CASE 1. TANTANO VS.
CABOVERDE she should not pay the full amount considering that the value of the
FACTS: Petitioners files a complaint of annulment of the Deed of Sale
of lots from their parents Maximo and Dominalda. During the
pendency of the case, the parties executed a Partial Settlement
Agreement (PSA) fixing the share of the uncontroverted properties
among themselves, in particular, the adverted additional eight (8)
parcels of land including their respective products and
improvements. Under the PSA, Dominalda’s daughter, Josephine,
shall be appointed as Administrator. The PSA provided that
Dominalda shall be entitled to receive a share of one-half (1/2) of the
net income derived from the uncontroverted properties. The PSA
also provided that Josephine shall have special authority, among
others, to provide for the medicine of her mother.
Both Annabelle Saldia and Jesus Tan then took their
respective oaths of office and filed a motion to fix and approve bond
which was approved by the trial court over petitioners’ opposition.
Petitioners harp on the fact that the court a quo failed to
require Dominalda to post a bond prior to the issuance of the order
appointing a receiver, in violation of Section 2, Rule 59 of the Rules
of court
Respondents insist that where there is sufficient cause to
appoint a receiver, there is no need for an applicant’s bond because
under Sec. 2 of Rule 59, the very purpose of the bond is to answer
for all damages that may be sustained by a party by reason of the
appointment of a receiver in case the applicant shall have procured
such appointment without sufficient cause.
Issue: WON posting bond is required in receivership?
Held: YES
Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order
appointing a receiver the court shall require the applicant to file a
bond executed to the party against whom the application is
presented. The use of the word "shall" denotes its mandatory
nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in this case, the
consent of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence, the filing of an
applicant’s bond is required at all times. On the other hand, the
requirement of a receiver’s bond rests upon the discretion of the
court. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 clearly states that the court may, in its
discretion, at any time after the appointment, require an additional
bond as further security for such damages.
CASE 2. ENRIQUEZ VS. MERCANTILE INSURANCE CO
FACTS: Petitioner Enriquez filed a replevin case against Asuten for
the recovery of the Toyota Hi-Ace van valued at P300,000.00. She
applied for a bond in the amount of P600,000.00 with respondent in
Asuten's favor. The Regional Trial Court approved the bond and
ordered the sheriff to recover the van from Asuten and to deliver it
to petitioner. While the van was in petitioner's custody, the Regional
Trial Court dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to
prosecute. Thus, it ordered the sheriff to restore the van to Asuten.
When petitioner failed to produce the van, the Regional Trial Court
directed respondent to pay Asuten the amount of the bond.
Due to Enriquez's failure to remit the amount, Mercantile
Insurance paid Asuten ₱600,000.00 in compliance with RTC. It was
also constrained to file a collection suit against Enriquez. In her
defense, Enriquez claimed that her daughter-in-law, Asela, filed the
Complaint for Replevin in her name and that Asela forged her
signature in the indemnity agreement. She also argued that she
could not be held liable since the replevin bond had already expired.  Civil Case No. 10846. Unfortunately, she did not. Respondent was,
RTC ruled in favor of Mercantile Insurance. It found that
non-payment of the premiums did not cause the replevin bond to
expire. Thus, Enriquez was still liable for the reimbursement made by
the surety on the bond.  lawful order of the RTC in Civil Case No. 10846. If there were any
Enriquez appealed with the CA, arguing that the replevin
bond had already expired; therefore, she could not have been liable
under the indemnity agreement. She also averred that even
assuming that she was still liable under the indemnity agreement,
van was only ₱300,000.00.
CA rendered a Decision affirming the decision of the RTC. 
ISSUE: WON Enriquez should be made liable for the full amount of
the bond paid by respondent 
HELD: Yes. Replevin is an action for the recovery of personal
property. It is both a principal remedy and a provisional relief. When
utilized as a principal remedy, the objective is to recover possession
of personal property that may have been wrongfully detained by
another. When sought as a provisional relief, it allows a plaintiff to
retain the contested property during the pendency of the action.
As a provisional remedy, a party may apply for an order for
the delivery of the property before the commencement of the action
or at any time before an answer is filed.  Rule 60, Section 2 requires
that the party seeking the issuance of the writ must first file the
required affidavit and a bond in an amount that is double the value
of the property.
Once the affidavit is filed and the bond is approved by the
court, the court issues an order and a writ of seizure requiring the
sheriff to take the property into his or her custody. If there is no
further objection to the bond filed within five (5) days from the
taking of the property, the sheriff shall deliver it to the applicant. The
contested property remains in the applicant's custody until the court
determines, after a trial on the issues, which among the parties has
the right of possession. 48
She is incorrect. Under the Guidelines on Corporate Surety Bonds: 
Unless and until the Supreme Court directs otherwise, 55 the
lifetime or duration of the effectivity of any bond issued in criminal
and civil actions/special proceedings, or in any proceeding or
incident therein shall be from its approval by the court, until the
action or proceeding is finally decided, resolved or terminated. This
condition must be incorporated in the terms and condition of the
bonding contract and shall bind the parties notwithstanding their
failure to expressly state the same in the said contract or agreement. 
Of all the provisional remedies provided in the Rules of
Court, only Rule 60, Section 2 requires that the amount of the bond
be double the value of the property. 
However, there is a rationale to the requirement that the
bond for a writ of seizure in a replevin be double the value of the
property. The bond functions not only to indemnify the defendant in
case the property is lost, but also to answer for any damages that
may be awarded by the court if the judgment is rendered in
defendant's favor. 
Thus, the requirement that the bond be double the actual
value of the properties litigated upon. Such is the case because the
bond will answer for the actual loss to the plaintiff, which
corresponds to the value of the properties sought to be recovered
and for damages, if any.59
Any application of the bond in a replevin case, therefore, is
premised on the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant. Thus,
the Rules of Court imply that there must be a prior judgment on the
merits before there can be any application on the bond.
Forfeiture of the replevin bond, therefore, requires first, a
judgment on the merits in the defendant's favor, and  second, an
application by the defendant for damages. Neither circumstance
appears in this case. The Regional Trial Court would have erred in
ordering the forfeiture of the entire bond in Asuten's favor,
considering that there was no trial on the merits or an application by
Asuten for damages. This judgment could have been reversed had
petitioner appealed the Regional Trial Court's May 24, 2004 Order in
thus, constrained to follow the Regional Trial Court's directive to pay
Asuten the full amount of the bond.
Respondent paid ₱600,000.00 to Asuten pursuant to a
errors in the judgment of the RTC, as discussed above, petitioner
could have appealed this. Petitioner, however, chose to let civil case
lapse into finality. This case cannot now be used as a substitute for
her lost appeal.
 Hence, the petition was denied.

CASE 3 AGNER VS BPI

FACTS: Spouses Agner obtained a 800K loan from CITIMOTORS.

Spouses executed a promissory note with chattel mortgage over a
Mitsubishi vehicle in favor of Citimotors, Inc. The contract stated that
the spouses would make a monthly payment of 17K and that 6%
interest per month shall be imposed for failure to pay each
installment. The PN also stated that in case of failure to pay, the
entire amount shall be due and payable without need of prior notice
or demand. Citimotors assigned all its interests in the PN to ABN
AMRO BANK, which assigned the same to BPI FAMILY. Spouses
defaulted in payment. BPI sent a demand letter to petitioners,
declaring the entire obligation as due and demandable, and requiring
them to pay 570K or the surrender of the mortgaged vehicle. As the
demand was unheeded, BPI filed an action for REPLEVIN and
DAMAGES before MANILA RTC. A writ of Replevin was issued;
however, the vehicle was not seized. THE RTC and CA ruled for BPI.

Issue: Whether demand is necessary prior to the filing of application

for the writ of replevin.

Whether respondent's remedy of resorting to both actions of

replevin and collection of sum of money is contrary to the provision
of Article 1484 of the Civil Code and the Elisco Tool Manufacturing
Corporation v. Court of Appeals 10 ruling.

Records bear that both verbal and written demands were in fact
made by respondent prior to the institution of the case against
petitioners. Even assuming, for argument's sake, that no demand
letter was sent by respondent, there is really no need for it because
petitioners legally waived the necessity of notice or demand in the
Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage, which they voluntarily and
knowingly signed in favor of respondent's predecessor-in-interest.

Further, the Court even ruled in Navarro v. Escobido that prior

demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of
replevin, since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of
Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on the
possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin
could be filed.

Also, there is no violation of Article 1484 of the Civil Code and the
Court's decision in Elisco Tool Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of
Appeals.

The remedies provided for in Art. 1484 are alternative, not

cumulative. The exercise of one bars the exercise of the others. This
limitation applies to contracts purporting to be leases of personal
property with option to buy by virtue of Art. 1485.

Compared with Elisco, the vehicle subject matter of this case was
never recovered and delivered to respondent despite the issuance of
a writ of replevin. As there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot
be said that petitioners were deprived of the use and enjoyment of
the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent pursued, commenced or
concluded its actual foreclosure. The trial court, therefore, rightfully
granted the alternative prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent
to the remedy of "[e]xact[ing] fulfillment of the obligation."
Certainly, there is no double recovery or unjust enrichment to speak
of.