NACE Paper No.

MECCOCT18-12448

Cracked HP Steam Superheater Alloy 800 Pipe of a Thermal Oxidizer from a Gas Plant SRU

Yousif A. Al Rabie Iyad Al-Buraiki

Saudi Aramco, Dhahran, 31311 Saudi Aramco, Dhahran, 31311
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

ABSTRACT
A failure was reported in an alloy 800 (UNS N08800) high pressure steam superheater pipe
downstream of a thermal oxidizer in a Gas Plant SRU. A metallurgical failure analysis investigation
confirmed that the tube had failed due intergranular environmental stress corrosion cracking. No
evidence of corrosion was found on the tube internal or external surfaces. It was concluded that the
tube failed due to internal Caustic Stress Corrosion Cracking (CSCC) cracking. It was recommended to
review the water treatment program and inspect the rest of the tubes for similar cracks.

Keywords: Caustic Stress Corrosion Cracking, Alloy UNS N08800, Alloy 800, HP Steam Superheater,
Thermal oxidizer, SRU

INTRODUCTION
Caustic soda (sodium hydroxide) is one of the most widely used inorganic chemicals in water treatment
process. Improper injection rates and/or concentrations led to many failures in the industry. These
failures were mostly identified as Caustic Stress Corrosion Cracking (CSCC).(1-3)

Caustic Stress Corrosion Cracking (CSCC) is a form of Environment Assisted Cracking (EAC),
characterized by surface-initiated cracks that occur in materials exposed to caustic. EAC, which is
defined as a cracking process caused by the synergistic effects of stress, and environment on a
specific material.(2) All three factors–stress, aggressive environment, and susceptible material–are
necessary for EAC. This damage mechanism can affect many materials including carbon steel, low
alloy steel, series 300 stainless steel, and Nickel base alloys. However, Nickel base alloys are
recommended for high temperature services starting at 230 oF which are possibly contaminated with
caustic. Predominantly, this cracking mechanism follows an intergranular path. (1-4)

Previously, Alloy 800 (UNS N08800) was tested(5) in steam environments containing caustic and
chlorides. The wet/dry steam environment experiment with caustic carried on for 22 weeks and no
cracking was reported. Furthermore, the chlorides environment carried on for 36 weeks and no
cracking was reported for the non-welded specimens. Another, chlorides environment experiment was
performed on welded specimens which cracked intergranularly in the heat-affected (large-grained) zone
after 6-13 weeks. The cracked specimens were not annealed after welding. However, the annealed
specimens did not fail after 13 weeks(5).

In other tests, however, it was reported that Alloy 800 was susceptible to CSCC at 610 oF in sodium
hydroxide concentration (≤ 10% NaOH) and 500 oF at 20% NaOH(6). Increasing caustic concentration
for water treatment and/or pH control increases the probability and severity of cracking in addition to
similar effects of temperature increase. Moreover, various reports indicated failures of Alloy 800 in
nuclear power generation industry due to CSCC in steam systems(7).

Background
In a sulfur recovery unit, a leak was observed downstream of the High Pressure (HP) Steam
Superheater 8” piping during operation. A temporary clamp was installed for 11 months. Then, the
clamp was removed and the pipe was sent for failure analysis. The pipe was in service for six years.
Design specifications and operating conditions of the pipe is provided in Table 1.

Table 1
Design Specifications and Operating Conditions

Material of fabrication ASTM 1B407 (UNS N08800)-Seamless*

Size (Dia./Thickness) 8” Sch. 40
Service environment High pressure-temperature steam
Length of service 6 Years
Design & operating temperature 1050 oF & 600oF
Design & operating pressure 725 psig & 635 psig
* As shown on equipment datasheet.

This HP Steam Superheater was fed saturated steam through an 8” pipe. Downstream of the heater,
the superheated steam exits through an 8” pipe which connects to a 2” pressure balance line. The
other end of this 2” pressure balance line is the saturated steam that fed to furnace. This line was
intermittently operated. The failure of the 8” downstream piping was located just downstream of the 2”
pressure balance line as shown in Figure 1. Different chemicals are being injected into the system such
caustic soda, neutralizing amines, oxygen scavenger and antiscalant.

1
ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Dr., West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959.
 Figure 1: HP Steam Superheater diagram.

FAILURE ANALYSIS PROCEDURE

Positive material identification (PMI) was carried out on the cracked pipe on the tubes using Optical
Emission Spectroscopy (OES) analyzer confirmed that the cracked pipe chemistry was Alloy 800,
(Table 2).

Table 2
Chemical Composition Analysis Results (Weight %) Compared to UNS N08800

Element Pipe UNS N08800

C 0.10 0.10 max.
Ni 32.13 30 min.
Cr 20.42 19 min.
Fe 45.25 39.5 min.
Si 0.05 1.00 max.
Mn 0.60 1.50 max.
Cu 0.05 0.75 max.
Al 0.18 0.15-0.60.
Ti 0.36 0.15-0.60.
S 0.012 0.015 max.

Figures 2 and 3 show photographs of the as-received cracked pipe. The pipe was visually examined
externally. There was no evidence of corrosion found on the pipe’s external surface. Close examination
revealed nearly the entire circumference was cracked from 7 O’clock to 5 O’clock position as shown. In
addition, the pipe was found to be longitudinally welded.
 Flow Direction Flow Direction

Weld Bulge

Side A Side B
Figure 2: A general, as-received photographs of the failed pipe.

Figure 3: Close-up image of the crack.

Slight bulging to the inside was observed as shown in Figure 4. The bulge appeared to be at the end of
the clamp location. Internal visual examination showed that the internal surface exhibited
interconnected cracks like mud-cracking or a spider web as shown in Figure 5. Moreover, no metal loss
was observed on the internal surface.

Figure 4: Close-up image of the pipe showing a bulge.

 Figure 5: Close-up image of ID showing interconnected cracks.

Microscopic evaluation examination

The cross-sectional sample at one crack-end was prepared as shown in Figure 5. Microscopic
evaluation revealed intergranular cracks with no corrosion deposits as shown in Figure 6 and 7. The
observed metal loss of material shown in Figure 6 was likely grain dropout as a result of intergranual
cracking mechanism. The observed microstructure showed an equiaxed austenite grains with some
annealing twins. In addition, no sensitization was noticed at the grain-boundaries.

OD

OD ID
ID
Figure 6: Photomicrographs showing the pipe microstructure with intergranular cracks at
different magnification (10% Oxalic acid etched).
OD OD

ID ID
Figure 7: Photomicrographs showing the pipe microstructure with intergranular cracks at
different magnification (10% Oxalic acid etched).

Micro-hardness

Micro-Hardness measurements was carried out on the microscopically evaluated sample. The
hardness indentation was performed from the ID to OD.

ID

OD

Figure 8: Photo shows the cross-sectional sample with hardness indentation.

Table 3
Micro-Hardness Measurement Results

Measured
Indent ID to OD
Hardness
No.
(HV 0.5)
1 219
2 200
3 181
4 179
5 194
6 212
Average 198
 DISCUSSION
A series of intergranular cracks developed as shown in the examined microstructure. All gathered
evidence strongly suggested that the pipe cracked due to environmental stress corrosion cracking,
specifically Caustic Stress Corrosion Cracking (CSCC). The cracks most likely initiated at wet
conditions and propagated with time. In general, cracking can be promoted by residual stresses that
result from welding or from cold working during forming as well as applied stresses. However, the crack
was circumferential in this failure, most likely due to bending stress. The hardness levels were found to
be acceptable for this type of material and the materials condition in general did not seem to have
played a role in the failure.

Wet conditions are required for this type of damage mechanism. One possible scenario was water
condensed in the 2” pressure balance line occurred as line was not operated continuously and not
insulated. Another possible scenario was that the 2” valve isolating the saturated steam line from the
failed line (superheated steam) was passing. As a result, the wet steam/water was passed through the
2” gate valve as shown in Figure 9. Apparently, the crack was initiated at the 12” O’clock position which
supports the suspected wet conditions from the 2” line.

Figure 9: Sketch showing possible wet condition scenario.

Similar leaks may have developed in this system. Cracks might have initiated but may not have yet
leaked. For more reliable and safe operation, it was recommended to inspect the aforementioned piping
for cracking in addition to high risk locations in the system to prevent similar failures.

The design conditions were reviewed and change of the piping metallurgy was not recommended at
this stage. Alloy 800 was considered suitable for this application and probably even over-specified for
the operating conditions.

The bulging that was found was most likely as a result of the maintenance clamping that was used to
stop the leak and was not found to have played a role in this particular failure.
 CONCLUSIONS
 The analysis results strongly suggested that failure was due to Caustic Stress Corrosion
Cracking (CSCC). This type of damage mechanism can affect many materials. Therefore,
existing equipment and piping may have already been affected. Cracks for example, may have
already initiated but may not have failed yet.
 Although the material of this pipe did not conform to the piping specification as a seamless pipe
as show in the Line Designation Table, the seam weld did not contribute to the failure.
 Operation procedures and piping arrangement is recommended to be reviewed to eliminate
water carrying over into the superheated steam line.
 In addition, caustic carryover in the steam was suspected. It was recommended to evaluate the
water treatment program implemented in place.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank Saudi Aramco for allowing this work to be published and colleagues
who contributed to the various tests and characterization of the samples specially Abbas A. Al-Turaifi
and Mohammad Y. Al-Salman.

REFERENCES
1. Reynolds J., 99 Diseases of Pressure Equipment: Caustic Cracking, Inspectioneering Journal.

2. NACE International, Avoiding Caustic Stress Corrosion Cracking of Refinery Equipment and
Piping, Standard RP0403-2008.

3. API 2RP 571(2011); Damage Mechanisms Affecting Fixed Equipment in the Refining Industry,
American Petroleum Institute, (Washington, NW)

4. Rebak, R. B. (2006). Industrial Experience on the Caustic Cracking of Stainless Steels and
Nickel Alloys - a Review. NACE International

5. R.D. Kane, Corrosion in Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Operations, Corrosion:

Environments and Industries, Vol 13C, ASM Handbook, ASM International, 2006, p
967–1014.
6. Griess, J C, Hammond, J P, & Maxwell, W A. Effects of chloride and caustic on the cracking
behavior of several materials under alternate wet and dry steam conditions. United States.
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Solutions”. NACE International.
8. Rebak, R. B., Environmentally assisted cracking of nickel alloys —a review, Environment-
Induced Cracking of Materials,Elsevier,2008, Pages 435-446.
9. ASTM B407 (2014); “Specification for Nickel-Iron-Chromium Alloy Seamless Pipe and Tube”,
ASTM International (West Conshohocken, PA: ASTM).

2
American Petroleum Institute (API), 1220 L Street, NW Washington, DC 20005-4070.