Module 4

Thai Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy

INTRODUCTION
Happy hour! This module aims to enlighten the readers about Thai politics as well as foreign
policy. This module also addresses the three formidable problems that Thai government is facing. Have a
ponderous moment!

OBJECTIVES:
At the end of this module, you will be able to:
1. Know the foreign policies embedded in Thai society;
2. Develop a critical understanding on Thai domestic politics and foreign
policy;
3. Appreciate the efforts of Thai government to address these problems
effectively.
(ACTIVATE)
Exercises #1: CONCEPT MAP
By using the template below, fill in the table in connection with the
Constitutional Monarchy structure of government.
(ACQUIRE)
From Bureaucratic Polity to Bourgeois Polity?
For years Thailand was described as a bureaucratic polity or political system such as the
following:

“Cabinet members, for the most part, have been officials who have risen to political
eminence; and in the conduct of their roles as members of the ruling circle,
cabinet politicians have shown themselves more responsive to the interests and
demands of their bureaucratic subordinates than to the concerns of interest groups,
political parties or legislative bodies outside the state apparatus.”

Within this framework military has been the dominant political institution. The
bureaucratic polity survived into early 1970’s with serious challenge, but substantial economic
and social changes led to its collapse in 1973. The most significant of these changes was
economic growth based upon rapidly increasing exports of primary products, a growing service
sector, and the expansion of an industrial sector producing textiles and other light industrial
products for export and of consumer goods for domestic markets. It was aided by a favorable
climate of world trade, cheap energy costs, and high levels of aid and foreign investment.

This pattern of economic growth facilitated the development of several significant social
forces. The most notable one was a Bangkok – centered business elite dominated by major
banking families and commercial and industrial firms. In Thailand each of the newly expanding
social forces had reason to dislike the restrictions of bureaucratic polity. Many businessmen were
“disenchanted with its outmoded, inefficient and restrictive paternalism, and there was growing
awareness that the officials of the polity needed businessmen more than businessmen needed
officials.

Many intellectuals chafed at the restrictions on intellectual and political discourse and
had growing contempt for the political leadership. Workers were prevented from organizing
unions to bargain for higher wages and better working conditions. These attitudes, coupled with
growing corruption in the regime, economic incompetence, and rivalry within its ranks resulted in
the student – led rebellion of 1973, which toppled the regime and introduced a three – year period
of constitutional politics with a more open political process.

In Thailand, today political participation in decision making clearly extends to “bourgeois

– middle class groups” and is no longer the sole province of employees of the state. The most
significant of these new groups are members of the business elite, who have to play a major role
 in Thai cabinets and in economic decision making. They are no longer the “pariah entrepreneurs”
of the bureaucratic polity. Two caveats are in order. The first is that the present polity also
includes some access for labor unions, especially on such issues as the minimum wage. The
second is that the military still plays an extremely important role in decision - making.

The institutional framework for the new policy is the 1978 constitution, which
established an elected House of Representatives and an appointed, military – dominated
Senate, which could sit to vote on bills affecting national security, the budget, the throne, and votes of no
confidence. The clauses that gave the Senate these powers expired in 1973 despite major efforts
by military leaders to amend the constitution to retain a strong Senate and give senators the right
to be appointed members of the cabinet.

The “military – dominated Senate would no longer be permitted to sit in joint session
with the lower house to deliberate on legislation or to vote on no – confidence motions.” The
defeat of amendments is significant partly as a triumph for parliamentary government, but also
for limiting military access to cabinet positions while continuing to provide access for leading
businessmen – politicians.

The cabinet is the centerpiece of the present bureaucratic - parliamentary compromise,

other institutional frameworks have also emerged to permit wider participation than was allowed under
the bureaucratic polity. One example is the recently established
tripartite negotiations including the Finance Ministry, the Bank
of Thailand, and the Banker’s Association to discuss policies
including affecting the monetary and fiscal situation.

The key figure in the polity is the prime minister, who has the main responsibility of
brokering a “free – for – all between a growing numbers of organized
constituencies” and shifting coalitions, including constituencies outside
the state. Prime Minister ‘Prem has been criticized for being indecisive and
unable to implement a comprehensive program to address Thailand’s problems.

The major problem of bureaucratic polity was the growing gap

between demands for participation on the one hand and a political rigidity on
the other. The present arrangements help bridge this gap by giving
previously excluded social forces a greater opportunity to influence the exercise of authority, at the
same time making it more difficult for the military to veto this influence.
 Three other factors have contributed to the unexpected stability of the present
constitutional arrangements. One is the growing influence of a cadre of highly skilled technocrats
in the Budget Bureau, the National Economic and Social Development Board, and other
ministries. The second factor has been the absence of major external economic and foreign policy
shocks. Most notable in this regard has been the stability of oil prices. The third and most
significant factor has been the monarchy’s strong support for Prime Minister Prem.

Prospects for the Future

The present polity’s strength is its ability to accommodate the demands of a wider range
of groups than could be the bureaucratic polity. It’s weakness are threefold: (1) with the
exception of a narrow range of fiscal and monetary policies aimed at stabilizing prices and
alleviating a worsening balance of trade problem, its leaders have a difficulty designing and
implementing coherent development policies.

(2) A similar lack of coherence continues to affect policy objectives in export promotion
and industrial restructuring. Implementing coherent policy is very difficult, first, because of
problems in accommodating diverse business factions in the cabinet. This lack of coherent
economic policies to resolve structural problems is particularly significant because the second
weakness is that the legitimacy of the present polity rests largely upon economic performance.

“Effectiveness may be the short – term substitute for legitimacy.” – Kusuma

Snitwongse

(3) The third weakness of the regime is dissatisfaction with the present constitutional
arrangements among military circles and their desire to increase military’s influence over the
government. Military leaders have never fully reestablished the preeminent position they enjoyed
in Thai politics.

Several attempts have been made to reassert military dominance. The most striking
was the attempt by the “Young Turks” to seize control in a coup d’état. The rationale for the coup
was that the civilian government under Prime Minister Prem was weak, indecisive and unable to
solve worsening economic and social problems. A newer and much more sophisticated
approach to reassert military leadership and provide a rationale for a continuing role in politics has
been made by “Democratic Soldiers.” This group of officers has argued that defeating the communist
insurgency in Thailand requires political strategies as well as military ones.
 The Democratic Soldiers call for a “political offensive” that will eliminate dictatorship in
Thailand, build genuine democracy, and use democratic means to solve economic and social
problems that have facilitated the growth of the communist movement. If such strategy is
pursued, they argue, it will undermine the sources of communist strength. The argument of
Democratic Soldiers is that past elected governments have not been democratic.

Thai Foreign Policy

The main focus of Thai foreign policy since 1979 has been the Vietnam occupation of
Cambodia and efforts to achieve a solution to this problem. The invasion of Cambodia forced a
major readjustment of Thai foreign policy, which had already gone through several significant
readjustments. In Thailand’s most recent readjustment of its foreign policy, the PRC has become
the main deterrent to a possible large – scale Vietnamese attack upon Thailand while the United
States remains key patron and the main source of weapons.

ASEAN is important as a forum for regional support of the Thai position and for help in
preventing the United Nations from recognizing the Heng Samrin regime. However, there are a
number of potential military threats to Thai political stability and security stemming from the
Vietnamese presence in Cambodia. One is the danger of border confrontations escalating into
uncontrolled conflict. Another is the temptation for Vietnamese troops to strike deeper and harder
into Thailand than in the past to punish the Thais for assistance to rebels and to destabilize the
Thai government. A third possibility is the open invasion of Thailand by Vietnamese troops.

Vietnamese analysts apparently believe Thailand is in a weak position economically and

unstable politically. The Vietnamese leaders clearly believe they can manipulate these differing
views to their own benefit. These Vietnamese expectations are likely to be proven wrong over the
next few years. The Thai economy is stronger than portrayed by the Vietnamese. Oil import costs
have stabilized, and for the next few years both agricultural and industrial growth rates are likely
to remain steady. Foreign direct investment has not been deterred by the border clashes, and
Thailand is widely viewed as having a promising investment climate.

The final threat to Thai political stability stemming from Vietnam’s invasion of
Kampucheais the possibility that a continuation or worsening of the present levels of conflict
along the Thai – Cambodian border might encourage the military to reassert itself in domestic
politics. The present conflict does provide some military factions with an argument to shift the
current bureaucratic – parliamentary compromise in their favor.
Remaining Threats to Thai Security

The major threat to Thai security in the longer term is the possible renewal of the
insurgency in the northeastern and northern provinces. While the number of armed insurgents in
these regions has dropped dramatically in recent years, there are reasons to believe that the
original causes of the insurgency have not be permanently removed.

One major reason for its collapse was the curtailment of external support from the PRC
and the closing of base areas in Laos and Cambodia by the Vietnamese. Second, the
government’s new programs under order 66/2523 were extremely well timed to take advantage of
the difficulties caused by the loss of external support, and they have been effectively
implemented.

Two of these conditions are subject to reversal. The World Bank projects a decline in
rural incomes in the northeast in the late 1980s as a consequence of growing population,
limited arable land, and limitations on the kinds of crops that can be grown in northeast. Nevertheless, the
recent improvements appear to be fragile. A decline in rural income is likely to worsen income
distribution, close off opportunities for education and social mobility, and leave substantial
numbers of person vulnerable to abuses of power.

A prudent course for the Thai government, however, might be to assume a worse – case
prospect and remove potential causes of support for renewed insurgency while it has the
opportunity. To prevent the renewal of insurgency would require several steps that the present
Thai government will find difficult, given the predominance of urban – based groups in politics.

Other groups outside the military and bureaucracy are able to bring pressure to bear on
the government. With few exceptions as sugar planters and millers, however, these groups are
urban – based and are unlikely to push for structural changes that would reorder present
priorities and the policies that support them. The critical indicator of such a move would be efforts
of one or more of the large parties to “reach out to form an alliance with the farmers expanding
political participation in the countryside.”

If some of the present leaders begin to make this choice, the prospects for both stability
and security would be enhanced. If they do not, the present stability and security are likely to
erode in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

APPLICATION
 Instruction: In your own words, expound the passage “Effectiveness may be the short –
term substitute for legitimacy.”byKusuma Snitwongse.

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ASSESSMENT
Instruction: Identify what is asked in the question. Write your answers in the space provided.

1. According to the 1978 constitution, assumes the main responsibility of

brokering a “free – for – all between a growing numbers of organized constituencies” and
shifting coalitions, including constituencies outside the state. _________________________

2. They are group of officers who argued that defeating the communist insurgency in
Thailand requires political strategies as well as military ones. _________________________

3. What has been the dominant political institution within this framework?
_____________________________
 4. Despite of large – scale Vietnamese attack upon Thailand, this country still remains as
a key patron and the source of weapons. _________________________

5. In Thailand, political participation in decision makingis no longer the sole province of

employees of the state but it extends to __________________________

TRUE/ FALSE: Write T if the statement is TRUE and F if otherwise. Write your
answer in the space provided.

___________6. The Democratic Soldiers call for a “political uprising” that will eliminate
dictatorship in Thailand, build genuine democracy, and use democratic means to solve economic
and social problems that have facilitated the growth of the communist movement.

___________7. The rationale for the coup was that the civilian government under Prime Minister
Chan – o - cha was weak, indecisive and unable to solve worsening economic and social
problems.

___________8. ASEAN is important as a forum for regional support of the Thai position and for
help in preventing the United Nations from recognizing the Heng Samrin regime.

___________9. The House of Representative is the centerpiece of the present bureaucratic -

parliamentary compromise, other institutional frameworks have also emerged to permit wider
participation than was allowed under the bureaucratic polity.

__________10. One of the factors that contributed to the unexpected stability of the present
constitutional arrangements is the growing influence of a cadre of highly skilled technocrats.

Summary

Thailand began the 1980s facing three formidable problems: finding an appropriate
balance between military and civilian political power, refashioning and economy that
appeared to be developing serious structural difficulties, and dealing with the consequences
of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

References

Jackson, Karl; Paribatra, S. and Dwijandono. J.S. (2002). ASEAN in Regional and

Global Context. Institute of East Asian Studies. University of California.