By

Joseph S. Miller
EDA, Inc
Introduction
 Over 35 Years in the Nuclear Power Industry
 MS Nuclear, BS Mechanical, BS Industrial
 Worked at a BWR Nuclear Power Station for 9 years.
 Responsible for Fuel, safety analyses and PRA.
 Responsible for Nuclear Steam Supply Systems
 Technical Support Manager for Emergency Response
Organization.
 Supported the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
in reviewing Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems.
Acknowledgements
 Thanks to Japanese Industrial Atomic Forum (JIAF)
 Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)
 AREVA PowerPoint- The Fukushima Daiichi Incident
– Dr. Matthias Braun
 Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) & Japan
Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) on Plant
Data
 Lake H. Barrett- Foundation For Nuclear Studies
Briefing
 General Electric
 The Fukushima Daiichi
Accident

1. What Happened?
2.Plant Designs
3.Accident Progression
4.Spent fuel pools
5.Radiological releases
6.Impact on US
What Happened?
Tsunami Size Was Accident Cause
3/11 15:45 at Fukushima I
Plant Designs - Fukushima Dai-ichi
 Unit 1 is BWR/3
 Units 2-4 are BWR/4
 BWR is a Boiling Water Reactor
 There are 52 Reactors in Japan and 104 Reactors in the
USA (35 BWRs & 69 PWRs)
 The Fukushima I reactors began operation in the
1970’s so they are all thirty - forty years old.
 They all are early vintage Mark I Containment Designs
Fukushima Dai-ichi Site Reactor and Fuel Specifications
Fukushima Dai-ichi – Tokyo Electric Power Co.

Reactor
Commercial Supplier
Reactor No. Net MWe Reactor Model
Start

Unit 1 439 BWR-3 3/71 GE

Unit 2 760 BWR-4 7/74 GE
Unit 3 760 BWR-4 3/76 Toshiba
Unit 4 760 BWR-4 10/78 Hitachi
Unit 5 760 BWR-4 4/78 Toshiba
Unit 6 1067 BWR-5 10/79 GE
PWR – Pressurized Water Reactor
 What happened?
•The plant was immediately shut down (scrammed)
when the earthquake first hit. Off-Site power was lost.
•Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) started to
provide backup electrical power to the plant’s backup
cooling system. The backup worked.
•All AC power to the station was lost when the Tsunami
flooded the EDGs.
•The diesel generators ceased functioning after
approximately one hour due to Tsunami induced
damage.
•At that point, the plant experienced a complete
blackout (no AC electric power at all). Commonly
called a “Station Blackout”.
Operating BWR
When it Started
Containment Isolation
The Tsunami Hits
 What happened (cont.)?
•Initially the Isolation condenser (IC) for Unit 1, which uses the
condensate as a heat sink, was used to remove the decay heat
from the shutdown reactors. After 1 or 2 hours, the 29,000
gallons of water in the IC is hot, the condensate heat sink was
not available and no heat removal was available for Unit 1.
•Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system for Units 2 & 3,
which operate on steam from the reactor, were used to cool
reactor core water, however, the battery‐supplied control valves
lost DC power after the prolonged use.
•DC power from batteries was consumed after approximately
34 hours.
•Hours passed as primary water inventory was lost and core
degradation occurred (through some combination of
zirconium oxidation and clad failure).
Isolation Condenser (Unit 1) and RCIC (Units 2 &
3) Were Used to Cool the Plants
RCIC Works for About 8 Hours
RCIC Stops Cooling Plants
 What happened?

•Hydrogen in reactor building exploded causing it to

collapse around the containment.
•The containment around the reactor and RPV were
reported to be intact.
•Pressure in the containment drywell rose as wetwell
became hotter.
•Hydrogen produced from zirconium oxidation was
vented from the containment into the reactor building.
Fuel in Top of Core is Uncovered
Zr-Water Begins at
 What happened?

•Portable diesel generators were delivered to the plant

site.
•AC power was restored allowing for a different backup
pumping system to replace inventory in reactor pressure
vessel (RPV).
•The decision was made to inject seawater into the RPV
to continue to the cooling process, another backup
system that was designed into the plant from inception.
•Radioactivity releases from operator initiated venting
appear to be decreasing.
Melting of the Fuel
Release of Fission Products
Containment is Last Barrier
Venting the Containment
Unit 1 Primary Containment Pressure
(D/W) & Reactor Pressure (3/11 – 3/16)
Decay Heat
Hydrogen Explosion Units 1 & 3
Damage to Torus Unit 2
Looking Down Units 3, 2 & 1
Units 4 & 3 Looking Down
Radiation Levels
Fukushima I Fuel Pools
Surry 1 & 2
 Surry Power Station, Unit 1 &2 II PWR-DRYSUB 2,546
06/25/1968
 Virginia Electric and Power Co. WEST 3LP 05/25/1972
 Surry, VA S&W 12/22/1972 90
 (17 miles NW of Newport News, VA) S&W 03/20/2003
 050-00280 05/25/2032
 www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/sur1.html 94
Current Event -Surry Power Station Shuts Down
After Apparent Tornado Cuts Off-site Electricity

 Apparent tornado damages switchyard adjacent to

nuclear units
 Loss of Off-Site Power
 Emergency Diesel Generators Activated
 Dominion Virginia Power crews have restored off-
site power to station
 Back-up diesel generators functioning to
supplement electrical supply
 Units are in a safe and stable condition
US Reactors
Three Mile Island
March 28, 1979
TMI Core
Configuration
Evening 3/28/1979
Three Mile Island History
 Reactor Scram: 04:00 3/28/79
 Core melt and relocation: ~ 05:00 –07:30 3/28/79
 Hydrogen Deflagration: 13:00 3/28/79
 Recirculation Cooling: Late 3/28/79
 Phased Water Processing: 1979‐1993
 Containment Venting 43KCi Kr‐85: July 1980
 Containment Entry: July 1980
 Reactor Head removed and core melt found: July 1984
 Start Defuel: October 1985
 Shipping Spent Fuel: 1988‐1990
 Finish Defuel: Jan 1990
 Evaporate ~2M gallons Processed Water: 1991‐93
 Cost: ~$1 Billion
Impact on US Reactors
 US has implemented B.5.b requirements in 2008
 Beyond Severe Accident Guidelines
 Onsite high pressure portable pump
 Procedures and appropriate staging areas and
requirements for fire hoses and equipment on site
 MOUs with fire local fire stations to establish the plant
as a priority in case of an emergency.
Impact on US Reactor
 Some of the things that should be reviewed
 Review all external events, i.e., fire, flooding, explosions
and earthquake, to ensure that there is backup
emergency equipment that can support a station black
out.
 Review training for extreme station Blackout events and
procedure.
 Ensure that emergency batteries are qualified for worst
case events for fl0od, fire, explosions and seismic.
 The portable high pressure pump and associated
equipment that was required because of B.5.b should be
housed in a structure that is qualified for worst case fire,
flood, explosion and seismic events.