Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts: Hague Principles ?
Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts: Hague Principles ?
Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts: Hague Principles ?
Hague Principles ?
* This paper is the outcome of consultations within the Permanent Bureau, involving
among others Ms Marta Pertegás, Secretary, and Ms Ivana Radic, Legal Officer, as well as Ms
Peggy Carlier, Ms Ning Zhao, Ms Éphigénie Gagné and Ms Aïcha Brahma, Interns. The Permanent
Bureau wishes to thank most particularly Ms Peggy Carlier, who devoted a large portion of her
internship with the Permanent Bureau to the drafting of this paper.
1 T. KRUGER, “Feasibility study on the choice of law in international contracts - Overview
and analysis of existing instruments”, Prel. Doc. No 22 B of March 2007. This information is
available on the Hague Conference website at <www.hcch.net>, under the headings “Work in
Progress”, “General Affairs”, and “Prel. Doc. No 22 B of March 2007”.
2 I. RADIC, “Feasibility study on the choice of law in international contracts - Special
focus on international arbitration”, Prel. Doc. No 22 C of March 2007. This information is
available on the Hague Conference website at <www.hcch.net>, under the headings “Work in
Progress”, “General Affairs”, and “Prel. Doc. No 22 C of March 2007”.
3 “Feasibility study on the choice of law in international contracts - report on work
carried out and preliminary conclusions”, Prel. Doc. No 22 A of March 2007, and “Feasibility
General Affairs and Policy of the Conference, the Working Group on Choice of
Law in International Contracts (“the Working Group”) was set up and held its
first meeting in The Hague on 21 and 22 January 2010.4 A second meeting of
the Working Group is scheduled from 15 to 17 November 2010.
At the 2010 meeting of the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the
Hague Conference, the Members of the organisation acknowledged that the
main objective of the future instrument is to establish a global model for conflict
rules applicable to contracts. Therefore, the Council invited the Working Group
study on the choice of law in international contracts - Report on work carried out and conclusions
(follow-up note)”, Prel. Doc. No 5 of February 2008. This information is available on the Hague
Conference website at <www.hcch.net>, under the headings “Work in Progress”, “General
Affairs”, and “Prel. Doc. No 22 A of March 2007” and “Prel. Doc. No 5 of February 2008” (follow-
up note).
4 See the Conclusions and Recommendations adopted by the Council on General Affairs
and Policy of the Conference (31 March – 2 April 2009). This information is available on the
Hague Conference website at <www.hcch.net>, under the headings “Work in Progress”,
“General Affairs” then “Conclusions and Recommendations adopted by the Council (31 March – 2
April 2009)”.
5 See the Conclusion and Recommendation adopted by the Council on General Affairs
and Policy of the Conference (7-9 April 2010). This information is available on the Hague
Conference website at <www.hcch.net>, under the headings “Work in Progress”, “General
Affairs” then “Conclusions and Recommendations adopted by the Council (7-9 April 2010)”.
shows, such principles could eventually be used as a legislative guide for those
States that do not have rules of private international law in such matters.
The idea of developing a non-binding instrument in order to influence the
rules relating to the law applicable to international contracts is nothing new. In
1980, a Working Group established by the International Chamber of
Commerce’s Commercial Law and Practice Commission submitted to its
National Committees draft Guidelines for the law applicable to international
contracts. On that occasion, it considered that disputes between the parties to
8 The replies to the Questionnaire have shown moreover that States do not consider soft
law useful for courts, see Prel. Doc. No 5 of February 2008, supra note 3, No 13, 6. For a
consideration of the normative character and effectiveness of that approach, see H. HARTNELL,
“Living La Vida Lex Mercatoria”, Unif. L. Rev. / Rev. dr. unif. (2007), 735 et seq.
9 See KRUGER, supra note 1.
10 Also taking into account the connection between court jurisdiction and applicable law,
the Hague Principles should be fully consistent with the 2005 Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements. Regarding this kind of parallel, see for instance Z. TANG, “The Interrelationship of
European Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Contract”, Journal of Private International Law (2008),
35 et seq.
11 The questionnaire responses show that over two thirds of the Organisation’s Member
States that replied consider that a new instrument would be useful to assist parties to the contract,
17 In fact, this observation had already been made during the 1980s, see H. VAN LOON,
supra note 14, No 17, 103.
18 Vienna Convention of 11 April 1980 on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(UNCITRAL); see V. HEUZÉ, La vente internationale de marchandises : droit uniforme, LGDJ, Paris
(2000).
19 Arts. 4 and 5 of the CISG.
20 For global statistics on international trade in services, see the WTO’s website (general
information regarding the GATS) <www.wto.org/index.htm> [last consulted on 29 June 2010].
21 See, by contrast, the formulation of EU rules, which refer to the choice of a “law” and
seem, as a result, implicitly to exclude the lex mercatoria, see O. LANDO / P.A. NIELSEN, “The
Rome I proposal”, Journal of Private International Law (2007), Vol. 3, issue 1, 30-34. See,
however, Recitals 13 and 14 of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177/6,
04.07.2008, 6.
Party autonomy lies at the heart of the development of the future Hague
Principles. A provision for choice of law will surely be possible and even
encouraged by the Principles. In this respect, it needs to be recalled that the
25 On the subject of consumer contracts, the absence of specific rules in the 1955
Convention needs to be borne in mind along with the extract from the Final Act of the Fourteenth
Session (Proceedings of the Fourteenth Session, Tome II, Consumer sales, edited by the Permanent
Bureau of the Conference, Netherlands Government Printing Office, The Hague (1982), II-177 to
II-180), which contains a draft Convention relating to certain contracts of sale made by consumers.
However, that subject-matter was not included in the 1986 Convention. See also J. FAWCETT, J.
HARRIS and M. BRIDGE, International Sale of Goods in the Conflict of Laws, Oxford University
Press, Oxford (2005), 871.
26 For a definition of the weaker party, see, e.g., F. LECLERC, “rather than a permanent and
unchanging condition of one contracting party, relevant regardless of his or her partner’s
personality, the situation of weakness reflects a breach of equality between the parties to the
contract, a disparity of the opposing forces within the contractual relationship”, La protection de la
partie faible dans les contrats internationaux, Bruylant, Brussels (1995), No 2, 2; see also P. MAYER,
“La protection de la partie faible en droit international privé”, La protection de la partie faible dans
les rapports contractuels: comparaisons franco-belges, LGDJ, Paris (1996), 513.
To what extent can parties benefit from freedom of choice? Should the future
Hague Principles restrict the parties’ choice to State-based laws, or should it
instead allow broader freedom of choice by extending the parties’ options to
non-State-based rules?
A definition of “non-State-based rules” is in order. While references to the
lex mercatoria, the “general principles of law” or “the principles of the law of
international trade” do not allow determination of the rules’ concrete
substance,29 a reference to the Principles of European Contract Law or the
30 In support of this solution: “the application of rules, admittedly private in origin but
codified, such as the UNIDROIT principles, seems to be a far more suitable practice for the arbitrator
who finds recourse to an a-national rather than a State-based law to be more appropriate in the
case in point: such rules can be easily consulted, and are precise and suited to international trade.
The arbitrator needs, however, to apply them in a reasoned and reasonable way, when the
circumstances warrant it”, BÉGUIN and MENJUCQ, supra note 29, No 2712, 1058.
31 Art. 28(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law; Art. 46 of the Arbitration rules of the
Netherlands Arbitration Institute; Art. 42(1) of the ICSID Convention; Art. 3(1) of the Arbitration
Rules of the Milan Chamber of Commerce; Art. 1496, para. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(France); Art. 1054(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Netherlands); Art. 1051 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Germany); Art. 187(1) of the Federal Act on private international law (Switzerland). See
also Prel. Doc. No 22 C, supra note 2, 4, and LANDO and NIELSEN, supra note 21, 31.
32 P.E. NYGH, “The reasonable expectations of the parties as a guide to the choice of law
in contract and in tort”, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (1995),
Vol. 251, 307-309; H.J. SONNENBERGER, in Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, Vol. 10, 4th ed.,
Munich (2006), Introduction, Nos 267 et seq.; D. MARTINY, in Münchener Kommentar zum BGB,
Vol. 10, 4th ed., Munich (2006), Art. 27, Nos 28 et seq.; J. KROPHOLLER, Internationales Privatrecht,
6. Auflage, pub. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (2006), 464-465.
33 Draft Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable
to contractual obligations (Rome I), COM (2005) 650 Final.
34 LANDO / NIELSEN, supra note 21, 31-32; D. BUREAU and H. MUIR WATT, Droit
international privé, Vol. 2, Partie spéciale, PUF, Paris (2007), 304.
35 Art. 3(1), Rome I Regulation, supra note 21. For a critique of that solution, considered
as the “weak point” of the Rome I Regulation, see F. MARRELLA, “The New (Rome I) European
Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations: What has Changed?”, The ICC
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin (2008), 107.
36 LANDO / NIELSEN, supra note 21, 34 and R. WAGNER, Der Grundsatz der Rechtswahl
und das mangels Rechtswahl anwendbare Recht (Rom I-Verordnung), Praxis des Internationalen
Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (2008), 379.
37 Another advantage is that the Principles are more easily understood and accessible for
parties than a choice of State-based law that is, for reasons of neutrality, entirely unrelated to their
legal situation, M.J. BONELL, “Die Unidroit-Prinzipien der internationalen Handelsverträge: Eine
neue Lex Mercatoria?”, Zeitschrift für Europarecht, internationales Privatrecht und Rechts-
vergleichung (1996), 153.
(c) The absence of connection between the legal situation and the law
chosen
The freedom of choice envisaged for the future Hague Principles does not imply
that a connection is required between the chosen law and the commercial
transactions of the parties. The theory of localisation, which excludes the
chosen law when it is unrelated to the location of the contractual situation’s
elements, is still applied by several legal systems. According to its supporters,
38 In support, see MARTINY, supra note 32, Art. 27, No 22 and the citations.
39 P. NYGH, Autonomy in International Contracts, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1999), 58-60.
40 Inter-American Convention of 17 March 1994 on the Law Applicable to International
Contracts.
41 Section 1-301 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that: “(c) Except as otherwise
provided in this section:
(1) an agreement by parties to a domestic transaction that any or all of their rights
and obligations are to be determined by the law of this State or of another State is effective,
whether or not the transaction bears a relation to the State designated; and
(2) an agreement by parties to an international transaction that any or all of their
rights and obligations are to be determined by the law of this State or of another State or country is
effective, whether or not the transaction bears a relation to the State or country designated.”
Also S. SYMEONIDES, American Private International Law, Kluwer International, Alphen
aan der Rijn (2008), No. 432 in fine, 199-200.
42 See infra, point 5.
43 Art. 7 (regarding arbitration agreements) of the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985 on
international commercial arbitration, amended in 2006.
44 Art 3 c) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Compare with the
definition of “agreement in writing” contained in the Hague Convention of 23 November 2007 on
the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance.
45 Art. 9 of the Rome Convention of 19 June 1980; Art. 11 of the Rome I Regulation; Art.
13 of the Inter-American Convention of 17 March 1994 on the Law Applicable to International
Contracts.
46 Art. 9(2) of the United Nations Convention of 23 November 2005 on the use of
electronic communications in international contracts, <www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/2005Convention.html> [last consulted on 29 June 2010].
47 Art. 7 of the Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International
Contracts <www.oas.org/DIL/CIDIPV_convention_internationalcontracts.htm> [last consulted on
29 June 2010].
48 Akai Pty Ltd v. People’s Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 188 CLR 418 (High Court of Australia);
P. NYGH / M. DAVIES, Conflict of Laws in Australia, 7th ed., LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood
(2002), No 19.4 360-362.
49 Art. 3 of the Rome I Regulation; compare with the Rome Convention, which is phrased
more restrictively: “The choice must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by
the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case”, Art. 3 of the Rome Convention of 19
June 1980 (emphasis added). For a description of the background to adoption of the Rome I
Regulation, see WAGNER, supra note 36, 378.
50 “A juridical act, whether or not it contains any foreign element, is governed by the law
expressly designated in the act or the designation of which may be inferred with certainty from the
terms of the act”, Art. 3111, para. 1 of the Civil Code of Quebec.
51 “But even when the contract does not refer to any state, the forum may nevertheless be
able to conclude from its provisions that the parties did wish to have the law of a particular state
applied. So the fact that the contract contains legal expressions, or makes reference to legal
doctrines, that are peculiar to the local law of a particular state may provide persuasive evidence
that the parties wished to have this law applied. On the other hand, the rule of this section is
This approach was indeed followed in the case of Sonat Exploration Co. v.
Cudd Pressure Control Inc.52
It can thus be observed that there is no consensus in comparative private
international law on the forms of admissibility of implied choice, even within
the broader civil law and common law families.
The arbitration rules relating to determination of the parties’ implicit choice
are no more unified. The term “implicit” sometimes appears in the provision
inapplicable unless it can be established that the parties have chosen the state of the applicable
law. It does not suffice to demonstrate that the parties, if they had thought about the matter, would
have wished to have the law of a particular state applied”, Restatement of the law, Second,
American Law Institute, ALI Publishers, St. Paul (1971), Vol. 1, para. 187, commentary a., 561-562;
SYMEONIDES, supra note 41, No 450, 209.
52 Sonat Exploration Co. c. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc 271 S.W.3d 228 Tex., 2008.
53 Art. 21 of the Arab Convention on commercial arbitration (Amman, 14 April 1987).
54 Art. VII of the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 21
April 1961; Art. 33 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Art. 28 of the UNCITRAL Model Law; Art.
28 of the International Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association.
55 O. Lando, supra note 6, 174.
56 A. DICEY / J. MORRIS / L. COLLINS, The Conflict of Laws, Vol. 2, 14th ed., Sweet &
Maxwell, London (2006), Rule 203, No 32-080, 1567 (regarding the Rome Convention).
57 P. LAGARDE, “Le dépeçage en droit international privé des contrats”, Rivista di diritto
internazionale privato e processuale (1975), No 1, 649.
58 J.-M. JACQUET, see “Contrats”, Répertoire de Droit international, Dalloz (1998), Nos 56
and 57, 13. According to Bernard Audit, this restrictive view is inspired “by the concern to observe
the statutory establishments and the fear of imbalance between the parties”, B. AUDIT, Droit
international privé, 5th ed. (2008), No 821, 685.
59 Dépeçage is a “form of accomplishment of contractual intent”, LAGARDE, supra note 57,
No 4, 652. Compare: “dépeçage is simply a manifestation (or the logical conclusion) of the
principle of party autonomy”, R. PLENDER, The European Contracts Convention: The Rome
Convention on the Choice of Law for Contracts, 2nd ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell (2001), No 5-
17, 100-101; M. EKELMANS, “Le dépeçage du contrat dans la Convention de Rome du 19 juin 1980
sur la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles”, Mélanges offerts à Raymond Vander Elst,
Tome I, Nemesis, Bruxelles (1986), 247.
60 Dépeçage is in fact permitted by several instruments, including in particular the
Resolution of the Institute of International Law on “The Autonomy of the Parties in International
Contracts Between Private Persons or Entities” (“the parties may choose the law to be applied to
the whole or one or more parts of the contract”, Art. 7 of the Resolution, Basel Session 1991,
Revue critique de droit international privé (1991), 198), the Rome Convention of 19 June 1980
and the Rome I Regulation (“the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or a part only
of the contract”, Art. 3(1)). As regards arbitration, see RADIC, supra note 2.
61 J. FAWCETT / J. CARRUTHERS, “Choices must be logically consistent”, Cheshire, North and
Fawcett: Private international law, 14th ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford (2008), 691. Cf. “the
only limit of dépeçage is one of practice: the application of several laws to a single contract should
not rupture its consistency”; J.-M. JACQUET, supra note 58, No 55, 13; “when the contract is
severable the choice must be logically consistent, i.e., it must relate to elements in the contract
which can be governed by different laws without giving rise to contradictions. For example, an
‘index-linking clause’ may be made subject to a different law; on the other hand, it is unlikely that
repudiation of the contract for non-performance would be subjected to two different laws, one for
the vendor and the other for the purchaser. Recourse must be had to [the rule applicable in the
event of choice] if the chosen laws cannot be logically reconciled”, M. GIULIANO / P. LAGARDE,
“Report concerning the convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations”, Official
Journal of the European Communities, 31 Oct. 1980, No C 282, 17.
62 Regarding the discussions of this matter in connection with the 1986 Convention, see
Proceedings of the Extraordinary Session of October 1985, Diplomatic Conference on the law
It is premature to make any claims on the reach of the future Hague Principles.
If they are to be comprehensive, it would be desirable to provide for rules
applicable in the absence of choice of law by the parties.63 A few lines of
investigation that might lead to the drafting of subsidiary rules, if so desired, are
set out below.
At a first stage and for the sake of clarity, it could be useful to include an
introductory chapeau which would state that the rule applicable in the absence
of choice consists of a general principle subject to an exception – the general
principle being that the law applicable in the absence of choice would be that
with the closest connections to the contract.
In the second stage, the rule applicable in the absence of choice could provide
that determination of the applicable law would be based on a presumption in
favour of the law of the habitual residence of the party who is required to
provide the characteristic performance.64 The rule established might then be
supplemented by a list of specific contracts by subject-matter: for sale,
distribution, insurance, finance, real estate, transport, etc.
In effect, the addition of a provision relating to specific contracts rather than
mere commentaries following the written rule seems more suitable. This is why
the Conference could include in the future Hague Principles a number of
connections that would apply to each broad type of commercial contract.65
applicable to sales contracts, edited by the Permanent Bureau of the Conference, Netherlands
Government Printing Office, The Hague (1987), Nos 50-54, 725.
63 For an outline of the various methods used in arbitration matters when the parties have
not designated an applicable law, see LANDO, supra note 6, 164-169.
64 The rule could be phrased as follows, for instance: “In the absence of choice, the law
applicable to the contract shall be the law of the location of habitual residence of the party that
shall provide or ought to have provided the characteristic performance.”
65 Compare with Sections 189 to 197 of the Restatement, Second, as described by
S. SYMEONIDES, supra note 41, No 490, 226-227. The reference to a list of specific contracts is also
used in the European Community rules, in particular Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation. For the
background to adoption of that provision, see WAGNER, supra note 36, 381 et seq. On the other
hand, Article 9 of the Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International
Contracts does not provide for specific clauses by class of contracts.
That methodology, together with the number and type of contracts concerned,
will naturally require analysis and consideration within the Working Group.
remedy excessively rigid application of the connection rule deemed valid in the
absence of choice.
However, unlike certain domestic legislations, the arbitrator or judge
would not be required to demonstrate the absence of close connections
between the legal situation and the law designated by the rule to be applied in
the absence of choice (negative proof): it would suffice for the award or
judgment duly to establish that the connections to another system are stronger
(affirmative proof).
70 P. MAYER, see “Lois de police”, Répertoire de droit international, Dalloz, Paris (1998),
No 26, 4.
71 Ibid., No 27, 4.
72 H. BATIFFOL / P. LAGARDE, Traité de droit international privé, t. 1, 8e éd., LGDJ, Paris
(1993), 569.
73 Cf., for instance, Art. 17 of the Hague Convention of 14 March 1978 on the Law
Applicable to Agency, available on the Hague Conference website at <www.hcch.net>.
74 BATIFFOL / LAGARDE, supra note 72, 569.
75 DICEY / MORRIS / COLLINS, supra note 56, Rule 210, No 32-230, 1627.
mechanism has no relevance.76 This solution is justified by the fact that in the
case of a choice of law, implementation of renvoi would result in thwarting the
parties’ legitimate expectations: the contracting parties’ intent is undoubtedly to
choose a substantive rule and not to consider the renvoi virtually imposed by
the conflict rules of the State-based systems involved. Accordingly, the principle
of legal security, and correspondingly the observance of party autonomy,
require that bypassing of the designated law cannot be an option.
Finally, the co-ordinating function of the renvoi is made pointless in this
VII. – CONCLUSION
mim