Frege on Knowing the Third Realm Tyler Burge Mind, New Series, Volume 101, Issue 404 (Oct., 1992), 633-690, Stable URL: httpflinksstor.orgsici?sici=026 442328 199 210% 20243 A 101%3.\404%3C533%3A FOKTIR% 362. 0,CO%3B2-0 ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at fp (fw. jstor orglaboutitersihtml. ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless You. have obtained prior permission, you ray not download an entire issue of &joumal or multiple copies of aricies, and You may use content in the ISTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR twansmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sercen or lnted page of such transmission. Mind is published by Oxford University Press. Please contact the publisher for fucther permissions regarding the use ofthis work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at htip:l/www.jstor.org/joumals/oup hurl. Mind ©1992 Oxford University Press ISTOR and the ISTOR logo are trademarks of ISTOR, and are Registered in the US. Patent and Trademase Office. For mote information on ISTOR contact jstor-info@umich edu, ©2002 STOR, hup:thrwwjstor.orgy ‘Tue Dec 24 17:31:25 2002Frege on Knowing the Third Realm: TYLER BURGE, Anyone wito reads Frege with moderate cate is struck by a puzzle about the cen- teal objective of his work, His main project is to explain the foundations of arita- metic in such 4 way as to enable us to understand the nature of ouc knowledge of arithmetic, But he says very litle about aur knowledge of the foundations. A full treatment of this and associated puzzles would requite more room than { have here? [want to give a short solution o the puzzle, and then discuss one aspect of itthatT find interesting, ‘The short solution is that Frege accepted the traditional rationalist account of| knowledge of the relevant primitive truths, truths of Jogic. This account, which hhe associated with the Euclidean tradition, maintained ha basic truths of geom- tty and logic are self-evident, Frege says on several occasions that such primi- ‘ive truths —as wel as basic rules of inference and certain relevant definitions — are self-evident, He did not develop these remarks because he chought they admitted litle development The interesting problems for him were finding and Understanding the primitive cuths, and showing how they, cogether with infer- ‘nice rules and definitions, could be used to derive the truths of arithmetic ‘This short solution seems to me correct—-as far as it goes. It does, however, leave outa lot. Frege thought that knowledge of the axioms of geometry required intuition-an imaginative or broadly perceptual capacity (1968. pp. 19-21}, Knowledge of the basic cruths of logic simply tequired reason. He regarded both types of basic cuths as self-evident, but the differences between the two types of knowledge are significant, That is one complication. Another is that Frege uses a variety of terms that are translated “self evident". His sophisticated understand- ing ofthe notion is neither psychologistic nor purely proof theoretic. le does not mean by it what most contemporary philosophers would mean by it His uses of itrelate in interesting ways this basi philosophical views. A third cormplication is that there are complex relations between Frege's appeals to self-evidence and an appeal he makes to pragmatic epistemological considerations, This appeal " Lam indebted to Tom Ricker for clarifying his views, discussed in note 16. Thave also henefed from remarks from verious participants at «conference on erly analytical Dhilosophy held at the Univesity af Csicago in honour af Lennard Linky. 2 An aunliry purde attends this primary one. Most of Fese's philosophical work is directed a comecting what he regards asthe mistndetandings embedded in tormal pra tice and lanauage-misuncerstanings tat he thougit had prevented a correct under ‘standing ofthe fudameatal notions presen in kis account of the foundations. But he hes ‘eve ess to say about the epistemlany of kis analysis and elucidation of the notions that Fnteresied hum thane does about Knowledge of the foundations. Mind, Vol, 101 404. October 1992 ©.Oxford University Press 1992634 Tyler Burge rakes his rationalism original and gives it, [ think, special relevance to modern problems. Although these points are worth developing, [ will not discuss them here. Instead, I shall discuss an intensification of the puzzle in the light of the “short solution thar I have just given, Frege assumes that only cruths ate self-evident, He also assumes that itis rational to believe what is self-evident, given that itis well understood. Frege believes in ather types of purely mathematical justification for arithmetical judg- ments besides sel-evidence and derivation from self-evident truths.” But these other types also involve only reasom. The key idea in what follows is that Frege ‘assures that we can know arithmetic and is foundations purely through reason, and chat individuals ate reasonable and justified in believing basic foundational truths (¢ 1979, p. 175; 1983, p. 190}. Frege ted that both the thought contents that constitute the proof-structure of rathematies and the subject matter of these thought coments (extensions, fine- tions) exist. He also thought that these entities are non-spatial, non-temporal, ‘causally inert, and independent for cheir existence and natures from any person’s thinking them or thinking about them. Frege proposed a picturesque metaphor of ‘thought contents as existing in @ “third realm”. This “realm” counted as “third” because it was comparable co but different fram the realm of physical objects and (he realm of mental entities. I think that Frege held, in the main body of his career, that not only thought contents, but murabers and functions were members ofthis thied realm. (Cf. 1968, p.viti; 1967a, pp. 15-16; 1962, p. xvii). Entities in the ‘other realms depended for determinate identities on functions (concepts) in the third realm. Since logic was committed to this realm, and since all sciences con- ‘ained logic, all sciences were committed to and were partly about elements of this realm. Broadly spesking, Frege was a Platonist about logical objects (like ‘numbers and trath values), fanctions, and thought contents. Ishall say more about Frege's Platonism Inter, but I think that Ihave said enough to enable me to intro- duce the problem that L want to discuss ‘The problem is that of understanding hows reason alone could justify one in believing chat a thought is true, whea the thought has a subject matter that is as independent of anyone's thinking as Frege indicaes jt is. How could mere rea- soning giveone any ground for believing that a realm of entities is one way rather than another, when that realm is so independent of that reasoning? How could reasoning and understanding have any tendency ¢o tell one how things ia such a realm really are? 21 disinguish purely matheratical justifications from justifications of mathematics at detive from applications (0 the empirical world—which he also seems € have be= lieved in, bul which {ay aside + Frege's lie isnot committed «a thought contents, any to extensions and fonctions Bue thse an, aifiet no of bis Hews about ogi, bur of hs interests m deriving aimee from logic. For chat, he did nor need to refer to thought contents (Gedaren}, But he thea envisioned a logic which was commited o thoughe cones, In he eorespoud- nce with Russell, for example, te indicates the need for special narses Of senses 0 avoid ‘he “ambiguity of indirect discourse or proposiional atte atbutions fer. 1980, 15% 1976.9. 236),Frege on Knowing the Third Reaim 63S ‘This problem is clearly kin @a problema about the relation between the knowl- ‘edge and truth of mathematics thet is commonly discussed today he contez- porary problem is hat of understanding how our beliefs about mathematics could have any tendency to be true given that we do not appear io bear causal-percep- tual relations tothe subject matter of mathematics. This may be seen asa problem for Frege. But ici not one that he wold have naturally formulated for himself. His attitude toward the point that numlaers and thought contents are not causally effective (“wirklich”) seems to have been “so what?" He showed no special interest in the causal theory of knowledge, arin cashing aut his occasional phys ical-cantact metaphors of “grasping” thoughts. The idea that mathematical or logical knowledge should be judged by reference to the standard of empirical knowledge would have seemed foreign to him. Like Frege I see no reason to think that mathematical or logical knowledge is, questionable because it apparently lacks causal-perceptual relations to its subject ‘matics, But I formulated a problem that rnade no reference to causal-perceptual relations. This formulation seems not € iraport assimptions foreign to Frege. A theory of knowledge should not make t puzzling how being reasonable could be conducive to having true beliefs. Frege's rationalist theory of knowledge com- bines with his Platonism to raise & question a just this point. Why did he not dis- cass the question? ‘Some recent interpretations of Frege suggest tha itis a question that i some hhow precluded by his philosopby, or that it rests on fundamental misreadings of his views. One might question the nouon of “subject matter” that the formulation of the problem uses, Or one might claint that Frege's notion of truth or of logic: blocks a “meta-standpoint” from which one could raise the question, Or one «ould doubt whether Frege’s Platonism should be understood in the way thatthe “third realm” metaphor suggests, and maintain that in talking about nursbers or thowabt contents, Frege was really talking about our language ar our cognitive practices in such a way that no gap between our beliefs and the numbers was even fortnulable, I will notcriticize in detail al such lines for sort-cireuiting ou ques tion for Frege, though [ will remark on some of them in a general way. [think none provides good grounds for ignoring the question. Ia fact, Frege himself gives an answer to it, The reason why he did not discuss it in detail is similar to the reason why he did not discuss knowledge of the foundations in detail. ie believed that he tad little to add to a traditional answer, [think that his answer is ‘worth understanding, Let us back up a bit, I want to explain in more detail what [ mean by saying that Frege was aPlatonist about logical objects, functions, and thought contents 2 Besacerraf 3983). «Actually, he does provide an argument: objective sense-perecption requites percep twal belieg, but perceptual belie requires grasp of thoughts Inthe Grd realm—e non ‘esl relation: $0 one cart cite the clement of Causal interaction in sense perception as providing grounds Cor thinking that knowledge cannot involve nor-causal cognitive ela- tons to abstract entities (1984, pp. 369-570, 1967, 9. 360),656 Tyler Burge First, some preliminary disclaimers. Although I think that Frege maintained a metaphysical view about numbers and other such entities, I de not believe that this view daminated his thinking. His is, far che mast part, the relaxed Platonism of a mathematician who simply assumes that there are numbers, functions, and so on, and who regards these as an abstract subject matter which can be accepted ‘without special philosophical explanation, which is clearly different from mental oor physical subject matters, and which mathematics seeks to characterize cor- recily. One can see this atinude toward functions very prominently in “On Func- tion and Concept”. Frege highlighted the inter-subjective objectivity of scientiic: theorizing. He believed that standatd mathematical practice told ane mast af ‘what was true sbout mathematical entities, and he thought that one could know ‘mathematical truths independently of any philosophy. Indeed, he assumes that ‘ordinary mathematical practice yields “certain” knowledge even prior to the exe- cation of his foundationalise program (1977, §13; 1968, 82). ‘Most of Frege's uses of his metaphysical view are defensive, His metaphysical remarks ward aif idealist, physicalistic, psychologistic, reductive, or deflationary positions because he thinks that they prevent clear understanding of the funda- ‘mental nations of logic and arithmetic. As I shall later show, he does give his Pla- tonism extra-mathematical work. But he does not think out this side of his philosophy as someone would who was concerned about certainty or who believed that logie and mathematics fad no other cognitive underpinning than ‘that provided by philosophy. Another preliminary point about Frege’s Platonism is that although he uses the Platonic metaphor of vision an occasion, when characterizing our knowledge, he shows no jntetestin developing the metaphor. He appeals to no faculty other than reason in his account of our mathematical knowledge. Moteaver, as [have inti- ‘mated earlier, his epistemological views are complex, and involve not only Pla- tonic elements, but elements not at all associated with tcaditional Platonism. The discussion in what immediately follows will be concerned withthe Platonic char- acter of Frege's ontology. For now, [lay epistemology aside. As is well-known, Frege thought that extensians—including numtbers—fune: dans—ineluding concepts—and thought contents are imperceptible, non-spatial, temporal, and causally inert.” He emphasizes that numbers (3968, p. 108), con- cepts (1968, p. vi), and thought contents (1967, p, 23; 1962, p- xxiv) are discov- cred —not created, He sharply distinguishes the act of thinking, which does occur > Numbers ate counted imperceptible (1968, p. 85; 1979, p. 268; 1983, p. 284. Thoughts ae lemed impereepuble (1964, p. 369; 1967, p, 360), Numbers are counted ‘spate 1968 pp. 98 1,85, 93). Thadahts ae counted non spatal (1984, pp. 363 570.196" p. 96} Concer ater funetans are counted stemporal and by ipcation ienperceputle, non-spatal, and eansaly ier (1956, p, vi, 1968, p, 37: 1984, p. 13%: IBRD P1221 alo iggca these pin ho concepts intel 10a 2, 1962, Biv, 1984, p. 198519670, pp. 181-182). Nucibers ae courted temporal (1984, 1.230 1967, p. 212) Thouptis we counied atemporal (198s, pp. 36937, 1967 p 40, Numbers ave counted causally inet (1968, p. 35, 1967a, pp, 15-6; 1962, pv Tear sl oe aly a (Le 24 9G? Haw 1998. pp 3 SRE, pp. 149-150; 1984, pp. 240,371, 19670. pp. 212, 360-362).rege on Knowing the Third Racks 637 in time, from the chought contents that we “grasp” or think, which are tintcless. So in coming © know thought contents that denote numbers, concepts, and the like, one discovers objects, concepts, and relations that are what they are time~ lessly, independently of any causal influence. One comes to “stand in relation”, as Frege says, with non-spatial, atemporalentitics. (1984, pp. 363, 368; 1967b, pp. 353-4360 1967a, p. 23; 1962, p xxiv) Frege calls numbers, concepts, and thought contents “objective”. By this he ‘means, partly, that they are not intrinsically bome by a mind, as a pain or an after image is. He says that they are subject to laws. They are common property to dif- ferent rational beings (1968, p. 26; 1984, pp. 363i; 1967, pp. 35S). Much of Frege's discussion of atemporal entities centres on their objectivity, For many of his purposes, the intersubjectivity and lawfulness of logic are its key properties. Many of these things might be maintained by someone who was not a Pla tonist. Oue might make the remarks about impercepribility, non-spatiality, temporality, and causal inertness, if one glossed thera as part of a practical recommendation or stipulation for a theoretical framework, having no co‘ai- tive import—or as otherwise not being theoretical claims or claims of reason. ‘Carnap might have said at Icast some of those things, thoust only given cer- tain background qualifications. Or one might have some other basis for quali- fying these remarks, reading them as “non-metaphysical” or as lacking their apparent ontological import. Mareover, certain idealists might say these things. Kant might have said them, given certain background qualifications. He. could have seen numbers as just as genuinely existent and discoverable as physical objects ate, And he could see their objective status in terms of the possibility of inter-subjective agreement on laws governing them. Platonism has 20 monopoly an claims €0 fawlike or inter-subjective objectivity about non-sp tial, atemporal entities. So we need to say mare in order to distinguish Frege's view from altematives {would not take very seriously a reading of Frege as a Camapian. Discussing my attiude would require going more into his methodology and epistemology than Tplan to. Tthink itclear, however, that Frege was trying to provide a rational foundation for mathematics ~in a way that Carmap would have regarded as mis- auiided. Frege saw reason, not practical recommendation, as giving logical objects tous €-, 1968, p, 105). There is nothing remotely akin to Camap's Prin- ciple of Tolerance cither in Frege's philosophical pronouncements, or even more emphatically, in his temperament ‘What interests me mote is the distinction between Frege’s Platonism, on the, ‘one hand, and certain deatisms or certain vaguer "practice" oriented anti-Platon- isms, on the other. Patonism, as T understand the doctrine, regards sore entities (or Frege, some objects and all funetions) as existing non-spatially and atempo- rally, Further, it avoids commenting on them as having special status, inclading being dependent for their existence or nature (as opposed to their discovery} on practice ar mental activity. They ar in xo way derivative, instrumental, fictional, ‘or otherwise second-class. The relevant entities are (undamental. It would be638 Tyler Burge incompatible with Platonism to regard them as essentially part of an appearance ‘or perspective fora thinker—as Kant would tave—though they may impose con stitutive conditions on such appearances or perspectives. Platonism rejects any deeper philosophical commentary that would indicate that the ature or existence of these atemporal entities isto be regarded as in any way dependent on something rental, inguistic, communal, or on anything ike. practice or activity thac occurs in Gime. In Kane, we find a non-Platonic explanation of mathematical structures in terms of a mental activity “synthesis”, that undenies the categories and the forms of spatial and teraporal intuition. And in Hegel abstract structures are held tobe abstractions from spirit it history. Recently, some philosophers have sought to avoid being “metaphysical”, contenting themselves with generalized remarks that mathematical objecis are grounded in some unspecified way in linguistic or ‘mathematical practice. Such views can admicnon-spatio-temporal entities andean ‘rant them objective status. But they are not Platonic in my sense. They regard temporal entities as derivative from human pcactices—such as linguistic activity, Tsee such views as covertly idealist, [dealin regards actual activity or practice as implicated in the nature and existence of non-spatio-temporal structures. Pla- tonism holds that structare is more fundamental than actual activity Frege’s Platonism shows itself in two ways. One is that he never enters the ‘commentary that an idcalst (ora deflationist) would enter on his claims about non-spatio-temporal entities, or about their objectivity or their discoverability. Hr takes them fo be fundamental. The other is that he claims, more than once, that the assumption of the relevant entities explains the intersubjective objec- tivity of scicace and communication, I wll discuss these points briefly, in tur, "There is, as far as Ican see, no evidence that Frege thought thatthe existence or nature of these non-spatio-temporal entities was to be explained in terms of hhurman language, human inference, human practices (including the aciivity of judgment) or other pattems of human activity in tree. Frege thought of exten- sions, functions, and thought contents as genuinely existing entities * He opposed thinking of such entities as having some derivative status. He inveighs against any suggestion that they are products of the mind, mere symbols, or otherwise dlependeat on events in time.? Had he maintained that extensions, functions, or thought contents were dependent on human conceptualization or human lan- uage, judgmtent, or inference Cactual or possible), he would have said s0, and thereby qualified the numerous remarks that have traditionally invited the Pla- ‘onic interpretation of his work. He never does say so, His claiens that temporal entities are independent af us are unqualified, sierra scone artes ater: unas The uate ar peo priaely read as involving ex stemial commitments * For extersons and numbers, cf, 1968, passim, 1967, pp. 10, 12; 1962, pp. xi vs 16, 1962, pti 1984, p50, 1967, p. 312 For concepts or functions, i 96 138 196.122 For tou, 1988, pp. 363,370: 1867,Frege on Knowing the Third Realm 639 (On several occasions, Frege compares the objectivity and existence of num bers, concepts, oe thought contents with the existence and abjectivity of physical ‘objects. He compares numbers to the North Sea as repards objectivity (1968, p. 34). In doing so, he very explicitly indicates that the entity that we call “the North Sea" is what it is completely independently of our imposing the boundaries ot riaking a map that we use © associate that entity with the name “the North Sea” He elaborates this comparison elsewhere: Just as the geographer daes nat create a sea wien he draws boundary lines and says: the part of the ocean's surface bounded by these lines 1 am going to call the Yellow Sea, so too the mathematician cannat really create anything by his defining, Norcan one by pure definition magical- ly conjure into a thing a property that infact it does not passess—save tbat of now being called by the name with which one bas named it, (196Ta,p. 11; 1962, p. xii He compares a mathematician’s relation to numbers with the astronomer’srelac tion to the sun (1979, p. 7, 1983, p. 7) and tothe planets (1968, p. 37). He says tha ike geographers, mathematicians cannot create, but can only discover “what is there and give ita name” (1968, p, 108; ct. also 19674, pp. 23-24; 1962, p. xxivs 1979, p. 137; 1983, p. 149). He compares our epistemic relation to numbers and concepts cand probably though contents) to our grasping a pencil ‘The picture of grasping is very well suited to elucidate the matter. If T grasp a pencil, many different events take place in my body... bat the pencil exists independently of them, And it is essential for grasping that something be there which is grasped... Tn the same way, that ‘which we grasp with the mind also exists independently of this activi- ty... and it neither identical with the totality ofthese events nor cre by itas a part of our awa mental life, (1967a, pp. 23-24; 1962, p. atv of 1979, p. 197; 1983, 149) ‘Thought contents exist independently of thinking "in che same way”, he says, that 4 pencil exists independently of grasping it. (The artifactual character of pencils plays no roe in his understanding ofthe analogy, a other examples indicate,} He says that chought contents are cue and bear their relations co ane another (and pre sumably to what they are about) independently of anyone’s thinking these thought contents—"just as a planet, even before anyone saw it, was in interaction with other planets” (1984, p. 363: 19676, p. 354). And he compares a thought's independence of our grasping it to the star Algol's independence of anyone's being aware of it (1984, p. 369; 1967, p. 359). All these comparisons suggest (and those of 1967a, pp. 23-24; 1962, p. anxivs 1984, pp. 363, 369; 1967, p. 354, 359 explicitly state) that numbers, functions, and thought contents are independent of thinkers “in the same way” that physical objects are. Frege nowhere asserts or clearly implies that he maintains any sort of idealism—Kantian oc atherwise—abaut the physical ‘objects studied by the physical sciences. Ie nowhere qualifies the ontological slalus of physical objects. 1 is dubjous historical methodology to atribute to a philosopher with writings that stretch over decades, a large, contraversial dac- trine, if he nowhere cleatly states it in his writings. If Frege had believed in640 Tyler Burge any such idealism about physical objects (or any doctene qualifying ter onto- Togical status), he would have surely said he did.” Doing so would have been necessary for a philosopher (o halance the atu statements about mind-inde- pendence that Prege makes. Frege thought that to know the physical world, one has o grasp thoughes (which bore for him eternal denotational relations to concepts and extensions) that are ternal and eternally cue. Logic is embedded in the content of any knawledge. Since logic is about (denotes) concepts and ater functions, relations, and logical objects, all knowledge is at least partly about non-spatio-temporal enities. More ‘overslogicconcerastheforms of corectjudgmientand inference: and logical seuc~ ture is discovered by electing on patterns of correct judgment and inference. But Frege does not give the slightest indication that he thought that either the physical World or the non-spatio-temporal entities inevitably appealed to in knowing it dependinany way on any activities of judgment, inference, or linguistic practice? 9 Sich pssues as 19°9p.17; 1983p. 149, oan ofthe varios pasages abot indepdent fed tat dc seom mad anes qualia, ic ee fowhore mates be compare wih ny srt wealm rena tang Foon ‘erpataton of rage tanta ale ses loge, 198008 py 590,191, Slogn Steril ssa ta een fo Regs texts ease ses hee fol of te Pepea elt he pecy a ogee once eld sem oe lett ey te conea cf & Kec oof view tga oes ene tf Fras ink tmoveading aogmerts and feces are Sour of Cecovey: Bat Tegel teary abou te orm cores gmetad teen shat dpmets tnd neon Hoge etc edge se fon CC, 96h py. 993-288 ET ape 3th Than fn eee ha es tse pena fora on sence nsctal actives of edge oon ay ike Kaen syst Sidon ache dno Sate posophes have sugested chat Regs mt foe epee pice sone tow singe qulication so tons ss sounding eeecaconet pe cst case excel se snd complex Buse foe athe ugdenton Fs ile sae soni The coment wo ples gover lin eee tu cxgressions and they senaceorreerens They da not bear dicectly onthe ature ofthe ‘Shee overs testes a all At rost oe of te prt might be coherent iove ae aut cara mie ome ef cucmetoge! Paton ose a fous that we ave perception lke inesiton of mater) obs. There sre maa compl Iicohese cfd sobe of them art coupety epee onaogy Bat thas ySinpc ped athe contesepeeges tomate opposition omy aereton il tas angnge ad penal Hah on. "An imerrelaaon of Frege snr olga i proposed ia Wee (990. one pecsng te Nath Se “gnpason (150 p 38), Mele ase epee cack he Stout append te pon es af Chat oe ell "he Nos Sea fre, at sonoweil the Ser Sex" woul lex thresh perce necopioes. scone taco “lis mp teas foweer at nec hac such ceed oes ‘red rote sfsanve eapryscl Gaim, Ear ola sa umezosied ob fSetresr simply olan tari pol fo ammusic cette unl) an set wth cnet oe ja fl ps Te) Wepre teem exs 0 apne is ‘ltng Toto reagon sic ar xen clamor eg are snp cle at porstfity ortous frmulos epoes every icon at ey ae eso Pe Gis ashen oat) al Lae she ocean as Fegeehcres out deom pe nat ange a eng bourse moves wit argon om fetark tng pon abou ie word“ Froes view tae papa wld ‘Sn aceiaestate impor suction 298) he language ct peti So pesent rtd n Foye Tat cones ta badass oe seem snowFrege on Kncvtng the Third Realm 642 Frege notonly compares non-spatio- temporal entities tophysical objects intheie independence af us; he makes unqualified statements about the independence of sch entities from anything ahout us. Fe repeatedly claims that both the truth of ‘though contents and thought contents themselves are independent of individuals’ And graups' thinking the thoughts or recognizing thera to be true (19674, pp. 5. 23; 1962, pp. xvii, xxvi; 1968, p. 60: 1984, p. 363; 1967b, p. 354). He writes:"What ‘we wantio assertin using that proposition [tha the number theee is prime] is some: thing thav always was and always will be objectively tue, quite independently of ‘our waking oF sleeping, life or death, and irrespective of whether there were or will be other beings who recognize or fail to recognize this truth.” (1984, p. 1345 1967, p. 123) ‘The lack of qualification in his claims of independence is especially striking in 1wo passages: one where he writes that someone's thinking a thought has “nothing to 40” either with its trth or with the thought content itself (1984, p. 368; 19676, p. 359); and another where he writes that thought comtents are.nat uly true independently of our recognizing them to be true, but taey, the thought contents themselves, are “absolutely independent of our thinking” (1979, p. 133; 1983, p. 145). Independence is independence. Frege's repeated remarks about mind-independence of non-spatio-temporal entities would not Ihave been literally true, if they had becn backed by a set of unstated qualifica- tions of the sort that an idealist (or deflationary) interpretation of them would require. Ultimately the idealist asserts dependence of the thought-contents and timeless objects on some underlying practice or activity that makes possible the ‘eamework in which attributions of objectivity are made, No idealist—and no deflationist who thought that nan-spatia-temporal entities were dependent on ‘our language, practices, or judgments, or who thowghe that general philosophi- ceal assertions about them were “non-factual”—would have made such state- ments without careful, explicit qualifications. Frege enters no such ‘qualifications Hints vrceumtiatategucr re Geta cege reenact Gat nce earths atti ty aoe atid ipa cty acl edge Ferd bare eres Er irene Utrera cena etrstnc ono ieee at cr ts th We Soe ae ee eee ease tpeece tte ene oie Sra fap icoerrendetn mae tase Done int ier aetna aegisoA Tyler Burge Frege repeatedly inveighs against seeing logic (or mathematics) as embedded inlanguage inthe way that graramaris."® Fe thought thac thought contents, logical ‘objects, and logical functions hore na such essential dependence relation to the actual practice of thinking or language use. For Frege, the subject matter of logic snot the nature of human thinking or practice (1967, p. 13; 1962, p. xvi), even wher that practice accords with che laws of truth: “But above all. we should b= wary of de view thatits the cask of logic to investigate actual thinking and judging, insofar as it isin agreernent with the laws of euch” (1979, p. 146; 1983p, 158— ‘the published translation is ambiguous in a way that does not matcl the German), ‘This independence insures, for Frege, no scope for variation in the laws of logic between one group of thinkers and another (1979, pp. 7, 146; 1967b, pp. 7, 158: 1967, p. 13; 1962, pp. xv-xvi). Frege criticizes one Achelis who writes, _ the nostos which hold jn general for thinking and acting cannot be a- Fived at by the one-sided exercise of pure deductive abstraction alone; ‘what js cequired is an empirico-critical determination af the abjective Brine of aur psycho physical organization which are vada al {intes forthe great consciousness of mankind Frege replies: [Utappears that according to Achelis]the laws in accordance with which judgments are made are se< up as a norm for how judgments are to be imade. But why do we need to do this?.,, Now what is our justification for isolating 4 part af the entite corpus of laws and setting it up as a snorm?... Ate [the laws of logic] like the grammar of a language which may, of course, change with the passage of time? This isa possibility we really have to face up a if we hold thatthe law of logic derive their au- thority from a source similar to that ofthe laws of grammar... if itis nor- mal 10 judge in accordance with our avs of logic as itis normal 10 walk, upright (1979, p. 147; 1983, p. 159) Frege thought one can discover lagic by reflecting on linguistic and mathematical practice. Buc he makes it very clear that his lagical heary is not about practices, and does not take its authority from such practices. They are not what ground the ‘normative structures that logic articulates." " Someincemetes of Frege hve tien hs views tobe redecripons of features of uc pesto ef niet or of ingen. Aiough Megs des degre logical suc tre ac nfnngute 4 cope, does i aby vec o> telorming sues ratte mecan stave esc, Tuow ef ocvdence tat Pepe feng tate ory nde ay dames hate acy cate “lyons much et nga practi dengtsh rep eto {Ectotery (onic des foes on meguage a arti ofudgmen rm Frege's views shout naar fought cmt an of judge. als erty importa Ase at Pegs was inte in judgment ss. tors sleléng form, se judgment fm ats rep sgh at thug corte a the mo er re a= ‘Sal scare cher lnguage osteo gen pal Or sta ov aman tings va eg we tha her in cntactos etcen sets eng ta ee ‘one's aking tobe fie (196Tap. 8,18, pu ay ekg cle tha he des utelove inet gre conection twee” wpe cnet" enol amet phate exested in aighage) and actu udgments a peti, tha woul close anFrege on Knowing the Third Reaine 643 A second way Frege’s Platonism shows itself lies in his attempts to explicate the success of science, the fact af intersubjectively objective cognitive practices, and indeed the authority of logic, in terms of che timelessness of the truths and structures of logic. In The Baste Laws of Aritkmenic he states that the laws of logic (which he also calls the laws of truth} are authoritative because of their timelessness: “[the laws of «ruth] are boundary scones set in an eternal founda- ‘Gon, which our thought can overflow, but never displace. Itis because af this that they have authority for our thought if it would attain to truth." (1967a, p. 13; 1962, p. xvi. Frege frequently claims that only because individuals are not the bearers of ‘thoughe contents is sciemtite communication possible (19678, p. 17; 1962, p. ‘xix; 1979, pp. 133, 137-138; 1983, pp. 144, 149-150; 1984, pp. 363, 368; 19676, pp. 354,359). But he sometimes goes further. In the Logic manuseript of 1897 he indicates that itis the timelessness of the subject matter of logic—the laws’ not containing conditions chat might be satisfied at some times and not at others— that enables lagie 10 provide completely universal laws of truth (1979, p. 148; 1983, p. 160), The idea seems to be that all rue thoughts are eternally true if ‘hey are true at all; but some have temporal subject matters, Some true laws even contain conditions that might be satisfied a¢ certain cimes but not at others, But the laws of logic cannot be ahout temporal subject mavers and cannot contain such conditions, For ifthe truth of some though follows from the truth af oth- fs, then it must always fallew. So to account for the universal aspect of entail- ment, one must assiime that the subject matter of logic is eternal. (The conclusion of this argument, though not the argument itself is stated in 19672, p. 13; 1962, p. xvi.) In “Thoughts” Frege gives two more arguments that sciemitic objectivity (of communication and of knowledge of the physical world, respectively) is expli cable only on the view that thought contents helong to a “thicd realm" chat is neither mental nar physical, Inthe first arsument (1984, p. 363; (967, p. 354} he holds that scientific communication cannot be understood on the assumption that thought contents are ideas in particular people’s minds. He had previously maintained that thought contents are clearly at perceptible or knowable on the basis of perceptions (1984, pp. 354, 360; 1967b, pp. 345, 351). He concludes (1.984, p. 363; 1967, p. 354) that in order to understand the objectivity of the communal scientific enterprise, ane “must recognize” the third realm. The timelessness of the cruths of this realm and the fact that their tcuth is independ ent of whether anyone Cakes them (o he true are clearly seen as part of an possible gap between mind and sujet matter, There is more evidence for this fact i his Siscussion of scemticism 19 "The Thaught". The example he gives in 19673, p. 13 and 1962. pp. av-avi canoems an empirical iru As [discuss below, he sdicates thax some truths simple tthe of arilheieue and basic logical euths-—can be depied only through ‘madness, and that any attempt to deny them ina thoronghgoing way will undermice judg mene rset648 Tyler Burge account of how a “science common to many on which many could work" is possible.'* In the second argument (1984, p. 368; 19676, p. 359), Frege indicates that a “firm foundation af science” must be facts that ate independent of men’s varying, sates of consciousness, Facts'are, he maintains, tue thoughts. True thoughts Ihave the requisite independence: not only are they not part of anyone's “inner ‘mental world; cheit uth “has nothing to do with” someone's thinking them. The ‘work of science consists in the discovery of true thoughts (whtich provide a “firm foundation" for the science). Moreover, Frege argues that the applicability of ‘mathematical truths ro investigations at any time (he cites application of mathe- ‘matics in an astronomical investigation into events in the distant past) is possible because a mathematical thoughts truth, and the thought content itself, are cime- less. So, he concludes, explicating the objectivity of science and the temporally neutral applicability of mathematics cequires that both the thoughts and their ruth be timeless." ‘These arguments take for granted the existence of the objectivity manifested in imtersubjectively accepted norms for communication. aad the checking and © atthough hi argument io expt in is 1958, the ate ein cs no a toda he arcncon RR, a). ik te argon he eas teresting of ee arguments Lam dacessng. "e Thomas Ricketts (986) opposes reading Frege asthe arcerypical metaphysical platnist™ (#3). according to whi ere mind independent ex'stence of ies 1 ot Frege pucsinpecton ofthe representational operation of language explains Row our sistency ve ofa at om or ai to mak owed them, Tris deterigton of Paronem does nt fe the Platonise f aibue, Frege as Clearly ary to ave a general expanaion of gui representation oven of fexuouany it jedgmene Burin conan fo Richens cane tat Frege eouge a te sreviously ced passepes indicate tat assuming the mind-Independsice of a though mens torcept af logical object wer neceeany to understanding the abe of Sete pracice and te trvetst appltcablity 0 loge and maeratics [do ot ink Sharh thdughtfarssch objets iy would sorchow’ oti opardy inte abeence fut explanation, Logic ws for sim epstemiealy pratt pitosophy of loi, I rather iHatauct an explanation accounts for wha is involved im emet,loleal inference and logieal mah: Reka Cabornes “The crucial etre ofthis Plant in fencers tian te its aking onologeal noon especialy hat fan indepencenly cating hg. ror to and aveubeapat (tom logit ones, from motion of usps, seat on, ine Ne Sth (66) Keckets ago hss thot Frege’ clams aout the objet s- socisted wit opie afe not meant fo be actual claims ane that here terete no persibie eaplanton for Frege of objectivity, As lineste mth ext, seen evidence for ‘felevanty agente cic in ege degree factual 2nd non-Facta esis Move ‘ver, Foges Paton does not involve ay claim about ce riety af ontolaca! no tions over logical notions, (do\not see cven iii plausibly to atting (his Sstumplon to epe) Lage ad ontology ae only entangled in Frege, Logie se Siar 25 Frege says (1986, le 1087, p43) hasan ntclogy But ogi the tiost general stience_ So no rough: about being tose be ndepemtent oft ations Moesver Frepe's most uvarpentl onfological eaegores function and cbc) ae log Utcnegoves Nor oes Frege's appeal toontlosy rhs ses athe abject of et {nce and the uiveratyof ogi ply cat hehe tat ototogea nus wee pace to logeal one, uch es vane apr from ther Te exlamain is ot cefinion= ‘Ewvaion; or fedsction. AL ite ky Soloist notne fe ses boi presippee an i Sle logical aotons Rether he hous eat fll understanding ogc ivelved cpp] {osc ike logieal cect futon, ought cone cnd Independence, melestness,rege on Knowing tho Third Realm 645 confirming of scientific results. Frege thinks that we need na reassurance about its solidity. He is not concemed with scepticism, He regards ardinary certainties as certain (1977 §13; 1968, p. 2). He does not seek foundations, nor daes he appeal this Platonism, ta bolster confidence in an otherwise doubtful scientific enterprise. He does not view philosophy in the grand reanner, as protecting sci- ‘ence against otherwise dangerous philosophical worves. He articulates his Pla- tonism because he finds a refusal co qualify the timelessness of mathematics! structures, of fo explain them in terms of something mace familiar and tempo- ral—such as our minds or pratices—provides the hest understanding of scien- tific intersubjective objectivity. He thinks his view shows why practices that have been found tobe firm are i fact fm (1968, p. 2). Let us cura to Frege's views about how we know this third realm of entities. As J indicate eacier, am prescinding from complexities in Frege's epistemology. ‘What is important for our purposes is that Frege thought that our knowledge of the primitive logical suths and infereace rules depended on a logical faculty— reason (1968, p. 21; 1980, pp. 27, 57; 1976, 37, 89: 1962 I, §74; 1984, p. 405, 19676, p.393; 1979, pp. 267-273; 1983, pp. 286-292.) The question is: how could Frege believe that reason alone could give one knowledge of an atemporaleealm ‘of entities that are completely independent for their existence, natute, and cela- tions to one another, of anyone's reasoning? Frege is aware that foundational questions ahoat our knowledge af mathemat- {cal structures ultimately come down to questions about knowledge of the prim- itive auths and inference rules. He is admirably clear that lagie does not answer these questions: “The question why and with what right we acknowledge a law ‘of logic to be true, logic can answer only by reducing it co another law of logic ‘Where thatis not possible, logic can give no answer” (19672, p. 155 1962, p.x¥i “We justify a judgment either by going back wo truhs that have been recognized already or without having recourse to other judgments. Only the first case, iner- ence, is the concer af Logic” (1979, p. 175; 1983, p. 190), Frege lays fundamen- {alepistemological questions aside in much of his work, especially in Basic Laws ‘of Aridhmerc. Butt would be-a serious misunderstanding to think that he chou tat the questions were off limits.” For he expresses a consistent interest thera. Of course he thought that one could not and need not argue forthe basic log- ical euths, But he did see them as a source for the justification ofthe belie ia them by a person who understood them. He thought that they were self-evident causal ineniness, imperespibili,non-spatiality. Frege thought of himself as describing She nological feaues dat lope mus Have: Logical and onflogteal ssions ae terre: lates fur Frege; and al he relevant lopeal objets an funetions ae tcesly relate the relevant nations Ghoght components) Frege sees ce whole logical stuete, no st ona ima Plane fastion "7 Ck also 1979 pp. 3,195 1983, pp.3, 190, Conuas Rickeus (1986p, Sl) “Thetis, 2g far as Frege is concerned, tina tg be said about the just ieto for eu recogson tins basic lawe of loge to be ths" and Welger (1990, pp 71-72) Frege sys Rood bicahour te epistemology at bei inthe asc abs, scaerea though his wets. Tshal rot discuss these passages inthis paper, however.646 Tyler Burge We justify our judgment of the basic truths, ase said, without having recourse to other judgments (1979, p. 175; 1983, p. 190) ‘One needs to bear in mind here a three-fold distinction that Frege often caries along. in his writings (i is very explicit in “The Thought” 1984, p. 352; 1967b, pp. 342-343): a) psychological explanation of belief or judament, including, an account of its acquisition, (b) justification of our belief or judgment, and (c) grounding for logical truth, Frege always lays aside psychological explanation But he repeatedly discusses the justification of “our” belief or judgment in logical tcuths as well as the grounding of logice! truth. Understanding grounding of ruth isa matter of understanding the natural order of truths, which is independent of ‘thinking or practice, and the ‘same for all men” (1968, p. ii, 17; 1967, pp. 13, 15; 1962, pp. xvi, xvii), One understands the grounding of truth when one under- stands the natural order of logical and mathematical proofs, and the primitive ‘raths on which such proofs rest. What grounds logical rruths re the primitive. logical teuths. ‘One of Frege's primary motivations for understanding logical truth and the ‘roof structure of logic was to understand the nature of justification for ou math- ‘ematical judgments. In Foundations of Arithmetic Frege begins in §§1 and 2 by ‘announcing an interest the proof stricture of mathematics. But he icamediately associates this structure with the question ofthe justification of belief. fn §2 he says that the aim of proof is, partly. o place a proposition beyond doubt, In §3 he says chat “philosophical motives” underly his inquiry into the foundations of ‘mathematics: The motives turn out fo centre on answering the question “Whence do we derive the justification of our assertion {of mathematical tcuths)"? The question of whether arithmetic is analytic cams aut ro concem the justification for making a judgment. He refines this to read, itconcems “the ultimate ground upan ‘which rests the justification for holding [a proposition] to be true". ‘What is importane about this passage is not only Frege's concentration on jus- tification for judgment, hut also his befief that the justication of an arithmetical judgment derives from the mathematical foundation (Grund)—from the primi tive truths. The problem [of finding the justifcation for assertion or judgment), he says, is to be solved by “finding the proof of the proposition and following it hack tothe primitive truths.” (1968, p. 4). One might ask, haw can a problem of the justification of our beliefs of judgments be solved by citing primitive truths? low can such truths be primary in an account of justification? Frege's line is made clearer in “The Thought” where he characterizes laws of truth as general laws which concern not “what happens” but “what is". Speaking ‘of these las about "what is” in the third realm, Frege says that “from the favs. ‘of truth there follow [“ergibt sich —a non-technical tert] prescriptions about asserting, thinking, judging, inferring” (1984, p. 351; 1967, p. 342). Frege then calls hese prescriptive epistemic laws “laws of thought” (1984, p. 351; 19676, p, 342), This is a paradigmatic Platonic direction of explanation: from what i in an abstract realm Co what is reasonable. What could be the natuce of this derivation fromm general avs of cuth—which cancem logical abjects and functions —to pre-Frege on Knowing the Third Realm 647 scriptive laws about judgment? Frege writes: “the laws of cuth] are boundary stones set in an eternal foundation, which our thought can overflow, but never dis place. It is because of this that they have authority for our thought if it would ‘attain fo truth" (1967, p. 13; 1962, p. xv) Is it contingent that a judging subject “would attain wo trath”? Frege is certainly ‘insistent thatthe laws of truth are independent of ther being taken to he true by anyone (1967a, pp. 13, 15:1962, pp. xvi, xvi), Moreaver, he thinks it not contea- dictary to suppose something's being true which everyone takes (0 be false (1967, p. 13: 1962, pp. xv-xvi}. On the other hand, Frege sees judgment as an advance from thought content to truth value, The function or air of judgment is toreach trth. Soto be a judging, subject, one must have this aim or function inso- far as one makes judgments. In this sense, the prescriptions of the lass of truth trust apply tothe judgments of judging subjects ‘There is a second way in which Frege thinks that there is a deep, non-contin gent relation between the laws of th and prescriptive laws about judgment. To be rational, he thinks, one must be disposed to acknowledge the simplest logical «cuths. Judgments in contradiction withthe laws of logie would constitute a kind of madaess (19674, p. L4; 1962, p. xvi) Infact, Prege appears to believe that ture to acknowledge primitive logical laws, like the principle that every object is identical with itself, and even certain truths of arithmetic, would throw thought into confusion and undermine the possibility of genuine judgment and thought (1968, p. 21). This sugaests that he was inclined f0 believe that a disposition (0 acknowledge basic logical truths and inferences—and a disposition not to deny ‘non-basie but relatively simple ruts of arithrnetic—wasa condition not only for ‘being rational but for being a judge or thinker at al Here ic is worth looking very carefully ata famous passage in Rasic Laws Frege considers a supposed possibility in which beings had laws of thougkr (pre- scriptions for judgment) that contradicted ours, He claims that such beings would ‘exhibit a “hitherto unknown type of madness”, and indicates that such beings’ ‘procedures for taking things to be true would be in radical disaccord with the laws ‘of teuth (19673, p. 14; 1962, p. xvii). Shorlly afterwards, he writes; If we step away from logic, We may say; we are compelled to make judgments by our own nature and by external circumstances; and if we do so, we cannot reject this law—of Identity, for example; we must ae- knowiedge it unless we wish f0 reduce our thought 10 confusion and fi nally do without all judgment whatever. I shall neither dispute nor support this views I shall merely remark that what we brave here is not & Jogical consequence. What is given is not a ground (Grusd) for some- thing's being true, but for our taking itto be true. Not only that: this im possibilty of our rejecting the law in question hinders us not at all in supposing beings wh da reject it where it hinders us in supposing that these beings are right in so doing... Anyone who has once acknowledged a law of truth has By the same token acknowledged a law that prescribes the way in which one-ought to judge, no matter were, ot when, oF by ‘whom the judarnent is nade. (19678, p15; 1962, p. xvii)648 Toler Burge Frege is taking a hands-off antitude toward the epistemological issues forthe pur- pose of his mathematical reatise. But, given his own beliefs, what does he neither dispute nor suppor in the view he states? Some have thought that inciting the limits of logic, he is preseinding from any judgment about grounds for our taking something tobe trie, as opposed tothe ground for its being true, Some have even hheld that grounds for our taking something to be true are thought by Frege to be psychologistic, and of no interest (o him. ‘These are serious misteadings of the passage. Understanding grounds for our saking something tobe thie had long heen what motivated his inuicy into the foundations of arithmetic. (Cf. especially 1968, p. 3, where he uses exactly the same German terms as he does in the above-cited ‘passage: grounds for taking fholding] something to be tue.) One page earlier in Baste Laws Frege characterized the laws af logic in the double way T have described: not only as laws of truth but as laws that “prescribe the way in which ‘one ought to think” (1967, p. 14; 1962, p. xvi)—as laws of thought. What Frege ‘akes no position on is whether we are compelled to acknowledge the laws by our ‘own nature and by external circumstances, ‘This is indeed a psychological matter. He thinks that any such psychological law would admit of conceivable exceptions—mad beings that do reject the law Butwhere he writes, “wemust acknowledge itunless we wishtoreduceourthousht to confusion and finally do without al judgment whatever", he is speaking in his ‘own voice. For he had already indicated that he believes that renouncing the laws of arithmetic (which are less basic for him than the basic laws of logic) would be to reduce thought o confusion and make thinking impossible (1968, p.21). Frege thinks that acknowledging these laws, atleast implicitly in one’s actual thinking, ignecessary forhavingreason and for being anon-degeneratethinking and judging subject. (He apparently believed that although a mad person could reject a law, abiding by such rejection would reduce thoughtto confusion, andby degreesunder- rmine judgment altogether) These are aormative not psychological judgments, Although they arenotlogicalconsequences, they are partof Frege"sepistemic view. So let us summarize the view that Frege maintains. He holds that justification for holding logical laws to be true rests on and follows from primitive laws of teuth, Ke spells out this dependence of epistemic justification on the laws of truth intwo ways, He thinks that laws of truth indicate Row one ought to think “if one Wwould atain to uth”. But a judging subject necessarily would attain to teath, insofar as itengages in judgment. So any judgment by a particular person neces- sarily is subject co the prescriptive laws set out by the primitive laws of logic. One is justified in acknowledging them because doing so is necessary (0 fulfilling ‘one's aim and function as a judging subject. Frege’s second way is: acknowledgement of certain laws of tuth is necessary for having reason and for engaging in non-degenerate chinking and judging. One is rationally entitled to judge the primitive laws of logic (a be true because the nature of reason—and even non-degenerate jndgment—is partly constituted by the prescription that one acknowledge atleast the simple and basic laws of truthFrege on Knowing the Phir Realm 649 “To pur it crudely, reason and judgment—indeed mind—are partly defined in. terms of acknowledging the basic laws of truth"? ‘Our problem sas to explain how, for Frege, mere reason could give grounds to believe that a subject matters any particular way, given that the subject matter is atemporal, causally inert, and independent of thinking about it, Most current approaches to the substantive problem look for some analog of causal interela- ‘ioa in our mathematical knowledge. More traditional views—both Platonic and idealist—see the relation as individuative or constitutive. [An idealist line isto make the subject matter constitutively dependent on thinking, synthesis, or practice. Frege's line isto hold that, although the laws of tcuth are independent of judging subjects, judging subjects arc in two ways not independent ofthe laws of truth, First, (0 be a judging subject is € be subject o the prescriptions of reason, which in tum are provided by the laws of truth (logic), For judgment has the function of ataining tru; and the laws of logic—which ate constituted by atemporal thoughts and atemporal subject matter—provide imiversal prescriptions of how one ought to think, given that one’s thinking has the function of atiaining truth. Second, being a judging subject isto have or have had some degree of reason, Having or having had some degree of reason requires acknowledging, at east implicitly in one’s thinking, the simplest, most basic log- ‘cal ruths and inferences; and daing so commits one to an atemporal subject mat ter. Questions of “access” to the thitd realm are on reflection seen f0 be ‘misconceived. For, fo reverse somewhat Gertrude Stein’s dictum about Oakland, there is no there there, ‘Why was this line noc more prominent in Frege’s philosophy? Me thought chat his primary contribution lay in identifying primitive teuths and inference rules, and in deriving arithmetic from them. He accepted the traditional rtionalist-Pla- tonist line about the relation between reason and primitive truths. He didnot think itneeded substantial elaboration, Like Frege, chink that chis neglected line is not to be dismissed, Unlike Frege, {think it may be worth developing. Department of Philosophy TYLER BURGE University of California Los Angeles USA * Ong ean see ths view allued to inte passage where Frege cms cat ogi can, wth an adealis: and atspayehologistie quaiiestors be seen she suc of at mands Tut Mind (Gast) (1984, 9 565, 1987p. 999) Onecan alo sce tn cat "We might With stron af 4 wel-kaowmn pronation sy: the proper objet of reaton i reason Ih Frthmeic we te nt cancers wth abject which we come to kno a8 someting sien from without rough the medium ofthe senses, Dut wih abject ven diel To veason, Whlchas her mostproperatject are completely arsparertta er (1968, p. 113) Ch aso 1917 $94; and 1d0k 256 "These ques are not del sts they have sometimes been taken They are expressions ofthe ew that he sie forts and abject: of opi consti: tively Inform mind, and help dein whi is tobe mind a reason.650 Tyler Burge REFERENCES, Renacerraf, Paul 1983: “Mathematical Truth” in Philosophy of Mathematics Selected Readings, ed. Benaceraf and Putnam, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press Frege, G. 1962: Grandgesetce der Arithmerik. Hildesheim: Georg Olms. 196 7a: The Basie Laxes of Arithmetic, wans and ed. M, Fusth, Las Angeles University of California Press. 1967: Kleine Schrifien . Hildesheiny: Georg Olens, 1968: Foundations of Arithmetic, uans 1.L, Austin, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1977: Regriffeschvift. Hildesheim: Georg Olts. 1976: Wissenschafdicher Rriefwechsel, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1979: Posthumous Writings, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1980: Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence. Chicago: Univer sity of Chicago Press. 1983: Nackgelassene Schriften. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 1984: Callected Papers. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Rickeus, Thomas G. 1986: “Objectivity and Objecthood; Prege’s Metaphysics of Judgement”, in Frege Synthesized, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. ‘Sluga, Hans 1980: Goulob Frege. London: Routlege and Kegan Paul Weiner, Joan 1990; Frege ix Perspective. Idhaca: Comell University Press.