SPL Full Text Cases On BP 22

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 163494, August 03, 2016
JESUSA T. DELA CRUZ Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Jesusa T. Dela Cruz
(petitioner) under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the
Decision2 dated November 13, 2003 and Resolution3 dated May 4, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26337. The CA affirmed the
Decision4 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, on
August 31, 2001, in Criminal Case No. 89-72064-86, convicting the petitioner
for twenty-three (23) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P.
Blg. 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
The Antecedents
The case stems from a complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed by Tan Tiac
Chiong, also known as Ernesto Tan (Tan), against the petitioner. 5 Tan entered
into several business transactions with the petitioner sometime in 1984 to
1985, whereby Tan supplied and delivered to the petitioner rolls of textile
materials worth P27,090,641.25. For every delivery made by Tan, the
petitioner issued post-dated checks made payable to "Cash". When presented
for payment, however, some of the checks issued by the petitioner to Tan
were dishonored by the drawee-bank for being "Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds" or "Account Closed". The replacement checks later issued by the
petitioner were still dishonored upon presentment for payment.6 chanrobleslaw
The fourth batch of twenty-three (23) replacement checks issued by the

petitioner to Tan became the subject of his complaint. All checks were dated
March 30, 1987 and drawn against Family Bank & Trust Co. (FBTC), but were
issued for different amounts totaling P6,226,390.29,7 to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Check
Amount
No.
078790 P 145,905.57
078791 145,905.57
078789 145,905.57
078788 145,905.58
078787 145,905.59
078786 145,905.59
078785 1,354,854.50
078784 337,380.50
078783 309,580.17
078782 411,800.15
078804 874,643.86
078803 129,448.30
078796 282,763.60
078802 129,448.36
078801 129,448.36
078800 129,448.38
078799 129,448.36
078798 129,448.36
078797 282,763.60
078795 282,763.61
078794 145,905.57
078793 145,905.57
078792 145,905.57
P 6,226,390.29
The 23 checks were still later dishonored by the drawee-bank FBTC for the
reason "Account Closed". Tan informed the petitioner of the checks' dishonor
through a demand letter,8 but the amounts thereof remained unsatisfied.9 chanrobleslaw
In March 1989, 23 informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed in court
against the petitioner. Upon arraignment, the petitioner pleaded "not guilty"
to the charges. The cases were consolidated and thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.10 chanrobleslaw
The prosecution was able to present its evidence during the trial; it rested its
case on June 5, 1995. The defense, however, failed to present its evidence
after it had sought several hearing postponements and resettings. In view of
the petitioner's failure to appear or present evidence on scheduled dates, the
RTC issued on July 27, 2000 an Order11 that deemed the petitioner to have
waived her right to present evidence. A copy of the order was received by the
petitioner's counsel of record.12 chanrobleslaw
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC then decided the case based on available records. On August 31,
2001, the RTC rendered its Decision13 finding the petitioner guilty of the
charges. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, viewed from all the foregoing, the Court finds

[the petitioner] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation[s] of [B.P.] Blg. 22 on twenty-three (23)
counts, and hereby sentences her to suffer imprisonment
of one (1) year in every case, and to indemnify [Tan] the
amount equal to the collective face value of all the
subject checks, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.14 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed to the CA, arguing, among other

grounds, that she was not accorded an ample opportunity to dispute the
charges against her. Contrary to the RTC's declaration, the petitioner denied
any intention to waive her right to present evidence.15 In fact, she intended to
present a certified public accountant to prove that she had overpayments with
Tan, which then extinguished the obligations attached to the checks subject
of the criminal cases.16 chanrobleslaw
Ruling of the CA
The appeal was dismissed by the CA via the Decision17 dated November 13,

2003, with dispositive portion that reads: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal in the above-entitled case

is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated August 31,
2001 in Criminal Case Nos. U-89-72064-86, of the [RTC],
Branch 2 of Manila, is AFFIRMED in toto.
The Present Petition
Hence, this petition for review founded on the following grounds: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I.
THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

PETITIONER HAD BEEN ACCORDED AMPLE
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE.
II.
THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO

CONSIDERATION A PREVIOUS DECISION ISSUED BY ONE OF ITS
DIVISIONS.
III.
THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER

RECEIVED A NOTICE OF DISHONOR OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.

IV.
EVEN ASSUMING, WITHOUT CONCEDING, THAT THE PETITIONER IS

LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22, THE CA GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT APPLYING TO THE PETITIONER THE PROVISIONS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NUMBERS 12-2000 AND 13-2001.19 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The petitioner prays for an acquittal or, in the alternative, a remand of the
case to the RTC so that she may be allowed to present evidence for her
defense. She also asks the Court to take into consideration the fact that she
was acquitted by the CA in another set of B.P. Blg. 22 cases on the ground
that she has overpaid Tan.20 Granting that the Court still declares her guilty of
the offense, she asks for an imposition of fine in lieu of the penalty of
imprisonment.21 chanrobleslaw
In its Comment,22 respondent People of the Philippines, through Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG), signifies that it was interposing no objection to the
petitioner's alternative prayer of a case remand.23 The OSG agrees that the
petitioner was not duly notified of the hearing scheduled on July 27, 2000, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner was not duly notified of the July 27, 2000

hearing because, one, the notice of said hearing was sent
to her former address, and, two, the notice was sent on
August 3, 2000, that is, one week after the scheduled
date of hearing. Thus, petitioner's failure to appear at
the July 27, 2000 hearing is justified by the absence of
a valid service of notice of hearing to her.
Petitioner, who is out on bail on a personal undertaking,

having posted a cash bond in lieu of a bail bond, is
entitled to personal notice of every scheduled hearing,
especially the hearing for her presentation of evidence.
There must be clear and convincing proof that she, in
fact, received the notice of hearing set on July 27, 2000
in order that the questioned Order of the trial court
dated July 27, 2000 may be considered without
constitutional infirmity. x x x.24 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The OSG, nonetheless, argues that the petitioner's acquittal in another CA

case failed to render applicable the rule on conclusiveness of judgment
because there was no identity of subject matter and cause of action between
the two sets of cases.25 As regards the petitioner's alleged failure to receive a
cralawred
notice of dishonor, the OSG maintains that the defense should have been
raised at the first instance before the RTC.26 chanrobleslaw
Tan filed his own Comment/Opposition,27 refuting the arguments raised in the

petition for review.
Ruling of the Court
The Court finds the petitioner entitled to an acquittal.
Questions of fact under Rule 45
The petition was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The general rule is
that petitions for review on certiorari filed under this rule shall raise only
questions of law that must be distinctly set forth. Questions of fact, which
exist when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, are
not reviewable.28 chanrobleslaw
Pertinent to this limitation are the petitioner's arguments that delve on first,
the claim that she was not properly notified of the proceedings before the
RTC and, second, her alleged non-receipt of a notice of dishonor from Tan.
Being questions of fact, the Court, as a rule, finds those unsuitable to review
the issues, and instead adheres to the findings already made by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA. This is consistent with jurisprudence providing that a trial
court's factual findings that are affirmed by the appellate court are generally
conclusive and binding upon this Court, for it is not our function to analyze
and weigh the parties' evidence all over again except when there is a serious
ground to believe a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result.29 chanrobleslaw
By jurisprudence, the following instances may however be considered

exceptions to the application of the general rule that bar a review of factual
findings: (1) when the factual findings of the CA and the trial court are
contradictory; (2) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) when the inference made by the CA
from the findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4)
when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) when
the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (6) when the judgment of the CA is premised on misapprehension
of facts; (7) when the CA failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the
findings of fact are themselves conflicting; (9) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based;
and (10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.30 chanrobleslaw
Taking into consideration the petitioner's allegations that hinge on the RTC's
and CA's alleged errors in their factual findings that could fall under
exceptions (2), (3), (6) and (7), and which if considered could materially alter
the manner by which the petitioner's guilt was determined, the Cofurt finds it
vital to look into these matters.
The petitioner was notified of scheduled hearings
The Court rejects the petitioner's claim that she was not duly notified of
scheduled hearing dates by the RTC. It is material that the petitioner was
represented by counsel during the proceedings with the trial court.
Fundamental is the rule that notice to counsel is notice to the client. When a
party is represented by a counsel in an action in court, notices of all kinds,
including motions and pleadings of all parties and all orders of the court must
be served on his counsel.31chanrobleslaw
Particularly challenged in the instant case was the RTC's service of the notice
for the July 27, 2000 hearing, when the petitioner's and her counsel's
absence prompted the trial court to deem a waiver of tpe presentation of
evidence for the defense. While the petitioner, and the OSG in its Comment,
referred to a belated sending of notice of hearing to the petitioner's
supposedly old address, it appears that her counsel, Atty. Lorenzo B. Leynes,
Jr. (Atty. Leynes), was sufficiently notified prior to July 27, 2000.32
chanrobleslaw
Cited in the RTC decision was a timely receipt by Atty. Leynes of the notice, a
matter which the petitioner failed to sufficiently refute. Even after several
postponements and case resettings had been previously sought by the
defense, counsel and the petitioner still failed to appear or come prepared
during the hearing.33 The RTC decision narrates the antecedents, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On August 24, 1998, the cases were set for reception of
defense evidence, but counsel arrived late causing the
resetting to September 24, 1998.
On November 5, 1998, on motion of the defense, on the

ground [that] its witness was not available, the hearing
was transferred to November 19, 1998. Due to the
unavailability of the public prosecutor, hearing was
reset to January 12, 1999.
On January 12, 1999, upon urgent motion filed by the

defense on the alleged ground [that] defense counsel was
suffering from emotional and psychological trauma,
hearing was reset to February 9, 1999. Thereafter,
hearing was postponed to February 23, 1999. With the
commitment of defense counsel, Atty. Jerry D. Bañares,
that he will rest his case at the next setting, hearing
was reset to March 9, 1999.
On March 9, 1999, Atty. Bañares[,] instead of complying

with his commitment, withdrew as counsel. Thereafter, a
new counsel, [Atty. Leynes], entered his appearance, and
filed an urgent motion for postponement.
On March 15, 1999, [Atty. Leynes,] instead of continuing

with the presentation of defense evidence[,] opted to
file a motion for voluntary inhibition and postponement.
The motion was granted and the cases were re-raffled to
Branch 2 on April 26, 1999.
Meanwhile, on March 12, 1999, [Tan] filed a motion for

issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
On April 20, 1999, [Atty. Leynes] filed a Motion to

Declare the Entire Proceedings Null and Void.
On June 9, 1999, the Court, thru Judge Florante A.

Cipres, jointly resolved the motions by granting the
issuance of a writ of attachment and denying the motion
to declare null and void the entire proceedings.
On July 24, 1999, Atty. Bernardo Fernandez entered his

appearance as co-counsel, asking that he be served with
copies of all the pleadings and other court processes.
After entering his appearance, Atty. Fernandez, on August

4, 1999, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
denying the Motion to Declare Null and Void the Entire
Proceedings with [Atty. Leynes] as movant The motion was
denied for lack of merit, with a copy thereof furnished
[Atty. Leynes].
On January 25, 2000, reception of defense evidence was

set. However, the [petitioner] and her counsel failed to
appear compelling Judge Cipres to reset the hearing to
March 24, 2000 and to April 6 and 13, 2000 at 8:30 a.m.
and to issue a warrant of arrest for the apprehension of
[the petitioner].
Unfortunately, Judge Cipres became indisposed and

eventually retired. Thus, Judge Rebecca G. Salvador as
Pairing Judge of Branch 2, took over.
Accordingly, the hearing for reception of evidence was

again reset to July 27, August 17 and 24, 2000.
The Office of [Atty. Leynes] was notified of the hearing

dates. Notices were received by one Edwin Gamba and Atty.
Virgilio Leynes.
On July 27, 2000, defense counsel and the [petitioner]

again failed to appear. Hence, Judge Salvador decreed
that "the [petitioner] is considered to have waived
presentation of evidence in her defense".
A copy of the Order was furnished the Office of [Atty.

Leynes]. Same was received by Atty. Virgilio Leynes.
On September 5, 2000, Atty. Bernardo Fernandez[,] who

claimed he did not receive any court [o]rder or process,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration setting [the] same to
September 8, 2000.
On September 8, 2000, Atty. Fernandez did not appear.

Instead, it was Atty. Virgilio Leynes who showed up.
On March 5, 2001, this Court, thru Judge Leonardo P.

Reyes, Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 2, denied the
Motion for Reconsideration.34 (Emphasis ours)
These were reiterated in the CA decision, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
After the prosecution rested its case on June 5, 1995,

the presentation of the defense's evidence was set but
was postponed and reset several times. Notably, the
postponements were mostly at the instance of the defense.
However, despite due notice and warrant of arrest, the
[petitioner] and her counsel failed to appear on the
scheduled dates for presentation of the defense's
evidence. This prompted the court a quo to issue an
order dated July 27, 2000, considering the [petitioner]
to have waived her right to present evidence. Copy of the
said order was sent to the Office of [Atty. Leynes] and
the same was received by Atty. Virgilio Leynes, Jr., the
[petitioner's] counsel of record.35 (Citations omitted)
The records support the finding that the petitioner was duly notified of the
scheduled hearings. Specifically for the July 27, 2000 hearing, notice was
received by Atty. Leynes. Minutes of the hearing scheduled on May 23, 2000,
indicating that the next hearing was reset to July 27, 2000, bore the
signature of Atty. Leynes.36 A notice of hearing dated July 20, 2000 for the
July 27, 2000 schedule also indicated receipt for Atty. Leynes by one Edwin
Gamba on July 25, 2000.37 It was not the service to the petitioner that should
determine the sufficiency of the notice because she was then represented by
counsel, upon whom all court notices should be addressed and served.
The petitioner was deemed to have waived right to present evidence
The petitioner claims that she had sufficient evidence to support her plea for
acquittal, but was unduly deprived the right to present such evidence.
The Court has explained the reasons in sustaining the RTC's and CA's
declarations that the petitioner was sufficiently apprised of the schedule of
hearing dates for the defense's presentation of evidence. Notwithstanding the
opportunity given to the defense, hearings were repeatedly postponed at the
instance of the petitioner and her counsels.
The question now is whether the trial court committed a reversible error in
issuing the Order dated July 27, 2000, by which the petitioner was considered
to have waived her right to present evidence in her defense.
The Court answers in the negative.
In People v. Subida,38 the Court reminded judges to be on guard against

motions for postponements by the accused which are designed to derail and
frustrate the criminal proceedings. Just as the accused is entitled to a speedy
disposition of the case against him or her, the State should not be deprived of
its inherent prerogative in prosecuting criminal cases and in seeing to it that
justice is served.39 Thus, parties cannot expect, much less insist, that their
pleas for postponement or cancellation of scheduled hearings will be favored
by the courts. In the event that their motions are denied, they need to bear
the consequences of the denial. "The strict judicial policy on postponements
applies with more force and greater reason to prosecutions involving
violations of [B.P. Blg.] 22, whose prompt resolution has been ensured by
their being now covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure."40

Thus, in the instant case, the RTC judge could not have allowed the case to
continually drag upon the defense's requests. In Paz T. Bernardo substituted
by Heirs, Mapalad G. Bernardo, Emilie B. Ko, Marilou B. Valdez, Edwin T.
Bernardo and Gervy B. Santos v. People of the Philippines,41 the Court
emphasized that the postponement of the trial of a case to allow the
presentation of evidence is a matter that lies with the discretion of the trial
court; but it is a discretion that must be exercised wisely, considering the
peculiar circumstances of each case and with a view to doing substantial
justice.42
chanrobleslaw
Corollary to this rule on the disposition of motions for postponement during

trial is a rule that addresses an accused's waiver of the right to present
evidence. By jurisprudence, the Court has affirmed a trial court's ruling that
the accused was deemed to have waived her right to present defense
evidence following her and counsel's repeated absences. Such waiver was
deemed made after it was determined that the accused was afforded ample
opportunity to present evidence in her defense but failed to give the case the
serious attention it deserved.43 The Court has after all consistently held that
the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an
opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.44

Violation of B.P. Blg. 22
The Court now explains why the petitioner's acquittal is warranted.
The petitioner's acquittal in another set of B.P. Blg. 22 cases fails to

exonerate her from the indictment for the 23 subject checks. While the
petitioner claims that another division of the CA, specifically the Special
Former Fifth Division, acquitted her in CA-G.R. CR No. 13844 for four counts
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 following a finding that the petitioner had
overpayments with Tan, it is not established that the overpayments similarly
apply to the obligations that are covered by the subject checks. In light of
applicable law and prevailing jurisprudence, the conviction of the petitioner is
nevertheless reversed.
"To be liable for violation of B.P. [Blg.] 22, the following essential elements
must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to
apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or
issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.45 chanrobleslaw
As between the parties to this case, the dispute only pertains to the presence
or absence of the second element. In order to support her plea for an
acquittal, the petitioner particularly insists that she failed to receive any
notice of dishonor on the subject checks, which rendered absent the element
of knowledge of insufficient funds.
Although a notice of dishonor is not an indispensable requirement in a

prosecution for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as it is not an element of the offense,
evidence that a notice of dishonor has been sent to and received by the
accused is actually sought as a means to prove the second element.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases that underscore the value of a notice of
dishonor in B.P. Blg. 22 cases, and how the absence of sufficient proof of
receipt thereof can be fatal in the prosecution's case.
In Yu Oh v. CA,46 the Court explained that since the second element involves
a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 created
a prima facie presumption of such knowledge, as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of

insufficient funds.—The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is
refused by the drawee because of insufficient
funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the
date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such
maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the
amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee of such check
within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by
the drawee.
Based on this section, the presumption that
the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency
of funds is brought into existence only
after it is proved that the issuer had
received a notice of dishonor and that
within five days from receipt thereof, he
failed to pay the amount of the check or to
make arrangement for its payment. The
presumption or prima facie evidence as
provided in this section cannot arise, if
such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank
is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if
there is no proof as to when such notice was
received by the drawer, since there would
simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-
day period.47 (Citations omitted)
Further, the Court held: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Indeed, this requirement [on proof of receipt of notice

of dishonor] cannot be taken lightly because Section 2
provides for an opportunity for the drawer to effect full
payment of the amount appearing on the check, within five
banking days from notice of dishonor. The absence of
said notice therefore deprives an accused of an
opportunity to preclude criminal prosecution. In other
words, procedural due process demands that a notice of
dishonor be actually served on petitioner. In the case at
bar, appellant has a right to demand and the basic
postulate of fairness requires — that the notice of
dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to
afford her the opportunity to aver prosecution under B.P.
Blg. 22.48 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
To support its finding that the petitioner knew of the insufficiency of her funds
with the drawee bank, the RTC merely relied on the fact that replacement
checks had been issued, in lieu of those that were originally issued to pay for
the petitioner's obligation with Tan.49 The Court finds the conclusion
misplaced, considering that the last batch of replacement checks, which
eventually became the subject of these cases, were precisely intended to
address and preclude any dishonor. Thus, the replacement checks dated
March 30, 1987 were purposely drawn against a different checking account
with FBTC, different from the old checks that were drawn against another
drawee bank.

The prosecution also attempted to prove the petitioner's receipt of a notice of
dishonor by referring to a demand letter50 dated August 8, 1987, along with a
registry receipt51 showing that the letter was sent by registered mail, and the
registry return card52 showing its receipt by a certain Rolando Villanueva on
August 25, 1987. Given the circumstances and the manner by which the
documents were presented during the trial, the presumption that could lead
to evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds failed to arise. The Court
emphasized in Alferez v. People, et al.53 the manner by which receipt of a
notice of dishonor should be established, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary In Suarez v. People, x x x [w]e explained that: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The presumption arises when it is proved that

the issuer had received this notice, and that
within five banking days from its receipt, he
failed to pay the amount of the check or to
make arrangements for its payment. The full
payment of the amount appearing hi the check
within five banking days from notice of
dishonor is a complete defense. Accordingly,
procedural due process requires that a notice
of dishonor be sent to and received by the
petitioner to afford the opportunity to aver
prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.
x x x. [I]t is not enough for the

prosecution to prove that a notice of
dishonor was sent to the petitioner. It is
also incumbent upon the prosecution to
show "that the drawer of the check received
the said notice because the fact of service
provided for in the law is reckoned from
receipt of such notice of dishonor by the
drawee of the check.["]
A review of the records shows that the

prosecution did not prove that the petitioner
received the notice of dishonor. Registry
return cards must be authenticated to serve
as proof of receipt of letters sent through
registered mail.
In this case, the prosecution merely
presented a copy of the demand letter,
together with the registry receipt and the
return card, allegedly sent to petitioner.
However, there was no attempt to
authenticate or identify the signature on the
registry return card. Receipts for registered
letters and return receipts do not by
themselves prove receipt; they must be
properly authenticated to serve as proof of
receipt of the letter, claimed to be a notice
of dishonor. To be sure, the presentation of
the registry card with an unauthentieated
signature, does not meet the required proof
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner
received such notice. It is not enough for
the prosecution to prove that a notice of
dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check.
The prosecution must also prove actual
receipt of said notice, because the fact of
service provided for in the law is reckoned
from receipt of such notice of dishonor by
the drawee of the check. The burden of
proving notice rests upon the party asserting
its existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In
criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof
required is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there should
be clear proof of notice. Moreover, for
notice by mail, it must appear that the same
was served on the addressee or a duly
authorized agent of the addressee. From the
registry receipt alone, it is possible that
petitioner or his authorized agent did
receive the demand letter. Possibilities,
however, cannot replace proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The consistent rule is
that penal statutes have to be construed
strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused. The absence of a notice
of dishonor necessarily deprives the accused
an opportunity to preclude a criminal
prosecution. As there is insufficient proof
that petitioner received the notice of
dishonor, the presumption that he had
knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot
arise.54 (Citations omitted and emphasis
ours)
Similarly, in the instant case, the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the
actual receipt by the petitioner of the demand letter sent by Tan. No witness
testified to authenticate the registry return card and the signature appearing
thereon. The return card provides that the letter was received by one Rolando
Villanueva, without even further proof that the said person was the
petitioner's duly authorized agent for the purpose of receiving the
correspondence.
The OSG contends that the argument on the petitioner's failure to receive a
notice of dishonor could not be raised at this stage. The Cdurt disagrees.
While the question may seemingly present a factual issue that is beyond the
scope of a petition for review on certiorari, it is in essence a question of law
as it concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set
of facts. It addresses the question of whether or not service and alleged
receipt by the petitioner of the notice of dishonor, as claimed by the
prosecution, already satisfies the requirements of the law.
Clearly, the prosecution failed to establish the presence of all elements of

violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The petitioner is acquitted from the 23 counts of the
offense charged. The failure of the prosecution to prove he receipt by the
petitioner of the requisite written notice of dishonor and that she was given at
least five banking days within which to settle her account constitutes
sufficient ground for her acquittal.55 chanrobleslaw
Even the petitioner's waiver of her right to present evidence is immaterial to

this ground cited by the Court for her acquittal. The basis relates to the
prosecution's own failure to prove all the elements of the offense that could
warrant the petitioner's conviction, rather than on an action or argument that
should have emanated from the defense. The burden of proving beyond
reasonable doubt each element of the crime is upon the prosecution, as its
case will rise or fall on the strength of its own evidence. Any doubt shall be
resolved in favor of the accused.56 chanrobleslaw
Civil liability of the petitioner
Notwithstanding the petitioner's acquittal, she remains liable for the payment
of civil damages equivalent to the face value of the 23 subject checks,
totaling P6,226,390.29. In a line of cases, the Court has emphasized that
acquittal from a crime does not necessarily mean absolution from civil
liability.57
chanrobleslaw
It was not established that the petitioner had paid the amounts covered by
the checks. The Court has explained that the overpayments that were
determined by the CA in another set of B.P. Blg. 22 cases against the
petitioner could not be applied to this case. The petitioner failed to present
any evidence that would prove the extinguishment of her obligations. Thus,
the petitioner should pay Tan the amount of P6,226,390.29, plus legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be computed from the
date of finality of this Decision until full satisfaction thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 13, 2003 and Resolution dated
May 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26337
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Jesusa T. Dela Cruz
is ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 on
twenty-three (23) counts on the ground that her guilt was not established
beyond reasonable doubt. She is, nonetheless, ordered to pay complainant
Tan Tiac Chiong, also known as Ernesto Tan, the face value of the subject
checks totaling Six Million Two Hundred Twenty-Six Thousand Three Hundred
Ninety Pesos and 29/100 (P6,226,390.29), with interest of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 196289, August 15, 2016
ELIZABETH ALBURO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, dated May 16, 2011, of petitioner Elizabeth Alburo assailing
the Resolutions1 dated October 26, 2010 and March 24, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dismissing, based on technicality, her appeal of the cases filed against her for violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P 22) that she was eventually convicted by the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Angeles City and affirmed by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 58, Angeles City.
The following are the antecedent facts:
Petitioner and her husband bought a house and lot from petitioner's sister-in-law, Elsa
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Alburo-Walter, who is married to James Walter, through Aurelio Tapang in his capacity as
attorney-in-fact of Elsa and James Walter. The subject property is located at Villasol
Subdivision, Brgy. Santol, Angeles City, covered by TCT No. 71458. The agreed
consideration is Fifty Thousand U.S. Dollars ($50,000.00) or its peso equivalent. Petitioner
and her husband made a partial payment of Twenty-One Thousand U.S. Dollars
($21,000.00) and the remaining balance has been paid through four (4) postdated checks
issued by petitioner, now the subjects of this case. The checks eventually bounced, thus,
four (4) separate Informations for violation of B.P. 22 were filed with the MTCC, Branch 2,
Angeles City against petitioner, that read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 01-777
That sometime in the first week of July 2000, in the City

of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously draw and
issue to the complainant, AURELIO TAPANG of Tapang Realty
Company, a Land Bank, Dau Branch Check, bearing Check No.
0048902 post-dated/dated August 5, 2000 in the amount of
P300,000.00, well-knowing that she has no sufficient
funds in the bank, which check when presented for payment
was dishonored for reason of "DRAWN AGAINST INSUFFICIENT
FUNDS," and demands notwithstanding for more than five
(5) days from notice of dishonor, the accused failed and
refused, and still fails and refuses to redeem the said
check, to the damage and prejudice of said complainant,
AURELIO TAPANG, in the afore-mentioned amount of THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), Philippine
Currency.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.

0048902 post-dated/dated September 5, 2000 in the amount
of P300,000.00, well-knowing that she has no sufficient
Currency.

0048903 post-dated/dated August 5, 2000 in the amount of
P300,000.00, well-knowing that she has no sufficient
Currency.

0048906 post-dated/dated November 5, 2000 in the amount
of P363,460.00, well-knowing that she has no sufficient
HUNDRED-SIXTY THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS
(P363,460.00), Philippine Currency.

After trial on the merits, the MTCC,2 on January 7, 2008, found the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and sentenced her to the following:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and

circumstances, accused Elizabeth Alburo is hereby
adjudged GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of] violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and she is, hereby, sentenced to
suffer penalty as follows:
a. Criminal Case No. 01-777 –one year imprisonment

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
and to pay the amount of Three hundred thousand pesos

(P300,000.00) Philippine currency face value of the
check, as civil indemnity plus legal interest of six
percent (6%) per annum from the filing of the information
on May 25, 2001 until the finality of herein decision.
Then after the judgment becomes final and executory until
the obligation is satisfied the amount due shall earn an
interest of 12% per year;
b. Criminal Case No. 01-778 – one year imprisonment and

to pay the amount of Three hundred thousand pesos
interest of 12% per year,
c. Criminal Case No. 01-779 – one year imprisonment and

to pay the amount of Three hundred thousand pesos
interest of 12% per year, and
d. Criminal Case No. 01-780 – one year imprisonment and
to pay the amount of Three hundred sixty-three thousand
four hundred sixty pesos (P363,460.00) Philippine
currency face value of the check, as civil indemnity plus
legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the
filing of the information on May 25, 2001 until the
finality of herein decision. Then after the judgment
becomes final and executory until the obligation is
satisfied the amount due shall earn an interest of 12%
per year;
Finally, accused Elizabeth is ordered to pay Sixty

thousand pesos (P60,000.00) as reasonable attorney's fees
and cost of the suit amounting to P19,056.00.
SO ORDERED.3
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC, the dispositive portion of its Resolution4 reading as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no justifiable reason to warrant the

reversal of the assailed Decision dated January 7, 2008
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch II,
Angeles City, the same is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed. Costs
against accused/appellant.
Upon finality of this Resolution, let the entire original

records of these cases be remanded to its court of origin
for its disposition.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA that was dismissed by the latter in its
Resolution dated October 26, 2010. The said Resolution reads, in part, as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This Court resolves to dismiss the petition in view of

the following infirmities:
1. There is no allegation of material dates

as to when the questioned Order dated March
5, 2009 was received and the motion for
reconsideration was filed;
2. The Office of the Solicitor General was
not furnished [a] copy of the petition;
3. There are no copies of pleadings attached;
and
4. The case is erroneously captioned "People
of the Philippines, Respondent vs. Elizabeth
Alburo, Accused-Petitioner."
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in the CA's Resolution7 dated March 24,
2011; hence, the present petition.
On June 13, 2011, this Court's Second Division resolved8 to deny the petition for failure of
the petitioner to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed Resolutions to
warrant the exercise of this Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case, and to
strictly comply with the requirements specified under Rule 45 and other related provisions
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as the petition lacks a valid affidavit of service in
accordance with Sections 3 and 5, Rule 45 and Section 5 (d), Rule 56, in relation to
Section 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, there being no
properly accomplished jurat showing that the affiant exhibited before the notary public at
least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the affiant as required under Sections 6 and 12, Rule II of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended by Court En Bane Resolution dated February
19, 2008 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
This case was then transferred to the Third Division on July 4, 2011.9 chanrobleslaw
Petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration10 dated August 17, 2011 arguing that she
would be denied due process to appeal her conviction by the lower court based merely on
technicality.
On September 14, 2011, this Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
file its Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration. Eventually, the OSG filed its
Comment11 dated December 2, 2011. Petitioner, likewise filed her Reply to
Comment12 dated January 9, 2012.
This Court, in its Resolution13 dated February 1, 2012, granted petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration dated August 17, 2011 and reinstated the petition. It also ordered the
OSG to file its comment on the petition. In time, the OSG filed its Comment[14 ]dated May
21, 2012. Thereafter, petitioner filed her Reply15 dated October 22, 2012.
The issues submitted for this Court's consideration are the following: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

OUTRIGHTLY DENYING THE PETITIONER'S AMENDED
PETITION FOR REVIEW FOR STILL NOT BEARING
COPIES OF THE PLEADINGS FILED BELOW DESPITE
ATTACHMENT OF THE REQUIRED DOCUMENTS UNDER
THE LAW, THEREBY SACRIFICING SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE GRAVELY ERRED IN

DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ADMIT ATTACHED AMENDED PETITION FOR
REVIEW SINCE ITS DENIAL WOULD RESULT TO DENIAL OF RIGHT
TO SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING

THE MERITORIOUS GROUND RAISED BY THE PETITIONER IN HER
AMENDED PETITION FOR REVIEW.
In substance, petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to prove: (1) the second
element of the crime charged; (2) she had knowledge when she issued the subject checks;
and (3) she does not have sufficient funds for payment thereof. She adds that the only
evidence presented is a demand letter which was allegedly sent to petitioner through
registered mail and received by petitioner's housemaid.
Petitioner further insists that the demand letter is defective since Aurelio Tapang has no
authority to collect the balance of the subject property. She also claims that nowhere in
the alleged registry return receipt of the demand letter does it indicate that the signature
appearing thereon is that of petitioner.
Petitioner also asserts that she never received any notice of dishonor and that the lower
courts merely relied on the testimony made by Jerry S. Bognot, the representative of
Landbank, who testified that for each of the unfunded checks, she was given notices of
dishonor.
The OSG, on the other hand, points out that only questions of law can be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and that the issues on whether petitioner
has knowledge that she does not have sufficient funds when she issued the subject checks
and whether there was proper service upon petitioner of the notice of dishonor are
questions of fact.
The petition has merit.
Under Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A

party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment,
final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition may include an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other
provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of
law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner
may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion
filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during
its pendency.
As an exception to the rule, questions of fact may be raised in a Rule 45 petition if any of
the following is present:
(1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the

findings are grounded on speculations; (3) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings
are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case and its findings are
contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the
Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if
properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (8) when the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) when the
facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.16
A question of fact exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the
falsehood of alleged facts."17 On the other hand, a question of law exists "when the doubt
or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts."18 chanrobleslaw
It is true that petitioner raises a question of fact in the present petition by insisting that
she has no knowledge that she does not have sufficient funds when she issued the checks
and that there was no proper service upon her of the notice of dishonor, however, this
Court still deems it proper to consider the said issue because the MTCC and the RTC
misapprehended the facts.
For violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the prosecution must prove the following
essential elements, namely:
(1) The making, drawing, and issuance of any check to

apply for account or for value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at

the time of issue there were no sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
in full upon its presentment; and cralawlawlibrary
(3) The dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for

insufficiency of funds or credit or the dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the drawee bank to stop payment.19
There is no dispute that the first and the third elements are present in this case. It was
proven that petitioner issued the subject Landbank checks in favor of Aurelio Tapang as
payment for the balance of the purchase of the house and lot owned by Elsa Alburo-Walter
and when presented for payment, the same checks were dishonored for the reason of
being drawn against insufficient funds.
The remaining issue is whether or not the second element is present. To establish the
existence of the second element, the State should present the giving of a written notice of
the dishonor to the drawer, maker or issuer of the dishonored check. The rationale for this
requirement is rendered in Dico v. Court of Appeals,20 to wit:
To hold a person liable under B.P. Blg. 22, the

prosecution must not only establish that a check was
issued and that the same was subsequently dishonored, it
must further be shown that accused knew at the time of
the issuance of the check that he did not have sufficient
funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment.
This knowledge of insufficiency of funds or

credit at the time of the issuance of the
check is the second element of the offense.
Inasmuch as this element involves a state of
mind of the person making, drawing or issuing
the check which is difficult to prove,
Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates a prima
facie presumption of such knowledge. Said
section reads:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of

insufficient funds. — The
making, drawing and issuance of a
check payment of which is refused
by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit
with such bank, when presented
within ninety (90) days from the
date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or
credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full
by the drawee of such check
within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the
drawee.
For this presumption to arise, the

prosecution must prove the following: (a) the
check is presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the check; (b) the drawer or
maker of the check receives notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee; and
(c) the drawer or maker of the check fails to
pay the holder of the check the amount due
thereon, or make arrangements for payment in
full within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been
paid by the drawee. In other words, the
presumption is brought into existence only
after it is proved that the issuer had
received a notice of dishonor and that within
five days from receipt thereof, he failed to
pay the amount of the check or to make
arrangements for its payment. The presumption
or prima facie evidence as provided in this
section cannot arise, if such notice of
nonpayment by the drawee bank is not sent to
the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof
as to when such notice was received by the
drawer, since there would simply be no way of
reckoning the crucial 5-day period.
A notice of dishonor received by the maker or
drawer of the check is thus indispensable
before a conviction can ensue. The notice of
dishonor may be sent by the offended party or
the drawee bank. The notice must be in
writing. A mere oral notice to pay a
dishonored check will not suffice. The lack
of a written notice is fatal for the
prosecution. 21
The MTCC, as affirmed by the RTC, found the existence of the second element. The RTC
ruled:
Accused also claims that the prosecution failed to prove

that she received the demand letter (Exhibit B) sent to
her, while the prosecution offered in evidence the
Registry Receipt No. 3363 dated February 19, 2001
(Exhibit B-2) for the said letter and the Registry Return
Card (Exhibit B-3) showing that the letter was received
and signed for by a Jennifer Mendoza, who identified
herself as a housemaid of the accused. Moreover, the
representative of the Landbank, Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga
Branch testified that for each of the unfunded checks
issued in these cases, they were given notices of
dishonor (Exhibits P, P-l, P-2 and P-3).22
A close reading of the above findings, however, would show that the RTC failed to mention
that petitioner received any notice of dishonor and simply stated that a representative of
Landbank, Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga Branch testified that notices of dishonor were
issued. It is necessary in cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, that the
prosecution prove that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor.23 It is a general rule
that when service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that the notice was served
must prove the fact of service.24 The burden of proving notice rests upon the party
asserting its existence.25
cralawredchanrobleslaw
Now, ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases,

however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P.
22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice. Moreover, it is a general rule that, when
service of a notice is sought to be made by mail, it should appear that the conditions on
which the validity of such service depends had existed, otherwise the evidence is
insufficient to establish the fact of service.26 chanrobleslaw
A perusal of the records of the case, likewise shows the absence of any indication that
petitioner received the notices of dishonor allegedly sent by Landbank. The absence of
proof that petitioner received any notice informing her of the fact that her checks were
dishonored and giving her five banking days within which to make arrangements for
payment of the said checks prevents the application of the disputable presumption that
she had knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds at the time she issued the
checks.27 Absent such presumption, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that
petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds when she issued the said checks,
otherwise, she cannot be held liable under the law.28 chanrobleslaw
The giving of the written notice of dishonor does not only supply proof for the second
element arising from the presumption of knowledge the law puts up, but also affords the
offender due process.29 The law thereby allows the offender to avoid prosecution if she
pays the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for the
payment in full, of the check by the drawee within five banking days from receipt of the
written' notice that the check had not been paid.30 Thus, the absence of a notice of
dishonor is a deprivation of petitioner's statutory right.
Anent the demand letter sent through registered mail, the same was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner received the same. Although the Registry Return Card
shows that the letter was received and signed for by a Jennifer Mendoza who identified
herself as a househelper of petitioner, it was not proven that the same person is a duly
authorized agent of the addressee or the petitioner. For notice by mail, it must appear that
the same was served on the addressee or a duly authorized agent of the addressee.31 To
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the issuer of the check indeed received the
demand letter is highly important because it creates the presumption that the same issuer
knew of the insufficiency of the funds. It is [also] essential for the maker or drawer to be
notified of the dishonor of her check, so she could pay the value thereof or make
arrangements for its payment within the period prescribed by law.32 To assume that
because the Registry Receipt Card appears to have the signature of a person other than
the addressee and that same person had given the letter to the addressee, is utterly
erroneous and is not proof beyond reasonable doubt as required in criminal cases.
Thus, there being no clear showing that petitioner actually knew of the dishonor of her
checks, this Court cannot with moral certainty convict her of violation of B.P. 22. The
failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of dishonor
is a clear ground for her acquittal.33 chanrobleslaw
Having ruled on the substantial issues raised, there is no longer a need to discuss the
other issues that delve on the technicalities of the case because they can be passed upon
in the interest of justice. Cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity
to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or
some procedural imperfections.34 In that way, the ends of justice would be served
better.35 Necessarily, the need to remand the case to the CA, as prayed for by the
petitioner, no longer arises.
This decision, however, does not prejudice the civil obligations, if any, that petitioner
might have incurred by reason of her transaction with private complainant. And while no
criminal liability could be imposed in this case for lack of sufficient proof of the offense
charged, a fair distinction should be made as to the civil aspects of the transaction
between the parties.36 chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure, dated May 16, 2011, of petitioner Elizabeth Alburo is GRANTED; hence,
the Resolutions dated October 26, 2010 and March 24, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
are SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Decision dated January 7, 2008 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 2, Angeles City and the Resolution dated March 5, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Angeles City, convicting the petitioner of four (4) counts
of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Elizabeth Alburo is, therefore, ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 195145, February 10, 2016
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES SULPICIO AND

PATRICIA RAMOS, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the July 30, 2010
decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87843 entitled
"Spouses Sulpicio and Patricia Ramos v. Manila Electric Company" that
affirmed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) August 22, 2006 decision3 in Civil
Case No. 99-95975.
The August 22, 2006 RTC decision ordered the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO) to restore the electric power connection of Spouses Sulpicio and
Patricia Ramos (respondents) and awarded them P2,000,000.00, with legal
interest, in total damages.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Factual Antecedents
MERALCO is a private corporation engaged in the business of selling and

distributing electricity to its customers in Metro Manila and other franchise
areas. The respondents are registered customers of MERALCO under Service
Identification Number (SIN) 409076401.
MERALCO entered into a contract of service with the respondents agreeing to

supply the latter with electric power in their residence at 2760-B Molave St.,
Manuguit, Tondo, Manila. To measure the respondents' electric consumption,
it installed the electric meter with serial number 330ZN43953 outside the
front wall of the property occupied by Patricia's brother, Isidoro Sales, and his
wife, Nieves Sales (Nieves), located beside the respondents' house.
On November 5, 1999, MERALCO's service inspector inspected the

respondents' electrical facilities and found an outside connection attached to
their electric meter. The service inspector traced the connection, an illegal
one, to the residence and appliances of Nieves. Nieves was the only one
present during the inspection and she was the one who signed the Metering
Facilities Inspection Report.
Due to the discovery of the illegal connection, the service inspector

disconnected the respondents' electric services on the same day. The
inspection and disconnection were done without the knowledge of the
respondents as they were not at home and their house was closed at the
time.
The respondents denied that they had been, using an illegal electrical
connection and they requested MERALCO to immediately reconnect their
electric services. Despite the respondents' request, MERALCO instead
demanded from them the payment of P179,231.70 as differential billing.
On December 20, 1999, the respondents filed a complaint for breach of
contract with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages against
MERALCO before the RTC, Branch 40, City of Manila. They prayed for the
immediate reconnection of their electric service and the award of actual,
moral, and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.
In a decision dated August 22, 2006, the RTC ordered MERALCO to reconnect
the respondents' electric service and awarded damages as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered directing defendant

MERALCO to permanently reconnect immediately the
plaintiffs electric services, and for said defendant to
pay the following: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. P100,000.00 as actual or compensatory

damages;
2. P1,500,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P300,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; and,
5. Costs of suit;
with legal interest on the total damages of P2,000,000.00
from the date of this Judgment until fully paid.
MERALCO appealed the RTC's decision to the CA.
In its assailed July 30, 2010 decision,5 the CA denied the appeal for lack of
merit and affirmed the RTC's order of reconnection and award for payment of
damages. The appellate court held that MERALCO failed to comply not only
with its own contract of service, but also with the requirements under
Sections 4 and 6 of Republic Act No. 7832, or the Anti-Electricity and Electric
Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994 (R.A. 7832), when it
resorted to the immediate disconnection of the respondents' electric service
without due notice. It also ruled that the respondents were not liable for the
differential billing as it had not been established that they knew or consented
to the illegal connection or even benefited from it.
MERALCO moved for the reconsideration of the decision, but the CA denied its
motion in a resolution6 dated January 3, 2011. The present petition for
review on certiorari7 was filed with this Court on March 4, 2011, as a
consequence. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Petition
MERALCO argues that under R.A. 7832, it had the right and authority to
immediately disconnect the electric service of the respondents after they were
caught in flagrante delicto using a tampered electrical installation.
MERALCO also claims that by virtue of their contract of service, the

respondents are liable to pay the differential billing regardless of whether the
latter benefited from the illegal electric service or not. It adds that this is true
even if the respondents did not personally tamper with the electrical facilities.
Finally, MERALCO contends that there is no basis for the award of damages as
the disconnection of the respondents' electric service was done in good faith
and in the lawful exercise of its rights as a public utility company. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Respondents' Comment
In their comment8 of June 29, 2011, the respondents pray for the denial of
the present petition for lack of merit. They argue that the discovery of an
outside connection attached to their electric meter does not give MERALCO
the right to automatically disconnect their electric service as the law provides
certain mandatory requirements that should be observed before a
disconnection could be effected. They claim that MERALCO failed to comply
with these statutory requirements.
Also, the respondents contend that MERALCO breached its contractual

obligations when its service inspector immediately disconnected their electric
service without notice. They claim that this breach of contract, coupled with
MERALCO's failure to observe the requirements under R.A. 7832, entitled
them to damages which were sufficiently established with evidence and were
rightfully awarded by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
Lastly, the respondents argue that they are not liable to MERALCO for the
differential billing as they were not the ones who illegally consumed the
unbilled electricity through the illegal connection. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Court's Ruling
We DENY the petition for review on certiorari as we find no reversible

error committed by the CA in issuing its assailed decision.
The core issue in this case is whether MERALCO had the right to immediately
disconnect the electric service of the respondents upon discovery of an
outside connection attached to their electric meter.
The distribution of electricity is a basic necessity that is imbued with public

interest. Its provider is considered as a public utility subject to the strict
regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power. Failure to comply
with these regulations gives rise to the presumption of bad faith or
abuse of right.9 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Nevertheless, the State also recognizes that electricity is the property of the
service provider. R.A. 7832 was enacted by Congress to afford electric service
providers multiple remedies to. protect themselves from electricity pilferage.
These remedies include the immediate disconnection of the electric
service of an erring customer, criminal prosecution, and the imposition of
surcharges.10 However, the service provider must avail of any or all of these
remedies within legal bounds, in strict compliance with the requirements
and/or conditions set forth by law.
Section 4(a) of R.A. 7832 provides that the discovery of an outside

connection attached on the electric meter shall constitute as prima
facie evidence of illegal use of electricity by the person who benefits from the
illegal use if the discovery is personally witnessed and attested to by an
officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB). With the presence of such prima facie evidence,
the electric service provider is within its rights to immediately disconnect the
electric service of the consumer after due notice.
This Court has repeatedly stressed the significance of the presence of an

authorized government representative during an inspection of electric
facilities, viz.:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The presence of government agents who may authorize

immediate disconnections go into the essence of due
process. Indeed, we cannot allow respondent to act
virtually as prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty
of disconnection due to alleged meter tampering. That
would not sit well in a democratic country. After all,
Meralco is a monopoly that derives its power from the
government. Clothing it with unilateral authority to
disconnect would be equivalent to giving it a license to
tyrannize its hapless customers.11 (Emphasis supplied)
Additionally, Section 6 of R.A. 7832 affords a private electric utility the right
and authority to immediately disconnect the electric service of a consumer
who has been caught in flagrante delicto doing any of the acts covered by
Section 4(a). However, the law clearly states that the disconnection may only
be done after serving a written notice or warning to the consumer.
To reiterate, R.A. 7832 has two requisites for an electric service provider to
be authorized to disconnect its customer's electric service on the basis of
alleged electricity pilferage: first, an officer of the law or an authorized ERB
representative must be present during the inspection of the electric facilities;
and second, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity
and the customer is caught in flagrante delicto committing the acts under
Section 4(a), the customer must still be given due notice prior to the
disconnection.12 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In its defense, MERALCO insists that it observed due process when its service
inspector disconnected the respondents' electric service, viz.: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under the present situation, there is no doubt that due

process, as required by R.A. 7832, was observed [when]
the petitioner discontinued the electric supply of
respondent: there was an inspection conducted in the
premises of respondent with the consent of their
authorized representative; it was discovered during the
said inspection that private respondents were using
outside connection; the nature of the violation was
explained to private respondents' representative; the
inspection and discovery was personally witnessed and
attested to by private respondents'
representative; private respondents failed and refused
to pay the differential billing amounting to
P179,231.70 before their electric service was
disconnected.13 (Emphasis supplied)
After a thorough examination of the records of the case, we find no proof that
MERALCO complied with these two requirements under R.A. 7832. MERALCO
never even alleged in its submissions that an ERB representative or an officer
of the law was present during the inspection of the respondents' electric
meter. Also, it did not claim that the respondents were ever notified
beforehand of the impending disconnection of their electric service.
In view of MERALCO's failure to comply with the strict requirements under

Sections 4 and 6 of R. A. No. 7832, we hold that MERALCO had no
authority to immediately disconnect the respondents' electric service.
As a result, the immediate disconnection of the respondents' electric service
is presumed to be in bad faith.
We point out, too, that MERALCO's allegation that the respondents refused to
pay the differential billing before the disconnection of their electric service is
an obvious falsity. MERALCO never disputed the fact that the respondents'
electric service was disconnected on November 5, 1999 -the same day as
when the electric meter was inspected. Also, MERALCO's demand letter for
payment of the differential billing is dated December 4, 1999. Thus, there is
no truth to the statement that the respondents first failed to pay the
differential billing and only then was their electric service disconnected.
The disconnection of respondents' electric service is not supported by

MERALCO's own Terms and Conditions of Service.
In addition, we observe that MERALCO also failed to follow its own procedure
for the discontinuance of service under its contract of service with the
respondents. We quote in this regard the relevant terms of service: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
DISCONTINUANCE OF SERVICE:
The Company reserves the right to discontinue service in

case the customer is in arrears in the payment of bills
in those cases where the meter stopped or failed to
register the correct amount of energy consumed, or
failure to comply with any of these terms and conditions
or in case of or to prevent fraud upon the
Company. Before disconnection is made in case of or to
prevent fraud, the Company may adjust the bill of said
customer accordingly and if the adjusted bill is not
paid, the Company may disconnect the same. In case of
disconnection, the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of
the former Public Service Commission (now ERC) shall be
observed. Any such suspension of service shall not
terminate the contract between the Company and the
customer.14 (Emphasis supplied)
There is nothing in its contract of service that gives MERALCO the authority to
immediately disconnect a customer's electric connection. MERALCO's
contractual right to disconnect electric service arises only after the customer
has been notified of his adjusted bill and has been afforded the opportunity to
pay the differential billing.
In this case, the disconnection of the respondents' electric service happened

on November 5, 1999, while the demand for the payment of differential billing
was made through a letter dated December 4, 1999. Thus, we hold that
MERALCO breached its contract of service with the respondents as it
disconnected the latter's electric service before they were ever
notified of the differential billing.
Differential billing
Section 6 of R.A. 7832 defines differential billing as "the amount to be

charged to the person concerned for the unbilled electricity illegally consumed
by him." Clearly, the law provides that the person who actually consumed the
electricity illegally shall be liable for the differential billing. It does not ipso
facto make liable for payment of the differential billing the registered
customer whose electrical facilities had been tampered with and utilized for
the illegal use of electricity.
In this case, as the prima facie presumption afforded by Section 4 of R.A.

7832 does not apply, it falls upon MERALCO to first prove that the
respondents had actually installed the outside connection attached on their
electric meter and that they had benefited from the electricity consumed
through the outside connection before it could hold them liable for the
differential billing.
The records show that MERALCO presented no proof that it ever caught the
respondents, or anyone acting in the respondents' behalf, in the act of
tampering with their electric meter. As the CA correctly held, the respondents
could not have been caught in flagrante delicto committing the tampering
since they were not present during the inspection of the electric meter, nor
were any of their representatives at hand.15 Moreover, the presence of an
outside connection attached to the electric meter operates only as a prima
facie evidence of electricity pilferage under R.A. 7832; it is not enough to
declare the respondents in flagrante delicto tampering with the electric
meter.16 In fact, MERALCO itself admitted in its submissions that Nieves was
the illegal user of the outside connection attached to the respondents' electric
meter.17 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On this point, MERALCO argues that Nieves was an authorized representative

of the respondents. However, the records are bereft of any sufficient proof to
support this claim. The fact that she is an occupant of the premises where the
electric meter was installed does not make her the respondents'
representative considering that the unit occupied by the respondents is
separate and distinct from the one occupied by Nieves and her family.
Similarly, the fact that Nieves was able to show the respondents' latest
electric bill does not make her the latter's authorized representative.
While this Court recognizes the right of MERALCO as a public utility to collect
system losses, the courts cannot and will not blindly grant a public utility's
claim for differential billing if there is no sufficient evidence to prove
entitlement.18As MERALCO failed to sufficiently prove its claim for
payment of the differential billing, we rule that the respondents
cannot be held liable for the billed amount.
On the issue of damages
With MERALCO in bad faith for its failure to follow the strict requirements
under R.A. 7832 in the disconnection of the respondents' electric service, we
agree with the CA that the award of damages is in order. However, we deem
it proper to modify the award in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.
First, actual damages pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually
sustained and are susceptible of measurement. They are intended not to
enrich the injured party but to put him in the position in which he was in
before he was injured.19 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos,20 we explained that in order

to recover actual damages, there must be pleading and proof of the damages
suffered, viz.: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be

capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely
on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining
the fact and amount of damages. To justify an award of
actual damages, there must be competent proof of the
actual amount of loss, credence can be given only to
claims which are duly supported by receipts. (Emphasis
supplied)
In this case, Patricia stated that her family's food expenses doubled after
MERALCO disconnected their electric services as they could no longer cook at
home. We note, however, that there is no- sufficient proof presented to show
the actual food expenses that the respondents incurred. Nevertheless, Patricia
also testified that they were forced to move to a new residence after living
without electricity for eight (8) months at their home in Tondo, Manila. They
proved this allegation through the presentation of a contract of lease and
receipts for payment of monthly rentals for 42 months amounting to
P210,000.00. Thus, we find it proper to increase the award of actual
damages from P100,000.00 to P210,000.00.
Second, moral damages are designed to compensate and alleviate the

physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
harm unjustly caused to a person.21 They may be properly awarded to
persons who have been unjustly deprived of property without due process of
law.22
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Regala v. Carin,23 we discussed the requisites for the award of moral

damages, viz: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In fine, an award of moral damages calls for the

presentation of 1) evidence of besmirched reputation or
physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by
the claimant; 2) a culpable act or omission factually
established; 3) proof that the wrongful act or omission
of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages
sustained by the claimant; and 4) the proof that the act
is predicated on any of the instances expressed or
envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil
Code.
Applied to this case, after due consideration of the manner of disconnection of
the respondents' electric service and the length of time that the respondents
had to endure without electricity, we find the award of moral damages
proper. Aside from having to spend eight (8) months in the dark at their own
residence, Patricia testified that they suffered extreme social humiliation,
embarrassment, and serious anxiety as they were subjected to gossip in their
neighborhood of stealing electricity through the use of an illegal connection.
The damage to the respondents' reputation and social standing was
aggravated by their decision to move to a new residence following the
absolute refusal of MERALCO to restore their electric services.
However, we find the award of P1,500,000.00 in moral damages to be

excessive. Moral damages are not intended to enrich the complainant as a
penalty for the defendant. It is awarded as a means to ease the moral
suffering the complainant suffered due to the defendant's culpable
action.24 While prevailing jurisprudence deems it appropriate to award
100,000.00 in moral damages in cases where MERALCO wrongfully
disconnected electric service,25 we hold that such amount is not
commensurate with the injury suffered by the respondents. Thus, in view of
the specific circumstances present in this case, we reduce the award of
moral damages from P1,500,000.00 to P300,000.00.
Third, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or

correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or
compensatory damages. The award of exemplary damages is allowed by law
as a warning to the public and as a deterrent against the repetition of socially
deleterious actions.26
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In numerous cases,27 this Court found that MERALCO failed to comply with the
requirements under R.A. 7832 before a disconnection of a customer's electric
service could be effected. In these cases, we aptly awarded exemplary
damages against MERALCO to serve as a warning against repeating the same
actions.
In this case, MERALCO totally failed to comply with the two requirements
under R.A. 7832 before disconnecting the respondents' electric service. While
MERALCO insists that R.A. 7832 gives it the right to disconnect the
respondents' electric service, nothing in the records indicates that it
attempted to comply with the statutory requirements before effecting the
disconnection.
Under these circumstances, we find that the previous awards against

MERALCO have not served their purpose as a means to prevent the repetition
of the same damaging actions that it has committed in the past.
Therefore, we increase the award of exemplary damages from
P300,000.00 to P500,000.00 in the hope that this will persuade MERALCO
to be more prudent and responsible in its observance of the requirements
under the law in disconnecting a customer's electrical supply.
Lastly, in view of the award of exemplary damages, we find the award of

attorney's fees proper, in accordance with Article 2208(1) of the Civil
Code. We find the CA's award of attorney's fees in the amount of
P100,000.00 just and reasonable under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated July 30,2010 and
resolution dated January 3,2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
87843 are AFFIRMED with the following modifications: MERALCO is ordered
to pay respondents Spouses Sulpicio and Patricia Ramos P210,000.00 as
actual damages, P300,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. Costs against Manila Electric
Company.
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 118806. July 10, 1998
SANTIAGO ARGONCILLO, RICHARDO BALBONA and POLICARPIO

UMITEN, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision1 of the Court of Appeals which

affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch
15,2 finding petitioners herein guilty of illegal fishing with the use of an
explosive, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Policarpio Umiten, Santiago

Argoncillo and Richard Balbona, guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of illegal fishing with the use of an explosive punishable under Section 33 in
relation to Section 38 of Presidential Decree No. 704 dated May 16, 1975 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058 dated December 1, 1976 and each
shall suffer a straight penalty of twenty (20) years imprisonment.
However, accused, Johnson Sucgang, Elvis Villar and Efren Alvaro, are
acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
The fish sample is forfeited in favor of the government.
Considering the penalty imposed upon the accused, Policarpio Umiten,

Santiago Argoncillo and Richard Balbona, the bail bond for their provisional
liberty is increased to Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos each effective
immediately upon promulgation. They shall not be released from detention
until they put up an appropriate bail bond for their provisional liberty.
The property bond of accused, Johnson Sucgang, Elvis Villar and Efren Alvaro,
are deemed cancelled.
Costs against the convicted accused.
SO ORDERED.3 cräläwvirtualibräry
On August 1, 1990, an Information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz

charging Johnson Sucgang, Policarpio Umiten, Elvis Villar, Santiago
Argoncillo, Richardo Balbona and Efren Alvaro with illegal fishing (with the use
of dynamite), as follows:
That at or about 6:30 oclock [sic] in the evening of May 7, 1990, in the sea
water of Barangay Basiao, Ivisan, Capiz, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
catch, take, gather and have in their possession and control different species
of fish with the use of explosives.4
cräläwvirtualibräry
Upon arraignment on September 11, 1990, the accused, with the assistance
of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial ensued thereafter.
The lower court synthesized the evidence presented by the prosecution as

follows:5
Due to reports of rampant illegal fishing at Barangay Basiao, Ivisan, Capiz,

personnel from the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
specifically from the Bureau of Fisheries as well as the Barangay Captain of
said place assisted by the local policemen created a team to conduct
surveillance within the Ivisan Bay. Thus, around 5:30 in the afternoon of May
7, 1990, a team riding in two (2) pumpboats from the Barangay Basiao wharf
proceeded along the waters of Ivisan Bay. Riding in one pumpboat were
Persinefles U. Oabe, the Barangay Captain of said place; Rolando Amoroso,
an employee of the Bureau of Fisheries; Pat. Rafael Tupaz, a member of the
local Integrated National Police and Remegio Unasin, a barangay councilman
who acted as the pilot. In the other pumpboat were Joey de la Cruz, a co-
employee of Rolando Amoroso; Pat. Reggie Uadan and Enido Baldesimo. Now
and then, the team had to stop and listen for possible occurrences of illegal
fishing within their vicinity. Around 6:30 of the same evening while standing
by with their engines off, in a place facing Barangay Culasi, they heard an
explosion. Sensing it was caused by dynamite, they proceeded to the area
around five hundred meters (500 m.) away from them.
After ten minutes of navigation, the team arrived at the scene in question
which was near an islet. They surrounded the area. At a distance of around
ten meters, Joey de la Cruz, an employee of the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources, saw three persons diving into the water. Thereafter, they
would surface and throw their catch of fish to the unmotorized banca around
four meters long nearby. In the seashore of said islet, around three to four
meters away from these three persons floating in the water, were three other
persons standing in the rocky portions around three meters apart. These six
persons tried to escape but Rolando Amoroso, the co-employee of Joey de la
Cruz, advised them not to do so and introduced themselves as law enforcers.
The team found out that the fishes they caught were deep sea fish of four
kinds locally known as vulgan, bulawis, pacol, and bag-angan. Joey de la Cruz
gathered seven fish samples from their banca while Rolando Amoroso went
down from the pumpboat and proceeded to the islet. However, upon
inspection, he failed to find any explosive (dynamite) either on the seashore
or on the banca. No paraphernalia used in dynamite fishing were found. Both
Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso recognized the six persons as the
herein accused by their faces.
Persinefles U. Oabe, barangay captain of Barangay Basiao, who was with the
team riding in a pumpboat with Rolando Amoroso identified the three persons
retrieving fish from the water as Policarpio Umiten, Santiago Argoncillo and
Richard Balbona while the other three persons standing on the rocky portions
of the islet as Johnson Sucgang, Elvis Umiten and Efren Alvaro.
The team apprehended the six accused and brought them to the fish cage of
the barangay captain located within the same barangay. While on their way,
Joey de la Cruz externally examined the fish samples.
Upon their arrival at the fish cage, another external examination was
conducted by Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso. In both external
examinations, the two found out that the fishes were caught with the use of
explosives because blood was oozing from their operculums and their eyes
were protruding.
An on-the-spot investigation was conducted but the accused denied any

culpability. They were then released on the strength of their promise to report
to the local police the following day.
The fish samples were then placed in a plastic bag filled with ice at the house
of Barangay Captain Persinefles U. Oabe that evening. In the morning, Joey
de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso brought the fish samples to their office in
Roxas City where they conducted an internal examination. The examination
revealed that the fish samples were caught with the use of explosives
because their air bladders were raptured and deeply stained with blood; the
vertebral columns were broken but with bloodstains; their ribs were broken;
and there were blood clots in their abdomens. Joey de la Cruz and Rolando
Amoroso rendered a written report of their internal examination to the
Provincial Agricultural Officer.
The testimonies of Joey de la Cruz, Rolando Amoroso, and Persinefles U.

Oabe above were corroborated by Pat. Rafael Tupaz, one of the police escorts
of the team.
Sgt. Sergio Ordales, a member of the local police of the municipality of Ivisan
testified that while on duty in the morning of May 8, 1990, herein six accused
arrived at their station. He asked why they were there and they answered
that they were told to report to the police station. He learned from them that
they were arrested for illegal fishing with the use of explosives.
On the other hand, the lower court portrayed the evidence presented by the
version of the defense, thus:
All the accused denied the imputation of the prosecution.
Policarpio Umiten, Santiago Argoncillo, Richard O. Balbona were uniform in

alleging that around 4:00 in the afternoon of May 7, 1990, they dropped a
fishnet about two hundred (200) armslength and one (1) meter in width at
the scene where they were apprehended. This method they locally call
patuloy requires that the fishnet be retrieved every hour to collect its catch.
The trio went back to the place near the islet in question around 6:30 in the
evening for the purpose of collecting their catch from the fishnet. They had
not been able to collect all their catch from the net when the team of law
enforcers, prosecution witnesses herein, arrived. They were asked whether
they heard an explosion. After they denied having heard any, Barangay
Captain Persinefles U. Oabe, told the accused to go with them. The team got
seven pieces of fish samples. The accused left around one and one-half kilos
of fish they had gathered at the time the team of law enforcers arrived. They
were then brought to the fish cage owned by Persinefles U. Oabe at Barangay
Basiao.
Above three accused would like the Court to believe that the seven pieces of
fish samples taken by the team of fishing law enforcers were the catch of
their fishnet they locally called patuloy.
On the other hand, Elvis Villar testified that he and Efren Alvaro were
together in going to the islet in question, riding in an unmotorized banca to
gather shells locally called suso and butlogan for viand. Both started
gathering shells under the stones in the islet around 5:30 in the afternoon.
While they were preparing to go home at around 6:30 in the evening, the
team of law enforcers riding in motorized pumpboats arrived. The barangay
captain and the personnel from the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
asked them whether they heard an explosion. After they denied having heard
any, they were told by the barangay captain to board their pumpboats. They
obliged, leaving the shells they had gathered. They were then brought to the
fish cage of the barangay captain.
Although accused Johnson Sucgang admitted his presence in the islet in

question, he offered a different explanation. He testified that he went to said
place to look for pulutan requested by his customer, Wilfredo Arcangeles.
Being an operator and manager of Virgen Beach Resort located at Sitio
Manangkalan, he obliged. Thus, between 5:00 to 5:30 in the afternoon of May
7, 1990, he left his resort riding in a banca. He paddled his way towards the
islet where he saw two persons at the bank while the other three were on the
water. He went ashore. Later, the barangay captain and his companions
riding in two pumpboats arrived. Like his co-accused, he was asked if he
heard an explosion. After he denied hearing any, the barangay captain told
him to go with them. They were all brought to the fish cage of the barangay
captain for questioning.
Wilfredo Arcangeles corroborated the claim of Johnson Sucgang. He

confirmed that he requested the latter to look for pulutan since he had
visitors from Bacolod City prompting Johnson Sucgang to look for some. He
saw the accused leave in a banca and affirmed that he had no dynamite with
him.6cräläwvirtualibräry
On September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision which, as stated
at the beginning, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners point out that the fact that neither explosives nor related
paraphernalia were found in their possession is an indication of their
innocence.
We do not agree. First, it is quite probable that petitioners dumped these

materials into the sea while the raiding party was approaching. Moreover,
Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1058, provides:
Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; xxx -- It shall be unlawful for any person to catch,
take or gather, or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or
fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives,
obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in
paragraphs (l),7 (m)8 and (d),9 respectively, of Sec. 3 hereof xxx.
xxx.
The discovery of dynamite, other explosives and chemical compounds

containing combustible elements, or obnoxious or poisonous substance, or
equipment or device for electric fishing in any fishing boat or in the
possession of a fisherman shall constitute a presumption that the same were
used for fishing in violation of this Decree, the discovery in any fishing boat of
fish caught or killed by the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous
substance or by electricity shall constitute a presumption that the owner,
operator or fisherman were fishing with the use of explosives, obnoxious or
poisonous substance or electricity.
In Hizon vs. Court of Appeals,10 this Court held that the law, as contained in
the last paragraph of Section 33, creates a presumption that illegal fishing
has been committed when fish caught or killed with the use of explosives,
obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing
boat. In this case, it cannot be denied that the fishes found in petitioners
banca were caught or killed by the use of explosives.
The Report11 of Bureau of Fisheries employees Joey de la Cruz and Rolando

Amoroso states:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Agriculture
Roxas City
1990-05-08
The Provincial Agricultural Officer
Department of Agriculture
Roxas City
Sir:
I have the honor to submit to this office the result of the scientific fish
examination conducted on the fish samples taken from the possession of Mr.
Johnson Umiten Sucgang, 38 years old, married and resident of Barangay
Basiao, Ivisan, Capiz and company on May 7, 1990, 6:30 PM by combined
elements of the Department of Agriculture, PC/INP Unit of Ivisan, Capiz and
Barangay officials of Basiao, Ivisan, Capiz conducting sea borne patrol on
illegal fishing.
Source of fish samples : Sea water of Brgy., Basiao,

Ivisan, Capiz
Fish samples taken from : Johnson U. Sucgang, 38 years old,
married, of Brgy., Basiao, Ivisan,
Capiz, et. al.
Date fish samples taken : May 7, 1990 at 6:30 PM
Date fish samples examined : May 7, 1990 at 7:00 PM
Name of fish samples taken Number Weight Value
Local Name
Bulawis 2 pcs. 300 gms P 8.00
Bulgan 2 pcs. 200 gms 10.00
Pakol 1 pc. 100 gms 2.00
Bag-angan 1 pc. 150 gms 3.00
Bukod 1 pc. 150 gms 3.00
Characteristics noted on the fish examined:
1. External Manifestation
a. Blood, oozing on the operculum.
2. Internal Manifestation
a. Air bladder raptured deeply stained with blood;
b. Vertebral column broken with blood stain.
Conclusion:
The fish samples manifested signs that said fish were caught or killed by the
use of explosives.
Examined by:
(Sgd.)
JOEY I. DE LA CRUZ
(Sgd.)
ROLANDO E. AMOROSO
Fish Examiners
Joey de la Cruz affirmed the above findings in his testimony before the trial
court.12 Said testimony was corroborated by Rolando Amoroso, a co-employee
of De la Cruz in the Bureau of Fisheries. The latter further stated that the fish
were killed specifically by dynamite:
ATTY. LUMAWAG:
Q Can you identify whether it was through dynamite or any other means of
explosive the fish was caught?
A Yes, sir. Because you know when we saw, when we conducted the external
manifestation of the fish, not only blood oozing from the ears but also from
the eyes that were protruding.
Q Is it not possible that it be caused also through fishing by means of

electricity?
A No.
Q Other kinds of explosives?
A Yes, explosives.
Q For example, what other aside from dynamite?
A What explosives aside from dynamite, no other. 13 cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court correctly gave credence to these testimonies, thus:
Above three (3) accused would like the Court to believe that the seven (7)
pieces of fish samples taken by the team of fishing law enforcers were the
catch of their fish net they locally called [sic] patuloy.
x x x.
With the external and internal examination by Joey de la Cruz and Rolando
Amoroso showing that these fishes were caught with the use of explosive,
bare denial of above three (3) accused that they caught them by means of a
fishing net they locally call patoloy is insufficient to disprove such finding. It is
simply a superiority of weight of object evidence over testimonies of the
accused.
Joey de la Cruz is an agricultural technologist of their office and a graduate of

Bachelor of Science in Fishery. Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso had
undergone training course in fishery laws and implementing regulations as
well as actual demonstrations in sea to practice what they had learned in
theory. [As] xxx technical personnel of the Bureau of Fishery and Aquatic
Resources, their finding after an internal and external examination of fish
samples to prove they were caught with the use of explosives should be
presented to show that these prosecution witnesses fabricated their story.
There is no ulterior motive which implied them to testify as they did.
Furthermore, no evidence was introduced by the defense to impeach their
credibility nor evidence to discredit their persons. Credibility of the
testimonies having remained unimpeached, it shall be given great weight in
the determination of the guilt of the accused. Besides, being public officers to
enforce fishing laws, in the absence of ill-motive on their part, to impute to
the accused a serious offense of illegal fishing with the use of explosive, the
presumption is that there was regular performance of public duty on their
part.14
The presumption that the crime of illegal fishing was committed has,
therefore, been clearly established. Such presumption, however, is
merely prima facie, and may be rebutted by the accused. u
Petitioners attempt to overcome said presumption by disputing the findings of

prosecution witnesses Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso. They claim that
since not all their catch were examined, there can be no conclusive proof that
the fish were killed with the use of explosives.16 cräläwvirtualibräry
They also question the credibility of these witnesses, thus:
xxx. If it is true that prosecution witness Joey dela Cruz, allegedly a technical
personnel [sic] of the Bureau of Fisheries and competent to determine if a fish
is killed by dynamite blast, found the 7 fishes to have been killed by a
dynamite blast, it was unnatural for the team not to arrest the petitioners on
the spot. xxx.17 cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioners arguments have no merit.
It is ridiculous to have expected that all the fish found in the accuseds fishing
boat would be subjected to an examination. It is sufficient that, as in the case
at bar, a random sample of the accuseds catch was examined and found to
have been killed with the use of explosives. A patent impracticality would
result if the law required otherwise.
The fact that the patrol team did not immediately deliver the accused to the
municipal jail does not diminish the credibility of the above witnesses.
Persinefles U. Oabe, the barangay captain of Basiao, gave a plausible
explanation for the accuseds release:
A We released those six persons because if we bring them to the municipality

of Ivisan we have no available transportation because they were only riding in
a single motor vehicle.18 cräläwvirtualibräry
The want of available transportation is not surprising. The dearth in law

enforcement facilities, especially in the provinces, is not lost on this Court and
is a matter of judicial notice.
In fine, we find no reason to disturb the assessment of the trial court

regarding the credibility of prosecution witnesses Joey de la Cruz and Rolando
Amoroso. Its findings are accorded great respect by appellate tribunals since
trial courts have the advantage of examining the witnesses testimonies and
observing their demeanor first hand.19 cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioners also argue that they could not have been caught fishing with the
use of dynamite in shallow waters because the fishes used as evidence were
described by the prosecution witnesses as deep sea fishes. According to
petitioners:
The seven (7) fishes that the prosecution used as evidence were described by
prosecution witnesses as deep sea fishes. But it has been shown in the
testimony of petitioner Santiago Argoncillo that he and the other petitioners
were fishing in shallow waters about 1 1/2 meters deep (TSN, March 13,
1991, p. 7) and using fishnet 200 armslength long and 1 meter wide (TSN,
March 13, 1991, p. 4). This testimony was not rebutted by the prosecution. In
fact, the 3 accused who were acquitted by the trial court were found by the
prosecution witnesses standing on the seashore near where the petitioners
were fishing (TSN, January 23, 1991, pp. 5 to 6). That petitioners would
engage in dynamite fishing in shallow waters and near the seashore would be
unnatural. The allegation that the petitioners were fishing with the use of
explosive is therefore not credible.20 cräläwvirtualibräry
We are not persuaded.
The fishes caught by petitioners were not actually deep sea fishes in the
sense that they came from the deep portions of the sea as distinguished from
shallow waters or waters near or along the shores. The fishes caught were
locally known as vulgan, bulawis, pacol, and bag-angan. They are generally
described as isda sa bato or bottom feeders. The following excerpt from the
testimony of fish examiner Joey de la Cruz shows that the term deep sea
fishes arose from the trial courts erroneous translation of isda sa bato or
bottom feeders which were the terms actually employed by said witness to
describe the subject fishes:
ATTY. LUMAWAG:
Q What were the species of the fishes that you recovered from that banca?
A Bottom feeders.
COURT:
Isda sa bato, in English?
A Bottom feeders.
COURT:
Deep sea fishes.21cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioners next contend that if it is true that they were engaged in illegal
fishing, it would be unnatural for them to use a boat which would make it
difficult for them to escape from the law enforcers riding motorized boats.22
Petitioners contention is too ludicrous to warrant serious consideration. The

law punishing illegal fishing does not require the use of motorized banca or
boat for the crime to be committed. Concededly, a motorized banca can
better serve those engaged in illegal fishing for purposes of eluding law
enforcers. However, not everyone can financially afford to fit a motor in his
banca. Indeed, petitioner Argoncillo admitted that the banca that they were
using was leased from a certain Dikoy Odrunia.23 cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioners likewise aver that they did not flee when the law enforcers arrived,
and even voluntarily reported to the Ivisan Police Station the following
morning. They submit that their alleged non-flight should strengthen their
claim of innocence.24cräläwvirtualibräry
We disagree. There is no established doctrine to the effect that, in every

instance, non-flight is an indication of innocence.25 Moreover, even if they
wanted to, petitioners could not have possibly eluded the law enforcers who
were in two pump boats. Attempts to flee would also have been useless since
petitioners were already identified by the barrio captain.
Lastly, the fact that the accused were asked by the patrol team whether or
not they heard an explosion is not in any way reflective of petitioners
innocence. We deem such inquiry as nothing more than a part of the
investigative process. It is quite common, and in most cases, necessary, for
law enforcers to ask questions to help them ascertain whether or not there
exists probable cause to arrest persons suspected of committing a crime.
Having failed to discharge themselves of the burden of disproving that they

have committed illegal fishing, the Court is left with no alternative but to
affirm petitioners conviction.
The penalty imposed by law26 for illegal fishing if explosive is actually used is

imprisonment ranging from twenty (20) years to life imprisonment. The
Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that if, as in this case, the offense is
punished by a law other than the Revised Penal Code, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall
not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. 27 The trial court
therefore erred when it sentenced petitioners to suffer a straight penalty of
twenty (20) years imprisonment.28 In Spouses Jose and Trinidad Bacar vs.
Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr.,29 we held that it was erroneous to impose
a straight penalty of six (6) years imprisonment on the accused for homicide.
We explained:
xxx. It is basic law that xxx the application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is mandatory where imprisonment exceeds one (1) year, except only in
the following cases:
a. Offenses punished by death or life imprisonment.
b. Those convicted of treason (Art. 114), conspiracy or proposal to

commit treason (Art. 115).
c. Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion (Art.

134), sedition (Art.139), or espionage (Art. 117).
d. Those convicted of piracy (Art. 122).

e. Habitual delinquents(Art. 62, par. 5).
Recidivists are entitled to an indeterminate sentence. (People v. Jaramilla, L-

28547, Feb. 22, 1974). Offender is not disqualified to avail of the benefits of
the law even if the crime is committed while he is on parole. (People v.
Calreon, CA 78 O.G. 6701, Nov. 19, 1982).
f. Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded

sentence.
g. Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of

the same (Art. 159). (People v. Corral, 74 Phil. 359).
h. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed

one year.
Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one year, the accused
cannot avail himself of the benefits of the law, the application of which is
based upon the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law and not upon
that which may be imposed in the discretion of the Court. (People v. Hidalgo,
[CA] G.R. No. 00452-CR, Jan. 22, 1962).
i. Those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the
indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused,
since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon
his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of
imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether
punishable by the or by special laws, with definite minimum and maximum
terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty
specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.30 cräläwvirtualibräry
Accordingly, the proper penalty to be imposed upon the accused should be an

indeterminate penalty which is hereby set at twenty (20) years as minimum
to twenty-five (25) years as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the decision of the

Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioners are
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from twenty (20) years as minimum to twenty-five (25) years as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193313, March 16, 2016
ERNIE IDANAN, NANLY DEL BARRIO AND MARLON

PLOPENIO, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is a Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 March 2010 in CA-

G.R. CR No. 30729 affirming the Decision 2 dated 22 February 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42 of Virac, Catanduanes finding
petitioners Ernie Idanan (Idanan), Nanly Del Barrio (Del Barrio) and Marlon
Plopenio (Plopenio), together with Roberto Vargas (Vargas) and Elmer Tulod
(Tulod) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of lumber under
Section 68 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705, as amended.
The petitioners were charged in the following Information:
That on or about the 16th day of October 2005 in the

afternoon at [B]arangay San Miguel, [M]unicipality of
Panganiban, [P]rovince of Catanduanes, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused[,] with intent to gain, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another did there and then
(sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess, and
in control of twenty nine (29) pieces of narra lumber
with gross volume of 716.48 board feet or 1.69 cubic
meter valued at Php275,844.80, Philippine currency loaded
in a truck bearing Plate No. UMU-424 without necessary
permit, license or documents required under the existing
laws, rules and regulations of the DENR to the damage and
prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines in the
amount of Php275,844.80.3
During trial, the prosecution presented the police officers who apprehended
petitioners. Their version goes:
In the morning of 16 October 2005, the PNP headquarters of the Municipality

of Panganiban, Province of Catanduanes received an information that a group
of illegal loggers will be transporting narra flitches4 along Kilometer 11, 12 or
13 in Panganiban. At around 3:30 p.m., the OIC Chief of Police P/Inspector
Chito Oyardo and five (5) other policemen were patrolling Kilometer 12 in a
motorbike and a compactor when they spotted an idling Isuzu Elf truck loaded
with lumber. The policemen approached the truck. They found out that
Idanan was the driver while Del Barrio and Plopenio were the passengers.
Vargas and Tulod were seen hauling lumber to be loaded into the truck.
Petitioners were not able to produce any document authorizing them to
transport lumber so they were placed under arrest. PO1 Ferdinand Bobiles
took photographs of the truck, the seized lumber and the accused.
Thereafter, petitioners were first brought to the police station before they
were brought to Camp Camacho in Virac, Catanduanes.5
The defense, on the other hand, denied the charge. Idanan, Del Barrio and
Plopemo testified that while they were traversing Kilometer 12, they were
flagged down by policemen. One of them borrowed the truck. Idanan, the
driver of the truck, obliged. One of the policemen drove the truck for about
100 meters while petitioners trailed the truck by foot. They then saw the
policemen load narra flitches into the truck. Not one of them questioned the
police out of fear. To petitioners' surprise, they were then arrested and
ordered to follow the policemen to the police station.6 Vargas and Tulod
claimed that they were going to Caramoran and they hitched a ride with
Idanan.
The defense presented a Certification signed by Punong Barangay Elias D.

Obierna (Elias) and Barangay Tanod Benito P. Obierna (Benito) certifying that
the police intercepted the truck driven by Idanan; that it was found empty;
and that the police officers asked the driver of the truck to deliver the logs to
the Municipal Office/Police Office Station of Panganiban, Catanduanes.7
The Obiernas initially denied that they executed the Certification. Elias later
on clarified that while he signed the Certification, he was not present at the
time of the apprehension and had no personal knowledge that the truck was
empty. Elias claimed that Santiago Idanan forced him to sign the
Certification.8 Benito was present during the incident. He allegedly saw
firewood on two trucks and heard the policemen instructing a certain son of
Agoy to load the lumbers into the truck.9
On 22 February 2007, the RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of illegal possession of lumber. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of all

the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby
sentences accused Ernie Idanan, Nanly del Barrio, Marlon
Plopenio, Roberto Vargas and Elmer Tulod to suffer the
imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five
(5) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. The 29 pieces of narra lumber
subject of this case are forfeited in favor of the
government.10 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of

official duty in giving credence to the testimonies of the police officers.
Moreover, there was no evidence manifesting ill motive on the part of the
police officers to falsely testify against the accused. The trial court held that
possession of 29 pieces of narra lumber with gross volume of 1.69 cubic
meters and estimated value of P275,844.80 without any documentation
clearly constitutes an offense punishable under PD 705, as amended.
Tulod and Vargas are at large.11
On 29 March 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming

petitioner's conviction.
Petitioners maintain that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable

doubt all the elements of the offense charged. Relying on an illegal
possession of firearm case where the Court held that to support a conviction,
there must be possession coupled with intent to possess, petitioners assert
that their intent to possess the subject narra lumber must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. In the case of Tulod and Vargas, they claim that they were
merely hired to load the lumber on the truck. On the part of Idanan, he
admitted that the truck was owned by his father. Thus, their possession over
the lumber is considered temporary, incidental, casual and harmless. Del
Barrio and Plopenio meanwhile were merely present at the crime scene.
Petitioners note the testimony of the Chief of Police is far from being candid
and straightforward when he had to be coached by the prosecutor on matters
relative to the arrest of the accused. Petitioners accuse the police officers of
planting evidence against them because since the assumption of the Chief of
Police to his post, he had never apprehended anybody for illegal possession of
lumber. Petitioners assert that their testimonies are candid and spontaneous.
They even cite the testimonies of the barangay officials as corroborative of
their defense that the truck confiscated by the police officers had no narra
lumber on it.
In their Comment,12 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) noted that

petitioners were apprehended by the police offices in flagrante delicto as they
were transporting 29 pieces of narra lumber along Kilometer 12 in Barangay
San Miguel, Panganiban, Catanduanes without the required documentation.
The OSG added that mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the accompanying legal documents consummates the crime. Finally,
the OSG defended the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and assailed
the defense of frame-up as weak.
At the outset, we find the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible.

Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but it must be credible in itself, such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.13 Petitioners' statements that they did not complain or put up
any resistance when they were arrested despite their innocence is contrary to
human nature and experience. Petitioners should have at least protested if
they believed that they were not committing any crime. Moreover, the
allegation of "planted evidence" is unsubstantiated. There is no proof that
that the police had the ill-motive to falsely accuse and testify against
petitioners, aside from the unsubstantiated and far-fetched allegation that the
police wanted to impress their superiors. The presumption of regularity
accorded to police officers is unrebutted.
Section 6814 of PD 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines, provides:
Sect. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or

other products without license. Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
and disposable public lands, or from private lands,
without any authority under a license agreement, lease,
license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as
defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code; Provided, That in the case of
partnership, association or corporation, the officers who
ordered the cutting, gathering or collecting shall be
liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor

of the government of the timber or forest products to
cut, gathered, collected or removed, and the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools used therein, and the
forfeiture of his improvements in the area.
The same penalty plus cancellation of his license

agreement, lease, license or permit and perpetual
disqualification from acquiring any such privilege shall
be imposed upon any licensee, lessee, or permittee who
cuts timber from the licensed or leased area of another,
without prejudice to whatever civil action the latter may
bring against the offender.
Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering,

collecting, or removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land
without any authority; (2) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without
any authority; and (3) the possession of timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.15
Petitioners were charged under the third category, i.e., of possessing and in

control of 29 pieces of narra lumber without the legal requirements as
required under existing forest laws and regulations.
Illegal possession of timber is an offense covered by special law and is malum

prohibitum. Thus, criminal intent is not an essential element of the offense.
However, the prosecution must prove intent to possess or animus
possidendi.16
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also
constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the object of the
crime is in the immediate physical control of the accused. On the other hand,
constructive possession exists when the object of the crime is under the
dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found.17
Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a

showing of non-exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. Such
fact of possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and
any reasonable inference drawn therefrom.18
We find that Idanan, Del Barrio, and Plopenio were, at the very least, in
constructive possession of the timber without the requisite legal documents.
Petitioners were found in the truck loaded with 29 pieces of narra lumber.
Idanan admitted to driving the truck while Del Barrio and Plopenio
accompanied Idanan. They claimed to have traveled for almost three hours
just to retrieve the cellular phone of Idanan's father from a certain Jojo
Cabrera (Cabrera) in Barangay Poblacion, Panganiban, Catanduanes. When
pressed by the prosecutor if they managed to get the cellphone, they replied
that they failed to locate Cabrera. The three accused did not protest despite
seeing that the policemen allegedly load lumber into the truck. Neither did
they complain when they were subsequently arrested. Idanan was the driver.
It is presumed that he exercised full control of the vehicle that he is driving
and that he knew what its load was. Having offered no plausible excuse,
petitioners failed to prove to our satisfaction that they did not have
the animus possidendi of the narra lumber.
Mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents, even absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal. It would make no
difference at all whether the ownership of the lumber pertains to only one
accused.19
The possession of lumber was made without any license or permit issued by
any competent authority.
Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punishable as Qualified

Theft under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code20 thus:
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall

be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and

medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but
if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the
one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty
shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal,
as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium

and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum

and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen
is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision

correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the
property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200
pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is

over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if

such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if

the theft is committed under the circumstances enumerated
in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the
value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If
such value exceeds said amount, the provisions of any of
the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not

exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is
not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under
the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of
earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his
family.
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified

theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by
two degrees than those respectively specified in the next
preceding article x x x.
The Information alleged that the 29 pieces of lumber measuring 716.48 board
feet were valued at P275,884.80. Said amount was evidenced by the
Statement of Narra lumber materials21 which was presented in evidence and
testified to by Basil Cesar Camba, the person who signed the Statement.
Since the amount exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods should be imposed in its maximum period. To
determine the additional years of imprisonment prescribed in Article 309 (1),
the amount of P22,000.00 should be deducted from P275,884.80, thus,
leaving the amount of P253,884.80. The net amount should then be divided
by PI 0,000.00, disregarding any amount below P10,000.00. The result is the
incremental penalty of twenty-five (25) years which must then be added to
the basic penalty of the maximum period of prision mayor minimum and
medium periods. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods has a range of six years (6) and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Its
maximum period is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten
(10) years, and the incremental penalty is 25 years. Had appellant committed
simple theft, the penalty should have been twenty years of reclusion
temporal. In qualified theft, the penalty is two degrees higher. Thus the
penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.22
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, we recommend executive

clemency. In People v. Tomotorgo24 the Court recommended executive
clemency to appellant taking into consideration the evidence that he only
intended to maltreat his spouse resulting in her death, his manifest repentant
attitude and remorse for his act. In People v. Abano,25 appellant was
convicted of parricide and murder but the court recommended executive
clemency because the Court considered her emotional suffering in the hands
of her philandering husband. In Mendoza v. People,26 petitioner was convicted
for failure to remit the contributions of his employer. Petitioner had managed
to settle his obligation but he was not eligible for condonation under Republic
Act No. 9003. While it was observed that the penalty imposed on petitioner is
harsh, the Court had to apply the law to its full extent. Thus, the Court
recommended executive clemency.
In this case, the resulting penalty is reclusion perpetua. This penalty will be

suffered by the driver and the helpers. The operator of the illegal logging
business has not been apprehended. While we sympathize with the plight of
petitioners who were merely following orders and were consequently caught
in possession of the lumber, we must still apply the law in full force. Dura lex
sed lex. But considering the facts about petitioners' participation in the crime,
and guided by jurisprudence on instances when the facts of the crime elicited
the Court's compassion for the accused, we recommend executive clemency. chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The 29 March 2010 Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30729 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioners ERNIE IDANAN, NANLY DEL BARRIO and
MARLON PLOPENIO are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Pursuant to Article 5 of
the Revised Penal Code, the Court shall TRANSMIT the case to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, and RECOMMENDS the grant
of executive clemency to petitioners.
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 205015 November 19, 2014
MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This case stemmed from Ma. Mimie Crescencio's (petitioner) conviction for violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised
1 2
Forestry Code of the Philippines (Forestry Code), as amended by Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 277, rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofTalibon, Bohol, Branch 52, in
3
Criminal Case No. 96-27, on August 12, 2008. The Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R.
4
CR No. 01162, dismissed the appeal in its Resolution dated April 15, 2011 for failure to
5
serve a copy of the Appellant’s Brief to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). The CA,
in its Resolution dated November 19, 2012, also denied the petitioner’s motion for
6
reconsideration of the said resolution.
The Facts
Acting on an information that there was a stockpile of lumber or forest products in the
vicinity of the house of the petitioner, Eufemio Abaniel (Abaniel), the Chief of the
ForestProtection Unit of Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) -
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Talibon, Bohol, together with
Forest Rangers Urcino Butal (Butal), Alfredo Bastasa and Celso Ramos (Ramos) went to
the petitioner’s house at Balico, Talibon, Bohol on March 15, 1994 at 3:00 p.m. Upon
arriving thereat, they saw forest products lying under the house of the petitioner and at
the shoreline about two meters away from the petitioner’s house. As the DENR personnel
tried to investigate from the neighborhood as to who was the owner of the lumber, the
petitioner admitted its ownership. Thereafter, the DENR personnel entered the premises
of the petitioner’s house without a search warrant. 7
Upon inspection, 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber, which is equivalent to 452 board feet,

were discovered. When the DENR personnel asked for documents to support the
petitioner’s claim of ownership, the latter showed to them Official Receipt No. 35053
issued by Pengavitor Enterprises where she allegedly bought the said lumber. However,
when the DENR personnel scaled the lumber, they found out that the dimensions and the
species of the lumber did not tally with the items mentioned in the receipt. The said
receipt showed that the petitioner bought 10 pieces of red lawaan lumber with sizes
2x6x18 and 5 pieces with sizes 2x8x16 on March 13, 1994. On the other hand, the
lumber in the petitioner’s house, on March 15, 1994, was 24 pieces of
magsihagonlumber of three different sizes, to wit: 20 pieces 2x6x18; 3 pieces 2x8x18;
and 1 piece 2x10x12. 8
Since the petitioner could not present any other receipt, Abaniel ordered the confiscation
of the lumber, asked for police assistance, and told the petitioner that they were going to
transport the confiscated lumber to the DENR office for safekeeping. Seizure Receipt No.
004157 and a Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being
Confiscated, which showed the value of the lumber to be 9,040.00, were issued to the
9
petitioner. Forest Rangers Butal and Ramos corroborated Abaniel’s testimony. 10

SPO1 Desiderio Garcia testified that upon the request of Abaniel for police assistance,
he and PO3 Antonio Crescencio went to the house of the petitioner where they saw
some lumberwhich was later loaded on a cargo truck. Thereafter, they escorted the
transport of the lumber to the DENR office in San Roque, Talibon, Bohol. 11
On the other hand, the lone witness of the defense, Lolita Crescencio, admitted that the
seized lumber were owned by the petitioner but claimed that the latter bought it from
Pengavitor Enterprises of Trinidad, Bohol and from Java Marketing in Ubay,
Bohol. However, the defense had only the Official Receipt No. 35053 issued by
12
Pengavitor Enterprises which, however, did not tally with the forest products confiscated.
On May 17, 1994, the petitioner was charged by the Provincial Prosecutor of Tagbilaran
City, Bohol, with violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277.
The Information alleged:
13
That on or about the 15th day of March, 1994, in the municipality of Talibon, Bohol,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with intent to possess and to gain for her own benefit, without any legal document as
required under existing jurisprudence, laws and regulations, and without any lawful
authority under existing rules and regulation of DENR Forest Management Sector,
willfully, unlawfully and illegally possess and have under her custody and control forest
products consisting of twenty-four (24) pieces of magsihagon lumber with a volume of
452 board feet and a total value of Nine Thousand Forty (₱9,040.00) Pesos, Philippine
Currency; to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines. 14
During the arraignment on July 15,1997, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.Thereafter, trial ensued. 15
On August 12, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of the offense
16
charged and sentenced her to imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayoras minimum to eleven (11) years and six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of
prision mayoras maximum. The RTC also ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber
owned by the petitioner. 17
As expected, the petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. However, in its
Resolution dated April 15, 2011, the CA dismissed the appeal outright because the
18
petitioner failed to furnish the OSG a copy of the Appellant’s Brief in violation of the Rules
of Court. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA,in its
Resolution dated November 19, 2012. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
19
The Issue
The core issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA’s dismissal of the appeal due to
the petitioner’s failureto serve a copy of the Appellant’s Brief to the OSG is proper, in
view of the attendant factual circumstances and in the interest of substantial justice.
Ruling of the Court
In this case, the petitioner asks for a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure
and submits that the CA erred in dismissing her appeal purely on the basis of mere
technicalities.
Confronted with issues of this nature, this Court is mindful of the policy of affording
litigants the amplest opportunity for the determination of their cases on the merits and of
dispensing with technicalities whenever compelling reasons so warrant or when the
purpose of justice requires it. 20
The Court has constantly pronouncedthat "[t]he rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid,technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure – not
override – substantial justice. For this reason, courts must proceed with caution so asnot
to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather, they must ensure thatall litigants are
granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free
from the constraint of technicalities." 21
It is clear that without at all touching on the substantive aspects of the petitioner’s cause,
the appellate court opted not to decide the case on the merits. The subject of the appeal
was the decision of the RTC convicting the petitioner of violation of the Forestry Code
and sentencing her to suffer an imprisonment of no less than six (6) years to eleven (11)
years.
In this case, there is nothing in the record that shows any deliberate intent on the part of
the petitioner to subvert and delay the final disposition of the case. In fact, when the
petitioner learned that her appeal was dismissed by the CA for failure to serve a copy of
her Appellant’s Brief to the OSG, she immediately confronted her previous counsel who
denied having filed such brief. Asthe petitioner was very much worried of being
incarcerated, she asked her previous counsel to withdraw from the case. Thus, the
petitioner submits that the outright denial of her appeal is due to the incompetence and
ignorance of her former counsel who even lied about the fact thathe has indeed filed an
Appellant’s Brief.
As a general rule, the inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate

excuse as to call for the appellate court’s indulgence except: (a) where the reckless or
gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (b) when
application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or
(c) where the interests of justice so require. 22
Here, the petitioner submits that the inadvertence of her counsel to serve a copy of the
Appellant’s Brief tothe OSG is a persuasive reason or a compelling justification to forego
the Rules of Procedure as the wanton recklessness or gross negligence of her counsel
has deprived her of due process of law which will result in the outright deprivation of her
liberty.
In this regard, the Court agrees that the CA should have taken a liberal view of the rules
and ruled on the meritsof the appeal, especially when what is involved is no less than the
petitioner’s liberty.
Nonetheless, even if the Court brushes aside the technicality issue, it will still find that the
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the petitioner’s culpability.
In attempting to escape liability, the petitioner contends that: (a) she had the supporting
documents to show that she bought the questioned lumber from legitimate sources; and
(b) the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the DENR personnel was illegal
and, thus, the items seized should not have been admitted in evidence against her.
The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secured in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nonetheless,23
the constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures admits of

certainexceptions, one of which is seizure of evidence in plain view. Under the plain view
1âwphi1
doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in the
position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. 24
There is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed with a search warrant
when they went to the house of the petitioner. When the DENR personnel arrived at the
petitioner’s house, the lumbers were lying under the latter’s house and at the shoreline
about two meters away from the house of the petitioner. It isclear, therefore, that the said
lumber is plainly exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure of the lumber outside the
petitioner’s house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.
Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the petitioner, even without a
warrant. Section 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of
25
the DENR or any personnel of the Philippine National Police to arrest, even without a
warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the
offenses defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense orthe forest products gathered or taken by the
offender. Clearly, in the course ofsuch lawful intrusion, the DENR personnel had
inadvertently come across the lumber which evidently incriminated the petitioner.
The fact of possession by the petitioner of the 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber, as well

as her subsequent failure to produce the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of the Forestry Code.
Under Section 68 of the Forestry Code, there are two distinctand separate offenses
punished, namely: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land withoutany authority; and (2) possession of timber or other forest products
without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations. 26
In the second offense, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and
removal of the forest products are legal or not. Mere possession of forest products
withoutthe proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes
from a legal source is immaterial because the Forestry Code is a special law which
considers mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper
documentation as malum prohibitum. 27
In the present case, the magsihagonlumber were admittedly owned by the petitioner but
unfortunately no permit evidencing authority to possess said lumber was duly presented.
Thus, the Information correctly charged the petitioner with the second offense which is
consummated by the mere possession of forest products without the proper documents.
The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that the lumber was confiscated
from the petitioner, namely: a Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of
Lumber Being Confiscated on March 15, 1994, seizure receipt, a photograph of the
house of the petitioner, and a photograph of the confiscated lumber. Moreso, the direct
and affirmative testimony of the DENR personnel as state witnesses on the
circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes the petitioner’s liability.
As to the imposable penalty on the petitioner, the RTC imposed an indeterminate

sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to eleven (11)
years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayoras maximum.
The Court does not agree. This Court notes that the estimated value of the confiscated
pieces of lumber, as appearing in the Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and
Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated is ₱9,040.00 which is alleged in the Information.
However, except for the testimonies of Abaniel and Butal that this amount is the estimate
based on prevailing local price as stated in the apprehension receipt they issued, the
prosecution did not present any proof as tothe value of the lumber.
Clearly, this evidence does not suffice. The Court had ruled that in order to prove the
amount of the property taken for fixing the penalty imposable against the accused under
Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the prosecution must present more than a
mereuncorroborated "estimate" of such fact. In the absence of independent and reliable
corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty under
Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of
the case. Hence, the lower court erred in finding that the value of the confiscated lumber
28
is ₱9,040.00 for no evidence of such value was established during the trial.
Accordingly, the Court imposes on the petitioner the minimum penalty under Article
309(6) of the RPC, whichis arresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods. However,
29
considering that violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code is punished as Qualified

Theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the RPC, the statutory penalty shall
30
be increased by two degrees, that is, to prision correccionalin its medium and maximum
periods or within the range ofthree (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to
four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days, considering that there are no attending
mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense.
In accordance with current jurisprudence and taking into account the Indeterminate
31
Sentence Law, the Court finds it proper to impose on the petitioner, in view of the
circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of frmr (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of
prision correccional, as maximum. WHEREFORE, the Decision on August 12, 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court of Talibon, Bohol, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 96-27, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Ma. Mimie Crescencio is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four ( 4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

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THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 163494, August 03, 2016

JESUSA T. DELA CRUZ Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

The fourth batch of twenty-three (23) replacement checks issued by the

Ruling of the RTC

WHEREFORE, viewed from all the foregoing, the Court finds

Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed to the CA, arguing, among other

The appeal was dismissed by the CA via the Decision17 dated November 13,

WHEREFORE, the appeal in the above-entitled case

The Present Petition

THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO

THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER

EVEN ASSUMING, WITHOUT CONCEDING, THAT THE PETITIONER IS

In its Comment,22 respondent People of the Philippines, through Office of the

Petitioner was not duly notified of the July 27, 2000

Petitioner, who is out on bail on a personal undertaking,

The OSG, nonetheless, argues that the petitioner's acquittal in another CA

Tan filed his own Comment/Opposition,27 refuting the arguments raised in the

Ruling of the Court

The Court finds the petitioner entitled to an acquittal.

Questions of fact under Rule 45

By jurisprudence, the following instances may however be considered

The petitioner was notified of scheduled hearings

On November 5, 1998, on motion of the defense, on the

On January 12, 1999, upon urgent motion filed by the

On March 9, 1999, Atty. Bañares[,] instead of complying

On March 15, 1999, [Atty. Leynes,] instead of continuing

Meanwhile, on March 12, 1999, [Tan] filed a motion for

On April 20, 1999, [Atty. Leynes] filed a Motion to

On June 9, 1999, the Court, thru Judge Florante A.

On July 24, 1999, Atty. Bernardo Fernandez entered his

After entering his appearance, Atty. Fernandez, on August

On January 25, 2000, reception of defense evidence was

Unfortunately, Judge Cipres became indisposed and

Accordingly, the hearing for reception of evidence was

The Office of [Atty. Leynes] was notified of the hearing

On July 27, 2000, defense counsel and the [petitioner]

A copy of the Order was furnished the Office of [Atty.

On September 5, 2000, Atty. Bernardo Fernandez[,] who

On September 8, 2000, Atty. Fernandez did not appear.

On March 5, 2001, this Court, thru Judge Leonardo P.

After the prosecution rested its case on June 5, 1995,

The petitioner was deemed to have waived right to present evidence

The Court answers in the negative.

In People v. Subida,38 the Court reminded judges to be on guard against

Corollary to this rule on the disposition of motions for postponement during

The Court now explains why the petitioner's acquittal is warranted.

The petitioner's acquittal in another set of B.P. Blg. 22 cases fails to

Although a notice of dishonor is not an indispensable requirement in a

SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of

Indeed, this requirement [on proof of receipt of notice

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary In Suarez v. People, x x x [w]e explained that: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The presumption arises when it is proved that

x x x. [I]t is not enough for the

A review of the records shows that the

Clearly, the prosecution failed to establish the presence of all elements of