Asynchronous Activity No.

1. Commission of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 35 SCRA 345

2. FACTS: EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic into
the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import
goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars
were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan
(as there was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned
the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue
was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner
appealed.
3. ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate.
4. HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least
2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties
are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of
government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take
the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated
‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other
governments ends and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of
notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to
undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to
time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements
act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to
show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are
not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of
agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover
such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the
admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims,
postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not
by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with
respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with
respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any
legislation.

2. Bayan v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449

3. Magallona v. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to
UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446,
correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements complied with are: to
shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the
other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it
merely notices the international community of the scope of our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to
regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis
continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid
such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils.’ total maritime
space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago’.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it should follow the natural
configuration of the archipelago.

Facts

Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522 in March 2009 demarcating the

maritime baseline of the Philippine archipelago. The former is a rectangular baseline
based on the Treaty of Paris and UNCLOS I while the latter followed a straight
baseline method prescribed by UNCLOS III. Measurement of maritime zones will
begin from these baselines.

Issue

Whether RA 9522 violated Article 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Ruling

No.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory. It is just a
codified norm that regulates the .conduct of states.

The RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as
geographic starting points. Also, RA 9522 includes provisions that enforce our
claims to the KIG, SS, and Sabbah.

RA 9522 is not unconstitutional, the Petition was dismissed.

RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones

Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III,
Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at the relevant
provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners’ reading plausible. Nevertheless,
the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court.
Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an
UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will
find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of
its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted
disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and
exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago;
and second, it weakens the country’s case in any international dispute over
Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-
recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and
continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the
Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and
our national interest.
Magallona Vs Ermita Case Digest

Case Digest: GR No. 187167 

2/2/2015

5 Comments
 

Prof. Magallona, Hontiveros, Prof. Roque and 38 UP College of Law Students

-vs-

Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator
National Mapping & Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr.

 
-writ of certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522

Facts:

RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of
the baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago. This is in consonance with
UNCLOS I.

RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section

2 in which the government reserved the drawing of baselines in Sabah in North
Borneo.

RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which
are in compliance with UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of the signatory,
shortening one baseline while optimizing the other and classifying Kalayaan Group
of Island and Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.

Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the

constitutionality of RA 9522:- it reduces the territory of the Philippines in
violation to the Constitution and it opens the country to maritime passage of
vessels and aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the economy,
sovereignty, national security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the
classification of Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to the lives of the
fishermen.

Issues:

1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional

Ruling:

Petition is dismissed.

1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it
is the citizens who will be directly injured and benefitted in affording relief over
the remedy sought.

2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.

First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a
statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zone and continental shelf
under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or
losing a territory as provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-
lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-
use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from
the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive
economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves. In
order to measure said distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their
archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the treaty—the role played by
RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of
15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by
optimizing the location of base points, increased the Philippines total maritime
space of 145,216 square nautical miles.

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is

consistent with the Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as
part of the archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS III since it
categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical
miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country,
for decades, had been claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one
hand and on the other hand they had to consider that these are located at non-
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So,
the classification is in accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s
responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.  

Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah,
situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty.

And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the
Constitution’s delineation of internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522
transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters hence
subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing
the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court
emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying
landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas
underneath, regardless whether internal or archipelagic waters. However,
sovereignty will not bar the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining
freedom of navigation and the generally accepted principles of international law. It
can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is
deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a
customary international law, thus automatically incorporated thereto.

This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies
concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim all waters
inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the
Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines
the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a
maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in
strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to
UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to
be bound by it.

The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to
determine the passing of a law and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment was
necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on
the Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter
and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our
archipelago and it will weaken the country’s case in any international dispute over
Philippine maritime space.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-
recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and
continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the
Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and
our national interest.
4. Imbong v. Ochoa, 721 SCRA 146

Imbong v. Ochoa (G.R. No. 204819)

Facts:

The increase of the country’s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the executive
and the legislative’s decision that prior measures were still not adequate. Thus,
Congress enacted R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide Filipinos, especially the poor
and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modern family
planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples’ right to
reproductive health be achieved. Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement
measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s health
and population control.

Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the
constitutionality of RH Law. Meanwhile, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed
legislation took effect. The Court then issued a Status Quo Ante Order enjoining the
effects and implementation of the assailed legislation.

Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it
violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title
rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood,
the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by
concealing its true intent – to act as a population control measure. On the other hand,
respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, and that
the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and “reproductive health” are both interrelated
as they are inseparable.

Issue:

Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the Constitution

Ruling: NO

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards
the reduction of the country’s population. While it claims to save lives and keep our
women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated
earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and
the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning
products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern, however,
are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest
underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country. The
Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners’ contention that the whole idea of contraception
pervades the entire RH Law.

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.

In Cawaling, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was written: It is well-settled that the “one title-one
subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as
here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of
the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a
liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede
legislation.”

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
“reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to
the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights
of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the
right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive
health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must
not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of
the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”

Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible

parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human
development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that
Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.

The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect
to certain provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante
Order issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No.
10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

5. Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656

SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [421 SCRA

656; G.R. No. 159085; 3 Feb 2004]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior
officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and
direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in
Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their
withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the
President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a
violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation
No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State
of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their
barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the
Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435,
declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners
contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual
basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive
Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention
of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding
the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential
issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress
has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v.
President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners
contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by
Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al,
petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to
the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of
rebellion.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional?

(2) Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring
suit?

Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not
expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its
Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers.
It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power.
While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none
of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the
President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the
report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have
replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of
Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is
of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling
out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on
the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated
legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on
warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this
whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised
Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing,
petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing
to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of
Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its
decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the
powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.

5. David v. Arroyo, 489 SCRA 162

DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL. (CASE DIGEST)

DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424
May 3, 2006
TOPICS: Constitutional Law, PP 1017, Sec. 17, Article XII
FACTS:
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call
upon AFP and the to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless
violence in the country. Permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments were revoked. Rallyists were dispersed. The police
arrested petitioner David and Llamas without a warrant.
President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national
emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed petitions with the SC,
impleading Arroyo, questioning the legality of the proclamation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
RULING:
No. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever
becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. However, the SC ruled that under Section 17, Article XII of
the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative legislation,
cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business
affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly
unconstitutional.
7. In Re Petition for Judicial Clemency of Manuel V. Romillo Jr. G.R. No. 97091, December 9, 1997

8. Risos-Vidal v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM PETITIONER-INTERVENOR,

VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

NATURE:
These are petitions including:
1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, which essentially prays for the issuance of the
writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April 1, 2013   and April 23, 2013 Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En banc, respectively.

(2) a Petition-in-Intervention[ filed by Alfredo S. Lim praying to be declared the 2013 winning candidate
for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s)
disqualification to run for and hold public office

FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of
the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification.

On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive
clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada explicitly states that He is hereby restored to
his civil and political rights.

On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy [7] for the position of
President but was opposed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of the cases
prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the second
highest number of votes on the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a
Certificate of Candidacy,[10] this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the
COMELEC because of Estrada’s Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer
the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification.  Petitioner relied on Section
40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)

In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for
disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored
by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim garnered
the second highest votes intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention
of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as
a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.

HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing the assailed Resolutions.  The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately
demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a
“whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law” or were so “patent and gross” as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political
rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy.
The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only
reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in
fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The
sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted
the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we
apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted
together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12
of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms,
Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In
other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty
after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold
any public office, whether local or national position.

9. Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 756 SCRA 636

Facts:

On October 17, 1988, petitioner, then Commissioner of the Commission of

Immigration and Deportation, allegedly, with evident bad faith, approve the
application for legalization of the stay of 32 aliens, who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of EO 324 which prohibits
legalization of said disqualified aliens, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to
said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by
petitioner.

Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice

Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner fixing bail
at P15,000. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until her
physical condition improves as she was recuperating from injuries sustained
in a vehicular accident. On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed concurrently a
Petition for Certiorari seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding
with the Criminal Case No. 16698 and a motion before the Sandiganbayan to
defer her arraignment. The SC dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a motion
for bill of particulars with Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the
aliens were conspicuously admitted in the complaint. The SC, in its resolution
of November 12, 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset petitioner’s
arraignment not later than 5 days from receipt of notice thereof.

On December 7, 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to admit 32 amended informations. On December 2,
1993, the SC directed the OSP and Ombudsman to consolidate the 32
amended informations. Said informations were consolidated under Criminal
Case No. 16698.

On July 31, 1995, the prosecution filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to
issue an order preventively suspending petitioner. The Sandiganbayan
directed petitioner to file her opposition to the July 31 motion for the
prosecution within 15 days from receipt thereof.. Petitioner filed her opposition
on August 22, 1995. On January 25, 1996, the Sandiganbayan suspended
petitioner from her position as Senator for 90 days.

Issue:
WON the Sandiganbayan can issue a 90-day preventive suspension order
against petitioner.

Ruling:

Yes. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension

of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of RA
3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support, specifically Section 13 of the
said law which states that any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act shall be
suspended from office.

In Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that the validity of Section 13 of

RA 3019, treating the suspension pendent lite of an accused public officer,
may no longer be put to issue. It applies to all persons indicted upon a valid
information under the Act, whether appointive or elective, permanent or
temporary, career or non-career service.

In Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that preventive suspension is not

a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings.

It is also settled that the use of the word “office” in Section 13 of RA 3019
indicates that it applies to any officer which the officer charged may be
holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.

The accused is given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the

propriety of his prosecution. However, it should be treated in the same
manner as a challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of motion to quash
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and should
be limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information constitute
the elements of an offense.

Petitioner claims that the amended informations did not charge any offense
punishable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 because the officials acts
complained of were authorized under EO 324.
However, in a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the
allegations of fact in the information. Hence, petitioner admitted the facts
which constitute the elements of the offense.
The pronouncement upholding the validity of the information filed behooved
the Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to issue the order of
preventive suspension.

Also, the order of suspension prescribed in RA 3019 is different from that of

Section 16(3) of Article Vi of the 1987 Constitution because the former is
preventive (not a penalty), and the latter is punitive imposed by either House
of Congress upon its members. RA 3019 does not exclude from its coverage
the members of Congress. The doctrine of separation of powers simply
recognized that each of the 3 co-equal branches of government has exclusive
prerogatives and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into
the internal affairs of another.

10. Manalang-Demegillo v. Trade and Investment Development Corp., 692 SCRA 359

DEMIGILLO VS TIDCORP (G.R. NO. 168613 MARCH 5, 2013)

Manalang-Demigillo vs Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines
G.R. No. 168613 March 5, 2013

Facts: On February 12, 1998, the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee was renamed Trade and
Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) pursuant to Republic Act No. 8494 entitled An
Act Further Amending Presidential Decree No. 1080, As Amended, by Reorganizing And Renaming the Philippine
Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation, Expanding Its Primary Purpose, and for Other Purposes. Republic
Act No. 8494 reorganized the structure of TIDCORP. The issuance of appointments in accordance with the
reorganization ensued. Petitioner Rosario Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo) was appointed as Senior Vice President
(PG 15) with permanent status, and was assigned to the Legal and Corporate Services Department (LCSD) of
TIDCORP. Petitioner was evaluated and given a ‘poor’ rating for two consecutive evaluations due to her
unimproved performance resulting to her name being dropped from the rolls of TIDCORP.

Issue: Whether or not the reorganization is valid resulting to Demigillo’s reassignment valid.

Held: Yes. Under the circumstances, when the members of the Board of Directors effected the assailed 2002
reorganization, they were acting as the responsible members of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP constituted
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080, as amended by Republic Act No. 8494, not as the alter egos of the
President. We cannot stretch the application of a doctrine that already delegates an enormous amount of power.
Also, it is settled that the delegation of power is not to be lightly inferred.

The result of the lengthy consultations and close coordination was the comprehensive reorganization plan that
included a new organizational structure, position classification and staffing pattern, qualification standards, rules and
regulations to implement the reorganization, separation incentive packages and timetable of implementation.
Undoubtedly, TIDCORP effected the reorganization within legal bounds and in response to the perceived need to
make the agency more attuned to the changing times.

Having found the 2002 reorganization to be valid and made pursuant to Republic Act No. 8494, we declare that
there are no legal and practical bases for reinstating Demigillo to her former position as Senior Vice President in the
LCSD. To be sure, the reorganization plan abolished the LCSD, and put in place a setup completely different from
the previous one, including a new staffing pattern in which Demigillo would be heading the RCMSS, still as a
Senior Vice President of TIDCORP. With that abolition, reinstating her as Senior Vice President in the LCSD
became legally and physically impossible.

Demigillo’s contention that she was specifically appointed to the position of Senior Vice President in the LCSD was
bereft of factual basis. The records indicate that her permanent appointment pertained only to the position of Senior
Vice President. Her appointment did not indicate at all that she was to hold that specific post in the LCSD. Hence,
her re-assignment to the RCMSS was by no means a diminution in rank and status considering that she maintained
the same rank of Senior Vice President with an accompanying increase in pay grade.

The assignment to the RCMSS did not also violate Demigillo’s security of tenure as protected by Republic Act No.
6656. We have already upheld reassignments In the Civil Service resulting from valid reorganizations. Nor could
she claim that her reassignment was invalid because it caused the reduction in her rank, status or salary. On the
contrary, she was reappointed as Senior Vice President, a position that was even upgraded like all the other similar
positions to Pay Grade 16, Step 4, Level II. In every sense, the position to which she was reappointed under the 2002
reorganization was comparable with, if not similar to her previous position.

CASE DIGEST: TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MA. ROSARIO S.
MANALANG-DEMIGILIO. (G.R. No. 176343; September 18,
2012)

FACTS: The Board of Directors of Trade and Investment Development

Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP), a wholly owned government
corporation, formally charged Maria Rosario Manalang-Demigillo
(Demigillo), then a Senior Vice-President in TIDCORP, with grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
insubordination, and gross discourtesy in the course of official duties.
TIDCORP alleged that Demigillo engaged in a verbal tussle with Mr. Joel
Valdes (Valdes), President and CEO of TIDCORP. Allegedly, Demigillo
also sent a memorandum addressed to Valdes which contained
discourteous and arrogant words.

Pending the investigation, TIDCORP placed Demigillo under preventive

suspension for 90 days.

Demigillo assailed her preventive suspension in the Civil Service

Commission (CSC). The CSC ruled that her suspension was not proper
because under Section 19(2), Rule II, of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Uniform Rules), a civil service
officer like Demigillo might be preventively suspended by the
disciplining authority only if any of the two grounds were present, to wit:
(1) there was a possibility that the civil service employee might unduly
influence or intimidate potential witnesses against him; or (2) there was
a possibility that the civil service employee might tamper the
documentary evidence on file in her office. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the CSC .

ISSUE: Was Demigillo's 90-day preventive suspension proper?

HELD: The 90-day preventive suspension order issued against

Demigillo was valid. Under Section 51 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the imposition of preventive suspension by the proper disciplining
authority is authorized provided the charge involves dishonesty,
oppression, or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty,
or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges
which would warrant his removal from the service. Section 51 nowhere
states or implies that before a preventive suspension may issue there
must be proof that the subordinate may unduly influence the witnesses
against him or may tamper the documentary evidence on file in her
office.
Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the CSC promulgated the Uniform
Rules on August 31, 1999. It is clear from Section 19,supra, that
before an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation may
validly issue, only two prerequisites need be shown, namely: (1) that the
proper disciplining authority has served a formal charge to the affected
officer or employee; and (2) that the charge involves either dishonesty,
oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if
there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of the charges
which would warrant her removal from the service.Proof showing that
the subordinate officer or employee may unduly influence the witnesses
against her or may tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office
is not among the prerequisites.

In Gloria v. Court of Appeals, we stated that preventive suspension

pending investigation "is a measure intended to enable the disciplining
authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the
latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against
him." As such, preventing the subordinate officer or employee from
intimidating the witnesses during investigation or from tampering the
documentary evidence in her office is a purpose, not a condition, for
imposing preventive suspension, as shown in the use of the word
"intended." GRANTED.