from that rationale. Such,
of course, presumes service provision as the primary role of local government/local
administration, and free mobility among the electorate and business interests alike,
ready to switch providers or, indeed, location. But other factors matter too, such as
local identity, rootedness in a place, simple lethargy or limited interest to chase the
‘best deal’ among users. The main instrument of exercising pressures is through
both economic and political factors: the selective use of consumption and the voting
pattern in response to presumed satisfaction with the ‘performance’ of local govern-
ment or a local administration. In other words, it is about making local government
‘more business-like’ (see Harvey 1989; Cochrane 2000: 123).
The approach to, and implementation of, city-regional governance encapsulates
two main strands of rationality and debate: that of ‘city’ and that of ‘region’ as
geographic references for sub-national government. The perceived and actual roles
of cities, especially in a national, but also increasingly international, context matters
as framework for the articulation and prioritisation of policy objectives and
accepted modi operandi at the sub-national level. The notion of city-region fuses
those of ‘city’ and ‘region’, with their complex interrelationships in functional,
governmental–administrative and democratic identity terms. ‘Region’ encapsulates
two main, quite different, understandings of its very characteristics. For once, they
are understood as an integral part of a vertically organised territorial hierarchy of
levels of government with clearly allocated powers and responsibilities. This is
about the scalar state (Brenner 1999) with clear allocation of responsibilities and
powers, be that power socially constructed (Marston 1999) as part of a ‘social fix’
(MacLeod and Goodwin 1999b), or through political processes (Delaney and
Leitner 1997) and as part of a political agenda and milieu. On the other hand, there
is a contrasting understanding of ‘region’ as a mere virtual construct, imagined and
projected as part of a strategic policy agenda shared among a group of locally-based
actors, and this grouping may change its composition in response to shifting policy
objectives. ‘Region’, or ‘regionalisation’ as the process of formation and manifes-
tation, essentially means little more than a passive spatial backcloth to the ‘multiple
geographies of affiliation, linkage and flow’ (Amin 2004: 38).
City-regions may thus vary in their nature between, on the one hand, fully inte-
grated, cohesive and contiguous territories with their own, dedicated and regionally
legitimated political rationalities, processes and governmental institutions and
capacities, and, on the other, imagined spaces as product of a varying modular com-
position of locally rooted ‘molecules’ of interest representation. Such may be more
or less institutionalised, thus varying in spatial ‘softness’ and bounded fuzziness
(Allmendinger and Haughton 2010). Equally varying are scope and capacity to
make and implement policies.
Feiock (2007), from a North American (US) political science perspective of
metropolitan governance, correlates the distinction between regional ‘territoriality’
and ‘spatiality’ to, respectively, outright consolidation and co-ordinated fragmen-
tation of local entities. In other words, governmental territoriality and its implicit
84 Cities, city-regions and the state

power, legitimacy and responsibility can be rescaled only as part of full formal re-
territorialisation, either through merging existing government units into bigger
entities, thus abandoning the original entities, or adding a new extra layer of
governmental territory and power, with associate rescaling of some of the powers
so far possessed by the local units. By contrast, the more imagined, virtual nature
of regional ‘space’ is associated with a continued degree of fragmentation, albeit
in a co-ordinated setting.
This, Feiock (2006) sees as pitching ‘regionalists’ against ‘localists’ about the
most effective way of governing clusters of common local interests as found across
a metropolitan (city-regional) setting, while also permitting variations in response
to diverse popular interests and priorities. Essentially, such revolve around the
question of ‘more’ or ‘less’ state involvement and managerialism. Concerns about
government efficiency and policy efficacy are among the main rationales behind
the two different approaches to governing (Hooghe and Marks 2009).
The conceptual elements of ‘new regionalism’, with its ‘fuzzied’ boundaries,
and ‘soft’ spatialities (Allmendinger et al. 2008) and forms of institutionalisation
(Kearns and Paddison 2000; Brenner and Theodore 2002; Jouve 2003), embrace
the dilemma between, on the one hand, a quest for greater policy efficacy through
tailor-made policy spaces and, on the other, the subsequent danger of inefficiencies
through ignoring interlinkages and potential duplications and counter-effectiveness
of initiatives as indirect costs. Consequently, proposals about ways to accommodate
the city-regional scale of governance have revolved around debates on the extent
to which there should be ‘structural adjustment’ – or ‘reform’ – of government
units, their responsibilities, powers and territorialities. Should a new dedicated
territorial layer of government institutions and powers be established within the
state-administrative hierarchy or not? In other words, is a vertical and/or horizontal
re-scaling of state territory necessary to ‘shadow’ shifting scales, forms and sizes
of functional spaces.
The degree of ‘difference’ in the socio-economic composition of a city-region
matters here fundamentally (Swyngedouw 1997), especially so in North America,
and particularly the USA. This is, because it is this variability that circumscribes
the scope for gaining support – and legitimation – for region-wide political action
by a set of actors, and design policies across invisible territorial and institutional
divisions. The more diverse and contrasting the views and interests held across
local societies in a city-region, the more difficult it will be to find approval of nego-
tiated cross-boundary outcomes, without clear evidence as a resulting likely
win-win situation for all involved. It is here that social and political divisions – as
well as prejudices – matter in the search for governmental structures and practices
that best suit the different groups’ specific interests and priorities (Delaney and
Leitner 1997; Martin et al. 2003).
All this affects the ways in which municipalities within a city-region, each with
their own characteristics, view each other in their respective utility for cooperative
engagement, and this includes perceived interdependencies, leadership or
laggardness. Such appraisal is guided by political considerations, such as electoral
gains, and here the base of legitimacy (and voter approval) matters: does it draw
 Cities, city-regions and the state 85

on local or regional criteria? This shapes the ways in which agreements can be
designed and engaged with, structures put in place or shared ownership of city-
regional policy agendas defined. This is easier for informal arrangements, which
can be joined and left at will in response to perceived local (actor-specific) interests.
There is a much bigger entry and exit hurdle for formal arrangements, where exit
clauses may exist in the interest of maintaining the integrity of the regional
structure so as to protect the other participating actors’ interests. It is here that
difference in form and function between city-regional governance and government
matters. While ‘regional government solutions may be politically challenging at
best and impossible at worst … Regional governance merely requires cooperation
among existing local governments. Almost by definition, it promotes local
intergovernmental cooperation’ (Post 2004: 68). But given the absence of structure
as organising principle, the effectiveness of governance, especially when relying
on cooperation, depends on the political ability and capacity of leadership to frame
common agendas and extract agreements and concessions where needed. ‘Group
formation is often facilitated by the presence of a strong leader and/or an
entrepreneur who is willing to overcome the cost of collective action’ (Post 2004:
70; see also Ostrom and Walker 2000).
In contrast to the state rescaling approach through territorial restructuring, as
favoured by integrationist policies, those adopting a more federal, fragmentational
perspective allow for a more complex and fluid picture of policy-based, multiply
scaled jurisdictions of limited life spans. ‘Fragmentists’ draw on Tiebout’s (1956)
and Ostrom’s (1975) market-focused, public choice school with its stronger
emphasis on service delivery as presumed primary role of local government, as
commonplace in the USA. It is here, as Stoker (1998a) points out, that the whole
notion of ‘governance’ versus conventional ‘government’ underpins, and expresses
in a codified form, ‘less government’ as part of a neo-liberal agenda of public
spending cuts and reduced state presence in economic (and civic) matters, such as
also advocated by public choice theorists (and representatives). As such, with its
broader, even eclectic and, at times, fuzzy and disjointed conceptualisations and
explanations (see also Jessop 1995), ‘governance’ expands the notion of ‘govern-
ing’ beyond the focus on ‘state’ and ‘government’ and public administration, the
prime target also of New Public Management (Hood 1995). Other actors are part
of the story too, especially also following the rationale in economic development.
This reflects a shift away from structure and a positivist perspective of ‘what should
be’, to actually existing governmental realities, with all their variations, place-
specific manifestations (Brenner and Theodore 2005) and also less than ideal
confusion and ‘messiness’. ‘Broadly, the governance perspective challenges
conventional assumptions which focus on government as if it were a “stand alone”
institution divorced from wider societal forces’ (Stoker 1998a: 8). But this growing
‘gap’ between the idealised, theoretical, normative postulates about government,
and the rather less than perfect practice of policy-making, including a more
‘muddling through’ approach, creates tensions and also misconceptions about the
workings of local administrations, including their scope and capacity for policy-
making and dealing with market processes. Yet, such ‘muddle’ and obfuscation of
86 Cities, city-regions and the state

responsibility in a scenario with multiple actors and associated rationales, also

raises questions of legitimation and accountability.
Clear structures, by contrast, while perhaps more rigid and less immediately
responsive to changing demands, are much more adapt at providing clear lines of
responsibility and, at least in theory, transparency. Ad hoc, informal arrangements
of changing actor constellations, by contrast, do rather less so, as they face a
‘cultural lag’ as public attitudes and perceptions meet changing conditions (Stoker
1998a: 20). This also raises questions of legitimacy, as the public may get ‘left
behind’ by the repeated re-constellation of actor groups and agendas, and their
spatial referencing. Legitimacy of governance arrangements reflects this variability,
lack of clarity and strict structuration, and thus the epistomologies established by
political theory. Yet, with the shift to governance, questions of legitimacy are more
a matter of interpretation and ‘adjustment’ than ‘an all-or-nothing affair’ (21).
Indeed, as Stoker further points out, ‘the point is that it is possible to make the
rules of power more or less legitimate’ (21). Legitimacy is thus as much subject to
repeated reconfiguration and re-adjustment, as changing constellations of actors,
agendas and related spatialities are. Citizens are thus expected to be more engaged
and make active decisions in governing matters, even if restricted primarily to
service provision. Governance thus draws in a wider range of actors and requires
them to take on political responsibilities. Yet, such implicitly expected greater
engagement also raises scope for resistance and challenge. Pro-active responses
may question the nature and process of reconfiguring governance, as the above
examples of popular challenges to top-down implemented local government
reorganisation, illustrate.
Governance arrangements need to reflect, yet also underpin and manifest, the
application of ‘regionalisation’ in its relationship to the local: For once, as patch-
work of adjoining local areas with their specific interests remaining dominant,
where the regional dimension represents little more than a loose collaboration in
strictly defined (and delimited policy fields) or, as a more integrated, contiguous
area that sits atop the local areas as a higher tier (higher scale) of policy space and
administrative territory with its own rationale, legitimacy and responsibilities.
While the former essentially remains at the local level, existing merely as a virtual
projection onto the regional scale, the latter does install a distinct regional level of
governance and draws power and legitimacy of policy-making from there. As
Dierwechter describes the challenges for moving from a locally rooted ‘patchwork’
to a regionally embedded integral space: ‘jumping scale is also about jumping
culture, about getting the people who drive Volvo station wagons (with bike racks)
to engage in collaborative regional planning with the people who drive pickup
trucks (with gun racks)’ (Dierwechter 2008: 245). It is a contrast between Richard
Florida’s urban-based ‘creative class’ and those living in Cowboy Land, to borrow
a description by The Oregonian (Pulaski 2003) in a series run in 2003 on
regionality in Oregon, contrasting an urban Portlandia with a rural hinterland across
the mountain range. Seeking to merge the two and present and treat them as one
by ignoring any difference and (imagined) boundaries between them, is bound to
fail for want of common understanding and objectives.
 Cities, city-regions and the state 87

Summary: localising the region or regionalising the local?

A question of emphasis
Conventionally, the government of places has been hierarchically organised with
clear and distinct territorial boundaries at different scales: local, regional, national,
etc. The city-region is interesting and challenging, as it transcends the neat ‘Russian
Doll’ organisation and imagination of territorial government, from the national
down to the local level. The growing fluidity of functional relations and, associated
with that, communication networks between actors, has challenged this neat
arrangement. Responsibilities and response strategies are no longer so clear in their
legitimation and effectiveness. This shift from the certainty and predictability of
state structure to the vagaries and uncertainties of functional, inherently -
opportunistic, connections has produced a sequence of interpretations and
recommendations that reflect paradigmatic shifts as well as experiences with what
seemingly works and what doesn’t, and they all converge on the city as arena for
multi-scalar governance to act itself out.
Concern with governing city-regions reflects the varying and changing nature
of the phenomenon of urbanising regions, and the perception by analysts and policy
makers of it as a ‘challenge’ to existing forms and practices of governing functional
spaces. The reason is its position at the interface between several scales of
operation and associated relationships. Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) distinguish
between: (1) supra-regional, external factors as ‘exogenous’ context, e.g. national
and global factors; (2) the internal (‘endogenous’) city-region specific conditions
(economy, culture, etc.); and (3) as product of internal and external factors, the
particular city-regional governance (government) arrangements and practices (e.g.
modes of service delivery). This is discussed further in Chapter 5.
As economic processes, for instance, cut across municipal boundaries, scope
may well vary for individual municipalities to articulate and implement effective
policy responses. Joint action may promise improved efficacy of initiatives, as it
allows individual local actors to ‘punch above their weight’. Consequently, as
Stoker points out, ‘under governance, the ultimate partnership activity is the
formation of self-governing networks’ (1998a: 23). Placing emphasis on ‘self-
governing’ is important as a recognition of the scope for a local community to
shape its own locality and its governance, rather than being at the receiving end of
far-away central government. This may involve a greater or lesser degree of institu-
tionalisation, but that degree is a result of local agreement, rather than central
government order. yet, self-government, and building and joining/leaving collab-
orative governance networks, includes scope to walk away from networks or join
new ones, as policy goals change and self-interest may suggest. This, of course,
places emphasis on leadership skills to be able to negotiate successfully and ‘take’
along other actors and the electorate, to agree to, and support, a resulting collabo-
rative government regime, while also providing political gain.
It is here that political debates about legitimate interest representation, ‘demo-
cracy’ and ‘community interest’ revolve around the question of the right scale of
governance, i.e. the location of power, control and influence both within and
between localities. This leads to highly specialised, narrowly defined (and voter-
88 Cities, city-regions and the state

legitimated) functional entities within a presumed self-organising system of

governing city-regions at a variable spatial scale, as defined by the sum of collab-
orating entities. Following Blatter’s (2004) view, Castells’ (1997) proclaimed
‘flows’ as spatial relations and linkages may combine, in varying constellations,
several such fluid spaces simultaneously. Yet, such a system of overlapping and
intersecting governance, both vertically and horizontally, raises questions about
the mechanisms for maintaining ‘order’ and thus inefficient overlaps and
duplication of efforts. It is these that will be investigated in the following chapter.
5 City-regional governance
Between state hierarchy and ‘inter-local
assemblages’

‘Governance has become somewhat of a conceptual fad’ writes Pierre (2011: 17)
in the introduction of his discussion of forms of governance mechanism found in
a place. He identifies four types of agendas and rationales, which underpin different
compositions and modi operandi of governance arrangements: managerialism,
corporatism, pro-growth and welfare governance. This distinction is based on the
rationale and modi operandi of governance, especially the role of democratic
representation of local interests, group specific interests such as businesses, and the
balancing of community (social) and capitalist strategies (competitiveness). In
particular, this refers to the role of the state vis-à-vis capital interests as expressed
in the concept of globalisation. This is a result of an ideological move away from
a state-centric perspective in delivering public services, and an embrace of public
sector providers as part of a public choice, neo-liberal agenda.
The growing number of non-state actors as part of the change of government
into governance, supported by an envisaged reduced role for the state in shaping
and, especially, implementing policies and service delivery. This follows the neo-
liberal paradigm that the state and its institutions be mere ‘enablers’, rather than
primary actors and service providers (Fyfe 2005). Instead, it is private sector actors
that have played a growing role, and this has affected policy-making cultures and
ways of doing things. Such include collaboration and communication through
networks, rather than institutional structures alone. It is this increased number of
actors that sits at the centre of the notion of governance, and implies greater
variability in response to particular combinations of internal (i.e. intra-regional)
and external (i.e. extra-regional) factors. These include state structures, policy-
making traditions, including recognition of a city-regional level of governing as
desirable, as well as relative economic position in a globalised setting.
Figure 5.1 illustrates this matrix defined by the intersection of two key variables
as determinants of the mode of city-regional governance: internal milieu (impetus
‘i’) and external context (as impetus ‘e’). They circumscribe scope, capacity and
willingness among policy makers to engage at the regional level within a city-
region. Internal include structural factors, such as the internal arrangement of a
city-region as either mono- or polycentric, or the degree of local identity and thus
a sense of localism. External includes state structure, in particular a federal versus
centralised organisation, and position within the globalised economy. The latter may
90 City-regional governance

vary between a stronger ‘core’ and weaker ‘peripheral’ context. These factors, in
their particular local combination and manifestation, produce a city-region-specific
milieu that is more or less supportive of a regional approach, and this, together with
local experiences, actor constellations and public discourses, leads to particular
policy agendas and attitudes towards engagement – or non-engagement – at the
city-regional level. It is this framework that provides the conceptual context for the
choice and analysis of the case studies presented later on in Chapter 6.
City-regional governance is thus shaped by two interdependent variables. First,
the geographic manifestations of a city-region, either through ‘real’, fixed and
clearly bounded territoriality or less clearly defined, fuzzy ‘virtual’ spatiality.
Second, the dimension of governing between formal, institutionalised government
and less clearly structured and territorialised, relationally defined network
governance. Quality and varying relevance of established functional connectivities
offer avenues for policy-making across institutional and territorial boundaries. This
may be for no other reason than negotiating and formulating a pragmatic joint, co-
ordinated response to the functional realities of city-regionality, without a priori
surrendering local powers. Such matters, as it maintains intact the relative
functional importance and standing of individual municipalities within a city-
region. Concerns about maintaining locally based competitiveness, including
anxiety about not having enough of a voice in the bigger city-regional construct,
can thus be addressed, especially, when facing a relatively dominant core city, such

federalised,
multi-level,
External Factors (Impetus)

‘localist’
State

centralised,
state acts Varying City-Regional
locally
(dirigisme) Milieux as Context for
‘advantaged’,
Governance
Globalisation

competitive,
connected,
Arrangements

‘disadvantaged’
un-competitive
peripheralised
poly- mono- mixed segre-
centr centric gated leadership history of
admin-territorial, Societal (socio- (public, ‘regionalism’
functional economic ethnic) private) v. ‘localism’
Structure Governance modi
Operandi

Internal Factors (Impetus)

Figure 5.1 City-regional governance between internal and external determinants

 City-regional governance 91

as in a mono-centric arrangement. Any such imbalance in voice and visibility

within a city-region is felt less urgently in the more ‘equal’ settings of a polycentric
structure. Yet, local attempts at gaining a higher profile compared with the rest of
the city-region, may well add to potential tensions, distrust and, subsequently, more
reluctant co-operation. These characteristics set the intra-regional ‘climate’ for
potential collaborations, and the willingness to engage in such, and face the
political consequences, for better or worse.
Practice and outcome of such city-regionalisation then raise questions about
legitimacy and democratic representation, especially in the face of a growing
number of special interest groupings and organisations joining in the formation of
governance (Heinelt and Kübler 2005). Such involves a growing selectivity
between those who are included in the new governance networks, and those who
are not and find themselves marginalised. This reflects the complex, often some-
what hazy, but in functional-economic terms increasingly important, role of
metropolitan areas in national and international space economies. These may be
either mono-centric in internal structure, revolving around a dominant city whose
dominance may be contested and resented by the surrounding other municipalities.
Such generates an acute sense of asymmetry among intra-regional relationships,
Thus, for instance, in a mono-centric arrangement, the dominant city usually
gives its name to the whole city-region as part of an attempt to project a ‘homo-
geneous’ city-regional space through a process called here ‘metro-isation’. Such
may either reflect functional reality, or the realisation across the relevant group of
municipalities that it is the name with the greatest external recognition factor that
offers advantages for reaching out to international capital. In a less ‘metro-ised’ –
i.e. less tightly functionally integrated – city-regional project, the choice of name
may be much more conflictual, because all participating localities vie for regional
influence. None of them is likely to want to see the name of one of the rivals simply
stamped on the region as a whole, and thus on themselves as well. Instead, a neutral
name may be sought, even if that reduces external recognition. Internal politics
matters, especially when negotiated joint action is needed or intended (see
Herrschel 2013). A key internal factor is the socio-economic composition of the
relevant localities – i.e the local electorate – and thus the likelihood of finding
political support for collaborative inter-local policies across a metropolitan area.
But even simple localism and sense of belonging and identity with a locality, may
cause resistance among the electorate to any such airbrushing ‘their’ place from
existence by removing its name from general, especially external, visibility through
such a re-labelling exercise. The case of Lahnstadt in Germany, described in the
previous chapter, illustrates this.
Among the external context parameters that may challenge governmental
structures and arrangements in city-regions are, first, the economic challenges of
competitiveness and, second, state legislation and policies. This is especially the
case for hierarchical arrangements of government, its territorialisation, recognition
of the regional scale within it and established practice with a regional level of
policy-making. The latter will also shape the public’s awareness of, and attitudes
towards, form, format and ‘realness’ of regionally scaled governance. The result of
92 City-regional governance

the particular manifestations and combinations of the two types of impetus is a

region-specific preference for particular forms of inter-municipal relationships
between bottom-up, locally-led co-ordination, and more top-down, centrally
orchestrated, coercion (see Figure 5.1). This is illustrated in the following chapter
by several examples of city-regionalism in Europe and North America, affected
by variations in ‘context’ through state structure as shaped by state legislation on
metropolitan governance, and through different internal parameters. Such manifest
themselves through: (1) established political cultures of whether or not wanting to
reach across local boundaries, following socio-economic and racial divisions that
underpin city-suburb relations; and (2) a contrast between mono- and polycentric
arrangements (see Figure 5.1). The varying combinations of these lead to a specific
city-regional milieu for governance, shaped by the interaction between the three
main factors distinguished here: the geographic ‘quality’ of a ‘city-region’; the
quality of interrelations (connectivity) between policy makers, be they localities,
organisations or individuals; and internal functional and socio-demographic
structure as expression of social ‘cohesiveness’. All this produces a specific, if
varying, milieu for the shaping and operating of city-regional governance. This
produces an ‘inter-governmentality’ that embraces a host of interests, actors and
agendas beyond those between government units, be that horizontally between
neighbouring municipalities, or vertically across levels of government. Inter-
governmentality may well require more or less elaborate forms of collaborative
organisational management to facilitate collaboration between institutions and
organisations (Agranoff and McGuire 2004) which, in turn, points to political
culture and leadership
Pierre (2011) raises the question about the validity of speaking of a ‘shift’ from
government to governance, as if there was an abandonment of the old model and
‘government’ becoming an out-of-date model. Instead, as will also become evident
from the case studies in Chapter 6, government continues to play an important role
as an expression of the state and its institutions, and statutorily underpinned powers
and responsibilities. This, as will become evident, includes the distinction made
here between fixed, firmly manifested territoriality and fluid, notional spatiality.
It is the conceptualisation of the role and position of state actors that has changed.
They have become the lynchpins between institutionalised and non-institution-
alised policy-making, and between territorial versus spatial geographic reference
and manifestation of such action.
The external context variable ‘state structure’ sets the parameters for governance
as on a scale between the two poles of (1) conventional, ‘old style’ state-centric
government as the by far predominant service provider and policy maker, and (2)
new ‘governance without government’ as predominantly, even entirely, privatised
form of governing. While the former leaves little scope for non-state actors to be
involved in delivering local services, in the latter, opposite scenario, the state may
be de facto reduced to merely contributing to an amalgamation of other actors and
service providers within little more than a virtual organisation. The relative position
on that scale between ‘old governmentality’ and ‘new governance’ mode follows
wider conceptualisations of role and purpose of government vis-à-vis the private
 City-regional governance 93

sector and its operational ethic and rationale. The distinction into the four categories
of governance mechanisms offered by Pierre and Peters (2005) – managerialism,
corporatism, pro-growth and welfare governance – reflects this balance and its
manifestation in the degree of institutionalisation and state presence. To this, so it
is suggested here, the geographic dimensions of territory and space may be added
as a key vehicle for state power and legitimacy to express itself, next to the
established degree of institutionalisation. All this is connected to a growing
variability of agendas, each producing their own ‘tailor-made’ spatialities as notional
geographic references of a virtual existence. Space and territory, together with
institutions and associations, set the framework for, yet also key expressions of,
city-regional governance as it emerges in response to the particular circumstances
found in a city-region as circumscribed by the combination of indigenous and
external context, governmental, economic and cultural (see Figure 5.1).
As part of adopting principles of governance, the subsequently growing number
of unelected, non-governmental actors competing with government as part of the
reported embrace of ‘governance’ raises questions about democratic control,
legitimacy and transparency (Purcell 2007). This may be seen as requiring more
managerial input, especially in the form of more government, so as to maintain
the link between democratic legitimacy, the definition of policy agendas and their
delivery. Institutionalisation, rather than reliance on informal arrangements, may
be seen as the way to achieve ‘order’ and lines of democratic managerial respon-
sibility. The other route to legitimacy and public accountability is through public
institutions directly, which participate in collaborative arrangements. So, there are
two roots, as shown in Figure 5.2: geographic formalisation and institutionalisation
of collaborative arrangements per se. This circumscribes the degree of legitimacy
provided either directly through institutionalisation and mechanisms of public
accountability or, indirectly, through the nature of participants in such collabo-
rations, and these may involve representatives of the relevant municipalities. These
two basic dimensions – institutionalisation and its geographic expression as two
intersecting variables – produce four quadrants. Both variables comprise, on the
one hand, different degrees of institutionalisation and, on the other, ‘real’ territo-
riality versus ‘virtual’ spatiality. In the top left-hand corner, marked as Quadrant 1,
the variables high institutionalisation and fixed territoriality (=high degree of
geographic formality) intersect, thus characterising a local government that, to a
degree, represents some ‘state-like’ characteristics: institutional capacity, territo-
riality and expression of self-interest as political machinery. This is reflected in
the term ‘local state’, as used by Gottdiener (1987), focusing on the influential role
of capital, especially in combination with property ownership, as well as by Duncan
and Goodwin (1987), with their more institutional perspective on the local
government machinery as part of a system of regulation. Both perspectives recog-
nise an ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ to a locality and its polity, and its interdependence.
Whether societal (class) structure, the role of capital (property ownership) or
institutional interaction with economic processes, a locality is viewed as a local
state because of its particular local socio-political structures and ways of policy-
making, and the ways this local milieu responds to, and thus shapes, but also is
94 City-regional governance

affected by, wider social and political–economic circumstances and processes. The
‘local state’, in all its varying degree of sovereignty – with being ‘local’ one of the
key distinguishing as well as limiting factors vis-à-vis nation state and globalised
capitalism, is thus also about dynamic change in societal, economic and political
terms (Halford 1993).
By contrast, in the opposite corner, marked as Quadrant 4, the institutionally
weakest and spatially fuzziest form of governance may be found. This variety is
quite ‘low key’. Barely visible in public life, it prefers to work behind the scenes
through informal linkages and connections at administration level, using ‘memo-
randa of understanding’ between formal actors, rather than firm, legally backed
contracts and institutionalised commonality. The other two quadrants (2 and 3)

Government Quadrant 1 Quadrant 2

High

(state-centric) • Formal contracts • Formally

between governmental
and non-governmental
actors (e.g. service
providers, chambers of
commerce)
• Fixed territories, variably
combined to create
(Degree of Institutionalisation)
Formalisation of Governing
institutionalised
• Governmental
re-organisation to
increase competitive
capacity,
• Focus on governmental
efficiency in policy-making

combined actors’ and service delivery,

territories) • Formal contracts of
co-operation, but variable
spatial applicability

Governance Quadrant 3 Quadrant 4

(multi-actor, • Less formal • Institutionally ‘thin’
inside and inter-municipal • Coalitions between
outside collaborative governmental and
government) arrangements non-governmental
• Ad hoc defined, actors,
• Non-binding, • Spatially variable
• Institutionally ‘thin’ (policy-based): virtual
(low degree of regions,
formalisation)
• Territorially fixed through
agreement by
Low

participating
municipalities

Territoriality: Spatiality:
‘hard’, clearly bounded, ‘soft’, virtual forms of
part of state territorial variable regionalisation
hierarchy
High Low
Formalisation of geography
(degree of territorial fixity)

Figure 5.2 Types of city-regionalisation between institution and geography

 City-regional governance 95

offer more contrasting combinations of stronger institutionalisation and softer

spatiality (Quadrant 2), or more clearly manifested territoriality with weaker insti-
tutionalisation (Quadrant 3). Institutional ‘thinness’ may well be found with a
degree of formalisation, as shown in Quadrant 2, so as to give it a degree of public
‘presence’ and ‘realness’. This requires little more than an ‘office, a secretary and
a website’, as a key local economic development person in Vancouver (Canada)
summed up the representation of virtual regions to the author during an interview
in 2004. At least indirectly, such arrangements may also, although not necessarily,
possess some degree of formal democratic legitimation, which depends on the
degree to which local governments, rather than non-elected actors, participate. Yet,
in terms of geographic manifestation, there is no fixed territorial boundary, but
rather a more flexible form of spatialisation, which relies on imagined, program-
matically driven, sketched out images and projections of geographic ‘reach’ with
less than clearly defined boundaries. These depend on the constellation of partic-
ipating actors, be they municipalities or interest representations, such as chambers
of commerce, and the geographic areas they each project. The sum of these more
or less ‘real’ areas provides the geographical manifestation of a city-regional con-
struct. Its boundedness and thus more formal territoriality depends on the
participants, in particular, governmental entities.
Alternatively, as for the scenario illustrated in Quadrant 3, the balance between
degree of institutionalisation and fixity of territorialisation may be inverse: non-
governmental associations with fixed territoriality, such as chambers of commerce,
for instance, or development agencies established through higher tier government
decree/legislation as non-governmental bodies, but with clearly defined, even
legally manifested, territorial responsibilities and powers. This combination pro-
vides some inherent tension between the relative flexibility and openness of the
grouping for participants, as institutional and thus formal hurdles are relatively
low, and the degree of territorial ‘realness’ and potential impact on the manifes-
tation and operation of government.
The prevalence of one or the other scenario and thus combination of varying
degrees of institutionalisation and territorialisation (geographic manifestation)
reflects local conditions as circumscribed by the combined local effectiveness of
external and internal (endogenous) factors. The former involves the manifestation
of statehood, such as in the form of federalisation versus centralisation of scalar
government. The latter, by contrast, includes the competitive economic standing in
a globalised world, and thus the opportunities and challenges for specific policy
agendas to promote local development and prospects. Political traditions and
histories matter, as do scope and capacity for, as well as experiences with, govern-
ing local affairs vis-à-vis the nation state and its claim to shaping local matters. In
addition, the local political ‘climate’, or milieu (Lowndes and Leach 2004), matters
for the articulation of local political agendas and the ability, and willingness, of
local actors to ‘stick their necks out’ to engage with regional matters, even if the
local benefits are not immediately visible.
Both institutionalisation as expression of formal government and policy-making
capacity, and territoriality matter in their ‘actually existing’, as well as virtual and
96 City-regional governance

merely imagined, varieties. Institutional theory points to, and seeks to concep-
tualise, the role of organisations in expressing and formulating norms, rules, values
and agreed modi operandi (Pierre 1999). This it does through administrative
processes and structures, but also through symbols, narratives, and public discourse
(Pierre 2011). This is where the particular role and nature of ‘localness’ comes in
to signify local features and particularities that find their geographic expression in
fixed territoriality as reference for the possession of power, and virtual spatiality
as expression of more ambitious claims to influence and relevance (Brenner
2004b). Accordingly, in their mere projected, imagined ‘virtual’ manifestation,
organisations then operate by negotiated agreement, and this may well be through
equally merely imagined and virtually constructed spaces. The combination of
those two key variables – institutionalisation and geography (see Figure 5.2) –
represents the primary descriptor of city-regional governance as it manifests itself
in individual cases.
For the concept and practice of governance, in contrast to government, there
has been much less concern with administrative reorganisation and thus the
redrawing of boundaries for tasks and responsibilities. Yet, this inherent fluidity and
vagueness, with its reduced transparency of the exercise of power and influence,
has raised concerns about legitimacy and representativeness of policy-making
under such circumstances (Skogstad 2003). In particular, the key role of inter-actor
networks in shaping political agendas has raised questions about the role and
governmental suitability of business-derived practices in inter-actor relations
(Provan and Kenis 2008). While such more informal, actor-relational modus
operandi has been considered more efficient for its swifter, less bureaucratic and,
importantly, more responsive, way of formulating policy answers, it has also raised
concerns about public scrutiny. Portrayed and adopted as a dynamic, fluid and
actor-driven form of governing functional, relational spaces on the basis of agreed
shared agendas, governance relies on negotiations, finding compromises and
building alliances (Sørensen 2002), however narrowly task-specific and temporal
they may be. In this instance, finding and maintaining partnerships matters. Stoker
(1998a: 22) suggests distinguishing between three key forms of partnerships.

1 Principal-agent relations, shaped by a dominant actor in a network. A mono-

centric city-region would be an example for such an asymmetric arrangement.
2 Interorganisational relations, which are negotiated and established among
‘equals’ of partners involved, team up to boost their respective prospects and
capacities. A polycentric city-region would be one example of systemic co-
ordination.
3 ‘Systemic –coordination’ is much more about changing the modus operandi to
allow for new ways of doing things as the most effective way to achieve set
goals. The outcomes are tailor-made governance arrangements. Establishing a
new tier of metropolitan government as a joint initiative, including transfer of
some powers ‘up’ to that new level, such as implemented in Portland, Oregon,
would be an example of systemic change on the basis of existing more frag-
mented structures.
 City-regional governance 97

All three scenarios share the objective of finding and establishing a new modus
operandi in policy-making for greater efficacy – especially when negotiating more
conflictual topics – both in framing agendas and implementing agreed initiatives,
which needs to take into account historically based political sensibilities about
local control and external intervention. These include uncertainties and disruptions
associated with shifting municipal boundaries merely in the interest of adminis-
trative convenience and/or functional efficacy. The challenge comes from the fact
that in a fragmented, collaborative and self-organising context, in contrast to a
territorially and institutionally restructured and consolidated setting with a more
cohesive system of city-regionalisation, regional agendas are defined and addressed
by multiple nodes of power, authority and influence, and these may sit both within
and outside the governmental system as part of a broader coalition of actors under
the conceptual umbrella of ‘governance’. Policy efficacy will thus depend not only
on the very existence, but also extent, of a ‘creative overlap’ (Schapiro 2007)
between these collaborative, variable political–administrative spheres and their
respective spaces of policy-making. The ‘glue’ holding this together, is the pursuit
of common agendas, shared notions of shared challenges, even threats, yet also a
reluctance to surrender own policy competencies for fear of establishing a ‘thin
edge of the wedge’ for (further) top-down, coercive policy implementation (Rhodes
1997). It is between these competing interests and agendas that locally led, frag-
mented, yet co-ordinated, city-regional governance seeks to negotiate a
region-wide modus operandi in policy-making for specific goals and policy fields
(Herrschel 2013).
Both views, region-centric ‘consolidationists’ and locally focused ‘fragmentists’
(see here also community power-oriented concepts as Molotch’s (1990) growth
machine), seek an effective mechanism – albeit in different ways – to match
government and its territorial base to the changing functional relations and
spatialities in metropolitan areas, which disregard administrative boundaries. It is
about the neo-liberal concern with the minimal state and thus minimised danger of
‘interference’ with markets and their (presumed inherently) efficient use and
allocation of resources. Yet in neither interpretation, has much attention been given
to the links between the city-regional milieu as product of internal and external
structures and the nature of inter-actor relationships as part of a city-regional
governance regime. This matters, especially in economic development, with its
dependence on external processes, such as associated with globalisation (see
Chapter 3). They go beyond a mere focussing on the local population’s choices in
the cost of service delivery.
Actor characteristics, such as entrepreneurialism (Hall 1988; Harvey 1989),
imagination, creativity and an established sense of the benefits (and limitations) of
regionally extended action, play an important role. Here, past experiences with,
and evidence of, costs and benefits associated with joint policy-making may well
serve as justifications for – or against – a decision about local engagement at the
regional scale. The sum of these, as ‘impetus’, shapes the emergence of city-region-
specific forms of regionalised governance between conventional centrally-imposed
consolidated territories of government on the one hand, and loose alliances as
98 City-regional governance

locally agreed policy co-ordination-based virtual, programmatic spaces, on the

other. External parameters as ‘impetus’ on local processes include economic
conditions as well as, in particular, state structures and forms of governmental
instutitonalisation and organisation. Willingness to engage regionally is shaped by
the institutional-governmental capacity provided by state structure, its territoriality
and scalar allocation of policy-making capacity.
The mechanism chosen thus determines the number of policy spaces with their
varying degrees of matching governmental territories of powers and responsi-
bilities: centralised, hierarchical coercion favours fewer, yet more persistent units,
while decentralised collaboration and co-ordination produces more entities, albeit
with mostly rather more limited life spans and operational briefs. In the latter
instance, region-wide action is thus less predictable in scope and more dependent
on opportunity. The resolve and political capability of individual actors will matter,
especially when it comes to policy implementation, and legitimation. It is here that
governmental institutions as the source of powers, resources and legitimation play
an important role. Their ability and willingness to collaborate is thus important,
especially when opting for a fragmented, locally-based form of regionalisation.
Pointing towards the specific role of institutions in local governance, Feiock’s
(2004, 2009) concept of ‘Institutional Collective Action’ (ICA) offers a useful tool
for describing and evaluating inter-institutional collaboration, such as between
municipalities, and the willingness to do such a thing in the first place. Here,
government entities are presumed to organise themselves in response to perceived
opportunities or challenges, as they seek to overcome their inherent (economically
driven) inter-local competitiveness. Instead, they cooperate in the pursuit of a
perceived win-win outcome with – after all – clear local advantage. Any collabo-
ration thus depends on the existence of such explicitly local advantages as outcome
of any form of non-coercive, voluntarily accepted, forms of regionalisation (Larkin
and Marshall 2008; Harrison 2010)

External context for the shaping of city-regional governance

As discussed above and shown in Figure 5.1, the external, supra-regional political–
economic environment is an important factor in fashioning scope for, and practice
of, city-regional governance. The role and position, as well as recognition, of the
regional scale in the scalar hierarchy of the state, the distribution of power across
that hierarchy between local and central government, the very scalar position of
‘central government’, the preference for a federally or centrally organised system
with more or less dirigisme, and identified economic prospects –actual and per-
ceived – in the ever more globalising economic realm, all contribute to the degree
of a municipality’s likely concern with, and attitudes towards, engaging with, and
adopting a likely modus operandi in, practical city-regionalisation. The following
section now explores these external descriptors in their local interpretation and
translation into regional agendas.
Depending on the balance between the role of public administration and that of
corporate (capital) interests and ways of doing things, Pierre (1999) distinguishes
 City-regional governance 99

four key models of urban governance, which draw on relevant concepts in urban
politics and administration (Figure 5.3).

1 Technocratically-oriented managerialism, with a particular concern about

planning, especially for transport and regulating expansionist development –
the infamous urban ‘sprawl’ in the North American context. Environmental
concerns, especially as expressed in ‘quality of life’, are high on the agenda,
and hierarchically organised working is part of that.
2 Corporatism with its elitist role for capital interests in government through, on
the one hand, an ‘open ear’ by policy makers for their needs and interests as
part of efforts to boost the local economy and gain political reward for it, but
also as part of the move to governance and involving the private sector more
in the delivery of services.
3 Pro-growth government with its common agenda of competitiveness as ‘glue’
for collaborative action, driven by the shared concern among policy makers
and businesses about local economic development for job creation, higher tax
returns and greater profitability, respectively.
4 Welfare governance with its social-democratically oriented concern about
popular social-economic welfare often, but not exclusively, led by political
agendas, but also public concerns about social security, health care, education,
etc., which are, especially in Europe, considered as traditional areas of state
involvement.

The four scenarios thus differ in the composition of governing actors, and the
balance between economic and social interests in the contested power field
between capital and political interests ‘outside’ a locality, to which local actors
both within and outside government need to respond, but which also shape the
conditioning context for local policy makers to be – and feel – able to respond.
‘The managerial city is shorthand for urban governance dominated by non-
elected officials, particularly senior-level administrators and managers’ (Pierre
2011: 20, emphasis added). There is thus a clear distinction between the public
administration and political-democratic element in governing a territory and/or
place. It is the administrative side as the feature associated most closely with the
hands-on provision/delivery of public services, that provides much of the direct
interface with the population. Meanwhile, the government dimension sets out the
general strategies and objectives, including the role of public sector vis-à-vis the
private sector in service provision. It is here also that New Public Management –
which emerged in the 1980s on the back of a politically driven privatisation agenda
(Christensen and Laegreid 2001; McLaughlin et al. 2001) – proposes not just to
transfer the provision of services directly, but also to instil a private sector ethos
as sure way to demanded greater cost efficiency. This is part of the then new neo-
liberal doctrine of ‘small state’ and a stronger involvement of the private sector, as
advocated by Thatcherism and Reagonomics with their ‘market fundamentalism’
(Stieglitz 2008) and drive to ‘shrink the state’.
Particularly in North America, with its strong focus on local service delivery and
100 City-regional governance

Welfare governance Entrepreneurial governance

High
(intervention, regulation)

dirigiste, redistributive, adopting competitive

State engagement

direct interventionist business strategies

Corporatist governance Managerial governance

negotiated, business group new public management,
interests shape public policy private sector methods,
professionalisation of policy-making
Low

(city managers)

Low High
Role of market agenda
(competitiveness)

Figure 5.3 Governance models (strategies) between state and capital interests
Source: based on the categories of governance by Pierre (2011).

community interests, local government has been interpreted in this light. In Europe,
by contrast, the governmental role of local government has been of primary concern,
as arena for political debates and expressions of local interests within a state
hierarchy (Cox 1998). It is here that differences in professional cultures between the
‘bureaucrats’ exist across different institutional and/or departmental ‘silos’ (Fuller
2010) within one level of administration, but also across different levels of a state
administration, even within the same policy field. Different scalar perspectives
shape priorities and thus policy agendas, as well as ways of doing things, and here,
institutional capacity and capability in formulating and implementing policies have
been affected by a growing degree of professionalism as part of a general change
in political culture and debate about efficient service delivery, competitiveness –
also with the private sector – and performance indicators as part of a neo-liberal
performance-measuring culture in local government (Melkers and Willoughby
2005). This is linked to, and draws on, the concept of New Public Management in
the public sector, seeking to transfer private sector business methods and modi
operandi to the public sector. The result has been a growing degree of ‘performance
management’ with a subsequent competition between managerial considerations of
‘competitive’ service delivery and the political–democratic and representational
perspectives and rationales of a regionally extended local governance. This reflects
a continuing competition between the two main roles of local government (see
Keating 1991), which may cause friction and intra-governmental competition
between policy fields and ‘their’ respective departments. Demands articulated by
those advocating greater competitiveness for economic development, and greater
sustainability, are one such example of possible conflict (Herrschel 2013).
Potentially, such conflict, particularly if it results in a local political stalemate, may
lead to external intervention by central government in an attempt to push things in
the direction of its own political agenda.
 City-regional governance 101

The managerial perspective favours achieving economies of scale and thus

lower cost in the provision of services, such as through an amalgamation of local
authorities as discussed in the previous chapter. Yet, while this may generate some
economic advantages for service provision, at least in the short term, it also means
a dilution of local democratic representation and interference with an established
sense of local identity and sense of place ownership, and so, ‘from the later 1990s
through the 2000s, the managerial dimension has clearly come to dominate over
the democratic-participatory dimension of local government’ (Pierre 2011: 33).
The emphasis on management and technocratic perspectives encourages the pursuit
of ‘specialist’, professionalised agendas within policy fields and governmental
departments, opening up avenues for lobbying, for instance, as this is where
rewards for engagement are situated. Seeing to ‘get the job done’ is also easier to
pursue than wider, longer-term strategies, and ‘results’ can more easily be presented
for political gain in time for the next local elections. ‘Urban managerialism focuses
on getting the job done as quickly and cheaply as possible’ (37), and that notion
of efficiency is a powerful argument supporting a shift from elected, democrat-
ically legitimated politicians and officials, to a group of professional managers
who are much less publicly accountable. Yet, the political–democratic dimension
is an important element in local government, distinguishing it from a mere central
government agency (Sharpe 1970; Briffault 2000). One of its key strengths is its
flexibility and responsiveness to challenges, involving also the private sector. This
adds greater capacity, but also scope for conflict.
This challenge becomes even more poignant if group-specific interests, such as
business, take on greater influence, as is assumed under corporatism. ‘Corporatist
government in its purest form is based on the more or less continuous presence of
organized interests in the policy process’ (Pierre 2011: 51); organisations like
chambers of commerce are typical examples. Their influence will vary with the
policy agenda, as well as the importance the business community is being given by
local politics and the expectations of local government. In addition, the degree
matters of institutionalisation and integration of business representations in local
governance. Here are considerable differences between the Anglo-American and
European, and also cross European, arrangements. In North America, an inherently
stronger emphasis on entrepreneurialism and business involvement in service
delivery and policy debates goes together with a weaker institutionalised partici-
pation in local governance. Chambers of commerce are no more than a lobbying
organisation, whose members join voluntarily in return for expected business
advantage. In Europe, by contrast, businesses are often compulsorily enrolled with
their respective chambers of commerce – which operate at the regional level – but
which in turn are a statutorily arranged part of local governance. In Germany, for
instance, they must be consulted by local government about local planning. Thus,
while in Europe individual business engagement with local governance is limited,
favouring instead a formal representational presence, in Britain and North America,
the opposite is the case: weak institutional representation but stronger individual
engagement and participation.
Other important differences between the US (less so Canada) and Europe
102 City-regional governance

involves the roles and standing of urban cores and suburbs. While in the former,
the suburbs are becoming increasingly the actual centres of social and economic
gravity, with growing functional assertiveness and independence vis-à-vis the old
core, in Europe, the functional heart and centre of gravity remains the urban core.
The core is where the city shows its history, characteristics and quality as a civic
place. In North America, this history is less differentiating, especially west of the
Appalachians and the ‘old’ East Coast. The sense of public space as an expression
of civic-ness becomes increasingly difficult to maintain in a predominantly car-
borne society. Car parks (parking lots) attempt to present themselves as public
spaces per se, using clichéd symbols of traditional (European) town squares, such
as clock towers in shopping centres chiming London’s ‘Big Ben’ tune to create the
phantasy of a civic square. This makes it quite evident that while the imagination
of a town square as historic centre of local civic life exists, if in an imagined,
idealised, virtual world, with no real manifestation and reality in the predominantly
suburban world of car-borne North America, it is not necessarily associated with
‘city’ in a European sense. The pastiche re-enactment of presumed ‘typical’ features
of urban-ness cannot disguise the little difference that often exists between what
is labelled ‘city’ and ‘suburb’ respectively. Often, city and suburb are little more
than half a century apart in their origins, and that matters when it comes to defining
the particular value and characteristics of ‘urban-ness’ versus ‘suburban-ness’.
These differences in tradition and historic referencing in Europe and North
America need to be kept in mind when discussing suburbanisation, the nature of
suburbs in relation to ‘their’ cities, and attitudes towards the central city. The
relationship between city and the suburban hinterland is based around differences
in historic development and respective functionality, In fact, their respective roles
and perceived positions in terms of centrality have become almost diametrically
opposed to the traditional view. In Europe, the suburbs emerged as aspiring urban
extensions outside the city walls during the Middle Ages, with fewer statutory and
civic rights and privileges than the recognised cities. By contrast, suburbs in North
America have become the primary places of growth and development, with assoc-
iated social, political and economic empowerment. Meanwhile, the established
‘older’ city centres have lost both economic capacity and fiscal capability as a
result of ‘urban flight’ (Adams et al. 1996) since the 1950s, leading to the fiscal
crisis of the late 1970s (Glassberg 1981). The resulting stark spatial socio-
demographic differentiation in North American cities between core city and the
wider sub-/urbanised region (Barnes and Ledebur 1998; Gainsborough 2001a;
Herrschel 2009), often translates into ‘separatist’ tendencies to match voter profiles
to administrative–political structures. As a consequence, it is the suburbs that have
mostly become the places of privilege, even developing into de facto virtual socio-
economic and political fortresses against a perceived ‘wilderness’ of the core city.
This has turned on its head the historic meaning of the term ‘suburb’ in its European
origin, where ‘suburbia’ was the day-to-day settlement beneath, and thus outside
the protection of, the castle and its walls. This matters when it comes to perceived
roles and ‘importance’ of localities in a city-regional context and, subsequently,
their interrelationship.
 City-regional governance 103

The variety of actors involved outside local government goes well with the
concept of governance, including its implicit notion of collaborative, negotiated
and collective action (in contrast to elitist dirigisme). It thus seems to go some way
towards the broad interest representation that elected officials as representatives of
local popular interests ought to adopt as part of democratic government. The
question is, of course, the degree to which individual actors’ and group interests are
permitted, or are able, to influence negotiation and balancing between a set of
interests in their own specific favour, as, for instance, the case in an elitist system
(see also Chapter 4).
Institutions play a key role in the analysis and operation of government, but also
governance, having attracted particular attention to analysis since the 1990s
(Kearns and Paddison 2000). Institutions play an important role for the manifes-
tation of statehood and territorial power, as well as foci of the legitimation of
policy-making. Yet, they are also increasingly engaging in virtual spatialisation,
often through proxi virtual organisations at governmental arm’s length to avoid (or
circumvent) formal (statutory) restrictions and limitations, as well as anxieties
about ‘too much’ state, in an attempt to respond to ever more rapidly changing
functional spatialities (see also Brenner 2002, 2004a). Institutional changes and
restructuring to ‘match’ them to shifting tasks and expectations are difficult, slow
and often contested, making the use of informal arrangements, channelled through
‘virtual organisations’, a more feasible and effective option. It is a clear set of goals
that drives institutional actors, yet such goals are conditioned by the wider
political–economic and cultural contexts, as well as the ‘institutional dimension’
(Pierre 2011) comprising institutional cultures, capacities and modi operandi
(Healey 1998). This leads to a preference for more or less formalised ways of gov-
erning a city-region, based on the likely most effective way of achieving set goals.
Yet, institutions are merely one set of actors, albeit important ones. Other factors
matter too, as drivers of urban and city-regional governance. Regime theory offers
here a broader perspective, including the recognition of a role for different types
of actors next to institutions, and this relates well to the concept of governance. It
is here that the different in emphasis on perspective between Europe and North
America becomes evident, with the latter focusing on urban elites as drivers and
formulators of urban politics (Pierre 2011), especially in the context of neo-liberal
economic development under the impact of globalisation and competitiveness.
Richard Florida’s (2005) propagation of a ‘creative class’ aims in this direction. In
the European context, however, an inherently more institutionally focused
perspective prevails, rooted in Europe’s multilevel structure and tradition in formal
government.
More flexible, yet less transparent in terms of democratic processes and legiti-
mation, are ‘growth coalitions’, so much en vogue in the early 1990s in the USA
(Jonas 1991) and UK (Harding 1991). They provide a central plank for the concept
of entrepreneurial governance, as found in the ‘entrepreneurial city’ (Hall and
Hubbard 1996), and work through close agreements between political and business
elites in the pursuit of economic growth as leading local political paradigm, driven
by expectations of gains ‘all round’, as a typical win-win scenario. Such ‘pro
104 City-regional governance

Characteristics Supra-municipal approach Inter-municipal approach

Centrally Locally Centrally Locally

defined defined dependent dependent

Governance state- local autonomy state locally

capacity dependent (statutory ‘incentivised’, dependent,
(leadership, empowerment) universally state fragmentation
institutional implemented possible
efficacy) (localism)

Governance centrally part- indirectly locally

capability dependent independent legitimated legitimated
(financial (finance and through locally through central through local
resources, legitimacy), levied income government representation
legitimacy) block grant and and/or agreed and local (local delegates)
indirect own levies, representation, and share of
legitimacy direct mandate shared finance local finance
through state (elected) local and (joint funding)
law central and central
grant

Figure 5.4 Approaches to regionalisation: vertical and horizontal initiatives

Source: derived from Klink (2008) table 3.2.

growth governance is essentially the structuring of concerted, public-private

actions to boost the local economy’ (Pierre 2011: 81). It is something guided by a
desire to circumvent ‘bureaucracy’ and be faster, better targeted, and thus more
effective in making policies and obtaining results vis-à-vis capital interests,
irrespective of its growing volatility and mobility. The privatisation of local
economic development units, as adopted by municipalities in the early 1990s as a
way to signal ‘business friendliness’ and ability to speak the same ‘business
language’ (Herrschel 1995), illustrates this train of thought.
In the USA, the growth ‘regime’ adopted in Atlanta (Stone 1989, 2001) has
become a particularly well known example of ‘fusing’ the respective capacities
and capabilities of political and corporate actors to mutual benefit. This includes
economic improvements to the city for joint political and economic rewards. The
notion of ‘growth regimes’, ‘growth coalitions’ or as introduced by Molotch (1993)
as ‘growth machines’, presumes a paramount and continuing importance of
‘growth’ as driver of local politics and governance. This ties-in with Richard
Florida’s (2005) proclamation of a ‘creative class’ as driver of new urban growth,
reflecting, but also reproducing, particular local qualities. Yet, other factors, such
as a growing awareness of, and concern with, sustainability (also as a quality
indicator) may alter the dynamics between actors and, indeed, the choice of actors
engaged in a local ‘regime’. This may involve conflict and competition between
agendas and associated actor groupings (see Herrschel 2013).
 City-regional governance 105

This public–private collaboration is also in line with the neo-liberal, public

choice agenda propagated under the mantle of neo-liberalism. Yet, such focus on
private sector resources relies on the belief of continuing capital interest in the
location, i.e. in the generally visible and accepted positive outlook for a city. If
such is no longer deemed likely, a pro-cyclical effect may set in, reinforcing
economic restructuring and disinvestment through a weakening (withdrawal) of
the policy-making capacities and capabilities of the private sector. Capital and
private sector actors – and the population – are ultimately mobile, responding to
shifting opportunities and prospects, whereas a geographic place, such as a city, is
not. Yet, the latter may seek to respond to such changes by finding new partners and
alliances to strengthen and develop alternative locational attractions which may
be possible to put in place as a joint project with other municipalities. Such
perspective recognises the fact that local factors matter, but they need to be
combined and presented in varying ways to respond to shifting, locally and
regionally specific, space-economic realities and agreed joint political agendas and
interests, even if for no more than very localist rationales.
The challenge of course, is then the mechanism of such changing collaboration
and the underlying political linkages. This includes the degree of institutionalisation
versus a reliance on extra-institutional, informal arrangements with associated
virtual organisations. Yet, such arrangements also, in turn, condition the actors into
certain ways of reasoning and politically calculating, as well as doing things. The
result is a likely reproduction of local and regional modes of governance, rather
than a departure from established modi operandi, thus perpetuating established
governance regimes. Such are more likely to occur as an outcome of external
intervention, be that through legislative involvement by the state, such as through
re-structuring government and its territoriality, or shifting capital interests with
potential new investment in response to equally newly identified competitive
opportunities or, indeed, selective disinvestment from individual places that have
lost their economic appeal. This, in essence, favours a reproduction, even re-enforce-
ment, of existing uneven opportunities and prospects between municipalities within,
as well as between, city-regions.
Rodriguez and Ovedo (cited in Klink 2008), suggest two main types of metro-
politan governance: supra-municipal and inter-municipal (see Figure 5.4). The
former takes a distinctly vertical approach, and is a product of central government
involvement (intervention) as part of a hierarchical, top-down view and approach
to spatial governance, imposing a supra-local tier of government. The latter, mean-
while, is more locally-centric and remains at that scalar level. Taking a horizontal
perspective, this method of city-regionalisation places emphasis on locally
generated co-operative arrangements on a ‘pick and mix’ basis in the search for
shared agendas and, based on those, co-ordinated action. The state-led model, by
contrast, focuses on adding a city-regional perspective through a dedicated layer
of governing. There, spatial restructuring and inter-scalar shifting of responsibilities
maintain their legitimacy through the state’s political mandate and overall respon-
sibility for cohesive development within its territory.
Both categories – supra- and inter-municipal – sit on a scale marking variations
106 City-regional governance

in the balance between local and central government dependency in terms of

powers and scope for action. This is a reflection of national constitutional arrange-
ments and thus the location of powers for city-regional policy matters within the
state–governmental hierarchy. For instance, how autonomous are local policy
makers to engage with, and influence, city-region-wide policies and decisions?
What mechanisms of such engagement would they prefer? According to Figure
5.4, under a supra-municipal arrangement, the possible scenarios hover between the
two ‘extremes’ of ‘total central dependency’ (such as being ‘creatures of Parlia-
ment’ as in England, or the state, as in Canada, for instance), on the one hand, or,
on the other, far-reaching local autonomy (as found in Germany and the US, for
example), equipped with statutorily protected local rights and thus scope for
innovative governance. Between those, there is a variety of combinations of central
dependency and local autonomy to form versions of metropolitan (city-regional)
governance. In a centrally-shaped system, policy arrangements (and governance
arrangements) are rolled out to apply to all municipalities of a state territory as
part of a nationally defined strategy (that is to benefit the national economy and
national development).
For the inter-municipal model, contrasts are less ‘extreme’, as there is much
less of a choice between ‘all out’ central dependency and local autonomy. Instead,
the focus is on locally-led collaborative arrangements, ranging from more centrally
incentivised approaches (with fiscal dependencies on the central state) and more
individualised, even fragmented arrangements. These apply to only a selection of
voluntarily collaborating municipalities without central government involvement.
Pragmatic, but locally derived, objectives drive these arrangements rather than
centrally defined and rationalised interests and agendas. Financial dependencies are
weaker, based on a variable degree of local financial revenue which, in turn
provides the capacity for more independent decision making. Legitimacy, an
important criterion in democratic policy, varies between direct election (full
autonomy) and indirect legitimacy through the central state as ultimately
responsible body. In the latter instance, local government is not much more than a
mere agent of the centre, and thus depends in its actions on central government
support. By contrast, in the former scenario (full local autonomy), the constituent
local governments are the source of the necessary powers, fiscal means and institu-
tional capacity to act regionally.
It is at that point – the reliance on local capacities – that a concern about the
effects of inequalities comes into play, based on the existence of uneven resources,
political skills and institutional capacities. This may trigger a more welfare-oriented
concern about social–economic cohesion across a city-region, something that
matters for the perceived quality of life as appeal for the ‘creative class’, for
instance. The central state, in its assumed responsibility for the wider state territory
as a whole, may intervene in city-regional policy affairs to secure adherence to the
wider goals at state level. Questions of sustainable development, and transport
infrastructure, for instance, are particularly predisposed to cut across the respon-
sibilities of individual levels of government. Such, in effect, welfare considerations
(e.g. securing/improving quality of life), has been identified by Pierre (2011) as the
 City-regional governance 107

fourth governance type in his classification (see above p. 99), where the state
intervenes in market processes to ‘steer’ the markets in the desired direction (and
compensate for required economically ‘sub-optimal’ arrangements). The European
Union’s Regional Structural Fund is such an interventionist tool aimed at
alleviating inequalities in development opportunities and ‘steer’ the market towards
politically desired investment on the basis of social (or strategic longer-term),
rather than pure economic (and short-term) benefit. Yet, it needs to be noted that
recipients of redistributive welfare policies may well be stigmatised as ‘declining’
and ‘problematic’, further undermining their prospects and setting in train a vicious
downward spiral and/or self-fulfilling prophecy. Image matters, not just for
attracting the much-quoted ‘creative class’, but also, and in particular, increasingly
speculative investment looking for opportunities with likely high returns. A
negative image about future growth prospects does not convey that confidence, as
the current euro crisis has amply demonstrated.

Internal factors as context for city-regional governance:

‘local milieu’ and local structure
Choice and variability in actor constellations – something corresponding with the
neo-liberal agenda of public choice theory – implies inherent dynamism and scalar
as well as communicative variability. While this, on the one hand, is expected to
encourage innovation and entrepreneurialism in forms and mechanisms of inter-actor
engagement and policy-making, it also projects uncertainty and unpredictability.
Changing political agendas and political processes, societal values and aspirations as
part of a democratic process, further adds to a sense of ‘flux’. Given this variability,
the projected spatial image matters in its complexity, ‘fuzziness’ and thus likely
efficacy. ‘The key point is not the number of jurisdictions [involved], but rather the
concurrence of multiple opportunities by which participants can forge or dissolve
links among different collective entities’ (Ostrom 2010: 6). As part or that, of course,
mechanisms and procedures of conflict resolution (Hamilton 2000), of negotiation
and balancing between differing, or even contrasting, interests and objectives are of
fundamental importance. Here, formal structures, procedures and allocation of
responsibilities and capacities are essential, as inherent qualities of ‘government’.
Joint goals and interests are, while necessary, not in themselves sufficient to
produce joint action. Other ‘obstacles’, whether institutional cultures, competition
for influence, socio-economic divisions and associated adoption of localist
agendas, or party-political affiliations horizontally, between local governments, or
vertically, along the governmental hierarchy, all matter.
The modus operandi of regional governance is, as discussed above, circum-
scribed by a combination of external and internal factors. Yet cities and city-regions
are not merely leaves blowing in the wind of globalisation, but offer different forms
of resistance, depending on their internal dynamics and thus capacity. While
externally, state structure and economic conditions and processes are dominant
factors, internally much is shaped by the balance of relative power between munici-
palities in a region. It is in this ‘balancing’, the associated negotiations, making of
108 City-regional governance

choices and political processes, which are key elements in shaping a city-regional
agenda as response to external economic processes, threats and opportunities. In a
mono-centric arrangement there is an inherent asymmetry that is likely to affect the
dynamic of collaborative negotiations, even approaches, in that there tend to be
sensitivities among the less dominant localities about being ‘pushed around’ and/or
become virtually invisible in the shadow of the leading city. This is likely to affect
any negotiations and any willingness to ‘compromise’. Such may go as far as
opposing to having the name of the leading city imprinted on the city-region as a
whole, and thus also onto each of the localities that are part of it, opting instead for
a neutral name, even if that means a lesser recognition factor outside. The case of
Seattle, the city ‘hidden’ behind the city-regional name of Puget Sound, is one such
example of a compromise label, adopting the name of a physical region. This is to
defuse and disguise intra-regional imbalances, and thus competitiveness for pre-
eminence and visibility, between the region’s main municipalities.
Localities in a mono-centric city-regional setting are thus particularly sensitive
towards, and watchful of, any signs of infringement of their independence and
statutory, as well as de facto, equal footing in shaping city-region-wide policies.
Other influential intra-regional structural factors include socio-economic structures
and, especially in a US context, racial patterns, including divisions between core
city and suburbs. Socio-economic segregation manifests itself spatially much more
clearly in US cities (Massey and Denton 1993) than in their European counterparts,
especially as they are accompanied by tendencies and efforts to manifest and match
those spaces to governmental territories by re-drawing boundaries (Fleischmann
1986). This occurs through suburbs administratively separating from their ‘host’
municipality and becoming municipalities in their own right through a legal process
called ‘incorporation’. On the other hand, existing municipalities, cities in parti-
cular, may seek to expand their boundaries to include suburban developments just
outside their boundaries through ‘annexation’. This moving of boundaries is an
important, yet essentially exclusionary, expression of socio-economic differen-
tiation, even segregation, and the attempt by individual groups to translate
residential clustering into spatial and political control. Thus, there is evidence of
suburban communities – generally rather homogeneous socio-economic groups –
seeking to break away from a city to retain greater control over taxation and
expenditure, and re-establish themselves as independent municipalities (Gains-
borough 2001). Drawing clear boundaries as a claim to the ownership of a territory
of local government and thus control of its policies, especially on taxation, is one
key driver of such movements. Boundaries and divisions may be wanted to
manifest and reinforce separation and separateness. ‘In short, it is argued, fragmen-
tation enables elite (often white) populations to escape their obligations to the wider
metropolitan society by separating themselves fiscally and spatially into separate
jurisdictions’ (Lewis 2004: 100). Of course, these are counter-movements to city-
regionalisation, as they advocate and implement further divisions and separateness,
rather than joint action. Atlanta and Detroit illustrate such divisions in a stark way,
exemplifying the widely held picture of ‘black cities’ and ‘white suburbs’ (Savitch
1978). These divisions may be actively defended, including by such moves as
 City-regional governance 109

preventing public transport to reach outer – white – suburbs, so as to ‘prevent’ an

influx of the black population. Examples from the Atlanta case, discussed in the
next chapter, illustrate this strategic non-connectivity.
The opposite scenario of a structurally more balanced city-region revolves
around ‘poly-centricity’, introduced to the debate on metropolitan governance by
Polanyi and Ostrom in the 1960s (see also Ostrom, 2010, Aligica and Boettke
2011). In essence, it depicts a city-region as containing ‘many centers of decision
making that are formally independent of each other … [following] various
contractual and cooperative undertakings … to resolve conflicts … in a coherent
manner with consistent and predictable patterns of interacting behavior. To the
extent that this is so, they may be said to function as a ‘’system’’’ (Ostrom et al.
1961: 832), although the organising principle may vary according to individual
city-regional circumstances and perceived urgencies by policy makers to respond.
Polycentric arrangements, in their spatial manifestation are thus likely to be more
ad hoc, negotiated, self-organising, virtual and horizontally oriented than mono-
centric arrangements with their centrally organised modi operandi (Ostrom 2010).
Yet, just because of the sheer multitude of intersecting interests without an a priori
organising ‘authority’, a polycentric system needs, as Ostrom (2010) points out, to
have a minimum of ordered structural relationships, so as to persist and be viable.
In other words, the spatial manifestation of more ‘ad hoc’ governance needs to be
connected to existing mechanisms of governmental territoriality to provide
structure, order, implementational capacity and reliability and predictability to
policies emanating from the ‘virtual’ spaces of network relations and projected
geographic ‘reach’ and representation, which characterise governance.
Given the more symmetrical relationship between localities in a polycentric
city-region, competitive rivalries are part and parcel of the envisaged quasi-market
conditions, especially when focused on public service delivery, as so essential in
the USA. The very notion of competitiveness (or rivalry) implies a striving for
‘importance’, even pre-eminence, within in a system of networks and linkages as
expression of strategic alliances and collaborations (Rueckert and Walker, 1987).
This is circumscribed by particular local conditions (‘milieu’) and thus projections
of local policy-making capacity within the regional context and beyond. As a result,
coalitions between actors vary in their quality, ‘durability’ and impact, as local
factors may be more, or less supportive of finding and maintaining collaborations.
A potential plethora of varying collaborative interests and engagements,
commanding longer or shorter terms of viability, and including a variety of overlap-
pings between spaces of interest, need to find at least some organisational
mechanism to achieve set outcomes. There is thus a need for finding organisational
principles that co-ordinate ensuing potential inefficiencies to achieve an efficient
arrangement that responds to voters’ interests.
Yet neither system, polycentric nor mono-centric, can individually serve all
purposes and intentions. While the polycentric system promises more respon-
siveness and localness, the need for cooperation and communication in informal,
ad hoc relationships and linkages makes it less predictable and, in implementa-
tional terms, even feeble. Meanwhile, the mono-centric, hierarchical arrangement
110 City-regional governance

promises reliability, predictability and clear lines of accountability, yet may easily
be remote and detached from the detailed challenges ‘on the ground’.
Local circumstances matter for the formulation and operation of regional
interests and agendas. This refers to the so-scaled ‘local milieu’ (Ache 2000) as
localising, conditioning factor, vis-à-vis external, wider, structural changes and
political–economic demands. The role of community power as an expression of the
particular composition and characteristics of a local population has gained in
recognition with local regime theory. Power to act is socially framed and
constructed, rather than merely allocated or ‘provided’ by structure, and may thus
be altered again through strategic action. ‘What is at issue is … a capacity to act’
(Stone 1989: 229), and this involves acting to enhance scope to act, such as through
building alliances, allegiances and engage in networks, as strategies to enhance
scope for policy-making capacity and capability. These are means of reaching out
to other governmental as well as non-governmental actors as part of a broadening
out of governing regimes. Stoker defines a regime ‘as an informal, yet relatively
stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained
role in making governing decisions’ (1998b: 123).
In addition to institutionalisation, the crucial role of territoriality matters funda-
mentally as the key common reference to communities and political electorates
and their localised interests. It is not merely the institutional base that is the source
of democratic legitimacy. Also important are place-based identities, senses of
ownership and control of living environments. Governance regimes bring together
actors – institutions, organisations and individuals – to negotiate common goals and
modi operandi, and gain greater capacity to act by ‘blending their resources, skills,
and purposes into a long-term coalition: a regime’ (Stoker 1998b: 123). The
particular contribution of regime theory to urban political theory in general is its
adding of awareness of ‘pre-emptive power’ as an additional quality, on top of the
‘standard’ tripartite set of systemic, command and coalitional powers. This refers
to the ability to plan ahead and pre-empt likely developments and political
scenarios, and so be better prepared for responding with strategic answers and
action. That may well include establishing new institutional or territorial arrange-
ments, if working through existing arrangements proves ineffective or unworkable.

Towards a comparative framework for analysing ‘post-modern’,

self-organising city-regional governance
The move towards governance has opened up hierarchical state governmental
structures by increasing the range of actors beyond the sphere of the state, as well
as removing once established institutional–territorial rigidities associated with
government. While projected as more ‘in tune’ with the rapidly changing
requirements and spatial manifestations of globalised corporate capital, it has also
raised questions about reliability, predictability and legitimation of political
authority, as in the case of informal alliances between governmental and non-
governmental actors as part of a governance ‘pact’. With the conventional
modernist, Fordist notion of government (Stoker 1989; Painter 1991), with its
 City-regional governance 111

hierarchical organisation and top-down modus of implementing policies from the

national to the local level, no longer so certain, other forms of horizontal organi-
sation through collaborative action and coordination of policies have taken hold
(see also Brenner 2004a). Network relations between actors from within and
outside government have emerged as the main vehicles – or rather, backbones – of
governance and its institutional and spatial expression. Especially the resultant
spatial fuzziness contrasts with the territorial fixities and certainties of statehood
and its governmental authority (Keohane and Nye 2000; Gualini 2004). Instead, it
suggests a de facto dissolution of contiguous state territory into a variable
patchwork of geographically overlapping and intersecting clusters of spaces, linked
by power relations and shared agendas (Ruggie 1993).
The essentially virtual nature of policy-defined spaces means that they are often
away from the public eye, serving primarily as ‘internal’ reference for institutional
policy makers. An absence of clearly recognisable, formalised institutional presence
and democratic representation means that avenues for political reward for acting
collaboratively at the regional level are not so obvious. They can only express
themselves through the conventional state structures, i.e. local government and
responses by the electorate at the ballot box. Much of the success of ‘new’ – i.e.
open, ad hoc – network approaches depends on the public acceptance and approval
of local policy makers’ efforts at regional ‘outreach’. There thus need to be clear
local advantages to result from any such regional involvement (Cashore 2002;
Harrison 2008) to convince the local electorate of the advantages of such action for
the locality and thus, by extension, the very electorate. Not surprisingly then,
especially in metropolitan areas, competition and cooperation are close bedfellows,
with actors needing to justify the legitimacy of their actions through effective and
(locally) ‘successful’ policies as part of collaborative dialogue at the city-regional
scale. Yet, as policy spaces intersect and overlap, maintaining clear lines of
legitimacy of institutional decisions and actions is not always easy (Shapiro 2007).
In the resulting new (virtual) ‘spheres of authority’ (Rosenau 1997), boundaries
of responsibility and legitimacy are inherently in flux, being more shaped by
leadership and the appraisal of political opportunities, at a particular time and for
individual actors, than institutionalised and territorially-defined policy objectives.
As a result, policy makers need to make judgements about balancing agendas and
the political utility of different alternatives in the geometries of possible collabo-
rative network relations within and across a city-region, and this may vary between
a more localist as against regionalist rationale and perspective. This balance, in
turn, is shaped by the composition of actors; multi-purpose or single-purpose
representations, public or private sector, etc. as part of governance (Heinelt and
Kübler 2005). Yet, such growing governmental fragmentation (Parks and Oakerson
2000) and competition not necessarily needs to mean the termination of regional
cooperation and abandonment of a regional agenda, as long as the local benefits
of such engagement are clear. Here, political capability – and also risk taking,
political courage and innovation – are required from local political actors, as there
is no clearly established system of political ‘reward’ for such action come the next
local elections. Much depends on the ability of leading actors to establish trust
112 City-regional governance

(Holton 2001) and a working rapport in favour of collaboration. Internal resources

will matter particularly strongly in such instances, as external variables – such as
institutional structures and flows of legitimation processes – are not designed for
cooperation. In such instances, endogenous capacity needs to overcome a disadvan-
tageous context, and finding mutual gain solutions (win-win situations) is crucial
in this, as it is those that provide the legitimacy for engagement and the basis for
political approval by the respective electorate. Regionalism here thus becomes a
bridge across different spatial scales between the local and the global (Scott 2001;
Brenner 2004a). Yet, referring to the North American context (especially US),
Sassen points out that the regional discourse, in its varied scalar association and
interpretation, is ‘totally submerged under the suburbanization banner, a concept
that suggests both escape from and dependence on the city’ (Sassen 2006: 196).
Figure 5.5 presents a matrix of the two main dimensions of city-regionalisation
(city-region building): ‘mechanism of regionalisation’ and ‘strength of relation-
ality’. This matrix is introduced here as a comparative framework for the analysis
of forms and mechanisms of metropolitan (city-regional) governance. Each city-
region, so the argument here, produces a particular combination of these two
dimensions, with varying relative importance of either of them. This, it does in
response to the two main sources of impetus as challenges to, and drivers of, city-
regionalisation, as discussed above: ‘Impetus A’ and ‘Impetus B’ respectively.

Impetus A
External impetus comprising of two main dimensions:

1 globalising capital interests and the need for competitiveness;

2 state-institutional structure, and the provision for local and regional govern-
ment within the scalar, organisational hierarchy.

The respective impact of these two determinants reflects political discourse and
choices about the role of the state in economic matters, varying between a more
statist, regulatory approach (e.g. to promote social equity) and neo-liberal laissez-
faire with its primary concern of cost-effectiveness and profitability.

Impetus B
Internal impetus produced by:

1 the structure of a city-region as circumscribed by the relative balance in

regional ‘importance’ of the localities within in a city-region – mono-centric
or poly-centric – and their interrelationship: competitive or collaborative;
2 the specific local milieu as sum of histories, identities, social composition, and
political–economic ways of doing things. Here, it matters, whether there is a
single dominant city shaping the city-region and giving it its name, or a range
of localities with more similar standing and ‘importance’ within the city-
region, competing for greater influence.
 IMPETUS A (effects of external factors): Globalisation and State
(e.g. need for economic competitiveness, impact of state constitution and regulation)

City-Regional miIieu
Nature of Mode of r egionalisation (region building)
regionalisation
(quality of inter- Associative Consolidative IMPETUS B
actor relations) self organising, virtual spatiality, scalar restructuring of government
institutions and territoriality
(Effects of internal
institutionally ‘thin’
factors):
Loose, self- co-ordination
organising ad hoc – functional structure
arrangement, (mono-/poly-centricity
institutionally ‘thin’, co-operation
with virtual spatiality – economic performance/
prospects
collusion
– socio-economic structure
Fixed, scalar confederation
– modus operandi of city-
restructuring of
regional governance
government
coercion
institutions &
– attitudes to regionalisation
territory
histories and identities
(localism)
City-Regional miIieu

growing degree of ‘togetherness’ and integration

Figure 5.5 Comparative analytical framework: dimensions of constructing (metropolitan) regions

Source: Author.
114 City-regional governance

Within Impetus B (and here the ‘milieu’) the two main alternative scenarios of
internal city-regional structure are:

(a) mono-centric arrangements, encapsulating a hegemonic form of regionali-

sation around a single city, with the whole city-region often simply named
‘metro-City’ (referred to here as ‘metro-isation’);
(b) poly-centric arrangements, with their preference for an inter-municipally
agreed ‘neutral’ compromise name for the region.

Each scenario develops its specific internal dynamics in inter-municipal relationships.

The combined effects of Impetus A and B, in their particular local balance and
manifestation, produce a city-regional milieu with a stronger or weaker propensity
for adopting a region-wide perspective and engaging in governance at that
geographic scale. And this propensity is the joint outcome of a willingness and
preparedness by local actors to ‘go regional’, and the degree of political and fiscal
pressures applied by the central state on local actors to engage with a regional
agenda. Such pressure may reach from a relatively subtle ‘convincing’ of the
advantages of a city-region-wide perspective in policy-making, to a rather interven-
tionist coercion through statutory and/or fiscal means.
Means and mechanisms of city-regionalisation will also be shaped by the likely
outcome, as this may be perceived by local actors as a greater or lesser ‘threat’;
whether ‘association’ or ‘consolidation’ is the declared (by the state or by inter-local
agreement) outcome, individual actors, as well as local communities, may be
concerned about losing their voice at the regional level and their ability to manage
their own (local) affairs. This, in turn, will set the conditions for particular forms
of city-regionalisation to emerge, reaching from a tentative coordination of
essentially locally defined and implemented policies, via ‘stronger’ forms of
commitment to inter-local engagement in the shape of ‘co-operation’ or ‘collusion’,
to a much farther-reaching ‘surrender’ of local policy-making autonomy under a
confederate agreement to finally, as the ‘nuclear option’, combine local entities by
redrawing territorial boundaries and governmental responsibilities. The way
municipalities engage with each other within a city-region, and adopt a regional
perspective in their policy-making, is thus fundamentally circumscribed by five
key variables:

1 economic necessity and opportunity;

2 projected format and modus operandi of city-regionalism as perceived ‘threat’
or ‘opportunity’, including the degree of geographic ‘realness’ of state territory
versus (more or less imagined) governance space;
3 intra-regional structure: polycentric versus mono-centric arrangement of local
government units in the city-region;
4 political context: paradigm of regionalism and state intervention/ pressure at
the local level;
5 preferred mechanism of regionalisation: co-ordinated fragmentation versus
centrally imposed consolidation.
 City-regional governance 115

These five determinants jointly set up the scene for an array of intersecting, com-
peting and potentially conflicting tensions between actors and interest groups,
which impact on a city-region and influence the adoption of particular governance
arrangements and modi operandi, at a particular time. The resulting arena offers a
framework within which to compare and examine the principles and practices of
city-regional governance in different national state-structural and economic
circumstances, and with varying intra-regional municipal patterns, political cultures
and relations. The joint outcome of these factors may include a preference for, on
the one hand, a vertical extension of state-centric government through insertion of
an extra layer of regional governmental capacity or, on the other, a primarily
horizontal engagement through broadening local agendas towards engagement
with multi-actor governance. This dichotomy reflects different key signifiers of
‘governing’, such as: notions of the liberty of the individual vis-à-vis the
prerogative of the state; the perceived role and relevance of public administration;
the meaning of ‘localness’ as an expression of ‘community’, however defined; and
the very constitutional context and national practice of organising and executing
(regionally relevant) government.
In particular, this framework sets out to allow gaining a clearer understanding
of the processes of formulating, structuring and implementing governance in city-
regions. A comparative analysis, cutting across varying national and local
circumstances – distinguished here into external and internal conditions shaped by
political, economic and cultural parameters – provides the opportunity to capture
some of the scenarios possible as a result of the diverse forms of interaction
between local actors within city-regions. This is illustrated by the case studies
presented below in Chapter 6. Specific geographic and temporal scales define and
reflect the political–economic and state–societal city-regional ‘climate’ for engag-
ing not only functionally at that scale, but also follow with governance principles
and practices, whether the outcome be ‘separatist’, tentatively consultative or
enthusiastically collaborative in nature.
Questions arising involve the respective effects of internal and external impetus
on a city-region’s ability to produce a governance arrangement that ‘best matches’
existing de facto functional regionalisation, and, subsequently, the nature of the
relationship between the two main variables identified here as key drivers in
shaping city-regional governance: ‘mechanism of regionalisation’ and ‘modus
operandi’ of regional governance? Are the answers to be found in far-reaching
territorial ‘consolidation’ through restructuring government territories through
amalgamation and re-drawing of boundaries? Or are they more likely to suggest a
more subtle approach in the form of collaboration between existing local
government to fit together local ‘fragments’ into a city-regional patchwork carpet
of joint regional policy agendas?
6 City-regional governance
as product of impetus, milieu
and structure
Comparing policies

This chapter introduces several case studies of city-regional governance, as

metropolitan areas seek to find responses to internal (local, regional) and external
(state structure and global competitiveness) pressures and challenges (see Chapter
5) They illustrate different national contexts in terms of provisions for local
government responsibility, power, legitimacy and public acceptance, as well as
functional structures and relations between ‘city’ and ‘hinterland’. All these factors,
as discussed earlier, combine to produce time and place-specific forms of city-
regional governance (Brenner 1999). They reflect varying balances between
internal factors, such as a mono- versus polycentric structure, a local policy-making
‘milieu’ with greater or lesser affinity for adopting a regional perspective, and
external impetus emanating from a combination of state structure and related policy
agendas and competitive pressure from globalisation. Externally, varying economic
prospects and connectivities matter, as do balances between central control and
local autonomy and capacity, in shaping city-regional policies on the ground.
In addition to these two dimensions of intra and extra city-regional variation, the
third main dimension of comparison is that between the business-centric and
inherently localist tradition in local government in North America, especially the
US, shaped by the settlement history and the so important notion of the ‘frontier’
versus, in Europe, the more state and public administration-focused tradition with
its acceptance of state hierarchy. This includes an awareness of being part of a
multi-level state system as well as a much deeper and more complex history in
terms of identities, role of territoriality and external relations. All this fuses into
what is termed here ‘local milieu’ (see Chapter 5), which provides the source for
local responses to the external pressures shaped by the variables ‘state’ and ‘global-
isation’ respectively (Chapter 5 and Fig. 5.1). The cross-section and interaction
between these factors shapes a matrix within which the case studies may be placed
to reflect the relative differences in the likely impact exercised by these three
variables as part of a distinction between an ‘internal’ and ‘external’ sphere of
determinants of a preference for particular mechanisms of governing city-regions.
These vary between different degrees of institutionalisation, openness to partici-
pation to actors interested in joint policies and agendas, or degree of ‘imposition’
by external pressures and incentives versus locally made choices (albeit vis-à-vis
externally shaped parameters).
 Impetus, milieu and structure 117

These local choices reflect a particular local ‘milieu’ defined by a fusion of historic
developments and experiences, economic position and prospects, and societal values.
The latter emanate from historic developments, both locally and nationally based,
dominant political discourse, socio-economic patterns and related sense of social
identity, political-institutional capacities as part of a state structure, including fiscal
arrangements, and political leadership and acceptance of a particular role of the state
as part of local government. The different factors exercise varying degrees of impact
on local political discourses and, of particular interest here, views of the benefits –
or threats – of reaching beyond ‘city limits’ and engaging region-wide with other
municipalities and non-governmental organisations within the surrounding region,
however vague that may be defined in its spatial extent. Given this complexity, only
an inter-local and inter-national comparison can provide some indication of the
varying roles played by external factors – state and globalisation – and internal para-
meters, as expressed in a local (policy-making) milieu. In particular, the dimensions
of ‘state’ and ‘local milieu’ are of interest here as variables, as these appear of primary
importance in shaping the policy-making process, especially when focusing on the
role of governmental institutions, non-governmental organisations and interest groups
(advocacy groups), rather than corporate organisations and their behaviour. While
these play a crucial role in the overall development of, especially economic, policies,
their analysis would take the whole study in a different direction and beyond the
scope of this book. Globalisation, in turn, is treated as somewhat of a ubiquitous
background force, exercising a general pressure for greater competitiveness on all
places, although different equipment with location factors will provide corresponding
variations in pressures, positive or negative. Here, this particular aspect of local
competitiveness flows into the analysis through the individual case studies, as it is
the concern with, and about, this that shapes local (economic) policies, including the
willingness and readiness to engage regionally, without direct state intervention.

Cities and regionalism in Europe and North America –

some comments on difference and similarity
International comparisons offer the opportunity to include the role of the state in
the development of urban–regional policy-making formations. This however, as
Cox points out, has often been neglected in discussions on urban (and regional)
government/governance, with the state and its activities/structure been treated
more like a ‘background condition, as something mobilized in the service of,
say, growth coalitions’ (Cox 2004: 247). Such matters in particular, when looking
at conditions in Europe and North America. In the former, the political–adminis-
trative organisation of the European Union and its involvement in local policy
negotiations and networks through its various agencies and its control of fiscal
and regulatory resources (Cox 2004), have created a strong government-centred
framework for city-regional governance. By contrast, ‘the American politics
continues much as it has been for fifty years or more’ (240), with a distinct role
for the business community as an integral part of local-regional policy-making,
and a deep suspicion of ‘more government’, seen as adding bureaucracy and
118 Impetus, milieu and structure

potentially undermining local democratic control and autonomy. Many of the

central state’s effects are thus incidental, rather than specifically targeted at
particular areas or types of localities,
Using examples from both Europe and North America allows to take account of
a variety of key parameters for regionalisation in terms of political context, values,
experiences and ways of doing things, and how these lead to ‘variants, hybrids, or
brand-new creations resulting from the dialectical relationship between structure
and agency, i.e. structure and change’ (Moulaert et al. 2007: 206). Markusen (1987)
for instance, in reference to the North American example of ‘regions’, refers to
their territoriality as a presumed ‘given’, although she emphasises the need for
such regions to be flexible and responsive to both intra- and extra-regional
pressures, rather than being arbitrarily drawn-up territories.
It is here that North America and Europe have different traditions, which will
have an impact on the nature and objectives of engaging across local boundaries.
For instance in the US, frequently driven by the local business community, local
growth coalitions are well established and shaped by local/regional business
interests, that is the ‘capital classes’ (Cox 2004). They are rooted in, and dependent
on, the markets provided by their respective local areas. Local businesses depend
on local conditions ‘by virtue of some combination of local knowledge, property
investments, dependence on specifically local markets, property investments’
(263). In a way, this is part of the ‘local milieu’ as bedrock of local policy agendas.
Businesses drive this agenda, often in conjunction with state agencies who they
seek to co-opt, as part of an established corporatist local political–economic
culture. This contrasts with the much more government-centric, administratively
organised and institutionalised arrangements in mainland Europe (Britain and
Ireland follow more the North American model). There for instance, the chambers
of commerce are one example of institutionalised corporate elements. In much of
mainland Europe, such as in Germany, France or Italy, the chambers are closely
linked to governmental institutionalisation, with membership compulsory for all
local businesses above a minimum size, and their views must be considered in
local development plans for example. Thus, while in North America it is the
business’ individual voices that matter, even if self-organised in a local represen-
tation, in Europe the voice of businesses is formally institutionalised and expressed
in close alliance with governmental structures. But state conditions and ways of
working change too, with institutions and actors ‘learning’, for instance more
effective lobbying techniques and more imaginative ways of designing shaping
policies, although this, of course, varies considerably between places. Here,
chambers in large metropolitan areas possess greater organisational capacity and
capability, although the application of such in public policy, varies.
In North America, especially the USA, city-regions show an often stark social
and ethnic contrast between ‘core city’ and ‘suburb’, which has contributed to
hostile attitudes towards inter-municipal cooperation and region-building (Rusk
1993). City-regions around Detroit and Atlanta make these difficulties obvious
(see p. 141ff). Social segregation, with ever more ‘gated communities’ creates
defensive thinking among the suburban and core city population, with the former
 Impetus, milieu and structure 119

seeking to keep ‘their’ tax dollars to themselves, and the latter wanting to maintain
political control of the core city, not at least to secure social programmes and public
investment. As a further point, there are different political cultures in core city and
suburb (Clark 1996). While in the former, party-political contacts and linkages and
more redistributive policies are well established, the suburbs prefer a more techno-
cratic, public choice-oriented and ‘business-friendly’ approach to local policies.
Efficiency gains in the delivery of local services and, as a consequence, likely
further tax cuts, are a perennial political topic in suburban areas.
Having a metropolitan ‘feel’, is an important descriptor of the notion of
‘urbanity’, as it relates to the perceived belonging to a place and its resident com-
munity, which in turn, is closely linked to a sense of quality of life and ownership
of a locality as a place (Healey et al. 2003). In the USA and Canada, most of the
cities outside the ‘old’ East are no older than 150 years, having followed similar
developments and architectural styles. In many ways, therefore, apart from the big
metropolitan centres of international recognition, the average North American city
may look quite alike, offering similar mixes of architectural styles, layouts and
economic developments. The absence of a deeper, more varied, historic rooting
and characteristic produces merely limited qualities of urbanity and unique
reference points for more deeply entrenched localism. Yet, it needs to be pointed
out that the absence of historic regions, as found in Europe, means that the different
federal states provide reference points for a sub national ‘regional’ identity and
sense of belonging (Raagmaa 2002; Paasi 2003). Specific place-based features
may therefore matter, rather than underlying histories. In urban areas, with
ubiquitous suburbanity and its identical features (and values) across North America
for instance, living in an urban environment or ‘downtown’, for instance, empha-
sises a counter-positon to ubiquitous ‘normality’ of an essentially standardised
form of North American suburban way of life. Not living in the suburbs is
‘different’ from the ‘norm’, be that for reasons of lifestyle choice or outcome of
socio-economic divisions and exclusions. It is thus at the socio-economic level
that a fundamental part of identities is shaped and linked to the contrast between
‘urban’ and ‘suburban’, rather than a complex mesh of layers of histories and
cultural legacies signified in individual physical artefacts in the urban landscape,
or place-based narratives. With the historic ‘veneer’ much thinner in North America
to define and distinguish places, currently existing differences and specificities,
with their dependence on socio-economic construction, are much more relevant
for shaping policies and attitudes to interact with the ‘outside’ beyond city limits,
and in this context, ‘thinness’ of identity-making substance makes it sensitive to
dangers of ‘muddying the waters’, so it seems, when faced with a regulating
agenda. Facing the prospect of bringing local entities together by reducing the
divisionary effects of boundaries and distinctions drawn up between localities, may
cause alarm for fear of diluting the foundation of identity. Indeed, people and,
subsequently, policy makers may wish to retain such borders to defend their
individual constructed identities as a sign of ‘us’ versus ‘the rest’. Challenging that
removes one of the few key distinguishing factors, and such may well be seen as
an unwanted obfuscation of ‘us’ as a local community. The cases of Atlanta and
120 Impetus, milieu and structure

certainly also Detroit, illustrate this division and attempts at maintaining existing
partitions between city and suburb,
In Europe, while localism also plays an important role, it has more depth to fall
back on, and this provides a more substantial point of reference for, and source of,
constructing and maintaining identity and sense of ‘us’. On the one hand, such
produces a deeply engrained sense of localism and local patriotism, while also
serving as a source for ‘localising’ new arrivals in the cities’ suburbs. These become
part of the city as a whole, as it is the core city that provides identity and difference
for the suburbs as well. Suburbs are not per se socio-economically different from
the core city; divisions are much more complex and varied, cutting across a city,
dividing suburban as well as urban areas. While urban living has gained in
popularity and ‘trendiness’ over the last three or so decades, it never really went
out of fashion per se altogether. Although it was coming to be seen as a place to
live of ‘last resort’, as widespread in North America, changing lifestyles and values,
but also ideas about living environments, have brought back city centres as
accepted, even desirable places to live, albeit only highly localised and selective,
with the right locational attributes. This quite homogeneous tableau of urbanism
offers, in Markusen’s (1998) words, ‘a chance to study regionalism in a more
purely capitalist economic setting, with relatively fewer cultural complications’. It
is a simpler world, shaped by socio-economic and economic factors and consider-
ations, rather than a complex, diverse historic underpinning.
Regionalisation in North American cities is thus seen with suspicion by many
‘suburbanites’ who want to maintain, or even create (see Chapter 5), administrative
separation as a defensive wall. Another important ‘North America factor’, which was
found by the author to be of particular prominence in the Pacific Northwest, is an
inherent individualism and distrust of governmental interference with private lives,
going back to the pioneering days and a strong sense of self-reliance. The history
and narrative of the ‘frontier’, especially outside the ‘old’ states of New England, is
never far away (Turner and Bogue 2010). This means a distinct dislike of a seeming
concentration of governmental power and its likelihood of overbearing onto local
matters and scope to run localities locally. So, regions and regionalisation are viewed
as the potential thin end of the wedge of the state mushrooming and reaching out to
‘run’ local matters. Again, this reflects the identification of regionalisation with ‘big
state’ and external interference with matters of local democratic choices and
decisions. Policy implementation is thus more often left to single purpose bodies and
informal alliances that can be called off any time, if they are deemed to restrict local
interests. Claims by authors such as Ohmae (1995) that future economic prosperity
will favour more autonomy for regions at the expense of the nation state, has further
fuelled distrust of region-building projects.
In Europe, by contrast, the state tends to be viewed as the leading arbiter of new
and better forms of competitiveness-enhancing regionalisation. Certainly, the
presence of the state at all levels of government is accepted, even though there are
variations in the degree to which local matters are safeguarded for local decision
making. But in these debates there is little real questioning of the essential features
of regionalisation per se for policy purposes. The multi-level structure of the
 Impetus, milieu and structure 121

European Union, and its emphasis on regions for the implementation of financially
supported policies, has added further pragmatic reasons for accepting regionali-
sation. Histories, identities and sense of togetherness add to this picture. This means
that in the face of economic processes (globalisation), the principle of territorial
government, involving a presence of state institutions, is not questioned per se.
For business organisations, especially in Europe, the need for dealing with ever
more rapidly and fundamentally changing markets and economic spaces as part of
globalisation, makes a shift away from technocratic regionalism and associated
bureaucracy seem welcome and overdue. Such a shift promises greater respon-
siveness and thus relevance to continuously changing conditions, and there are
ample signs that the firmly institutionalised chambers of commerce, for instance,
engage in new joint initiatives, also in the form of largely virtual new marketing
organisations, to drive new policy agendas. The cases of Lyon and Turin, for
instance, are very interesting examples of these changes. Not surprisingly, perhaps,
relations between them and conventional regional administration and planning
have not always been easy.
Development control is one of the areas where business interests and those of
the administration do not always converge, and it is one of the main areas of
conflict in local policies, especially in North America. Generally, the business
community prefers the possibility of a more responsive, communicative, policy-
oriented approach. This has repeatedly been confirmed to the author during many
discussions with representatives of the business community (e.g. chambers of
commerce). This type of approach is in tune with established business practices of
collective action in response to perceived shared market challenges. Business
clusters provide a particularly fertile context for the development of such informal,
and largely personality-based, network forms of cooperation. New organisations,
resulting from such informal cooperation, are usually time limited, ‘thin’ in
capacity and bureaucracy, and tend to be outside the government hierarchy. They
may work both horizontally, bringing together otherwise competing localities and
groups of actors within localities, and vertically, working across the institutional
boundaries within an administrative hierarchy through lobbying and calling ‘round
tables’. Again, the case studies illustrate this function well. Yet, despite the growing
focus on informal mechanisms of regionalisation, the state continues to play an
important role in much academic debate about regions and their governance as
part of a scalar hierarchy of state territories (Brenner 2002, 2004a; Jessop 2003;
Gualini 2004).
Some authors refer to lesser degrees of institutionalisation (and government
centredness) as ‘soft institutionalism’ (MacLeod 2001, 2004) as backdrop to
reflections on ‘enriched institutionalism in urban and regional enquiry’ (MacLeod
2004). This, nevertheless, acknowledges the continued key role of institutions, just
as argued in Patsy Healey’s (1997) ‘institutionalist approach’ to planning. Territo-
riality, and thus geography, seem inextricably linked to processes and analyses of
economic development and decision making, shaped by socio-cultural, historic
factors and ways of doing things. ‘Institutions matter’ (Peck 2000), but they are,
as this study seeks to argue, not the solution per se. By the same token, they also
122 Impetus, milieu and structure

cannot be simply replaced by something ‘new’. Non-formalised arrangements,

with no fixed territoriality, driven by convenience and temporary utility, may well
be on the increase among local policy makers, but they cannot be a complete
replacement ‘of the old’. The emphasis there is on the number and diversity of
formal organisations that compete and interact in the pursuit of economic govern-
ance (regulation). ‘Institutional thickness’ thus encompasses both the sum of
relevant organisations involved in economic development and the ‘instituted
process’ (MacLeod 2004: 66) as the conditions underpinning economic develop-
ment in a place, that is context-specific ‘action frameworks’ (67). Instead, it is
about establishing new linkages and trusts between existing organisations and
actors in the pursuit of an agreed shared goal. Essentially, as one policy maker in
Vancouver said, ‘all that’s needed is an office, a website and a secretary’ (Interview
VEC, Nov. 2004). It is only then that such new organisations can retain a sufficient
distance to government and its structures to be able to contribute to the shaping of
‘governance’, acting as ‘honest broker’, rather than merely adding to ‘government’
and thus being perceived as ‘yet more (costly) bureaucracy’ (see also Jessop 2004).
So, while on the one hand, ‘political and institutional form does not necessarily
follow function’ (Keating 1998: 76), and ‘regional states’ (Ohmae 1995) do not
seem the automatic outcome of the attempt to rescale economic governance in the
face of pressures for greater global competitiveness, there is evidence that some
form of organising, and thus representing and ‘visualising’, self-organising collab-
oration is an advantage for being effective policy makers.
In a recent article, Moulaert et al. argue that ‘institutional change is path-
dependent – whether driven by hegemonic or counter-hegemonic forces’ (2007: 206).
In other words, local conditions past and present shape the extent to, as well as the
ways in, which challenges are perceived and preferably responded to, and this in turn
follows changing general paradigms in policy-making, such as ‘localism’ or
‘regionalism’ in relation to local government. Depending on local factors and influ-
ences by different political agendas and interests, including the balance between the
business community and local government, this may result in ‘a difference between
hegemonic discourses and actual practices’ (206). Such a ‘gap’ results from the
degree to which there is a wholesale shift from one paradigm to another and the
speed at which such shifts occur among different policy-making actors. Such may,
as has been the case in England since 2010, a complete reversal of previous favour-
itism of a regional agenda towards its abandonment and replacement by ‘all-out’
localism. Evidence from the following exemplary case studies will point out that
such shifts are not necessarily as clear-cut and, in the instance of regionalisation and
regional governance, may be rather messy and opportunistically driven, reflecting
local circumstances, especially political–economic ‘milieux’, and external pressures
and incentives emanating from both state and globalised capital.

Regionalisation in practice
Getting the structures right has been at the centre of the struggle for more competitive
and successful regions. Yet while much of the academic debate concentrated on the
 Impetus, milieu and structure 123

questions of territorial scale (Brenner 2002; Gualini 2004) and the associated
presence, form and modi operandi of institutions and administrative structures, practi-
tioners often have moved to find new solutions in the face of growing pressures of
globalised competition. Different local circumstances ‘condition’ such searches and
subsequent responses, reflecting functional structures, roles and sizes of munici-
palities, balances between ‘urban’, suburban’ and ‘rural’, and political attitudes
towards regionalisation of interests and actions. Information was obtained from a
series of interviews with key policy makers in economic development within local
and city region-wide government (economic development units, planning depart-
ments), and chambers of commerce as business representations. In addition, a host
of documents has been examined and relevant websites have been analysed at
varying points in time over the last decade. This made it possible to identify shifts in
strategies and policy foci.
In the course of this research, interviews with regional decision makers in
metropolitan areas were conducted between 2003 and 2006, including Turin,
Lyon, Hamburg, Seattle, Detroit, Atlanta and Vancouver. The analysis suggests
that there is more to raising competitiveness than ‘fiddling’ with ‘structure’.
Although it is important to avoid institutionalised obstructionism vis-à-vis collab-
orative overtures (Hauswirth et al. 2003), there seems little point in trying to find
the ‘perfect’ structure and associated territorial scale. Too rapid and too unpredict-
able are the changes in the policy-making environment triggered by globalisation,
especially in economic policy, and thus the shifts in interests, priorities and
agendas among policy makers within, and between, localities. Perhaps inevitably,
therefore, the case studies exposed the challenges, often within the government
machinery, between representatives of different institutional cultures, political
capabilities and capacities, degrees of leadership and established balances of
power between governmental and non-governmental organisations, and thus the
balance between group-specific interests, such as the business community, and
the general local communities. It is particularly this interface that has raised
questions of the role of elitism in democratic representation, as economic develop-
ment units seek to emulate corporate ways of doing things so as to ‘speak the
same language’. Organisations like Torino Internazionale, Vancouver Economic
Commission or Hamburg Economic Development, are examples of such new
organisations being set up in the space between corporate and state interests, and
local representation, so as to be in a good position – with greater credibility – to
act as ‘honest brokers’ between the different interests and agendas and ways of
doing things. The interesting observation is that the seven case studies relate to
each other in different ways, cutting across national or, indeed, continent-specific
contexts, local economic, historic and practical government. This allows
interesting links to be drawn between the seven city-regions, such as between
Turin and Detroit – sharing the car production specialism, but differing
fundamentally in their histories and structures – or Vancouver and Turin as hosts
of the Winter Olympics with similar foci on using this as a major vehicle for
enhanced international status.
124 Impetus, milieu and structure

Part 1: European experiences

Turin: ‘reaching outwards’ as a way of local re-invention and economic

survival
Turin exemplifies a city that, facing an economic crisis after the collapse of its
dominant industrial base, needed to reinvent itself and rediscover its historic role
as a leading urban centre for a large region and Italy. Strong local leadership, and
attempts at de-politicising this process, led to a fundamental repositioning of the
city within a regional and international context. The combination of loss of compet-
itiveness (globalisation), a new regional agenda by the national government (state),
and in particular strong local factors ‘local milieu’ led to a comprehensive policy
framework to connect the city outwardly to the region, and beyond. In the early
1990s, Turin discovered that after the loss of its 100 year-long status as first and
foremost the home of Fiat, a new economic base had to be found. A strong city
mayor with a business background and a clear vision, promoted ‘Torino Inter-
nazionale’ as a new initiative to open up the city to international business and
competition, and vision has been the main driver and focus of efforts, rather than
battles about administrative procedures and competencies. In effect, the city
understood itself as reaching out into the region in the sense of a Greater Turin.
Torino Internazionale has been the city’s new (and novel) way of responding to
globalisation and to open up to the world, advocating a regional approach, although
it is essentially a local initiative by the dominant city of Turin. It thus does not
really address how to govern the metropolitan area. In 1990, Italy’s legislators
formally attached a regional dimension to the city by establishing the città
metropolitane as a theoretical construct, analogue to English metropolitan author-
ities. Although never really properly implemented, this top-down creation was
somewhat overtaken by state-sponsored, locality-focused regionalisation
initiatives. These include the 1994 creation of a formal urban network within the
Province of Bologna as an expression of the new locality-based nature of regions:
the 48 municipalities of that province signed a contract of cooperation with the
region for a range of specified regional matters that would be dealt with as required.
This arrangement was therefore not an ex ante redistribution and formalisation of
powers, but a problem-specific and time-limited, negotiated, informal agreement
for a clearly specified territory as sum of the participating municipalities’ areas.
The goal was to put the main urban regions in the driving seat for moving ahead
regional, and thus national, economic development.
It is a national state ‘impetus’ for regionalisation similar to the initiative at the
time in France, as illustrated by the Lyon case. Without providing any clear
guidance of the modus operandi, extra powers or financial capacity, every large city
was meant to establish a ‘metropolitan’ government, based and focused on the city,
thus effectively extending it into the region (Geppert 2009). Yet, there was no clear
definition of what ‘metropolitan’ meant in practice, how ‘real’ it was meant to be
in terms of governmental territoriality and capacity. This urban focus of the
regional scale, however ‘fuzzy’, reflects the realisation that it is successful urban
economies that will drive the regional and national economies, and that it is
 Impetus, milieu and structure 125

‘government’ that needs to be extended and enhanced. This matters, as there is

already governmental presence at the regional level in the shape of the official
NUTS 1 regions and the counties as groupings of municipalities. The problem is
the delimitation of such regions, as different tasks require different territories and
thus boundaries (Interview Regione Piemonte, 29 Jan. 2004).
The issue of multiple geographies as an expression of variable interests between
adjoining municipalities in a city-region, also over time, has been a key driver
behind the shaping of Torino Internazionale as a non-governmental, thinly institu-
tionalised organisation, with a small office suit, few, but dedicated and innovative
staff, and a website; the hallmarks of a virtual regionalism (see above). By its very
nature, it resembles an open membership organisation for municipalities in the
wider Turin metropolitan area to join without the threat of foregoing powers of
local self-government, and this includes joining alliances, and leaving them, in
different constellations and for different purposes. In effect, it is a form of region-
alisation à la carte, where individual municipalities may participate for a certain
range of individual policy fields (or agendas), but choose not to do so for others.
Bobbio and Rosso (2003) compare forms of metropolitan cooperation in Leone,
Milan and Turin, and this includes an interesting list as cross tabulation between
the 47 municipalities forming the (virtual) metropolitan region of Turin, and eight
policy fields (Table 6.1). Interestingly, just nine municipalities – admittedly
including the by far dominant city of Turn – subscribed to all eight policy fields.
Only one field, tourism, managed to attract all 47 local governments to participate
in regionally collaborative engagement, followed by ‘participation’ as informal
and non-binding round-table. Overall, when organised by size of community, a
general picture emerges of smaller communities tending to engage less strongly,
reducing their engagement to fewer policy projects. This may well have to do with
a sense of vulnerability to potential domination by the larger communities in the
region, especially the by far leading core city, Turin. Anxiously guarding their
constitutionally and historically based autonomy, selecting only ‘safe’ projects
seems the logical consequence of an instilled, long and deeply embedded sense of
localism. By the same token, the possibility of being ‘in’ for some, and ‘out’ for
other, policies may strengthen the acceptability of the city-region as a policy space,
albeit in a virtual presence. Its virtuality as an organisation permits to maintain
local individuality and thus feel ‘safe’ and, as a consequence, more willing to
engage at all. Just being seen to be part of the new and energetic metropolitan
‘club’ may be a sufficient outcome for a municipality in itself, so as to remain
visibly part of the agenda, and maintain a stake in any perceived benefits that may
arise from such regional engagement for individual local interests. The case of
Hamburg makes this consideration by outlying municipalities very clear. Non-
inclusion in the metropolitan region, even if on a mere virtual, imagineered, level,
is considered as sending the wrong messages to outside observers. Not having
made the grade to be included is seen as visibly condemning a locality to periph-
erality and marginality.
Yet, notions of power and credibility matter for such regional constructs, and
that means some implementational ‘teeth’ and here, established governmental
126 Impetus, milieu and structure

Table 6.1 Participation by municipalities in regional policy fields in metropolitan Turin

Participation in:
Local Population Metrop. Torino Turin Metrop. Traffic Strategic Turin Pass
authority 2001 conf. Internaz. Metrop. in public master econ. tourism 15*
provincial transp. plan policy
plan body area
Torino 857433 x x x x x x x x
Moncalieri 53120 x x x x x x x x
Rivoli 49505 x x x x x x x x
Nichelino 46858 x x x x x x x x
Settimo 45495 x x x x x x x x
Grugliasco 36929 x x x x x x x x
Ven. Reale 34777 x x x x x x x x
Chieri 32136 x x x x x x
Carmagnola 24670 x x
Orbassano 21563 x x x x x x x x
Collegno 21070 x x x x x x x x
San Mauro 17672 x x x x x x x x
Rivalta 17565 x x x x x x x x
Alpignano 16648 x x x x x x x
Caselle 15437 x x x x x x x x
Vinovo 13425 x x x x x x x
Volpiano 13008 x x x x
Beinasco 12754 x x x x x x x x
Borgaro 12754 x x x x x x x x
Leini 11948 x x x x x x x
Pianezza 11237 x x x x x x x
Trofarello 10352 x x x x x x x x
Santena 10019 x x x x
Gassino 9015 x x X
Poirino 8930 x x
Cariagnano 8623 x X
PionTorinese 8238 x x x x x x x
Piossasco 8238 x x x x x x
Druento 8228 x x x x x x x x
None 7759 X x
Brandizzo 7399 x x
Bruino 7308 x x x x
Volvera 6966 x x x x
Buttigliera 6522 x x
La Loggia 6485 x x x x x x
Cambiano 5798 x x x X
Castiglione 5480 x x x X
SanBenigno 5156 x
Candiolo 5080 x x x x x
Villastellone 4641 x
Pecetto 3687 x x x x x
Rostoa 3626 x x x x
Baldissero 3240 x x x x x x
Piobesi 3232 x x x
SanRaffaele 2815 x x
Villarbasse 2814 x x x x
Caselette 2641 x x
San Gillio 2581 x x x x
Lombardore 1511 x x
TOTAL 1568161 38 22 30 32 26 33 47 31
Notes: Based on: Bobbio and Rosso (2003), Table 3. *Pass 15: The project Pass15 ran for 15 years, from 1998 to
2012, as an annual pass for under 15 year-olds to access, free of charge, a range of leisure, culture and education
facilities in participating municipalities within the Turin region.
 Impetus, milieu and structure 127

organisations with defined powers and territorially circumscribed responsibilities,

matter, so as to link the ‘virtual’ to the ‘real’ for implementing policies, yet maintain
the ‘virtual’ as indirect coupling between the local and regional perspective. This
allows local interests to disengage, if preferred. Perhaps not surprisingly, the
official region, Piemonte, confirms this dual approach, when admitting that ‘Torino
Internazionale is a good idea, but the region needs to participate’ in any such
enterprise, and thus be part of the regionalisation game (interview, Regione
Piemonte, 29 Jan. 2004). By the same token, the need was pointed out for allowing
variable geographies of collaboration within any regional construct to accommo-
date different sub-areas of common agenda and interest and sense of shared
purpose. For instance, as a senior officer at Regione Piemonte pointed out (ibid.),
economic development no longer means the same between regions, so that a one-
size fits all approach, as conventional top-down regionalisation has adopted in the
interest of redistributive development policies, not at least through the EU’s
Structural Fund, no longer seems such an automatically desirable and effective
approach. Rather, regions need to help local areas to develop and, importantly,
need to be locally seen and perceived to be able to provide this support and
opportunity. ‘Local’ means no longer automatically just to focus on localities as a
‘natural’ sub-regional entity, but to look at other spatial structures as well, however
‘virtual’, such as business clusters. These may well transcend local administrative
boundaries and project a wider, seemingly coherent, spatial image. Yet, in
Piemonte, this is not easy. Given the small-scale structure of local government,
with more than 1200 local authorities, some 90 per cent of these are smaller than
5,000 inhabitants (ibid.). Table 6.1 illustrates this for the Turin city-region.
External incentives through higher tier government may vary in response to
shifting political agendas and governmental majorities. When the current regions
were set up in 1970, the associated regional government was meant to acquire
some powers, but devolve others to localities. Yet, the national government cut
funding for these regional powers, so that they are little more than ‘paper tigers’
with no implementational ‘teeth’. This inequality is a particular problem for
Piemonte region with its differences between urban cores and remote rural mount-
ainous areas. Interests and perspectives vary widely, and Turin-based urbanity
means more to some than others. With Turin itself still undergoing a process of re-
invention and repositioning (Vanolo 2008), agendas and perspectives on the
relationship between city and region are in flux, with regional interests changing
in their perceived importance. In the run-up to the 2006 Winter Olympics, of
course, regional engagement clearly led to local advantages (location of events), a
phenomenon also experienced in Vancouver four years later. Yet, with the city’s
functional and reputational dominance in the region, especially from an external
perspective, there is a danger of reducing the region too much to a narrow (city-
focused) understanding of city-region for marketing reasons and forgetting the rest
(interview, Regione Piemonte, 29 Jan. 2004)
This re-orientation represents a major shift from Turin’s insular, inward-looking
nature during its ‘industrial phase’ when it functioned primarily as the location for
Fiat’s globally operating business. Turin was not the economic centre of the region,
128 Impetus, milieu and structure

from which it was perceived to have withdrawn, functionally disembedded; city and
metropolitan area (province) were separate entities (interview, Regione Piemonte, 29
Jan. 2004). Turin had effectively become a location in Fiat’s production network,
rather than a metropolitan centre, and as a result, the sense of ‘region-ness’ (see also
Hettne and Söderbaum 2000) is much less developed compared with, for instance,
the ‘Third Italy’ arrangements in neighbouring Emila-Romagna (Camagni and
Salone 1993; Cooke, 1996). Instead, the region was looking to Milan as the ‘trendy’,
international city. Yet, economic changes meant that Turin refocused on its more
immediate spatial functional context and interconnect with it, and had to make up
for lost time in city-region building (interview, Regione-Piemonte, 29 Jan. 2004). It
is at this point that the new vision of Torino Internazionale comes in; establishing the
city as a place, a regional centre and internationally connected and visible locality
with its own, specific characteristics and potential. Actors involved include a broad
range of interests across scales and sectors. The first step involved the governmental
and institutional actors, such as Piemont Regional and Provincial governments,
various branches of the chambers of commerce (Foreign Department, Brussels
office), trade associations, the university, the polytechnic, religious and consular
organisations (Torino Internazionale, report and interview, 29 Jan. 2004). In the
second stage, the main focus was on local communities and resources, such as study
centres, training centres, cultural and social institutions and organisations with
ongoing international relations.
Preparations for the Winter Olympics in 2006 provided extra impetus to deliver
projects and make things happen ‘on the ground’, rather than engage solely in
designing grand strategy in virtual space. As a result, Torino Internazionale has
come to be accepted not just as a think-tank with ‘fancy ideas’ but also as a relevant
policy maker. It has become part of the political establishment as they proved their
credentials. One outcome of this has been the growing emphasis on ‘do-able’
projects, proposed in the concept, so as to deliver results and convince policy
makers and the public alike of the feasibility and ‘realness’ of the proposed re-
invention of the city. This greater emphasis on doing things was also possible
because of the principle of cooperating, an initially new concept among relevant
actors within the city, and between it and the region with its many small munici-
palities in the Turn hinterland (Torino Internazionale, 2000; and interview, 29 Jan.
2004). Driven by a technocratic rather than political mayor, two strategic avenues
were taken to make projects ‘happen’: (1) consultations (3 years) to connect the
project with the public and establish a general acceptance of its purpose and ways
of implementation (legitimation); and (2) openness, ‘listening’ and seeking a broad
coalition of actors and interests to minimise conflict, delay and obstruction (Associ-
azione Torino Internazionale 1999).
The new ‘Metropolitan Conference’ served this purpose of a talking shop and
negotiating table, and as such followed a central government requirement for
creating such a platform as part of the regionalisation agenda. The Conference
represents the visible political–institutional expression of a network-based, collab-
orative and consultative approach horizontally between municipalities and other
relevant actors in the city-region (Torino Internazionale 2000). In essence, it is a
 Impetus, milieu and structure 129

platform for discussion and negotiation of regional objectives between local

representatives who, as delegates at the regional conference, provide indirect
democratic legitimacy for decisions. Yet, a change in leadership half-way through
the project phase meant a move back from the ‘new’ network approach with
informal consultation and negotiation, to an emphasis on ‘government’ with
utilising institutions and the administration to ‘see things through’. The key task
remains to convince the other town councils of the benefits of closer cooperation
with Turin, e.g. through infrastructure measures that improve their economic
prospects. In this respect, the strategic plan is a mere guidance for further
development, as it takes governmental capacity to implement projects ‘on the
ground’. Yet the apparent virtual abandonment of the Olympic Village, with the
shut information office still containing boxes with prospectuses of the 2006 Winter
Games (observed in April 2010), points to the danger of projects being too much
tied to specific, time-limited, objectives. Collaborative agreements may lose their
‘drive’ in a similar way, once the goal has been reached.
Torino Internazionale operates at two levels: the grand strategy meta-level,
involving strategic perspectives and public debate and participation beyond the
government, and a detailed, project-based approach where ideas are put into
practice (Pinson 2002). The link between ‘meta’ and ‘project’ is crucial for the sum
of the projects adding up to a bigger strategic and ‘real’ whole. There is thus a
distinct separation between a non-statal, non-governmental organisation as collab-
orative platform for negotiations of interests, and institutionalised governmental
arrangement to implement the agreed project, ‘see them through’. It is an attempt
at rescaling the strategic-imagined territoriality of Turin as a city-region, based on
a new awareness and interpretation of global–local interrelations, while also linking
this to ‘real’ power and scope for policy-making. The objective has been, as Pinson
(2002) points out, to develop a Turin-specific societal and political–economic
‘milieu’ with specific identities, modi operandi and developmental objectives, as
well as strategic ideas and innovative capacity.
But despite the mobilisation of popular debate outside government, Torino
Internazionale is, in essence, an elitist project (Pinson 2002), put in place and
shaped by a group of technocrats around the mayor, inspired by the success with
such ‘grand visions’ and strategic approaches as in Barcelona and Lyon. It is the
personality of the mayor and his immediate collaborators, which acts as the
connector between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of government, that brings diverse
interests and perspectives together in an agreed framework of shared interest. Yet,
public institutions have remained central for the development and implementation
of broader governance structures and discourses, acting as a hinge between institu-
tionalised, territorially bounded and locally tied government, and relationally
expanded governance, with its reach across spaces, territories, institutions,
including those outside of government.
This city-focused regionalism has been highlighted by Lefevre as a general
"renaissance of metropolitan governments" in the new regionalism of the 1990s
(Lefevre 1998). In effect, therefore, regions in Italy may be seen as little more than
aggregations of individual localities, which act as the centres of actual decision
130 Impetus, milieu and structure

making and provide the grounding in civil society. Regions are effectively the result
of regional clustering of a ‘multitude of local societies which have their networks,
strategies and cohesion at the municipal and the provincial levels, rather than a
genuine, separate regional scale of government (Bagnasco and Oberti 1998: 162).
As a result, there is no genuinely regional interest or dynamism to translate into
region-based policies and networking within the state system. Other, more firmly
established representations, such as the counties (provinces) can step into the fray
if a regional task so requires. The absence of regionally scaled institutions and
forms of governance reflects the multiplicity of local communities and established
identities, as expressed in the many small, yet independent municipalities.
This makes the development of appropriately scaled, responsive, credible and
thus ‘efficient’ territorial regions more difficult (after Putnam 1993, cited in
Bagnasco and Oberti 1998: 150). Regardless of this, the state continues to apply
some dirigiste pressure to address this fragmentation of voice, interests and circum-
stances at the local level, so as to reach a more coordinated and cohesive approach
to policy-making and thus credibility. As a result, there are regulated state-regional
conferences convened by the state government in Rome and there are also local-–
regional conferences hosted by the regions to discuss collaborative work between
the regional administration and the relatively powerful municipalities. This draws
on the historically well entrenched – especially urban-centric – localism in Italy.
The strategic plan is the instrument that ‘cities adopt nowadays to identify and put
into practice whatever is necessary for growth in the new world context’ (Associ-
azione Torino Internazionale 1999).

While Turin’s reach for a regional dimension has largely been driven by the city,
albeit with some encouragement by the national government, as in France, it has
been national government that has attempted to build metropolitan regions as
national economic champions. The state put pressure on the main city-regions to
enhance their profile internationally through better intra-regional cooperation, and
thus increase their institutional and economic capacity to compete successfully.

Lyon: state-driven metropolitanisation as multi-level regionalism for

international profiling and competitiveness
Lyon is an interesting case of a metropolitan area that has grown from a rather
vague metropolitan-ness hovering somewhere above the existing territorial
structure of municipalities, region and Départements, to a high profile, image-
making spatial narrative seeking to transcend boundaries between types of actors
(public-private), scales of administration and role for ‘government’. The main goal
is to reach beyond the metropolitan region to the international, even global, econo-
mic scale. For this, in 2009, the logo of ‘OnlyLyon’ was created, deliberately in
English, to highlight internationality, rather than Frenchness (www.onlylyon.
org/onlylyon-org-42-2.html, accessed 18 August 2013). It has been set up as a roof
organisation, all virtual, run by the city-region’s economic development arm –
ADERLY (Agence pour le Développement Economique de la Région Lyonnaise)
 Impetus, milieu and structure 131

– and serves as a portal for all leading economic and internationally related topics
and organisations. Only Lyon embraces local and regional governmental and non-
governmental actors relevant to economic competitiveness and locational appeal
as a place for outside (foreign) investment. This includes projecting a broad alliance
and thus policy-making credibility to the public. Bodies involved include:

Greater Lyon, Rhône County, University of Lyon, as well as key regional

business representations as a reflection of the main target groups of this
initiative: the Lyon Chamber of Commerce and Industry, ADERLY (Lyon
Area Economic Development Agency), Lyon Saint-Exupéry Airport, Lyon-
Rhône Employers Association (MEDEF), and the Confederation of Small
and Medium-sized Businesses (CGPME).
(www.onlylyon.org)

This new arrangement goes well beyond the original venture into regionalising the
city’s economic strategy in 2000, in response to the then French government’s push
to establish key city-regions as lighthouses (poles) for national economic compet-
itiveness and success. It is part of a continuing process of spatially ‘upscaling’
Lyon’s strategic approach via the regional to the international level as target. Much
of this multi-agency approach depends on key persons in the emergent network,
where the Lyon mayor holds a central position. The head of Grand Lyon and the
CEO of Lyon Chamber of Commerce jointly launched in 2013 the new branding
campaign of ‘addicted to Lyon’. This focuses very much on personal qualities and
impressions generated by the city and its population as a unique strength of interna-
tional appeal. It follows the growing shift towards quality of life as a key dimension
in competitive economic policy, of the kind that appeals to the ‘creative class’
Local government in France is rather complex and multi-tiered with a nested
arrangement of governmental territories, leading to the impression of ‘big govern-
ment’ (Morris 1994). They reach from the sub-local arondissement, via communes
and collaborative communeautes urbaines, to the Départements as regionalisation
of the state, and the ‘official’ regions as – from an EU perspective – more virtual,
strategic bodies with limited, yet specific, powers, such as in public transport.
Institutionally, they are not in direct line with the centralised scalar state hierarchy.
Such a nested configuration of locally effective administrative units adds to the
local policy-making ‘milieu’ discussed above (Chapter 5), also referred to as ‘local
chord’ (Randels and Dicken 2004: 2017). Given this institutional ‘thickness’ any
new spatial unit, such as a place marketing or economic development organisation,
should not add further to this complexity, and thus sit outside this hierarchy.
ADERLY, the Lyon economic development agency, has been such an organisation;
an essentially virtual, institutionally thin, ‘office-cum-website-cum-secretary’
umbrella organization put in place to overcome overt bureaucratisation and provide
a common reference point for otherwise separate, yet economically relevant,
organisations. These include the local universities and business organisations, both
important players in this shift towards governance. Inevitably, the challenge has
been to negotiate and balance between localism and regional agendas, in the search
132 Impetus, milieu and structure

of ways how best to articulate and translate this scalar tension into effective
policies. These struggles go back to the 1960s, when a metropolitanisation initiative
(OREAM) by the central state established broad metropolitan planning organi-
sations as spatial containers to capture socio-economic trends underpinning the
development and prospects of metropolitan areas. This was the first explicit focus
on metropolitan areas as a specific phenomenon – of growing economic importance
– somewhere between the local and regional levels of administration.
Yet, their centrally imposed nature was viewed by the main metropolises as an
attempt by Paris to extend its primary role, and was thus met with considerable
reservation (Randels and Dicken 2004). Interestingly enough, this misread the
actual purpose to counterbalance the state’s economically unhealthy overt concen-
tration of activity in the Paris region. In 1969, as a step from these rather vague
metropolitan planning regions, somewhat smaller, more urban-focused associative
metropolitan inter-communal organisations were drawn up by Paris; a sign of state
dirigisme impacting directly on the local level’s modi operandi of governing. In
line with other, similarly organised and rationalised collaborative arrangements at
the city-regional scale, communeautès are indirectly legitimated though delegated
councillors to its board from the member municipalities (see also Vancouver,
Seattle). Inside this regional space sits Greater Lyon (Grand Lyon) as a grouping
of the municipality of Lyon plus 54 surrounding municipalities. Given its size and
functional and political connections and relevance, the city of Lyon possesses
particular weight in these associations, causing unease among the smaller members
about being drowned out and not given sufficient voice in any metropolitan-wide
decisions (Randels and Dicken 2004). Nevertheless, this imbalance does not seem
to have created an ‘anti-Lyon’ grouping among the 54 municipalities outside Lyon
(Kübler 2012). A sense of mutual benefit seems to more than outweigh such
anxieties.
The origins of the communal association of Grand Lyon go back to pooling
municipal service provision for greater efficiency, such as rubbish collection and
publicly, that’s what it has primarily come to be known as to the general public
(interview, Grand Lyon, 25 Jan 2003). At first, general strategic planning at the
city-regional level was its primary role to set a framework for individual municipal
plans. Only later, in the 1990s, as economic development became more of a leading
local policy objective, was it given the new remit of devising economic develop-
ment strategies for the city-region on behalf of the municipalities. Inevitably, that
meant a leading role for the city of Lyon whose then mayor sought to open up the
city to the outside world. An explicit internationalisation strategy, revolving around
a new upmarket office development on the river Rhône near the city centre, the Cité
Internationale, has been used to signal its international ambitions and reach. This
was to overcome the city’s established inward-looking self-centeredness (interview,
Grand Lyon, 25 Jan. 2003) and included branding Lyon a European city. The
relatively dominant role held by Lyon within the associative Grand Lyon causes,
of course, anxiety and even resentment among the many, much smaller munici-
palities subsumed under the Grand Lyon banner. Yet, there is considerable effort
to consult the smaller municipalities and other players to gain broader support for
 Impetus, milieu and structure 133

its policies and strategies (interview, Grand Lyon, 25 Jan. 2003). It is this platform
function, translating local policies and interests/priorities into a regional strategy
and investment pattern, that legitimises such policies and gives all members a sense
of being part of the policy-shaping and -making process.
Collaborating closely with the Lyon Chamber of Commerce and ADERLY, its
economic development arm, the region supported and marketed Lyon as an interna-
tional city, promoting in particular the Cité International office development on
the Rhône. In the beginning, in the 1970s, the challenge was to develop a strategy
for 2000, to promote inward investment and be more inviting. Importantly, this
collaborative network of players within and outside government has remained
institutionally thin, located outside established hierarchical territorial structures
and thus not adding to a regional scale already crowded with actors, it has instead
drawn on existing arrangements. Its primary role is to provide a city-regional
platform for bringing together different types of policy makers, rooted in different
forms of organisations and organisational cultures, as well as spatial/territorial
contexts. In particular, the focus is on the local business community, and Grand
Lyon seeks to build new forms of collaboration, while operating from little more
than an office with a handful of staff and a website. Its main assets and routes of
operation are the connections into the business community, and from there, beyond.

Ш / Ш /

Ш /
Ш /
Ш
Ш //

S
Ш
Ш /
Ш /
Ш /

Legend:
Legend:
Ly
Ly == City
City of
of Lyon
Lyon
GdL
GdL = = Grand
Grand Lyon
Lyon
UA
UA = = Urban Area (of
Urban Area (of Lyon)
Lyon)
StE
S tE =
= City
City of
of St
St Etienne
Etienne
CR
CR = = City
City Region
Region (of(of Lyon)
Lyon)
CoC
CoC – - Chamber
Chamber of of Commerce
Commerce

Not to scale

Figure 6.1 Multi-scalar spatiality and territoriality in the Lyon city-region

Source: Author.
134 Impetus, milieu and structure

As a result, the spatial model of the Lyon city-region shows a combination of

differently scaled governmental territories and governance spaces, with most set in
a more or less concentric pattern around the city (Figure 6.1): city of Lyon in the
centre, then Grand Lyon, then the functionally defined urban area as ‘aire urbaine’
with some 300 municipalities, and then the ‘region urbaine’, which embraces St
Etienne as next neighbouring large city. This fusion of larger cities into a Lyon-
dominated city region follows the 1960s description of OREAM (Organisation
d’Etude d’Aménagement de l’Aire Métropolitaine Lyon – Saint-Etienne).
Established in 1968 by the national planning body DATAR, this organisation (until
1983) introduced a city-regional, cross-boundary perspective to metropolitan
planning as part of a national spatial development agenda (Rabilloud 2007) in post-
war France, which sought to address regional inequalities (DATAR 2013).
This large Region Urbaine was established in the late 1980s through collabo-
ration between Grand Lyon and the four Dėpartements cutting through the
city-region (Rhône, Isère, Ain, Loire), so that the functional relations and linkages
of the city-region could be addressed across administrative boundaries. In effect,
therefore, metropolitanisation as a functionally defined, virtual space of cross-
boundary collaboration was raised to the regional representation of the central
state. This brought into the game influential regional players with considerable
formal powers and fiscal capacity. It is these that ADERLY, as virtual roof organi-
sation, can draw on, and link to, shape policies, especially in the areas of public
transportation (accessibility), sustainable development, metropolitan functions and
improved cooperation between businesses, planners and regional marketing people.
It is the joined-up work of the latter that has been considered crucial for fostering
– but also projecting to the ‘inside’ and the world ‘outside’ this city-region –
successful development and good economic prospects. For that, ADERLY has had
no powers of its own, but needs to work through the formal regions and Grand
Lyon as recognised representations, however indirect their legitimacy may be
themselves (interview, ADERLY, 26 Jan 2003)
So, summing up, it becomes evident that the chamber of commerce has been a
key driver behind these informal, thinly institutionalised and spatially virtual,
policy arenas, with ADERLY a prime example. As a result, administrative divisions
and the challenges they cause, could be transcended by ‘speaking with one voice’
for the whole city-region vis-à-vis the outside (globalised) world. Straddling four
Dėpartements, and thus sitting on the ‘edges’ of three French regions, ADERLY
illustrates the complex cross-border situation of the Lyon city-region (see Figure
6.3). Here, different cultural and geographic regions meet, each with their own
historic identities. Here, the city provides an important common focus and interest
that manages to reach across inter-institutional and inter-regional boundaries, and
govern the virtual spatiality of the Lyon city-region as a territorial reality. The
success of the city-region is recognised as advantageous by all actors concerned,
with its ‘soft’, virtual nature an important factor in its broad acceptance and ability
to just hover above the complex underlying administrative structures.
ADERLY, and now ‘OnlyLyon’, fit that bill of connecting and offering a
platform and network for communication, negotiation and coordination by offering
 Impetus, milieu and structure 135

an open platform – or ‘round table – for different actors, with their various assoc-
iated forms of territorialisation and institutionalisation kept largely out of play.
This avoids adding more competitive institutionalisation and potentially conflictual
claim for power and control. Instead, the metropolitan (functional) area is the
background and rallying point for the virtual metropolitanisation through ADERLY,
not the administrative structures. In fact it is only through the institutional thinness
and organisational virtuality that ADERLY can gain support and acceptance and
thus become effective. Being under the stewardship of both the municipalities and
the Lyon chamber of commerce, ADERLY’s primary mission is to act on behalf of
both local businesses and local governments, and doing so in an advocacy role
without formal powers. The main tool at its disposal is its network, connecting
policy makers across institutional, territorial and strategic boundaries. It is thus a
clear illustration of regionalisation through ‘soft power’, relying on connections
and networks, both as an existing as well as expanding resource (and thus
exercising increasing attractiveness). As is the case with such thinly institution-
alised, spatially virtual and network-based organisations and policy processes, there
are questions about transparency and legitimacy and it is here that the close
connection to, and involvement of, the formal governmental institutions at local
and regional level matter.

Hamburg: local ‘statehood’ and multi-scalar mix of territoriality and spatiality

‘Co-operation has a long tradition in the North’, claims matter-of-factly the
Hamburg Economic Development Company (HWF) on its website (www.hwf-
hamburg.de/ueber-uns/ accessed 30 April 2013), and presents it as a distinct
strength. It suggests a collaborative, innovative and problem-solving mentality that
serves as an economic advantage. Hamburg’s local economic development interests
branched out only in 1998 when its economic development arm, HWF, reached
south across the river Elbe, and thus city limits, to agree a formal collaboration
with Süderelbe AG – Southern Elbe Ltd – as the economic development agent for
the municipalities in the southern hinterland of Hamburg.
Hamburg, like Lyon, dominates by far the wider city-regions (c 4 million
inhabitants: Diller and Knieling 2003), much of which is rurally structured with a
number of small towns and villages. The next nearest city, and historic rival, is the
much smaller city of Lübeck (c. 200,000 inhabitants), also an old Hanseatic port.
Despite a distance of some 80km, it is increasingly becoming absorbed into the
growing presence and visibility of the Metropolitan Region of Hamburg (Metropol-
region Hamburg), which was formally constituted by inter-state agreement in 2006.
This introduced a degree of institutionalisation to an existing relatively loose
framework agreement from 1996 between the three Land governments (Lower
Saxony, Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein) and the relevant counties, whose
territories the Hamburg city-region straddles. Delimitation of this essentially
functional virtual space was based on commuting patterns: for a county to be
included, at least 30 per cent of its workforce needed to be commuting regularly
to Hamburg (interview, HWF, 25 Feb. 2004). This collaborative arrangement was
136 Impetus, milieu and structure

initiated by the chamber of commerce to overcome intra-regional political rivalries

between the different actors and representatives of territorial government and,
instead, project a more cohesive and internationally competitive image of economic
capacity (ibid.), based on existing functional economic connectivities. There was
no state treaty or other formal agreement, but the arrangement was between formal-
ised structures which thus provided access to executive mechanisms as well as
political legitimacies (interview, Hamburg planning dept., 24 Feb. 2004). Yet, the
resulting area was deemed too small by the further outlying counties around
Hamburg, fearing to be marked as peripheral and irrelevant and, just as importantly,
also marginalised in political terms, because they had no seat at the negotiating
table of city-regional policies and strategies. They thus pressed for inclusion into
the designated metropolitan region, despite their de facto lesser functional tie-in
with the urbanised area. But appearances on public representations of metropolitan-
ness, and thus ‘centrality’ and ‘achievement’, mattered. The Metropolregion was
thus as much about meeting the trans-boundary nature of economic reality as about
the projection of an ambitious (aspirational) virtual spatiality of belonging.
Including more rural and relatively disconnected ‘edges’ to metropolitan areas also
responded to strategic concerns at federal level about a growing rift between
metropolitan areas and ‘the rest’, by advocating a city-regional Area of Strategic
Co-operation (Raumordnerischer Kooperationsraum) (Adam and Heidbrink 2005).
Concern about appearing excluded and marginalised and not being able to
participate in, and influence, policies of city-regional relevance and impact, stand
behind efforts to join the metropolitan ‘club’. Thus, significantly, the neighbouring
city and historic competitor, Lübeck, signed up as a member in 2012 after a decade
of seeking closer involvement. But at first, no more than some form of loose
cooperation between the Metropolregion and Lübeck was on offer (interview, IHK,
25 Feb. 2004). The formal Agreement of Cooperation, signed on 24 Feb. 2011,
explicitly specifies that cooperation in strategic projects of wider regional relevance
is its primary concern (Partnerschaftsvereinbarung). Now, reaching out to Lübeck
is considered more of a mutual gain (www.luebeck-marketing.de, accessed 3
March 2013), and to some degree reflects the attempt by the Metropolregion to
boost its economic and political capacity in a competitive, globalised environment.
Lübeck’s decision thus confirms the positive economic perspectives associated
with the very term and notion of ‘metropolitan region’, especially as used in the
German context. There, ‘metropolitan’ is understood as inherently ‘global’, i.e.
globally competitive and relevant (Matern and Knieling 2009). Choosing that label
thus already serves as a strategic statement about ambition. Further expansion into
the surrounding hinterland is planned now as part of a four state strategic project
of regional cooperation (MORO) between Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,
Niedersachsen und Schleswig-Holstein, based around Metropolregion Hamburg
as concept and fifth partner organisation (MORO Nord 2010), either through
formal accession to the Metropolregion or through affiliation (MORO Nord 2010;
Knieling 2011).
The effective absorption of a smaller rival is similar to the relationship between
Lyon and St Etienne (see above). But it is here where the main structural
 Impetus, milieu and structure 137

similarities end. While Lyon is part of a centralised state with strong top-down
flows of government from the national to the local level, Hamburg is part of a
federalised state and enjoys the status of a city-state. Hamburg’s Lord Mayor is
thus wearing two hats, that of a municipal leader and the one as the prime minister
of a federal state (Land). The only other two city-states in Germany are neigh-
bouring Bremen (120km away) and Berlin (even further away). This elevated dual
status matters, as it provides more powers and resources for governmental
autonomy yet also raises the administrative and political height of borders and
boundaries within and around the city of Hamburg. State boundaries define a wider
range of powers than municipal boundaries (Herrschel and Newman 2002;
Hauswirth et al. 2003).
City-regional cooperation has a well-established tradition in Hamburg, as the
city-state’s boundaries are a tight fit and the functional area, especially transport
routes, reaches well out into the surrounding two federal states of Lower Saxony
and Schleswig-Holstein. Collaboration and coordination was thus inevitable, and
was guided by a win-win scenario: Hamburg gained access to its hinterland for
expansion, and the two adjoining states benefited from the city’s economic
strength. Not surprisingly, therefore, inter-state collaboration goes back to the mid
1950s, when Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein formally agreed to co-ordinate, and
then integrate, their respective development plans, and this was followed soon after
by a similar agreement between Hamburg and its southern neighbour, Lower
Saxony (www.ml.niedersachsen.de, accessed 30 April 2013). In 1992, the two bi-
lateral agreements were combined into a tri-lateral arrangement, thus de facto
recognising and formally establishing the metropolitan region of Hamburg as a
planning space, underpinned by formal regulative structures that draw on existing
governmental territoriality. The subsequent Regional Development Concept for
the Metropolregion Hamburg of 1994 formally put the governance reality of the
metropolitan region of Hamburg on the map. Nevertheless, the very term ‘concept’,
rather than ‘programme’ or ‘plan’, reflects the framework nature of the agreement,
serving to coordinate, but not coerce through federal state involvement (which
would be non-constitutional). Municipalities are willing to coordinate, yet retain
full control of, policies on their respective territories.
The current Strategic Policy Framework 2011–13 is based around four key
policy fields as foci and justification of agreed joint action: internationalisation,
provision of basic quality of life, spatial functional structure and living conditions
(quality of life) and strategic planning (MORO Nord 2010). Internationality as
externally oriented ambition, and regionality as internal organisational strategic
principle, are clearly intertwined, as external factors share internal agendas and
processes, and the outcome of internal management and collaboration will, through
demonstrable achievements and qualities, impact on the external perception of the
metropolitan region as a whole (see also Grossmann 2006), and this includes its
competitive attractiveness. For Hamburg, with its declared strategy to become a
‘green metropolis’ (Bauriedl and Wissen 2002; Schubert 2006), being connected
to, and claim participation of, the open countryside of the metropolitan periphery
is clearly a bonus, as it adds credibility to the claim. This strengthened the
138 Impetus, milieu and structure

bargaining position of the outlying rural counties wanting to be part of the city-
region. So, a win-win situation was on the cards. The rural parts now had
something advantageous to offer to the urban core, and cooperation seemed more
about a mutual gain scenario for all concerned. This provided the rationale for
membership of the Metropolregion, and reflects the realisation among Hamburg’s
policy makers that Hamburg is (and needs to be) more than just a port city, even if
one of global importance. In response, the city’s policy makers have shifted their
perception of the city in relation to its hinterland.
At the beginning of the 2000s, Hamburg viewed itself as a prosperous island
within a rather struggling hinterland, from where few benefits could possibly emanate
for the city. Since then, with changing public discourse at national and international
level in favour of sustainability as a concern in, and next to, economic development,
Hamburg recognised the positive image potential of the rural hinterland. Thus, while
ten years ago Hamburg could barely bring itself to admitting the existence of a
surrounding hinterland (interview, Hamburg planning dept., 25 Feb. 2004), large-
scale urbanity is now advocated and represented as a positive quality, just as
resembled by Richard Florida’s urbane creative class. The shadow effects, such as
exclusion through selectivity of networks, elitism, question of democratic represen-
tation and cohesion between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas, but also
inequalities within metropolises, are less immediately evident and less recognised
(and acknowledged). Instead, metropolitan-ness becomes a positive brand of
‘success’ and ‘competitiveness’ associated with prospects, progress and quality of
life, albeit – and that’s not so publicly pointed out – not necessarily for all.
Again, it is the essentially virtual nature of the Metropolregion, and the openness
and voluntary form of collaboration, that has made it possible to bring a quite broad
church of independent-minded, even localist, actors together. In the end it was the
realisation and recognition of the fundamental importance that the city holds as an
economic growth pole, symbolised by its port as a global hub, and it is this port
function that provides the main rationale and justification for claiming ‘globalness’.
In 2006, having been accustomed to collaborative working, city-regional purpose
and working practices were strengthened further, becoming more explicit of, and
thus prescriptive for, the relevant governmental and administrative units. Policy
objectives now specify inter alia: international competitiveness, securing provision
with basic quality of life (functions) and collaboration in the management of land
resources (www.ml.niedersachsen.de). This agenda was confirmed in 2012, now
with explicit reference to linking ‘city and country’ through partnerships, a reflection
of federal policy agenda. These initiatives and policies are funded through contri-
butions from each Land and the respective counties, although with just 7 staff (ibid.),
the office reflects rather ‘thin’ institutionalisation, a hallmark, so it seems, of virtual,
programmatic regional spatiality. All partners meet once a year at a Regional
Conference, hosted by the Metropolregion, to serve as platform for the negotiation
and formulation of policy agendas. Ensuring equal status for all participating
member authorities is an important concession to the smaller players’ anxiety about
being ‘run’ by Hamburg through proxi. Affirmation of equal ‘voice’ among all
territorial units participating in the Metropolregion also assures greater acceptance
 Impetus, milieu and structure 139

of such collaboration among the local electorates with their concern about retaining
local decision making autonomy.
The concept of the city-region – or Stadtregion (see Chapter 2) – in Hamburg
goes back more than 50 years and was driven by the ever expanding urbanisation
of the city’s hinterland. Yet it is only during the last 10 or so years that the concept
– and terminology – of Metropolregion has gained in public and political debate,
together with the notion of a redefined Greater Hamburg. Much of this has to do
with the growing focus on metropolitan regions as spatial vehicles for economic
development right up to the national level (something also found in France as driver
of metropolitan policies since the 1990s). In fact, the current German national
development plan only knows metropolitan regions – there is nothing else
(Egermann 2009) – as no one wants to be seen as not being linked to a metropolitan
area and thus appear peripheral and, ultimately, irrelevant. It is these arguments
about belonging to a metropolitan region, and to be seen to be so, that have
underpinned much of the debate over the last decade or so about the membership,
purpose and modus operandi.
Current discussions are about extending the metropolitan region further into the
hinterland to capture large parts of northern Germany, and also reach across the
border to Denmark and Sweden as international partners (see Figure 6.2). Four
key mechanisms are used to facilitate coordination and collaboration among
members of the metropolitan region in its diversity of interests (Knieling and
Obersteg 2010): (1) avoiding all forms of new institutionalisation and instead using
loose arrangements around individual projects; (2) put in place a management
agency (non-state) to oversee and implement agreed projects; (3) establish
sufficient dedicated institutional capacity – located in Hamburg – to cover the
policies for the extended virtual city-regional space (satisfying Hamburg’s view
of being the centre of the region); and (4) locating such extra capacity at state,
rather than municipal, level, and thus provide it with sufficient capacity to act and
effect policies.
So, summing up, the city-region of Metropolregion Hamburg has been shaped
predominantly by territorially-based actors, although others have also been
included. The strong role of ‘government’ is reflected in the decision to use formal
contracts to regulate powers and responsibilities by the involved different tiers of
government, and here this applies in particular to the level of the federal states
(Länder) as de facto central government level. As a result of the essentially institu-
tionalist, state-centric and territorially based perspective, actors are reluctant to
commit to more fundamental, permanent forms of regional cooperation, that could
affect their future independence and independent policy-making (Heeg et al. 2003).
The involvement of ‘the state’ in form of the Länder seems to exacerbate that
territorial thinking. Instead, as elsewhere, they prefer more open, informal and less
committed forms of ad hoc and project-based collaboration with, importantly, a
limited life span and no executive powers. Again, the benefits for each actors
engaging in a form of regional cooperation need to be clear at the outset, especially
when such involves some elements of ‘surrendering’ powers. Here, public
discourse and political paradigms on the strengths and weaknesses of
140 Impetus, milieu and structure

regionalisation matter, as they prepare and underpin – or undermine – any

willingness and readiness by local actors to reach beyond their ‘safe’ institutional
and territorial boundaries of responsibilities and powers. A ‘light touch’ form of
regionalisation is thus preferred, such as in the form of a more or less virtual roof

Denmark
DK

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North
PPN S e a
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HRO
MRH1 MRH2
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PL
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PPN
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Meck
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Pomerrra
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MRH1 Ш /
Ш /
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Lower Saxony Sleswig-
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Lower Saxony Anhalt

Legend:
DK = Denmark
PL = Poland
KI = Kiel (city of)
HL = Hanseatic City of Lübeck
HWI = Hanseatic City of Wismar
HH = Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg (a city state)
HB = Free and Hanseatic City of Bremen (a city state)
MHR1 = Metropolitan Region of Hamburg (Metropolenraum Hamburg), as until
2010
MHR2 = Extensions to Hamburg Metropolitan Region in 2010, encompassing
the Hanseatic City of Lübeck.
PPN = Project Partnership North (Project Partnerschaft Nord): area covering
counties participating in an associational extension of Hamburg
Metropolitan Region, since 2012:

Figure 6.2 Hamburg Metropolitan Region – seeking membership to avoid

marginalisation and global ‘invisibility’
Source: author, based on map available from Hamburg Metropolitan Region under
http://metropolregion.hamburg.de/projektpartnerschaft-nord/ (17 June 2013)
Note: Much of the former Iron Curtain followed the River Elbe. The regional states of
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt were part of former East
Germany.
 Impetus, milieu and structure 141

organisation as externally and also internally visible label and name, but which
remains largely outside actual government. Currently, a form of holding company
is discussed as potential model for the Metropolregion (Diller and Knieling 2003)
to avoid state-related institutionalisation, and thus maintain a ‘neutral arena’ for
actors representing different institutional and territorial scales to feel ‘safe’ collab-
orating. The basic idea thus has some similarities for the ‘multiplexed’ and
‘a-la-carte’ regionalism adopted and practiced in the Turin city-region. Different
actor groups and different types of projects and policies are allowed to subscribe
to varying degrees of formalisation and institutionalisation to reflect their degree
of commitment and depth of joint action – as identified at a particular time.

Part 2: North American experiences

The North American context for the shaping of city-regional governance differs
from that in Europe in terms of the role of historic complexity and ‘depth’, the
perceived and accepted role of the state, equally the role of the business
community, and the importance of their voices and political relevance. A multi-
level federal arrangement is found in both countries, although there are differences
in the degree to which central government (Canadian provinces, US states) are
permitted to become active locally and intervene in local matters. Furthermore,
the role of ethnicity and its geographic manifestations in the cities as driver of local
politics and urban-suburban contrasts – even conflicts – is greater in the USA than
in Canada. In many ways, Canada can be read as the ‘light’ version of the USA,
reflecting its stronger European legacy in state and society.
Atlanta, Seattle/Puget Sound, Detroit and Vancouver illustrate quite different
policy-making milieux as scenarios for the development of region-specific modes
of governance, although they share various characteristics that go beyond a simple
national division. Local factors are of fundamental importance, circumscribing the
respective local milieu as product of internal functional structures, including social
and economic divisions and associated group-specific interests, and external (state,
globalisation) factors. Thus, while the Atlanta and Detroit city-regions both show
stark socio-economic and racial divisions between core city and suburban
hinterland, their respective economic patterns are almost inverse. In Atlanta, it is
still the core city that accommodates most of the city-region’s economic capacity,
while in Detroit it is the suburbs, leaving an economically struggling core city. In
Puget Sound, like the Vancouver city-region, competition and rivalry between the
leading localities set the tone for city-regional governance. Local political
advantages, or simple technical requirements by infrastructure projects, are key
drivers of collaborative approximation. This is now explored in more detail.

Atlanta: city-regionalisation versus maintaining local separateness.

Atlanta illustrates a scenario where internal socio-economic structural divisions
push for localist views of government and territoriality. This is in spite of
functional, especially economic, pressures towards a regional perspective. The
142 Impetus, milieu and structure

contrast expresses itself in the competition between, on the one hand, locally
focused territoriality, with clear boundaries and thus limits to service delivery and
its (local tax-based) funding and, on the other, a metropolitan-wide, strategic spatial
perspective, such as offered by the Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, or
Atlanta Regional Council, albeit with no governmental capacities. The tension is
thus between the two key dimensions of city-regionalism distinguished here:
territoriality and spatiality. They compete, yet also need to find ways to connect to
allow meeting most effectively the complexities of governing the city-region,
however contested and antagonistic such link may be. Rarely, has this inherent
conflict between functional spatiality and (responding) governmental territoriality
become more evident than in the recent popular rejection in July 2012 of the
proposal to expand the Atlanta light rail system further into the region. This
rejection by the electorate of a joint proposal by the ten municipalities of the Metro
Atlanta area brought to the fore strong underlying tensions and a distinct defensive
localism among the – primarily suburban – population (Schmitt 2012; Hart 2012).
The voting outcome shows a clear core-periphery gradient in approval of the
scheme: the outlying districts were vehemently (70 per cent and more) opposed
(www.metroatlantatransportationvote.com/images/atl_voting_map.jpg, accessed
11 Jan. 2013), much more than in the centre, mirroring the socio-demographic
pattern in the city-region. From a suburban perspective, not being connected by
public transport is considered an advantage for maintaining communicative
distance to the city centre, and thus retaining the existing socio-demographic (and
racial) separation (interviews with Atlanta Regional Council (ARC), 27 Feb. 2003;
Cobb County Econ. Dev., 28 Feb. 2003; and also Hatfield 2013). Meanwhile, from
an economic perspective, this raises questions about the city-region’s longer-term
competitiveness (Bristow 2010). The need to go through such a referendum
process, triggered by a proposed 1 per cent rise in locally levied sales tax to fund
the new infrastructure, also highlights the importance of the ‘home rule’ doctrine
with its emphasis on local, especially urban, self-government, and this includes
fiscal control and far-reaching autonomy from state intervention (Vanlandingham
1968). The particular context for the emergence of a specific mechanism of city-
regional governance in the Atlanta metropolitan area is thus shaped by ethnic
segregation and the inherently localist view of ‘home rule’. Social differences,
whether economic or racial (or both), can thus manifest themselves in specific
local agendas, including attempts at creating new ‘separatist’ municipalities to
establish new boundaries between social groupings.
The city of Atlanta, despite its half million population, accommodates merely
just over 10 per cent of the 10-county Metro Atlanta city-region’s total population.
This share is even smaller when related to the 28 counties (and 140 municipalities)
of the Atlanta Metropolitan Statistical Area and its some 6.5 million population
(ARC, www.atlanta.net/visitors/population.html, accessed 22 Dec. 2012). There
is thus considerable suburbanity surrounding the urban core of the city-region.
Many suburban residents (mainly white) resent their tax dollars being spent outside
‘their’ jurisdiction, especially ‘suburban money’ on central city policies (Bahl et al.
1992; Boadway 2001). Such cross-boundary transfer is viewed as a hidden, wealth
 Impetus, milieu and structure 143

transferring ‘Robin Hood tax’, and frequently finds itself associated in public
discourse with ‘regionalism’ (Alesina et al. 1995). Regionalisation, especially of
the associational, ‘virtual’ type, has much to do with a sense of shared purpose,
such as in the much reported case of Portland/Oregon (Mitchell-Weaver et al. 2000;
Gibson and Abbott 2002; Herrschel 2009; Young, 2010). But in itself, it cannot be
a guarantee for successful achievements of set goals.
The ‘glue’ that seems to keep interested parties together, especially in the
absence of any forms of coercion through dedicated, statutorily empowered insti-
tutions, is a sense of shared benefit, a win-win outcome for all concerned, however
temporary that may be (Gates 1999; O’Connor and Gates 2000), and such requires
similar aspirations and policy priorities across boundaries, to provide the political
ground for local policy makers to engage in regionally collaborative policies and
gain local electoral reward for doing so. Otherwise, socio-economic divisions and
associated differences in aspirations, reinforce divisions and locally centric
perspectives, which make policy coordination at the regional level more difficult.
Concerns about getting ‘value’ from taxes paid are one such indicator of perceived
cost or benefits of a city-regional approach (Herrschel 2013). In Atlanta’s case, the
regional awareness among the electorate is rather limited, as the general political
reference is either local or the federal state of Georgia. City-regionalisation has
thus taken on something of a ‘last resort’ option (interview, Cobb County, 28 Feb.
2003), existing merely in the shadow of ‘official’ government.
The ARC is the main body to represent the city-region, albeit in the form of
more or less virtual governance. With no direct implementational capacity of its
own, not unlike its counterpart in the Puget Sound city-region, it needs to work
through the participating municipalities to effect policies ‘on the ground’. In
essence, it is thus an institutionally ‘thin’, all but virtual organisation that sits
outside the formal government hierarchy. The organisation was set up in 1947 by
the counties immediately surrounding the city of Atlanta to achieve more efficient
service delivery (www.arc.org, accessed 22 Dec. 2012), rather than pursue
principles of strategic government. Census-based indicators were used to define a
functionally interrelated area as the geographic basis for ‘joining up’ public service
provision. This entirely technocratic construct sought to capture the inherent
dynamic of the functional city-region. Accordingly, the ARC sees itself as a
regional ‘planning and co-ordination agency’ (ibid.), and thus recognises its
guiding, rather than coercive, role and capacity.
What constitutes the city-region clearly remains somewhat hazy, as there are
two, quite different, yet interdependent, geographic dimensions to it: a spatial and
a territorial. The spatial dimension reflects the statistically defined functional
relationality between city and surrounding region. This means, it effectively
stretches across, and sits atop, the territorial dimension as determined by the sum
of the jurisdictions which agreed to some form of association when joining the
ARC as ‘their’ co-ordination body for city-regional issues. The challenge, of
course, is the quality of the link between spatiality and territoriality, i.e. between
strategic guidance and implementational, coercive capacity vis-à-vis the relevant
municipalities.
144 Impetus, milieu and structure

Political leadership thus matters to fuse inherently localist perspectives to a

regional agenda accepted by all, however pragmatic and project-specific in
purpose. Recognising the importance of ‘soft power’ of networks and leadership,
and its rather limited implementational capacity (scope), ARC now places
particular emphasis on engaging with, and shaping, political leadership, seeing its
role as ‘the catalyst for regional progress’ by seeking to focus leadership, public
awareness, political attention and planning resources on key regional issues
(www.atlantaregional.com, accessed 19 Sep. 2012). This leadership is considered
instrumental for the efficacy of a non-coercive form of regionalisation, which relies
on collaborative arrangements based on local appraisals of the benefits of such
engagement. In this, the mayor of Atlanta plays an important role in the connec-
tivity between core city and suburban region. So, variability comes with the person
in office. Thus for instance, during the 1990s, the then mayor of 8 years’ tenure had
visited the ARC as platform for city-regional engagement just once. He thus clearly
demonstrated his lack of interest in looking beyond city limits and recognising a
regional dimension to local matters (interview, Metro Atlanta Chamber of
Commerce, 28 Feb. 2003). By contrast, his successor sought to actively reach out
to, and engage with, the ARC as connector to the leaders of the other municipalities
to seek common ground (interview, ARC, 27 Feb. 2003, and Atlanta City Council
(ACC), 27 Feb. 2003). This new approach reflects a more communicative,
network-building leadership approach, and resulted in the setting up in 2003 of the
Metropolitan Atlanta Mayors’ Association (MAMA). This brings together the
leadership of all 65 municipalities in the 10 counties comprising Metro Atlanta
(metroatlantamayors.org, accessed 20 Sep. 2012).
One of the main factors behind a regional approach – however reluctant – is the
internal political pressure from continuing traffic congestion in the city-region.
Described as ‘chaotic’ a decade ago (interview ARC, 27 Feb 2003; Copeland,
2002), the situation seems to have seen little change (Mancini-Nichols, 2012). The
challenge is to ‘sell’ the need for a regional approach to the outlying communities
with their merely tentative sense of belonging functionally to the core city of
Atlanta. Some coercive capacity at regional level exists at State-wide GRETA
(Georgia Regional Transport Authority), as it can draw on Georgia’s state
legislative and political-constitutional capacity. GRETA is thus effectively part of
the governmental hierarchy. And with regional transportation an integral part of
Georgia’s policy agenda, there are capital grants available to municipalities, which
may serve as a coercive instrument. Thus, despite a lack of executive powers of
direct intervention, as such would contravene locally-based ‘home rule’, withhold-
ing transport funding may be used as a sanction for non-compliance with set policy
objectives. These may well include recognition of a regional agenda in local
policies. Yet, such agendas are usually technocratically focused politically ‘easier’,
projects, seeking cost-effective service delivery, rather than more fundamental
concerns about a regionally oriented strategic development perspective.
Maintaining a regional agenda without coercive capacity is not an easy task vis-
à-vis the divisions characterising the wider, functionally defined Metro Atlanta
area with its 19 counties and considerable socio-demographic contrasts. This gives
 Impetus, milieu and structure 145

the nature of city-regional engagement added importance, potentially varying

between local choice and centrally imposed coercive requirement. Nevertheless,
even with local choice on participation in regional agendas, some jurisdictions,
e.g. affluent (white) Walton county, seek to strengthen their separateness through
incorporation as ‘cities’ in their own right, rather than being an integral part of a
county (interview, ARC, 27 Feb. 2003).
This virtual, actor network-based regionalisation is supported by the state
governor (metroatlantamayors.org, accessed 21 Dec. 2012), who thus provides
added legitimacy and political capital. Yet ultimately, all voluntary engagement by
local policy makers requires win-win outcomes for all participants to show to local
voters as justification for such engagement. Atlanta’s internationally recognised
name offers a good bargaining chip, although there is some animosity, even resent-
ment, among outlying municipalities about Atlanta’s economic dominance
(interview, ARC, 27 Feb. 2003). Not surprisingly, it takes political leadership to
‘sell’ the idea of ‘region’ to a critical electorate steeped in long-established local-
ism, and with deeply held doubts about the wisdom of engaging with a regional
level of public policy, which may develop a life of its own and usurp local powers
and responsibilities (interview, Cobb County, 28 Feb. 2003). And so the mayors
have an important, yet difficult role of linking local interests and their territorial
manifestation to a somewhat vaguely defined strategic regional agenda.
Local policy makers are thus the recognised main drivers of any change in
politics towards a more regional perspective, and the ARC is seeking to push the
regionalisation agenda through an engagement of the local political leadership by
providing a common platform to meet informally and get to know each other.
Examples of boosting the efficacy of the networking capacity of the ARC’s virtual
regionalism, are its annual State of the Region Breakfast, or a luncheon hosted by
the state governor for all 45 MAMA members in November 2012 (metroatlanta-
mayors.org, accessed 22 Dec. 2012). Yet, much of this process seems to remain
largely out of sight of the public’s eye. This makes it more difficult for locally
elected policy makers, including the mayors, to gain political dividends from
regional engagement. But it is those dividends that are likely to encourage associ-
ational regionalisation outside top-down coercion, be that mere coordination –
however selective and tentative – or the stronger form of confederation (Figure 5.1).
The case of Atlanta highlights the tentativeness of forming a regional agenda in
a political climate of strong, deeply embedded localism underpinned by stark socio-
demographic variations and entrenched distrust of supra-local governmental
institutions as potential threat to local self-government. The mono-centric nature
of the Atlanta city-region reinforces the structural and political dichotomy between
core city and surrounding suburban municipalities. Nevertheless, there is a general
acceptance, supported by business interests, that the central city’s name and
recognition are an economic asset for the whole city-region. Yet this is where the
accepted sense of regionality stops. All other forms of regional engagement are
locally calibrated and entirely pragmatic and considered with inherent weariness.
This means that informal, non-binding, piecemeal, bottom-up arrangements, which
promise win-win outcomes for all concerned, seem the only feasible form of
146 Impetus, milieu and structure

regionalisation. This all remains decidedly at the virtual level of strategic communi-
cation and arrangements among the political elite, based around informal networks
and relations, such as between the relevant mayors. Yet, as this remains largely
hidden from public view, any positive outcomes of such engagement are less likely
to be recognised. This makes making the case for regionalisation more difficult,
despite the recognised need for maintaining economic competitiveness as part of
a city-region.
Business leaders, as confirmed by the chamber of commerce (interview, Metro
Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, 28 Feb. 2003), have long realised as much (Renn
2010). Yet, it is the electorate who needs to appreciate the salience of the economic
opportunities of regionalisation, before compromises are accepted as good LOCAL
practice, however reluctantly, so as to provide scope for political manoeuvre for
local policy makers. This is one of the reasons why, for instance, Portland in
Oregon was able to adopt a formalised regional government approach with statu-
torily agreed regional competencies: a widely accepted shared objective, supported
by effective political leadership (Gibson and Abbott 2002; Herrschel 2010).

Detroit: the suburban city-region

The metropolitan region of Detroit is an interesting example of the conflictual
nature of political and economic interests, and suburban versus core city agendas;
a contrast so typical of North America. In addition, just as in Atlanta, there is a
strong underlying racial dimension, so that race and socio-economic patterns
overlap. Yet, Detroit is particular also because of the very nature of the city as
‘mo(tor) town’, whose development was shaped by the automobile, is inherently
dominated by suburbanisation. Detroit itself never really was a residential city with
a distinct sense of urban civicness (interview, Chamber of Commerce, 14 July
2004). The city, therefore, had not been able to establish itself as the natural core
of a wider (dependent) region with a concentration of key functions and political
centrality. The centripetal nature of the Detroit region’s development meant not
only a serious obstacle for the city to boost its central position, but, in fact,
weakened it through a shift of political and functional–economic power to the
suburbs. The outcome has been a ‘doughnut effect’ where the actual functional
balance between centre and suburb became inverse to the established notions of a
city-region’s structure. The gradient of functional, especially economic, importance
rises from the core outwards, although there are very tentative signs of a possible
revival (observations, Apr. 2010) immediately along the waterfront. Nevertheless,
the city centre closes at the end of office hours and remains largely shut on
weekends, unless there are special occasions, such as a major sports event in the
city centre arena, or – at a small scale – a temporary ice rink in Cadillac Square,
one of the few main public spaces downtown.
Detroit city-region may be described as constituted of a peripheralised core,
having lost political and economic standing within the wider city-region, and with
an increasingly more visible and active suburban ring around the central city, which
increasingly seems to speak for the city-region as a whole. In many ways, the core
 Impetus, milieu and structure 147

city, especially the areas immediately around the relatively small core downtown
area, may be described as relative periphery, largely abandoned by people and
functions and capital, clearly demonstrating a ‘left behind’ status. Yet, the old core
city possesses a globally recognised brand name as ‘Motown’, rooted in its
dominant ‘old industrial history’, but also an expression of its cultural industry
based on the very image of ‘motor city’. There is thus a clear division within the
city-region between the economically ‘hollowed out’ centre that possesses the
externally seen recognition factor, and the ‘anonymous’ suburban areas with much
of the economic capacity and development impetus. But there is a growing recog-
nition among policy makers, even though the population may need more
convincing, that the two parts belong to the same story and would benefit from co-
ordinated representation and collaboration, especially in economic development
and the challenge of overcoming the problem of a declining, ‘shrinking city’. There
is thus a clear suggestion of a win-win situation waiting to be utilised. A March
2007 visit to the ‘Shrinking Cities’ exhibition in the Museum of Contemporary Art
Detroit, revealed a strong message to the visiting public that city and suburb are two
sides of the same coin and neither can ‘win’ without the other. One of the state-
ments on an exhibit wall urged: ‘Detroit is not a shrinking city. It is a growing
region marked by uneven development’ (MOCAD, 24 Mar. 2007), and a program-
matic statement beneath it read: ‘seed regional solutions through educational tools.’
It is an observation that is being translated into a region-wide programme to instil
a sense of city-regional awareness among young politicians to overcome frag-
mented and localist views of ‘them’ and ‘us’: the Millenium Mayors training of
young politicians to develop networks between suburbs (and city) (Carney 2010).
Regionalisation in the Detroit area thus seems to be focused on the strategic
benefits (and necessities) of overcoming the perceived, constructed and effective
locally centred foci and divisions as a result of the growing socio-economic and
functional segregation between core city and suburbs. It is interesting to note, and
this differs from other city-regions, that the suburbs recognise the need to use
Detroit’s international visibility and acceptance as a place to gain recognition and
a presence themselves. So, at the imagined, virtual level, a Detroit space is
considered useful. This also reflects suburbs’ awareness of their limited credibility
as urban players in their own right. It is only as an ensemble, jointly with the Detroit
name as focus and label, as the suburban localities – organised in the SE Michigan
Suburban Alliance – can connect to the outside world and also attract connectivities.
As a result of this development, the political balance in the city-region is inverse
to the conventional patterns of a leading central city and more or less dependent
suburban communities around it. The very history and associated notion of the
term ‘suburb’ implies a degree of suburbanisation to an urban centre. Here, it is the
suburbs that are setting the agenda, with Detroit’s main asset being its legacy global
recognition factor. It is this that the suburban region cannot match (interviews,
Detroit Chamber of Commerce, 14 July 2004, and Michigan Suburban Alliance, 8
April 2007 and 10 April 2010). The business community especially values both the
city’s name and political infrastructure, and suburban location and development
opportunities. Business thus adopted a regional agenda in the form of a Regional
148 Impetus, milieu and structure

Economic Partnership, established in 1997 (interview, Detroit Chamber of

Commerce, 14 July 2004), to challenge the ingrained political localism and paro-
chialism, reinforced by racial segregation and mutual distrust; a pattern also found
in Atlanta.
The Partnership’s aim has been to foster regional development without resorting
to new institutional structures, as such would have been near impossible to achieve,
given the fragmented nature of agendas and structures in the city-region. Instead,
it remained an inherently ‘virtual’ construct, based on an existing loose association
of counties around Detroit for the promotion of inward investment, and for that, a
more coordinated, focused approach was deemed potentially more resource
efficient and outcome effective. This closer, more formal arrangement (at least on
paper) came from the realisation that there was some regional implication of what
went on in one county, and that effects could be felt across boundaries. Further-
more, there was also a growing awareness that combining resources for marketing
could achieve more, but that’s as far as it went (interview, Detroit Chamber of
Commerce, 14 July 2004).
Yet any movement to a politically adopted regional perspective needs to involve
the suburbs in all their diversity and variety, and allow difference to exist within
‘togetherness’, at least as far as externally oriented projections are involved. Thus,
the city-region can accommodate variety and local difference, including suburb and
core city, while also projecting an image of coherence, and this requires political
leadership and also trust (interview, Michigan Suburbs Alliance, April 2010). The
regional agenda gained a public face in the shape of the Detroit Regional Economic
Partnership established in 1997 as a recognised business voice in the wider Detroit
area of 10 counties. This initiative is also a reflection of the fact that SE Michigan
is the economic heartland of the whole state, and thus there is a relatively tight-knit,
larger scale economic network overlaying the regional political territoriality. The
spatially wider business perspective cannot, however, do more than draw a blanket
over an underlying fiercely parochial localism (interview, Detroit Chamber of
Commerce, 14 July 2004). The Partnership seeks to bridge the gap between a
fragmented governmental administration both societally and territorially, and a
wider corporate spatial interest and perspective, and so bring together represen-
tatives from the 10 participating counties and more than 100 businesses
(PRNewswire 2001). The Partnership’s main mission is to market the region to
enhance business opportunities and offer relevant information and contacts to
potential investors. The main purpose is not economic planning, but rather business
and their development strategies and opportunities. Such general strategic ‘virtual’
regional arrangements are easier to achieve than formal collaborative action between
governmental entities. There is a deep reluctance to ‘give up’ any powers or reduce
decision-making freedoms, and thus much of any interaction is about protecting
existing local (individual) rights. ‘No-one wants to share anything here, [but] keep
whatever powers they hold, and protect their rights. Even public transport is
separated between city and suburban ring’ (interview, Detroit Chamber of
Commerce, 14 July 2004). The key question, of course, is how to define a region
in the absence of any natural geographic or political guidance. Essentially, in a
 Impetus, milieu and structure 149

largely homogeneous setting, it is about cutting across a county line that is deemed
regional. ‘There is no explicit concept behind it. The notion of ‘region’ is very
vague’ (ibid.).
‘It’s difficult to get people together, it’s all about me, me, me.’ One of the
reasons is that city council members are not based on a constituency. They need not
answer any voters, but rather may follow their own interests, personal ideals and
ideologies, with rather less regard to the ‘bigger picture’. With the racial issue so
important [black city, white suburbs], personal ambitions matter a lot’ (ibid.). This
goes as far as the city council seeking to obstruct the mayor, for instance when the
mayor’s budget needs approval by the council. The outcome of this is a lack of
trust between policy makers, especially between city and suburbs (ibid.). Yet, it is
not just a simple matter of ‘city versus suburb’; the suburbs themselves do not even
cooperate among themselves, with each following its own parochial policies in the
pursuit of local revenue from business and property taxation.
Facing these divisions –in administration and minds – business interests push for
some form of coordination and view beyond local and county boundaries. Yet,
such need to be non-threatening, remain strategic and non-binding and allow
leaving arrangements, if locally wanted. For instance, there was the SE Michigan
Association of Councils, which was the starting point of an, in essence, virtual
form of regionalisation. As the Association is membership based, such membership
needs to produce clear results and advantages for each member. ‘Everyone wants
a tangible advantage’ (interview, Detroit Chamber of Commerce, 14 July 2004).
General, conceptual, idealistic statements and ‘grand plans’ are not good enough;
there need to be locally ‘useful’ data and information. As found frequently with
such agreements, the general public is not aware of them, and so there is little
political capital in a regional agenda as part of local politics.
If anything, a regional – i.e. cross-boundary – perspective is driven by business
interests, not political leadership. This is due to the fact that also smaller companies
are now increasingly operating inter-/nationally. So, it is under the pressure from
business that the political actors are being dragged along, keen to benefit from any
positive effects, while also being seen to be ‘business friendly’ (and ‘jobs friendly’).
Organisations such as the Economic Development Coalition of Southeast Michigan
(EDCSEM), formed in 2006, comprise business promotion organisations based in
different municipalities of the Detroit city-region, e.g. Ann Arbor SPARK, Detroit
Economic Growth Corporation, the Detroit Regional Chamber, or Detroit Regional
Economic Partnership, or Detroit Renaissance, but also local government actors at
county level, e.g. Macomb County or Oakland County (www.prnewswire.com/
news-releases-test/economic-development-coalition-formed-in-southeast-
michigan.html, accessed 8 May 2013).
This collaboration between business and local government draws on the realisation
that a cross-boundary regional perspective can well enhance local prospects as a share
of a stronger regional economy. ‘Going regional’ is thus understood as of individual
advantage. Such a perspective is not new to business, which, by its very nature, is
seeking to expand market boundaries for greater opportunities, and it is them who
take the initiative to overcome an ingrained underlying political (and also public)
150 Impetus, milieu and structure

parochialism. It is about expanding entrepreneurial and innovative capacity through

enlarging the pool of expertise and skills, which then feeds back and benefits
individual local actors. Consequently, at this point, businesses are more ‘ahead of the
Ωgame’ with adopting a regional, strategic perspective as a means to advance local
interests, than are politicians. The business-driven nature of collaboration thus nicely
illustrates the generally strong role of businesses, also at the strategic level, in local
politics in North America, especially the USA. Thus, it is advocacy groups, such as
the Michigan Suburbs Alliance, which offer platforms for meetings of minds between
policy makers without being tied to ‘structure’. The name of these organisations
suggests a clear division between ‘city’ and ‘suburb’, appearing to exclude Detroit
and turn the surrounding suburban ‘doughnut’ into the primary policy maker. Yet,
Detroit features as an integral part of its discussions and agendas. Indeed, some of its
organised/hosted meetings are in downtown Detroit (www.michigansuburbs
alliance.org, accessed 7 April 2013). Detroit itself does not help itself with a city
government that seems rather dysfunctional and ‘failing’, where the State of Michigan
feels obliged to intervene, overrule the mayor and impose a bankruptcy lawyer as
emergency manager to deflect the city’s looming fiscal bankruptcy
(www.huffingtonpost.com 3 Apr. 2013; www.nytimes.com 15 Mar. 2013). This is not
just a reflection of a structurally driven fiscal crisis, but also of political weaknesses
and frictions. But in a rather dramatic and attention-raising act, Detroit filed for, and
was granted by the State Court, bankruptcy protection on 17 July 2013 (Kaffer et al.
2013).
Changing political dynamics through fostering more circumspect and collabo-
ratively minded leadership has been the main goal of the Millennial Mayors’
Congress. Set up in 2009, the Millennial Mayors Congress is a partnership of civic
leaders seeking to address challenges at the regional level in the Detroit city-region
(www.michigansuburbsalliance.org, accessed 7 April 2013). Participating munici-
palities are represented by a city official, such as the mayor, and a ‘Millennial’
resident, or ‘young leader’, of the ‘millennial’ age group of around 18–35 years
(Carney 2010). Much of the rationale of this project is shaping future policy
makers’ mind-sets towards a more collaborative, regional perspective, away from
established parochialism (interview, Michigan Suburbs Alliance, April 2010). This
is related to ‘hands-on’ policy issues, such as improving public transport across
municipal boundaries, alleviating particularly stark barriers to urban redevelopment
and addressing a lingering ‘rust-belt’ image. Importantly, a key goal of the
Congress is that it ‘will help metropolitan Detroit overcome its generations-long
tradition of insularity and fragmentation, while giving leaders a tool to address
greater-than-local concerns’ (ibid.).
So in essence, the divisions within the Detroit city-region, separating city from
the suburban hinterland, are a deeply embedded distrust along socio-demographic,
and, especially, racial, lines, and the associated politics of localism. There is not
enough urbanity in Detroit to overcome these divisions as a dominant player. The
relatively small downtown, and short history as a city, have not provided enough
urban capacity to overcome the shock of its economic collapse. Unlike Turin, also
a ‘car city’ from its economic specialism, Detroit has not the historic depth and
 Impetus, milieu and structure 151

inherent status as the leading social, political and cultural leader in the region that
it could be allowed to fall back on. Its main asset is its name and the global
recognition factor it has as a legacy of the car industry; and it is this that keeps the
economically and socially more potent suburbs potentially interested in engaging
with the city, outside of racial politics. It is a slow process of changing attitudes and
this takes quite some time to develop. Simple administrative reforms and top-down
coercion in a regional approach cannot substitute for that. Building trust, a key
element in locally-led cooperative regionalism, and a likely win-win outcome for
all concerned, are key ingredients in shaping effective and credible city-regional
governance. They cannot be imposed. Important for cooperation and thus utilising
latent joint capacities in the city-region, is a sense of shared benefit from doing so,
and realising that it takes time to overcome entrenched prejudices. This requires
political leadership, just as the Millennial Mayors project tries to instill. But the
voting public needs to be convinced as well; and here more work is mapped out.

Puget Sound: competitive localism and the ‘production’ of city-regionality

through the development of public discourse and use of latent shared values
The third example, the Puget Sound city-region, differs from Atlanta in its internal,
duo-centric structure around the two main functional nodes of Seattle and Tacoma.
Although there is an uneasy rivalry between the two, pragmatic joint arrangements
can be reached, such as with the shared airport SEATAC (Seattle-Tacoma)
(www.psrc.org, accessed 21 November 2012) which, by its very nature, is the most
outward-looking organisation in the region (interview, Tacoma EDU, 6 Oct. 2002).
Furthermore, the Puget Sound city-region is much less shaped by divisions in the
social-economic structure than is the case in Atlanta, for instance. Just a third of the
population is non-white, of which a quarter is black (PSRC 2011). Nevertheless,
Puget Sound shares with Atlanta distinct city-suburb contrasts as a typical US urban
feature (Jargowsky 1996), even though without the element of stark racial
segregation. Yet, the competition between two main urban centres provides a
specific context for the city-region’s governance arrangements. Indeed, intra-
regional competition between the different urban (metropolitan) areas is viewed by
the business community as positive (interview, Trade Development Alliance of
Greater Seattle, 7 Oct. 2002).
The intra-regional inter-urban competitiveness marks out an important internal
structural element, which impacts on the attitudes to, and engagement with, region-
ally oriented local policies among both local policy makers and the local electorate.
Regionalisation of the political (rather than the technocratic) arena has evolved only
slowly since the late 1990s (interviews,Tacoma Economic Development Unit (EDU),
6 Oct. 2002; and Seattle Corporate Planning Dept., 5 Oct. 2002). It was only then that
the regional scale had slowly gained recognition within the city-region as a
potentially useful device in economic policy. Its focus was thus shifting from serving
as a mere instrument for technically-driven provision of public transport – its original
brief and raison d’être – to raising the city-region’s international competitiveness.
Yet, it was the former that laid the conceptual foundations of a city-regional
152 Impetus, milieu and structure

perspective in the form of the Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC). This was put
in place in 1990 by the State of Washington as de facto central government, at a time
when there was generally little interest in regional issues across the USA (interview,
Tacoma EDU, 6 Oct. 2002). Otherwise, localist competition prevailed in a neo-liberal
political climate. This initial recognition of a regional policy-making dimension per
se was followed by a second such external impetus in 1994: the requirement by the
State of Washington that municipalities prepare an area-wide comprehensive
development plan, rather than merely small sections limited to specific development
projects. This encouraged a more comprehensive, longer-term strategic perspective,
which also needed to go beyond the immediate administrative boundaries. A more
efficient provision of public transport outside the central city areas has been one such
driver of a more city-regional perspective.
Intra-regional competition between the main cities is reflected in the region’s
somewhat anodyne name, ‘Puget Sound’. This is based on a geographic feature,
rather than a place. For boosting economic opportunities, Seattle’s name, imprinted
on the whole city-region, would have been far more effective. Indeed, Trade
Development Alliance of Greater Seattle adopts this approach as a business-led
organisation outside the political arena. Similarly, the two port authorities of Seattle
and Tacoma (interview, Tacoma EDU, 6 Oct. 2002) engage in virtual regionali-
sation through coordinated marketing (Port of Tacoma, 2009). But this was about
external visibility as a two-hub international transport region, rather than
addressing internal city-regional divisions and animosities, especially between the
urban centres and their suburbs (interview, Renton Mayor’s Office, 5 Nov. 2003).
The attempt at maintaining a low-key and, from a local perspective ‘unthreat-
ening’ introduction of a regional agenda, is also reflected in PSRC’s web address
extension ‘.org’. Inherently institutionally ‘soft’ (MacLeod 2001), it is clearly an
organisation that seeks to project itself as outside the governmental hierarchy and
devoid of any coercive powers to intervene in local matters. Instead, it operates
akin to ‘a regional UN [United Nations]’, as a leading PSRC planner commented
(interview, PSRC, 14 Nov. 2002), with much debating, negotiating and slow
compromise-seeking decision making. Yet, the PSRC has gradually raised the
profile of a regional dimension in policy-making and has offered an increasingly
more publicly visible political arena for debating conflicting interest and policy
priorities across municipalities and between policy fields. Its role broadened to
that of a regionally operating strategic development agency. Its current ‘mission is
to ensure a thriving central Puget Sound now and into the future through planning
for regional transportation, growth management and economic development’
(www.psrc.org, accessed 5 April 2012). PSRC’s brief thus does not look that
different from ARC’s in Atlanta. But, in contrast, PSRC has gained in political
presence and stature since being initiated by State decree as external impetus. This
was achieved in collaboration, and through compromises, with the city-region’s
municipalities, thus explicitly acknowledging – and assuring – the primacy of the
local jurisdictions in terms of democratic legitimacy.
Finding and adopting a shared and generally accepted collaborative way ahead
faces many obstacles, especially concern about losing local financial control
 Impetus, milieu and structure 153

(taxation) and, politically important, popular local support. ‘Cities are like little
kingdoms’, an official in the Mayor’s Office of the suburban city of Renton
observed (interview, 5 Nov. 2003). Yet, to promote their interests, the same cities
have come to realise the opportunities that rest in joint action with like-minded
municipalities. One example is the Suburban Cities Association in King County
(interview, PSRC, 14 Nov. 2002), although its very name reflects the deep-seated
divisions in the region between the old core cities and the outer suburbs and exurbs.
External impetus, such as central government directives, or internal impetus in the
forms of threats by the local business community to take investment (and jobs)
elsewhere, if region-wide obstacles to a competitive operating environment do not
get tackled. Boeing’s decision in 2001 to move its headquarters out of the city-
region was also intended as a signal to the political leadership to address regional
transport (interview, Seattle Chamber of Commerce, 5 Oct. 2002). Such pressure
has helped facilitate the acceptance of a more explicitly strategic regional develop-
ment (and competitiveness) agenda, albeit with an unconvinced local public. The
PSRC’s current 2040 Vision strategy therefore promises explicitly to focus on
‘people, property, planet’ as guidance for the Growth Management, Environmental,
Economic and Transportation Strategy for the Central Puget Sound Region, and
thus appeal to the public (http://psrc.org/growth/vision2040/pub/vision2040-
document/, accessed 16 Nov. 2012).
The explicit reference to ‘people’ – i.e. the electorate – furthermore suggests
an attempt to raise the organisation’s public profile, demonstrate its work and
‘usefulness’ and relevance to the public’s general interest and day-to-day concerns,
and thus gain public recognition and acceptance for its regionally scaled, cross-
jurisdictional policies. This matters, as the plethora of single-purpose organisations
and governmental bodies increasingly obscures the source of power and the ways
in which decisions are made. Yet, it is the call for small government and adminis-
tering services outside government – reflecting an inherent distrust of government
per se – that brings about this atomisation of power (interview, Tacoma EDU, 6
Oct. 2002). This includes the fact that this ‘cross-cutting’ does not involve statutory
powers and thus any ‘danger’ of coercive pressures towards local government –
whether actual or perceived. Such would face considerable local resistance,
especially where strong localist traditions exists under the umbrella of ‘home rule’,
as in Atlanta’s case. In such instances, virtual regionalisation is the only form of
city-regionalisation likely to be accepted, with two key factors emerging as
defining its policy efficacy: leadership among political actors within the region, and
public acceptance of the (locally felt) utility of a regional perspective beyond and
across local boundaries. Both factors shape the ‘milieu’ for per se accepting a
regional policy agenda in a city-region and, subsequently, the preferred mechanism
of implementing such.
Public support for a regional perspective is particularly important, as this also
provides the basis for local policy makers to gain political reward for their regional
engagement, and this, of course, is likely to shape their readiness to ‘act regionally’
and be imaginative about it. In both examples, the business community was ‘ahead
of the game’ in framing a regional agenda, realising the importance of publicity and
154 Impetus, milieu and structure

marketing a city-region as a whole. But such efforts are first and foremost aimed
at external audiences as part of a national and international competitiveness agenda.
Much less is aimed at the city-region itself, unless, for instance, entrenched local-
ism undermines and weakens economic opportunity, such as flagged up by Boeing
in Seattle. But social divisions and stereotyping, especially along racial lines, work
against a broader policy approach, in particular, when it comes to the likely use
elsewhere of locally raised tax monies.
This concern is well established in the American psyche, especially since the
ever more uncompromising nature of the neo-liberal agenda. Regionalisation is
easily equalled with a redistribution of funds across a city-region, especially between
the generally more affluent suburbs and the socially and economically more
challenged core cities, often raising vague connotations of ‘socialism’. It is here
that the internal structure of city-regions matters. Mono-centric city-regions are
simpler in this respect, as they are ‘only’ dominated by the divisions between city
and suburbs, while polycentric city-regions are subject to many overlapping and
intersecting such divisions, as well as inter-local rivalries between the main cities.
The result is more fractious relationships and thus more difficult, conflictual
conditions for developing and investing political goodwill and trust at the city-
regional level. Regionalisation is a delicate, even contentious, issue, and a general
weariness of ‘more government’ means that low key, virtual forms of regional
governance have been the by far preferred option as the least ‘costly’ way in terms
of local taxation. Yet, in the absence of any coercive powers, they depend for success
on ‘weaker’ forms of regionalisation through self-organising arrangements, ranging
from ‘shallow’ coordination to forms of deeper integration. Indeed, these seem to
be the preferred format, at least as far as the business community is concerned.
‘Regionalisation is about local partnerships, driven by common interest and sense
of external threat from globalisation – yet there should be no submission of [local]
power, but continued competition at metropolitan level’ (interview, Trade Develop-
ment Alliance of Greater Seattle, 7 Oct. 2002). Against this, the local government view
is that ‘when times are tough, there is a call for more government’ (interview,
Tacoma EDU, 6 Oct. 2002). Thus, for instance the recent loss of a major banking busi-
ness from downtown Tacoma to a suburban location highlighted the fragility of the
city’s economic recovery since de-industrialisation. This in turn put the city’s eco-
nomic development policies in the dock; people and politicians expected that ‘some-
thing was to be done about that’, and this expectation cost the head of Economic De-
velopment his job (Cooper 2013). At other times, it may well take a dose of state
coercion to impress a regional perspective on local policy makers, e.g. through call-
ing regional ‘round tables, such as practiced to develop a regional economic devel-
opment and tourism strategy to stretch from Vancouver in Washington (across the river
from Portland, Oregon) to Vancouver in British Columbia, Canada.

Vancouver: city-regionalism as expression of local (lifestyle) ‘milieu’

The Vancouver city-region, like Puget Sound, comprises a densely urbanised
polycentric metropolitan area, with several large suburban cities, some of which
 Impetus, milieu and structure 155

(e.g. Richmond and Surrey) of the same size as Vancouver (0.5 million each),
sharing as competing neighbouring municipalities into the region. This density,
but also a general concern about quality of life and preserving the beautiful natural
landscape as a key component in this quality, has led to accepting a regional
perspective. At the same time, there is latent concern within local government, and
among the public, about how this regionalisation ‘is done’, imposed top-down by
central government (the Province), or bottom-up through local cooperation. There
is little appetite for the former variant (interview, Vancouver Board of Trade, 3
Nov. 2003). City-regionalism in Vancouver has thus emerged essentially on the
back of development planning control (that is ‘zoning’), which goes back to the
city’s first development plan of 1929, designed upon request by the Provincial
government of British Columbia to protect land resources from urban expansion
(Donald 2005), and technocratic concerns, such as transport planning, are the main
drivers of regional cooperation. But otherwise, a strong municipal sense of
independence and local policy-making autonomy prevails.
In Vancouver, and not just in the city itself, public debate expressed and
reinforced a preparedness to accept the principles of development control in a bid
to enhance urban living and quality of life as early as the beginning of the 1970s.
The then liberal political middle-class movement, TEAM (The Electors’ Action
Movement) gained control of the Vancouver city council in contested elections
against the backdrop of a perceived assault on ‘urban living’, and social equity and
inclusion by rapid urban expansion on the ‘edges’, supported by extensive road
building, as a result of, so it was seen, the self-serving interests of a narrow local
political elite of ‘inaccessible politicians’ (Ley et al. 1992: 281). The result was a
receptive mood for the discourse of ‘community’, later translated into the concept
and political agenda of ‘smart growth’, and this has become an important driver in
fostering a sense of ‘shared purpose’ without the underlying competitiveness latent
to economic development policies. Being ‘environmentally concerned’ reflects the
appreciation of the high environmental quality in the city-region – shaped by its
astounding physical landscape combining a mountainous backdrop with the sea,
and has become a major economic asset. This requires more strategic, longer-term
perspectives as guidance to local policy decisions, than economic development
often does, including cooperation with neighbouring municipalities to address the
‘bigger picture’ of quality of life.
Such actions possess sufficient political currency to deliver potential votes as
they chime with popular views and values held. Only then, can local politicians be
expected to engage in policies that go beyond short-term successes/results and a
localist perspective. The regional agenda thus needs publicity, and benefits from it,
so as to raise its profile (interview, Vancouver Board of Trade, 3 Nov. 2003), but
it requires a receptive audience.
The early start in debating and formulating such concerns publicly and visibly
gave the city a policy innovator’s edge and time for building a broader coalition to
develop and manifest ‘smart’ policies as an integral part of a local political
discourse which, in itself, leads to as competitive advantage. The current mayor’s
decision to use ‘greenness’ as an obvious ‘boosterist’ policy tool to promote the
156 Impetus, milieu and structure

city’s competitiveness, is an extension of this expertise through the Greenest City

2020 Action Plan launched in 2009 (http://vancouver.ca/greenestcity/, accessed 5
April 2012), just ahead of the 2010 Winter Olympics as the then touted ‘most
sustainable’ Games. It is an attempt to further strengthen the perception of
Vancouver as innovative and creative (also including Richard Florida’s creative
class), and avant-garde in successfully bringing together often conflicting policy
fields, while pursuing an economically successful sustainability agenda. And for
this all physical assets of the city-region will be mobilised.
The new slogan of ‘Vancouver 2020 – a bright green future’ is intended to propa-
gate just this, and suggests sufficient political capital (in terms of voter acceptance)
for it to serve as longer-term strategic guidance of local development policies
towards the adoption of regional ‘smartness’. It is an expression of the attempt to
propagate a shared vision as accepted vehicle for shaping local and individual
agendas (Healey 2002). And here, the private sector has taken a lead role, focusing
on particular problems as ‘rallying points’ for concerted action, but, again,
voluntarily, not as part of central government engagement. The close link between
the main actors promoting regionalisation, and local interests and concerns, is
important. For this, two main approaches are being used in the city-region: the
conventional, territorialised, government-heavy mechanism of formally regionalised
local government, focusing on planning, especially infrastructure. Then, there is the
‘new’ approach of informal, network-based and strategic policy oriented govern-
ance, working with projected strategic policy. This informal approach is favoured
by the business community and focuses on the implementation of economic policy.
The Vancouver Economic Committee is an institutionally thin, network-based
organisation that seeks to connect key policy makers and businesses by aiding flows
of information. The challenge with these organisations is their funding flow; they
depend on continuous fund raising, and this affects their ability to plan ahead. But
crucially, they are not part of the state hierarchy, are flexible and focused on debate
and communication and negotiation, and are therefore easily adopted.
By contrast, the primary actor in Vancouver city-region’s governance system is
the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) as formalised actor from within
the government hierarchy, possessing clear powers, capacities and territorial
responsibilities. Formally established in 1967 by the British Columbia government
as a form of direct local intervention, GVRD was created as part of a province-wide
‘network of regional districts’ to ‘provide(s) a mechanism for metropolitan govern-
ment’ (Sancton 2005: 324). GVRD is to act on behalf of the participating
municipalities and, in line with other such organisations, is, as also elsewhere,
indirectly legitimated through councillors delegated to its board by those munici-
palities. GVRD was thus top-down implemented and then bottom-up legitimated,
albeit solely as a strategic body to offer a regional perspective as guidance for local
policies (Sancton 2005). Renamed ‘Metro Vancouver’ a few years ago to raise the
city-region’s profile and reflect a competitive image consciousness of the value of
the label ‘metropolitan’ for Vancouver’s urban attractiveness as a place, its latest
strategic development document is the ‘Metro Vancouver: 2040’ strategy. Also
referred to as a regional growth strategy by the GVRD, it was adopted in July 2011
 Impetus, milieu and structure 157

by all relevant municipalities. Agreement was facilitated by propagating an explicit

fusion of both (local) economic growth and (regional) sustainability.
This economic-cum-sustainability agenda, is not something ad hoc fashionable,
but goes back to the ‘Sustainable Region Initiative’ started in 2002. Seeking to
negotiate and compromise between a still new Smart Growth campaign among
policy makers, and a clearly competitive agenda, the outcome was the more
explicitly ‘growth oriented’ 2008 ‘Sustainability Framework’ for a Regional
Growth Strategy (p 1). Approved by all municipalities in the city-region as
‘shareholders’ in Metro Vancouver, this provided a common ground for them
including the vehemently competing suburban cities of Surrey and Richmond
(interview, Surrey EDU, 26 Oct. 2004) to identify local advantage in regionalism.
Overcoming localist views requires regular contacts and the building of trust
through regular meetings to discuss regional concerns from the perspective of the
different municipalities, so as to foster a regional perspective among local actors
(interview, Surrey Planning Dep., 26 Oct. 2004). Here, the mayors, as leading
policy makers, are of vital importance. If they cannot ‘get on’, regional cooperation
between municipalities will be difficult to achieve (interview, Surrey Chamber of
Commerce, 26 Oct. 2003). So, as in the other examples, it is the availability of
opportunities for regular meetings between policy makers to discuss city-regional
agendas face-to-face, that matters. This includes, the building of trust among actors
across municipal and other boundaries, especially so in a competitive environment
as economic development. The main ‘voice’ for economic development is the small
organisation, Vancouver Economic Committee (VEC). As advocacy group well
connected to the business community as well as the city council (the city mayor is
the VEC chairman), its primary mission is to promote Vancouver as a place to
invest, and facilitate communication between business interests and concerns, and
the administration (interview, VEC, 23 Oct. 2003). VEC thus sees itself as a key
player among the ‘context people’ focusing on strategy, rather than detailed
implementation of policy.
City-regionalism in the Vancouver area has been shaped by two main forces,
each pulling in a different direction. While the settlement structure with large,
rapidly growing suburban ‘cities’ encourages competition and thus reluctance to
regional engagement among each other, but also with the established city and
‘natural’ leader, the high value of ‘quality of life’ in public discourse pushes for the
opposite. For that reason, technocratic regionalisation to make the buses and metro
run, for instance, benefits from a discourse of efficient service delivery and political
advantages emanating from that. As such, is more acceptable than political–institu-
tional forms of region building. This applies in particular, to inherently locally
centric, even localist, economic development policies. Network-based, ad hoc,
informal and thus non-committal arrangements are preferred for this policy field.
Vancouver thus tries to ‘play’ both systems in a delicate balancing act; as much
conventional regional ‘government’ as absolutely necessary to address ‘naturally’
regional issues like transport and environment, yet leaving other fields to ‘new’
forms of (local) regionalism, unless, perhaps, that new necessities and shared
opportunities emerge.
158 Impetus, milieu and structure

Summary: city-regional governance as local product of internal

and external pressures and demands
This chapter presented seven case studies of metropolitan governance, taking into
account varying external and internal political–economic factors, including degrees
of ‘economic stress’ and local particularities. In this tri-variate framework (see
Figure 6.3), the former include national parameters of state structure with greater
or lesser degree of devolution of powers, and national and international (global)
economic processes and related pressures for competitiveness. This intersects with
the second dimension, the internal (i.e. local and regional) factors circumscribing
local scope and capacity to shape city-regional governance. Again, these include
economic factors – such as location factors, comparative advantage and existing
economic structures – and then, governmental parameters, including statutory and
fiscal provisions for institutional capacity. It is these variables that connect the case
studies in general, as they all find themselves circumscribed by this framework.
Yet, they also add particular local dimensions, which have been subsumed under
‘city-regional milieu’. It is this that ultimately translates ‘context’ into governance
arrangements for individual city-regions as a continuous balancing and negotiation
process between explicitly local and regional agendas. Nevertheless, and that
became clear, even seemingly regional concerns are ultimately translated into, and
measured by, local outcomes. All seven city-regions demonstrated that direct state
intervention and territorial scalar restructuring seem decidedly a thing of the past
– no longer politically feasible vis-à-vis strong local opposition – and this is
especially so with the growing confidence and sense of individuality among cities.
Instead, state involvement remained indirect through the established state
structures, but also ‘incentives’, at times in the form of ‘sticks and carrots’. Yet,
essentially, the tendency is in favour of self-selecting, self-organising arrange-
ments, based on local assessments of opportunities and benefits resulting from
such regional engagement.
Local culture and history matter as a resource for cities and city-regions to
develop a sense of togetherness, joint fate and also a source of re-invention and re-
projection of identity and ‘placeness’. This is where the comparison between
Europe and North America became quite instructive. For once, the notion of ‘city’
and ‘hinterland’ differs quite substantially, with the city in Europe generally still
seen as the core, the central focus of a city-region, even when there are poly-centric
arrangements or underlying structural problems. The city is expected to, and sees
itself as, the ‘natural’ propagator of any moves towards a city-regional agenda. The
underlying depth of historic roles and functions provides cities with a broader
repertoire of reference points to produce a new narrative about their placeness,
should a particular functional-economic role come to an end. The two cases of
Turin and Detroit demonstrated this quite clearly. With the dominant car industry
declining, Turin could revert back to its traditional historic role of an important
administrative and commercial centre for a wider region; a function it had
neglected when becoming a mere industrial location. Detroit, by contrast, has no
such possibility, and certainly there is no natural acceptance by the ‘hinterland’ of
the city’s leadership. Quite the contrary. It is the suburban ‘cities’ that drive the
 Impetus, milieu and structure 159

agenda, requiring Detroit merely for its name. Underlying social, and especially
racial, divisions are much more important than any historic sequence of events.
The case of Atlanta underscored this point. By the same token, despite these
differences, major, high-profile events possess a clear ability to focus minds and
political agendas at a regional level. The Winter Olympics, with their international
visibility and reputation, resulted in both city-regions, Turin and Vancouver, in a
strong sense of regional purpose, even if for purely local benefits. But hosting the
Winter Olympics offered a sufficiently ‘big pie’ to offer significant ‘slices’ for all
participating municipalities, and it is these opportunities that attract businesses and
their representative organisations. In all cities they play a significant role in shaping
a city-regional, outward-looking agenda, albeit within their particular operational
contexts: institutionalised and ‘naturally regionalised’, closely linked to ‘govern-
ment’ in Europe, and more informal representations as part of ‘governance’, with
a strong business voice, operating locally, in North America.
7 Summary, conclusions, outlook

This book set out to explore the political–economic context of city-regions, as it

shapes scope and practices of their governance. This includes the underlying
rationales and individual local-regional interpretations and applications, all framed
by the pressures of a globalised economy. Both governance and ‘context’ stretch
across spatial scales, as they cut across, and seek to negotiate and balance between,
different perspectives and democratically defined tasks. The democratic dimension
clearly emerged as a key determinant of the mode of ‘governance’ in operation in
a city-region, as it is this that circumscribes the political scope (risk and reward)
for local policy makers to engage across boundaries as part of a regional approach.
The degree to which this seems politically opportune varies with time, policy field
and agenda. The spatial structure of the population, and the underlying differences
in political views and expectations from their places, vary, determined by identity
and history, as found in Europe, or socio-economic and racial parameters, as so
important in North America. Governance practices and principles, especially the
role of government, needs to reflect this to maintain democratic legitimacy. This
leads to a continuous process of identifying the ‘most “democratic” scale at which
to organize governance’, whereby ‘governance structures at the city-region scale
may or may not be more democratic than smaller and larger-scale structures’
(Purcell 2007: 203). There is thus no automatic ‘best practice’ in scalar governance:
what works – and is accepted – in a city-region depends on the particular socio-
cultural and political–economic local ‘milieu’ at a particular point in time. Practice
needs to be negotiated. The scalar positioning of governing tasks and responsi-
bility cannot thus be decided a priori as a matter of principle in the scalar
organisation of power and responsibility. This is what ultimately makes territorial
and institutional reorganisation and restructuring so contested and doubtful: a
seemingly optimal arrangement cannot last. Demands, requirements, expectations
and modi operandi keep changing, not least in response to ever more rapidly
altering technological scope and practices. City-regionalism not by itself provides
the ‘better’ solution to the functional challenges of city-hinterland interdepen-
dencies and the associated multiple and variable scalarity of perspectives and modi
operandi. Variability, flexibility and responsiveness are key qualities for
maintaining appropriateness and effective capacity of policy-making, certainly vis-
à-vis globalised economic processes. It is here, where a more regulationist
 Summary, conclusions, outlook 161

perspective, such as suggested for instance by MacLeod (2001), with its focus on
dialectics between regulative structures and modi operandi, and social-economic
patterns, offers a more variable, seemingly responsive – and thus, ultimately, task-
appropriate – modus of governing, than those focusing on territoriality per se with
a particular, a priori scalar location of responsibilities and policy-making tasks
(Ohmae 1993; Scott 2001; Pastor et al. 2000). As the case studies demonstrated,
‘optimal’ scalar governance for city-regions may not necessarily be the city-
regional level for all policy-making eventualities. What ‘works best’ needs to be
negotiated and arranged in a situation-, place- and time-specific way. Overcoming
structural and/or discursive fragmentation through restructuring not necessarily
offers the ‘better’ answers per se. This is where the ‘virtual regionalism’, as
suggested in this book, may offer the ‘best of both worlds’: a variable scalar
positioning of perspective and collaborative engagement, leading to self-selecting
groupings of policy-making partners around shared agendas, while refraining from
a priori institutional reorganisation and associated restructuring of territory, powers
and responsibilities, presuming that this, in itself, will produce more effective
policies. The challenge is to maintain – and/or provide – sufficient interest in, and
scope for, variability in the spatially-based framing, as well as targeting, of policy
responses, recognising the time-limited nature of any such derived agendas and
modi operandi, while retaining structures, allocation of powers and mechanisms of
democratic legitimacy as modular ‘base entities’. This counteracts concerns about
a growing complexity of the state apparatus, and thus implicit inefficiencies,
reduced transparency and, when power is ‘scaled up’, loss of local control and
responsiveness to community interests, while avoiding loss of capacity – and
efficiency – through fragmentation and too much ‘localism’. It is here that
‘territorial innovation’ and ‘territorial dynamics’, as argued by Moulaert and
Nussbaumer (2005), become effective, which, if related to the regional scale,
produce ‘social regions’.
By its very nature, city-regional governance stretches across, or sits between,
both the local and regional scale of institutional structures, governmental territories,
political and economic ambitions and agendas, and socially imagined and produced
spatial entities. This raises frictions, uncertainties about power, responsibilities and
representation (Purcell 2007), pressures to pursue efficacy in administration and
service delivery through ‘economies of scale’, and necessities to find new answers
to shifting economic patterns and an increasingly selective distribution of opportu-
nities. The actual and perceived role and position of city-regions in this complex
power field has varied in interpretations and conceptualisations. These reflect
different disciplinary views and general perceptions of scalar government as, on the
one hand, clearly segmented and (mostly) state-organised, hierarchical–territorial
structures of government, while, on the other, a more ad hoc, spatially produced and
projected self-organising assemblage of multiple actors and their associated
operational/representational spaces. Both approaches seek to reconcile functional
and administrative–governmental geographies, despite the inherent tensions
between dynamic shifts with relational connectivities and fixed structures with
static territories.
162 Summary, conclusions, outlook

Accordingly, city-regions have been conceptualised, and subsequently oper-

ationalised, in different ways, with correspondingly varying emphasis on the ‘city’
and the ‘region’ component. While the former views city-regions as constructed
outwardly from one city (or group of two or more leading cities), presuming a
continuous centrifugal process, the latter takes a more equitable perspective,
understanding the city-region more of a continuous process of dialectic negoti-
ations between city and region as hinterland, and their respective qualities. Their
relative ‘weight’ in this marriage may vary in response to externally described con-
ditions, but also established internal perceptions of the ‘value’ of the ‘urban’ in
relation to ‘the regional’, and the respective contributions they make to a city-
region. This matters for the ‘bargaining position’ between individual and collective
interests, and ways of governing them. The outcome may be a constellation that
reflects a city-region or a city-region,
In this context, as discussed in Chapter 2 the historic dimension matters for the
established, accepted and expected role of the leading city/cities in a city-region.
While in Europe the city is per definitionem considered the natural core of a city-
region, in North America this is much less clear and more contested, based on
actually existing fiscal and political capacity, socio-economic clustering and
economic potential. As a result, city-regionalism, and its governance, has been
shaped in North America, especially the USA, much more by concerns about socio-
economic spatialisation and associated fiscal costs and quality of local service
delivery, than a contrast between dominant city/cities and the wider regional
hinterland per se. The increasingly self-selecting process of social and, especially,
racial spatial differentiation since the 1950s, allowed by growing car ownership,
has thus counteracted ‘conventional’ attempts at ‘organising’ the governance of
city-regions through top-down territorial restructuring and administrative reorgan-
isation with a rescaling of tasks and responsibilities; an approach that owed much
to the European notion of city and hinterland. Yet, since then, the ‘hinterland’ has
increasingly become empowered as part of continuous suburbanisation, and this re-
balancing, at times inverting the relative standing of central city/cities and suburban
‘hinterland’, has generated a much more delicate, often contentious, even
distrusting, relationship between municipalities within city-regions and associated
socio-economic groupings. A simple transfer of ‘what works in Europe’ to North
American, including Canadian, conditions does not automatically also transfer
success and, likewise, American New World experiences to Europe. The notion of
‘spatial flows’ and thus a fuzzying of place, territory and structure, as suggested by
Castells (1996) or David Harvey (1989), owes much to the particular place unifor-
mities and dominance of highway-based taffic flows of American, especially
southern Californian, suburbanity, rather than the strong, clearly identifiable place-
ness in Europe.
The ongoing contestations and tensions around the ‘old style’ approach to
reorganising the Toronto metropolitan area, illustrate that quite clearly. It takes an
overarching, dominant region-wide discourse that transcends administrative
boundaries and socio-economic spatial clustering, to achieve support for a regional
agenda, as long as clear local, or even personal, advantages from this can be made
 Summary, conclusions, outlook 163

clear. Hosting the Olympics, as illustrated by Vancouver and Turin, with its interna-
tional limelight and associated ‘fame’, is one such example. Another one is a
leading, unifying public discourse, such as the strong concern with quality of life
and an awareness (and appreciation) of the natural environment as complimentary
to trendy urban living, as in Vancouver or Seattle. Here, a collective, negotiated
‘smart’ agenda seeks to facilitate a shift in values, priorities and perspectives from
a narrow, short-term and often monetary, perspective, to a broader, more holistic
and longer-term view embracing both political process and spatial perspective. For
this, regulative intervention and rescaling of (some) competencies is accepted as
a necessary course of action to achieve set policy agendas in an efficient and
effective way (Herrschel 2013).
In Europe, the ‘old order’ between city and hinterland is still largely intact.
Cities are considered the natural centres of a wider catchment area, just as concep-
tualised by Christaller in the 1930s. While suburbanisation is recognised as a
current challenge, it is controlled by generally accepted tight regulation. Urban
functions and their interdependencies – for mutual benefit – continue to be an
important criterion in shaping the notion, and practice, of city-regionalism and its
governance. Cities are viewed as, and are set to be even more so, the centres of
regional – and national – economic development and competitiveness, well beyond
their administrative boundaries. Not all are capable of doing so in the same way,
but even stagnating or shrinking cities continue to be so. They are not ‘overtaken’
by their respective suburbs, but by other, economically more successful cities
elsewhere. That is the reason why the national and regional governments, but also
the European Union, place so much emphasis on cities as engines of economic
development, and offer a range of direct and indirect support and incentives to
achieve that. Direct regulative intervention, such as through territorial reorgani-
sation is, just as in North America, faced by political resistance and thus much
more difficult than in the 1960s or 1970s, for instance. This, however, is based less
on socio-economic spatial segregation, than historic factors of identity and
associated localism, a sense of urban hierarchy and competitiveness and still spatial
fusion of administrative, economic and cultural-political centrality. Suburbs are, as
by their very name, viewed as auxiliary to, and dependent on, ‘their’ cities even if
separated by administrative boundaries.
The examples discussed in this book demonstrated and reinforced the fact that
interpreting globalisation as producing a ‘flat’, borderless playing field for a
competitive inter-urban and/or inter-regional race for a place in the global
economic network, needs to be treated with caution. This includes the presumed
economic opportunities associated with economic development and attempts to
rise through the ranks by acquiring more and more globally influential functions.
Cities are not mere passive objects ‘buffeted about’ by the winds of globalisation,
although some are more resistant to such than others, with varying capacities and
capabilities to respond and utilise new opportunities, exposing established
positions. Cities and, by extension, city-regions, are also, and increasingly so,
actors in their own right, with some becoming increasingly independent locali-
sations of economic activity, disembedding from regional/national economic
164 Summary, conclusions, outlook

frameworks. There are differences, however, in how this capacity for respon-
siveness is imposed within city-regions. In North America, for instance, suburban
areas gain in their standing at the expense of ‘traditional’ urban cores. Thus, city-
regional competitiveness and relative economic success do not necessarily include
every municipality and every inhabitant within its territory in the same way. Inter-
ests, opportunities and capabilities vary, and differing spaces of similarity and
difference develop, all in relation to specific agendas, at a particular time. Such
differentiation may thus reinforce the ‘gap’ between, for once, ‘winners’ and
‘losers’ in the reconfiguring power field between state structures, power arrange-
ments and governmental scalar modi operandi and, secondly, the selecting effects
and opportunities defined by gobalised capitalism. The growing fluidity of
functional relations challenges any neat arrangement of territorially based, scalar
government, favouring, instead, variable spaces of changing agendas and,
subsequently, self-organising groupings of actors brought together by similar,
shared goals, as identified at a particular time. As a result, responsibilities and
response strategies are no longer so clear in their legitimation and effectiveness.
This shift from the certainty and predictability of state structure to the vagaries
and uncertainties of functional, inherently opportunistic, connections has produced
a sequence of interpretations and recommendations that reflect paradigmatic shifts
as well as experiences with what seemingly works and what does not.
As economic processes, for instance, cut across municipal boundaries, scope
may well vary for individual municipalities to articulate and implement effective
policy responses. Joint action may promise improved efficacy of initiatives, as it
allows individual local actors to ‘punch above their weight’. It is here that political
debates about legitimate interest representation, ‘democracy’ and ‘community
interest’ revolve around the question of the right scale of governance. This means
location of power, control and influence both within and between localities at a
level that is as close as possible to communal – and individual – interests and
concerns, yet also maintains a sufficiently ‘big picture’ view to locate narrower
perspectives in a broader context for greater policy efficacy. This leads to highly
specialised, narrowly defined (and voter-legitimated) functional entities within a
presumed self-organising system of governing city-regions at a variable spatial
scale, as defined by the sum of the collaborating entities. Yet, such a system of
overlapping and intersecting governance, both vertically and horizontally, raises
questions about the mechanisms for maintaining ‘order’ and avoiding inefficient
resulting duplication of efforts. Variably scaled, agenda-specific principles of
regulationist rationales and modi operandi may offer a useful conceptual as well
as practical approach to city-regional governance. This includes responding to
particular city-regional manifestations of external context, as described by the
interface between: (1) globalising patterns of capitalism, and its selective allocation
of variable economic opportunities; and (2) state institutional and territorial
structures and governing principles concerning the regional scale. Then, there are
internal conditions, as shaped by the relative roles and positions of city and
hinterland, i.e. the respective emphasis on city-region versus city-region. These
relationships, and their impact on policy makers, as well as the responsiveness and
 Summary, conclusions, outlook 165

ability to respond in a democratic–political sense, varies between places, actors

and over time.
In turn, different likely mechanisms of city-regional governance emerge,
varying between state-driven reorganisation – now largely politically anathema –
and locally shaped self-selecting and self-organising mechanisms of regionalising
local agendas and interests. The latter is now the more preferred option, avoiding
major territorial and institutional reorganisations and related political tensions and
conflict. Depending on agenda, political capacity as statutorily defined, and cap-
ability as shaped by political leadership skills and effectiveness, collaboration takes
on more or less committal forms. They, as discussed and illustrated above, may
range from a loose form of mutual consultation, via coordinated policies, to a more
formalised and autonomy surrendering (albeit for the ‘local good’) cooperation
and even merger. But such needs to be locally decided as the best option for
achieving specific local objectives, including economic opportunities. Not all
circumstances and agendas warrant the same form of response. Thus, more open
arrangements may be more effective for some than for other policy fields, or place-
specific political–economic and socio-cultural situations.
Figure 7.1 illustrates four ‘extreme’ scenarios (in the sense of endpoints on a
scale) of this interaction between ‘state’ and globalisation’, and the impact on scope
and capacity to shape for city-regional governance. This includes relative embed-
dedness in state territoriality and institutionalisation, with city-regions ‘standing
out’ from, or ‘blending in’ with, their surrounding wider context, depending on
greater or lesser differences in economic and political–governmental circumstances
and ways of doing things. Such may serve as a conceptual framework for the
selection of comparative case studies, as well as for further debate about the link
between ‘context’, city-regional ‘milieu’, and governance arrangements and modi
operandi.
Figure 7.1 suggests four scenarios as contexts for cities and their political–
economic scope for making (economic) policies. They are the result of the
intersection of two main variables identified here as dominant external drivers: the
degree of state intervention and thus political space to manoeuvre, and the degree
of globalisation as pressure towards becoming more economically competitive and
maintain an economic base. Both variables are shown in their relative ‘extreme’
positions of greater impact (‘high’) and lesser impact (‘low’), shown as producing
four quadrants as scenarios. A third dimension, not shown here, as the diagram is
about the externally shaped context, comprises the ‘city-regional milieu’ as product
of specific local factors, such as history, governmental practices and experiences,
political culture and social-economic circumstances, and past experiences (e.g.
restructuring). Such include the social stratification of the population as reference
point for policy legitimacy and popular approval (elections).
Scenario 1, labelled Stagnant – embedded, brings together a combination of low
exposure to, and pressure by, globalisation, and a continued high state presence in
public policy through state-intervention. Politically and economically unchallenged,
cities in this scenario of external conditions remain an integral part of a space
economy through protective interventionist state regulation. But this also implies a
166 Summary, conclusions, outlook

Low Scenario 1: Scenario 2:

Stagnant – embedded: Competitive – embedded

• Politically and economically
stagnant,
• remains integral part of a space
economy through interventionist
(protectionist) state regulation
Degree of State Intervention
• Economically and politically
dynamic (local milieu), but
• remains firmly embedded in wider
economic and political spaces
through active (interventionist) state

regulation across state territory in

pursuit of spatial developmental
equity.
• City viewed as source of regional
growth

Scenario 3: Scenario 4:

Stagnant – disembedding Competitive – disembedded

• Economically ‘unchallenged’, but
• politically innovating as opportunity
through state incentives and/or
• out of necessity after withdrawal of
support
High
• Economically and politically
dynamic,
• with or without state support acting
independently and innovatively,
• leaving wider space economy
behind’,
• selectively engaging with adjoining

localities

Low High
Degree of Globalisation
(competitiveness pressures)

Figure 7.1 Scenarios of Conditions for city-regional governance between ‘state’

(structure and action), and ‘globalisation’

continued claim by the state to maintaining control of all its territory – and all
territorial units therein, including the cities. This control, the state uses to counteract
the differentiating and fragmenting effects of globalisation-induced inter-territorial
(inter-municipal) competition for investment. Instead, state regulation seeks to
maintain a ‘good’ match with the developing economic spaces as they stretch across
state territories vertically and horizontally across the scalar hierarchy. Such a scenario
clearly reflects, on the one hand, a continued Keynesian-inspired political agenda and
sense of territorial responsibility in maintaining integrity and consistent economic
opportunities, and, on the other, as ‘extreme form’, a state-managed economy, set
behind vigorously protected external borders to keep globalisation ‘out’, such as
was attempted under communism in Eastern Europe.
Scenario 2, labelled competitive – embedded reflects a combination of two com-
peting influences and external pressures: for once, economic globalisation with its
trans-border flows of capital and information and thus reduced clarity of territorial
boundaries as they become dissolved and ‘fuzzied’, making territories morph into
 Summary, conclusions, outlook 167

(or be complemented by) process and function-based spaces, and, then, the continued
claim by the state to the entirety of its territory as a contiguous entity, with all its
contents (including the cities). Cities are thus firmly retained in their spatial and
government-structural frameworks, with clearly defined responsibilities and govern-
mental scope and capacity, while increasingly being challenged by globalisation,
ignoring the state’s claim to sole representation of its territory, and establishing a
new spatial inequality and differentiation on the basis of (varying) economic opportu-
nities. It is to these that the cities, irrespective of their ‘state corset’, need to respond
in their own ways to get the best possible ‘deal’ for their own electorates.
The third scenario, stagnant – disembedding combines low exposure to global-
isation with a low degree of state presence and intervention, thus effectively
illustrating an economically-driven, neo-liberal agenda with ‘small state’ and
emphasis on competitiveness-driven policies and governance. This includes local
innovativeness in policy-making, network building across institutional and
territorial boundaries, with resulting close collaboration between public and private
sectors and a particular emphasis on a leading role for the latter. This is made
possible by a low presence of state regulation, thus accepting inequalities in
developmental opportunities to emerge and manifest themselves across a state’s
territory. As a consequence, this undermines the contiguousness and continuity
(cohesion) of this territory. Differentiation and fragmentation along previously
invisible lines of shared interests and positions among the ‘stronger’ local players
(cities) may emerge. This points out opportunities and, by implication, dis-opportu-
nities as shadow effect. Not belonging to such a network among the ‘stronger’
cities thus clearly marks such excluded places as more marginal and less attractive
(competitive).
Finally, the fourth quadrant, competitive – disembedded, describes a scenario
that combines relatively low exposure to globalisation with a high degree of state
regulation. This is a recipe for the least dynamic situation among the four scenarios,
with few effective challenges that may seek to differentiate between local
conditions and utilise individual local competitive advantages. Cities are generally
embedded within their surrounding territories, are regulated through state structures
and fixed government arrangements, and are ‘run’ with a likely strong emphasis on
government, rather than the broader practice of governance. Borders remain
generally intact as signifiers of territorial responsibilities and institutional
capacities, and urban policies thus follow established modi operandi within a
hierarchically organised state system. The weakness of more individual, locally
specific opportunities offers little incentive for developing more explicit and
innovative local responses to compete with other localities. Instead, cities are
largely loci of policies and processes shaped by state regulation in a hierarchical
setting. Reasons for this scenario may vary: embracing old industrial cities that
have suffered economic decline, but also those in economically peripheral areas,
offering few locational advantages, and depending on state support. The nature of
state regulation and involvement through territorial policies will thus circumscribe
future scope for cities to act more independently. Are measures just about
maintaining a minimum quality of life as part of cohesion and egalitarian policy
168 Summary, conclusions, outlook

agendas, or are they aimed at improving institutional and economic capacities in

a city as a step towards self-help? Likewise, internal socio-economic and political
fragmentation may produce stalemate and incapability to work at the city-regional
level, independent from state involvement. Other actors, such as the business
community and its representative organisations, may then become the main drivers
of collaborative mechanisms, even if these remain largely at the virtual, imagined
level.
Overall, therefore, the governance of city regions is a product of a complex
interaction between continuously changing external and internal parameters which
impose a dynamic framework for the impact of globally defined economic
pressures, and the relationship between, cities and state in terms of territoriality, and
democratic principles and legitimacies. And this questions the so widespread
simple dichotomy between territorial-administrative state action, and ‘flowing’
market-driven organisational principles as dominant architects of city-regionalism.
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Index

Abu Lughod, J. 53 bankruptcy 1, 150

accessibility 44 Barcelona 129
accountability 77, 86, 93, 101, 110 Bartelson, J. 41
action frameworks 122 Berlin 137
adjustability 69, 77, 82–6 bi-polar-centricity 34
advertising 54 Blatter, J. 88
advocacy groups 117, 150 Bobbio, L. 125
affiliations 136 Boeing 153–4
Agence pour le Développement Bologna 124
Economique de la Région Lyonnaise borderlessness 39, 50, 64
(ADERLY) 130–1, 133–5 Boston 30, 68
agenda-setting 63, 75, 85, 89, 114; boundary-drawing 108, 111, 114–15, 125,
assemblage roles 97; case studies 138, 137
144; external context 100–1; outlook bounded territories 55, 70
161–4 Boustedt, O. 25
agglomerations 35, 63 branding campaigns 131
Agnew, J. 55–6, 58 Bremen 137
Agreements of Cooperation 136 Brenner, N. 16, 46, 51–4, 69, 71
Alexander, J. 18 Britain 26, 101, 118
Allen, J. 55, 61 British Airways 44
alliance-building 96, 110 bureaucracy 26, 81, 96, 100, 104; case
American Bureau of the Budget 24 studies 117, 121–2, 131
annexation 108 businesses 35–6, 63, 68, 74–5, 82–3;
Ardalan, K. 40 assemblage roles 89, 96; case studies
Areas of Strategic Cooperation 136 116–19, 121, 123–4, 131, 133, 135,
arenas 54, 58 141, 146–7, 149–50, 152–3, 156, 159;
Asia 53 external context 99, 101, 104; outlook
assemblages 55, 72, 89–115, 161 168
association-building 56
Athens 61 California 162
Atlanta 1, 23, 104, 108–9, 118–19; policy Canada 23, 78, 80, 95, 101; case studies
comparison 123, 141–6, 148, 151, 153, 119, 141, 154; external context 106;
159 outlook 162
Atlanta City Council (ACC) 144 capital 1–6, 8–9, 13, 19, 21; assemblage
Atlanta Regional Council (ARC) 142–5 roles 89, 91, 93; case studies 122;
austerity budgets 2 classes 118; external context 98–9,
104–5; fragmentation 46–7, 51–2; local
Bache, I. 79 context 64; outlook 166;
Baltimore 30 post-modernism 112; relationships 42;
banking 1–4, 154 trans-local governance 65, 70, 72
192 Index
capitalism 2, 5, 8, 19, 40–1; assemblage
roles 89, 94; case studies 120;
contiguous territoriality 56;
fragmentation 47–8, 52; global
city-regions 61; outlook 164;
relationships 43–4; trans-local
governance 65–6, 71, 74
car parks 102
case studies 7, 13, 21, 67, 90; assemblage
roles 92; outlook 161; role 115–59
Castells, M. 60, 68, 88, 162
census data 143
Central Place Theory 14–15, 18, 25
chambers of commerce 95, 101, 118, 121,
123; case studies 128, 131, 133, 135–6,
142, 146
cherry-picking 50
Chicago 30
Christaller, W. 14–15, 18, 25, 44, 163
Cité Internationale 132–3
Città Metropolitane 124
city-regions 1–13; assemblage roles
89–115; case studies 116–59;
definitions 14–38; outlook 160–8;
relationships 39–64; role 75–82;
self-organising 110–15
civic pride 80
civic squares 102
civil society 130
class structure 19, 93, 155
coalition-building 110
coercion 4, 92, 98, 114, 137, 143–5, 151–4
cohesion 92
Cold War 39
communautés urbaines 15, 131–2
communication 39–41, 43–4, 50, 60, 87;
case studies 134; structure 107, 109
communism 19, 25, 39, 44, 58, 61, 166
community 61–2, 74–6, 81, 87, 89;
assemblage roles 97; case studies 119,
123, 125, 128, 130, 155; external
context 100; post-modernism 115;
structure 108, 110
comparative advantage 19, 44, 155, 158
comparative analysis 110–59
competitiveness 3, 11–12, 16, 18–19,
27–8; assemblage roles 89–91, 95, 98;
case studies 116, 122–4, 130–8, 142,
146, 151–4, 157–8; consolidation 75,
77, 81–3; contiguous territoriality 54,
58–9; external context 99–100, 103,
105; fragmentation 50; global
city-regions 62; local context 63–4;
outlook 163–7; post-modernism
111–12; relationships 39–43, 45;
structure 108–9; theories 31, 34–5;
trans-local governance 66, 71, 74
complementarity 15, 35
conflict resolution 107, 109
consolidationism 75–83, 97, 114–15
consultations 128
contiguous territoriality 54–9, 86, 111, 167
contracts 66, 74, 94, 109, 124, 139
conurbations 65
core cities 24, 108, 118–19, 141, 147
core-periphery relations 5, 44, 90, 102,
142, 146–7
corporatism 89, 93, 98–9, 101, 104, 118
cost-effectiveness 112, 143
county councils 78
Cox, K. 49, 117
creative class 65, 81, 86, 103–4, 106–7,
131, 156
cyberspace 54
DATAR 134
de-industrialisation 154
de-territorialisation 69
de-urbanisation 61
debt 1–2, 4, 9
Denmark 139
Detroit 1, 23, 47, 64, 108; case studies
118, 120, 123, 141, 146–51, 158–9
development agencies 95
devolution 2 1, 32, 158
Dickinson, R. 14–15, 34–5, 65
Dierwechter, Y. 32, 86
dirigisme 74–5, 78, 98, 103, 130, 132
Disneyfication 30
Doxiadis, C. 59–60
Duncan, S. 93
Eastern Europe 2, 25, 58, 61, 166
Economic Development Coalition of
Southeast Michigan (EDCSEM) 149
economics 1–6, 8, 11–20, 22–3, 25–33;
assemblage roles 89, 91, 93–5, 97–8;
case studies 116–17, 119–37, 139,
141–2, 145–8, 150–2, 154, 156–8;
consolidation 76–7, 79–81, 83, 85;
contiguous territoriality 54, 57–8;
emphasis 87; external context 98–102,
104–7; fragmentation 47–53; global
city-regions 59–63; local context 63–4;
outlook 160–1, 163–8; post-modernism
112, 114–15; relationships 39–45;
structure 107–8; theories 35–8;
trans-local governance 65–72, 74

economies of scale 35, 79, 101, 161
economies of scope 35
Ecumenopolis 59
edge cities 23
electorate 1, 4, 61, 72, 83; assemblage
roles 91, 112; case studies 139, 142–3,
145–6, 151, 153; post-modernism
110–12; trans-local governance 87
The Electors’ Action Movement (TEAM)
155
elites 12, 29, 64, 99, 103; assemblage roles
108; case studies 123, 129, 138, 146,
155
enclosures 55
England 23, 106, 122, 124
English language 130
entrepreneurialism 11, 49, 85, 97, 101,
103, 107, 150
epistemology 48, 51
ethics 75, 82
ethnicity 118, 141–2
euro zone 1, 9, 107
Europe 1, 6–7, 10, 12–13, 20; assemblage
roles 92; case studies 116–22, 124–41,
158–9; consolidation 75; contiguous
territoriality 58; external context
99–103; fragmentation 53; global
city-regions 59–61; local context 64;
outlook 160, 162–3; relationships 39,
49, 53; structure 108; theories 23–4,
27–36; trans-local governance 74
European Commission (EC) 35
European Metropolitan Regions 27
European Union (EU) 1, 6, 13, 27, 50;
assemblage roles 107; case studies 117,
121, 127, 131; outlook 163;
relationships 52
external factors 1, 3, 6, 11–14, 17;
assemblage roles 92, 97–107, 112; case
studies 116–59; contexts 89, 93, 158–9;
relationships 39–64; theories 19–20,
22–6; trans-local governance 87
federal states 32, 42, 58, 76, 78–9;
assemblage roles 89, 95; case studies
137, 141, 143
federated cities 76
Feiock, R. 83–4, 98
feudalism 28
Fiat 124, 127–8
financial crisis 1–4, 27, 52, 58, 64
Flinders, M. 79
Florida, R. 31, 65, 86, 103–4, 156
flows 1, 3–5, 16, 18–21, 41–6; assemblage
Index 193
roles 112; case studies 117, 137, 156;
outlook 162, 165–6; relationships 48,
51–3, 56, 59–60; trans-local
governance 68–9, 72, 83, 88
Fordism 45, 77, 110
Foucault, M. 55–6
fragmentation 46–54, 75–86, 96–8, 106,
108; case studies 130, 148, 150;
outlook 161, 167–8; post-modernism
111, 114–15
France 27, 63, 78, 118, 124, 130–1, 134,
139
Frankfurt 39
functionalism 3
gated communities 118
Geddes, P. 59, 65, 68, 70
gentrification 30
geography 20–2, 41, 43–7, 50, 53;
assemblage roles 94, 96, 105, 109, 111;
case studies 125, 141; outlook 161;
post-modernism 114–15; relationships
55, 60; trans-local governance 67,
71–2; urban 60, 71
geopolitics 32
Georgia 143–4
Georgia Regional Transport Authority
(GRETA) 144
Germany 24–5, 27–8, 32, 37, 42;
assemblage roles 91; case studies 118,
139; consolidation 76, 78–9, 81;
external context 101, 106; relationships
61
Giessen 79
global cities 59–63
global city-regions 59–63
global-local nexus 51
globalisation 39–45; assemblage roles 89,
94, 97; case studies 116–17, 121–4,
134, 136, 141; city-regional
governance 1–13; consolidation 80;
contiguous territoriality 54, 56–8;
external context 98, 103; fragmentation
46–54; global cities 59–63; local
context 63–4; outlook 160, 163–7;
post-modernism 112; structure 107;
studies 21; trans-local governance 66,
70, 73
glocalisation 55, 59
Goodwin, M. 93
Gottdiener, M. 93
Gottmann, J. 59–62, 68
governance 1–13; assemblage roles
89–115; definitions 14–38; outlook
194 Index
160–8; policy comparison 116–59;
relationships 39–64; trans-local 65–88,
158–9
government 10–13, 15–16, 18, 20–1,
23–6; assemblage roles 90–3, 95–6, 98;
case studies 116–18, 120–2, 124–5,
127–31, 134–5, 137, 141–3, 145,
148–50, 152–6, 158–9; consolidation
75–85; emphasis 87; external context
98–100, 103, 106; fragmentation 49,
54; outlook 160–1, 164;
post-modernism 110–12, 114–15;
relationships 40, 45–6; structure
107–10; theories 28–9, 31–2, 35–8;
trans-local governance 65–75
Greater Toronto Area (GTA) 80
Greater Vancouver Regional District
(GVRD) 156–7
Greenest City 2020 Action Plan 156
growth centres 27
growth coalitions 103–4, 117–18
Growth Machines 20, 25, 62, 97, 104
Hamburg 1, 123, 125, 135–41
Hamburg Economic Development
Company (HWF) 123, 135
Hanseatic League 135
Harrison, J. 66
Harvey, D. 43, 47–8, 162
Hawley, A. 35
Healey, P. 121
hegemony 3, 40, 43–4, 71, 114, 122
Heinelt, H. 77
hierarchy 14–16, 28, 37, 41, 46;
assemblage roles 91, 98; case studies
116, 121, 133, 143, 152, 156;
consolidation 76–9, 83–4; context 63,
98–100, 105–6; contiguous
territoriality 58; global city-regions 63;
governance 89–115; outlook 161, 163,
166–7; post-modernism 111–12;
relationships 53; structure 107, 109;
trans-local governance 65–8, 71–2
hinterland 5, 9, 15–16, 24–8, 38;
assemblage roles 102; case studies 116,
128, 135–9, 141, 150, 158; external
context 102; outlook 160, 162–4;
trans-local governance 86
holding companies 141
home rule 75, 81, 142, 144, 153
honest brokers 122–3
Hooghe, L. 79
humanism 3
identity 61, 65, 79–80, 83, 89; assemblage
roles 91; case studies 117, 119–21, 130,
134, 158; external context 101; outlook
163; post-modernism 112; structure 110
ideology 8, 11, 25–6, 78, 82, 89, 149
imagineering 125
impetus types 6, 40, 47, 69, 89;
assemblage roles 92, 96–8, 112–15;
case studies 116–59
in-between-ness 45–54, 57, 66
individualism 120
industrialisation 34, 59, 65, 68, 76, 154
information technology (IT) 39, 44
innovation 5, 8, 19, 29, 39; assemblage
roles 106–7; case studies 125, 129, 135,
150, 155–6; outlook 161, 167;
post-modernism 111; relationships 41,
48, 52–4; trans-local governance 65–6,
72, 106–7
inside contexts 39–64
Institutional Collective Action (ICA) 98
institutional theory 96
institutionalisation 96, 98, 101, 103, 105;
case studies 118, 139, 141;
post-modernism 111–12; structure 110
integration 75–82, 85, 91, 101
inter-actor relations see power relations
inter-governmentality 92
inter-local assemblages 89–115
inter-municipal governance 105–6
inter-organisational relations 96
interdisciplinarity 21
internal factors 39–64, 87, 107–13, 116–59
internal milieux see milieux
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2, 39
International Relations 56
internationalisation 132, 137
Internet 39, 44
interpretivism 3
interventionism 76–7, 105, 107, 114, 142,
158, 165
intraspection 22–6
investment 27, 41, 48, 51, 56; assemblage
roles 105, 107; case studies 118–19,
131, 133, 148, 153; outlook 166;
trans-local governance 77, 81
invisible states 1
Ireland 118
Iron Curtain 47
Italy 28, 76, 78, 118, 128
Jessop, B. 1, 61
Kantor, P. 53

Keynesianism 13, 61, 166
Kübler, D. 77
Lahnstadt 79, 91
laissez-faire 112
Lambooy, J. 14
land use 35
Le Galès, P. 53, 67
lead cities 108, 162
leadership 3–4, 6, 8, 19–20, 84–5;
assemblage roles 92; case studies 117,
123–4, 129, 137, 144–6, 148–51, 153,
157–8; emphasis 87; outlook 165;
post-modernism 111; trans-local
governance 67
Leeds City Council 23
Lefebvre, H. 48
legislation 79, 91–2, 95, 105
legitimation 19, 66, 77, 84, 86–8;
assemblage roles 95, 98, 101, 103,
105–6, 110; case studies 128, 152;
outlook 164; post-modernism 112
Lehman Brothers 1–2
Leone 125
Lequesne, C. 53
Lever, W.F. 63
linkages 14–15, 18, 20, 24, 27; assemblage
roles 94, 105, 109; case studies 119,
134, 139; relationships 41–2, 45–54,
60, 63; theories 35; trans-local
governance 67, 69, 78, 83–4, 88
Lisbon Agreement 27
lobbying 101, 118
local context 63–4
Local Enterprise Partnerships 26
local states 93–4
localisation 16, 45, 47–8, 51–2, 54–9;
outlook 163; relationships 63;
trans-local governance 70
localism 1, 4–5, 12, 15–16, 32;
assemblage roles 89, 91; case studies
116, 119–20, 122, 125, 130–1, 142,
145, 148, 150–1, 154; outlook 161,
163; theories 34; trans-local
governance 74–5, 77, 80–1
locality-centricity 75–82
logos 130
London 3, 39, 45, 58–9, 102
Los Angeles 59–60
Lower Saxony see Niedersachsen
Lübeck 135–6
Lyon 1, 63, 121, 123–4, 129–37
McGee, T. 59
Index 195
MacLeod, G. 54, 161
managerialism 75, 78, 80, 84, 89, 93, 99,
101
market forces 63
Marks, G. 79
Markusen, A.R. 120
Martin, R. 45
Marx, K. 20
Marxism 12, 19, 29, 65, 70, 74
Massey, D. 44, 61
Mathewson, K. 75
Maxey, C.C. 76
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 136
media 2
mega-urban regions (MURs) 59–63
Megalopolis 15, 59–62, 68
memoranda of understanding 94
Metropolitan Atlanta Mayors’ Association
(MAMA) 144–5
Metropolitan Conferences 128
metropolitanisation 18, 27, 91, 105–6,
112; assemblage roles 114; case studies
130, 132, 134–5
Metropolregion 136–9, 141
Michigan 147–50
Michigan Suburban Alliance 147, 150
micro-management 76
Middle Ages 102
Milan 125
milieux 3–4, 6, 8, 11, 45; assemblage roles
89–90, 92–3, 95, 97; consolidation 83;
fragmentation 51; impetus types
116–59; outlook 160, 165;
post-modernism 112–14; structure
107–10; trans-local governance 65, 70,
72
Millennial Mayors Congress 147, 150–1
Minneapolis-St Paul 81
Mitchell-Weaver, C. 32
modernism 77, 110
modularisation 13, 25, 69, 82–6
Molotch, H. 20, 97, 104
mono-centricity 15, 18, 34, 38, 66;
assemblage roles 89, 91–2, 96; case
studies 116, 145, 154; post-modernism
112, 114; structure 108–9
MORO 136
Motown 147
Moulaert, F. 122, 161
multi-scalarity 53, 58, 87, 135–41
multiplexing 141
Mumford, L. 28, 65, 68, 70
Museum of Contemporary Art Detroit 147
196 Index
names of city-regions 25, 76, 79–80, 91,
108; assemblage roles 112, 114; case
studies 141, 145, 147, 150–3, 156, 159;
outlook 163
nature 33
negative power 58
neo-liberalism 1–2, 8, 11, 19, 26;
assemblage roles 89, 97; case studies
152, 154; consolidation 79–80, 82, 85;
external context 99–100, 103, 105;
fragmentation 50, 52; global
city-regions 62; local context 64;
outlook 167; post-modernism 112;
relationships 39, 44, 49; structure 107;
trans-local governance 66, 71, 74
neo-Marxism 12, 70
network relations 109, 111, 129, 135,
156–7
network theories 26, 45
New England 30, 120
New Labour 26
New Public Management 85, 99–100
new regionalism 12, 22, 68–9, 71–2, 84,
129
new spatialisation 69–70
New York 29, 59
Niedersachsen 135–7
nodes 46–54, 60
North America 1, 7–8, 10, 12–13, 23–4;
assemblage roles 92; case studies
116–22, 141–59; consolidation 75,
83–4; external context 99, 101–3;
fragmentation 53; global city-regions
60–1; local context 64; outlook 160,
162–4; post-modernism 112;
relationships 39, 49, 53; theories
28–36; trans-local governance 74
nuclei 51
Nussbaum, J. 161
NUTS 1 regions 125
O’Brien, R. 44–5
obstructionism 123
OECD 35
Ohmae, K. 120
Olympic Villages 129
Ontario 79–80
ontology 48
Oregon 82, 86, 96, 143, 146, 154
Organisation d’Etude d’Amenagement de
l’Aire Métropolitaine Lyon – Saint
Etienne (OREAM) 132, 134
Ostrom, E. 109
Ostrom, V. 85
outcomes 4, 9, 17, 23, 40; assemblage
roles 91, 96, 98, 105, 109, 114–15; case
studies 119, 122, 125, 128, 137, 142–3,
145–6, 148–9, 151, 158; outlook 162;
relationships 48–50, 55–6, 58, 63;
trans-local governance 66–7, 70, 72–3,
77, 84
outlook 160–8
outside contextual issues 39–64
Ovedo, 105
Paasi, A. 55
Paris 39, 132
parochialism 34, 36, 148–50
Parr, J. 35
partnerships 96, 105
patriotism 120
PCs 39
perforations 54–9
performance management 100
Peters, J. 93
Piemonte 127–8
Pierre, J. 29, 31, 89, 92–3, 98, 106
Pinson, G. 129
Pittsburgh 76
place marketing 31
planning 20–1, 26, 28, 32, 46; assemblage
roles 99, 110; case studies 132, 134,
137, 143–4, 148, 152, 156; external
context 101; trans-local governance 86
pluralism 66
plurilateralism 53
Polanyi, K. 49, 109
policy-making 1–2, 4–6, 10–12, 14, 17;
assemblage roles 89–93, 95–8, 107;
case studies 116–17, 119, 122–3, 125,
127–31, 133, 135, 138, 141, 143,
145–6, 149–54, 156–7; consolidation
76, 80, 85–6; contiguous territoriality
56; external context 99, 103, 105–6;
fragmentation 47, 52; global
city-regions 61–2; local context 64;
outlook 160–1, 164; post-modernism
111, 114; structure 109–10; theories
19–20, 26, 29, 31–2, 36; trans-local
governance 69, 71, 74–5, 77
political science 21, 56, 83
political-economy 3, 8–10, 12, 18–21, 27;
case studies 118, 122, 129, 158;
contiguous territoriality 56; external
context 98, 103; fragmentation 49, 52;
outlook 160; post-modernism 112, 115;
relationships 41, 43, 45; structure 110;
trans-local governance 65, 70

poly-centricity 15, 18, 27, 34, 38;
assemblage roles 89, 91–2, 96; case
studies 116, 154, 158; consolidation 80;
post-modernism 112, 114; structure
109; trans-local governance 66
poly-polar-centricity 34
population 1–2, 14, 19, 23, 25; assemblage
roles 97, 99, 105, 108–10; case studies
118, 131, 142, 147, 151; outlook 160,
165; relationships 51, 59, 62; theories
27–8, 35–6; trans-local governance 76,
81
Portland 82, 86, 96, 143, 146, 154
positionality 44–5, 58
positive power 58
post-modernism 45, 60, 72, 110–15
post-positivism 71–2
power relations 3, 6, 49–50, 55–6, 58;
assemblage roles 96; external context
98–9; outlook 164; structure 110–11;
trans-local governance 65–6
principal-agent relations 96
private sector 21, 31, 69, 74, 111;
assemblage roles 89, 92–3; case studies
156; external context 99–101, 104–5;
networks 36; outlook 167
privatisation 2 1, 77, 92, 99, 104
pro-growth governance 89, 93, 99, 103–4
professionalism 100–1
profitability 43, 45, 99, 112
public choice theory 75, 82, 89, 105, 107,
119
public sector 69, 82, 89, 99–100, 111
public spending cuts 85
public-private partnerships 104–5, 130,
167
Puget Sound 108, 141, 143, 151–4
Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC)
152–3
quality profiling 5
racial issues 23, 108, 141–2, 146, 149–51,
154, 159–62
ratings agencies 4
re-territorialisation 69, 78, 84
Reagan, R. 99
referenda 142
regime theory 103–4, 110
Regional City model 64
Regional Conferences 138
Regional Development Concepts 137
Regional Economic Partnerships 148–9
Regional Structural Fund 107
Index 197
regionalisation 10, 13, 16, 18, 26;
assemblage roles 91, 97–8, 105, 108,
112, 114–15; case studies 118, 120–5,
127–8, 131, 135, 140, 143–7, 149,
151–7; relationships 64; theories 36–7;
trans-local governance 70, 75–6, 80,
82–3, 86
Regionalstadt 15, 37, 64
regulation 1, 8, 11–13, 31, 37–8; case
studies 117; consolidation 77;
contiguous territoriality 58;
fragmentation 53–4; local context 64;
outlook 163, 165–7; relationships 45–6;
trans-local governance 74–5
Renton 153
Richmond 155, 157
Rodriguez, 105
Rome 60–1, 130
Rosso, E. 125
round tables 121, 135
royal charters 28
Rust Belt 30, 150
St Etienne 134, 136
Salet, W. 36
Sassen, S. 50, 112
Savitch, H.V. 53
scalarity 16–18, 20–2, 29, 35–7, 40;
assemblage roles 98; case studies 121,
123, 130, 158; consolidation 76–7, 79,
82–4, 86; contiguous territoriality
55–7; emphasis 87; external context 98,
100, 105; fragmentation 45–9, 51–2;
global city-regions 61; outlook 160–1,
163–4; post-modernism 112, 115;
relativisation 54–5; structure 107;
trans-local governance 65–6, 68–9
Schleswig-Holstein 135–7
Schumpeter, J. 20
Scott, A. 32, 63
Seattle 1, 108, 123, 132, 141, 151–2, 154,
163
Second World War 82
segregation 41, 108, 118, 142, 147–8, 151,
163
self-organising city-regions 6, 26, 36, 52,
54; assemblage roles 97, 109–15; case
studies 118, 122, 154, 158; outlook
161, 164–5; relationships 60;
trans-local governance 69, 73–4, 82, 88
separatism 141–3, 145
September 11 2001 59
service delivery 21, 25, 27, 36–8, 65;
assemblage roles 89, 92, 97; case
198 Index
studies 119, 132, 142–4, 153; external
context 99–101; outlook 161–2;
structure 109; trans-local governance
74–6, 79, 83, 85–6
Sheppard, E. 44–5
shrinking cities 47, 51, 54, 61, 64, 147,
163
slogans 156
smart growth 30, 155–7, 163
social construction 48, 55–6, 83, 110
social relations 35, 47, 49, 55–6
social sciences 56
socialism 154
sovereign debt crisis 1, 9
sovereignty 57–8, 62, 94
spatiality 22, 26–8, 32, 35–7, 41;
assemblage roles 90, 92–3, 95–6; case
studies 135–43; consolidation 83;
contiguous territoriality 54–6; external
context 102–3, 105; fragmentation
45–8, 52; global city-regions 60;
outlook 167; post-modernism 111–12;
structure 109; trans-local governance
66, 68–75
spheres of authority 111
Stadtregion 15, 24–5, 139
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(SMSAs) 14, 24–5, 35
state 1–13, 40–1; assemblage roles 89,
91–5, 97–8; case studies 116–17, 124,
130, 132, 134–42, 144–5, 154, 156,
158; consolidation 76, 79–81, 83–5;
contiguous territoriality 55–8; external
context 98–100, 103, 105–7;
fragmentation 47, 49–54; global
city-regions 60–2; local context 64;
outlook 161, 164–8; post-modernism
111–12, 114–15; structure 107; theories
14–38; trans-local governance 68,
71–2, 74–5
State of the Region Breakfasts 145
Stephens, G. 87
stereotypes 154
Stoker, G. 77, 85–7, 110
Strategic Policy Framework 137
structural adjustment 84
structural factors 2–16, 18–21, 24, 26–9,
31–2; assemblage roles 89–93, 96–8,
102–10; case studies 116–59; milieux
116–59; theories 34, 36–8; trans-local
governance 76–9, 81–2, 84–7
Structural Fund 127
structuralism 3, 29, 74
structuration theory 42
Studensky, P. 76–7
Suburban Cities Association 153
suburbanisation 9, 16, 24–5, 30, 34–5;
assemblage roles 102, 108–9; case
studies 146–7; outlook 162–3;
post-modernism 112; trans-local
governance 66
suburbs 4, 24, 28, 30, 32; assemblage roles
102, 108–9; case studies 119–20, 141,
146–54; outlook 163; trans-local
governance 76–7, 81
Süderelbe AG 135
supra-municipal governance 105–6
Surrey 155, 157
Surrey Chamber of Commerce 23
sustainability 64, 104, 106, 134, 138,
156–7
Sustainable Region Initiative 157
Sweden 78, 139
switchboards 3
Swyngedouw, E. 50, 55, 59
systemic coordination 96
Tacoma 151–2, 154
taxation 25, 31, 74–5, 77, 80–2;
assemblage roles 99, 108; case studies
119, 142–3, 149, 153–4
technocracy 28, 54, 67, 70, 72; assemblage
roles 99, 101, 108; case studies 119,
121, 128–9, 143–4, 151, 155, 157;
trans-local governance 77, 79, 81
technology 39–41, 43–4, 50–1, 59, 73, 82,
160
territoriality 11, 22, 26–8, 31–2, 36–7;
assemblage roles 90, 92–3, 95, 98; case
studies 118, 122, 129, 135–43, 148,
158; consolidation 76, 83–4;
contiguous 54–9; external context 105;
fragmentation 46–54; outlook 164;
post-modernism 111; relationships 44;
structure 109–10; trans-local
governance 65, 68–75
Thatcher, M. 74, 78, 99
think-tanks 128
Third Italy 128
Thornley, A. 36
Tiebout, C.M. 85
Torino Internazionale 123–5, 127–9
Toronto 79–81, 162
Tosics, I. 28
tourism 125, 154
trade associations 128
Trade Development Alliance of Greater
Seattle 152

trade-area relations 35
trans-local governance 65–88
trans-scalarity 2, 19, 57
transcendence 42–3
transference 41–2
transformation 41
transparency 77, 86, 93, 96, 103, 135
transport links 14, 24, 59–60, 99, 106;
case studies 109, 134, 137, 142, 144,
150–3, 155
Turin 1, 121, 123–30, 141, 150, 158–9,
163
United Kingdom (UK) 74, 78
United Nations (UN) 46, 152
United States Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations 24
United States (US) 14, 21, 24, 30–2, 35;
case studies 116–19, 141, 150–2, 154;
consolidation 76, 78, 81, 83–5; external
context 103–4, 106; global city-regions
59, 62; outlook 162; relationships 49;
structure 108–9; trans-local governance
68, 74
upscaling 131
urban theories 14–38
urbanisation 14, 18, 24–5, 34, 36–8;
assemblage roles 102; case studies 139;
consolidation 76; global city-regions
61; relationships 59, 64; trans-local
governance 65, 68
urbanisme 61
Index 199
Vancouver 1, 23, 95, 122–3, 127; case
studies 132, 141, 154–7, 159; outlook
163
Vancouver Economic Committee (VEC)
123, 156–7
virtual spaces 9, 11, 13–14, 17, 21–2;
assemblage roles 90, 95–6, 98; case
studies 125, 127–8, 134–6, 147;
contiguous territoriality 55–6; external
context 103; fragmentation 46–54;
global city-regions 62; outlook 161,
168; post-modernism 111; regions
82–6; structure 109; theories 26, 34;
trans-local governance 68, 70–3
Walks, 23
Washington Consensus 39
Washington DC 59, 68
Weber, M. 44
websites 95, 122, 125, 131, 133, 135, 152
welfare governance 89, 93, 99, 106–7
West 2, 13, 21, 25, 34, 39, 82
West Yorkshire 23
Westphalia, Peace of 29, 72
Wetzlar 79
Wheeler, S.M. 62
Wikstrom, N. 87
Winter Olympics 123, 127–9, 156, 159,
163
World Bank 39, 46
world cities 59
zoning 55, 155
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