Conflict of Law Prelim Digested Cases

Godinez, Theresa T.
Conflict of Law (Saturday)
CONFLICT OF LAWS and CHOICE OF LAW CASES
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V. CA

FACTS:
Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA) hired Milagros Morada as a Flight Attendant for its
airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. While on a lay-over in Jakarta, Morada went to
a disco with fellow crew members Thamer & Allah, both Saudi nationals. Because it was
almost morning when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast
together at the room of Thamer. In which Allah left on some pretext. Thamer attempted
to rape Morada but she was rescued by hotel personnel when they heard her cries for
help. Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah, the latter as an
accomplice.
Morada refused to cooperate when SAUDIA’s Legal Officer and its base manager tried
to negotiate the immediate release of the detained crew members with Jakarta police.
Through the intercession of Saudi Arabian government, Thamer and Allah were
deported and, eventually, again put in service by SAUDIA. But Morada was transferred
to Manila.
One year and a half year later, Morada was again ordered to see SAUDIA’s Chief Legal
Officer. Instead, she was brought to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a blank
document, which turned out to be a notice to her to appear in court. Monada returned to
Manila.
The next time she was escorted by SAUDIA’s legal officer to court, the judge rendered a
decision against her sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes.
Apparently, she was tried by the court which found her guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to
a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
After denial by SAUDIA, Morada sought help from Philippine Embassy during the
appeal. Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her. SAUDIA fired her without
notice.
Morada filed a complaint for damages against SAUDIA, with the RTC of QC. SAUDIA
filed Omnibus Motion to Dismiss which raised the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction, among others which was denied
ISSUE:
Whether RTC of QC has jurisdiction to hear and try the case
HELD:
YES. The RTC of QC has jurisdiction and Philippine law should govern.Its jurisdiction
has basis on Sec. 1 of RA 7691 and Rules of Court on venue. Pragmatic
considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of
the RTC QC assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of the
litigant. Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear
the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be
forcing Morada to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
where she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a
fundamental unfairness to her.
Godinez, Theresa T. Conflict of Law (Saturday)
By filing a complaint, Morada has voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. By
filing several motions and praying for reliefs (such as dismissal), SAUDIA has effectively
submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction.
CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA V. BASSO
GR No. 178382-83
FACTS:
Petitioner Continental Micronesia is a foreign corporation organized and existing under
the laws of and domiciled in the United States of America. It is licensed to do business
in the Philippines. Respondent, a US citizen residing in the Philippines, accepted an
offer to be a General Manager position by Mr. Braden, Managing Director-Asia of
Continental Airlines. On November 7, 1992, CMI took over the Philippine operations of
Continental, with respondent retaining his position as General Manager. Thereafter,
respondent received a letter from Mr. Schulz, who was then CMI’s Vice President of
Marketing and Sales, informing him that he has agreed to work in CMI as a consultant
on an “as needed basis.” Respondent wrote a counter-proposal that was rejected by
CMI.
Respondent then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner corporation.
Alleging the presence of foreign elements, CMI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of CMI and the subject matter of the controversy.
The Labor Arbiter agreed with CMI that the employment contract was executed in the
US “since the letter-offer was under the Texas letterhead and the acceptance of
Complainant was returned there.” Thus, applying the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis,
US laws apply. Also, applying lex loci contractus, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the parties
did not intend to apply Philippine laws.
The NLRC ruled that the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the case when CMI
voluntarily submitted to his office’s jurisdiction by presenting evidence, advancing
arguments in support of the legality of its acts, and praying for reliefs on the merits of
the case.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case and over the parties.
ISSUE:
Whether labor tribunals have jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that the labor tribunals had jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter of the case. The employment contract of Basso was replete with
references to US laws, and that it originated from and was returned to the US, do not
automatically preclude our labor tribunals from exercising jurisdiction to hear and try this
case.
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of CMI was acquired through the
coercive process of service of summons. CMI never denied that it was served with
summons. CMI has, in fact, voluntarily appeared and participated in the proceedings
before the courts. Though a foreign corporation, CMI is licensed to do business in the
Philippines and has a local business address here. The purpose of the law in requiring
that foreign corporations doing business in the country be licensed to do so, is to
subject the foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of our courts.
Where the facts establish the existence of foreign elements, the case presents a
conflicts-of-laws issue. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court
in a conflict-of-laws case may assume jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided, that
the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties
may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an
intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is
likely to have power to enforce its decision. All these requisites are present here.
HASEGAWA VS. KITAMURA

G.R. NO. 149177, NOVEMBER 23, 2007
FACTS:
Nippon, a Japanese consultancy firm entered into a one-year ICA contract with
Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines. On February
2000, Kitamura was informed that Nippon is no longer renewing his ICA and his
services would only be utilized until March 31, 2000. Aggrieved, Kitamura now filed an
action for specific performance and damages with the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a
motion to dismiss. The trial and appellate court ruled in favor of Kitamura, hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC of Lipa City has jurisdiction for contracts executed by and
between two foreign nationals in foreign country wholly written in a foreign language?
HELD:
Yes. In the judicial resolution of conflict problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved:
jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction
and choice of law are two different concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to
cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether
the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to
both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state a
constitutional authority to apply forum law.
The only issue is the jurisdiction, hence, choice of law rules as raised by the petitioner is
inapplicable and not yet called for. The petitioner prematurely invoked the said rules
before pointing out any conflict between the laws of Japan and the Philippines.
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL INC. VS. ROUZIE, JR.

G.R. No. 162894 February 26, 2008
FACTS:
Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W.
Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired
respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government
projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts.
Respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney
C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment contract which rendered judgment ordering

BMSI and RUST to pay respondent’s money claims.
Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent
elevated the case to this Court but was dismissed in a Resolution which became final
and executory.
Respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union to Raytheon International, Inc. as well
as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The
complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case that BMSI verbally
employed respondent to negotiate the sale of services in government projects and that
respondent was not paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project
which he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST
as well as petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one company.
In response, petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim, it was a foreign
corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied entering into any
arrangement with respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also
denied combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose of assuming the alleged
obligation of the said companies. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on
grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for
damages by way of compulsory counterclaim.
Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Hearing Based on Affirmative
Defenses and for Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of the complaint on
grounds of forum non conveniens and failure to state a cause of action. Respondent
opposed the same. Pending the resolution of the omnibus motion, the deposition of
Walter Browning was taken before the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago.
RTC denied petitioner’s omnibus motion and held that the factual allegations in the
complaint, assuming the same to be admitted, were sufficient for the trial court to render
a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the principle of forum non conveniens was
inapplicable because the trial court could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a
foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines.
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for certiorari
for lack of merit, and also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action against Raytheon International, Inc.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of forum non conveniens.
HELD:
No, the Court found a failure to state a cause of action against Raytheon International,
Inc., referring to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading. As a general rule, the
elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges
facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The evidences are not quite
sufficient to meet a ruling that the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
No, the court finds lack of merit on the complaint on ground of forum non
conveniens and states that the Philippine Courts have the jurisdiction over the parties.
Hasegawa v. Kitamura – the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in

judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the instances where the Court held
that the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a foreign
element, the following requisites had to be proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to
which the parties may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to
make an intelligent decision as to the law and
the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce
its decision.
HONGKONG SHANGAI BANKING CORPORATION v. SHERMAN

G.R. No. 72494 August 11, 1989
FACTS:
In 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd., (Eastern) a company incorporated in
Singapore applied w/, & was granted by the Singapore branch of HSBC an overdraft
facility in the max amount of Singapore $200,000 (w/c amount was subsequently
increased to Singapore $375,000) w/ interest at 3% over HSBC prime rate, payable
monthly, on amounts due under said overdraft facility. As a security for the repayment
by Eastern of sums advanced by HSBC to it through the aforesaid overdraft facility, in
1982, Jack Sherman, Dodato Reloj, and a Robin de Clive Lowe, all of whom were
directors of Eastern at such time, executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor of
HSBC whereby Sherman, Reloj and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on
demand all sums owed by Eastern to HSBC under the aforestated overdraft facility.
The Joint and Several Guarantee provides that: “This guarantee and all rights,
obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under
and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We
hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes
arising under this guarantee.”
Eastern failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded payment of the obligation
from Sherman & Reloj, conformably w/ the provisions of the Joint and Several
Guarantee. Inasmuch as Sherman & Reloj still failed to pay, HSBC filed a complaint for
collection of a sum of money against them. Sherman & Reloj filed a motion to dismiss
on the grounds that (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint, and (2) the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendants.
ISSUE:
W/N Philippine courts should have jurisdiction over the suit.
RULING:
YES.
While it is true that "the transaction took place in Singaporean setting" and that the Joint
and Several Guarantee contains a choice-of-forum clause, the very essence of due
process dictates that the stipulation that "this guarantee and all rights, obligations &
liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed & determined under & may be enforced
in accordance w/ the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the
Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this
guarantee" be liberally construed. One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in
International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable
basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam.
To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Indeed, as pointed-out
by HSBC at the outset, the instant case presents a very odd situation. In the ordinary
habits of life, anyone would be disinclined to litigate before a foreign tribunal, w/ more
reason as a defendant. However, in this case, Sherman & Reloj are Philippine residents
(a fact which was not disputed by them) who would rather face a complaint against
them before a foreign court and in the process incur considerable expenses, not to
mention inconvenience, than to have a Philippine court try and resolve the case. Their
stance is hardly comprehensible, unless their ultimate intent is to evade, or at least
delay, the payment of a just obligation.
The defense of Sherman & Reloj that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore
is based merely on technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove, that the filing
of the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On
the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the action here just to
harass Sherman & Reloj.
The parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion
of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to divest
Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the
light of a State to exercise authority over persons and things w/in its boundaries subject
to certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction over travelling
sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of other States, and foreign
military units stationed in or marching through State territory w/ the permission of the
latter's authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the concept of sovereignty, is
exclusive w/in and throughout the domain of the State. A State is competent to take
hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and agencies assume
jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before them.
AZNAR vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
FACTS:
EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner Aznar
according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as
her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced
by CFI Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it
deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared by Us an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier
case.
As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines,
and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the
fact that when he executed his will he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so
that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by

acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
What law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to
the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term “national law” is used therein.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under
the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form
and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil
Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the
State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case,
should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen
was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable,
and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the
validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of
the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the
rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the conflict
of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and
appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in
the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in
California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the
domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with
the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of
California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and
another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there is no law to
the contrary in the place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the California
Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the
contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the
deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained.
As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article
16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article
946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator’s
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers
back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile,
the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer
the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth
between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and
the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in
the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for
children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is
the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged
natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the
domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of
California..
BELLIS vs. BELLIS

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States.
He had 5 legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3
legitimate children with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his
distributable estate should be divided in trust in the following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal
shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was
admitted to probate in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an
executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s
Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to
$240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount
of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the
residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of
their legitimates as illegitimate children.
The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.
HELD:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof
at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule
providing that the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law,
but would still refer to Texas Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for
the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would
arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed
different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
USA and that under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on
legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.
CADALIN vs. CADALIN

G.R. No. 104776, December 5,1994.
FACTS:
Bienvenido Cadalin, Rolando Amul and other petitioners are Filipino workers recruited
by Asia Int’l Builders Co. (AIBC), a domestic recruitment corporation, for employment in
Bahrain to work for Brown & Root Int’l Inc. (BRII) which is a foreign corporation with
headquarters in Texas. Plaintiff instituted a class suit with the POEA for money claims
arising from the unexpired portion of their employment contract which was prematurely
terminated. They worked in Bahrain for BRII and they filed the suit after 1 yr. from the
termination of their employment contract.
As provided by Art. 156 of the Amiri Decree aka as the Labor Law of the Private Sector
of Bahrain: “a claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after
the lapse of 1 year from the date of the expiry of the contract,” it appears that their suit
has prescribed.
Plaintiff’s contention is that the prescription period should be 10 years as provided by
Art. 1144 of the Civil Code as their claim arise from a violation of a contract. The POEA
Administrator holds that the 10 year period of prescription should be applied but the
NLRC provides a different view asserting that Art 291 of the Labor Code of the Phils
with a 3 years prescription period should be applied. The Solicitor General expressed
his personal point of view that the 1 yr period provided by the Amiri Decree should be
applied.
ISSUE:
1. WON the foreign law should govern or the contract of the parties.
2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case.
HELD:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence
governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple
copy of the Bahrain’s Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than
those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the
belief that where the laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the
workers, then the laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment
contract. It approved the observation of the POEA Administrator that in labor
proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and
its implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII
themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became applicable to said
contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable than those stipulated therein.
However there was a part of the employment contract which provides that the
compensation of the employee may be “adjusted downward so that the total
computation plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation”
therein agree,’ another part of the same provision categorically states “that total
remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation and
custom.”
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against
AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it. Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines provides:
‘The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party
who caused the obscurity.”
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a
prepared form containing the stipulations of the employment contract and the
employees merely “take it or leave it.” The presumption is that there was an imposition
by one party against the other and that the employees signed the contracts out of
necessity that reduced their bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of

the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof. The parties to a contract
may select the law by which it is to be governed. In such a case, the foreign law is
adopted as a “system” to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of
their capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters
of performance, and so forth. Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the
parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed
incorporated into their contract “as a set of terms.” By such reference to the provisions
of the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by
the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual
terms deemed written in the contract.
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such party
expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties’ own choice of the applicable law.
The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship the parties or their
transaction. There is no question that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants
have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because the services were rendered in
that country.
2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the complainants
was 3 years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten
years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as
provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
“A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actionable after the lapse of
one year from the date of the expiry of the Contract”.
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum (local court),
Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites
for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the
action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may
be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given
such a law. In Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955]),
where the issue was the applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the
State of New York for claims arising from said Code, the claims would have prescribed
under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of New York. The
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it was
not “specifically intended to be substantive,” hence, the prescriptive period provided in
the law of the forum should apply. The Court observed: “. . . we are dealing with a
statute of limitations of a foreign country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute
that its purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign
country concerned, of the substantive rights to which the statute pertains. We think that
as a yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose, this test is the most
satisfactory one.
The Court further noted: “Applying that test here it appears to us that the libellant is
entitled to succeed, for the respondents have failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian
period of limitation in question was specifically aimed against the particular rights which
the libellant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad
objectives.” The American court applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead of
the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no showing that the Panamanian law
on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural
law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum (local Court) on
prescription of actions.
However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes

irrelevant when the country of the forum (local Court) has a “borrowing statute.” Said
statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of
substance. A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum (local Court) to apply the
foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there
are several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form provides that an action barred by the
laws of the place where it accrued will not be enforced in the forum even though the
local statute was not run against it.
Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: “If by the laws of the
state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in
the Philippine Islands.”
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. In
the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio
vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forum’s public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on
the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized
that:“The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development” (Sec.
10).
‘The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare” (Sec. 18).
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all.”
Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.
The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is
3 years, as provided by the Labor Code or 10 years, as provided by the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
“The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accross:
(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment”
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written contracts
between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(l) of the
New Civil Code should govern.
Bank of America vs American Realty Corporation

G.R. No. 133876 December 29, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As security, the latter mortgaged a
property located in the Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third
party mortgagor who pledged its own property in favor of the 3 debtor-foreign
corporations.
The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to
enforce the loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially
foreclose the said mortgage, which was granted.
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an
action for damages against the petitioner, for the latter’s act of foreclosing extra-
judicially the real estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign
courts for the collection of the principal loan.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the
recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of
foreclosure.
HELD:
Incidentally, petitioner alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is
the governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose
its security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money.
We rule in the negative.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our
jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be
properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local or domestic or internal
law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were
properly pleaded and proved in said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in
our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates
the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.
DACASIN VS. DACASIN

G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
FACTS:
On April 1994, petitioner and respondent got married here in the Philippines. The
following year respondent got pregnant and gave birth and named her Stephanie. In
June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Illinois Court a divorce decree
against petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois Court dissolved the marriage, awarded to
respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for
enforcement purposes.
On 28th of January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract for
the joint custody of Stephanie. Two years after, petitioner sued respondent in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Petitioner claimed that respondent exercised sole
custody over Stephanie. Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint due to lack
of jurisdiction, since Illinois Court holt the jurisdiction in enforcing the divorce decree.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner's suit and
enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties' child.
HELD:
Yes. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his
suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific
performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody,
belongs to this species of actions.
Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court. Indeed, the trial court’s refusal
to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its
thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion
is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was “jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of
enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution.”
Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the “various provisions” of the divorce
decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies
beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s so-called “retained jurisdiction.”
ZAPANTA vs. THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF THE CITY OF DAVAO

G.R. No. 55380 September 26, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioner Gliceria Zapanta is the widow of Florencio B. Zapanta. When Florencio died,
the local civil registrar of Davao City issued a death certificate. However, she found that
the name appearing therein was “Flaviano Castro Zapanta” albeit the date of death and
all other circumstances and information reflected therein clearly and conclusively
revealed that the person referred to therein was no other than her late husband,
Florencio. Gliceria, therefore, filed a petition for correction of entry in the register of
death. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the correction of the
name “Flaviano Castro Zapanta” to “Florencio B. Zapanta” was not merely clerical but
substantial in nature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The general perception was that the judicial
proceeding under Art. 412 of the Civil Code, implemented by Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, could only justify the correction of innocuous or clerical errors apparent on the
face of the record and capable of being corrected by mere reference to it, such as
misspellings and obvious mistakes.
However, in later cases, the Court has held that it adheres to the principle that
even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding.
Adversary Proceeding, defined
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “adversary proceeding” as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application,

one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and
afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it...”
Thus, provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts
have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel has been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is “appropriate.”
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO vs.ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM

G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They
were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their
marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines.
According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son.
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave
support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the
Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a
complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the
facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
accused, he being an alien.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under
the Philippine law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that while it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of
Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his
country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as
well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that
Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party
who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving
the foreign law.
In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he
is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While
Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not
obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands
does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do
not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign
law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the
citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law;
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the
non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines
because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when
the latter is entitled thereto.
2. Yes. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is
living here in the Philippines and committed the offense here.
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION vs.CA

G.R. No. 114323 July 23, 1998
FACTS:
Oil and Natural Gas Commission is a foreign corporation, owned and controlled by the
Government of India. Pacific Cement Co., a Philippine corporation, was supposed to
deliver more than 4,000 metric tons of oil well cement to Bombay and Calcutta but
because of a dispute with the carrier, the shipment never reached the destination.
Despite payment by Oil and Natural, as well as repeated demands, Pacific does not
deliver the oil well cement. During negotiations, the parties agreed that the Pacific will
replace the oil well cement with Class ”G” cement. Pacific did deliver the Class “G”
cement but they were not according to specifications.
Oil and Natural informed Pacific that they will submit the dispute to arbitration as
provided for in their contract. The dispute was therefore submitted to arbitration, the
arbitrator was Shri Malhotra, an employee of Oil and Natural Gas. The decision of the
arbitrator was in favour of Oil and Natural Gas. The arbitral decision was confirmed by
an Indian court.
Oil and Natural Gas then filed a complaint in Pasig RTC for the enforcement of the
foreign judgment. This was opposed by Pacific for being “bereft of any statement of
facts and law upon which the award in favor of the petitioner was based”. The judgment
of the Indian court apparently simply adopted the award of the arbitrator without stating
anything by way of support for its judgment. The Pasig RTC dismissed the complaint.
The RTC said that the contract provided for some disputes to be settled by the regular
court and some to be submitted to arbitration. This type, the RTC said, was for the
courts. “Consequently, the proceedings had before the arbitrator were null and void and
the foreign court had therefore, adopted no legal award which could be the source of an
enforceable right.”
The CA affirmed the dismissal by the RTC. Aside from agreeing with the RTC that the
arbitral award was void, the CA also said ―that the full text of the judgment of the
foreign court contains the dispositive portion only and indicates no findings of fact and
law as basis for the award. Hence, the said judgment cannot be enforced by any
Philippine court as it would violate the constitutional provision that no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment of the foreign court is enforceable in this jurisdiction in
view of the private respondent's allegation that it is bereft of any statement of facts and
law upon which the award in favor of the petitioner was based.
HELD:
Yes, it is enforceable in this jurisdiction.
The SC said that “even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to
avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower courts, or portions
thereof, in the decision of the higher court. This is particularly true when the decision
sought to be incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the facts and
conclusions arrived at, as in this case, where Award Paper No. 3/B-1 consists of
eighteen (18) single spaced pages..” In effect, the SC was saying that we also do in this
country what the Indian court did and it was okay for as long as the award or decision
adopted was complete in terms of the discussion of the facts and conclusions. The 18
pages of single spaced award by the arbitrator was, according to the SC, complete
enough. The short decision of the Indian court which merely adopted the award was
acceptable in our jurisdiction. Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign
judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the
country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the
country in which the judgment is relied on. This Court has held that matters of remedy
and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. Thus, if
under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may
be rendered by adopting the arbitrators findings, then the same must be accorded
respect. In the same vein, if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order
of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees,
then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply
because our rules provide otherwise.
Finally, we reiterate hereunder our pronouncement in the case of Northwest Orient
Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that:
"A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the
proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.”
"Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam
of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest
by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere,
enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has
regularly performed its official duty."
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment (Pacific Cement) had the burden
of overcoming the presumption of its validity which it failed to do in the instant case. The
foreign judgment being valid, there is nothing else left to be done than to order its
enforcement, despite the fact that Oil and Natural Gas merely prays for, the remand of
the case to the RTC for further proceedings. As this Court has ruled on the validity and
enforceability of the said foreign judgment in this jurisdiction, further proceedings in the
RTC for the reception of evidence to prove otherwise are no longer necessary.
ST. AVIATION SERVICES CO., PTE., LTD vs. GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS,
INC.
G.R. No. 114323 July 23, 1998
FACTS:
St. Aviation Services Co., Private Limited (foreign corporation based in Singapore), and
Grand International Airways, Inc. executed an "Agreement for the Maintenance and
Modification of Airbus A 300 B4-103 Aircraft Registration No. RP-C8882". Petitioner
undertook the contracted works and promptly delivered the aircrafts to respondent.
Petitioner billed respondent in the total amount of US$303,731.67 or S$452,560.18. But
despite petitioner's repeated demands, respondent failed to pay, in violation of the terms
agreed upon. Petitioner then filed with the High Court of the Republic of Singapore an
action for the sum of S$452,560.18, including interest and costs, against respondent.
Upon petitioner's motion, the court issued a Writ of Summons to be served
extraterritorially or outside Singapore upon respondent. The court sought the assistance
of the sheriff of Pasay City to effect service of the summons upon respondent. However,
despite receipt of summons, respondent failed to answer the claim. On motion of
petitioner, the Singapore High Court rendered a judgment by default against
respondent. Subsequently, petitioner filed with the RTC Pasay City, a Petition for
Enforcement of Judgment.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on two grounds:
the Singapore High Court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person; and
the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is void for having been rendered in violation
of its right to due process.
The RTC denied respondent's MTD, holding that "neither one of the two grounds (of
Grand) is among the grounds for a MTD under Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure." Respondent filed a MR but was denied by the RTC. Respondent, then, filed
with the CA a Petition for Certiorari assailing the RTC Order denying its motion to
dismiss. Respondent alleged that the extraterritorial service of summons on its office in
the Philippines is defective and that the Singapore court did not acquire jurisdiction over
its person. Thus, its judgment sought to be enforced is void. Petitioner, in its comment,
moved to dismiss the petition for being unmeritorious. CA granted Grand’s petition and
set aside the Orders of the RTC "without prejudice to the right of private respondent to
initiate another proceeding before the proper court to enforce its claim."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment by default in Suit No. 2101 by the Singapore High Court is
enforceable in the Philippines.
HELD:
Yes. The conditions for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in our
legal system are contained in Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended.
Under the above Rule, a foreign judgment or order against a person is merely
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties. It may be repelled, among
others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or by want of notice to the party
against whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity. Respondent, in assailing the validity of the
judgment sought to be enforced, contends that the service of summons is void and that
the Singapore court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
Generally, the matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of
process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the
forum, which in this case is the law of Singapore. Here, petitioner moved for leave of
court to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons outside Singapore. In an Order, the
Singapore High Court granted "leave to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons on the
Defendant by a method of service authorized by the law of the Philippines for service of
any originating process issued by the Philippines at ground floor, APMC Building, 136
Amorsolo corner Gamboa Street, 1229 Makati City, or elsewhere in the Philippines."
This service of summons outside Singapore is in accordance with Order 11, r. 4(2) of
the Rules of Court 1996 of Singapore. In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is
acquired by service of summons by the sheriff, his deputy or other proper court officer
either personally by handing a copy thereof to the defendant or by substituted
service. In this case, the Writ of Summons issued by the Singapore High Court was
served upon respondent at its office located at Mercure Hotel (formerly Village Hotel),
MIA Road, Pasay City. The Sheriff's Return shows that it was received on May 2, 1998
by Joyce T. Austria, Secretary of the General Manager of respondent company. But
respondent completely ignored the summons, hence, it was declared in default.
Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon respondent in accordance with
our Rules, jurisdiction was acquired by the Singapore High Court over its person.
Clearly, the judgment of default rendered by that court against respondent is valid.
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119602 October 6, 2000
FACTS:
Philippine Roxas (owned by Phil. Pres. Lines), vessel, arrived in Venezuela to load iron
ore. When vessel was ready to leave the port, Mr. Vasquez (official pilot of Venezuela)
was designated to navigate the vessel through the Orinoco River.
The master of the vessel, Captain Colon, was at the bridge with the pilot when the
vessel left the port. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was underway. The
vessel experienced some vibrations but the pilot assured that they were just a result of
the shallowness of the vessel. The vessel again experienced vibrations which led to the
vessel being run aground in the Orinoco River, obstructing the ingress and egress of
vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon (vessel owned by Wildvalley
Shipping) was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.
Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance
Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of
unearned profits, and interest. The trial court rendered its decision on October 16, 1991
in favor of the petitioner, Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. The dispositive portion thereof
reads as follows: Both parties appealed: the petitioner appealing the non-award of
interest with the private respondent questioning the decision on the merits of the case.
After the requisite pleadings had been filed, the Court of Appeals judgment is reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar.
Ruing:
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proved.
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are
mandatory:
It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy;
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and
with the seal of his office.
The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of
full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country. With respect
to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best
evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the
best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.
At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded before
the lower court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about

the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal consequence on the event or
transaction in issue.
A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite the fact
that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial jurisdiction
of Venezuela. We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law
must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof,
the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local
or domestic law and this is known as processual presumption.
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. vs. RAFAEL MA. GUERRERO

G.R. No. 136804. February 19, 2003
FACTS:
Rafael Ma. Guerrero (“Guerrero” for brevity) filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank (“the Bank”
for brevity) with the RTC. Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for:
illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank;
a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and
unauthorized conversion of his account.
The Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by stipulation Guerrero’s account is
governed by New York law and this law does not permit any of Guerrero’s claims except
actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral
and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees on the same ground alleged in its
Answer. Guerrero opposed the motion.
The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. Alyssa Walden’s affidavit (“Walden affidavit” for brevity)
stated that Guerrero’s New York bank account stipulated that the governing law is New
York law and that this law bars all of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. The
Philippine Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden affidavit.
The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for
reconsideration. The Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals assailing the RTC Orders. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Walden Affidavit was sufficient proof of the New York law and
jurisprudence relied upon by the Bank in its Motion for partial summary judgment.
HELD:
No. The Walden Affidavit failed to prove New York law and jurisprudence. The SC
denied the Bank’s petition for lack of merit.
The CA considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public documents defined in
Rule 132 Sec 19 and 24 of the Rules of Evidence, which should be followed in proving
foreign law.
SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are: (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of
the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION
G.R. No. 145587 October 26, 2007
FACTS:
EDI-Staffbuilders, Inc. (EDI), upon request of Omar Ahmed Ali Bin Bechr Est. (OAB), a
company in Saudi Arabia, sent to OAB resumes from which OAB can choose a
computer specialist. Eleazar Gran was selected. It was agreed that his monthly salary
shall be $850.00. But five months into his service in Saudi Arabia, Gran received a
termination letter and right there and then was removed from his post. The termination
letter states that he was incompetent because he does not know the ACAD system
which is required in his line of work; that he failed to enrich his knowledge during his 5
month stay to prove his competence; that he is disobedient because he failed to submit
the required daily reports to OAB. Gran then signed a quitclaim whereby he declared
that he is releasing OAB from any liability in exchange of 2,948.00 Riyal. When Gran
returned, he filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against EDI and OAB. EDI in its
defense averred that the dismissal is valid because when Gran and OAB signed the
employment contract, both parties agreed that Saudi labor laws shall govern all matters
relating to the termination of Gran’s employment; that under Saudi labor laws, Gran’s
termination due to incompetence and insubordination is valid; that Gran’s
insubordination and incompetence is outlined in the termination letter Gran received.
The labor arbiter dismissed the labor case but on appeal, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the arbiter. The Court of Appeals likewise
affirmed the NLRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Saudi labor laws should be applied.
HELD:
No. The specific Saudi labor laws were not proven in court. EDI did not present proof as
to the existence and the specific provisions of such foreign law. Hence, processual
presumption applies and Philippine labor laws shall be used.
Under our laws, an employee like Gran shall only be terminated upon just cause. The
allegations against him, at worst, shall only merit a suspension not a dismissal. His
incompetence is not proven because prior to being sent to Saudi Arabia, he underwent
the required trade test to prove his competence. The presumption therefore is that he is
competent and that it is upon OAB and EDI to prove otherwise. No proof of his
incompetence was ever adduced in court. His alleged insubordination is likewise not
proven. It was not proven that the submission of daily track records is part of his job as
a computer specialist. There was also a lack of due process. Under our laws, Gran is
entitled to the two notice rule whereby prior to termination he should receive two
notices.
In the case at bar, he only received one and he was immediately terminated on the
same day he received the notice. Moreover, the quitclaim may not also release OAB
from liability. Philippine laws is again applied here sans proof of Saudi laws. Under
Philippine Laws, a quitclaim is generally frowned upon and are strictly examined. In this
case, based on the circumstances, Gran at that time has no option but to sign the
quitclaim. The quitclaim is also void because his separation pay was merely 2,948 Riyal
which is lower than the $850.00 monthly salary (3,190 Riyal).
NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC. vs.
NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD
G.R. No. L-54204 September 30, 1982
FACTS:
Napoleon Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta Abordo, died
from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with petitioner NORSE
MANAGEMENT. The M.T. "Cherry Earl," where he is an engineer, is a vessel of
Singaporean Registry.
In her complaint for compensation and reliefs available in connection with the death of
Napoleon Abordo," filed before the National Seamen Board, Restituta alleged that the
amount of compensation due her from petitioners Norse Management and Pacific
Seamen Services, Inc., principal and agent, respectively, should be based on the law
where the vessel is registered.
On the other hand, petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied
in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the
Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in the case.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court denied the petition. It is true that the law of Singapore was not
alleged and proved in the course of the hearing. And following Supreme Court decisions
in a long line of cases that a foreign law, being a matter of evidence, must be alleged
and proved, the law of Singapore ought not to be recognized in this case. But it is our
considered opinion that the jurisprudence on this matter was never meant to apply to
cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies such as the National Seamen
Board. For well-settled also is the rule that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are
not bound strictly by technical rules. It has always been the policy of this Board, as
enunciated in a long line of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account
of injury or death while in the course of employment, the law of the country in which the
vessel is registered shall be considered. We see no reason to deviate from this well-
considered policy. Certainly not on technical grounds as movants herein would like us
to.
Moreover, in the "Employment Agreement" between petitioners and the late Napoleon
B. Abordo, it is clear that compensation shall be paid under Philippine Law or the law of
registry of petitioners' vessel, whichever is greater. Since private respondent Restituta
C. Abordo was offered P30,000.00 only by the petitioners, Singapore law was properly
applied in this case.
Furthermore, Article 20, Labor Code of the Philippines, provides that the National
Seamen Board has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases including
money claims, involving employer-employee relations, arising out of or by virtue of any
law or contracts involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment. Thus, it is safe to
assume that the Board is familiar with pertinent Singapore maritime laws relative to
workmen's compensation. Moreover, the Board may apply the rule on judicial notice
and, "in administrative proceedings, the technical rules of procedure — particularly of
evidence — applied in judicial trials, do not strictly apply.
Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and
resolved in favor of labor.
ASIAVEST LIMITED vs. CA

G.R. No. 128803 September 25, 1998
FACTS:
In 1984, a Hong Kong court ordered Antonio Heras to pay US$1.8 million or
itsequivalent, with interest, to Asiavest Ltd. Apparently, Heras guaranteed a certain loan
in HongKong and the debtor in said loan defaulted hence, the creditor, Asiavest, ran
after Heras. But before said judgment was issued and even during trial,
Heras already left for good Hong Kong and he returned to the Philippines. So when in
1987, when Asiavest filed a complaint in court seeking to enforce the foreign judgment
against Heras, the latter claim that he never received anysummons, not in Hong Kong
and not in the Philippines. He also claimed that he never received acopy of the foreign
judgment. Asiavest however contends that Heras was actually given serviceof
summons when a messenger from the Sycip Salazar Law Firm served said summons
byleaving a copy to one Dionisio Lopez who was Heras’ son in law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign court acquired jurisdiction.
HELD:
No. Under paragraph (b) of Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which was the
governing law at the time this case was decided by the trial court and respondent Court
of Appeals, a foreign judgment against a person rendered by a court having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by the subsequent title. However, the judgment may be
repelled by evidence of WANT OF JURISDICTION, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Also, Section 3(n) of Rule 131 of the New Rules of Evidence provides that in the
absence of proof to the contrary, a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, is presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction.
There is nothing in the testimony of Mr. Lousich that touched on the specific law of
Hong Kong in respect of service of summons either in actions in rem or in personam,
and where the defendant is either a resident or nonresident of Hong Kong. In view of
the absence of proof of the Hong Kong law on this particular issue, the presumption of
identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption shall come into play. It will
thus be presumed that the Hong Kong law on the matter is similar to the Philippine law.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for
the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident
defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service
of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be
personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be
made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country,
any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set
forth in Section 8; 21 (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3)
service by publication, also with leave of court; 22 or (4) any other manner the court
may deem sufficient. However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a
non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court (such
as this case), personal service of summons within the state is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or
quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Nonetheless summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of
vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements.
In the case at bar, the action filed in Hong Kong against HERAS was in personam,
since it was based on his personal guarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor.
Significantly, in the pre-trial conference, the parties came up with stipulations of facts,
among which was that "the residence of defendant, Antonio Heras, is New Manila,
Quezon City." 39 We therefore conclude that the stipulated fact that HERAS "is a
resident of New Manila, Quezon City, Philippines" refers to his residence at the time
jurisdiction over his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court. With that
stipulation of fact, ASIAVEST cannot now claim that HERAS was a resident of Hong
Kong at the time. Hence, petition is denied.
CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE CASES
ANTONIO BENGSON III vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship when he
enlisted in the US Marine Corps and subsequently became a naturalized American.
When he returned to the Philippines, he reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation. Later, he ran for a seat in Congress and won. But Bengson III questioned
his election into office on the ground that he was not a natural-born Filipino.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cruz’s repatriation resulted in his reacquisition of his status as natural-
born Filipino.
HELD:
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino. In respondent Cruz’s case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he
rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently
reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 2630.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered
the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status
as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to,
his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs.COMELEC

G.R. No. 221697 March 8, 2016
FACTS:
Grace Poe-Llamanzares wishes to run for the Office of the President of the Republic of
the Philippines. However, she's a foundling. Her parents are unknown. Mr. and Mrs.
Militar who found the infant Grace in a church gave her to Mr. and Mrs. Poe, her
adoptive parents.
Under the Constitution, no person who is not a natural-born citizen shall serve as
President of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born citizen.
HELD:
Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born citizen. Adopting the legal principles from the
1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and
reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution.
The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption
that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the
PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution
that there are only two classes of citizens:
those who are natural-born and
those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who,
after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is
clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on
the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable
law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a
natural-born Filipino.
DJUMANTAN vs. HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO

G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995
FACTS:
Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a

contract worker.He then embraced and was converted to Islam.
He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez then returned to the
Philippines. Petitioner and her two children with Banez arrived in Manila as the “guests”
of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner
and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia.
In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner.
She filed a complaint for “concubinage” with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan against the two. This case was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.
On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary
visitor to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14,
1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s admission into the country and the change of her status
from temporary visitor to permanent resident are legal.
HELD:
There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s entry into the
country and the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent
resident. All such privileges were obtained through misinterpretation.Never was the
marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her
applications for temporary visitor’s visa and for permanent residency.
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is
deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to
prohibit and prevent their entry into the country. This right is based on the fact that since
the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure
permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the
government to permit them to stay.
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted,
much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines.The fact of marriage by
an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws
governing the admission and exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a
Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse
her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay
here as an alien. It is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a
visitor’s visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay.
an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and “may be
admitted” as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for
permanent residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen. The entry of aliens
into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they
are legally married to Filipino citizens.
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, vs.EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO

G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999
FACTS:
Mercado and Manzano are both running for vice-mayor of Makati City. Manzano got the
highest number of votes but his proclamation was suspended in view of a pending
petition for his disqualification on the ground that he is an American citizen. Manzano is
born in 1955 of Filipino father and mother. However, since he is born in the US, he is
considered as an American under the jus soli doctrine. Upon his return to the
Philippines, he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manzano is disqualified on ground that he is an alien.
HELD:
Manzano is a dual citizen, but his being such does not disqualify him from running for
public office. Under the Local Government Code, what is prohibited is dual allegiance
and not dual citizenship. The two terms are different.
Dual allegiance refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of
the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
Moreover, Manzano is considered to have renounced his American citizenship by filing
his certificate of candidacy.
CIRILO R. VALLES, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 137000 August 9, 2000
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian
mother. Then she ran for governor in Davao Oriental in 1998 but Cirilo R. Valles filed a
petition for her disqualification, contesting her Filipino citizenship due to her Australian
background and that she had renounced her Philippine citizenship as she was a holder
of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration. The Supreme Court
decided that Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is eligible to run for governor on the grounds that
she had always been Filipino due to her father’s citizenship as Filipino, in accordance
with the doctrine of Jus Sanguinis, and at most she had dual citizenship- she was an
Australian and a Filipino. The petition is dismissed and Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is
adjudged qualified to run for governor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosalinda Ybasco is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Yes, The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the
place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality
or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Rosalinda Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect
and at that time what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal
organic acts by which the US governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of
July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 29, 1916, also known as the Jones
Law.
WILLIE YU vs. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner is a Portuguese national who acquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization.
However, despite his naturalization, he still applied for and was issued a Portuguese
passport and declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he
signed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
HELD:
Yes, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of
petitioner’s Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization.
Express renunciation means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly
and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal
capacity, after having renounced his Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a
Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen,
applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport. To the mind of the court the foregoing
acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner’s Philippine
citizenship acquired through naturalization.
MAYOR JOSE UGDORACION, JR. vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 179851 April 18, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Ugdoracion and respondent Ephraim Tungol were rival mayoralty
candidates in the Municipal of Albuquerque, Bohol.
Ephraim Tungol filed a petition to deny due or cancel the COC of the petitioner
committed material misrepresentation in declaring his eligibility because he is actually a
“green card” holder or permanent resident of the US.
It appears that petitioner became a permanent resident of USA on Sept. 26, 2001.
However, petitioner stated in his COC that he had resided in Albuquerque for 41 years
before May 14, 2007 and he is not a permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign
country.
It appears that Ugdoracion became a permanent resident of the USA on September 26,
2001. For his part, Ugdoracion argued that his domicile of origin is the Municipality of
Albuquerque, Bohol notwithstanding his ostensible acquisition of permanent residency
in the USA. He then pointed to the following documents as proof of his substantial
compliance with the residency requirement:
a residence certificate dated May 5, 2006;
an application for a new voter's registration dated October 12, 2006; and
a photocopy of Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident Status dated October 18,
2006.
On May 8, 2007, the COMELEC First Division promulgated one of the herein
questioned resolutions canceling Ugdoracion's COC and removing his name from the
certified list of candidates for the position of Mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. Ugdoracion
filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution arguing in the main that his
status as a "green card" holder was not of his own making but a mere offshoot of a
petition filed by his sister. He admitted his intermittent travels to the USA, but only to
visit his siblings, and short working stint thereat to cover his subsistence for the duration
of his stay. However, the the COMELEC En Banc issued the other questioned
resolution denying Ugdoracion's motion for reconsideration and affirming the First
Division's finding of material misrepresentation in Ugdoracion's COC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling
Ugdoracion’s COC for material representation.
HELD:
No, the Court find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's cancellation of
Ugdoracion's COC for material misrepresentation.
Under Section 74, in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, in
unmistakable terms, requires that the facts stated in the COC must be true, and any
false representation therein of a material fact shall be a ground for cancellation thereof,
thus:
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks
to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth;
residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation;
that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation assumed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in
the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
xxxx
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any
time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days
before the election.
The false representation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code pertains to material

fact, and is not simply an innocuous mistake. A material fact refers to a candidate's
qualification for elective office such as one's citizenship and residence.
Moreover, Ugdoracion's contention is decimated by Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Section 40(f) of the Local Government Code, which disqualifies a permanent
resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country, unless said person waives his
status. in order to reacquire residency in the Philippines, there must be a waiver of
status as a green card holder as manifested by some acts or acts independent of and
prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
In the case at bar, Ugdoracion presented a photocopy of a document
entitled Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident Status dated October 18, 2006. A
close scrutiny of this document however discloses that it is a mere application for
abandonment of his status as lawful permanent resident of the USA. It does not bear
any note of approval by the concerned US official. Thus, [w]e cannot consider the same
as sufficient waiver of Ugdoracion's status of permanent residency in the USA. Besides,
it is a mere photocopy, unauthenticated and uncertified by the legal custodian of such
document. Assuming that said application was duly approved, Ugdoracion is still
disqualified for he failed to meet the one-year residency requirement. Ugdoracion has
applied for abandonment of residence only on 18 October 2006 or for just about seven
(7) months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections, which clearly fall short of the required
period. Thus, the petition is hereby denied.
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR vs.

The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
FACTS:
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his
certificate of candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his
certificate of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his
parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fernando Poe, Jr. is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
HELD:
Yes. Under “Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution.
“The following are citizens of the Philippines—
“(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
“(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
“(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
“(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
“(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme consider as viable is the fact that
the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of
private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11, 1954 at
the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the
residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume,
that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence
before death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with
proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the “en masse
Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan
Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the
latter was born on August 20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which
constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of
the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.
NESTOR A. JACOT vs. ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot was a natural born citizen of the Philippines who became a
naturalized citizen of the U.S. on December 13, 1989. Jacot sought to reacquire his
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act no. 9255 or the “Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act”. He filed a request for the administration of his Path of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los
Angeles, Ca. The Los Angeles PCG issued an Order of Approval of Jacot’s request and
on the same day, he took his Oath and Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo.
On September 27, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No.
06-12019 recognizing Jacot as a citizen of the Philippines.
On March 27, 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-
Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin and on May 2, 2007, respondent
Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC Provincial Office
in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US
citizenship.
On May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the
highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor. However, the COMELEC
Second Division issued its Resolution disqualifying the petitioner from running for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite
renunciation of his US citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division explained that the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 does not
automatically bestow upon any person the privilege to run for any elective public office.
It additionally ruled that the filing of a Certificate of Candidacy cannot be considered as
a renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Jacot filed a Motion for Reconsideration but COMELEC en banc dismissed his Motion.
Hence, he sought remedy from the Supreme Court through a petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship requirement as required
by law for persons seeking public office.
HELD:
No. Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate
of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal
and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship, because these are distinct requirements
to be complied with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that “natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their
Philippine citizenship.”
By the oath dictated in the provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines,
but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. The law
categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their
Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to
administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have
been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship
(1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and
(2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines,
to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Condon, a natural-born Filipino citizen, became a
naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
In 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise
known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. It was approved
and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
In 2006, petitioner filed an sworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship
before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia,
which in turn issued the Order certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
Petitioner then sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the
position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed
as the winning candidate.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan 7 and Luis
M. Bautista, (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate
petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The
petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post
on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a “personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath” as imposed by Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006,
she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied
with Section 5 (2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear
abandonment of her Australian citizenship
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to
renounce her Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225.
HELD:
Yes. Under R.A. No. 9225, it allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking
an oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s
Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith,
subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5.
Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:
“(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.”
In this case, on September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public
office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia.
Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of
Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath. The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her
Australian citizenship was invalid due to it was not oath before any public officer
authorized to administer it rendering the act of Sobejana-Condon void.
Thus, the petition is hereby dismissed.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
FACTS:
Rommel Arnado y Cagoco was a natural born Filipino citizen, who underwent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America. Arnado applied for
repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and
took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of RA 9225. By
taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship. After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American
citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements
for eligibility to run for public office.
Later on, Arnado ran for the position of municipal mayor in Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte. Linog C. Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado
contending that he is a foreigner and not a resident of the area. He indicated that
Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and departing Philippines. Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes. Meanwhile, Casan Macode Maquiling, another
candidate for mayoralty who garnered the second number of highest votes, intervened
in the case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and
the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained
the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arnado’s continued use of US Passport constitute his loss of Philippine
citizenship.
HELD:
No. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not
divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
In this case, between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and
30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times,
actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. While
the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth
Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless
an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation he took. Such act of using a
foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation.
However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and

effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. By the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the
rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but
by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he
was not qualified to run for a local elective position.
ROMMEL C. ARNADO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 210164 August 18, 2015
FACTS:
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship
after he was naturalized as a US citizen.
Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines,
Arnado applied for repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consul in San Francisco. He
took the Oath of Allegiance and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship.
He then filed his 2009 COC for the mayoralty post of Lanao del Norte for the 2010
elections. However, his co-candidate filed a petition to disqualify on the ground that he
continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after
executing his Affidavit of Renunciation.
While the petition for disqualification was pending, the 2010 elections proceeded,
wherein Arnado garnered the highest votes and was proclaimed winner.
COMELEC 1st Division: Nullified proclamation and applied rule on succession.
Maquiling, another co-candidate who garnered 2nd highest votes, contested to the
application of the rule on succession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner Arnado is qualified to run.
HELD:
No. Arnado failed to comply with the 2nd requisite because as held in Maquiling, his
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport
after executing said affidavit. Since then up to the time he filed his COC in 2012, Arnado
had not cured the defect in his qualification.
Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at the
time he filed his COC for the May 13, 2013 elections.
Under 4(d) of the LGC, a person with “dual citizenship” is disqualified from running for
any elective local position. This refers to dual allegiance. Consequently, congress
enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of naturalization abroad to reacquire their Philippine citizenship
and enjoy full civil and political rights.
Hence, they may now run for public office provided they:
Meet the qualifications for holding such public office, and
Make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath, prior to or at the time of filing their COC.
RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY

G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015
FACTS:
Petitioner Renato David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. Upon retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and
purchased a lot along the beach in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a
residential house. However, the portion where they built their house is public land and
part of the salvage zone.
Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the
DENR. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner,
a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9225.
The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition
of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio. An
information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant
of arrest was issued against the petitioner.
Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have
been committed before he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC
concluded that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen.

Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be charged with falsification for falsely identifying himself
as a Filipino in his Public Land Application, considering his eventual re-acquisition of
Filipino citizenship under R.A. 9225.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner Renato David made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public
document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in
fact he was then still a Canadian citizen.
Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen,
naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born
citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said
law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned.
Thus, the MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public
document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte. She stated in the COC that she is a resident
of the place for seven months.
Private respondent Montejo subsequently filed a Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification on the ground that Imelda failed to meet the constitutional requirement
of one-year residency. COMELEC granted the Petition for Disqualification, holding that
Imelda is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban
City as her place of domicile when she lived and even voted in Ilocos and Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Imelda is deemed to have abandoned her domicile of origin.
HELD:
No. The case at hand reveals that there is confusion as to the application of
‘Domicile’ and ‘Residence’ in election law.
Originally, the essential distinction between residence and domicile lies in the fact
that residence is the PHYSICAL presence of a person in a given area and
domicile is where a person intends to remain or his permanent residence. A
person can only have a single domicile.
It was ascertained from the intent of the framers of the 1987Constitution that
residence for election purposes is synonymous with domicile. It cannot be
contested that the petitioner held various residences in her lifetime. The Courts
reiterate that an individual does not lose his domicile even if she has maintained
different residences for different purposes. None of these purposes pointed to her
intention of abandoning her domicile of origin
The Courts ruled in favor of Marcos because of the following reasons:
A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin
by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a
bonafide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and
acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue;
A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term
“residence” in Civil Law* does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When
Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile oforigin and
merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium;
Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right
to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon
returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile
of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence
certfcate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary intentionclearly manifested. She even kept close
ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.
Thus, the COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District
of Leyte.
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 193237 October 9, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Romeo Jalosjos was convicted by final judgement of two counts of rape and
six counts of acts of lasciviousness. He served his sentence and was later on issued a
Certificate of Discharge from Prison. Years after, Petitioner applied to register as a voter
in Zamboanga City but was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election
Registration Board due to his previous conviction.
Petitioner then filed a petition for inclusion in the permanent List of Voters before the
Municipal Trial Court. Pending resolution of this petition, petitioner filed a CoC in the
upcoming local elections.
MTC later on ruled for the denial of the petition on account of petitioner’s absolute
disqualification which in effect deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Five
petitions were filed before the COMELEC first and second divisions, intended for the
purpose of cancelling Jalosjos COC. Pending resolution, the COMELEC en BANC
resolved for the denial of petitioner Jalosjos COC due to the latter’s perpetual absolute
disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement.
Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when proprio
Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner’s right to due process.
HELD:
No. Under Section 3 Article IX-C of the Philippine Constitution, requiring a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc may take action is confined only to
cases where the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power. It finds no application,
however, in matters concerning the COMELEC’s exercise of administrative functions.
The COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it issued
Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending petition or
resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely performed its
duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner’s CoC on the basis
of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established
by his final conviction.
In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions,
dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under
Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial
proceedings. Hence, petition is dismissed.
DOCTRINE: While the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one’s CoC
generally necessitates the exercise of the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions
commenced through a petition based on either Sections 1220 or 7821 of the OEC, or
Section 40 22 of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive on
account of final and executory judgments – as when a candidate’s disqualification to run
for public office is based on a final conviction – such exercise falls within the
COMELEC’s administrative functions.
ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015
FACTS:
Both petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero and respondent Jonathan Enrique Nanud were
mayoral candidates in the 2013 elections. Nanud filed for cancellation of Caballero’s
certificate of candidacy alleging that Caballero is a Canadian citizen and a non-resident
of Batanes.
On 3rd of May, the COMELEC cancelled Caballero’s COC, but on 13th of May,
Caballero won the 2013 elections. On December 12, COMELEC issued a writ of
execution and Nanud took oath of office.
Petitioner Caballero argued that prior to the filing of his COC in October 2012, he took
an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul
General in Canada on September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian
citizen pursuant to RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003). Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on October 1, 2012 to conform with
Section 5(2) of RA 9225. Furthermore, Caballero also argued that he did not lose his
domicile of origin in Batanes as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a brighter
future for him and his family; and that he went back to Uyugan during his vacation while
working abroad. However, COMELEC En Banc denied the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC En Banc gravely erred in disregarding the clear import of
procedural rules provided for under COMELEC Resolution No. 9523.
HELD:
No. While private respondent failed to comply with the procedural requirements of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 on the mode of service, the settled rule, however, is
that COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. Moreover, the
COMELEC may exercise its power to suspend its own rules as provided under Section
4, Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. – In the interest of justice and in order

to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission,
these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.
Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope with all
situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the
need to do justice, in any case without further loss of time, provided that the right of the
parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired.
The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of
procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all
matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and
efficient implementation of its objectives – ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
COMELEC.
MATEO CAASI vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990
FACTS:
Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate of Merito Miguel filed a petition to disqualify the latter
from being a candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Pangasinan on the ground
that Miguel is a green card holder.
On his defense: Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US
Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States.
He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter
the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He
alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all
previous elections.
COMELEC dismissed the petition on the ground that the possession of a green card by
the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his
residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, inspite of his green card, respondent has
sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his
having voted in successive elections in said municipality. As the respondent meets the
basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials
Petitioner then appealed to CA and prays for a review of the decision, "Merito C. Miguel,
petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R. Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing the decision of the
RTC which denied.
The Court of Appeals ordered the RTC to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in
the quo warranto case. It is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case
questioning the qualification of the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the
COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic requirements of citizenship
and residence for candidates to elective local officials and that there is no legal
obstacles for the candidacy of the petitioner, considering that decisions of the Regional
Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the Election Code are appealable to the
COMELEC.
ISSUE/S::
Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder thereof is a permanent resident of
the United States such that it would disqualify him to run for any elective local position.
Whether or not Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting
himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18, 1988 local elections,
waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States.
Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office.

HELD:
Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and
his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the United States. In the "Application for Immigrant Visa and
Alien Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the
US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984,
Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if
permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its face, the green
card that was subsequently issued by the US Department of Justice and Immigration
and Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT
ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed:
“Alien Registration Receipt Card. Person identified by this card is entitled to reside
permanently and work in the United States.”
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. He did not
go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there. He entered the
US with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an
immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.
No. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of
candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his
green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to
filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was
"disqualified to run for any elective office."
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The
waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent
clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered
his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in
the local elections on January 18, 1988, the conclusion is that he was disqualified to run
for said public office.
Yes. Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent
resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare
of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal
mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to
become a candidate for that office. Hence, his election was null and void.
Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one
(1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy is one of the qualifications that a
candidate for elective public office must possess. Miguel did not possess that
qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided
in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the
Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on
January 18, 1988.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents
or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear
policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens
who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its
citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose
of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country
are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for
with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties
under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as
permanent residents thereof.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of
another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito
Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was
elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (G.R.
No. 88831 November 8, 1990)
TEODULO M. COQUILLA vs. THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 151914 July 31, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Teodulo M. Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in
Oras, Eastern Samar. On 1965, petitioner joined the United States Navy and was
subsequently naturalized as a U. S. citizen. While on leave on the U. S. Navy, petitioner
visited the Philippines thrice from 1970 to 1973 and remained in the United States since
1985 upon retirement. On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and
took out a residence certificate, albeit continued making several trips to the US. On
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines subsequently after
his application for repatriation was approved. On November 21, 2000, he applied for
registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar. On February 27, 2001, he filed
his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar for “two (2) years.”
On March 5, 2001, respondent incumbent mayor of Oras who was running for re-
election, sought the cancellation of petitioner’s COC on the ground that the latter had
resided in Oras for only about 6 months since when he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines.
On May 14, 2001, petitioner garnered the highest number of votes and was
subsequently proclaimed mayor of Oras.
On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras
and who was running for reelection, sought the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years
when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10,
2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May
14, 2001. Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and received the highest number of votes
(6,131) against private respondent’s 5,752 votes, or a margin of 379 votes. On May 17,
2001, petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
He subsequently took his oath of office.
ISSUE/S::
Whether or not the petitioner may contend the defense that he was “compelled to adopt
American citizenship”.
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year
before the elections that was held on May 14, 2001.
HELD:
No, the petitioner may not contend that he was “compelled to adopt American
citizenship” only by reason of his service in the U.S. armed forces.
Petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630, which applies to the repatriation of
those who lost their Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces
of the United States, but under R.A. No. 8171, which provides for the repatriation of,
among others, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad,
he lost his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not
reacquire his legal residence in this country.
No, the statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of
Oras, Eastern Samar for “two years” at the time he filed such certificate is not true.
The court held that petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his
certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. Thus, the
petition is dismissed.
RODOLFO V. JAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 128314. May 29, 2002
FACTS:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and
Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. Perico instituted a
petition for issuance of letters of administration before the RTC of Queszon City, over
the estate of his parents. Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground
of improper venue. He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City
either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The decedents actual residence
was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a
bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed in
Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose of
obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization. Rodolfo then submitted documentary
evidence previously executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns, voters
affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor vehicle
registration and passports, all indicating that their permanent residence was in Angeles
City, Pampanga.
In his opposition, Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in
Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was
conclusively declared in their death certificates that their last residence before they died
was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City. Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry
appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature
on the said document.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the settlement proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City.
HELD:
Yes. Under Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
“ Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record.”
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of
administration granted in the proper court located in the province where the decedent
resides at the time of his death. The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the
decedents residence at the time of death, over the numerous documentary evidence
presented by petitioner.In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals, [16] we HELD:
“... the term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished from legal
residence or domicile. This term resides, like the terms residing and residence, is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word domicile still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms residence and domicile but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
inhabitant. In other words, resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
place of abode.It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention
to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.”
Hence, the petition is denied.
RODOLFO SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
FACTS:
Felicisimo T. San Luis was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. He

contracted three marriages. His first was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
which were born six children, but Virginia died on 1963. On May 1, 1968, he married
Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son. But on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce at State of Hawaii which issued a Decree
Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody of December 14, 1973.
On June 20, 1974, he then married Felicidad Sagalongos. He had no children but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18,
1992.
Respondent Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate, filing a letter of administration before RTC Makati.
The petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the decedent’s children during his first marriage,
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause
of action for the following reasons that:
Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in
the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his
death;
He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because
she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
legally married to Merry Lee.
In addition to this, petitioners Linda and her brother Rodolfo also filed a motion to
dismiss. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order denying the motions to
dismiss.
Respondent Felicidad presented the evidence that prove the marriage of Felicisimo to
Merry lee had already been dissolved and claimed that Felicisimo had the capacity to
marry her by virtue of par. 2 Article 26 of the family code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the venue was properly laid.
HELD:
Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the RTC of the province “in
which he resides at the time of his death.” It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that
“residence,” for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.”
Needless to say, there is a distinction between “residence” for purposes of election laws
and “residence” for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,
“residence” and “domicile” are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.
However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may
have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence

the Deed of Absolute Sale showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid
property. She also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala
Alabang Village Association and Ayala Country Club, Inc., letter-envelopes from 1988
to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the
deceased’s calling cards stating that his home/city address is at Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa” while his office/provincial address is in “Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.”
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which
has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa.
The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a
municipality and the branches of the RTC of the National Capital Judicial Region which
had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was validly filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Conflict of Law Prelim Digested Cases

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Conflict of Law Prelim Digested Cases

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Conflict of Law Prelim Digested Cases

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Godinez, Theresa T.

Conflict of Law (Saturday)

CONFLICT OF LAWS and CHOICE OF LAW CASES

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V. CA

HASEGAWA VS. KITAMURA

RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL INC. VS. ROUZIE, JR.

termination and breach of employment contract which rendered judgment ordering

Hasegawa v. Kitamura – the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in

HONGKONG SHANGAI BANKING CORPORATION v. SHERMAN

AZNAR vs. GARCIA

that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by

BELLIS vs. BELLIS

a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.

CADALIN vs. CADALIN

We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of

However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes

Bank of America vs American Realty Corporation

DACASIN VS. DACASIN

ZAPANTA vs. THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF THE CITY OF DAVAO

Adversary Proceeding, defined

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “adversary proceeding” as follows:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application,

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO vs.ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION vs.CA

WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about

MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. vs. RAFAEL MA. GUERRERO

EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

ASIAVEST LIMITED vs. CA

CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE CASES

ANTONIO BENGSON III vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs.COMELEC

DJUMANTAN vs. HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO

Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, vs.EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO

CIRILO R. VALLES, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

WILLIE YU vs. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

MAYOR JOSE UGDORACION, JR. vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

The false representation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code pertains to material

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR vs.

NESTOR A. JACOT vs. ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and

ROMMEL C. ARNADO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. – In the interest of justice and in order

MATEO CAASI vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office.

TEODULO M. COQUILLA vs. THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

RODOLFO V. JAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Felicisimo T. San Luis was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. He