MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent

G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts,
the MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS
has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).

ISSUE:

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine,
Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which
is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
 Chavez vs Public Estates Authority

G.R. No. 133250, Nov. 11, 2003

Facts:

• In 1973, the government signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also
included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to
carry out all the works in consideration of 50% of the reclaimed land.

• In 1977, then President Marcos created the Public Estates Authority (PEA), tasking it to “reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged areas” and “to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all
kinds of lands” and issued another Presidential Decree transferring to PEA the “lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay” under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project (MCCRRP).

• In 1981, then President Marcos issued a memo directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that
“All future works in MCCRRP shall be funded and owned by PEA.

• In 1988, then President Aquino issued a Special Patent transferring to PEA the reclaimed parcels of
land. Then, the Register of Deeds of Parañaque issued titles in the name of PEA, covering the “Freedom
Islands”.

• In 1995, the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to
develop the Freedom Islands without public bidding.

• In 1998, Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends that
the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI.
Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a violation of Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private
corporations.

• Court denied his motion for a TRO.

Issue:

Whether the stipulations in the amended Joint Venture Agreement for the transfer to Amari of certain
lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling:

Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint which is hereby
declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
Ratio:

The Regalian Doctrine

• The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian
Doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Upon the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all “lands, territories and possessions” in the Philippines
passed to the Spanish Crown.

• The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution adopted the Regalian Doctrine substituting, however, the State,
in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. It is a time-honored
principle of land ownership that “all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or grant, belong to the public domain.”

• AMARI as a private corporation cannot acquire the reclaimed Freedom Islands, though alienable lands
of the public domain, except by lease, as provided under Sec. 3, Article XII of the Constitution.

• The Decision does not bar private corporations from participating in reclamation projects and being
paid for their services in reclaiming lands. The Decision however prohibits, private corporations to
acquire reclaimed lands of the public domain.

• Despite the nullity of the Amended JUA, AMARI is not precluded from recovering from the PEA in the
proper proceedings, on a quantum meruit basis, whatever AMERI may have incurred in implementing
the Amended JUA prior to its declaration of nullity.

FRENZEL v. CATITO

G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003

Ponente: J. CALLEJO Sr.

DOCTRINE:

A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot
come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out

FACTS:

Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He was so enamored with
Ederlina that he bought her numerous properties such as house and lot in Quezon City and in Davao
City. He also put up a beauty parlor business in the name of Ederlina. Alfred was unaware that Ederlina
was married until her spouse Klaus Muller wrote a letter to Alfred begging the latter to leave her wife
alone.

When Alfred and Ederlinas relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina had not been able to secure a
divorce from Klaus. The latter could charge her for bigamy and could even involve Alfred, who himself
was still married. To avoid complications, Alfred decided to live separately from Ederlina and cut off all
contacts with her.
On October 15, 1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlinas father, complaining that Ederlina had taken all his life
savings and because of this, he was virtually penniless. He further accused the Catito family of acquiring
for themselves the properties he had purchased with his own money. He demanded the return of all the
amounts that Ederlina and her family had stolen and turn over all the properties acquired by him and
Ederlina during their coverture.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner could recover the money used in purchasing the several properties

HELD:

No, even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by him as the real
vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio. A
contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot
come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or
property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may
not maintain an action for his losses. To him who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is
unyielding. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties
where it finds them.

BOARD OF MEDICINE v. YASUYUKI OTA,

GR No. 166097, 2008-07-14

Facts:

Board of Medicine (Board) of the PRC, in a letter dated March 8, 1993, denied respondent's request for a
license to practice medicine in the Philippines on the ground that the Board "believes that no genuine
reciprocity can be found in the law of Japan... as there is no Filipino or foreigner who can possibly
practice there." [9]

Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against the Board before the RTC of
Manila on June 24, 1993, which petition was amended on February 14, 1994 to implead the PRC through
its Chairman.

On October 19, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision finding that respondent had adequately proved that
the medical laws of Japan allow foreigners like Filipinos to be granted license and be admitted into the
practice of medicine under the principle of reciprocity; and that the Board had a ministerial duty of
issuing the Certificate of Registration and license to respondent, as it was shown that he had
substantially complied with the requirements under the law.[12] The RTC then ordered the Board to
issue in favor of... respondent the corresponding Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice
medicine in the Philippines.[13]

The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed the case to the CA, stating that while respondent
submitted documents showing that foreigners are allowed to practice medicine in Japan, it was not
shown that the conditions for the practice of medicine there are practical and... attainable by a foreign
applicant, hence, reciprocity was not established; also, the power of the PRC and the Board to regulate
and control the practice of medicine is discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not compellable by a
writ of mandamus.[14]

The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.[15]

Hence, herein petition

Issues:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT
HAD ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF RECIPROCITY IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE BETWEEN THE
PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN.

Ruling:

The Court denies the petition for lack of merit.

R.A. No. 2382, which provides who may be candidates for the medical board examinations, merely
requires a foreign citizen to submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), showing that his country's existing laws... permit citizens of the
Philippines to practice medicine under the same rules and regulations governing citizens thereof.

Section (j) of P.D. No. 223 also defines the extent of PRC's power to grant licenses, i.e., it may, upon
recommendation of the board, approve the registration and authorize the issuance of a certificate of
registration with or without examination to a foreigner who is... registered under the laws of his
country, provided the following conditions are met: (1) that the requirement for the registration or
licensing in said foreign state or country are substantially the same as those required and contemplated
by the laws of the Philippines; (2) that... the laws of such foreign state or country allow the citizens of
the Philippines to practice the profession on the same basis and grant the same privileges as the subject
or citizens of such foreign state or country; and (3) that the applicant shall submit competent and...
conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the DFA, showing that his country's existing laws permit
citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession under the rules and regulations governing citizens
thereof.

The said provision further states that the PRC is authorized to prescribe additional requirements or grant
certain privileges to foreigners seeking registration in the Philippines if the same privileges are granted
to or some additional requirements are required of... citizens of the Philippines in acquiring the same
certificates in his country.

Nowhere in said statutes is it stated that the foreign applicant must show that the conditions for the
practice of medicine in said country are practical and attainable by Filipinos. Neither is it stated that it
must first be proven that a Filipino has been... granted license and allowed to practice his profession in
said country before a foreign applicant may be given license to practice in the Philippines.

CARINO VS. CHR

G.R. No. 96681, Dec. 2, 1991

FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions”to act upon their grievances. The
“mass actions” consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio,
gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return
to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at
the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days
pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently
formed to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a
walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed
dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In
the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking
teachers’ to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the
respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that
while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as
teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier,
upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing
its case and held that the “striking teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they should not have
been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;” there had been violation of
their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved

HELD:

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant
by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.

SIMON VS. COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. NO. 100150 JANUARY 05, 1994

Facts:

The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the
petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management
Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by,... the private respondents
(being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated)

On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang
Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary
Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop
the demolition of the... private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA.

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as
CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the
demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and... carinderia,[5] the CHR, in its resolution of
1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor
of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's...
supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that
violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest.

A motion to dismiss,[7] dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction.

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the
motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved.

On 18 September 1990, a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the
Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of
civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in... this case (were) not civil and political
rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business."

In an Order,[14] dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this recourse.

Issues:

Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:... a) to investigate the alleged violations of the
"business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the
instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;

Ruling:

There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection
of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and
public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and... hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed
against the religious

Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the
delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe
cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance,... mentioned such areas as the "(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3)
fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes
committed against the religious.

Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining
in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the... order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED.

Principles:

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all
parts of the world

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests
that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those... that relate to an individual's social,
economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the
universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be
his inherent and inalienable... rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.

There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection
of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and
public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and... hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed
against the religious.

Professional Regulation Commission v. De Guzman

G.R. No. 144681, [June 21, 2004]

FACTS: After the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) released the names of successful
examinees in the Medical Licensure Examination, the Board of Medicine observed that the grades of the
79 Fatima College of Medicine successful examinees were unusually and exceptionally high in the two
(2) most difficult subjects of the exam, i.e., Biochemistry and Obstetrics and Gynecology.

The Board then issued Resolution No. 19 withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees
from Fatima College of Medicine. As noted by PRC’s statistician consultant, Fr. Nebres of ADMU,
compared with other examinees from other schools, the results of those from Fatima were not only
incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. The NBI Investigation concluded that the
Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.

On July 5, 1993, the respondents-examinees filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC of Manila to
compel the PRC to give them their licenses to practice medicine. Meanwhile on July 21, 1993, the Board
of Medicine issued Resolution No. 21 charging the respondents of immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud
and deceit and recommended that the test results of the Fatima Examinees be nullified.
On December 19, 1994, the RTC of Manila promulgated its decision ordering the PRC to allow the
respondents to take the physician’s oath and to register them as physicians. The same was appealed by
the PRC to the Court of Appeals which sustained the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. WON it is a ministerial duty for the Board of Medicine to issue certificates of registration as physicians
under RA 2382

2. WON the respondent-examinees have the right to be registered as physicians

RULING:

1. A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word “shall”
with respect to the issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, the petitioners “shall sign and issue
certificates of registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the
Board.” In statutory construction the term “shall” is a word of command. It is given imperative meaning.
Thus, when an examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his physician’s license, the Board is
obliged to administer to him his oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1)
of Section 22 of the Medical Act of 1959.

However, the surrounding circumstances in this case call for serious inquiry concerning the satisfactory
compliance with the Board requirements by the respondents.

Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who aspires to practice medicine
in the Philippines, must have “satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination.” Section 22, in
turn, provides that the oath may only be administered “to physicians who qualified in the
examinations.” The operative word here is “satisfactorily,” defined as “sufficient to meet a condition or
obligation” or “capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance.” Gleaned from Board Resolution No. 26, the
licensing authority apparently did not find that the respondents “satisfactorily passed” the licensure
examinations. The Board instead sought to nullify the examination results obtained by the respondents.

Hence, until the moral and mental fitness of the respondents could be ascertained, the Board has
discretion to hold in abeyance the administration of the Hippocratic Oath and the issuance of the
certificates to them. The writ of mandamus does not lie to compel performance of an act which is not
duly authorized.

2. It is long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the
government. It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a
profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so
regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education,
order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned
professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a
prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field
of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance
among those who would practice medicine.
In the present case, RA 2382, as amended, prescribed the requirements for admission to the practice of
medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the scope and conduct of the
examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a physician’s license, or revoking a license that
has been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that
he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he
has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing
authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the privilege
will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if
denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been
satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without
thwarting the legislative will.

GUINGONA V. CARAGUE (G.R. NO. 94571)

April 22, 1991 | 196 SCRA 221

FACTS:

For the fiscal year of 1990, Congress passed RA 6831, otherwise known as the GAA Act of 1990. The said
budget contained an automatic appropriation of P98.4 billion, of which P86.8 billion was for debt
service. This automatic appropriation was made pursuant to three Marcos-era issuances: PDs 81, 1177,
and 1967.

The said Act set the appropriation for education at P29.7 billion -- significantly lower than the
appropriation for debt service. This was contrary to Section 5, Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution, which
states that "the State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education."

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not greater budget allocation for debt servicing as opposed to education violates Section
5, Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution.

2. Whether or not PDs 81, 1177, and 1967 are still operative despite having been issued during the
Marcos era.

3. Whether or not automatic appropriation is violative of Section 29(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

1. No, the constitutional provision that the highest appropriation should go to education does not mean
that the hands of Congress are so humstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of
the national interest and the attainment of other state policies/objectives. One of these policies is to
ensure that the President can take advantage of favorable economic conditions, such as situations
where interest rates are low.

2. Yes, said PDs are still operative. These were not automatically revoked upon the ouster of Marcos.
The Court held that these laws remain operative until they are amended, repealed, or revoked, and so
long as they are not inconsistent with the Constitution. In addition, the Court dismissed petitioners'
argument that the aforecited PDs fall within the ambit of Section 24, Art. VI pertaining to "all
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills," mainly because the PDs in question are considered enacted laws
and not bills.
3. No, the Court held there was no undue delegation of legislative power because the assailed PDs are
complete -- they set out a policy and are complete in their terms, such that the President doesn't have
any choice but to implement them.

Guzman vs. NU (G.R. No. L-68288)

Facts:

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National
University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued
and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable
remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged that
they were denied due process due to the fact that they were active participants in peaceful mass actions
within the premises of the University.

The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners’ failure to enroll for the first semester
of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their
constitutional and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his
activities in leading boycotts of classes. That Guzman “is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with the destruction of properties of
respondent University. The petitioners have “failures in their records, and are not of good scholastic
standing.”

Issue:

WON the petitioners were denied due process.

Held:

YES. Guzman et al were deprived of due process. In the first place, NU never showed which school
policies or duly published rules did Guzman et al violate upon which they may be expelled from. NU
failed to show that it conducted any sort of proceedings (not necessarily a trial-type one) to determine
Guzman et al’s liability or alleged participation in the said mass actions.
Under the Education Act of 1982, Guzman et al, as students, have the right among others “to freely
choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.” Guzman et al
were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools which provides that “no penalty shall be imposed upon any student
except for cause as defined in the Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated
and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.”
Therefore, in effect, NU, by barring the enrollment of Guzman et al imposed a sanction upon the students
without due investigation – such act is illegal.
The Supreme Court also emphasized the minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process, and these are:
1. That the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
2. That they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired;
3. That they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. That they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
5. That the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.