Language in Dispute: The Summulae Logicales

LANGUAGE IN DISPUTE: THE SUMMULAE LOGICALES
AMSTERDAM STUDIES IN THE THEORY AND

HISTORY OF LINGUISTIC SCIENCE
General Editor
E. F. KONRAD KOERNER
(University of Ottawa)
Series III - STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE LANGUAGE SCIENCES
Advisory Editorial Board
Ranko Bugarski (Belgrade); Jean-Claude Chevalier (Paris)

H.H. Christmann (Tübingen); Boyd H. Davis (Charlotte, N.C.)
Rudolf Engler (Bern); Hans-Josef Niederehe (Trier)
R.H. Robins (London); Rosane Rocher (Philadelphia)
Vivian Salmon (Oxford); Aldo Scaglione (Chapel Hill)
Volume 39
Peter of Spain
Language in Dispute:
The Summulae Logicales
PETER OF SPAIN
LANGUAGE IN DISPUTE
An English translation of
Peter of Spain's Tractatus
called afterwards
SUMMULAE LOGICALES
on the basis of the critical
edition established by
L.M. DE RIJK
by
FRANCIS P. DINNEEN, S.J.

Georgetown University
JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY

AMSTERDAM/PHILADELPHIA
1990
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
John, XXI, Pope, d. 1277.
[Summulae logicales. English]
Language in dispute : an English translation of Peter of Spain's Tractatus, called after
wards Summulae logicales : on the basis of the critical edition established by L.M. de
Rijk / Peter of Spain ; by Francis P. Dinneen.
p. cm. -- (Amsterdam studies in the theory and history of linguistic science.
Series III, Studies in the history of the language sciences, ISSN 0304-0720; v. 39)
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Logic ~ Early works to 1800. I. Dinneen, Francis P. II. Title. III. Series.
BC60.J5613 1990
160 - dc20 89-18528
ISBN 90 272 4524 X (alk. paper) CIP
© Copyright 1990 - John Benjamins B.V.
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or
any other means, without written permission from the publisher.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The origin of this translation was a Christmas vacation attempt

to become familiar with word-processing. It coincided with a re
reading of Bochenski's 1947 text of the Summulae, suggesting the
idea that things long neglected could be refreshed while practicing
the new techniques. When the outcome was proposed for publicat
ion, it was pointed out that De Rijk 1972 had outdated Bochenski
1947.
De Rijk's work is a model of careful scholarship, which this
translation does not adequately reflect and occasionally may distort,
given its origin and focus on linguistic challenges rather than logical
rigor. The original's details are to be found in De Rijk's critical
apparatus and in the 119-page Introduction to his 'Peter of Spain
(Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis) TRACTATUS, called afterwards
SUMMULAE LOGICALES - First Critical Edition from the Manu
scripts with an Introduction' (Van Gorcum & Comp. B.V. Assen,
1972). It was soon clearly futile just to try to complement Bochen
ski's text (based mainly on one manuscript) by additions or
corrections from De Rijk's. Acknowledgement of Van Gorcum's per
mission to attempt this translation is here gratefully made.
FOREWORD
"What is his noun ?" can be a poor translation of "Quel est son
nom ?" but might highlight a linguist's perspective in translating an
explictly logical work. There are no lexical or grammatical puzzles
in "to be safe on the Fourth, don't buy a fifth on the third", but few
non-Americans can 'translate' it and ordinary dictionaries won't
help. Comparable cultural lapses may annoy logicians comparing
this with the original, as will the fact that translation-equivalents do
not rigidly follow a logical one-to-one parallel.
It seemed appropriate in translating to take account of some
changes in grammatical terminology and perspective. This version
seems to refer to English rather than Latin, so here, 'word-group'
covers phrase, clause and sentence (oratio); 'ending' often seemed
the best choice for casus; for a syntactically vs. morphologically
defined unit, 'nominal' often appears for Hispanus' 'noun', as do
'verbal', 'adjectival' and other syntactically defined -al forms; where
'word' occurs, it is indicated whether it stands for Hispanus' nomen
or dictio. Some of his terms have since been replaced or used for
other purposes, like 'restrictive relative clause' for his (now)
misleading 'implication'. 'Or' can be ambiguous, so where coord
inate conjunction rather than disjunction is intended, a slanted line /
links the coordinates. Instead of using 'sign' for syncategorematics
like 'every', the word 'marker' was chosen. English and Latin often
diverge in lexical range, so glosses rather than true translations
often appear, like totus : '(the) whole (of)'. The Latin for some key
words and most 'sophisms' is given, particularly in the introductory
section, then wherever Latin ratio occurs, or where out of the ordin
ary expressions were preferred, such as 'peculiarly' for proprie. AU
footnotes are those of De Rijk's text except my own, initialled 'fpd'.
Since this is a work about dialectic, translation-choices made
here will give ample ground for dialectical dispute. In the mean
time, it is to be hoped that non-logicians, linguists and those just
interested in language may find interest in reading it.
Washington, D.C., December 1988 F.P.D.

CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v
FOREWORD vi
CONTENTS vii
INTRODUCTION xvii
SUMMULAE LOGICALES
TRACT I : On Introductory Notions
On Dialectic 1
On Sound 1
On Vocal Expression ( Vox ) 2
On the Noun 2
On the Verb 2
On the Word - Group ( oratio ) 3
On the Proposition 3
On the Categoric Proposition and its threefold
division 4
On the Triple Matter of Categorics 7
On their Equipollences 7
On Triple Conversion 8
On the Hypothetic Proposition and its Division 8
On the Truth of Hypothetics 9
On Mode 11
On Modal Propositions 11
On their Opposition 14
TRACT II : On Predicables
On Predicable 17
On Genus 17
On Species 18
On Difference 21
On Peculiarity (proprium) 21
On Accident 22
On Commonalities and Differences of
Predicables 23
On Predication 24
On Denominatives 24
viii CONTENTS
TRACT III : On Predicaments

On some prefatory notions 25
On Substance 27
On Commonalities and Properties of
Substance 28
On Quantity 30
On Commonalities of Quantity 30
On Compared-to-Another (Relation) 30
On Commonalities of Relation 31
On Quality 32
On properties of quality 33
On Action 33
On Passion ( to undergo : Pati ) 34
On a four-fold opposition 34
On Prior 35
On Together 35
On Change ( Motus ) 36
On Possession ( Habere ) 36
TRACT IV : On Syllogisms
On the Proposition 38
On the Syllogism 38
On Mood and Figure 39
On universal Rules 39
On the First Figure 40
On its Moods 41
On the Second Figure 42
On its Moods 43
On Reduction through the Impossible 44
On the Third Figure 44
On its Moods 44
On some Rules 46
On unusable Connexities ( conjugatio ) 48
TRACT V : On Topics
On the multiple ambiguity of Ratio 49
On Argument and Argumentation 49
On the Species of Argumentation 50
On Topic in General 51
CONTENTS ix
ON INTRINSIC TOPICS 52
On the Topic from Substance 52

On the Topic from Definition 52
On the Topic from the Thing Defined 53
On the Topic from Description 54
On the Topic from Nominal Interpretation
54
On the Topic from Concomitants of Substance 55
On the Topic from Whole 55
On the Topic from Universal Whole
or Genus 55
On the Topic from Species or
Subjective Part 56
On the Topic from an Integral
Whole 56
On the Topic from Whole in
Quantity 57
On the Topic from Whole in Mode 58
On the Topic from Whole in Place 58
On the Topic from Whole in Time 58
On the Topic from Cause 59
On the Topic from Generation 61
On the Topic from Corruption 61
On the Topic from Uses 61
On the Topic from Things Commonly
Co-occurring 62
ON EXTRINSIC TOPICS 62
On the Topic from Opposites 62
On the Topic from Things Relatively
Opposed 63
On the Topic from Contraries 63
On the Topic from Privative Opposites 63
On the Topic from Things Contradictorily
Opposed 64
On the Topic from the Greater and the Lesser 64
On the Topic from Like 65
On the Topic from Proportion 65
On the Topic from Transfer 65
On the Topic from Authority 66
X CONTENTS
ON MEDIATE TOPICS 66
On the Topic from Conjugates 67

On the Topic from Derivates (cases) 67
On the Topic from Division 67
TRACT VI : On Suppositions
On Signification 69
On Supposition and Copulation 69
On the Division of Supposition 70
Doubts 72
Solution 74
T R A C T VII : On Fallacies
INTRODUCTION 76
On t h e Definition of Disputation 76
On t h e Division of Disputation 77
On Sophistical Disputation and its Ends 79
On the thirteen Fallacies 81
ON LINGUISTIC FALLACIES 81
ON EQUIVOCATION 83
On the Definition of Fallacy 83

On the Definition of Equivocation 83
On the Division of Equivocation 84
On the First Species 84
On the Second Species 85
On the Third Species 87
On the three species 88
ON AMPHIBOLY 90
On the Definition of Amphiboly 90

On the first species 90
On the second species 91
On the third species 91
On the Modes Common to Equivocation and
Amphiboly 92
Doubts 94
CONTENTS xi
ON COMPOSITION AND DIVISION 98
On Potential Polysemy 98
Objections 99
On Composition 100
On Causes of this Fallacy 102
On its modes 104
On the first mode 104
On the second mode 106
On Division 107
On the first mode 107
On the second mode 108
ON ACCENT 109
On the Definition of Accent 109

On the Causes and Modes of Accent 109
On the first Mode 109
On the second Mode 110
Doubts 111
ON WORD-FIGURE 113
On the Mode of Signifying in a Word ( dictio ) 113

On Figure 115
On Word-Figure 115
On Causes and Modes of Word-Figure 116
On the third Mode 122
ON EXTRALINGUISTIC FALLACIES 126
ON ACCIDENT 126
On Causes and Modes of Accident 128

ON THE FALLACY AFTER-A-FASHION AND SIMPLY 137
On the Definition of these Terms 137

On Causes and Modes of this Fallacy 137
xii CONTENTS

On the fourth Mode 139
On the fifth Mode 139
ON IGNORING REFUTING EVIDENCE 141

On Refutation ( elenchus ) 141
On Ignorance 142
On Ignorantia elenchi 143
On the Causes and Modes of this Fallacy 143
ON ASSUMING THE POINT AT ISSUE 146
On its Definition 146

On Causes amd Modes of this Fallacy 146
On the fifth Mode 148
ON THE FALLACY OF CONSEQUENT 149

On Consequence 149
On Causes and Modes of this Fallacy 150
ON THE FALLACY OF NON-CAUSE AS CAUSE 153
On two kinds of Syllogism 153

On the Fallacy of Non-cause as Cause 15*
On the Causes of this Fallacy 15*
ON THE FALLACY OF MANY QUESTIONS AS ONE 156
On Statement, Proposition, Interrogation

and Conclusion 156
On the Causes and Modes of this
Fallacy 158
CONTENTS xiii

ON REDUCTION OF ALL FALLACIES 159
On two kinds of Ignoring the Point at issue 159
On generic Reduction 160
On specific Reduction 161
TRACT VIII : ON RELATIVES 164
On two kinds of Relative 164
On Substantive Relatives 164
On Identical Relatives 164
Questions 165
Doubts 166
On Relatives of Diversity 167
On a rule about a Relative of Diversity 168
On a rule about a relative of Identity
given by predecessors 168
Objections 169
On a certain rule about a Relative of
Identity 170
On Relatives of Accident 170
On division of a Relative of Accident 170
On Relatives of Accidental Identity 171
On the words such, so great, so many,
as often, so often 171
TRACT IX : ON EXTENSIONS 172
On Personal Supposition 172
On Restriction and Extension 172
On the Division of Extension 172
A Sophism 173
On two Rules 173
TRACT X : ON APPELLATIONS 175
On the Definition of Appellation 175
On the Division of Appellation 175
On the Appellation of a Common Term 175
xiv CONTENTS
TRACT XI : ON RESTRICTIONS
On the Definition of Restriction 177

On the Division of Restriction 177
On Restriction effected by a Noun 177
On a rule about Restriction
effected by a Noun 177
On a rule about a Restricted Term 178
On another rules about Restriction 178
On two rules about Restriction effected
by a Restrictive Relative
Clause ( implicatio ) 179
On some rules about Restriction
effected by a Verb 180
A Sophism 181
Question 182
On Restriction effected by Usage 184
On Restriction effected by a
verb's Transitivity 184
TRACT XII : ON DISTRIBUTIONS 185
On the Definition of Distribution 185

On Universal Markers 185
On markers distributive of
Substance 185
On the marker every 186
What it may signify 186
Whether it demands three
Appellates 187
On a rule about what was
discussed 189
On its Refutation 190
A Sophism 191
Another Sophism 191
On a certain rule 192
Another Sophism 192
On the marker 'not a (one)' ( nullus )
On a Rule 193
A Sophism 193
On the marker nothing ( nichil )
A sophism 194
Some other sophisms 195
CONTENTS xv
On markers distributive of Two 196

A Sophism 196
Another sophism 197
Whether Negation has ability to
distribute 198
On Distribution of an Aptitude 199
On Accomodated Distribution 199
On the marker 'the whole (of)' ( totus ) 199
A Sophism 200
On markers distributive of Accidents 201
On markers distributive of Quality 201
A Sophism 201
On markers distributive of Quantity 202
A Sophism 202
On the word ( dictio ) twice 203
On the nominal 'infinite 1 ( infinitum ) 203
A Sophism 204
INDEX OF REFERENCES 206
INDEX OF WORDS AND THINGS 208
INDEX OF SOPHISMS AND EXAMPLES 262

INTRODUCTION
PETER OF SPAIN'S SUMMULAE, THE MODISTAE,

AND LINGUISTICS
Hispanus was a contemporary of linguistic theorists called 'Modist-

ae' after their 12th to 14th century writings entitled De Modis Sign
ificandi. Their concerns involved differences between the way
things actually are in themselves, how we understand them, and how
grammatical conventions require us to communicate about them:
modi essendi ways things are SO
modi intelligendi ways of conceiving things SEEM
or ways of being understood
modi significandi ways we must communicate SAID
or ways of being REpresented
This suggests a preference for the cognitive potential of language
over its common actual role of silence-prevention. Linguists until
recently have been more concerned with SAID than CIRCUM
STANCE, since SAID can be idealized as independent of the SO-ways
things are, or the SEEM-ways we think about them. But that inde
pendence can only be one of degree. 'Meaning' distinguishes
language from noise, and modal differences distinguish one language
from another. Descriptive Linguistics allows 'meaning' a negative
role (e.g. that differences between English take vs. took or tones in
Chinese are distinctive). Transformational Generative Grammar
attempts a less negative account of 'meaning' because of its explan
atory vs. descriptive concept of an adequate grammar. In Hispanus'
terms, the relation of form to matter is 'explanatory', since form
determines matter much like precise questions determine what
answers to them are considered apposite. What Hispanus separated
as formal vs. material perspectives is what distinguishes emic
Phonemics from etic Phonetics, yet both sets simultaneously define
each other: without adequate phonetic description, phonological
explanation is unreliable; without adequate meaning-distinctions,
semantic explanations are inadequate. If its peculiar technical
terms are the most precise answers to questions a discipline asks,
Hispanus' work may alert us to questions modern linguistic work
overlooks or confuses.
xviii SUMMULAE LOGICALES
Material or etic (as in phonetics) objects of study are definable in

terms of what can be called their Composition: a positive, additive
list of components forming units distinguishable by the way they are
distributed. Formally or emically (as in phonemics), objects with
identical composition can be viewed as contrastive because of dif-
ferent functions they frequently serve. Of a phonetically identical
high, front vowel i, we can say that in Latin it is one of five basic
contrasts, but in other languages, one of three, or more than five,
such oppositions. Latin i also contrasts as a syllable, morpheme,
word, clause or sentence with other Latin forms. When I talk to my
self about me, three emically distinct grammatical persons, but only
a single real-world referent is involved, etically or materially
identical in SO, functionally or formally distinct in SAID, and not
much of a challenge for normals to keep distinct in SEEM.
Different modes of signifying (SAID) can refer to identical modes
of existing in a real (SO) situation, as in saying (a) 'Old Sol hasn't
been around much', or (b) 'The sun hasn't been rising in the morn
ing'. While (a) ambiguously signals a State of affairs about someone,
(b) ambiguously signals a personal Action or impersonal Process. We
now consider (a) metaphoric, but neither an Action or a Process
interpretation of (b) SAID has been thought to correspond literally to
SO since Ptolemaic Astronomy was abandoned. We see this as a
clear conflict among SO, SEEM, SAID - areas the Modistae assigned
to modi essendi, modi intelligendi, and modi significandi. In (b),
rising has an active mode of signification lacking passive contrast
when the sun is involved. Similarly, we still describe people as jov
ial, mercurial, saturnine, choleric, phlegmatic or sanguine: in terms
of astrological and physiological theories few still credit, without
either lying or being deceived. Both situations involve interpretat
ions of 'Meaning', and Hispanus provides labels for keeping separate
several aspects of what that single cover term, 'Meaning', means.
SUPPOSITION and SIGNIFICATION
The tract on Supposition is the 6th of this 12-part Summary of Dia

lectic by Petrus Hispanus (d.1277). The Summulae's first part (I-V)
introduces Aristotelian ideas familiar enough at the time to be call
ed Old Logic; the second (VI-XII) studies properties of terms, then
considered novelties of Modern Logic. The two most important pro
perties of terms were Supposition and Signification, which contrast
like meaning-as-reference (Supposition) and meaning-as-sense (Sign
ification). Among the questions raised were how senses and refer
ents are related: e.g., must things exist if we have words for them,
or how can statements about them be labelled valid or invalid, true
or false, appropriate or inappropriate, under different conditions ?
INTRODUCTION xix
Hispanus's treatment is of current interest because identical data

must be dealt with differently in related disciplines studying them
(a) as natural objects and subjects, (b) to match objectivity and
subjectivity and (c) to discuss the nature of subjective objects.
Objective stresses extramental status, while subjective involves
tests decided by individual or social values. What the Stoics called
lexis, Hispanus a dictio, and Bloomfield a linguistic form, for
instance, can be considered a subjective-object (because as socially
constituted, it is accessible as such only to natives). But Bloom-
field's phonetic form, Stoic phone , or another use of Hispanus'
dictio, is a lexical item REpresented without invoking its grammat
ical or semantic status. That makes it an objective-object (because
neutrally accessible to native and nonnative alike), yet a quasi sub
jective-object (as accessible only to trained observers).
Each of those objects can be studied statically or dynamically, as
end points of an action or process (actively thinking up terms to
abbreviate how we keep things distinct from each other: meanings
as senses; or the process of accepting terms and their senses as
applying or adaptable to things: meaning as reference). Or they can
be taken as a static table of descriptive labels: e.g., generic
concepts like that of 'man', or relations such as grammatical
number.
Even if, as Hispanus claimed, logical methods test the validity of
how other disciplines argue to their conclusions, those methods do
not endow dialecticians with a special ability to judge whether terms
are appropriately defined. Still, if Dialectic is supposed to clarify
conventions about how the Signification and Supposition of terms
determine each other, it is not unreasonable to expect a consistent
way of dealing with accounts of sense and reference in a work on
Dialectic: that what Subject or Predicate mean in Logic, for
instance, can be distinct from their interpretation in Grammar.
But English words like meaning and Latinate ones with an -atio
suffix are as inherently ambiguous as Latin modi significandi -
neutral to English 'ways of signifying' or 'ways of being signified'.
In passages where Hispanus distinguishes Signification and Supposit
ion, terms we translate as imposition, signified, acceptance, sign
ifying, supposition and coupling are equally ambiguous. Nothing
in his definitions determines whether or when, e.g., representation
is equivalent to 'the act of representing', 'the process of re
presenting', or 'the fact that a vocal expression represents' a thing
by vocal expression. If exact norms could be given, their ambiguity
would be systematic, and their use proportional or analogical (e.g.
XX SUMMULAE LOGICALES
how noun and verb are to be used consistently in grammar or dia

lectic; why indifferent use of sentence / proposition in a logical
or linguistic discussion would be predictably ambiguous).
Ambiguity is more common in ordinary than in technical language.
Hispanus mentions some of the differences. He says the matter Dia
lecticians study is only one kind of sentence and two kinds of. words
Grammarians predefine for them: the subset of sentences that
signify something true or false (now formally redefined as REpre-
sentations of Propositions), and the subset of words2 into which
sentences of that sort can be resolved (logically redefined as cate-
gorematic terms and non-terms called syncategorematic express
ions) The Dialectician studies as well two functions that terms
constituting a Proposition have by serving as its logical subject
and predicate. Where noun, verb and other parts of a sentence
might be defined positively and independently in Grammar (e.g., by
morphological shape, syntax, and meaning-type), the Dialectician's
Subject and Predicate terms define each other relationally and mut
ually, through their functional interdependence: the matter gram
mar and dialectic deal with can overlap, but their formalities and
functions are no more identical than those of grammar and poetry.
If words were technical terms like H2O instead of water, they

would all pair a unique Signification with a unique Referent, and
violations in argumentation would be easy to identify. Hispanus
calls terms like that univocal (pp. 23-27) as opposed to equivocal
(identical in form, different in Signification: pp. 23, 85, 86); many
words with root- or principal-Signification (p. 95) in common are
called denominatives or conjugates (pp. 23, 30, 31). E.g. like uni
vocals, grammar and grammarian have the same principal Significat
ion, and overlap in expression (like equivocals), but differ from
univocais by Consignification, and from equivocals by their form:
grammar has the same principal signification as grammarian, but
English derivational -ian can consignify 'person' while grammar does
not: spoken /gramaH/ in English pronunciations equivocally
REpresents either what writing REpresents as grandmother or as
grammar). Such words occasion the kind of Ambiguity he calls
Equivocation (p. 83).
1: Hispanus' oratio is here almost invariably translated word-group,

allowing it to correspond to our sentence, phrase and clause as well.
2: Where word occurs in this translation, Hispanus' original dictio or
nomen is noted.
INTRODUCTION xxi
When a construction constituted by two words like flying planes or

Aristotle's book (p. 90) can principally signify more than one
referent (a plane flying on its own, or one we cause to fly; the book
he owns, or the one he wrote), the ambiguity involved is called Am
phiboly (pp. 90 ff). So the kind of Ambiguity a Dialectician explains
by discussing properties of terms is traceable to three linguistic
sources: ambiguous words, ambiguous construction, or both.
For example, in 'The kid's study is astounding', both kid and study
are equivocal (kid can be child or goat; study the result of being
studied or the activity or result of studying something), so the ex
pression is ambiguous from both points of view: (1) it is ambiguous
in as many ways as the terms kid and study are equivocal; (2) it
is as ambiguous as the amphibolous construction (involving active
or passive study). Each interpretation of kid's study involves
different sets of significations and objects, characters or scenarios,
but the signification of proper names like Aristotle (if they have
any) cannot dictate that term's supposition in the same way as the
various significations of kid do, (lots of things can be called kids, but
only one is Aristotle), while either interpretation of Aristotle's book
has the same cast of characters signified by those two terms, but in
different roles (Aristotle as author, or Aristotle as owner).
Hispanus deals with facts like these in several ways. He says (1)
that a singular term signifies, supposes for, and summons (has Appel
lation for) the same thing, while suppositions of common terms can
vary (pp. 175 ff.); (2) being this or that kind of a thing is not a
matter of language, while being signified this or that way can be
exclusively a linguistic modality (p. 69); (3) functions like subject-
as-subject or predicate-as-predicate must be distinguished from that
which functions as subject or predicate (pp. 187, 169), just as gram
matical nouns or verbs can be considered as REpresenting terms in
logical propositions, and logical terms as REpresenting subjects and
predicates of judgements (pp. 2 ff); (4) while a morphological
Nominative often coincides with the semantactic role of Agent, the
mode of Agent can be superimposed on a syntactic Patient role or
Patient mode on a syntactic Agent role: in 'Aristotle is being
struck', a nominative has a Patient mode, and in 'Aristotle sees
himself', the supposition of Aristotle and himself is identical, but
himself has a coreferential Agent mode superimposed on its Patient
role (p. 165).
A Dialectic equipped to deal with properties of terms like supposit

ion vs. signification can handle sentences which are not isomorphic
REpresentations of covert propositions (like the sentence man runs
xxii SUMMULAE LOGICALES
for the propositions man runs, or a man is running: p. 3.) A

sentence using the word representation is intrinsically ambiguous; a
proposition (a REpresentation of something as state, process, or
action) is decidably true or false, but NOT by the overt sentence
'Signification is representation', because -ation forms of English are
three-ways ambiguous (state, process, action) and therefore signs of
at least nine propositions without change in expression.
Generic 'Signification' is defined as 'conventional representation of
a thing by a vocal expression' (p. 69) and is made more specific in
passing remarks Hispanus makes. E.g., Denominatives (like gramm
arian from grammar) have a common principal Signification but dif
ferent Consignification (pp. 69, 179); substantival nouns both 'sign
ify' and 'stand for' something, while verbs and adjectivais may share
principal signification, but 'copulate' rather than 'stand for' (p.
179); a signification may derive from extrinsic imposition, convent
ional transfer (p. 93) or intrinsic similarity (p. 63). But the most
important linguistic subdivision of 'signify' is the expression 'con-
signify'. Aristotle (On Interpretation III 16b i ff.) says nouns and
verbs with identical lexical roots 'signify' (semainei) the same thing,
but verbs 'consignify' (prosemainei) time as well: the noun sign and
verb signs differ in this way, although signs 'consignifies' more than
just time-contrast.
So Supposition (or reference) is ambiguously (a) a psychological
act of interpreting a term as referring to a thing, (b) the social
process associating a definition with what it picks out, or (c) the
state or fact that a term has a property consisting in its socially
shared association pairing a meaning with a referent. What Suppos
ition involves in all three can be variables, but Signification is a
constant (pp. 69 ff.; 172 ff.; 177 ff.): Restriction decreases, or
Extension increases, the number of things for which a term stands,
while its Signification remains the same. E.g., nation can signify,
stand or suppose for, and summon an individual existent thing; the
term capitol signifies, supposes for, and calls up a particular kind of
building, existent or not; in the unit-expression or construction
National Capitol, Capitol is restricted in that it does not suppose for
a State Capitol, and in that same phrase, State is restricted only to
Capitol (not capital a state owns), while the signification (what they
are able to pick out) of State or Capitol is unchanged. Hispanus says
Restriction in such cases is both mutual and proportioned (p. 178):
the less common (nation) restricts the more common (capitol), since
there are more capitols than National Capitols; but the less com
mon (nation) restricts the more common (capitol), e.g., because
there are more Capitols than Nations in the United States. But the
Signification of such terms is said to remain unaltered.
INTRODUCTION xxiii
Similarly, Circular shares principal meaning with Circle and over

laps with that of round, which has many senses and functions. The
Supposition of a round includes: circle, ring or sphere; circular,
ring-shaped, curved or spherical object; rounded form; anything
circular in cross section; completed course, series, or succession;
completed spell of activity; series in play or sport; recurring period
of time, succession of events or duties; single outburst of applause
or single shot by one or many guns; ammunition charge for a single
shot; single servings to everyone at a table or bar; dance moving in
a ring; movement in a circle or around an axis; thigh of beef below
the rump, above the leg; a Briton's slice of bread; archers' arrows
shot; boxing's three-minute period; a musical canon, or order in
ringing a peal of bells; completed game of golf; card player's turn
to bid, bet, play a card, deal or be dealt cards; convex curve given
the luff, head, or foot of a fore-and-aft sail. Rounds are a complet
ed course of time, series of events or operations; a going from place
to place in habitual ciruit: to go the rounds is to be reported; in the
round has to do with a stage surrounded by the audience or with a
broad understanding; in sculpture, not attached to supporting back
ground, freestanding. To make the rounds is to visit routinely like
actors or free-lance writers contacting producers and editors. The
same principal meaning is involved adverbially or prepositionally
((a)round), and in verbs transitively (make round, plump, or free from
angularity) as well as intransitively (become round, plump, or unang-
ular). Construction (with predicate functions or other terms) can
extend or restrict round's supposition (the number of defined things
the term stands for), signalled by word order (subjects precede),
copular signification (adjectival, verbal, lexical) and consignific-
ations of substantive terms (gender, number), as well as the consign-
ifications of the terms with which it is constructed (tense of the
verb or participle, lexical significations like possible, types of
relative, (which vs. another), of quantifier (such as, both), of
adverbial (only). Usage modifies standard signification/supposition
interdependencies: empty has mostly to do with solid things, not
air; king or professor are taken be ours, unless otherwise marked;
words have consignifications one may not attend to when focusing on
principal signification (e.g. grammatical 3rd person singular or plural
in a dictio which happens to be a verb).
Significations are presented as abstract relationships speakers can

understand, compared to concrete supposits they see, hear, feel, etc.
when counting. Words are as abstract compared to concrete utter
ances as abstract-because-absent paradigmatic options compared to
items concrete-because-present in the syntagmatic chain of speech.
But REpresentations of these have yet a different status. Inter-
xxiv SUMMULAE LOGICALES
national Signs suggest why this should be so, since they are ideo
graphic, unrestricted by grammatical or phonetic peculiarities of a
particular language. E.g., on a white field, a red circle encloses a
heavy black line from which wavy lines arise, with a red line passing
diagonally through the black one. This ideograph represents an idea
or object rather than a locution. If an idea is a signification, and
objects are what a significant term's supposition includes, the apt
ness of signs comes into question here in a way not mentioned in the
Summulae.
Ideographs can be less determinate than linguistic formulations: as
REpresenting a physical object, the international NO SMOKING sign
does not portray white cigarettes, filter-tips, cigars, pipes, or hook
ahs. English words like 'No Smoking' are indeterminate differently:
Smoking is ambiguous as to whether a state, action or process is in
volved, allowing dialectically-minded violators to retort 'My cigar
ette isn't smokimg, I am', or just as perversely, 'I'm not smoking, my
cigarette is'. Besides, the signification or sense of Smoking is indiff
erently involved in a neutral description, exclamation, or prohibition
- the relation of sign-to-signified (p. 70) may be less ambiguous if
what is 'signified' is an institutionalized practice, but the 'relation of
substitute to what has been substituted for' by the isolated term is
not.
Some of the presuppositions behind these expressions are illustrat

ed in Hispanus' Summulae Logicales. They involve notions of mean
ing, sense, reference, and modification. His mode of thinking is ana
logical. Comparing it with modern usage challenges us to see what,
for example, mode, modality, mood, etc. now have in common for
different fields.
Understanding, translating, paraphrasing or using the word mode as
others do involves ideas so basic as to pose problems. Mode presup
poses a determinable element, one in some way, yet aspectually dif
ferent from one instance to the next: like Chopin's Waltz in A Flat
in major or minor key, in 3/4 or 4/4 time; in grammatical para
digms, one graphic, phonetic, phonological, morphological, syntactic,
or semantic element is taken to be so basic that forms related on
one of those bases are called conjugations, declensions, inflections,
determinations, or modifications of it. Conceptions of 'meaning' and
its varieties need clarification. Latin and Greek words for 'signify'
are clearest when taken separately for the state of a sound-sequence
being, or the process of its becoming, or the act of making it, a
name.
INTRODUCTION xxv
For instance, Latin consignificat (transliterated as consignifies)

translates Aristotle's prosemainei in On Interpretation III 16b i ff.
where he says the rhēma, hygiainei ('is healthy'), differs from the
onoma, hygieia ('health'), because the rhēma signifies time in addit
ion to what 'health' names. As an 'Answer', this is interdependent
with an implicitly conventionalized 'Question' about what 'naming'
involves, and about what sorts of 'things' can be 'named'. Linguists
avoid that problem by adopting the philological tradition of object
ively labelling one part of these words' composition roots (perhaps
something like hygi-), and other parts of its composition affixes (like
-ainei and -eia) and distinguishing inflectional from derivational
affixes on formal grounds.
But words can have functions similar to those of affixes, as in
Dixit Petrum solum scribere ('He said Peter only writes / only Peter
writes'. Solum ('sole(ly)') either 'signifies' (functions as a
categorematic expression like subject or predicate), 'couples' (as
adjectival adjunct to the subject), or perhaps 'consignifies' (as ad
verbial modifier of the predicate). Hispanus proposed no separate
technical terms for meanings of bound as well as free forms he call
ed syncategorematics (3), both of which had the function of 'con-
signifying'. He took 'consignification' as a variable modification of
its constant 'signification'. But for free forms he did propose a
constant vs. variable distinction: only nouns 'signify', while verbs,
adjectives, and forms of be 'link' or 'couple'.
THE 'SCIENTIFIC' STATUS OF HISPANUS' SUMMULAE
Latin was the one language medieval Europeans shared, the object
of elementary schooling and the tool for all levels of scholarship.
Knowledge of Greek, once the lingua franca of the Roman Empire,
had become rare. In Hispanus' theocentric era, Latin style owed
more to St. Jerome's transliteration of Koine Greek scripture than
to Ciceronian polish. The certainty attributed to Christian
Revelation was transferred by some for quite confused reasons to
the Latinity of Jerome's deliberately literal translation.
The Summulae Logicales is also worth evaluating in the light of
debate about the 'scientific' status of Linguistics. Hispanus claimed
Dialectic was a study prerequisite to all others, because it shows
how to test their fundamental assumptions. But he calls his study an
Art, not a Science (1). Norms he proposed for this rigorous inter
pretation of language are public, refutable, and countable in the
Summulae, all characteristics claimed for 'science'. The 12 Tracts
of the Summulae deal with the following topics:
xxvi SUMMULAE LOGICALES
1) Propositions relating predicates and subjects are demonstrably

contrary, contradictory, or equipollent in precise ways.
2) Predications assert 3 kinds of class-membership: Genus,
Species and Individual.
3) There are 8 ways of 'being in' one of 3 kinds of membership.
4) Propositional elements (categorematic and syncategorematic)
combine validly only in 3 figures and 19 subtypes of syllogisms.
5) Arguments (about whether propositions are true or false)
derive from 21 common Topics'.
6) Suppositions (how terms stand for things) are of 7 types, with
specific rules appropriate to each.
7) There are 13 fallacies (6 linguistic, 7 extralinguistici, based on
mistakes about Suppositions, or faults of logical form.
8) The Suppositions of Relatives vary with their manner of
recalling antecedents.
9) Supposition can be extended, but Signification cannot.
10) Supposition or Signification are independent of the existence
of referents. Appellation names the Supposition of a term
signifying something that actually exists.
11) Suppositions can be restricted, but Signification cannot.
12) Suppositions of common terms are clarified by markers (like
Negatives and Quantifiers) which distribute their membership.
The work appeared around 1300, about a generation before Thomas
of Erfurt's more complete Modistic summary (Bursill-Hall, 1972).
Born in Lisbon about 1215, Peter was a contemporary of Thomas
Aquinas, and studied at the University of Paris (where Hispanus was
first added to distinguish this Petrus from others.) His teaching at
the University of Siena won Hispanus wide respect in the medical
field.
His approach to language is that of Dialectic: it differed from
Logic in that deductive certainty characterized 'Science', while
Probability (rules for 'testability') attached to Arts. For instance,
once a term like Circle is defined in Geometry (which the medievals
called a 'Science'), deductions about radii, parallel lines, and right
angles are demonstrable and acknowledged as certain. But words of
ordinary language can base only probable inferences, not certain
deductions, even though the syllogistic form of both sorts of argu
ments is identical.
Dialecticians have the annoying habit of arguing that if you use a
word, you must mean it. They found the most serious way of 'mean
ing' it was to assert it truly or falsely. While that is not identical
with using it in a way we would today allow as 'meaningful' or 'valid',
every word can be challenged as though it were a Subject, Predicate,
or a syncategorematic Operator in a syllogism.
INTRODUCTION xxvii
Some dialectic rules of thumb proposed in the Summulae can be re

stated or reinterpreted from a linguistic point of view. E.g., in log
ical formulation, Hispanus shows how sentences contrast or are equi
pollent referentially because quantifiers like every, no, and
especially some, make minimal pairs involving identical senses. The
quantifier some still plagues linguistic arguments about identity or
transformation of 'meaning' defined in terms of truth conditions.
Modern disputes seem to have abandoned Hispanus' technical gradat
ion of contradiction, contrariety, subalternation, and subcontrariety.
Norms now used for 'truth conditions' are objectively referential
(SO), not subjectively conceptual (SEEM). Logicians are not con
vinced Aristotle (or his Medieval successors) attained to clarity
about the scope of negation (i.e. how Constituents construct with a
negative). But in the Summulae (p. 6), these relationships are
assigned technical labels:
every no
man is contraries man is
animal animal
some man some man

is subcontraries is not
animal animal
Asserting some anythings are whatever they are implicitly asserts

as well that some are not, while assertions and negations quantified
by every or no have quite different positive and negative implic
ations.
xxviii SUMMULAE LOGICALES
Propositions were related in a similar way (p. 14):
possible to be CONTRARY possible not to be

contingent to be 3 is ever 4 contingent not to be
not impossible to be in contrary not impossible not to be
necessary not to be order not necessary to be
not possible to be Subcon. to you

not possible not to be
not contingent to be lines one & two
not contingent not to be
impossible to be impossible not to be
necessary not to be SUBCONTRARY necessary to be
Labels used here derive from a technique of subcategorization call

ed the 'Porphyrian Tree', first outlined by early Aristotelians, and
comparable in its form and reliance on a spatial analogy to 19th
century use of 'Trees' to show subclasses in Language Families, or
more superficially, to tree diagrams of Grammatical Derivation in
Generative Transformational Grammar:
INTRODUCTION xxix
SUBSTANCE
corporeal incorporeal
BODY
animate inanimate
ANIMATE
BODY
sensitive insensitive
ANIMAL
rational irrational
RATIONAL
ANIMAL
mortal immortal
MAN
Socrates Plato
This tree provided an imaginative constant for REpresenting how

terms vary as 'inferiors' of others, with a 'descent' from generic,
through several (sub)specific, to individual levels, when reference
was 'diffuse' or 'personal'; how things were said to 'b-in'
others; and how things were 'same' or 'different', with explicit
technical terms labelling each difference. While TG Tree branches
are read as 'both-and' Conjunctions in descending order (e.g. rewrite
S as NP + VP = 'both NP and VP') Porphyrian descent is read as a
Platonic 'either-or' Division until the last step, which is like TG's
'both-and': but this 'both-and' is no dichotomy - Plato & Socrates are
just any two Individuals, as numerically indefinite as lexical items.
xxx SUMMULAE LOGICALES
Notice that both Porphyrian and TG Trees preclude division at two

points: a Supreme Genus (like S) is not REpresented as a constituent
/ species of a higher genus, while other constituents can be simul
taneously species with respect to higher ones, and genus with
respect to lower ones. But while individuals such as Plato and Soc
rates (like lexical items with which TG REpresentations stop) are
constituents or members of the Most Specific Species Man, they are
not species themselves. So Substance and Individual are emically
primitive terms referring to the same etic things in different ways,
and all intermediate ones are related to their highest and lowest in
stances in the way an S is related to lexical items exemplifying it.
The scientific importance of Tree Diagrams is their claim to REpre-
sent Sentence, not just this sentence; the scientific interest of TG
Semantic Interpretation is concern with this species of Sentence, not
just this individual sentence. That is the concern of Pragmatics.
Similarly, logical Subjects and Predicates are exocentric Constitu

ents of a Proposition, so they mutually define each other's function,
just as Grammar's S, NP and VP do. Describing what grammatical
categories like Noun 'mean' (compared to subcategories like Proper
or Common Noun) is different from giving an account of lexical
items like Plato or horse. It is useful not to confuse names for
natural objects, labels for grammatical categories, and those for
ideas we have about either of them. This was an aim of Modistic
theory, much of which Hispanus seemed to take for granted.
Hispanus' era is called one of Terministic Logic. It dealt not only
with isolated PROforms for Substance, Quantified in deductive argu
mentation of the categorical type, but also with their Quality. This
involved the signification of substantive terms (with a basic model in
the Tree of Porphyry), as distinct from their supposition. An ident
ical conceptual content (signification), common to the most generic
and most specific terms with the same referent (supposit) was as
sumed. Another way of putting it is to say that the referents of
Subjects and Predicates could be taken as materially identical, but
formally distinct. Linguistic modification and its consequences
dominates the Modistic tradition. Its setting in a contemporary
sketch of how words 'mean' helps clarify its linguistic perspectives:
INTRODUCTION xxxi
L E V E L S AT WHICH W O R D - S E N S E S RELATE
TO C O M P A R A B L E REFERENTS
ACTS OBJECTS
SENSATION (concerned with) concrete, unique, intrins

ically mutable, spatio-
temporal things or events:
e.g., pies, wheels, days
via
sensory integration
MEMORY Typical concrete things or

and events; alone, or space-time
IMAGINATION related; contingent, so
intrinsically mutable: e.g.
round things; kinds of weather
via
Abstractive
Intelligence
ABSTRACT, ideal, necessary
INSIGHT UNITS and RELATIONS, inex-
UNDERSTANDING tended, atemporal, immutable,
universal: e.g. circumference;
recurrence of seasons
via
Comparison
R E L A T I V E necessity of
JUDGEMENT Abstractions and relations: e.g.,
IF ¼ pie, THEN 90 degrees; IF 2
moons, THEN season ending
via
INVESTIGATION of
Presuppositions
(scientific) KNOW L E D G E
REASONING results in (episteme) or H Y P O T H E S I S
(Lunar Year; Geometry,
Geocentric Astronomy)
xxxii SUMMULAE LOGICALES
SENSE, REFERENCE, AND MODIFICATION
SENSE
The above basically psychological scheme can be read in a number

of ways. Relating it to some elementary ideas of Predicate Logic
can help grasp part of what the Modistae were doing, what Hispanus
took from their work, and how it is relevant to TG's concern for Uni
versal Grammar. It was suggested that Predicates stand for categ
ories to which Subjects 'belong'; or that Predicates name classes,
and Subjects name their members; or that a predication says that a
Subject 'is' or 'is in' a Predicate. But different sorts of membership
are expressed variously, depending on the grammar of the language
involved. The most neutral, abstract, or formal REpresentation of
all was: S = P. Logical form abstracts from grammatical quirks.
But how we verbalize the symbol ' = ' depends importantly on what
the words used as subject and predicate 'mean'. Lexical senses of
Subject and Predicate terms, and the relation-types into which those
words enter, are interdependent. Odd words can disguise formal
nonsense as easily as logical form can fail to illumine concrete ex
pressions: 'Old Sol is the Sun' seems sensible enough, while 'Old Sol
is Sun' and 'Old Sol belongs to Sun' are less acceptable, but we must
know how the nominal phrase 'Old Sol' is used. Symbols like S = P
for Propositions sidestep problems like that, but in Sentences, we
have to know something about the word-types that can stand as RE-
presenting subject- and predicate-constituents in Predicate Logic.
Propositional Logic focuses on how pairs of Predications relate to
each other, not on how the constituent-pairs of its two Predications
are related: we can compute when compounds like 'IF Old Sol is the
Sun, THEN he hasn't been around much' are valid or invalid, even if
the sense of Old Sol remains opaque, and even when we have no idea
whether either part of the combination describes anything accurate
ly or not, or even whether there is anything to describe.
The sketch of how concepts develop shown above suggests different
levels of acquaintance with both things and words for them. Child
ren use generic heavy grammatically but have limited experience
with things adults consider heavy, while Newton would probably have
been neither consciously invoking nor denying his definition of Grav
ity if he said his wife was getting a bit heavy. Similar divergences
in match or overlap can be expected between individual and institut
ionalized concepts. Definitions of mode show that: few speakers
are aware of all a Dictionary records, yet inclusion of words like
mode in such standard works attests to their institutional stability.
INTRODUCTION xxxiii
REFERENCE
Speakers internalize the basic sense of mode without having to
consult a dictionary, but they may or may not know that mode can
be used to refer to everything included on a Webster list. They may
have experienced the things, events, or aspects that fall within
norms assigned by the SENSE of a term, but fail to see its relevance
in particular cases, since the things involved can be materially
identical (etically the same) but seen as emically or formally differ
ent: identical in composition, but regarded from a different funct
ional perspective. Hispanus' way of contrasting these facts is to
stress a potential aspect of sense when compared to actual refer
ence (pp. 16, 189). A basic (i.e., potential) sense of mode is involved
in the etic/emic appreciation of how 'the same thing' becomes a
quite 'different thing' because of what we are willing to consider
basic or accessory to some object that interests us.
Hispanus says Signification is the REpresentation of a thing
through a conventional expression, but that 'words not signifying a
universal or a particular ought not signify anything as we use term
here.' (p. 69). Significations have to do with substantival (man) or
adjectival (white or runs) aspects of the same thing in 'white man
runs'. But being adjectivized or substantial are modes of things
signified, not significations. Substantive nouns stand for, take the
place of, supply for; adjective nouns and even verbs are said to link,
join, or make a unit of (p. 69). Supposition is the acceptance of a
substantive term for some thing: Signification is the imposition of a
word to signify a thing; in 'man runs', man takes the place of, refers
to, substitutes for Socrates, etc., so signification is prior to
supposition; 'to signify' is the property of a word, but 'to substitute
for' is the property of a term already composed of sound and signi
fication. 'Signification' is a relation between a sign and what it is a
sign of, supposition between a substitute and its referent/interpret
ation. Copulation is acceptance of an adjective term for something.
(p. 70). Restriction narrows a common term from a larger to a
lesser supposition; Extension increases a common term from a
lesser to a larger supposition; discrete terms are neither extended
nor restricted. Extensions are effected by verbs, nouns & adverbs
(p. 172).
Consignifications include the 'meanings' of what we now term

bound morphemes. They are logically accidental, compared to the
substantive meaning of roots, but neither Hispanus nor any of the
Medievals were able to sort them out on a formal linguistic basis.
They are treated in his sections on Equivocation and Amphiboly:
xxxiv SUMMULAE LOGICALES
'urine is healthy' is ambiguous since healthy is said of an animal as

of a subject, of urine health's sign, of food as its efficient cause; of
a diet as of one observing it. All of these work in different ways ac
cording to different significations (p. 83). Aristotle's three common
modes of equivocation and amphiboly: (1) words (dog) or phrases
(Aristotle's book) signifying several things; (2) metaphorical use of
words (equivocation) and phrases (amphiboly) (3) compounds (im
mortal) signify several, simple expressions (mortal) only one (p. 93).
MODIFICATION
Modification has a clear relational interpretation within an

Aristotelian substance/accident framework applied to Grammar, but
even there it depends on the selection of, and consistent adherence
to, the criteria on which things are selected as basic. At different
times, for different reasons, one and the same object can be consid
ered as either a Constant or a Variable in a relation. Confusion here
can compound further confusions: e.g., inflection and derivation can
be seen to semanticaliy 'modify' roots and bases; adjectives and
adverbs to 'specify' nouns and verbs; phrases and clauses to 'restrict'
nominals and verbals, and subordinate sentences to 'qualify' super-
ordinate ones. But both phonetic as well as syntactic norms were
inexplicit in medieval works.
For these 'modifications' are in different media, at different levels,
with different effects. One could argue about whether inflection in
rex 'king') and regis ('of king') shows nominative modification by the
genitive, or of genitive by the nominative (or what the Medievals
were unable to do, modification of a root by both). Extension or Re
striction of word-meaning is a type of 'modification' for Hispanus
where signification is unaffected, but the supposition of naming-
expressions can be extended, restricted or qualified in various ways,
by different parts of speech or by grammatical accidents like
person, number, gender, tense, etc. He calls the meaning of such
'accidents', consignifications.
In Thomas of Erfurt's developed Modistic tract, each subdivision in
the traditional Porphyrian Tree corresponds to Modes distinguished
as most generic, generic, subaltern, special, and most-special.
Hispanus says things 'differ' in three ways: Commonly (Socrates
sitting, standing, or compared to Plato), Properly (being snub-
nosed) or Most-Properly (man from horse by 'rationality': p. 20).
Since the kind of argumentation Hispanus examines is Categoric,
how Subjects are asserted to 'b-in' Predicates is the main concern
INTRODUCTION xxxv
of Hispanus' third Tract 'On Predicaments'. He distinguished a triple

mode of predicating: equivocal (live vs. pictured 'animal') univocal
('animal' of man and cow) and denominative ('grammarian' from
'grammar'); then some things are said with construction (The man
runs') some without ('man' or 'runs' alone). So he distinguishes eight
Modes of Being-In, e.g. (1) Integral Part in its Whole, (wall in
house); (2) Integral Whole in its Parts (house in wall, roof, and
foundation); (3) Species in Genus (man in animal: any inferior in its
superior) etc. (pp. 2-9, 26).
Syllogisms have three terms and two propositions (Major and Minor)
with a Conclusion. But two propositions can only be made from
three terms by taking one twice: as subject in first, predicate in
second, predicate in both, or subject in both: the term taken twice
before the Conclusion is called the Middle Term. Since there are
three possible orderings, there are three figures (pp. 39 ff).
Just as Geometry is developed from axioms (self-evident, indemon
strable propositions from which theorems can be deduced), Dialectic
identifies a number of popular propositions called Topics', of which
all arguments are only lexically different versions: '... in the entire
Tract, there are only 21 Topics, of which 11 are intrinsic, 7 extrins
ic, and 3 mediate' (pp. 55 ff.).
The truth of propositions is decided on the basis of whether things
asserted or denied are actually related just as they are REpresented
in propositions. So the distinction of signification (norms for loc
ating an instance of a term) from supposition (what things are sub
stituted for by a term) is needed. Categorial meanings logically
antecede construction (pp. 69 ff.): a term signifies Substance,
Quality, Quantity, or one of the other ten Predicaments, a convent
ional representation of a thing by a locution. Words signifying
neither a universal nor a particular are not technically terms.
Signification is substantival (like man) or adjectival (like white or
runs), or more exactly, something signified substantively or
adjectivally, because Adjectivation or Substantiation are modes of
things signified, not Significations.
Signification is imposition of a locution upon a thing to be signi
fied, so it differs from supposition (acceptance of that term, already
signifying a thing, for something). In 'Man runs', man stands for
Socrates, Plato, etc. So Signification is prior to Supposition: 'to
signify' pertains to a word, 'to stand for' pertains to a term already
made up of a word and its signification; 'signification' is a relation
of a sign to what has been signified, but Supposition is not a sign-to-
xxxvi SUMMULAE LOGICALES
signified relation, but one of a substitute-to-what-has-been- substit

uted for. Coupling (copulatio) is acceptance of an adjectival term
for something.
The Dialectician looks for what invalidates an otherwise plausible
argument: there are 13 Fallacies, 6 linguistic (Equivocation, Amphi
boly, Composition, Division, Accent, and Fallacy of Word Figure), 7
extralinguistic (Accident, Simply or After-a-Fashion, Ignoring the
Refutation, Search for Principle, Non-cause as Cause, Consequent,
and Many Questions as One) (pp. 76 f f.).
But factual arguments cannot be settled by words. Of themselves,
they have only properties conferred by use, but when they combine
with other words, there is a double source of deception possible:
equivocation based on isolated words, and amphiboly resulting from
misinterpretations of construction (pp. 166 ff.).
The number of things for which a term may stand can be increased
or restricted in different ways: in 'a white man is running', white
restricts man to standing for whites; in 'a man can be the Anti
christ', man stands not only for those who exist, but is extended by
can to those who will exist. Discrete terms are neither restricted
nor extended (pp. 172 ff.).
Since objects for which terms can stand may be in the realm of SO
or SEEM, a subcategory of Supposition is Appellation: acceptance of
a term for things that exist. Signification/Supposition indifferently
concern existents and non-existents. Common terms like man are
not like singulars which stand for and summon the same thing by
signifying an existent like Peter. A common term's appellation for
the thing-itself-in-common is not its inferiors, when it has Personal
Supposition, as in 'man runs': man does not then signify, stand for,
or summon the same thing, it signifies man-in-common, stands for
particular men, and summons particular, existent men (pp. 175-76).
Conventions of ordinary usage also determine interpretation:
terms have signification or supposition, not intrinsically, but
instrumentally, as determined by their users: we usually say 'there
is nothing in the box' although the box is full of air because nothing
customarily supposes for solid things (p. 184).
What a term stands for is also determined by the mood of syllog
isms (indicated by markers like every), and conclusions can be true
or false, depending on quantification: in 'every man runs', man is
distributed for any inferior by every. But a singular term cannot be
INTRODUCTION xxxvii
distributed, so 'every Socrates' is incongruous. But if a marker like

every signifies neither a universal nor a particular thing, does it
signify anything ? (pp. 186 ff.) Every does not signify a universal,
but quantity universally, that a common term is taken for any of its
inferiors, as in 'every man'. Thing is ambiguous, and what every
signifies is a different kind of thing (i.e., the disposition of a thing
capable of being a subject or predicate: p. 187).
Genus, Species and Individual, as Porphyry's Tree suggests, label
aspects of solidary experiences to which we may or may not attend.
Most people are capable of doing that even when they actually do
not, but infants or those with some disabilities cannot. So Helen
Keller's grasping that water is sometimes generic, sometimes spec
ific, or at other times this individual thing at this particular time, at
this particular place, can be described as part of the process of
socialization, or the emergence of intelligence. When learning to
communicate, we have to learn to attend to (among other things)
what our language forces us to notice.
This involves questions for linguists, and indirectly for Linguistics,
about language, meaning and use, and the status of abstractions like
word. In what sense is meaning determinate (in Competence) before
use (Performance) ? Could one suspect that different uses of the
'same word' were involved without that prior determination ?
Having distinguished sorts of meanings from actual use, what is the
status of the those sorts, independent of use?
The Medievals progressed from what they called Logica Antiqua to
Logica Moderna by refining relations between two of Aristotle's
Categories, Substance and Quantity: other Categories (e.g. Quality
and Relation itself) were explicitly added. Part of the groundwork
was laid in Priscian's definitions of the parts of speech in categorial
terms, and in the commentaries on Priscian that became required at
the University of Paris. 'Linguistic' progress consisted in refining
the kinds questions that could be asked about language.
INTUITIVE CLASSIFICATION
Classifications recorded by Hispanus became part of Western trad

itional education. His Summulae was widely required as a text for
generations, and later texts borrowed, amended, rejected, or extend
ed parts of it without mentioning his name, perhaps even in ignor
ance of his identity: that was common in periods less concerned
with personalities than with ideas. What he reported and refined
were contrasts constituting the tacit conventions of communication
xxxviii SUMMULAE LOGICALES
in speech and writing. Fortunately, those conventions based on how

things have been described and talked about have not kept the
imaginative from proposing new ways, even if they have to deform
the older conventions a bit.
That these distinctions should be called 'intuitive' is relevant the
distinction between Description and Explanation: without accurate
description, no need for explanation arises. One can just accept
facts stoically with a That's just the way things are' attitude that
takes any anomaly in stride. But if we share the ancient Analogists'
expectation that the lot ought to make some kind of sense, we con
struct hypotheses about how to transform a jumble of Variables into
patterns predictable from hypothetical Constants.
Ancient astronomy did that with evidence anyone can verify empir
ically: the sun rises and sets as anyone can see (and we still say). It
seemed to make sense to take the Earth as the Constant, and planet
ary movements as Variables. The evidence was overt, and Ptolemaic
Astronomy provided fairly reliable predictions of solar eclipses.
Similar observations allowed a year 360 revolutions, defined Circle
from that, and founded a Geometry still basic for our carpenters and
architects.
Today's space flights provide empirical evidence for what once
could only have been a geometrical flight of fancy, not an
alternative design for an experienced world: many things are even
more variable than supposed, but seem equally systematic. Modern
grammars can simply presume facts about both the variability and
constancy of linguistic structures unthinkable to older workers, and
have available tools comparable in refinement to other objective
methods of observation in science. But refined description is still
not refined explanation.
INTRODUCTION xxxix
References
Aristotle, 1955. The Organon: The Categories, On Interpretation
(Cooke) and Prior Analytics (Tredennick). Loeb Classical Library,
London: Heinemann.
Bochenski, Innocentius M., O.P., 1947. Petri Hispani Summulae
Logicales quas e codice manu scripto Reg. Lat. 1205 edidit.
Rome: Marietti.
Bursill-Hall, Geoffrey L., ed. 1972. Thomas of Erfurt, De modis
significandi sive grammatica speculativa. London: Longmans.
De Rijk, Lambertus M., ed., 1972. Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis,
Tractatus, called afterwards 'Summulae Logicales'. First
Critical Edition from the Manuscripts with an Introduction. Assen:
van Gorcum.
TRACT I
ON I N T R O D U C T O R Y NOTIONS
On Dialectic
1 Dialectic is the art facilitating an approach to principles of
all methods. So in acquisition of sciences, Dialectic should be first.
This art 4s called 'dialectic' from 'dia' which means two

and 'logos', which means discourse (sermo), or from 'lexis',
which means reasoning (ratio), suggesting the discoursing or
reasoning of a pair, an opponent and a respondent in disputing. But
since disputation cannot be held without discourse, nor discourse
without vocal expressions, since every expression (vox) is a sound,
we must therefore start with sound as from what is prior.
On Sound
2 Sound is whatever is peculiarly perceived by the sense of
hearing. I say 'peculiarly' (proprie) since, though both man and
bells may be heard, this is only through sound. Sounds are either
vocal or non-vocal.
Vocal expression is sound produced from the mouth of an anim

al, formed by natural instruments. Those are called natural
instruments by which vocal expression is formed: the lips, teeth,
tongue, palate, throat and lungs.
A sound is non-vocal which is generated from the coming

together of inanimate bodies, as in trees cracking or the sound of
footsteps.
2 SUMMULAE LOGICALES
On Vocal Expression (Vox)

3 Some expressions are significative and others are not. It is
called significative if an expression represents something when you
hear it, like 'man' or the groans of those who are ill. A non-sign
ificative expression is one that represents nothing when heard, like
'buba'. Some significative expressions are such by convention, others
by nature.
A naturally significative expression is one that represents the
same thing to everyone, like groans of the sick or dogs' barking.
A conventionally significative expression is one that represents
something, depending on its inventor's choice, like 'man'. Some con
ventionally significant expressions are simple or uncompiex, like
noun and verb, while others are constructed or complex, like a
word-group (oratio).
On the Noun (Nomen)
4 A Noun is a conventionally significative vocal expression
without tense, no separate part of which signifies definite things, in
the nominative case. 'Vocal expression' is put into the definition of
noun as its genus; 'significative' to differentiate nouns from non-
significative vocal expressions; 'conventionally' to distinguish it
from a naturally significant expression; 'without tense' to
distinguish it from the verb, which signifies with tense; 'no part of
which, etc.' to distinguish it from a word-group, the parts of which
are separate signs. 'Definite' is included to distinguish the noun
from a nonfinite noun like 'non-man': this is not a noun for a
dialectician, but a nonfinite noun. 'In the nominative' (recta) is put
into the definition to distinguish it from oblique cases like 'of
Cato', 'to Cato' (Catonis, Catoni) and so on, which are not nouns
for a dialectician, but nominal cases or obliques. So only a
nominative or casus rectus is said to be a noun.
On the Verb (Verbum)
5 The verb is a conventionally significative vocal sound, with
tense, no part of which is separately significative, finite and in the
present tense. 'With tense' is included in the definition of verb in
distinction to a noun, which is a sign without tense. 'Finite' is used
to differentiate it from a nonfinite verb like 'not-run', which is not
a verb for the dialectician, but a nonfinite verb. 'Present tense'
(recta) is put into the definition to set the verb off from oblique
I: ON INTRODUCTORY NOTIONS 3
verbs like 'was running', 'ran' and 'will run'. The dialectician does
not call these just 'verbs' but 'oblique verbs'. Only when it is in the
present tense, indicative mood, is it said to be a verb, but other
verbs of the same mood and other grammatical accidents are called
'oblique verbs'. All other differences are put there for the same
reason as in the noun.
So it is worth noting that the dialectician posits only two parts
of speech: noun and verb. The rest he calls sincategor-
ematics, that is, 'consignificatives'.
On the Word-Group (Oratio)
6 A word-group (oratio) is an expression significative by con
vention, the parts of which signify separate things. All of 'the parts
of which signify separate things' is put there to distinguish it from
the noun and verb, and the rest is included on the same grounds as
for the noun and verb.
A word-group is either complete or incomplete. A perfect or
complete word-group generates complete sense in the mind of the
hearer, like 'the man is white'; incomplete or imperfect is one that
generates incomplete sense in the mind of the hearer, like 'white
man'.
A complete word-group is either indicative, like 'the man is
running', imperative, like 'make a fire!', optative, like 'would that
I were a good cleric', or subjunctive, like 'if you come to me, I'll
give you a horse'. Of all these word-groups, only the indicative is
said to be a proposition.
On the Proposition
7 A Proposition is a word-group signifying something true or
false, like 'man runs'. Propositions are categoric or hypothetic. A
categoric is a proposition whose subject and predicate are its
principal parts, as in 'man runs'. In this proposition, the noun 'man'
is subject, the verb 'runs' is predicate, and what conjoins the pair is
a linker (copula), which is clear by analyzing this way: 'man runs' :
'man is running'. The noun 'man' is subject, 'running' is predicated,
and the verb 'is' links the one with the other. And it is called
'cathegoric' from 'kathegorizo:', -zas, which is the same as 'pre
dico, -cas ('I predicate, you predicate'). A subject is that about
which something is said; a predicate, what is said the other.
On the Categoric Proposition and

its triple division
8 Categoric propositions are universal, particular, nonfinite or

singular.
A Universal Proposition is one in which a common term is

subject, determined by a universal marker (signum), as in 'every
man runs'; or: a Universal Proposition is one that signifies
something as belonging to all or to not a one of something else.
A Common Term is one that is naturally apt to be predicated

of many subjects, like 'man' of Socrates, Plato and of each and
every one of the rest of men.
Universal Markers are: 'every' (omnis), 'not a (one)' (nullus),

nothing' (nichil), 'any one at all' (quilibet), 'both / either'
(uterque), 'neither' (neuter) and their like.
A Particular Proposition is one in which a common term is

subject, determined by a particular marker, as in 'some man runs'.
Particular Markers are: 'some (one)' (aliquis), 'a certain ()'
(quidam), 'the (first) one' (alter), 'the other (one)' (reliquus) and
their like.
A Nonfinite (indefinita) Proposition is one in which a common

term is subject without a marker, as in 'man runs'.
A Singular Proposition is one in which a singular term is

subject, or a common term constructed with a demonstrative
pronoun is, as in 'Socrates runs' or 'that man runs'. A Singular
Term is one that is naturally apt to be predicated of one only thing.
9 Again: Categorematic Propositions are affirmative or neg

ative. An Affirmative is one in which the predicate is affirmed of
the subject, as in 'man runs'. A Negative is one in which the
predicate is removed from the subject, as in 'man runs not'.
10 Now that a Proposition has been divided three ways, it is

worth knowing that there is a triple question-form by which we ask
questions, namely: 'what ?' (que), 'what kind ?' (qualis), and 'what
number ?' (quanta). 'What questions the substance of the proposit
ion, so that to the question put by 'what ?', one must answer 'cate
goric' or 'hypothetic'. To 'what kind ?', one must answer 'affirm
ative' or 'negative', since 'what kind ?' asks about the quality of a
proposition. To 'what number ?', one must answer 'universal',

'particular', 'nonfinite' or 'singular', since 'what number ?' asks
about the Quantity of a proposition. So we have this mnemonic:1
What is CataHype,
Kind is AffirNeg,
and Quant is UnParInSin
11 Again: some Categoric Propositions share both terms, as
in 'a man is an animal' - 'a man is not an animal'. Others share
only the one, as in 'a man runs' - 'a man disputes'. Others share no
term, as in 'a man runs' - 'a horse is moved'. Again: some propos
itions sharing each term do so in the same order, as in 'a man is
running' - 'a man is not running', some in converse order, as in 'a
man is an animal' - 'an animal is a man'.
12 Again: propositions sharing both terms in the same order
are either Contraries, Subcontraries, Contradictories or Subaltern-
ates.
Contraries are a universal affirmative and a universal negative
proposition of the same subject and the same predicate, like 'every
man runs' - 'no man runs'.
Subcontraries are a particular affirmative and a particular
negative proposition of the same subject and the same predicate,
like 'some man is running' - 'some man is not running'.
Contradictories are a universal affirmative and a particular
negative proposition, or a universal negative and a particular
affirmative proposition of the same subject and the same predicate,
as in 'every man is running' - 'some man is not running' or 'no man
is running' - 'some man is running'.
Subalternate propositions are a universal affirmative and a
particular affirmative, or a universal negative and a particular
negative of the same subject and the same predicate, as in 'every
man is running' - 'some man is running' or 'no man is running' -
'some man is not running'.
1: que ca vel ypo

qualis ne vel aff
un quanta par in sin.
This is made plain in the figure below:
every no
man is contraries man is
animal animal
some man some man

is subcontraries is not
animal animal
On the Triple Matter of

Categorics
13 The Matter of Propositions is of three kinds: Natural,
Contingent, and Remote.
Matter is Natural in which the predicate is of the being of the
subject or a peculiarity (proprium) of it, as in 'man is animal', or
'man is risible'.
Contingent Matter is that in which the predicate can be
present or absent to the subject, as in 'a man is white', 'a man is
not white'.
Remote Matter is that in which the predicate is incompatible
with the subject, as in 'a man is an ass'.
On their Equipllenes
14 By the Law of Contraries, if one contrary is true, the other
is false, but not the converse ( since both may be false in Conting
ent Matter, as in 'every man is white' - 'not a man is white' ). In
Natural Matter, it is always the case that if one is true, the other is
false and the converse ( as in 'every man is an animal' - 'not a man
is an animal') as well as in Remote Matter ( as in 'every man is an
ass' - 'not a man is an ass' ), and in Contingent Matter, when an
inseparable accident is predicated ( as in 'every crow is black' -
'not a crow is black' ). But in a separable accident, both can be
equally false. So it is not always the case in Contingent Matter that
both are false at the same time.
By the Law of Subcontraries, if one is false, the other is true,
but not the converse, ( for both can be true in Contingent Matter ).
So the Law of Subcontraries is related to the Law of Contraries as a
Contrary.
By the Law of Contradictories, if one is true, the other is false
and the converse. For in no Matter can they be true or false at the
same time.
By the Law of Subalternates, if the universal is true, the
particular is true and not the converse; for the universal can be
false, while its particular existent is true. And if the particular is
false, its universal is false, and not the converse.
On Triple Conversion
15 Then: Propositions sharing both terms in converse order
have a three-way Conversion: Simple, by Accident, and by
Contraposition.
Simple Conversion is making a predicate out of a subject and
the converse, with Quantity and Quality remaining identical. This is
how the universal negative and particular affirmative are converted:
'not a man is a stone' - 'not a stone is a man'; 'some man is an
animal' - 'some animal is a man'.
Conversion by Accident is making a predicate out of a subject
and the converse, with Quality remaining identical, but with changed
Quantity. So a universal affirmative proposition is converted into a
particular negative, as in 'every man is an animal' - 'some animal
is a man', and a universal negative into a particular negative, as in
'not a man is a stone' - 'some stone is not a man'.
Conversion by Contraposition is making a predicate out of a
subject and a subject out of a predicate, with Quality and Quantity
remaining identical, but with definite terms changed into nonfinite
terms. In this way a universal affirmative and a particular negative
are converted, as in 'every man is an animal' - 'every non-animal is
a non-man'; 'a certain man is not a stone' - 'a certain non-stone is
not a non-man'.
One should know that if there is a marker in the subject of a
proposition to be converted, whatever it may be, it should have the
whole predicate in its scope and reduce the whole to subject.
On the Hypothetic Proposition
and its D i v i s i o n
16 Next on the Hypothetic Proposition. This is one that has
two categorics as its principal parts, like 'if man runs, man is
moved'. It is called 'hypothetic' from hypos, which means 'under'
and thesis, which means 'position', suggesting 'suppositive (to)',
because one part is sub-posed to the other.
Hypothetic Propositions are Conditional, Copulative or Dis
junctive.
A Conditional is that in which two categorics are linked by the

conjunction 'if', like 'if man runs, man is moved'. The categoric to
which the conjunction 'if is immediately joined, is called the
'antecedent', the other the 'consequent'.
A Copulative is that in which two categorics are linked by the
conjunction 'and', like 'Socrates runs and Plato debates'.
A Disjunctive is that in which two categories are linked by the
conjunction 'or', as in 'Socrates runs or Plato debates'.
On the Truth of Hypothetics
17 For the truth of a Conditional it is demanded that the ante
cedent cannot be true without the consequent being true as well, as
in 'if it is a man, it is an animal'. So it follows that every true
Conditional is necessary, and every false Conditional impossible.
For it to be false, it is enough that the antecedent could be without
a consequent, as in 'if Socrates is, something white is'.
For the truth of a Copulative, each part must be true, as in
'man is an animal and God is'. For it to be false, it is enough that
one or the other part be false, as in 'man is an animal and a horse is
a stone'.
For the truth of a Disjunctive, it is sufficient that one or the
other part be true, as in 'man is an animal or a horse is an ass'. It is
tolerated that each part be true, but not so peculiarly (proprie), as
in 'man is an animal or a horse can whinny'. For it to be false, each
part should be false, as in 'a man is an ass or a horse is a stone'.
On t h e i r Equipollences
18 Rules like the following are assigned concerning Equipoll
ences:
if a n e g a t i o n is p r e p o s e d to a n y
m a r k e r , it is e q u i p o l l e n t to its
its o w n c o n t r a d i c t o r y .
So these are equipollent: 'not every man runs' (non omnis homo
currit) - 'some man does not run' (quidam homo non currit); and so
on for others.
The second rule is:
if a n e g a t i o n is p o s t p o s e d to a n y
u n i v e r s a l m a r k e r , it is e q u i p o l l e n t
to its o w n c o n t r a r y .
as in 'every man is not an animal' (omnis homo non est animal) -

'not a man is an animal' (nullus homo est animal); or: 'not a man
runs' - 'every man runs'; and so on for other universal affirmative
and negative markers.
The third rule is:
i f a n e g a t i o n is p r e p o s e d a n d p o s t p o s e d
to a u n i v e r s a l and p a r t i c u l a r m a r k e r , it
is e q u i p o l l e n t t o i t s o w n subalternate.
like: 'not every man does not run' (non omnis homo non currit) - 'a
certain man runs' (quidam homo currit so too: 'not a certain man
does not run' - 'every man runs'. And so of any other marker.
From these rules there follows another such rule:
if two u n i v e r s a l n e g a t i v e markers
are p o s i t i o n e d in t h e same word-group,
s u c h t h a t t h e one is in t h e subject,
t h e o t h e r is i n t h e p r e d i c a t e - t h e f i r s t
is e q u i p o l l e n t t o i t s c o n t r a r y , the
second to its contradictory.
So: 'nothing is nothing' is equipollent to 'anything at all is some-

thing', since by the second rule; 'not anything at all' (quidlibet
non) and 'nothing' (nichil) are equipollent, for just as 'not every
(one)' (omnis non) and 'not a (one)' (nullus) are equipollent, so too
'mot anything at all' and 'nothing' and by the first rule, 'not
nothing' (non nichil) and 'something' (aliquid) are equipollent. So:
'nothing is nothing' is equipollent to 'anything is something',
because 'not nothing' and 'something' are equipollent.
Let this be enough to say on equipollents.

On Mode
19 A Mode (modus) is an adjacent determination of a thing. It
arises through something-adjoined (adjectivum). But thing-adjoined
(adjective) is ambiguous: one is a sort of nominal adjective, like
'white' or 'black' and their like, the other is a sort of verbal
adjective, like an Adverb. According to Priscian,2 an Adverb is a
sort of Verbal Adjective, - so for that reason, mode is ambiguous:
one mode is nominal, which arises through nominal adjectives, the
other adverbial, which arises through verbal adjectives, as in 'a
white man runs swiftly'.
Again: Some adverbs determine a verb in terms of composition
as these six do: 'necessarily', 'contingently', 'possibly',
'impossibly', 'truly', 'falsei/. Others determine a verb in terms of
the verb's sense (res), as in 'he acts firmly', 'he runs swiftly'.
Others determine a verb by reason of tense, as temporal adverbs do;
others by reason of mood (modus), as adverbs of wishing or com
manding do, and so on of the others. On that basis, mode is taken in
multiple ambiguity through adverbs.
On Modal Propositions
20 Leaving aside all other modes determining composition, it
must be said that there are these six: 'necessarily, 'contingently*,
etc. When one says 'a man necessarily runs', it is signified that this
composition is necessary. But in 'man runs well', or 'swiftly', it is
signifed man's running is good or swift. So in the latter example the
verb's sense (res) is determined, in the former, it is the verb's com
position. That is how it is to be understood of the other adverbs
mentioned. So only that mode which determines composition makes
a proposition Modal, and that is the only one we have in mind here.
21 One should know that these six modes are at times taken
adverbially, at times, nominally. Adverbially, like 'necessarily',
'contingently', 'possibly', 'impossibly', 'truly' and 'falsely';
nominally, like 'necessary', 'contingent', 'possible' and
'impossible', 'true' and false'.
A Modal Proposition is one determined by one of those six
modes, like 'that Socrates run (Socratem currere) is possible',
'that Socrates run is impossible'.
2: Inst. gramm. II 16, p.54.11.

22 Notice too, that in modals, the verb3 should be its subject,

mode its predicate. All other propositions are said to be About
Being-in (de inesse). Propositions modified by the modes 'truly'
and 'falsely' are left aside for now, because Opposition is taken in
them the same way as in these About Being-in, as is their Consequ
ence. But in the other four modes, Opposition is not taken that
same way, as will be clear later.
23 Note that each of the four modes makes four Propositions.
Since there are four modes, there will be four times four, so sixteen
propositions. For example, if the mode 'possible' be taken without
negation, it makes a single proposition like 'that Socrates run is
possible' (Sortem currere est possibile). If taken with negation
preposed to the verb, it makes another, like 'that Socrates not run is
possible' (Sortem non currere est possibile). A third proposition is
taken when negation is placed next to the mode, like 'that Socrates
run is not possible' (Sortem currere non est possibile). A fourth
proposition is taken with double negation, one placed at the verb,
the other at the mode, like 'that Socrates not run is not possible'
(Sortem non currere non est possibile). This way, for each of the
other modes, four propositions are taken.
On their Equipollences
2k The equipollences of those four propositions are known by
four rules.
The first rule is:
t o w h a t e v e r a f f i r m e d d i c t u m 'possible'
i s a t t r i b u t e d , 'contingent' i s a s w e l l , a n d
'impossible' r e m o v e d f r o m i t , a n d f r o m i t s
contradictory o p p o s i t e , 'neccesary' i s
removed.
The second rule is:
t o w h a t e v e r n e g a t e d d i c t u m 'possible' i s
a t t r i b u t e d , 'contingent' i s a s w e l l , a n d f r o m
t h a t s a m e d i c t u m , 'impossible' i s r e m o v e d ,
and from its c o n t r a d i c t o r y opposite,
'necessary' i s r e m o v e d .
3: Manuscript Vaticanus Reginensis 1205 (early 14th c.) has dictum

('what is said') for verbum, which suits 2k below well. [fpd]
The third rule is:

f r o m w h a t e v e r a f f i r m e d d i c t u m 'possible'
is r e m o v e d , f r o m t h a t s a m e d i c t u m ,
'contingent' i s a s w e l l , a n d 'impossible' i s
a t t r i b u t e d to i t , and to i t s c o n t r a
d i c t o r y o p p o s i t e , 'necessary' i s a t t r i b u t e d .
The fourth rule is:
from w h a t e v e r n e g a t e d d i c t u m 'possible' i s
r e m o v e d , f r o m t h a t s a m e d i c t u m , 'conting
ent' i s a s w e l l , b u t to i t , 'impossible' i s
a t t r i b u t e d , w h i l e 'necessary' i s a t t r i b u t e d
to i t s c o n t r a d i c t o r y opposite.
This is clear in the following figure or ordering:
I II
It is possible to be It is possible not to be
It is contingent to be It is contingent not to be
It is not impossible to be It is not impossible not to be
It is necessary not to be It is not necessary to be
III IV
It is not possible to be It is not possible not to be
It is not contingent to be It is not contingent not to be
It is impossible to be It is impossible not to be
It is necessary not to be It is necessary to be
All propositions in the first line are equipollent by the first

rule and are converted reciprocally; those in the second line are
equipollent by the second rule and convert reciprocally; those in the
third by the third rule, and those in the fourth line by the fourth
rule.
1* SUMMULAE LOGICALES
Again: Consequence and Equipollence of Modais can be

grasped by this rule:
a l l p r o p o s i t i o n s a b o u t possible a n d
impossible a r e e q u i p o l l e n t , t h e v e r b
being s i m i l a r l y , the mode d i s s i m
ilarly related.
A n d a l l a b o u t impossible a n d necessary a r e
e q u i p o l l e n t , the verb and mode b e i n g
dissimilarly related.
A n d a l l a b o u t impossible a n d necessary a r e
e q u i p o l l e n t , the verb being dissim
ilarly, the mode s i m i l a r l y , related.
A mode is to be understood as 'similarly' and 'dissimilarly

related' on the basis of affirmation and negation. So a mode is to be
called 'similarly' related when the mode is affirmed in both, or
negated in both, but 'dissimilarly' when affirmed in one and negated
in the other. It is to be understood the same way of the verb as for
mode. Note that in the previous rule, no mention is made of
contingent, because 'contingent' is converted with 'possible'. So
the same decision is made about propositions of both. Examples
should be sought in the figure above in the first, second, third and
fourth Order, because the rule is general for all.
On their Opposition
25 Again: Modal Propositions are Contrary, Subcontrary,
Contradictory or Subalternate. Contraries are propositions in the
third and fourth Order, or propositions in the fourth and third line.
So we have the verse:
Order three to four is order e'er Contrary
(Tertius est quarto semper contrarius ordo)
Subcontraries are first and second Order. So the verse:
Subcontraries to you are e'er lines one to two
(Sit tibi linea subcontraria prima secundae)
Likewise: first order contradicts the third, and second the fourth.
So the verse:
Lower Ill's destroy the I's on top

IV's contradict IPs without a stop
(Tertius primo ontradictorius ordo

Pugnat cum quarto contradicendo secundus)
Likewise: the first line is subalternate to the fourth and the second
to the third. So the verse:
First line bows to fourth, Particularly related,

By this rule to the set a line to line is fated.
(Prima subest quarte, vice particularis habens se

hac habet ad seriem se lege secundum sequentem)
or:
Let order subaltern take first or second turn
(ordo subalternus sit primus sive secundus)
All this is obvious in the following figure:

possible to be CONTRARY possible not to be

contingent to be 3 is ever 4 contingent not to be
not impossible to be in contrary not impossible not to be
necessary not to be order not necessary to be
S 5
C Y
u 0 R u
N 0
b T T b
R C
a I st line yie!ds A By rule to a
to 4th, Partic- D set, lines
ularly related A are fated
R C
t T T t
N 0
e 0 R e
C Y
r r
n n
not possible to be Subcon. to you

not possible not to be
not contingent to be lines one & two
not contingent not to be
impossible to be impossible not to be
necessary not to be SUBCONTRARY necessary to be
TRACT II
ON PREDICABLES
On Predicable
1
1 'Predicable is sometimes taken peculiarly (proprie); so only
what is predicated of several things is called a predicable. When
taken commonly, what is predicated either of several things or of
one is called a predicable. So 'predicable' properly taken is the
same as 'universal', but they differ because a predicable is defined
by being said, a universal just by being. A predicable is what is
naturally apt to be said of several things. A universal is what is
naturally apt to be in several things.
Predicable or Universal divides into genus, species, difference,
peculiarity (proprium) and accident, and here we take up only these
five.
On Genus
2 'Genus' is said in three ways. First, as a collection of many
things related in some way to each other and to a single source
(principium), like the set of those of the same parentage descended
from a single ancestor. Second, that is called a genus which is the
source of each generation (like father and fatherland). Third, that is
called a genus to which a species is subordinated. That last way is
how Genus is taken here. It is defined as follows: Genus is what is
predicated of several specifically different things, with respect to
what a thing is essentially (in eo quod quid); as animal is predicated
of a man, horse and lion, which differ in species.
3 To get to know this part of the definition (i.e. 'specifically
different'), one should be aware that 'different' is said in as many
ways as 'same', and that 'same' is said in three ways: same in
Genus, same in Species, same in Number. Things contained under
the same genus are generically the same (like man and ass under
animal). Things under the same species (like Socrates and Plato
under man) are specifically the same. But 'numerically same' is
said three ways: first, same in name or definition, second, same by

peculiarity, and third, same by accident. Things materially single
(res una) but with several names (like 'Marcus-Tullius') are said to
be nominally the same. When one is the definition of the other (like
'rational mortal animal is of 'man'), they are said to be same by
definition. When one is a peculiarity of the other (as 'risibility' is
of 'man'), things are said to be same by peculiarity. Accidentally
the same are those where one is an accident of the other, like
Socrates and the whiteness in him.
4 'Generically different', 'specifically different' and 'numeric

ally different' are used in a similar way. Generically different are
things under different genera (like man in the genus animal and
tree in the genus plant). Specifically different are things of
different Species (like Socrates and Brunellus). Things that can be
counted are numerically different (like Socrates and Plato).
5 To be 'predicated with respect to what' is said of what is

responsive to the question put by 'What ?'. When asked, 'What is a
man ?', a suitable answer is 'an animal'. So animal is predicated
of man 'with respect to what' (in quid),
6 Genus is defined another way, as follows: genus is that to

which species is subordinate.
7 Genus is divided into Most Generic and Subalternate Genus.

Most Generic Genus is what has no higher genus above it, like
substance. Or: Most Generic Genus is one that, being a genus,
cannot be a species.
It has ten divisions: Substance, Quantity, Relation, Quality,

Action, Passion, Location, When, Where, Costume. These ten are
called Most Generic Genera because they have no genus above them.
Though 'being' is predicated of these ten, it is said equivocally or in
multiple ambiguity of them and for that reason, being is not a
Genus. We will not say anything about these ten now, but they will
be discussed later under Predicaments.
A Subaltern Genus is what, though genus, can still be a species,

as animal is a Genus of man and a Species of animate body.
On Species
8 Species is what is predicated of several numerically different

things as to 'what (essential) kind' (in eo quod quid est). But in this
definition, the verb 'predicated' means aptitude, not actuality - as
II: ON PREDICABLES 19
in others - the way man is predicated of Socrates, Plato and other

particular men who are several yet numerically different, as was
clear above. It is predicated of them as to 'what kind'. When asked
'What is Socrates ? or Plato ?', a suitable answer is: 'a man'.
Species is also defined as follows: a species is what is put under
a genus. Or: a species is that of which genus is predicated, as to
'what kind'.
9 It is divided into Most Special and Subaltern Species. A Most
Special Species is one that, though species, cannot be a genus, (such
as man and horse and their like). Or: a Most Special Species is
one below which there is no lower species.
A Subaltern Species is one which, though a species, can still
a genus. So whatever lie between a Most Generic and a Most Special
Species are genera and species, taken from alternative points of
view. They are genera with respect to inferiors, and species with
respect to superiors.
To make this clearer, take an example in a single predicament:
Substance is First Genus; below that is Body; below Body is
Animate Body; below that is Animal; below Animal, rational Anim
al; below that is Man; below Man are Individuals, like Socrates and
Plato and Cicero.
10 Individual is what is predicated of only one.
11 All this is clear in the figure called the tree of Porphyry:

SUBSTANCE
corporeal incorporeal
BODY
animate inanimate
ANIMATE
BODY
sensitive insensitive
ANIMAL
rational irrational
RATIONAL
ANIMAL
mortal immortal
MAN
Socrates Plato
Ih ON PREDICABLES 21
On Difference
12 'Difference' is said three ways: Commonly, Peculiarly
(proprie), or More Peculiarly. A common difference is when one
differs from another by a separable accident (like Socrates sitting
differs from himself not sitting or from another). An inseparable
accident is like being snub-nosed or aquiline. A more peculiar
difference is when one differs from another by a specific difference
(like man from horse by rationality). It is in that last way that
'difference' is taken here.
It is defined as follows: Difference is what is predicated of
several specifically different things, with respect to 'What kind?'.
So 'rational' is predicated of man and gods, who are rational; for
we and the gods are both rational, as Porphyry has it , but 'mortal'
added to us, separates us from them. Something is said to be predic
ated with respect to 'what kind' which sensibly answers the
question put by 'What kind ?'. When asked: 'Of what kind is a
man?', a suitable answer is 'rational'. Therefore rational is predic
ated of man with respect to 'what kind'.
Difference is also defined as follows: that by which species go
beyond a genus, as man goes beyond animal by the differences
rational and mortal.
13 One should know that the identical difference is divisive as
well as constitutive, but divisive of genus and constitutive of
species, as rational divides animal with a difference opposed to
itself. For we say: one sort of animal is rational, another irrat
ional; and these two differences constitute diverse species under
animal. Every difference added to a genus constitutes a species, so
is labelled either constitutive or specificative. 'Mortal', added to
the genus rational animal, constitutes man. And that is why
Boethius says that only Species is defined. For a definition should
consist of a genus and differences; but only species has genus and
differences; therefore only species is defined.
On Peculiarity (Proprium )
14 'Peculiarity' (Proprium) is said in four ways. First, that is
called a proprium (or a peculiarity) which is in a species but not in
1: cf. Boethius' translation of the Isagoge 11-12.

2: De divisionibus 886A 5 sqq., ed. Migne.
every one (being a doctor or geometrician is in man but not every

man). Secondly, peculiarity is said of what is in every one but not
just in a single one (being two-footed is in every man, not just one).
Thirdly, proprium is said of what is in each and every one, but not
always (getting gray is in each and every one, but not always, since
it happens only in old age). Fourthly, a proprium (or peculiarity)
called Properly Proper, is defined as follows: a proprium (or
peculiarity) is what is always in each member and always only in a
member. Risibility, for instance, is always in each and every man
and man alone. But man is not called risible because he is actually
always laughing, but because he is naturally apt to laugh.
'Peculiarity' as used in that fourth sense is one of the five

predicables and defined this way by Aristotle : 'proprium is what is
in species alone, predicated conversely of that to which it is
peculiar, and does not indicate what the essence of a thing is', as
risibility does in man. 'Does not indicate what the essence of a thing
is' is put into a peculiarity's description to distinguish it from a
definition, which is predicated conversely of a thing and indicates
what its essence is, as 'sensitive animate substance' converts with
'animal' and indicates its essence, since every definition is made
through substantiate; and every superior is of the essence of its
inferior. As defined by Aristotle , 'a definition is a word-group
signifying what the essence of a thing is.' - A proprium (or
peculiarity) however does not signify what the essence of a thing is.
On Accident
15 An Accident is what is present or absent without its subject

being destroyed, like black, white or sitting. These can be
present or absent in a man without his destruction.
It is defined as follows: an accident is what is neither genus nor

species nor difference nor peculiarity, yet is in a thing. Or: an
accident is what just chances to be-in, or not to be-in, the same
thing, like white or sitting in a man.
Of these two, Aristotle says: 5 'the second definition is better,

since to understand the first, one must already know what a genus is,
what a difference is, and so on for the rest; but the second is self-
contained as far as getting to know what it is that it says.'
3: Topica I 5, I02al8s.
4: Topica I 5, 101b38-102al, and VII 3, 153al5-16.
5: Topica I 5, 1020-15.
II: ON PREDICABLES 23
16 An accident is separable or inseparable: separable like

white or sitting for a man, inseparable, like black for a crow or
Ethiopian, and white for a swan. And though black co-occurs in an
Ethiopian or a crow inseparably, this is not contrary to our definit
ion, which says it can be present or.absent without corruption of the
subject, since, as Porphyry has it 6 , a crow can be understood as
white and an Ethopian as light in color without corruption of the
subject.
Again: An accident can be common (like being white, or snub-

nosed) or proper (like Socrates' whiteness, or Socrates' snubness).
On C o m m o n a l i t i e s and Differences
of Predicables
17 What all five predicables have in common is to be predicat

ed of several. They differ because a genus is predicated of more
than the others and thereby differs from them. Difference differs
from genus, because it is predicated as to 'what kind', while genus is
predicated as to 'what'. Again: Difference is distinct from species
and proprium (or peculiarity), because it is predicated of several
species, while species is not. It differs from accident because
accidents allow of intensification and remission, but difference is
not susceptible of more or less. Species differs from genus, because
genus contains all species without being contained by them.
18 Species is distinct from difference, because one thing can be

made up of many differences, just as the two differences rational
and mortal are conjoined to constitute the species man. But a
species is not conjoined to a species to generate another species. A
particular mare is bred to a particular ass for the generation of a
mule, not just mare and ass in common. Species also differs from
peculiarity (or proprium) because species is naturally prior to
peculiarity, and peculiarity posterior to species. Further: things
whose terms or definitions are different, are themselves different;
but the definitions of peculiarity and species are different; there
fore they themselves are different. But species differs from accid
ent, because species is predicated as to 'what', accident as to
'what kind', or how a thing is. And species is naturally prior to
accident, since every accident is naturally posterior to its subject.
6: Isagoge p. 13, p. 20.

19 Peculiarity (or Proprium) differs from accident, because a
peculiarity is predicated of one only species, accident of several.
An accident is primarily in individuals, secondarily in genera and
species. For neither man nor animal runs except insofar as
Socrates or Plato runs. Peculiarity is primarily in species, then
through species, in an individual. Again: Genus, species, difference
and peculiarity are equally shared by all those of which they are
predicated, while an accident is not, but accident is susceptible of
intensity or remission. Again: Genus, difference, species, and
peculiarity are predicated univocally, while accident is not predicat
ed univocally but denominatively.
On Predication
20 To be predicated univocally is to be predicated according
to a single name and single nature (ratio) taken according to that
name. For instance, 'man' is predicated nominally of Socrates and
Plato - as in 'Socrates is a man', 'Plato is a man' - and the nature
with respect to that name is single - like rational, mortal, animal
- according to which it is predicated of its inferiors, as in 'Socrates
is a rational, mortal, animal', 'Plato is a rational, mortal, animal',
and so of others. That is why Being (ens) cannot be a genus, since,
though Being is predicated according to a single name of all things,
it is not predicated according to a single nature. For the nature of
Being, as said of a substance, is 'Being in itself' (ens per se); as
predicated of the other nine predicaments, however, it is 'Being in
another' (ens in alio). It is so predicated according to different
natures. And for that reason it is not predicated univocally but
equivocally or in multiple fashion.
To be predicated equivocally is to be predicated by a single
name and diverse natures taken with respect to that name: like
'dog' by a single name is predicated of the barker, marine animal
and heavenly body. The nature with respect to that name is not the
same thing said of all, but now one thing, now another.
On Denominatives
21 Whatever differ only by some ending (casu) of that noun on
the basis of which they have appellation, are called Denominatives,
like 'grammarian' from 'grammar' or 'strong' from 'strength'.
So 'grammarian', 'strong', 'white' and their like are predicated
denominatively. For that reason an accident is said to be predicated
denominatively.
TRACT III
ON PREDICAMENTS
On some prefatory notions
1 To become familiar with the Predicaments, prefacing a few
necessary things, let us first distinguish with Aristotle a triple
mode of predicating: some things we say are equivocals, some
univocals and others denominatives.
Equivocals are those whose name (nomen) is common and ac
cording to that name, the substantial nature is quite different.
Though 'animal' may signify both a real and a pictured animal, the
name is common to them and the substantial nature of the two
according to that name is quite different.
Those are called Univocals whose name is common and sub
stantial nature the same. The name animal is common to man and
cow and so too its nature according to that name is the same.
Those are called Denominatives that, differing only by some
ending (casu), have appellation based on that name, like 'grammar
ian' from 'grammar'. They differ by case alone, i.e. only by an
ending, which is material (a parte rei), and have appellation based on
that name. A denominative noun should therefore agree with a
univocal in its beginning (principio), like 'grammar' and 'grammar
ian', and 'white' and 'whiteness'.
2 Some things said are said without construction (complexione)
like 'man' or 'runs', some with construction, like 'a man runs'.
But before the other member of this division is subdivided,
ways of Being-in (modi essendi in) must be distinguished, which are
necessary for becoming familiar with the next division, and for some
things which will be said later.
In the first way, something is said to be-in another as an inte
gral part in its whole, like finger in hand or wall in house.
In the second way, something is said to be-in another as an
integral whole in its parts, like house in wall, roof, and foundation.
In the third way, as species in genus, like man in animal, and in
general, any inferior in its superior.
The fourth way of being-in is as genus in species, like animal in
man, any defining part in its definition, and all definitions in what
they define.
The fifth way of being-in is as form in matter. This fifth mode
is subdivided, since one sort of form is substantial, as soul is the
substantial form for a man; the other is an accidental form, like
being white for a man. The first of these is said to be-in peculiarly
(or properly) as form in matter, like soul in body; the other is said
to be-in accidentally in a subject, like whiteness in a wall and color
in a body.
The sixth way of being-in is as something in its first efficient

cause, like a reign in one ruling.
The seventh way of being-in is as something in its goal (finis),
like virtue in beatitude.
The eighth way of being-in is as something in a vessel and in
general, as a thing located in its place.
2
Aristotle distinguishes these eight modes of being-in , but
Boethius assigns nine , because he subdivides the fifth into two, as
has just been said.
3 Some things said are said of a subject, but are in no subject,
like substantial genera and species and substantial differences, all of
which are called substantial universals, when the name 'substance'
is extended, like man, animal and rational. To be said of a sub
ject', as taken here, is to be said of an inferior, as animal is said of
man, man of Socrates, and color of whiteness. But To be-in a
subject' is taken the way an accident is in a subject. Some, like
1: Categ. 1, lal-15, transl. Boeth. p. 5.3-17, ed. Minio-Paluello.

2: Physica IV 3, 210a 14-24.
III: ON PREDICAMENTS 27
substantial individuals, are neither said of a subject, nor are they in

a subject; others are said of a subject and are in a subject, as
genera and species of the other nine predicaments are said of infer
iors, and they are in a substance as an accident is in a subject, the
way color is said of whiteness as of an inferior, and is in a body as in
a subject. Others are in a subject, but they are said of no subject, as
this bit of knowledge is in a soul as in a subject, and is not said of
any inferior; or this color is in a subject, and is not said of a
subject; for every color is in a body.
4 When one is predicated of another as of a subject, things
said of what is predicated are all also said of the subject. For
example, if Socrates is a man, and a man is an animal, Socrates is
therefore an animal.
There are diverse species and differences of things not sub-
alternately posited, like animal and science, which are diverse
genera. The differences of animal are rational and irrational; for
animal is divided by them. The differences of science are natural,
moral and linguistic (sermonicialis), for science is divided by
them: sciences are either natural, or moral, or linguistic.
5 Each of those said with no construction at all signifies either
substance, or quantity, or quality, or to something [Relation: ad
aliquid], or where, or when, or be sited [Posture: situm esse], or to
have, or to do [Action: facere], or to undergo [Passion: pati]. To
give examples, substance as in man and horse; quantity, in two-
cubited or three-cubited; quality, in whiteness and blackness;
relation, double and triple; where, as in in a place; when, in
yesterday, tomorrow; posture, in to sit and to lie down; to have,
in to have shoes or armor on; action, in to saw, to burn; passion /
undergo, in to be sawn, to be burned.
Having dealt with these, each of the Predicaments themselves
must be discussed, and Substance first of ail, since it is prior to the
others.
On Substance
6 Substance is divided into first and second substance. First
substance is what is peculiarly / properly, principally, and maximally
predicated. Or: First substance is what is neither said of a subject
nor is in a subject, like a particular man or a particular horse.
3: In Arist. Caţeg. 172B2-C9, ed. Migne.

Second Substances are species in which first substances and
genera of these species are, such as man and animal; for a given
man is in man which is a species, just as man is in animal which is a
genus.
Substantial individuals are called first substances since they
primarily underly the others; their genera and species are called
second substances, since they underly secondarily. A given man is
said to be a grammarian, one running, an animal, and a substance,
and for that reason man is said to be a grammarian, running, an
animal and a substance.
7 Again: What are said of a subject are all predicated by
name and nature (ratio), like man of Socrates. But in several of the
things said of a subject indeed neither the name nor nature is
predicated, like this whiteness or this white thing. Yet in some
things, while nothing prevents a name from being predicated of a
subject, it is impossible for a nature to be predicated. So white may
be predicated of a subject, but the nature of white never is.
Again: Among second substances, species is more substance
than genus is, for species is closer to first substance than genus, and
also because it underlies more. For species underlies whatever
underlies genus, as well as genus itself. But Most Special Species
are equally substances, such as man, horse, and their like.
On C o m m o n a l i t i e s a n d
P e c u l i a r i t i e s of S u b s t a n c e
8 Now we have seen these, we must discuss commonalities and
peculiarites of Substance. What every substance has in common is
not to be-in a subject, since to be-in a subject only suits an
accident. That is clear for first substances by its definition, for
second substances, by Induction and Syllogism. Inductively as
follows: A man is not in a subject, a horse is not in a subject, nor is
an animal, and so on for other second substances; therefore no
second substance is in a subject. Syllogistically as follows: Nothing
of those that are in a subject is predicated by name and nature; but
every second substance is predicated by name and nature; therefore
no second substance is in a subject.
This is not a peculiarity of substance but also fits differences.
This is to be understood of substantial differences. Nor is there
further objection from parts of substance which are in a whole. The
reason why they appear to be in a subject is because the mode of
being-in as accident in a subject is one thing, the mode of being-in
as part in whole another, as was clear above.
9 Again: AU second substances and substantial differences are

appropriately predicated univocally. For all these are predicated of
first substances by name and nature, since they are univocally
predicated.
10 Again: Every first substance signifies this particular

thing (hoc aliquid : tode ti), that is, an individual and what is
numerically one. But second substance seems to signify this partic
ular thing by the fact that it is in a first substance and is of its
essence, yet it still does not signify this particular thing but rather
something common. What is signified by second substance is not one
just as one is signified by first substance.
11 Again: There is nothing contrary to substance. This is not

a peculiarity of substance, since it fits every substance, every
quantity and some others as well.
12 Again: Substance is not susceptible of more or less. I am

not saying one substance does not underly more than another, but I
do say that each and every substance, according to its being, is
neither intensified nor diminished the way a white thing is some
times more, sometimes less, white. Socrates is not more a man at
one time than another, nor more a man than Plato.
13 Again: it is a peculiarity of substance by its own change

ability (mutationem) to be susceptible of contraries, as the same
man is now white, now black, hot, cold, lazy and zealous.
Nor is there a further objection from a sentence, since granted

one and the same word-group like the proposition, 'Socrates is
sitting' is now true, now false, it is not that way by virtue of its own
development, but from the changeability of a thing, such as Socrates
getting up or running.
Notice that truth and falsity are in things as in a subject, but

in a word-group as in a sign. A mode of being-in is consequently
equivocated when truth and falsity are said to be-in both things and
a word-group. So too 'susceptible' is equivocated when urine is said
to be susceptible of health, and an animal susceptible of health.
Urine is susceptible of health because it is a sign of it, an animal
because it is a subject of health. So this peculiarity does not suit a
word-group but a substance alone.
4: Above, p. 25.
On Quantity
14 Quantity is either continuous or discrete. A discrete
quantity is such as a number and a word-group. So there are two
species of it. For there is no common term in number to which the
parts of number may be joined. In ten, five and five or three and
seven are not joined to some common term, but are always discrete
and separate. Number is a multitude brought together out of
unities. Similarly in a word-group, syllables are not linked to some
common term, but each one is separate from the other.
15 Continuous Quantities are Line, Surface, Body, Place and
Time. There are consequently five species of it. That a line is a
continuous quantity is clear because a line's parts are joined to a
common term, that is, to a point. Parts of a surface are joined to a
line, and body parts to a surface. Parts of time are joined to now, as
past and future are linked to the present. Parts of place are joined
to the same term to which particles of a body are.
On Commonalities of Quantity
16 Now we have seen these, Commonalities of Quantity are to
be discussed. The first common property is that nothing is contrary
to quantity, as there is no contrary to two cubits, three cubits and
surface, because contrariety is primarily in qualities (not in all
qualities, but in some of them). But quantity is not quality; which is
why there is no contrariety in quantity.
Again: Quantity is not susceptible of more or less. One line is
not more quantity than another line, nor is a triple less a number
than a quadruple.
Again: It is a peculiarity of quantity as such to be said to be
equal or unequal, as a number is equal or unequal to another number,
a body to another body, and a line to another line; and so on for
each.
On mpared - to - A n o t h e r (Relation)
17 Those are called Compared-to-another ( Relatives: ad ali-
quid ) which, by the very fact that they exist, are said to be to
others or somehow otherwise compared to another. Such as the
double of a half is a double; half a double, a half; a father is father
of a son; a son is the son of a father; something greater is greater
than something less; and like is like its like.
18 Some relatives are said according to Equiparity, like those
said with the same word (nomen): like is like like, equal equals
equal, near is near near. Others according to Superior Position, like
master, double, triple. Others according to Inferior Position (sup-
positionem) like servant, half, third, for the latter are subposed to
the former and the former are superimposed upon them. For a
master is superimposed on a servant, a father on his son, a double
on a half; while a servant is subposed to a master, a son to a father,
and a half to a double.
On Commonalities of Relation
19 After these come Commonalities of Relation. The first is
that contrariety consists in relation, as virtue is contrary to vice,
since both are relative to each other. But this is not appropriate to
every relation; there is no contrary to double or triple.
Again: Relatives are susceptible of more or less, as like is said
to be more or less like, and equal the same way. But this does not
suit all relatives; double is not said to be more or less double, nor is
triple, nor is a father said to be more or less a father.
Again: All relatives are said convertibly, so if there is a
father, there is a son and the converse; if a master, then a servant
and the converse; and if a double, then a half, and the converse.
Again: Relatives seem to be naturally together: for double
and half, father and son go together.
Again: Posited relatives mutually affirm and relatives denied
remove each other. If there is no double, there is no half; if there
is no father, there is no son.
20 Again: A definition of relatives is: those are 'to another'
for which to exist is somehow to be to another. And this definition
is peculiar to relatives.
Again: It is a peculiarity of relatives that if anyone knows one
of correlatives definitively, he knows the other's definition as well.
So if one knows a double definitively, he knows how to define what it
is the double of as well. For it is necessary to use the nature of the
two in both.
On Quality
21 Quality is that on account of which we are said to be of
such a kind. We are said to be white in terms of whiteness, because
of color, we are said to be colored; through justice, called just.
There are four species of Quality, The first is Habit and Dis
position. Habit differs from Disposition by being more permanent
and lasting, like virtues and things we know (scientie); knowledge is
difficult to displace unless there is a profound alteration from illness
or something like that in the knower or the one possessing virtues.
Justice and chastity are not easily changed. What are easily altered
are called Dispositions, like hot and cold, illness and health, and the
like. Habits may be called dispositions, but not the converse. Those
who have a habit are in a way well- or ill-disposed to those things to
which they are habituated. But dispositions are not habits. So Habit
can be defined as follows: a habit is a quality hard to change; a
disposition is a quality easy to change.
22 The second species of quality is a natural capacity or
inability to do something easily, or of undergoing something easily.
One is called healthy because he has a natural capacity of not
suffering from any things at all that happen; one is called sickly
from a natural inability to undergo anything; something hard has a
natural potency of not being cut quickly. Racers and boxers are so-
called not because they put those activities to use, but because they
have a natural ability of doing so easily.
23 The third species of Quality is Passivity or a Quality of

Being Affected (passio et passibilis qualitas). Examples are those
qualities which effect sensory reactions such as in taste, sweetness
or bitterness and their like. Or those qualities are also under this
species which are generated by emotions that are stable and diffic
ult to change. Swarthiness, whether brought on by some natural
reaction, by illness or by heat, is called a quality.
24 The fourth species of Quality is Form or Shape when it con
cerns something stable, such as the disposition of a body like
triangularity or quadrilaterality, straightness and curvature.
25 Those are called Qualitatives (qualia) which on this basis
are predicated denominatively, like grammarian from grammar
and just from justice, or which are said from some quality not
nominally derived.
This arises in two ways. Some are said non-denominatively

from a quality because no name was imposed on the quality itself, as
a runner is not so-called denominatively because no name was
imposed on that quality. Other qualitatives are said non-denomin-
atively because they do not share the name of a quality from which
they are said, even when there has been a name imposed, like 'eager'
from the virtue.
There are thus three ways of taking 'what sort of' (quale)
from a quality.
On Properties of Quality
26 There is contrariety in qualities, like whiteness to black
ness and justice to injustice. But this is not a peculiarity of quality
as such because it does not suit every quality. Shape has no
contrary, nor does some middle color.
Again: If one contrary be of such a kind (quale), the other
will be of that kind. So injustice is contrary to justice; but justice
is a quality; therefore injustice is a quality; and just is 'of that
kind', therefore unjust is also 'of such a kind'.
Again: Quality admits of more or less; one is said to be more
or less just, and grammatical, and white. But this is not a peculiar
ity of quality because squared does not admit of more or less, nor
does circle, nor quadrangulation, or rounding.
Again: it is a peculiarity of a quality that something is called
like or unlike it on the basis of that quality. So white is said to be
like white and just like just, but black unlike white.
On Action ( T o do : facere)
27 Action is that by which we are said to act on what is
subjected. A sawyer is said to act because he saws. Sawing is thus
an action, and by sawing, the sawyer is said to perform an act from
the fact that he saws. Striking is also an Action.
It is a Peculiarity of an action to entail change (passionem) of
itself.
To do and to undergo take contrarieties. To make something
warm is what is contrary to cooling it, and to be made warm is
contrary to being made cold, and being delighted to being saddened.
3« SUMMULAE LOGICALES
Again: Actions admit of more or less. To warm something is
said more or less, as are to be made warm and to be delighted and to
be saddened.
On Passion (To u n d e r g o : pati)
28 Undergoing something (passio) is an effect and consequence
of an action, like being warmed is effected by and is brought about
by warming.
It is a peculiarity of undergoing something first to be brought
about by action.
Again: Undergoing something is not in an agent, but in a
patient. Let what have been said before suffice for now about the
rest.
On four-fold Opposition
29 One thing is said to be opposed to another in four ways*
Some opposites are relatively opposed, like father and son, double
and half, or master and servant. Others are privatively opposed, like
privation and possession, sight and blindness, or hearing and deaf
ness. Others are contraries, like white and black. Others are con
tradictorily opposed like affirmation and negation, such as 'he is
sitting' and 'he is not sitting'.
What relatively opposed things are has been mentioned earlier.
Contraries are things placed in the same genus, which stand
maximally apart from each other, differ from and mutually exclude
each other, and alternate in the same susceptibility, except when
one is in a thing naturally, like whiteness in snow and heat in fire.
Privatively opposed are those that have to do with the same
thing in irreversible order, like going from possession to privation
and not the converse. For it is impossible that a return be made
from a privation into possession, as blindness and sight have their
origin with respect to the eye, and a change from sight to blindness
can occur, but not naturally the converse.
On Prior
30 Prior (prius) is said in four ways. First and properly,
something is said to be prior to another in time, insofar as one is
said to be more venerable and older than another, as a man of forty
years is said to be more venerable and older than one of twenty.
In the second way, that is said to be prior which is not convert
ible on the basis of subsequence in subsisting, as one is prior to
two; for two to exist is an immediate consequence of there being
one; so if there are two, there is also one, but not the converse.
The third way, prior is said according to order: in disciplines,
principles are prior to conclusions; in grammar, letters are prior to
syllables, and in a speech, the introduction is prior to narration by
order.
In the fourth way, what is better and more honorable is said to
be prior; most have usually called the more honorable and esteemed
the first (priores) among them.
Besides the four modes just discussed, there is another kind of
priority. Among things convertibly related because of essential
dependency, and one thing is somehow a cause the other exists, the
former is appropriately said to be naturally prior, as when a thing is
cause of the truth of a proposition or sentence made about it. For
example, 'that a man runs' (hominem currere) is converted with
the sentence, 'The man is running' (homo currit) if it is true that a
man runs, and The man is running' is true and the converse. For a
fact (res) is the cause of a sentence truly made about it. A true
sentence is not á cause that a fact exist. Depending on whether a
thing exists or not, a sentence is said to be true or false.5
On Together
31 'Together1 (simul) is said in three ways. In the first way,
those are said to be together whose generation is at the same time
and neither of them is earlier nor later than the other. These are
said to be simultaneous (simul tempore).
5: Arist. Categ. 5, №9-10, p. 54.6-7.

Second, those are said to be together that are convertibles and
neither is the cause of the others existence, like any relative, such
as double and half, and so of the others.
Third, those are said to be together that divide some genus
among themselves, like man, horse, lion and others that divide the
genus animal; or even differences, like rational and irrational.
Those latter two modes are said to be naturally together (simul
natura) the former to be simultaneous (simul tempore).
On Change (Motus)
32 There are six species of Change: Generation, Corruption,
Increase, Diminution, Alteration, and Locomotion.
Generation is a process of going from non-being to being. Cor
ruption is one of going from being to non-being. Increase is an
addition of a pre-existent quantity. Diminution is a decrease of a
pre-existent quantity. Alteration is a change from one contrary
quality into its contrary or into its intermediary quality, as when one
changes from whiteness to blackness or into intermediate colors.
Locomotion is a change from one place to another.
Locomotion has six species or differences: upwards, down-
wards, ahead, back, rightwards, leftwards; for toward all these
parts, there is a change of place.
On Possession (Habere)
33 'To Possess / have' is said in many ways. First, one is said
to possess a quality, like learning or virtue.
Second, 'to have' is said of what has a certain size, like two
cubits and three cubits.
Third, 'to have' is said of things about the body, like having
clothing or a coat, or having something on a body part, like a ring on
the finger.
'To have' understood this third way is one of the ten Predicam
ents. It is defined as follows: habit or costume (habitus) has to do
with bodies and those things next to it, like armor and footwear. In
the same way names are invented in other things, and depending on
proximity, some things are said 'to have', others, 'to be had'.
Fourth, 'to have' a member, like a hand or foot.
Fifth, 'to have' something contained, as a flask has wine or a

bushel has grains of wheat.
Sixth, 'to have; a possession like a house or a field.
Seventh, 'to have' a wife: of this last, Aristotle says that

mode is furthest from the one which is possession (habere). And he
says that there will perhaps come to light other uses of 'to have',
but the usual ones have almost all been enumerated.
6: Categ. 13, 15b28-30, p. 79.6-7.

7: ibid. 15b31-33, p. 79.9-10.
TRACT IV
ON SYLLOGISMS
On the Proposition
1 A Proposition is a word-group affirming or denying some
thing of another. A Term is what a proposition analyzes into, like
subject and predicate. To be predicated universally (dici de omni)
is when there is nothing to take under the subject about which the
predicate may not be said, as in 'every man rims': here running is
said of every man, and there is nothing to take under the subject
about which running would not be said. To be negated universally
(dici de nullo) is when there is nothing to take under the subject
from which the predicate would not be removed, as in 'no man
runs'; here running is removed from any man at all.
On the Syllogism
2 A Syllogism is a word-group in which, once some things have
been posited, something else necessarily happens through what have
been posited, Like
'every animal is a substance,
every man is an animal,
therefore every man is a substance'.
This whole is a sort of word-group in which, once some things have
been posited (i.e., the two premised propositions), something else
necessarly follows through them, (i.e., the conclusion).
Every Syllogism consists of three terms and two propositions.
The first of these propositions is called the Major, the second the
Minor. But two propositions cannot be made from three terms,
unless one is taken twice; that term is then either made subject in
the one proposition and predicate in the other, or it will predicated
in both or made subject in both. One of these terms is called the
Middle, another is called the Major Extremity, another the the Minor
Extremity. The middle is the the term taken twice before the
IV: ON SYLLOGISMS 39
conclusion. The major extremity is the term taken in the major
proposition with the middle. The minor extremity is the term taken
in the minor proposition with the middle.
On Mood and Figure
3 For a Syllogism, Mood and Figure are required. Figure is the
ordering of the three terms as to which is made subject and which
predicate. As was said, the ordering is done in three ways. On that
basis, there are three figures.
The First Figure is when what is subject in the first proposition
is predicate in the second, like
'every animal is a substance
every man is an animal'.
The Second Figure is when the same thing is predicated in
both, like
'every man is an animal
no stone is an animal'.
The Third Figure is when the same thing is subject in both, like
every man is risible'.
Mood is the ordering of the two proposition in the due quality
and quantity.
On u n i v e r s al Rules
4 So universal rules like these are given for any figure:
a s y l l o g i s m c a n n o t be m a d e f r o m solely
p a r t i c u l a r s , n o n f i n i t e s or s i n g u l a r s .
So one of the propositions ought to be universal.
1: Above, p. 38.
Again:
in n o f i g u r e c a n a s y l l o g i s m be made
from n o t h i n g but n e g a t i v e s .
Consequently, one of the premises should be affirmative.
Again:
If o n e p r e m i s e i s p a r t i c u l a r , t h e
c o n c l u s i o n m u s t be p a r t i c u l a r ,
and not the c o n v e r s e .
Again:
If o n e p r e m i s e i s n e g a t i v e ,
t h e c o n c l u s i o n is n e g a t i v e
and the c o n v e r s e .
Again:
If o n e p r e m i s e i s p a r t i c u l a r , the
c o n c l u s i o n m u s t be p a r t i c u l a r as
w e l l , and not the c o n v e r s e .
Again:
The Middle Term must never be
put into the c o n c l u s i o n .
On the First Figure
5 The First Figure has nine Moods, the first four concluding
directly and the next five indirectly. To conclude directly is for the
major extremity to be predicated of the minor extremity in the con
clusion. To conclude indirectly is for the minor extremity to be
predicated of the major in the conclusion.
Again: The Rule for the four moods concluding directly is:
if t h e m i n o r i s a n e g a t i v e
existential, nothing follows.
Again: under the same conditions:
if t h e m a j o r i s a p a r t i c u l a r
existential, nothing follows.
IV; ON SYLLOGISMS 41
On its Moods
6 The First Mood of the First Figure consists of two affirmat

ive universal propositions concluding to an affirmative universal.
Like
every man is an animal
therefore every man is a substance'.
The second consists of a universal negative and universal
affirmative concluding to a universal negative. Like
'no animal is a stone
therefore no man is a stone'.
The third consists of a universal affirmative and a particular
affirmative, concluding to a particular affirmative. Like
some man is an animal
therefore some man is a substance'.
The fourth consists of a universal negative and a particular
affirmative, concluding to a particular negative. Like
therefore some man is not a stone'.
The fifth consists of two universal affirmatives concluding
indirectly to a particular affirmative. Like
therefore some substance is a man'.
It is proven through the first mood of the first figure, which
concludes to a universal affirmative, convertible with a particular
affirmative, the particular conclusion in this fifth mood.
The sixth consists of a universal negative and a universal
affirmative concluding indirectly to a universal negative. Like
therefore no stone is a man'.
It is reduced to the second Mood by simple conversion of the con
clusion.
The seventh consists of a universal affirmative and a particular
affirmative concluding indirectly to a particular affirmative. Like
some man is an animal,
therefore some substance is a man'.
It reduces to the third mood by simple conversion of the conclusion.
The eighth consists of a universal affirmative and a universal
negative concluding indirectly to a particular negative. Like
no stone is an animal
therefore some substance is not a stone'.
This is reduced to the fourth figure by converting the major by
accident and the minor by simple conversion and transposition of the
premises.
The ninth consists of a particular affirmative and a universal
negative concluding indirectly to a particular negative. Like
'some animal is a substance
therefore some substance is not a stone'.
It is reduced to the fourth mood of the first figure by simple
conversion of the major and minor and by transposition.
On the Second Figure
7 Next, on the Second Figure, for which there are these
rules:
In t h e S e c o n d F i g u r e , if t h e
M a j o r is a p a r t i c u l a r existential,
nothing follows.
Again:
In t h e Second Figure, from affirm
atives alone, nothing follows.
Again:
In t h e S e c o n d F i g u r e , the Conclusion
is a l w a y s n e g a t i v e .
This third rule can be understood through the second.
On its Moods
8 The Second Figure has four Moods. The first consists of a

universal negative and a universal affirmative concluding to a
universal negative. Like
'no stone is an animal
therefore no man is a stone'.
This is reduced to the second mood of the first figure by simple
conversion of the major.
The second consists of a universal affirmative and a universal
negative concluding to a universal negative. Like
'
therefore no stone is a man'.
It is reduced to the second mood of the first figure by simple
conversion of the minor and conclusion, and by transposition.
The third consists of a universal negative and a particular
affirmative concluding to a particular negative. Like
'
therefore some man is not a stone'.
It is reduced to the fourth mood of the first figure by simple
conversion.
The fourth consists of a universal affirmative and a particular
negative concluding to a particular negative. Like

some stone is not an animal
therefore some stone is not a man'.
It is reduced to the first mood by Reduction to Absurdity (per

impossibile).
On Reduction through the Impossible
To Reduce to Absurdity (reducere per impossibile : Contra

diction) is to infer from the opposite of the conclusion with one of
the premises, the opposite of the other premise. Take the opposite
of a conclusion like: 'every stone is a man' with the major premise
of this fourth mood, and a syllogism will be made in the first mood
of the first figure as follows:

every stone is a man
therefore every stone is an animal'.
This conclusion is opposed to the minor premise of the fourth

mood. This is to prove through Reducing to Absurdity (probare per
impossibile).
On the Third Figure
10 Next on the Third Figure. The third figure is where the

same term is made subject in both premise. Rules for which are:
In t h e T h i r d F i g u r e , nothing
f o l l o w s if t h e M i n o r is
an e x i s t e n t i a l negative.
Again:
In t h e T h i r d Figure, the Conclusion
c a n only be particular.
On its Moods
11 The Third Figure has six Moods. The first consists of two
universal affirmatives concluding to a particular affirmative. Like
'every man is a substance

therefore some animal is a substance'.
It is reduced to the third mood of the first figure by converting the
minor by accident.
The second mood consists of a universal negative and a univer
sal affirmative concluding to a particular negative. Like
'no man is a stone
therefore some animal is not a stone'.
It reduces to the fourth mood of the first figure by conversion of the
minor by accident.
The third consists of a particular affirmative and a universal
affirmative concluding to a particular affirmative. Like
'some man is a substance
It reduces to the third mood of the first figure by simple conversion
of the major and conclusion and through transposition.
The fourth consists of a universal affirmative and a particular
affirmative concluding to a particular affirmative. Like
'every man is a substance
It reduces to the third mood of the first figure by simple conversion
of the minor.
The fifth consists of a particular negative, and a universal
'some man is not a stone
therefore some animal is not a stone'.
It reduces to the first mood of the first figure by Reduction to
Absurdity. Take the opposite of the conclusion with the one premise
and infer the opposite of the other premise, like
'every animal is a stone
therefore every man is a stone'.
This conclusion made in the first mood of the first figure contradicts
the major premise of the fifth mood.
The sixth consists of a universal negative and a particular
f
no man is a stone
therefore some animal is not a stone1.
It reduces to the fourth mood of the first figure by simple conver
sion of the minor.
On some Rules
12 A rule like this for syllogisms concluding to a particular

negative indirectly is given:
no s y l l o g i s m c o n c l u d i n g i n d i r e c t l y t o
a n e g a t i v e p a r t i c u l a r can c o n c l u d e to
it d i r e c t l y , and none c o n c l u d i n g to
it d i r e c t l y can c o n c l u d e to it
indirectly.
Again:
The F i r s t F i g u r e i n c l u d e s e v e r y kind
of P r o p o s i t i o n , t h a t i s , u n i v e r s a l a n d
p a r t i c u l a r , a f f i r m a t i v e and n e g a t i v e .
The Second i n c l u d e s the u n i v e r s a l
and p a r t i c u l a r n e g a t i v e . The Third
includes the p a r t i c u l a r affirmative
and n e g a t i v e , but not the u n i v e r s a l .
13
BARBARA CELARENT DARII FERIO BARALIPTON
CELANTES DABITIS FAPESMO FRISESOMORUM
CESARE CAMESTRES FESTINO BAROCHO DARAPTI
FALAPTO DISAMIS DATISI BOCARDO FERISON
In these four verses, there are nineteen words (dictiones) r e

presenting nineteen Moods of the three Figures in such a way that in
the first word, the first Mood is understood, in the second word, the
second Mood, and so on. So the first two verses represent the moods
of the first figure, the third (except for the last word), represents
the moods of the second figure, such that the first word of the third
verse represents the first mood of the second figure, the second
word the second mood, and so on for the others. The last word of
the third verse with the other words of the fourth represents the
moods of the third figure through its order.
Notice that by the vowels A, E, I, O, the four kinds of propos

itions are understood: by A the universal affirmative is to be
understood, by E the universal negative, by I the particular
affirmative and by O, the particular negative.
Again: In any word there are three syllables. Anything left

over is superfluous, except for M, as will soon2 be clear. By the
first of those three syllables is understood the major proposition of a
syllogism, by the second the minor, and by the third the conclusion.
For example, the first word BARBARA has three syllables, in each
of which there is an A. By A being put there three times, it is
signified that the first mood of the first figure consists of two
universal affirmatives concluding to an affirmative universal. That
is how the rest of the words are to be understood, depending on the
vowels used in them.
Again: Notice the first four words begin with the consonants
B, C, D, F, as do all other words following. By this it is to be
understood that all moods understood through a word beginning with
 should be reduced to the first mood of the first figure; all moods
signified by a word beginning with  to the second; with D to the
Third, and with F to the Fourth.
Again: Wherever S is put in these words, it means that the

proposition understood by the immediately preceding vowel it is to
be simply converted. P means a proposition should be converted by
accident. Wherever an M occurs, it means there should be trans
position in the premises (to transpose is to make a minor out of the
major and vice versa). When  occurs, it means the mood under
stood by that word is to be proven by Reduction to Absurdity.
2: Below, p. 47-48.
On unusable Connexities (conjugatio)
14 Since Aristotle shows in Prior Analytics3 connexities in
which a conclusion will not follow from premises are useless, by
finding terms in which pairing of this kind does not hold, a discovery
of terms like that is useful for that reason.
So wherever an unusable pairing is made contrary to the syllog
istic rules assigned above, further objections are to be sought by
taking two species with a single genus, (like man, ass and ani
mal); or two species with a peculiarity of one of them (like man,
ass, risible); or one species with its genus or peculiarity (like
man, ass, risible). For in these, an instance will be found.
To find further objections is to accept terms in which the
premises are true and the conclusion false, while the propositions
remain identical in quantity and quality. For example, this is an
unusable conjugation:
'no man is an ass
no stone is a man
therefore no stone is an ass'.
Against this useless pairing a further objection is inferred this way:
'no ass is a man
nothing risible is an ass
therefore nothing risible is a man'.
Here the premises are true and the conclusion is false, with the
propositions remaining identical in quantity and quality in both false
syllogisms.
3: Anal. Priora I 27, 43a20ff., p. 58ff.

4 i.e., terms technically labelled in quibus non.
TRACT V
ON TOPICS
On the multiple ambiguity of Ratio
1 'Ratio' is used in several ways. In one, it means the same as
definition or description, like: 'univocals are those with a name in
common and the same substantial definition (ratio) according to
that name.' In another, ratio ('reason') is the same as a kind of
mental ability. In another, it is the same as a word-group demon
strating something, like the reasons debaters advance. In another,
ratio ('design') is the same thing as a material's form: in a knife,
for instance, iron is the material while its form is the shape put into
the iron. In another way, ratio ('nature') is the same as a common
essence predicable of many things, like the essence of a species, or
genus, or difference. In another way ratio (Veason') is the same as
a middle term inducing a conclusion, and it is in this last way that
ratio is taken here in the definition of Argument, as follows:
On Argument and Argumentation
2 An Argument is a reason grounding conviction in debatable

matter, that is, a middle term testing a conclusion to be confirmed
by an Argument. The conclusion to an argument or arguments is an
attested proposition. Before it is tested, it can be doubted. It is
then the same thing as a question. Question is defined as follows: a
question is a proposition which may be doubted. A middle term is
what has two extremes.
Argumentation is the explication of an Argument by a word-
group, that is, a word-group that makes an argument explicit. But
an argument differs both from a middle term and from argumentat
ion, since a middle term is called that because it has two extremes,
while an argument adds to a middle term the power of testing the
conclusion (so in order for there to be an argument, there must be a
1: Arist. Categ. I la8-9.

middle term and it must have the power of testing the conclusion).
But the whole word-group, consisting of premises and conclusion, is
called Argumentation, and in it, the power of an argument is
revealed. One sort of whole word-group can induce a universal
affirmative, another only a universal negative, another only a
particular negative.
On the Species of Argumentation
3 There are four types of Argumentation: Syllogism,

Induction, Example and Enthymeme. A definition of syllogism was
given above.
Induction is progression from particulars to the universal. For
example:
'Socrates runs,
Plato runs,
Cicero runs,
and so on of
individuals
therefore every man runs'.
An Enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, i.e., a word-group in
which, without positing all its propositions, a precipitate conclusion
is inferred. For example:
'
every animal runs
therefore this man runs'.
In the argumentation cited, the proposition 'every man is an animal'
is understood and not put in there, for if it were, it would be a
perfect syllogism.
Notice that every enthymeme should be reduced to a syllogism.
Therefore in any enthymeme there are three terms just as in a
syllogism. Two of those terms are put into the conclusion and they
are the extremes, the other one is the middle term and that is never
put into the conclusion. One extreme is used twice in an enthym
eme, the other once only. From the extreme taken once, together
with the middle term, a universal proposition should be made in the
required mood, and that way a syllogism will result. For example, in
this enthymeme:
'every animal runs

therefore every man runs'
V: ON TOPICS 51
the extremes are 'man' and 'runs', and the middle term is
'animal'. The extreme 'man', is taken once; and from that and the
middle, a universal proposition is made as follows: 'every man is an
animal'; then the syllogism is complete, as follows:
'every animal runs
therefore every man runs'.
The form of Argumentation called Example is when through
one particular, another particular is tested because of some likeness
found in the pair, for example:
'It is bad for Leonese to fight Astorgans;
therefore it is bad for Astorgans to fight Zamorans';
On Topic in General
4 An Argument is confirmed by a Topic (Locus), so a definit
ion of Topic must be given as taken here. A Topic is the basis of an
argument, or that from which a suitable argument is derived for a
proposed question. We have already said what a question is.2
One should know that proposition, question, and conclusion are
substantially identical but differ formally; as was clear above,
they have distinct rationes ('functions / senses') or definitions. As
something doubted, it is a question; as already tested by an argu
ment, a conclusion; as posited for another in order to test it, it is a
proposition. So a proposition is so-called as what is put into the
premises to test a conclusion.
Topic divides into Maxim Topic, and Topic Differential of
Maxim. A Maxim Topic is the same as the maxim itself - a propos
ition compared to which no other is more basic, i.e., better known.
For example 'every whole is greater than its part', 'whatever a
definition is predicated of, the thing defined is as well', 'whatever a
species is predicated of, its genus genus is as well'.
A Topic Differential of Maxim is that by which one maxim
differs from another. For instance, these two maxims: 'whatever a
definition is predicated of, the thing defined is as well', and
'whatever a species is predicated of, its genus is as well' differ
through the terms constituting them, one by 'genus' and 'species',
the other by 'definition' and 'defined'. So these simple terms are
called maximal differences.
Both a Maxim Topic and a Topic Differential of Maxim are

called 'Topic', since both give solidity to an argument. So Topic
(locus) is taken here proportionally to a natural Place (locus), since
place in nature provides firm ground to natural things and keeps
them in being, while here a Topic confirms an argument.
A Topic Differential of Maxim is divided into Intrinsic,

Extrinsic and Middle. It is intrinsic when an argument is taken from
what are substantive of a thing, as from a definition. It is extrinsic
when the argument derives from things completely separate from a
thing's substance, as from opposites; like querying whether Socrates
is white, and concluding: 'Socrates is black; therefore he is not
white'. A Topic is Middle when an argument is taken from things
partly agreeing with the terms posited in the question and partly
differing, like univocal and denominative terms, which are called
conjugates. An example would be querying whether justice is good,
and concluding: 'a just thing is a good thing, therefore justice is
good'.
ON INTRINSIC TOPICS
An Intrinsic Topic can be divided into a Topic from Substance

and a Topic from Concomitants of Substance.
On the Topic from Substance
5 A Topic from Substance is when an Argument is taken from

the substance of terms posited in the question. It subdivides into a
Topic from Definition and from Description, and into a Topic from
Nominal Interpretation.
On the Topic from Definition
6 A Definition is a statement signifying a thing's essence (quid

est esse). The Topic from Definition is the relation between a
definition and the thing defined. It contains four arguments and four
maxims. First, making the definition subject of an affirmation;
second, predicating the definition affirmatively; third, making it
subject of a negation; and fourth, predicating it negatively.
2: Above, p. 49.
3: Above, p. 38, p. 49.
V: ON TOPICS 53
Examples of all are: 'a rational, mortal, animal runs, so man runs'.
The Topic here ? From Definition. The Maxim:
a n y t h i n g p r e d i c a t e d of a d e f i n i t i o n
is p r e d i c a t e d o f t h e t h i n g defined
a s w e1 1 .
Second: 'Socrates is a rational, mortal, animal; therefore Socrates
is a man'. The Topic here ? From Definition. The Maxim:
a n y t h i n g a d e f i n i t i o n is p r e d i c a t e d of,
t h e t h i n g d e f i n e d is a s w e l l .
Third: 'a rational, mortal, animal is not running; therefore a man is
not running'. The Topic here ? From Definition. The Maxim:
anything removed f r o m a d e f i n i t i o n is
r e m o v e d from the t h i n g d e f i n e d as w e l l .
Fourth: 'a stone is not a rational, mortal, animal; therefore a stone
is not a man'. The Topic here ? From Definition. The Maxim:
from w h a t e v e r a d e f i n i t i o n is removed,
so is t h e t h i n g d e f i n e d
On the Topic from the Thing Defined
7 The Topic from the Thing Defined is a relation between a
thing defined and its definition. It likewise contains four arguments
and four maxims.
First, by making the thing defined subject of an affirmation, as
in 'a man runs, therefore a rational, mortal, animal runs'. The Topic
here ? From the Thing Defined. The Maxim:
a n y t h i n g p r e d i c a t e d of t h e t h i n g defined
is p r e d i c a t e d of i t s d e f i n i t i o n a s w e l l .
Second, by predicating it affirmatively, as follows: 'Socrates is a
man, therefore Socrates is a rational, mortal, animal'. The Topic
here ? From the Thing Defined. The Maxim:
w h a t e v e r t h e t h i n g d e f i n e d is p r e
d i c a t e d of, so t o o is i t s definition
Third, by making the thing defined subject of a negation, like 'a man
is not running, therefore a rational, mortal, animal is not running'.
The Topic here ? From the Thing Defined. The Maxim:
a n y t h i n g r e m o v e d from the thing defined
is r e m o v e d f r o m i t s d e f i n i t i o n as w e l l
Fourth, by predicating it negatively, as follows: 'a stone is not a
man, therefore a stone is not a rational, mortal, animal'. Whence
the Topic ? From the Thing Defined. The Maxim:
f r o m w h a t e v e r t h e t h i n g d e f i n e d is
r e m o v e d , t h e d e f i n i t i o n is r e m o v e d
as w e l l .
Note that in all of these, Topic is denominated from what
causes inference, not from what is inferred. So when definition is
the cause, the Topic is from definition; when the thing defined is
the cause, the Topic is from the thing defined. Why ? Because a
Topic or Differential Maxim should be denominated from what
causes an inference, and not from what is inferred.
On the Topic from Description
8 A Description is a word-group signifying the being of a thing
through accidentals, as 'risible animal' is a description of man. Or
as follows: a Description is a word-group consisting of genus and
peculiarity, for example: 'risible animal'.
The Topic from Description is the relation of Description to
Thing Described. It contains four arguments and four maxims just
like the Topic from Definition. Arguments and Maxims are formed
in the same manner here as there, except that 'Description' is sub
stituted for 'Definition'. Similarly for Thing Described.
On the Topic from Nominal
Interpretation
9 There are two kinds of Interpretation. One is not converted,
like 'hurting the foot' (ledens pedem), an interpretation of what I
say as stone (lapis). The other is converted, like 'lover of wisdom',
an interpretation of what I say as 'philosopher' (philosophus). That
is how 'interpretation' is taken here. It is defined as follows:
Interpretation is exposition of one word (nomen) through some other.
The Topic from Nominal Interpretation is a relation between
interpretation and the thing interpreted. It contains the same
V: ON TOPICS 55
number of arguments and maxims as the ones mentioned before. For
example: 'a lover of wisdom runs; therefore a philosopher runs'.
The Topic here ? From Nominal Interpretation. The Maxim:
a n y t h i n g p r e d i c a t e d of a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
i s p r e d i c a t e d of t h e t h i n g interpreted.
So too on the side of a predicate. The Maxim:
a n y t h i n g an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is p r e d i c a t e d
of, t h e t h i n g i n t e r p r e t e d is a s w e l l .
Negatively: 'a lover of wisdom is not envious; therefore a philo
sopher is not envious'. The Maxim:
a n y t h i n g r e m o v e d f r o m an interpretation
is r e m o v e d f r o m t h e t h i n g interpreted.
Similarly in a Predicate. The Maxim:

f r o m w h a t e v e r an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is r e
m o v e d , t h e t h i n g i n t e r p r e t e d is a s w e l l .
On the Topic from Concomitants
of S u b s t a n c e
10 Now about the Topic from Concomitants of Substance:
that is when an argument is taken from what follow upon terms
posited in a question. It divides into Topics from Whole, Part,
Cause, Generation, Corruption, Uses and from the Commonly
Occurring.
On t h e Topic from Whole
11 The Topic from Whole divides like a whole. That can be
the sort of whole that is universal or integral, in quantity or in
mode, in place or in time. The Topic from Whole is divided like
that, since a universal whole is other than an integral whole, and so
for the others.
On the Topic from Universal Whole or
Genus
12 A Universal Whole, as taken here, is something superior
and substantial. A Subjective Part is something that is an inferior
under a universal.
The Topic from a Universal Whole or Genus is a relation

between a universal whole or genus itself and its part or its species.
It is always destructive. For example: 'a stone is not an animal;
therefore a stone is not an animal'. The Topic here ? From Genus.
The Maxim:
w h e n e v e r G e n u s or U n i v e r s a l W h o l e is
r e m o v e d , S p e c i e s or a S u b j e c t i v e
P a r t is r e m o v e d a s w e l l .
On the Topic from Species
or S u b j e c t i v e Part
13 The Topic from Species or Subjective Part is a relation
between a thing itself and its genus or whole. It is always
constructive. It contains two Arguments. First, by making species
subject, for example: 'a man runs; therefore an animal runs'. The
Topic here ? From Species or Subjective Part. The Maxim:
anything predicated of S p e c i e s is
p r e d i c a t e d of G e n u s as w e l l .
Second, by making species predicate, as follows: 'Socrates is a man;

therefore Socrates is an animal'. The Topic here ? From Species.
The Maxim:
a n y t h i n g a S p e c i e s is p r e d i c a t e d of,
i t s G e n u s is as w e l l .
On the Topic from an Integral Whole
14 An Integral Whole is what is composed of parts having
quantity and a part of it is called integral. The Topic from Integral
Whole is a relation between a thing itself and its part. It is always
constructive, for example: 'there is a house; therefore there is a
wall'. The Topic here ? From an Integral Whole. The Maxim:
g i v e n an I n t e g r a l W h o l e , a n y part of
it is g i v e n as w e l l .
The Topic from Integral Part is a relation between a thing
itself and its whole. It is always destructive. For example: 'there is
no wall; therefore there is no house'. The Topic here ? From an
Integral Part. The Maxim:
V: ON TOPICS 57
g i v e n r e j e c t i o n of a n Integral Part,
i t s W h o l e is r e j e c t e d as w e l l .
On the Topic from a Whole in Quantity
15 A Whole in Quantity is a universal taken universally, for

example: 'every man', 'no man'. The Topic from Whole in Quantity
is a relation betweem a thing itself to its part. It is both con
structive and destructive. For example: 'every man runs; therefore
Socrates runs'. The Topic here ? From a Whole in Quantity. The
Maxim:
anything pred icated of a W h o l e in Quant

i t y is p r e d i c a t e d of a n y P a r t of it.
or:
if t h e u n i v e rsal is t r u e , any singular
of i t a t a i l will be t r u e as well.
Destructively: 'no man is running; therefore Socrates is not

running'. The Topic here ? From a WHole in Quantity. The Maxim:
a n y t h i n g r e m o v e d f r o m a W h o l e in Quant
i t y i s r e m o v e d f r o m a n y P a r t of i t .
or:
if t h e u n i v e r s a l is t r u e , a n y singular
of i t w i l l b e t r u e a s w e l l .
The Topic from a Part in Quantity is a relation of parts in

quantity all taken together in relation to their whole. It is both con
structive and destructive. For example: 'Socrates runs, Plato runs,
(and so on for individuals); therefore every man runs'. The Topic
here ? From Part in Quantity. The Maxim:
a n y t h i n g p r e d i c a t e d of a l l P a r t s in
Q u a n t i t y t a k e n t o g e t h e r is predicated
of i t s W h o l e a s w e l l .
or:
if a n y s i n g u l a r a t a l l i s t r u e ,
i t s u n i v e r s a l i s t r u e as w e l l .
Negatively: 'Socrates is not running, Plato is not running, (and so on

for individuals), therefore no man is running'. The Topic here ?
From Parts in Quantity. The Maxim:
anything removed from all P a r t s in
Q u a n t i t y t a k e n t o g e t h e r is removed
from i t s Whole as w e l l .
or:
if a n y s i n g u l a r a t a l l i s t r u e ,
i t s u n i v e r s a l is t r u e a s w e l l .
On the Topic from a Whole in Mode
16 A Whole in Mode is a universal itself taken without determ
ination. Because all arguments and maxims are formed in this whole
and in its part in exactly the same way as in genus and species,
examples are omitted.
On the Topic from a Whole in Place
17 A Whole in Place is a word (dictio) embracing every place
adverbially, like 'everwhere'. A Part in Place is a word embracing
one place adverbially, like 'here'. The Topic from a Whole in Place
is a relation between a thing itself and its part. It is both destruct
ive and constructive. For example: 'God is everywhere; therefore
God is here'; 'Caesar is nowhere; therefore Caesar is not here'. The
Topic here ? From a Whole in Place. The Maxim:
w h a t e v e r suits a Whole in Place, suits
i t s P a r t as w e l l .
or:
a n y t h i n g r e m o v e d f r o m a W h o l e in Place
i s r e m o v e d f r o m a n y P a r t of i t a s well.
The Topic from a Part in Place is a relation between a thing
itself and its whole, for example: 'Caesar is not here; therefore
Caesar is not everywhere'. The Topic here ? From Part in Place.
The Maxim:
t o w h a t e v e r a P a r t in P l a c e i s unsuited,
i t s W h o l e is u n s u i t e d a s w e l l .
On the Topic from a Whole in Time
18 A Temporal Totality is a word (dictio) embracing every
time adverbially, for example: 'always' and 'never'. A Temporal
Partial is a word signifying a bit of time adverbially like 'now',
'then', yesterday, today and tomorrow. Examples of this should be
taken just as in a Whole in Place.
V: ON TOPICS 59
On the Topic from Cause

19 A Cause is that upon whose being something else naturally
follows. It divides into Efficient, Material, Formal and Final
Cause. Efficient Cause is that from which a beginning of change
(principium motus) comes, as a house-builder is the principle
changing and working so that a house comes into existence, and the
smith, that there be a knife.
The Topic from Efficient Cause is a relationship between a
thing itself and its effect. It is destructive and constructive. For
example: 'the builder is good; therefore the house is good'; or: 'the
smith is good; therefore the knife is good'. The Topic here ? From
Efficient Cause. The Maxim:
t h a t is g o o d w h o s e e f f i c i e n t cause
is i t s e l f g o o d as w e l l ;
or:
g i v e n an e f f i c i e n t c a u s e , i t s effect
is i m m e d i a t e l y g i v e n as w e l l .
The Topic from Effect of Efficient Cause is the converse of this.
20 Matter is that from which one thing is made along with
another. There are two sorts of matter: permanent, like iron in a
knife, and transient, like flour and water in bread, or straw and fern
in a field. Matter is defined as: Matter is what is in potency only.
The Topic from Material Cause is a relation between a thing
itself and its effect. It is both constructive and destructive.
Constructive, for example: 'there is iron', or 'flour'; therefore
there can be iron weapons', or 'bread'. The Topic here ? From
Material Cause. The Maxim:
g i v e n a m a t e r i a l c a u s e , i t is p o s s i b l e
for a m a t e r i a l i z e d t h i n g to be g i v e n .
It is destructive in permanent matter as follows: 'there is no iron;
therefore there are no iron weapons'. The Topic here ? From a
if a p e r m a n e n t m a t e r i a l c a u s e is re
m o v e d , i t s e f f e c t is r e m o v e d .
From its Effect (constructively) as follows: 'there are iron weapons;
therefore there is iron'. The Topic here ? From the Effect of a

given effect of a p e r m a n e n t material

c a u s e , p e r m a n e n t m a t t e r is i t s e l f given.
From the Effect of transient matter: 'there is a field, or bread;
therefore there was fern, or flour'. Transient Matter is not stable
but is completely changed into another nature. The Maxim:
given effect of t r a n s i e n t M a t t e r , it
m u s t be t h a t transient matter itself
pre-existed.
21 Form is what gives being to a thing and keeps it in being.

The Topic from Formal Cause is a relation between a thing itself
and its effect. Constructively as follows: 'there is whiteness;
therefore there is something white'. The Topic here ? From Formal
Cause. The Maxim:
given formal cause, its effect is

given as w e l l .
Destructively: 'there is no whiteness; therefore there is nothing

white'. The Topic here ? From Formal Cause. The Maxim:
if a f o r m a l c a u s e is r e m o v e d , its
effect is r e m o v e d as w e l l .
The Topic from its Effect will be the converse.
22 Final Cause or Purpose (finis) is that for the sake of which

something is done. The Topic from Final Cause is a relation be
tween a thing itself and its effect. As in 'beatitude is good;
therefore virtue is good'. The Topic here ? From Final Cause. The
Maxim:
if i t s p u r p o s e is good, a thing itself is

good as w e l l .
Or: 'suffering is evil; therefore sin is evil'. The Topic here ? From
Purpose. The Maxim:
if i t s purpose is evil, a thing is itself

e v i l as w e l l .
V: ON TOPICS 61
The Topic from Effect of Final Cause is the converse.
On the Topic from Generation
23 Generation is a progression from non-being into being. The

Topic from Generation is a relation between itself and what is gen
erated. For example: 'development of a home is good; therefore a
home is good'. The Topic here ? From Generation. The Maxim:
anythi ng whose generation is good, is

itself good as well.
and:
anythi ng whose generation is evil, is
itself e v i l as well.
The Topic from thing generated will be the converse. The Maxims
are these:
if a t h i n g t h a t is g e n e r a t e d is good,
its g e n e r a t i o n is g o o d a s well.
and
if a t h i n g that is g e n e r a t e d is evil,
its g e n e r a tion is e v i l a s well.
On the Topic from Corruption
2k Corruption is progression from being into non-being. The

Topic from Corruption is a relation of corruption to the thing cor
rupted. For example: 'corruption of the home is bad; therefore the
home is good'; or 'corruption of the Antichrist is good; therefore
the Antichrist is evil'. The Topic here ? From Corruption. The
Maxim:
if a thing's corruption is evil,

it is i t s e l f good;
and
if a thing's corruption is good,
it is i t s e l f evil.
The Topic from Thing Corrupted will be the converse.
On the Topic from Uses
25 Use, as understood here, is the operation or employment of

a thing, like cutting with axes or riding a horse. The Topic from
Uses is a relation of an operation to what its working or employment
is. For example: 'horseback riding or splitting is good; therefore a
horse is good or using axes is good'. Whence the Topic ? From
Uses. The Maxim:
if a t h i n g ' s u s e is good, it is itself
good as w e l l .
Or: 'killing is evil; therefore a killer is evil'. The Topic here ?
From Uses. The Maxim:
if its use is e v i l , it's evil itself as well.
On t h e T o p i c f r o m T h i n g s
Commonly Co-occurring
26 'Things Commonly Cooccurring' is taken in two ways.
There are things which sometimes do or do not cooccur, for
example, being suave and an adulterer. Only a sophistic Topic, not
a dialectic one is taken from them. There are others where one
thing always follows the other, as regret follows upon failure.
From these a dialectical Topic is taken. For example: 'he has
regrets; therefore he has failed'. The Topic here ? From Things
Commonly Cooccurring. The Maxim:
if t h e s e c o n d of t h i n g s c o m m o n l y c o -
o c c u r r i n g is t h e r e , so is t h e first.
Destructively: 'he has not failed; therefore he has no regrets'. The
Topic here ? From Things Commonly Occurring. The Maxim:
if t h e f i r s t of t h i n g s c o m m o n l y co-
o c c u r r i n g is n o t t h e r e , n e i t h e r
is t h e s e c o n d .
ON E X T R I N S I C TOPICS
27 What an Extrinsic Topic is was already mentioned. Among
Extrinsic Topics are ones from Opposites, from Greater, from Less,
from Likeness, from Proportion, from Transfer, and Authority.
On the Topic from Opposites
Again: There are four kinds of Opposition: Relative Opposit
ion, Contrariety, Privative Opposition and Contradiction. Things
that are just not found without each other are relatively opposed,
V: ON TOPICS 63
like father and son. Contrariety is the opposition between Con
traries like white and black. Privatively oppposed are those having
to do with the same thing, like sight and blindness for the eye.
Contradiction is an oppposition in which, as such, there is no middle
ground: there is nothing intermediate between being and not-being.
On the Topic from Things
Relatively Opposed
28 The Topic from Things Relatively Opposed is the relation
of one correlative to another. It is both constructive and
destructive. For example: 'there is a father; therefore there is a
son', and conversely; 'there is no father; therefore there is no son'
and the converse. The Topic here ? From Things Relatively
Opposed. The Maxim:
given one c o r r e l a t i v e , the other is
given as w e l l .
and
w h e n o n e c o r r e l a t i v e is r e j e c t e d , the
o t h e r is r e j e c t e d a s w e l l .
On the Topic from Contraries
29 Some Contraries are mediate, like black and white,
between which there are intermediate colors; others are immediate,
like healthy or ill for an animal. The Topic from Contraries is a
relation between one contrary and another. Constructively, we
have: 'an animal is well; therefore it is not sick', or 'this body is
white; therefore it is not black'. The Topic here ? From
Contraries. The Maxim:
if w e p o s i t o n e c o n t r a r y , that
excludes the other.
It holds destructively for immediate contraries only for as long as its

subject is stable, as in 'this animal is not well; therefore it is ill'.
The Topic here ? From Immediate Contraries. The Maxim:
if o n e i m m e d i a t e c o n t r a r y i s
e c c l u d e d , we m u s t p o s i t t h e o t h e r
if i t s s u b j e c t persists.
On the Topic from Privative Opposites
30 What Privatively Opposed Things are was discussed
above.4 The Topic from Privative Opposites is a relation between
Privation and Habit or between Habit and Privation. For example:
'he is sighted; therefore he is not blind'; or 'he is blind; therefore
he is not sighted'. The Topic here ? From Privative Opposites. The
Maxim:
given o n e of o p p o s e d p r i v a t i o n s , t h e
other is r e m o v e d f r o m t h e s a m e t h i n g .
This does not hold destructively without stability in a subject and a
time span naturally set. Calves are neither called blind nor sighted
before the ninth day, nor children toothed or toothless before a set
time.
On t h e T o p i c f r o m T h i n g s
Contradictorily Opposed
31 The Topic from Contradictory Opposites is a relation of
one thing contradictorily opposed to another, for example: 'that
Socrates is sitting is true; therefore that he is not sitting is false'.
The Topic here ? From Things Contradictorily Opposed. The
Maxim:
if o n e c o n t r a d i c t o r y o p p o s i t e is t r u e
the o t h e r is f a l s e , a n d the c o n v e r s e .
On the T o p i c f r o m t h e G r e a t e r a n d
on the T o p i c f r o m t h e L e s s e r
32 Greater as taken here is what surpasses another in power

and ability, Lesser as what is surpassed by it. The Topic from the
Greater is a relation between more and less. It is always destruc
tive. For example: 'a king cannot take the camp; therefore neither
can a soldier'. The Topic here ? From the Greater. The Maxim:
if w h a t s e e m s to be g r e a t e r is n o t so,
neither is w h a t s e e m s to be less.
The Topic from the Lesser is a relation between less and more. It is
constructive. For example: 'a soldier can take the camp; therefore
a king can too'. The Topic here ? From the Lesser. The Maxim:
if w h a t s e e m s t o be l e s s e r is s o ,
t h e n so is w h a t s e e m s t o be g r e a t e r .
4: Above, p. 63; cf. p. 32.

V: ON TOPICS 65
On the Topic from Like
33 The Topic from Like is a relation between one like thing

and the other. As in 'as risibility is in a man, whinnibility is in a
horse; but risibility is a Peculiarity of man; therefore whinnibility
is a Peculiarity of a horse'. The Topic here ? From Like. The
Maxim:
like is judged by like.
Destructively: 'the way risibility is in a man, whinnibility is in a

horse; but risibility is not peculiar to a man as a genus; therefore
neither is whinnibility in a horse as a genus'. The Topic here ? From
Like. The Maxim:
if o n e of l i k e s i s p r e s e n t , the other
is p r e s e n t as well.
or:
if o n e of l i k e s is a b s e n t , the other
is absent as well.
On the Topic from Proportion
34 The Topic from Proportion is a relation between one pro

portional and the others. For example 'a ship's pilot (rector) is to a
ship as an academic rector is to schools; but for sailing ships a pilot
is chosen for skill, not by lot; therefore for running schools, a rector
should be chosen for skill, not by lot'. The Topic here ?
From Proportion. The Maxim:
Proportionals are judged proportionally.
This Topic differs from the Topic from Like, because in the latter,
comparison is based on an inherent likeness, as in 'as risibility is in a
man, whinnibility is in a horse'; but in the Topic from Proportion, a
comparable relation rather than inherent likeness is attended to, for
example: 'a sailor is to his ship, as a teacher is to his classes'.
On the Topic from Transfer
35 There are two sorts of Metaphor or Transfer. One where a

name or word-group signifying one thing is transferred to signify
something else through a likeness, as laugh is transferred to
bloom when we say 'a meadow laughs'. A word-group is transferred
when we say 'you are ploughing sand' for 'you are wasting your
labor' of somebody who works in vain. That sort of transfer
pertains to sophistics, not dialectics.
Another sort of transfer is when a better known expression

(nomen) is taken for one less well known. As in proving a philo
sopher does not envy others, a transfer be made to 'a wise man does
not envy others'. This sort pertains to dialectics.
The Topic from Transfer is a relation between one transferred

thing and something else, for example: 'a wise man does not envy
others; therefore a philosopher does not envy others'. The Topic
here ? From Transference. The Maxim:
what suits something under a familiar

name suits it u n d e r a l e s s f a m i l i a r one
as well.
This Topic differs from that of Nominal Interpretation,

because in the latter, one accepts a word's (nomen) definition or
description or exposition, as 'philosopher' is expounded by what I
say in 'lover of wisdom'; but in the Topic from Transference, no
exposition of a word is sought: for a less familiar word, a better
known one is taken, or something else by which the proposal is easily
proven.
On the Topic from Authority
36 Authority, as taken here, is the judgement of an expert in

his field. So this Topic is commonly called the Topic from
Judgement of Fact.
The Topic from Authority is a relation betweem authority and

what is proven by it, as in 'astronomers say the heavens are change
able; therefore the heavens are changeable'. The Topic here ?
From Authority. The Maxim:
all e x p e r t s are trustworthy in their

own field.
ON MEDIATE TOPICS
37 Now about Mediate Topics. It has already been said what a

Mediate Topic is.5 One is from Conjugates, another from Case-
forms, a third from Division. Conjugates and case-forms differ
because a univocal / an abstract / a base (principale) form (which
are the same thing) is said to be conjugate with its denominative,
5: Above, p. 52.
V: ON TOPICS 67
like 'justice' and 'just' (justiţia et justum). Those deriving from a
base form are called case-forms, like just and justly [justum et
juste]. This difference is assigned by Aristotle in Second Topics.6
On the Topic from Conjugates
38 The Topic from Conjugates is a relation between one
conjugate and another, for example: 'justice is good; therefore
something just is something good'. The Topic here ? From
Conjugates. The Maxim:
w h a t i n h e r e s in one conjugate is in the
o t h e r as w e l l .
or
if o n e c o n j u g a t e is inherent, the other
is a s w e l l .
On the Topic from Derivates (asibus)

39 The Topic from Derivates (case-forms) is a relation
between one derivate and another. For example 'what is just, is
good; therefore what is justly done, is well done', and the
converse. The Topic here ? From Derivates. The Maxim:
w h a t suits one derivate suits the other
as w e l l .
On the Topic from Division
40 One sort of Division is by negation, For example 'Socrates

is either a man or he is not a man; but he is not a non-man, there
fore he is a man'. The Topic here ? From Division. The Maxim:
if a p a i r e q u a l l y d i v i d e something,
g i v e n o n e , t h e o t h e r is removed.
or:
if one is removed, the other is given.
A second kind of Division is not by Negation. This come about
in six ways: three as such (per se) and three by accident. First, a
division of genus into species, for example: 'some animals are
rational, some irrational'. Second, a division of a whole into its
6: Topica II 9, 114a 27-34.

integral parts, For example 'one part of a house is a wall, another
the roof, another the foundation'. Third, a division of an expression
into its Significations, for example: 'dog means the barker, or a fish,
or a celestial body'. Of the three accidental divisions, the first is
that of a Subject into its Accidents, for example: 'some animals are
well, some are sick'. Second, a division of an accident into its
Subjects, for example: 'one healthy thing is a man, another is a
brute animal'. Third, a division of an accident into accidents, for
example: 'one healthy thing is hot, another is cold'.
The Topic from Division is a relation between one exclusive
term and another, for example: 'if Socrates is an animal, he is
either rational or irrational; but he is not irrational; therefore he is
rational'. The Topic here ? From Division. The Maxim is the one
mentioned above.
In any other sort of Division, an Argument may be formed con
structively or destructively in similar fashion.
TRACT VI
ON SUPPOSITIONS
1 Some things are said with construction and some without. 'A
man runs' and 'a white man' are said with construction; 'man' is
not: by itself man is an unconstructed term.
Each unconstructed term signifies either substance, or quality,
or quantity, or relation, or action, or passivity, etc.
On Signification
2 The Signification of a term, as taken here, is the convent
ional representation of a thing by a vocal expression (vox). As a
result, since every thing is either a universal or a singular, words
(dictiones) not signifying a universal or a particular ought not signify
anything. So they will not be terms as 'term' is taken here, any
more than universal and particular markers (signa) are not terms.
One sort of signification is that of a substantive thing and it is
effected by a substantival noun like 'man'. Another is that of an
adjectival thing and it is effected by an adjectival noun or a verb,
like white or runs. As a result, signification is not properly
substantival or adjectival: something is signified substantively and
something adjectivally, since being adjectival or substantive are
modes of things that are signified, not modes of signification.
While substantive nouns are said to stand for (supponere),
adjectivais as well as verbs are said to couple (copulare).
On Supposition and Copulation
3 Supposition is the acceptance of a substantival term for
something. Signification and supposition differ because signification
is through the imposition of a vocal expression upon a thing to be
signified, while supposition is the acceptance of a term itself,
already signifying a thing for someone, as in 'a man runs', where
the term 'man' stands for Socrates, or Plato, and so on. As a
result, signification is prior to supposition. Nor do signification and
supposition have to do with the same things, because 'signify' has to
do with a vocal expression, while 'stand for' has to do with a term
already composed, as it were, of a vocal expression and a signific
ation. Therefore Supposition is not Signification.
Copulation is acceptance of an adjectival term for something.
On the Division of Supposition
4 Supposition is either common or discrete. Common suppos
ition is what is effected by a common term, like 'man'. Discrete
supposition is what is effected by a discrete term, like 'Socrates'
or 'this man'.
Again: Common suppositions are either natural or accidental.
Natural supposition is acceptance of a common term for everything
it is naturally apt to take part in: 'man' taken as such, naturally
stands for all men who were, are, and will be. But accidental
supposition is acceptance of a common term for those things for
which it demands something added. In 'man exists', the term man
stands for present men; in 'man existed', for past men, and in 'man
will be' for future men. So 'man' has diverse suppositions
depending on the diversity of what are added to it.
5 Accidental suppositions are either simple or personal.
Simple supposition is acceptance of a common term for a universal
thing signified by it. In 'man is species' or 'animal is genus', the
term 'man' stands for man-in-general and not for one of its infer
iors, and the term 'animal' stands for animal-in-general and not for
one of its inferiors. So too for any other common term, as in 'ris
ible is a peculiarity', 'rational is a difference', 'white is an
accident'.
6 Again: Simple suppositions include that of a common sub
ject term, as in 'man is a species' or that of a common term put in
an affirmative predicate, as in 'every man is an animal'. The pre
dicate term 'animal' has simple supposition, since it only stands for
the nature of a genus. Or that of a common term put after an
exceptive word (dictionem), as in 'every animal except man is irrat
ional'. Here the predicate term 'man' has simple supposition. So
this does not follow: 'every animal except man is irrational; there
fore every animal except this man'; it is a Fallacy of Word Figure,
shifting from simple to personal supposition. So is 'man is a
species; therefore some man is a species'; and 'every man is an
VI: ON SUPPOSITIONS 71
animal; therefore every man is this animal'. In all these a shift
from simple to personal supposition is made.
That a common predicate term is to be taken simply, is clear
in 'study about all contraries is the same study'. If the term study
did not have simple supposition, it would be false, since no particular
study is about all contraries. Medicine is not about all contraries,
only about the sick and well, and grammar is about the congruous
and incongruous, and so for the others.
7 Personal supposition is acceptance of a common term for its
inferiors. In 'a man runs', the term 'man' stands for its inferiors.
8 Again: Personal suppositions are either determinate or dif
fuse (confusa). Determinate supposition labels what a common term
has when taken indefinitely or with a particular marker, as in 'man
runs' or 'some man runs'. Each of these is called determinate, since
though in each, the term 'man' stands for every man running or not,
they are true only if one man is running. To stand for is one thing,
to make a locution true for something another. In the examples
above, as said, the term 'man' stands for every man, running or not,
but it makes the utterance true for one man running. That each is
determinate is clear, because in 'Socrates is an animal, Plato is an
animal, Cicero is an animal', etc.; therefore every man is an
animal', there is a Fallacy of Word Figure, shifting from many
determinates to a single one. That way a common term, taken
indefinitely, has determinate supposition; so too does one with a
particular marker.
9 Diffuse supposition is the acceptance of a common term for
several things by means of a universal marker. In 'every man is an
animal', the term 'man', by means of the universal marker, is taken
for several, since for any one at all, of its supposits.
Again: Diffuse supposition is either diffuse by demand of
marker or mood or else by demand of fact. In 'every man is an
animal' by marker demand, the term man is diffused or distributed
for any of its supposits. Since each man has his own essence, the
verb 'is' is taken by factual demand for as many essences as 'man'
is for men. Since his own animality is within each man, 'animal' is
taken by factual demand for as many animals as 'man' is for men,
and for as many essences as the verb 'is'. That is why the term
'man' is said to stand for things diffusely, mobilely, and distribut-
ively. It 'stands for' diffusely and distributively, since taken for
every man; mobilely, since descent can be made from it to any
supposit, like 'every man; therefore Socrates' or 'every man;

therefore Plato'. The term 'animal' is said to be diffused immob
ilely, since descent below it is not allowed, as in 'every man is an
animal; therefore every man is this animal'. There supposition
shifts from simple to personal. So too in 'man is the most noble of
creatures; therefore a particular man'; and 'roses are the most
beautiful of flowers; therefore a particular rose'. These differ in
that the latter has simple supposition in the subject, the former in
the predicate.
Doubts
10 It would not seem to be contrary to have said that in

'every man is an animal', the predicate term 'animal' has simple
supposition, though it was earlier said it has diffuse supposition. As
genus is predicated there of species, the term 'animal' is taken for
the common thing genus itself and so has simple supposition. But as
the common nature of genus itself is multiplied through supposits of
man, it is said to have diffuse supposition, not mobilely, but immob-
ilely. Mobilely diffuse supposition cannot coexist with simple sup
position, neither as to the same thing nor as to different things. But
diffuse supposition immobilely can coexist with simple supposition,
not as to the same thing, but as to diverse ones, as was said.
This way the contrariety perceived by those holding a predic

ate term would have simple supposition, and would be diffused
immobilely when there is a universal affirmative subject marker (as
in 'every man is an animal' ), should disappear.
11 I believe it to be impossible that a common predicate term

is diffused immobilely or mobilely when there is an affirmative uni
versal marker in the subject, as in 'every man is an animal' and
others like it. As Porphyry has it , everything predicated of another
is either greater than or equal to it. He means this of predication as
such. In 'every man is an animal', there is predication as such and
an equal is not predicated; therefore something greater is predic
ated; not an accidental; therefore a substantial or essential;
therefore genus or difference; not difference; therefore genus. But
the nature of genus, multiplied mobilely or immobilely, is no longer
genus. Therefore, in 'every man is an animal', since genus is
predicated there, it is impossible that a common term signifying the
1: Isag. p 7.4-6, Boethius' translation, p. 13.5-7.

nature of a genus be multiplied immobilely or mobilely; for it would

not even be a genus, just as, if man is diffused mobilely or immob
ilely, it will not be species.
Again: The same seems to be Aristotle's view in First Topics 2 .

He says it is necessary that everything predicated of another be
either predicated conversely or not; if conversely, it is a definition
or peculiarity; if not conversely, it either falls within the thing's
definition or it does not; if within the definition, it is genus or
difference. Aristotle there intends this to be predication in the
nominative case with species as subject, as such, or as multiplied.
But in 'every man is an animal', there is predication in the
nominative and neither equal nor accident is predicated; therefore
genus or difference is; not difference; therefore genus. So this
comes back to the same thing as before: for which reason it is not
possible that a common predicate term be diffused mobilely or
immobilely.
Again: Universal whole which is genus and whole in quantity

are opposed. But whole in quantity is ambiguous: one whole is
complete, as wherever a common term is diffused mobilely; the
other is incomplete or diminished, as wherever a common term is
diffused immobilely. For that reason if a common term is multiplied
simply, a whole in quantity results simply; if multiplied somehow or
other, a whole in quantity results somehow or other. Therefore if it
is impossible for a whole in quantity to be genus precisely as genus,
it is not possible that a common predicate term be diffused, as they
were saying.
Again: The pairing (comparatio) by which inferiors reduce to

their superior is opposed to that by which a superior reduces to its
inferiors. By the first, 'common' is taken as formally common. That
way common itself contains all beneath it. By the second, it is
taken as 'multiplied' or 'diffused', whether the common term is
multiplied for all or for some inferiors. If therefore genus stands as
such as formally common, it is impossible that it be multiplied
precisely as such.
We concede all these points.
2: 18, 103b 7-17.

Solution
12 The argument that convinced them is readily solved. They

say that in 'every man is an animal', since each and every man is
matched with his own essence and animality (it being impossible to
be a man without being an animal) - therefore the term 'animal'
will be taken for as many animals as 'man' is for men. We say this
argument lacks all plausibility. When I say 'every man is white',
or 'every man is black' (it being impossible to be a man without
being an animal), it is necessary that as many animals or animalities
be understood in the subject as there are men for whom the term
'man' is taken.
Yet it is fatuous to say that the multitude of those animalities

comes from multiplication by a predicate, when 'white' or 'black' is
predicated. So I say that since man is constituted (logically, not
naturally speaking) of 'rational' and 'animcil', that is why 'man'
of itself contains 'animal'. So when 'man' is multiplied, it has in
itself a multitude of those animalities. As when I say 'every man is
white', or 'every man is black', man no way has these animalities
from a predicate.
So too in the proposal when genus is predicated, as in 'every

man is an animal'. In this proposition, 'man' is subject, in which a
multitude of those animalities is understood, as was said, and the
genus 'animal', is predicated, which is in no way diffused, mobilely
nor immobilely, but stands there for the common generic essence
itself, predicable of several. So 'animal' is predicated and 'animal'
is understood in the subject, as in: 'every rational, mortal animal is
an animal'.
So I say in like manner that the verb 'is' is neither diffused

mobilely nor immobilely, because the fact that animal would be or
exist in man, is something the subject had of itself before it was a
subject of an actual or potential predicate in a proposition.
For this reason we abolish a certain previous division, namely:

diffused suppositions are either by demand of marker or mood, or
else by demand of fact. We say all diffusion is due to a demand of
mood. In 'every rational mortal animal is an animal' the term
'animal' is taken for every animal which is man because of the
marker. So too in 'every man is an animal': the term 'man' is
taken, not only for every man, but for every animal that is a man. It
is for that reason there are as many animalities as humanities, from
a natural point of view, (for humanity is identical in a logical, not a
natural approach, in any individual of man); just as man-in-general

is identical. That it be this or that animality is due to matter. In
the course of nature, my humanity is autonomous and other than
your humanity, just as my soul, through which my humanity is in me,
is different from your soul, through which humanity is caused in
you. And because of this marker or mood, diffusing 'man' does not
diffuse 'animal', but 'animal' as contracted to 'man' through its
differences.
So every diffusion is by demand of marker or mood.
TRACT VII
ON FALLACIES
INTRODUCTION
On the Definition of Disputation
1 Disputation is the activity of one person syllogizing with

another as to a proposal to be demonstrated. Five things are requir
ed for a disputation: its originator, called the opponent, one with
whom to dispute, called the respondent, the disputed proposal, the
activity of disputing and its instrument. All five are suggested in
the description of 'disputation' just given. By the meaning of
'activity', the action of disputing itself is touched on. The differ
ence 'syllogizing' suggests that activity arises from a syllogism as
the tool of disputation. By the difference 'of one' is understood the
originator of actual disputing, and by the difference 'with another',
the person with whom one disputes. By 'as to a proposal' is under
stood disputed facts, the object of the disputation.
2 To the five things singled out in this description a sixth can

be added by the difference 'to be demonstrated'. That blends the
activity of disputing with its object, a union one can understand by
pairing that activity with its disputed object, just as in equating the
activity of seeing with its object, something visible, we grasp the
union of seeing with something visible as something that is not
just what can be seen, but actually is. So when the activity of
disputing is unified with its object, we have not just something that
can be, but actually is, disputed or delimited.
3 If one objects that since induction is the tool for disputation,
a syllogism is not unique to it, there being only one tool for a given
thing, - say tools for an act are of two sorts, one perfect, the other
imperfect. Just as in grammar, where a simple congruous sentence
is the finished tool for speaking and a figurative one incomplete, the
syllogism is the perfect and complete tool for disputation, while
induction is an imperfect one, as is an enthymeme or example. So
VII: ON FALLACIES 77
while there is one complete tool for an act, not a number of them,
the incomplete ones falling short of perfection can be several.
On the Division of Disputation
4 There are four kinds of disputation: didactic, dialectical,

tentative (examination-arguments) and sophistical (contentious).
5 Didactic (doctrinalis) disputation comes to its conclusion

from principles peculiar to each discipline and not just from what
seem true to a respondent. The tool for this type of disputation is a
demonstrative syllogism. That involves reasoning from true and
basic premises or from such premises as derive their principle of
knowledge from them. Opposed to that is another, called a pseudo-
argument, and it is taken from the same principles, but falsely.
6 Dialectical disputation is what collects contradictions from

probable premises. Its tool is the dialectical syllogism, one that
comes to a conclusion from probable premises.
7 Tentative disputation argues from what seem true to the r e

spondent and anyone pretending to have knowledge must know. Its
tool is a tentative syllogism, one coming to a conclusion from things
that seem probable to the respondent. So if sometimes what he
argues from are necessary, or false, or simply probable, this is not
because they actually are that way, but because they seem probable
to the. respondent. Aristotle treats that at the beginning of the
Topics , when he divides a tentative syllogism into three parts, of
which he later says: 'so the first mentioned is the tentative
(litigiosus) syllogism and it should be called a syllogism1.
8 This shows why a question some .put is invalid: since Arist

otle deals in the beginning of the Elenchi 3 with tentative disputation
when delimiting species of disputation, why, they ask, does he not
delimit the tentative syllogism there, though he deals with other
species of syllogism ? The tentative syllogism is one objectors often
call materially faulty. But it is not because dialectical syllogisms
start from false premises that they are materially defective (as they
say), but because they offend against what counts as probable. A
dialectician takes probable simply: something that is simply
1: Topica I 1, 101a 1-2, Boethius' Translation p. 6.8-977.

2: Topica 1,1, 10la 1-2, transi. Boeth. p.6.
3: Sophistici Elenchi 2, 163b 4-7.
probable is what seems true to all, or most, or experts, and to these

as the majority, or all, or best known. A tentative syllogism does
not take probable that way, but only as what is probable to the
respondent, therefore as probable after-a-fashion (secundum quid).
So it offends against what counts as probable.
9 Sophistical disputation syllogizes from what seem probable

but are not. Its disputation-tool is the sophistical syllogism, one
that seems to be, but really is not, a syllogism, the one of which the
Elenchi 4 says that one sort is litigious, which is a syllogism, though
seemingly unsuited to the facts. That is a tentative syllogism, which
we have just discussed.
10 Notice that 'disputation' is said proportionally or analogic

ally of these four, as is the description of disputation given above.
That is why Aristotle does not define, but divides, disputation in the
Elenchi . A definition is of something said univocally, not analogic
ally. Yet a description of what is said analogically can be validly
given, which may be said analogically just like the thing described by
it.
11 If asked which of the four disputations mentioned is called

'disputation1 as prime analogate and secondary analogates, say that
if differences put in the above description are inspected, it is easy
to see. Taking 'disputation' from the perspective of the difference
'of one with another', (since we understand opposing disputants by it,
there being a greater opposition between a sophistical opponent and
a respondent), 'disputation' taken that way is said primarily of
sophistical, then of tentative (where there is still opposition but not
as great), then of dialectical (where opposition is less), and lastly of
didactic disputation (since that does not question but assumes what
it demonstrates). All the others question it. Taking 'disputation'
from the persepctive of syllogistic activity, everything reverses:
didactic disputation is the prime analogate and its secondary analog
ates are dialectical, then tentative, and lastly sophistical. So too if
we take 'disputation' from the perspective of its object (the propos
al to be demonstrated), because the didactic more truly demonstrat
es and tests, the dialectical less than didactic, the tentative less
than dialectical, and the sophistical less than the others.
12 Again: Didactic disputation is either mathematical or

scientific (naturalis) and each of these has several species. The
demonstrative syllogism is divided similarly.
4: Soph. El. 11, 171b 16-21.

5: Soph. El. 2, 165a 38-b8.
Again: There are three basic species of dialectical disputation.
One is for distinctions (obviationes) called discriminative; another
for practice, called exercitative disputation; the third for disci
plines discussed according to a philosophy. Similarly, there are
three kinds of dialectical syllogism. The third of these has four
kinds. The first is to establish or refute an accident, the second a
genus, the third a peculiarity, and the fourth a definition. Similarly,
taken that third way, there are four kinds of dialectical syllogism.
Again: There are two basic kinds of tentative disputation. The
first argues from commonalities to commonalities, as one argues
provisionally in dialectics or sophistics. The other is from commons
to peculiars, as one who argues hypothetically in special disciplines
like geometry, arithmetic or medicine. Similarly, there are two
basic kinds of tentative syllogism; one from commons to commons,
the other from commons to peculiariarities.
On Sophistical Disputation and its Ends
13 There are five kinds of Sophistical disputation. They derive
from the ordering of sophistical disputation to five goals or special
ends: Refutation, Falsity, Paradox, Solecism, and Trivialization.
14 Refutation is denial of what was conceded, or concession of
what was denied in the same disputation by the force of argument
ation.
15 'Falsity' is said two ways, one a sort of contradictory
falsity like 'Socrates is running and not running', the other, propos-
itional, like 'an Ethiopian is white'. The first is the clearest of all
falsities and pertains to refutation. The second pertains to the goal
of falsity when it is obvious. So Falsity as a goal is manifest propos-
itional falsity demonstrated by disputation. For even if a sophistical
opponent leads a sophistical respondent to a covert falsity - as that
the earth is larger than the least of visible stars - he does not
thereby attain his goal, since the falsity of this proposition is not
manifest but covert. Or if he willingly concedes a proposition
manifestly false, and is not forced to do so by some truly or
apparently inferring middle term, the opponent still does not attain
his goal.
16 Paradox (inopinabile) is what is contrary to the opinion of
all, or of most, or of experts, and of these as of all, or of the
majority, or of the best known. So Paradox and the Improbable are
substantially the same but differ formally since the Improbable is
so-called with respect to overtly opposed concepts. Paradox is so-
called because the mind is unwilling to take it in or agree to it, but
rejects it and disagrees.
17 Solecism is a fault made in putting parts of a word-group
(partes orationis) together contrary to rules of the art of grammar,
like 'whites man' or 'men runs'.
18 Trivialization (nugatio) is useless repetition from the same
part of a word-group like 'man man runs' or 'rational man'. I say
'of the same part of a word-group', for if the same thing is posited
in different parts, it is not trivializtion, like 'a man is a man' or 'a
man is rational'. It is called useless repetition, since if the same
thing is repeated for greater expressivity, it is not trivialization, as
in 'God, my God'.
19 Therefore sophistical disputation leading to refutation is
the first species of sophistical disputation. The second is sophistic
disputation leading to Falsity, the third to Paradox, the fourth to
Solecism, the fifth to Trivialization. Similarly, there are five
species of sophistical syllogism taken in the same way.
20 One must know that species are set up under a genus in two
ways. In one, a formal difference added to a genus constitutes a
species, as 'rational' and 'mortal' added to 'animal' constitute
'man'. In the other, final differences adjoined to a genus constitute
a species under a genus. It is in that second way that species of
sophistical disputation are set up. Aristotle notes this in the
Elenchi , when after dividing disputation simply taken into four
species, he adds those five goals by which sophistical disputation is
again subdivided into the five species he studies, as was said.
21 Now that disputation has been divided into four species and
any of those subdivided into their basic species, and sophistical
disputation so divided into the five species mentioned above (which
are perfected and constituted by the ordering of sophistical disput
ation to five goals or ends, as was said) - since those five ends or
goals are not the proximate ends of sophistic disputation but species
of it, as shown by what was said above, next comes the proximate
goal of sophistic disputation, apparent wisdom. Sophists prefer to
seem wise and not be, rather than be wise yet not appear to be. So
in every sophistical disputation, apparent wisdom is intended as a
sort of proximate and principal end of sophistical disputation in
itself.
On the thirteen Fallacies
22 Once the end of sophistical disputation is known, fallacies

that lead to it must be considered. Ends are always earlier in
intention, later in execution: we first think of a house, then lumber,
walls, and mortar. In execution it reverses: first come walls and
mortar, then lumber to make its parts, and finally there is a house.
So too in sophistical disputation: we first think of the principal end,
then of what lead to it, but when finally we get to disputing, it
reverses. So we must know that just as opinion, the end in dialectic,
is acquired through arguments derived from dialectical Topics,
similarly, apparent wisdom, sophistical disputations' end, is acquired
through arguments taken from sophistical Topics.
23 Sophistical Topics in general are thirteen fallacies, six

linguistic (in dictione) and seven extralinguistic (extra dictionem).
First we must discuss the linguistic ones.
ON LINGUISTIC FALLACIES
24 Six fallacies are made linguistically (in dictione): Equivoc

ation, Amphiboly, Composition, Division, Accent and Word
Figure (figura dictionis). That there are six linguistic ones, Aristotle
tries to prove inductively and syllogistically . Inductively: The
Fallacy of Equivocation is made in one of these six ways; so too,
Amphiboly is made in one of these six ways, and so of the others;
therefore every linguistic fallacy is made in one of these six ways.
Syllogistically:
Every deception made because we do not signify the

same thing with the same words (nominibus) or
word-groups (orationibus) is made in one of these six
ways;
but every linguistic fallacy is made because we do
not signify the same thing with the same words
and word-groups;
6: Hispanus' examples: vir alba and homines currit. [fpd]

7: Soph. El. 3, 163b 12ff.
8: Soph. El. 4, 165b 27-30.
therefore every linguistic fallacy is made by one of

those six ways.
The syllogism is in the First Mood, First Figure. Proof of the

major:
All polysemy (multiplicitas dictionis) arises in one of

these six ways;
but every deception made because we do not
signify the same thing by the same words and
word-groups is made from polysemy;
therefore, every deception made because we do not
signify the same thing by the same words and
word-groups is made in one of those six ways.
This was the major. Proof of the minor:
Every linguistic fault (malitia dictionis) arises

because we do not signify the same thing by the same
words and word-groups.
but every linguistic fallacy is from a linguistic
fault;
therefore every linguistic fallacy is made because we
do not signify the same thing by the same words and
word-groups.
This was the minor and the two syllogisms are in the First Mood of
the First Figure.
23 It should also be known, as Alexander in his commentary on

Sophistical Refutations has it, that polysemy (multiple ambiguity)
occurs in three ways, one actual, the second potential, the third
imaginary. Actual polysemy occurs when a simply identical word
(dictio) or a simply identical word-group signifies several things, as
will be clear in Equivocation and Amphiboly, where there is actual
polysemy. What concerns potential and imaginary polysemy will be
clear in their proper places. Since the nature of polysemy is more
truly realized in actual than in potential polysemy, and more truly in
potential than in imaginary polysemy, we must therefore first speak
about fallacies producing actual polysemy, then about those in which
it is potential, and finally about the imaginary.
9: Cf. L. Minio-Paluello, Note sull' Aristotele Latino Medievale

IX, 229-231 [in: Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica 46 (1954)] and
L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum I, 100-105.
ON EQUIVOCATION
On the Definition of Fallacy
26 Now we have dealt with these, we must speak of equivocat
ion or the Fallacy of Equivocation. Understand that 'fallacy' is
ambiguous. One way, fallacy means deception caused in us, in
another, it means the cause or principle of that deception. It is that
second way that we have fallacies in mind here.
27 That is why one should know that in any fallacy taken that
second way, principle is ambiguous and so is cause: motive prin
ciple, motive cause or plausible cause (causa apparentiae) conse
quently all label an identical principle. A different principle / cause
is the principle of defect / cause of non-existence, which is the same
thing, or the cause of falsity. It is the motive principle / plausible
cause in any fallacy that moves one to believe in what is not. The
principle of defect / cause of falsity, is what makes what is believed
in something false.
Since those two principles (or two causes) are in any fallacy, it
is fitting for them to be in Equivocation. The motive principle /
plausible cause in Equivocation is the unity of a word (dictionis)
simply taken. I say 'simply taken' because of accent; under accent
a word is not simply the same, as will be clear later. The principle
of deficiency / cause of non-existence / falsity in Equivocation is
the diversity of natures and of things signified.
On the Definition of Equivocation
28 So Equivocation is defined as follows: Equivocation is when
things of a different nature are subsumed under the same word
(nomine), taken simply. This definition uses 'thing' indifferently for
things themselves, with respect to the double mode of things, and
with respect to their relations. An example with respect to things
themselves is the word (nomen) 'dog', which signifies an animal that
barks, a marine animal and a celestial body. 'Healthy' is an example
with respect to the double mode of things, since in one mode the
word (dictio) signifies (the subject), and in another mode consignifies
its accidents. It thus always signifies the same health, that of an
animal, but by different modes. When we say, 'the urine is healthy',
its sense is: 'the urine is a sign of healthiness', but only that of an
animal. When we say 'food is healthy', its sense is: 'food can pro
duce health', but only that of an animal, and 'a diet is healthy',
because it preserves animal health, and 'a drink is healthy' because
it prepares for animal health. It is always the same health, but its
modes are diverse, since 'healthy' said of an animal signifies health
as the health of a subject or health in a subject. When said of urine,
as of a sign of health; of food, as of what effects it; of drink, as of
what prepares for it. All these modes are different. It is taken for
relations of things, as in prepositions that mean different causal
relations, as will be clear in paralogisms.
As for the other mode mentioned, the two principles / causes
we have cited are insufficient for Equivocation, It is further
required that there be in us an inability to tell different nominal
natures (rationes) apart. So Equivocation / Fallacy of Equivocation
taken this way can be defined: the Fallacy of Equivocation is the
deception caused in us by our inability to distinguish diverse natures
in the same word (nomine) taken simply.
On the Division of Equivocation
29 The kinds of Equivocation can be taken in two ways, as
Aristotle seems to intend : first, in itself, and secondarily, as
having something in common with Amphiboly. But in either this or
that way, Aristotle indicates only three kinds or modes of
Equivocation.
On the First Species
30 The first kind is when the same word (dictio) indifferently
signifies diverse things, as the word (nomen) 'dog' equally signifies
something in the sea, in the sky, or the thing that barks. And a
paralogism is formed as follows:
'every dog is something that can bark
but a certain marine animal is a dog
therefore a certain marine animal is
something that can bark*.
This does not follow since both premises are polysemous, true in one
way, false in two others, since in each there is a triple sense based
on the triple signification of the word (nomen) 'dog'.
Or as follows:
10: Soph. El. 4, 165b 30-166a21.

11: Soph. El. 4, 165b 30-166a6.
'those who are literate, learn
the learned are literate
therefore the literate learn'.12
In this paralogism, the major premise and conclusion are ambiguous,
since 'learn' is equivocal as to 'understand a teacher' and 'retain
what a teacher says'. Some understand what their teacher says well
enough but retain it poorly, while others retain well what he says,
but understand it poorly. Yet both the one and the other are said to
learn. So 'learn' is equivocated for this pair.
On the Second Species
31 The second kind or second mode of equivocation is when
the same word (dictio) signifies different things analogically
(secundum prius et posterius) as the word 'expedient' primarily
signifies 'good' and secondarily 'something necessary that happens
in bad things'. I am not saying it means something simply necess-
ary, but something necessary that happens in bad things; as when
some great evil occurs that can only be avoided through a lesser one,
that lesser evil is then called necessary with respect to the greater
one. So it is not simply necessary, but necessary with respect to a
greater evil. For example, amputation of a body part is bad; yet it
is necessary lest the entire body become diseased. A paralogism can
be formed as follows:
'every expedient is a good
an evil is an expedient
therefore an evil is a good'.
Each of the premisses is ambiguous, as is clear from the foregoing,
since although 'expedient' signifies something good and necessary
in evils, to the extent that it signifies a good, the major is true,
but false to the extent that 'expedient' signifies something necess
ary in bad things. The converse is to be said of the minor.
So too here:
'every healthy thing is an animal
urine is a healthy thing
therefore urine is an animal.'
12: The original example is 'quicumque sunt grammatici discunt;

scientes sunt grammatici; ergo scientes discunt'. [fpd]
Each of the premises is polysemous, as often said.
32 Equivocation from metaphor reduces to this second type.

For example:
'whatever laughs has a mouth

but a meadow laughs
therefore a meadow has a mouth.'
or
'whatever runs, has feet
the Seine runs
therefore the Seine has feet.'
the verbs 'runs' and 'laughs' primarily signify laugh and run and
secondarily bloom and flow, for the latter signify from proper
imposition and the former from customary use. So in both paralog
isms each premise was ambiguous.
33 Every prepositional polysemy is also reduced to this second

species of equivocation. Any preposition entails one relationship
primarily and others secondarily. For example, the prepositional 'on
the basis of' (secundum) primarily means a relationship of formal
cause and secondarily a relationship of efficient cause. A para
logism like this can be formed:
'it is a peculiarity of quality that something be called

similar or dissimilar on the basis of that quality
but something is said to be similar or dissimilar on the
basis of its similarity or dissimilarity
therefore similarity and dissimilarity are qualities',
which is false, for in fact they are relations. The major has a double
meaning by the ambiguity just discussed. So if the prepositional 'on
the basis of' (secundum) means efficient cause, it is true (since two
qualities of the same species are an efficient cause of similarity, for
they make their subjects similar to each other). But if it means
formal cause, it is false. A quality is not a formal cause of similar
ity itself, since its form is similarity, like whiteness is the form of
something white, the warmth of something warm, or the dampness
of something damp). The converse is to be said of the minor.
Similarly, the preposition 'in' primarily means a spatial relat

ionship and secondarily all others, which are clear depending on the
modes of being-in distinguished above. That is why Aristotle,
where he distinguishes those modes, says: 'one thing is simply and
properly said to be-in another as in a place'.
34 Note that the preposition 'in' does not indifferently signify
relations other than a spatial one, but primarily and secondarily, as
is clear here:
'in whatever illness is found, that is an animal
but illness is found in an imbalance of humors;
therefore an imbalance of humors is an animal'.
The major is ambiguous. If the preposition 'in' there means a
relationship of material cause as that-in-which, i.e., a relationship
of something as subject, it is true. If it means a relationship of
efficient cause, it is false. The converse is to be said of the minor,
for while an animal is the subject of an illness, imbalance of humors
is its efficient cause. That is how 'in' is taken here according to
different relations and it primarily signifies that relationship which
is one of an illness itself to its subject. Secondarily, it signifies a
relation of an illness to its efficient cause. Just as 'healthy' or
'sick' are said primarily of an animal, and secondarily of what
effects or keeps it that way, the preposition 'in' primarily means a
relationship of those things to their subjects, secondarily their
relationship to what they effect or conserve.
35 If you object that, since a cause is naturally prior to its
effect, therefore the preposition 'in' primarily means a relation of
health or illness to an efficient cause, secondarily a relation to its
subject (the opposite of what was being said) - one must say that
'primarily' is said ambiguously. In one way it has to do with causing,
and that way a cause is naturally prior to its effect. In another it
has to do with the completion and perfection of its species, so we
say anything completed and perfected is naturally prior to what is
less so. In the latter way, we speak of what is prior in that second
kind of Equivocation, Since health is not yet complete in kind when
it exists only causally, but is in its complete species in an animal as
in its subject, - it is in this way primarily in an animal and second
arily in what causes the animal to be that way (i.e., in its cause),
since here it has more of its perfection and kind, less so there.
Similarly, the preposition 'in' first signifies the latter relation, and
secondarily the former, as was said.
On the Third Species
36 The third kind of Equivocation is from diverse consignific-
ation of a word (dictio). As here:
13: Physics IV 3, 210a 14-24, especially 210a 24.

'whoever was being cured, is healthy
someone suffering a disease was being cured
therefore someone suffering a disease is healthy'.
The minor and conclusion are ambiguous, since the participle
'suffering' consignifies present time as well as imperfect past. So
'suffering' consignifies suffering then as well as suffering now. If
the minor is taken for suffering then, it is false, since one would be
both healthy and suffering from a disease at the same time which is
false. If taken for suffering now, it is true, since one can be
suffering now and could have been cured then. The converse is to be
said of the conclusion.
So too here:
'whoever was getting up, is standing
the one sitting was getting up
therefore the one sitting is standing';
the minor and conclusion are ambiguous just as in the preceding
paralogism. Thus Aristotle says in the Elenchi:14 'for that a sick
man is doing something or other or having something or other done
to him, has not one meaning only'. That is, if 'suffering', or any
other present tense participle is adjoined to a verb signifying act
ivity or passivity, they do not signify one thing, as in 'the one suff
ering runs' or 'sees' or 'is weighed down', the sense is: the one
suffering now runs or sees or is weighed down, or the one suffer
ing earlier.
On the three species

37 Aristotle assigns these three kinds or modes of Equivocat
ion in the Elenchi, first by giving one paralogism based on
equivocation of the verb 'learn', secondly by another involving the
nominal 'expedient', and thirdly, a pair of them based on the poly
semy of the participles 'suffering' and 'sitting'. There is another
mode distinguishing consignifications of common modes of equivoc
ation and amphiboly as will be clear later.16
38 Some assign a different reason for the diversity and order
of these equivocation modes. They say that in the first mode an
1*: Soph. El. 4, 166a 2-3.

13: Soph. El. 4, 165b 30-166a6.
equivocal word (dictio) is at the major extreme in the major, as

shows in the paralogism effected by the equivocation of the verb
'learn'. In the second mode, the equivocal is the middle term and in
the minor extreme for the third, as shows in Aristotle's paralog
isms. So since the major extreme is prior to the middle because it is
the major and the middle is prior to the minor extreme, that is why
these modes are so ordered.
But I do not think Aristotle adverted to that, since division of

Equivocation according to major, middle, and minor extremes in a
paralogism would not be a division of Equivocation in itself, but only
a division relative to, or in comparison with, something else.
Further: the nature of being a middle, major or minor extreme is
accidental to a given word (dictio), for the same one is sometimes at
the middle, sometimes at the major extreme, and sometimes at the
minor, whether it signifies one thing or many. Therefore the divis
ion of equivocation on the basis of its being a major, minor and
middle extreme is a disivion of a subject into its accidents. There-
fore the division of equivocation would not be into its subjective
parts. Besides, it would be division of equivocation on the basis of
an accident and not as such. All of which are drawbacks.
39 For that reason the nature of diversity and order, as we

have suggested, lies in this, that an equivocation arises in three
ways. That a word (dictio) signifies several things derives either
from its signification or its consignification, for a word is not so
much a sign of many things as a sign of signification or consignific
ation. If it derives from signification, then those things which are
signified are either signified on a par by a word or analogically; if
on a par, it is the first mode; if analogically, the second; if from
consignification, the third. And that way there are three modes.
They are ordered this way since the nature of equivocation or
definition is better preserved where many things are equally signif
ied than where one is primarily signified and the rest secondarily. In
both those modes, it is better preserved than in the third, since each
of the others arises from the side of signification, in which diversity
of the things signified is expected. The third is from the side of
consignification, in which the diversity expected is not of the things
signified, but of the modes of being signified.
16: Below, p. 90-91.

ON AMPHIBOLY
On the Definition of Amphiboly
40 'Amphiboly' is used ambiguously. Sometimes it names a
principle of deception existing in a word-group that is simply
identical. That deceptive principle is composed of a motive princ
iple and a deficiency principle. But sometimes it names the decep
tion caused in us by that principle. It is taken here the first way.
41 The cause of amphiboly's plausibility (apparentia) / motive
principle is the simple unity of the same word-group. Its cause of
nonexistence / the principle of amphiboly's deficiency is the divers
ity of the same word-group.
42 Amphiboly is the principle of deception from a word-group
that is simply one, yet signifies several things. In this definition,
both principles mentioned are touched on. I say 'a word-group
simply one' to put aside composition and division, since in them,
there is no word-group that is one simply, but only one after-a-
fashion.
43 One should know that just as 'amphiboly' is said two ways,
'fallacy of amphiboly' is ambiguous in the same way. 'Fallacy of
amphiboly' sometimes names the principle of deception itself, on
the basis of which amphiboly is defined. Sometimes it names the
deception caused in us by that principle. This distinction is general
for any kind of fallacy.
44 'Amphiboly' comes from 'amphi', which means a doubt,
and 'bole', which means a judgement, - or 'logos', which means a
speech, suggesting 'dubious judgement' or 'dubious speech'.
On the first species
45 There are three kinds of Amphiboly. The first derives from
the fact that a word-group principally signifies more than one thing,
like 'Aristotle's book'. This is ambiguous, since in one way,
'Aristotle's book' is the same as 'the book edited (or made) by
Aristotle', in another, '(the book) owned by Aristotle'.
So a paralogism is formed this way:
'whatever is Aristotle's is owned by Aristotle
this book is Aristotle's
therefore this book is owned by Aristotle'.
Both premisses are doubly interpretable by the ambiguity mentioned.
On the second species
46 The second kind of amphiboly comes from transfer of a

word-group. This is when a word-group properly signifying one thing
is transferred to signifying another through some sort of likeness, as
when 'ploughing sand' is transferred to 'wasting labor'.
So a paralogism is formed this way:
'whatever is ploughed is broken up

sand is ploughed
therefore sand is broken up'.
The Minor is ambiguous because 'plough sand' properly signifies

'break up earth', but by transfer, 'waste time'. The likeness lies in
the fact that anyone who ploughs sand squanders his labor and works
in vain.
On the third species
47 The third kind of Amphiboly comes from the fact that some
word-group signifies several things, white each part taken by itself
signifies only one, as in 'knowing age'.17 This is ambiguous, for it
signifies both that someone knows the age and that the age has
knowledge of something. This is because 'age' can be subject to or
object of to the verbal 'knowing'. This is like it: 'that someone sees
that he sees' , since the second word (dictio) 'that' can be subject
to or object of the verb 'sees'. So is this: 'that someone knows that
he knows' ; the second word 'that' can be subject to or object of
the verb 'knows'. And: 'I would like fighter acceptance'. This
can be paraphrased as:
17: The Latin text has a finite construction: scit saeculum ('the
age knows' or 'he knows the age'). [fpd]
18: 'quod quis videt, hoc videt' is not as ambiguous as the English
version. [fpd]
19: 'quod quis scit, hoc scit'.
20: 'vellem me accipere pugnantes': Hispanus says the ambiiguity
(paraphrased, not translated in English) is in the fact that "the
accusative me can be subject or object of accipere". [fpd]
'
whoever I want acceptance from, I wish they would
accept me
I want fighter acceptance of me
therefore I want fighter acceptance.'
Both premises are doubly interpretable by the ambiguity mentioned.

This is similar:
'quod quis videt, hoc videt what one sees, sees this
videt autem columpnam but he sees a column
ergo columpnam videt'. therefore one sees a column
The major is ambiguous, as has been said. This is like it:
'quicumque sunt episcopi whoever are bishops

sunt homines are men
isti asini sunt episcopi those asses are the bishop's
ergo isti asini sunt homines' therefore those asses are men
Both premises are ambiguous, because the word episcopi can either
be in the nominative or genitive case.
48 It is clear that deception from diversity of case produces

amphiboly rather than equivocation, because case is assigned a word
(dictioni) so that one can be ordered to another word. Therefore
deception from diversity of case is a deception from the ordering of
one word to another; therefore it has to do with word-groups;
therefore it is not a matter of equivocation. Again, it is clear that
deception from diversity of case produces amphiboly rather than
equivocation through Aristotle's forming amphibolous rather than
equivocal paralogisms on the basis of case-diversity.
On M o d e s Common to
Equivocation and Amphiboly
49 Since Aristotle puts modes common to both after Equivoc

ation and Amphiboly in the Elenchi 22 , we will put the common
modes of both after those two sophistical Topics, following his
example. There are therefore three modes common to equivocation
and amphiboly.
21: Soph. El. 4, 166a 9-14.

22: Soph. El. 4, 166a 14-21.
The first mode common to both is when a word (dictio) or

word-group principally signifies more than one thing. Notice that as
far as a word (nomen) is said to signify more than one thing, that
first mode comes under equivocation, like 'fish' and 'dog': both
these words principally signify more than one thing. As for a
word-group being said to signify more than one thing principally,
that first mode pertains to amphiboly, as in the word-group,
'Aristotle's book'.
The second mode common to both comes from what we become

accustomed to say, when using a word or word-group metaphorically,
for example. Such word-(nomen) transfer belongs to equivocation,
as when the verb 'laugh' is transferred to 'bloom', as was clear
before 2 3 ; in a word-group, transfer is part of amphiboly, as was
clear in the example 'ploughing sand'.
The third mode common to both is when a composite word

(nomen) signifies several things, but a separate thing simply, that is,
it signifies only one thing. An example of equivocation is in the
words (nomina) 'immortal' and 'incorruptible'. In one way, 'im
mortal' is the same as 'not able to die', and 'incorruptible' the
same as 'not able to be corrupted'. In another, 'immortal' is the
same as 'able not to die' and 'incorruptible' the same as 'able not
to be corrupted'. This is clear in Adam's case: before sinning, he
was immortal (i.e., able not to die). If he did not sin, he would never
die. So he was able not to die, since it was possible that he would
not sin and so would not die. But he was not immortal in the other
signification, 'not able to die', for then the possibility of dying and
sinning would be denied him, which is not true. This is the same as
the fact that the word (nomen) 'immortal' in one way does away
with the potency of dying and in another, with the act of dying, by
positing the potency for the same act.
It is better expressed this way than before because it is

clearer. Yet each is true and comes to much the same thing. Since
it has this capability from its composition, it is therefore said that a
composite signifies several things, but only a single thing when taken
apart, that is, analyzed into its parts, capable of the prior sense.
Then neither part signifies several things, but only a single thing.
50 If one objects that parts of a word (norøen) signify nothing

separately, as the beginning of Peri Hermenias 25 has it, answer
that parts of a composite word are compared both to the significate
(significatum) they had before being put together and to the signific
ate the same word has as a composite. A composite's significate is
constituted from the partial concepts of those same parts. As far as

the first significate is concerned, parts of a composite word do
signify; as far as the second significate is concerned - the one con
stituted from the first two - those parts signify nothing as distinct.
51 Note too that the concept of a composite word (nomen) is

simple compared to the composite word that signifies it, and so is
indivisible. But the same concept compared to the partial concepts
of its own parts is divisible, since it is made up of them. The
concept of a simple word, however, is not divisible in any way. So it
is necessary that the parts of a composite word, to the extent they
exist in their own whole, would have more the nature of what is to
be signified than the parts of a simple word. This is what Aristotle
says in the beginning of Perihermenias, that in simple words, a
part is not significative in any way, though some can mean some
thing in composites, but of nothing separate, that is, is the concept
of nothing discrete, and that because it exists within its whole.
52 An example of amphiboly is found in the word-group 'know-

ing age'. Granted that while neither word (dictio) 'know' and 'age',
signifies several things, the word-group they constitute does, as was
clear in the third mode of amphiboly. That is how a composite signi
fies several things, while as a separate item, a composite means only
one thing, as far as amphiboly is concerned.
Doubts
53 Evidence for the major of the three modes just discussed

can be doubted. First, because the division of those three modes is
incorrectly given by Aristotle. Every correct division is made
through opposites; but the division of those three modes is not
through opposites; therefore the division of those three modes is
incorrect. This is a syllogism in the Fourth Mood, Second Figure.
The major is clear because in it, 'opposite' is taken commonly for
'opposites' as any genus of opposition and for disparates. The minor
is clear, since the first mode in terms of equivocation arises from
the fact that a nominal (nomen) principally signifies several things;
but a nominal taken in the third mode in terms of equivocation, like
'immortal', principally signifies several things; therefore the third
mode of equivocation is contained under the first. But not a single
23: Above, p. 101.

24: Above, p. 107.
25: De interp. 2, 16a 20-21; Boethius' Translation p. 6.
26: ibid. 16a22-25, p. 6.7-9.
disparate thing or true opposite is contained under the other; there
fore the division of those three modes is not made through opposites.
This is the minor.
Answer that this division is correct and is made through oppos
ites. And that the foregoing syllogism is valid, though its minor is
false. To the objection made in testing it, answer that 'to princip
ally signify several things' is found in a nominal (nomen) from two
causes. One is conventional imposition of a name (nomen), the
other, composition of the nominal itself. The first of these causes
pertains to the first mode, the second to the third mode. So though
'immortal' may principally signify several things, this is not due to
conventional imposition upon this or that thing, but to the nature of
its composition, since the prefix 'in' can only do away with the act
of dying, or the potency antecedent to that act, and so consequently
with the act itself. Thus the fact that it may signify several things
is not based on the whim of the one coining an expression.
If it be objected that every word (nomen) signifies convention
ally, therefore this one does too, - answer that the nominal (nomen)
'immortal' and almost all composites signify by convention in one
way and by a kind of necessity in another. As to their remote cause,
all names (nomina) signify by convention but there is necessity as far
as their proximate cause is concerned. That the two words (dict-
iones) 'horse' and 'wild' are put together has choice as a source,
but once a word like 'wildhorse' ('mustang': equiferus) is a sort of
composite out of them, it must have the sort of significate it does.
So in 'wildhorse', composition is the proximate cause of its signific
ation, the choice to put them together its remote cause. So it does
signify by free choice as far as its remote cause is concerned, but as
to its proximate cause, its composition, it signifies of necessity. In
simple words (nominibus) like 'horse', choice is proximate cause.
3ust so in equivocal words (nominibus), since in simple ones,
imposer's choice is the proximate efficient cause that it principally
signify several things, as in the word 'dog'. In equivocal composite
words, the putting together itself is the proximate cause that they
signify several things, and choice of such putting together is the
remote cause. Since those modes are distinguished wholly in terms
of proximate rather than remote causes, it is obvious the three are
opposed and one is not contained under the other. It is also clear
from this how in the third mode a word may principally signify
several things conventionally, as well as how it does so of necessity.
54 Again: Since Aristotle puts an example in the first mode of
Equivocation and not of Amphiboly, conversely in the third mode,
but of neither in the second, he does not make those modes very
clear.
Reply to this by saying that to signify several things principally
is more appropriate to a word (nomini) than a word-group and it is
therefore found primarily in equivocation rather than in amphiboly.
That is why he gives an example of equivocation instead of amph
iboly in the first mode, to thereby signify that this mode primarily
suits equivocation rather than amphiboly. It is the converse for the
third mode, since for a composite to signify several things, while
separately only one, primarily suits a word-group, secondarily a
word (nomini). Parts of a word-group, when in their whole, not only
constitute the significate of the word-group, but also each and every
one of its parts retains its proper significate, discrete and separate
from the significate of another. In a composite word, it is not the
case that its parts are parts as such, retaining their significate
discrete and separate from the significate of another —27 - but as
said before in the division of modes. That is why he gives
examples in the third mode of amphiboly rather than of equivocat
ion, thereby signifying that the third mode primarily suits amphiboly
rather than equivocation. In the second mode, he gives neither
examples of equivocation nor of amphiboly, since, though metaphor
occurs in all of them, it does not occur identically in all. So he
exemplifies neither, since in a science, determination should not be
made except for those which are the same for all.
Or it should be said, and more aptly, that proper signification
of a word (dictionis) is said to be what usage commonly accepts.
What is now meant by a word metaphorically will later be signified
properly when usage has become set. Then the word will be equi
vocal as to the first mode. And because it so happens that a
signification which is not proper but metaphorical at one time later
becomes proper through frequent use, he thus did not have to put
examples in the second mode, since in an art, that should only be
made determinate which always stays the same.
55 Again: It still seems division of those modes is not
correctly made, since equivocation from consignification is not
contained under any of them. This is clear inductively for any of
27: the text has a gap here.

28: p. 93 ff.
them, since a word (dictio) signifies its accidents neither principally
nor metaphorically. So it is equivocation from consignification in
neither the first nor second mode, nor even in the third, for in that
mode, equivocation is solely in composite words (nominibus), while
equivocation from consignification is not only in composites but in
simple forms as well.
Answer that the principal signification of a word (dictionis) has
a double opposition: it is opposed both to consignification and
metaphoric signification. So when it is opposed to the one, it
removes the other; when opposed to the former, it removes the
latter. That is why 'to principally signify several' is taken here in
opposition to metaphoric signification, This way, it does not exclude
consignification. So what is here labelled peculiarly as 'principal
signification', is anything signified by a word (dictionem) as
commonly used, in such a way that its proximate cause is choice.
That I say 'by common use', excludes the second mode; that choice
is proximate cause of that signification removes the third. Then
equivocation from consignification is contained under the first
mode, since in common use, grammatical accidents are represented
both by a word (dictionem) and by choice, for whoever imposed a
word to signify a given sort of thing, simultaneously did so to signify
in a given gender and number, as the word (nomen) 'stone' was
imposed to signify a given sort of thing under a given sort of
accidents.
56 Again: It is asked why deception from some grammatical
accidents produces equivocation, as in the word 'suffering', while
deception from other accidents results in amphiboly, as it does in
deception based on diversity of case.
Solution: Some grammatical features are not attached to
words (dictio) absolutely but only as relatable to others. Take
endings Tcasus): case-ending is a noun's accident insofar as activity
or passivity emanates from a noun, e.g. a nominative, or as activity
or passivity pass into a noun (e.g. oblique cases), and similarly as
case-ending is a noun-accident compared to a verb. So case-ending
is a relational accident - a disposition of a substance in respect of an
act - and through such accidents, words are ordered to each other.
It is a mistake to say 'man's runs', since the ending (casus) needed is
not there. So deception from grammatical accidents like that is
deception from word-ordering, so deception in word-grouping,
resulting in amphiboly, not equivocation. There are other absolute
accidents attached to a word (dictio) as such, like tense. Words are
not ordered to each other through accidents like those: we can
equally well say 'the man runs', 'the man has run', 'the man will
run', 'I see the man', 'I have seen the man', or 'I will see the man'.
Though tense changes, the noun-verb construction stays the same,
both before and after, so it is not constructed with tense mediating
with what is its subject or object. So deception from accidents like
those is not a matter of word-grouping but one of words (dictio); so
equivocation rather than amphiboly is found there. Say in brief that
deception from accidents that are absolutes produces equivocation,
but deception from accidents that are respective produces
amphiboly.
ON COMPOSITION AND DIVISION
On Potential Polysemy
51 Composition, Division and Accent produce potential poly

semy according to the Commentator, as noted above 29 . Potential
polysemy is when an identical word (dictio) or word-group signifies
different things depending on different perfections. For example,
the verb 'pendere' has a one perfection in the second and a
different one in the third conjugation, since they are thereby two
specifically different verbs. That is why it is necessary that they
have different perfections, yet it is the identical verb materially,
since it is composed of the same letters and syllables. That way one
has material identity and diversity of perfection and on the basis of
diversity of perfection there is a diversity of significates. So too in
a word-group: when it is composite, it has one perfection and it has
a different one when divided. Like this word-group: 'two and three
are five' when composite is categoric with a coordinate subject;
divided, as in 'two are five and three are five', it is copulative.
Obviously a copulative and a categoric proposition have different
perfections.
So too every word-group taken as composite or divided: some

difference is always to be found on the side of perfection and
thereby, of significates. Since in these a word (dictio) or a word-
group is capable of being transmuted from one perfection into an
other, and through this capability, a diversity of significates is
found, it is thus called a potential polysemy. In equivocation and
amphiboly, since a word or a word-group still existing under the
same perfection signifies different things, an actual polysemy is said
29: but inaccurately: see p. 82 ff.

to be there since it is polysemous on the basis of the same actuality

or same perfection. For a perfection is called an actuality.
Objections
58 An objection to what was said is that since the word-group

'bread eating dog' (panem comedere canern) 30 may be one thing or
another, depending on whether the accusative b'd' is subject to
the verbal 'eating', or that same accusative is put next to that
same verbal —; but this example is not one thing or another mater
ially, since it consists of the same letters, syllables and words;
therefore it is materially identical. Therefore while it may be one
thing or another simply, a word-group should be one or another spec
ifically. On that basis, it signifies different things. Therefore the
word-group 'bread eating dog' existing identically as to matter, and
diversely as to its diverse perfections, signifies diverse things.
Therefore there is a potential polysemy here, since the definition of
potential polysemy given above suits it. Since only amphiboly is
found there, amphiboly then will produce a potential polysemy.
Which is contrary to what was said.
Say that in the word-group 'bread eating dog' there is no

potential polysemy, only an actual one, since it is a specifically
identical word-group, as will be clear. To the objection that it is
one thing or another specifically, though identical materially
because it is composed of the same letters, syllables and words, say
polysemy consists of both identity and diversity in a word-group,
since word-group identity is ambiguous as to identity of perfection
or identity of material. Both those identities are in the word-group
'the man runs', since there we have one and the same perfection -
hence identity of perfection - and since it is composed of the same
letters, syllables and words having always the identical material
ordering, material identity is also there; that way material identity
is also found there.
59 Again: 'diversity of word-group' is said in many ways. One

is based on species - 'two and three are five' differs specifically
from 'two are five and three are five' -, another is material
difference. That too is ambiguous, since a word-group can either be
composed of different letters, syllables and words, like 'Plato runs
30: The translation substitutes an English participle for the Latin

infinitive. Both subject and object of comedere must be in the
accusative case. [fpd]
and Socrates disputes', or of the same elements variously ordered.

That is ambiguous as well, since it is either a word-group of
identical words arranged differently as to the same perfection, or
there is a material difference in word-group from words variously
ordered as to different perfections. This last way, a word-group is
one thing or another as to composition or division. In the next to
last way, a word-group is one or another on the basis of amphiboly.
For example, in 'bread eating dog', no matter which accusative is
subject or object, the word-group is always identical on the basis of
its perfection, since this word-group is completed by the inflection
found there, even though the inflection is infinitival [in Latin fpd.].
Just as an indicative word-group is completed by its peculiar inflect
ion, and the imperative from its own proper inflection, so too this
infinitival word-group is perfected in its own way by infinitival
inflection, even though it is not a simply perfect sentence. So the
word-group mentioned is identical specifically and one thing or
another materially, depending on whether one of those accusatives is
subject or object; and similarly of the rest.
This can be illustrated by a natural similitude: one now a boy,

then youth or old man, is still the same person, though his physique
is not the same but changes from this to that. Not skinny, because
plump at one time and slim at another, but still the same person.
Just as material parts are so transmuted, yet one's human species
remains the same, so there is material diversity within yet specific
identity, - so too in the word-group 'bread eating dog' there is
diversity of matter in the way discussed, but identity of species.
60 Again: If asked whether amphibolous word-groups partici

pate equally in word-group identity, say one way, yes, another way,
no. As is clear from the above, word-group identity is ambiguous: -
one material, the other specific. Speaking of material identity, a
given amphibolous word-group is always the same, like 'Aristotle's
book'; the next is one thing or another like every word-group that is
amphibolous because a particular case-form can be subject or object
of the same verb. Speaking of specific identity, every amphibolous
word-group is equally the same: it has no specific difference in its
parts, since each and every word-group in and of itself has its proper
perfection by which it is always perfected. So for that reason each
and every amphibolous word-group is simply identical in itself by
identity of species.
On Composition
61 Having said all this, composition must now deal specially

with composition. But first one must see when a word-group is said
to be composite or divided. We must therefore know that a word-
group cannot be called composite or divided unless a different
position [or arrangement: situm] can be found in it with respect to
which parts can be variously ordered. When words (dictiones) are
ordered according to their most due position [or arrangement] in a
word-group, it is said to be composite. If removed from that posit
ion [or arrangement] and placed in a less appropriate one, the
word-group is divided. Take a word-group example: 'whatever lives
always is' (quicquid vivit semper est) can be [construed either as]
composite or divided. Since the unit 'whatever lives' is the subject
and the verb 'is' the predicate, the verb 'is' is the principal [verb]
and the verb 'lives', is not the principal [verb] since it is included in
the subject.
Proof: A verb is what consignifies time and is always the sign
of what are predicated of something else 31 . Therefore that verb
actually predicated, actually shares the nature of verb simply
taken; what is not actually predicated, does not participate in the
nature of verb simply taken. Therefore, since the verb 'is' actually
is predicated, it will actually share the nature of verb simply taken,
and since 'lives' is not actually predicated, but is bound to the
subject (which is contrary to the nature of verb-as-verb), it will not
actually share the nature of verb simply, though both is a verb
simply according to its potential, since each has in itself the
aptitude of being predicated. Thus each is potentially a verb simply,
but not each is actually a verb simply. So one is a principal member
and the other is not, as was said. Therefore, since an adverb of its
nature has to modify a verb, it will then more directly modify the
more principal verb than a less principal one, and so is located in its
more due position [or arrangement]. For that reason, when the word
(dictio) 'always' modifies the verb 'is', the word-group is
composite, as follows: 'whatever lives, always is'; and if it is
separated from that, it will be divided, as follows: 'whatever lives
always, is.' All others are to be understood similarly depending on
the nature of the words used.
62 So too of this word-group: 'I have set you slave being

free'.32 Since signs as signs ought to suit and contrast by reason of
their significates, for words (dictiones) are signs of things, if things
could be ordered more suitably, so too should signs, - then when
ordering of things is more suitable, ordering of signs will be too.
When ordering of things is less suitable, that of words will as well.
Since it is a more suitable status for human nature to leave slavery
behind for freedom than to fall into slavery from it, the participle
'being' is better construed with the noun 'slave' than with the
nominal 'free'. That way it is composite and its sense is: 'you being
a slave I have set free' that is, from you a slave I have made a free
man. The other way, it is divided, and its sense is: 'you being a free
man I have made a slave' that is, 'of you, a free man, I have made a
slave'.
63 Notice Aristotle puts this word-group among paralogisms of

division.33 Also that wherever composition, division, or accent is
found, a word-group need not be true in one mode and false in an
other: it can be that it is true or false in either sense, as in 'I touch
the one struck manually'. Assume someone had been struck with a
hand and I touch him with mine. The first version is then ambiguous,
since the ablative 'manu' ('manually') can determine the verb
'touch' or the participle 'struck', This is true in both senses. But
this would be false in both: 'I touch the one struck with a stick', its
position [or arrangement] remaining the same. It is like that in
equivocation. The sentence 'every dog is substance' can have three
senses and be true in any, while 'every dog is whiteness' is false in
any sense. So too for amphiboly.
All this shows that they are not telling all who say a word-
group is taken as composite when false in a composite sense, and as
divided when false in a divided sense, since this is not true in all of
them, as was said. But this is true, that if a paralogism is made on
the basis of composition, its solution will be in division, and if on the
basis of division, the solution will be in composition. The second
answer is held by Aristotle 3 4 , not the first.
On Causes of this Fallacy
64 The cause of plausibility / motive principle of composition

is unity of a word-group as to its species caused by composition. I
say 'caused by composition' since, from the fact that a word-group is
so composite or divided, its species and truth vary accordingly. The
principle of compositional deficiency is the possibility of different
significates for the same word-group. I say this because even though
a word-group is composite and so may stand under one species in
that composition, it is still possible for it to have another species or
31: Aristotle, De interp. 3, 16b 6-8.

32: 'ego posui te servum entern liberum'
'free(,) I have made you(,) a slave
33: Soph. El. 4, 166a 36-37.
34: Soph. El. 20, 177a 33-35.
another perfection than it can have through division. For that

reason it is possible for it to have diverse significates. All this was
clear in the word-group used earlier: 35 'whatever lives always is'.
So the potential a word-group has for diverse species, which derives
from its expression (vox) side, is ordered to its potential for diverse
significates derived from the factual side. (a parte rei)
65 Some say a composite's cause of plausibility is composition

itself, while the cause of its nonexistence is a word-group's division.
Others say the cause of plausible composition is the truth of the
composite word-group, while the cause of its nonexistence is the
falsity of that same word-group when divided. For they say the
truth of a composite word-group motivates belief in its truth when
divided, since the motive principle always produces belief in the
opposite by the principle of deficiency.
66 That these objectors poorly distinguish such principles of

this sophistical Topic is clear first in that all linguistic fallacies
differ from nonlinguistic ones because the motive principle of the
former's fallacies comes from the expression or sign side, while their
principle of deficiency comes from the factual side. But noniingu
istic fallacies take both principles from the factual side. Therefore
their first judgement cannot stand, since it holds both those princ
iples are from the expression or sign side. Composition or division
of a word-group itself is expected on the basis of expression or sign.
Again: Nothing changes except into something simply or part

ially like it. So it is not possible for one contrary to change into
another. Composition therefore does not become division nor the
converse. Through the first of these reasons the falsity of the
second position is clear, which posits both principles of composition
from the factual side, since there is no truth in a word-group except
on a factual basis.
Again: In equivocation, the motive principle derives from

linguistic unity (unitate dictionis), its principle of deficiency from
things signified. It the same in amphiboly and like that in accent,
as will later be clear 3 6 , as well as in the fallacy of word-figure. So
it is fitting that it occur the same way in composition, or there will
not be six linguistic fallacies. Aristotle taught the opposite by
induction and syllogism 37 . Therefore it is fitting to posit the motive
35: Above, p. 100 ff.

36: Below, p. 109.
principle of composition from the expression side and the principle

of deficiency from the factual.
67 That is why we said the motive principle of composition is

word-group unity based on its species caused by composition, while
the principle of deficiency is the potential for different significates
for the same word-group. Unity of a composite word-group motiv
ates belief in one significate without the possibility of another.
That is how a motive principle moves to an opposite by the principle
of defect, as in other sophistical Topics.
On its modes
68 Two modes of composition can be assigned. Aristotle

seems to hint at them in his chapter on composition.
On the first mode
The first mode comes from the fact that a dictum ('something
said') can stand for itself or part of itself as subject to some verb,
as in: 'to one sitting walking is possible' (sedentem ambulare est
possibile). A parologism is formed as follows:
'it happens that anyone who can walk does walk

but one sitting can walk
therefore it happens that one sitting walks'.
(quemcumque ambulare est possibile, contingit quod ipse ambulet

sed sedentem ambulare est possibile
ergo contingit quod sedens ambulat)
The minor is ambiguous, since if the dictum 'to one sitting-walking'

(sedentem ambulare) is itself made subject to the predicate 'is poss
ible', its sense is single. The word-group is false in that sense, since
then the opposed actions 'walk' and 'sit' are joined together. This
is as false as 'the one sitting is walking' (sedens ambulat) But if
that dictum is subject of the predicate mentioned as for part of
itself (i.e., for the subject of the dictum), then the sense would be
like: 'the one sitting has in himself the power of walking' and in this
sense, the minor is true. This is to be distinguished the same way:
'that one not writing is writing is possible' (non scribentem scribere
37: Above, p. 81 ff.

38: Soph. El. 4, 166a 23-32.
est possibile). A paralogism is to be formed the same way. These
word-groups and their like are composites in that an entire dictum
stands for itself, and divisives when the dictum stands for part of
itself, since a predicate is attributed more appropriately to an entire
dictum than to a part of it, even though the dictum is always
subject.
69 There is consequently nothing to the objection of those who
say that if it is true on the basis of the mode just mentioned, the
possibility of walking is now attributed to the entire dictum, now to
a part, the one I say as 'one sitting', therefore the accusative 'one
sitting' (sedentem) is subject to 'it is possible for one sitting to
walk'. This is awkward, since the word-group would be incongruous;
[in Latin: fpd] an accusative cannot be subject to a third-person
verb. So the distinction mentioned is null.
The solution is plain from what was said, since a dictum as a
unit is always subject to a third-person verb, now for itself (then
possibility is attributed to a dictum as a unit), now for part of itself
(i.e. a dictum's subject), and then possibility is attributed to the
subject of that dictum, namely to what I say as 'one sitting'.
70 Others distinguish these word-groups saying a parallelism is
implied by the participles 'sitting or 'writing', as Priscian has
it,39 since the participle was invented to imply its parallelism to
the verb, as in 'I read sitting' (sedens lego). This parallel is made
explicit by the word (dictio) 'while' or 'although', as in 'while I am
sitting, I am reading' or 'although I am sitting, I am reading'. They
say therefore that the word-groups cited are ambiguous since the
parallelism implied by the participle 'sitting' can be signified with
respect to the verb 'walk'. Then the sense of 'to one sitting walking
is possible' is 'while I am sitting, it is possible for me to be
walking', which is false. Or else a parallel can be denoted with
respect to the predicate. Then the sense of 'to one sitting walking
is possible'; is 'while he is sitting, he has the potency to walk later
on', which is true.
This distinction comes to the same thing as the first, for when
a parallelism is denoted with respect to the verb 'walk', possibility
is imposed upon the dictum as a unit, which is false. But when para
llelism is denoted with respect to the predicate, possibility is
imposed upon the dictum's subject, and that way is true.
71 Word-groups of this sort are usually labelled de re (about
a thing) and de dicto (about what was said). Word-groups are said
to be de dicto when a dictum stands for itself. When a dictum
stands for part of itself, word-groups are called de re. They label a
dictum's own subject a rem (thing); but a dictum's subject is not
the dictum. So even though a dictum may be a thing, it is not a
thing as they take 'rem' here.
On the second mode
72 The second mode of composition stems from the fact that a
given word (dictio) put in a word-group can determine different
things. Take 'letters which you know how to learn now is
possible'40, where the adverb 'now' can determine the verb
'learn'; (it is false that way, since letters you know cannot be
learned now, since you are in ignorance of what you learn; as
Aristotle says: 'whoever is learning, is ignorant'. ) Or it can
determine the predicate 'is possible' and so is true. Letters one
knows, one can relearn now. One can forget and so now have the
capacity to learn in the present.
This is similar: 'what one only can bear, can bear many'. And
a paralogism is formed this way:
'what one only can bear, can bear many
but what can not bear many, can one only bear
therefore what can not bear many, can bear many'.42
The major is ambiguous, since if the word (dictio) 'only' determines
the verb 'can', it is false; and its sense is 'what one only can bear
etc.', that is, 'what only can bear one and can not bear many, can
bear many'), for if it only can bear one, it therefore cannot bear
many. But if the word 'only' determines the verb b' ', it is
true; and its sense is 'what can only bear one, can bear many', that
is, 'what has power such that it only bears one, can bear many', for
whatever can bear many also has the power to bear one alone. A
ship that can carry ten men can also carry one; so that ship with a
capacity of bearing only one still can carry many. So what can bear
one alone can carry many.
39: Inst. gramm. XI 8, p. 552.

40: 'litteras quas scis discere nunc est possibile'.
41: Cp. Topica III 2, 117a 12, p. 53.
42: 'quod unum solum potest ferre, plura potest ferre
sed quod non potest plura ferre, potest unum solum ferre
73 How potential ambiguity may be in a word-group, compos
ite or divided, and when a word-group should be declared composite
and when divided has become clear in what was said. Now it
remains to state the principles / causes and modes of division.
On Division
7k The motive principle / cause of plausibility of division is
therefore word-group unity as to its species caused by division, since
it has one species when divided and another when composite. The
deficient principle / cause of nonexistence of division is the
possibility of different significates in the substance of a divided
word-group. I say this because, though a word-group may have a
single significate by the particular way it is divided, still its
substance is potential with respect to composition and that way with
respect to a different significate.
On the first Mode
75 There are two modes of division. The first comes from the
fact that a given word (dictio) can conjoin terms or propositions.
That is ambiguous as to whether it links or disjoins them, since
'conjoin' is common to linking or disjoining, just as 'conjunction' is
common to the copulative, disjunctive, or other conjunctions. It is
the genus for all. That is why conjoining terms or propositions is
common to both, namely to couple or disjoin the same things. The
first mode derives from that, as in 'five are two and three'. A
paralogism is formed as follows:
'whatever are two and three are three

but five are two and three
therefore five are three'.
The minor is ambiguous. It can be divided, with the sense: 'five are
two and five are three' That way it is copulative. Or it can be com
posite, with the sense: 'five are two and three'. It has a copulative
predicate and then there is a pairing of terms. The major is ambigu
ous in the same way. And so is: 'five are even and odd'.
By disjunction as follows:
'every animal is rational or irrational
but not every animal is rational
therefore every animal is irrational'.
ergo quod non potest ferre plura, potest ferre plura'.

The major is ambiguous because it can be divided, with the sense:
'every animal is rational or every animal is irrational', in which case
it is disjunctive, and disjunctive of propositions. Or it could be
composite, with the sense: 'every animal is either rational or
irrational', in which case it has a disjunctive predicate. It is a dis
junction of terms. This is the way those word-groups are said to be
composites, since conjunction is primarily disjunctive of word-group
parts and secondarily disjunctive of word-groups.
So too in: 'every animal is either well or ill', 'every line is
either straight or curved', 'every number is either even or odd', or
'every substance is either corporeal or incorporeal'.
On the second Mode
76 The second mode of division comes from the fact that a
given case-form or a given determiner can be ordered with different
things, as in, 'you see the one struck with your eyes' (tu vides oculis
percussum). A paralogism is made as follows:
'with whatever you see one struck, he is struck by that
but you see this one struck with your eye or eyes
therefore this one has been struck with your eye or eyes'.
The minor is ambiguous because the case-form or ablative 'eyes'
can be ordered with the verb 'see' and then it signifies the instru
ment of sight, with the sense: you see with your eye the one who
has been struck. It is then composite, for since that ablative is a
determination of an act, and an act is more truly in a verb than in a
participle, it ought for that reason primarily determine a verb and
secondarily a participle. Or it could be ordered with the participle
'struck' and then it signifies an instrument of striking. That way it
is divided, with the sense: you see the one who was struck by your
eyes.
These are like it: 'Free (,) I made you (,) a slave' and 'goodly
Achilles left fifty (and a) (of a) hundred men'.
So is 'you know only three men are running',
assuming six are in the race and you only know of three;
'but whatever is known is true
therefore that only three men are running is true'.43
The major is ambiguous, since the adverb 'only' can determine the
verb 'know', in which case it is composite and true; but if it
modifies the verbal 'running', it is divided and false.
Also 'you are born today' 44 . Proof: You exist today; there
fore born or unborn; but not unborn; so you are born today. The
major is ambiguous because the adverb 'today' can determine the
verb 'are', in which case it is composite and true; or the
participle 'born', in which case it is divided and false.
ON ACCENT
On the Definition of Accent
77 Accent is a law or rule for raising and depressing a syllable

of any one of parts of a word-group (partes orationis). It is divided
three ways into an acute, grave and circumflex accent. An acute
accent is one that sharpens / raises a syllable; a grave accent is one
that depresses a syllable and lowers it, and a circumflex is one that
sharpens a syllable and depresses it.
78 Accent, as a principle of deception, is the polysemy of a

word substantively the same, caused by diversity of accents.
On C a u s e s a n d M o d e s of the
F a l l a c y of A c c e n t
The cause of accentual plausibility is the unity of a word

(dictio) on the basis of a one accent. The cause of accentual falsity
is diversity of significates through capacities a word has from one
accent to another. There are two modes of the fallacy of accent.
On the first Mode
79 The first mode comes from the fact that a given word,
identical as to substance, can be dominated by a different accent.
As here:
'omnis populus est arbor every po:pulus is a tree

sed gens es populus but a tribe is a populus
ergo gens est arbor'. therefore a tribe is a tree'.
43: 'tu seis tantum tres homines currere,

sed quicquid scitur est verum
ergo tantum tres homines currere est verum1.
44: 'tu es hodie natus'.
The major is ambiguous, since the word (dictio) ' p  p u 1 u s ' means
one thing when the first syllable is lengthened. [poplar tree] and
another when shortened [people]. This is like it:45
'omnis ara est in templo [ every sty is in the eye ]
stabulum porcorum est ara [ a pigpen is a sty ]
ergo stabulum porcorum est in templo1 [so a pigpen is in the eye ]
so too here:
'quicquid hamatur hamo capitur 'whatever is taken is
caught with a hook
sed vinum amatur but wine is taken/loved
ergo vinum hamo capitur' therefore wine is taken
with a hook'.
' a m a t u r ' means one thing without aspiration, but something else
with it, and it is produced in a different way. So is this:
'iustos viros oportet pendere 'just men should hang
sed viros iustos non oportet but just men should not
pendere46 hang
ergo oportet iustos viros pati therefore that just men
should suffer and not
et non pati idem'. suffer is the same thing'
On the second Mode
80 The second mode comes from the fact that something can
be either a word (dictio) or a word-group, as here:
'tu es qui es 'you are who you are
sed quies est requies but quiet is rest
ergo tu es requies' therefore you are rest'.
The major is ambiguous because, when I say ' q u i e s ' , it can be a
word or a word-group, and correspondingly this means different
things. Just as this does:
'Deus nichil fecit invite 'God did nothing unwillingly
sed vinum fecit in vite but He made wine on the vine
45: The English parallels, but does not translate the Latin example,
where ara means 'altar', a:ra or bara means 'pigsty'.
46: Pe ndere is intransitive 'hang'; pendere is transitive 'hang'.
ergo vinum fecit invite 1 . Therefore He made wine

unwillingly'.
The major is ambiguous, since when I say ' i n v i t e ' , it can be a

word - in which case it is true -; or a word-group, and so false; it is
like that in the conclusion. This is similar:
'metuo longas pereunte noctes Lidia dormis'
what I pronounce as ' m e t u o ' can be a word or a phrase. 47
Doubts
81 Doubts arise from what was said. First, how 'accent' is to

be taken here, whether accepted on the basis of the definition laid
down at the beginning of this tract on accent, or taken commonly
for every mode of pronouncing in speech (dictio), which includes
lengthened, shortened, aspirated, unaspirated, acute, grave and the
like. That it is not to be taken here properly but commonly is seen
because some paralogisms are taken from accentual production or
suppression (as in the verb 'pendere', ['hang'] when the second syl
lable is lengthened or shortened), others from aspiration, which is
obvious enough. Therefore 'accent' is not taken here properly, but
commonly.
That it is not to be taken commonly but progerly seems to be

on the authority of Aristotle in the Second Elenchi 48 where he gives
a general solution for all word-groups according to accent, saying, 'it
is obvious how this must be solved; for the spoken word (nomen)
does not mean the same thing when pronounced with a grave or an
acute accent.' Therefore it is taken properly, not commonly, for
grave and acute are different accents properly taken. Again: If
'accent' were taken commonly, as used here, it would be common to
duration and breath; therefore it would be predicated of them as it
is of acute and grave.
Say 'accent' is taken here commonly for every mode of

pronunciation, not commonly on the basis of predication, but as a
47: Horace, Carmina I 25, vss. 8-9:

'me tuo longas pereunte noctes, // Lidia dormis ?'
me your long perishing nights, // Lidia do you sleep ?
m e t u o = 'I fear'.
Cf. Arist., Soph El. 4, 166 b4-5 in Boethius' translation,
48: Soph. El. 21, 178a 2-3.
consequence. 'Common' is said two ways, predicatively and as a
consequence only, such that it is not predicatively: the way surface
is consequent upon white, black and all intermediate colors (it being
a peculiarity of surface in the first place to be colored); - and this
is to be understood in bodies composed of elements, since other
bodies (like elements, the heavens, and stars) are not colored;
though this is not now our concern, being part of natural science; -
let it just be assumed that surface is consequent upon all the colors
mentioned and that it is predicated of not a one. It is thus one way
common as a consequent and not as a predicate; in another, it is
common in predicating, as superiors of inferiors. On this basis, then,
I say 'accent' is taken commonly here, with 'common' taken as a
consequence, since upon variation or diversity of time follows
diversity or variation of accent, as is clear in the word 'pendere',
depending on whether the middle syllable is lengthened or
shortened. Thus the solution is clear.
As to the objection to Aristotle's authority, that a word

(nomen) does not mean the same when pronounced with a grave or
acute accent - this happens now by accentual difference alone,
now by durational diversity and variation in lengthening and
shortening what is produced, upon which accentual differences
follow. To the objection that accent would be predicated of time
and breath, if it were common, the solution is clear from what was
said: it equivocates 'common'. 'Accent' is not here common by
predication, but as said, so is predicated neither of time nor breath.
What is here labelled breath is according as a syllable or word
(dictio) is said to be aspirated, since breath is primarily an accident
of a syllable, and of the word through a syllable, as is clear in
Priscian's tract on orthography,49 where four syllabic accidents are
assigned: duration, tenor, breath, and number of letters, and tenor
is the same as accent. All these are primarily in a syllable, second
arily in a word (dictio). I say 'primarily' in the way that the incom
plete and indistinct is prior to the complete and distinct. Indeterm
inate and indistinct in the syllable as such, they are determinate and
distinct in a word or in a syllable as far as it is in a word.
82 Again: Since 'accent' is to be taken commonly, as was
said, it is asked why that fallacy is called according to accent in
stead of according to time or breath.
49: Inst. gramm. II 12, p. 51.

Say that, as is already clear from the above, since diversity of

accent follows upon them and not the converse, it is called a fallacy
according to accent, and not according to time or breath, since
the label 'according to accent' is more common, from the fact that
its diversity is more common.
ON WORD FIGURE
On Mode of Signifying in a Word (dic t io)
83 Mode of signifying in a word (dictio) is ambiguous as to

substantial or accidental. For example: 'quality of noun' is
accepted ambiguously as to naturally apt to be shared in by several
or as naturally apt not to be shared in by several, but by one only.
Taken this way, it is completive / perfective of a noun; so
essential; so it is said every noun signifies substance with quality
essentially. The other way, that same quality is taken as actually
shared in by several, or as actually shared in by one only singular
thing. Taken that way, it is an accident of a noun. It is the same
thing to say 'quality of noun' is taken one way as to its potential of
being shared in by several, or being shared in by one only - so essent
ial -, and in another as actually being shared in by several, or by one
only, so accidental.
Note that each quality is divided into proper and appellative.

But proper and appellative insofar as they mean a potential for being
shared in by one only or by many. Taken that way, they are parts of
an essential quality. As meaning the actuality of being shared in by
one or several, they are parts of an accidental quality. And as parts
of an essential quality, they are included in Priscian's 50 definition
of noun and by Donatus. As accidental parts, they are listed
among accidents of a noun. For instance: 'man' as meaning a
quality naturally apt to be shared by several thus signifies an
esssential quality. As meaning man is actually in this and that, it
signifies an accidental quality; it is an accident for a name (nomen)
to be actually in several things, but not an accident for it to be so
potentially (habitu) or by aptitude, indeed it is essential to it.
84 If one ask whether that quality of man be humanity, say it

is not, since 'humanity' is a kind of word (nomen) having of itself its
50: Inst, gramm. II 18, p. 55 and V 22, pp. 36-57.

51: Ars gramm. I 5, p. 373.
own substance and its own quality; this way an infinite regress
would arise, which is impossible. By the word (nomen) 'man' is
signified its own substance and its own quality and similarly the
quality of Socrates; as naturally apt to be shared in by an individual,
it is essential to it; as that aptitude is in its actuality, it is
accidental to it.
85 From what was said it is clear the mode of signifying in a

word (dictione) is essential one way, accidental in another,
depending on whether it is taken according to what it can signify or
what it does signify.
86 Again: In a noun there is another accidental mode of

signifying from the side of accidents such as that by which a noun
signifies in masculine or feminine gender, and so of the others.
Therefore there is a double mode of signifying in a noun, one
substantial, the other accidental. So too in a verb: 'act' and
'undergo' are taken ambiguously as to potential - that way they are
essentials to a verb - or as to actuality - in which case they are its
accidents. For example: 'see', 'run', 'sit' and 'walk', e t c . are taken
ambiguously as to potentiality or actuality. They are taken potent
ially when we say a sleeper sees, a stabled horse runs well or walks
or goes out often, and that someone standing is always sitting or
sleeping. They are taken as actual when he opens his eyes and sees
things outside or when he now covers ground at top speed. We like
wise say 'it burns' about fire or a hot poker as of a potential, when
nothing is affected or being burned up by what we say burn, that is,
that they have the potential of burning. In general: whenever we
predicate a verb signifying a mode of activity of something doing
nothing, we predicate potential and there, 'to do something' is taken
as a potential, as saying a knife cuts, even though no one is cutting
with it. But when we predicate a verb of the same subject because
an activity is actually united with it, we predicate activity in
actuality. So too in verbs signifying passivity. That is why we said
'act' and 'undergo' are taken ambiguously, i.e. as potentiality or
actuality. Taken as to potential, they are a verb's essentials, on the
basis of activity, its accidentals.
So there is a double mode of signifying in a noun and a verb,

namely essential and accidental. So too in any other part of a word-
group. Therefore in a word (dictio) simply taken, this double mode
of signifying is found.
On Figure
87 Figure is what is contained by a boundary or boundaries;

one boundary like a circle within its diameter, boundaries like multi
lateral figures within their sides. A circle is not its circumference
but a surface the circumference contains, nor are three straight
lines ending at three points from each part a triangle, but the plane
contained by those three lines. Figure is found primarily in natural
things, then mathematical things, then subsequently in a word
(dictio), since proportionally.
On Word-figure
88 Since every figure is an accident of what it is the figure of,

if figure ought to be used proportionally of word (dictio), it should be
taken from the aspect of what are accidental to a word. So we say
word-figure (figura dictionis) is a mode of signifying accidentally in
a word. That is why we distinguished a double mode of signifying
above. The reason why figure is a word-accident like figure in the
examples cited, is not a proper likeness by which this 'figure' is
proportionally derived from that one, but a common likeness of the
latter to the former on the basis of which each is an accident, not on
the basis that each is a figure, since as accidental, it coincides with
any other accident. The proper likeness by which figure is in a word,
is that, just as in natural and mathematical objects, figure bounds
and contains that of which it is the figure, so too in a word, an acc
idental mode of signifying bounds and contains it. I am not saying a
word is bounded by a vowel the way 'musa' has its a boundary, but
by a conceptual one. Figure here is not a word's vocalic boundary,
though in that vocalic boundary of a word is understood what signi
fies through the mode what or what kind, or in a masculine or
feminine mode, and so of the others. It is clear that containment
pertains to word-figure as just discussed, since what is elemental
about a thing is said to bound and contain it. That is clear in figure
properly taken, which bounds and contains the body it belongs to,
and is an element of that body itself. Since an accidental mode of
signifying should come last to a word naturally, though not temp
orally, it is thus last on the part of what are understood in a word.
Accidental mode is, as it were, what bounds and contains a word.
That is why it is called word-figure and to that extent, it is a like
ness or proportion of the latter figure to the former.
89 Notice that deception is not occasioned by this figure

unless the figure or mode of signifying of one word (dictio) is
assimilated to the figure or mode of signifying of another. This
figure-similarity is ambiguous in words. One way, it depends on

whether a pair of words, alike in figure, have the same mode of
signifying. On this figure-likeness, deception does not arise, because
no defect is there, as when both are masculine or feminine gender,
both signify what or both what kind, and so of the others. 'Like
ness' of one word-figure to another is taken another way when one
word has but a single mode of signifying and through some overlap
with another, seems to have the other word's mode of signifying
when taken under that other as middle term, as will be clear in para
logisms. Since a word taken under a middle term this way has its
own proper mode of signifying different from the one posited as
middle term, it is therefore not simply like it, but dissimilar. It
appears to be like it because taken under it, and Aristotle shows this
dissimilarity in the Elenchi chapter 52 Fallacie autem fit in hiis,
where he says: 'it is difficult to distinguish what are said similarly
and diversely' that is, dissimilarly; so in one and the same word,
diverse modes of signifying are implicated, one truly and the other
only apparently. For that reason there is imaginary ambiguity and
through that plausibility, a defect. It is a diminished and imaginary
likeness. This is the way 'likeness' of figure is taken in this fallacy
and not in the first mode.
90 From all this it is already obvious what imaginary ambigu

ity is, and that it is not just polysemy (or multiple ambiguity) simply
taken: that is conventional representation of several things in the
same sign. Actual polysemy is for that reason polysemy simply
taken, because that description is completely verified in it, as is
clear in equivocation and amphiboly. Potential polysemy is not
polysemy simply taken, since there is no sign identical because of
the diverse dispositions in which it is taken, as was clear above.
Imaginary polysemy is when the same word (dictio) truly has one
mode of signifying and seemingly an opposed one. So as far as one
sign simply taken is there and that it involves several things within
itself, this better suits actual than potential polysemy. To the
extent that that polysemy is not one of things but of modes of
signifying, it is suits actual less than potential polysemy.
On Causes and Modes of Word-figure
91 We have established which mode of signifying in a word

(dictio) should be called word-figure, how 'figure' is to be taken
52: Soph. El. 7, 169a 30-31.

53: p. 97 ff.
metaphorically in a word and what metaphorical likeness is. Also,

which likeness between one word-figure and another produces a
fallacy and why this polysemy should be called imaginary. So we
must next discuss causes and modes of this fallacy.
The motive principle of the Fallacy of Word-figure is the

likeness of one word to another in an accidental mode of signifying.
Its principle of deficiency is the incompleteness or diminution of
that likeness.
92 There are three modes of the Fallacy of Word-figure. A

word (dictio) has a certain accidental mode of signifying which is a
principle of congruity or incongruity, like masculine, feminine and
neuter. Another is an accidental mode of signifying due to the thing
signified, which thing is a principle of truth or falsity. This second
mode differs from the first because the first derives from a thing as
existing in a word from the aspect of principles of congruity or
incongruity, while the second is due to a thing from the aspect of
principles of truth or falsity. I say 'to a thing' universally, as
'what', 'what kind', 'what quantity', e t c . The third mode of
signifying in a word is that of a word signifying a single thing as
'this individual something'.54 And on the basis of these three modes
of signifying or of understanding in a word, there are three modes of
the Fallacy of Word-figure.
On the first Mode
93 The first is when a masculine is interpreted as a feminine

or the converse, or when there is another between those two, as in:
'omnis substantia colorata every substance colored by

albedine est alba whiteness is white
sed vir est substantia but a man is a substance
colorata albedine colored by whiteness
ergo vir est alba'. therefore a man is white.
So too in:
'omnis aqua est humida all water is wet

fluvius est aqua a river is water
ergo f luvius est humida'. therefore a river is wet
54: tóde t i .
In both, a masculine is interpreted as a feminine. 'F 1 u v i u s'
(river) is masculine gender and because of the compatibility it seems
to have with water, in that we have here a mode of taking one thing
as under another, it seems to share the same mode of signifying with
water, and so is of the same gender. Understand I am not positing
this plausibility because one thing is subordinate to another
according to truth, but because we have here a mode of taking one
thing under another. For example, this is a Fallacy of Word-figure:
'omnis petra est alba every stoney thing is white
vir est petra a man is a stoney thing
ergo vir est alba'. therefore a man is white
though the minor extremity is not truly found under its middle term,
we do have there a mode of taking something under the middle term,
and for that reason it seems to have the same mode of signifying as
the middle term aside from its proper one. So it involves different
modes of signifying in itself. It is clear on the basis of what sort of
compatibility it would seem to be of similar figure. That is just how
it is to be understood in any other mode.
94 Notice that since likeness of word-figure arises through the
way of taking something under the middle term, all paralogisms of
word-figure are for that reason contrary to rules of inference, but
differently. Those violating the first mode invalidate the nature of
inference both in truth and plausibility, because they posit an
incongruity - solecism - and in what they appear to conclude, there
is neither truth, falsity, nor polysemy. There is no relationship there
at all, neither a true nor a plausible one, of premises to what seems
to be concluded. Since what is prior is not there, neither do its
consequences exist. So they are neither syllogisms nor properly
paralogisms in the first mode of word-figure, but rather incongruous
sentences.
95 This is not contrary to what we said above that there is a

motive principle and a principle of deficiency (so one of plausibility),
because that plausibility was in the premises themselves. What we
are now saying is that there just seems to be a conclusion. In other
modes, truth and falsity remain, so relationships remain, and even if
they are not true, they seem to be, since something posterior posits
what is prior to it. Truth and falsity are posterior to relationships.
For that reason, by having posited truth or falsity, dependencies true
or plausible are posited. In this word-groups
'omnis homo est albus every human being is white
femina est homo a woman is a human being
ergo femina est albus'. therefore a woman is white
a feminine is interpreted as a masculine, conversely to the examples
above, because of how the middle term is taken, as was said. But in
this:
'omnis substantia animata every animate, sensitive,
sensibil is est colorata substance is colored
animal est substantia an animal is an animate,
animata sensibilis sensitive, substance
ergo animai est colorata'. therefore an animal is
colored
neither is interpreted as one of the others. But if a paralogism were
formed this way:
'Musa et poeta similiter Muse and poet have the
terminantur same ending
sed Musa est feminini but Muse is feminine
generis gender
ergo et poeta'. therefore poet is also
feminine
there is a Fallacy of Consequent, not a Fallacy of Word-figure, since
words (dictiones) are not taken as signs or instruments, but as things,
since words are said to be taken as signs or instruments when we
speak about things by using them. That way they are signs of things
and an instrument of speaking. But when we are not speaking about
things by means of them, but about themselves as such, words are
taken as things, and for that reason there is deception in a thing, not
in a word. But if the paralogism were formed thus:
'qualiscumque est Musa, of whatever sort a Muse is,
et poeta a poet is as well
sed Musa est feminini but Muse is feminine
generis gender
ergo et poeta'. therefore poet is feminine
gender as well
words are taken as we use them to speak about things, so they
function as signs and instruments. There is no Fallacy of Word-
figure here, since 'of whatever sort' is distributive of quality, and a
quality cannot be extended further than to the quality which is the
thing signified, like whiteness, knowledge and the like, and to the
quality which is a mode of signifying like masculine, feminine and
the like. For the thing signified by the noun 'whiteness' is a quality
which is a thing, and similarly by the noun 'color'. But feminine
gender in the noun 'whiteness' (albedo) is a quality which is a mode
of signifying or of understanding, as is masculine gender in the noun
'color'. For that reason it is fitting that 'of whatever sort'
distributes for both, or for neither, or only for one, or only for the
other, since it cannot be for several modes. To say it distributes for
neither is fatuous, since it is distributive of quality and there is no
other mode of quality other than these two. If one says it distrib
utes for both, he validly takes it under the middle term and the
syllogism is entirely valid since it subsumes the other; but the major
is false, since this way its sense would be: whatever quality this
thing has, or that thing, and under whatever mode of signifying this
or that thing is understood; and each part of that copulative is
false, so the major is false. But if one says it distributes only for
the quality which is a mode of signifying, then he again takes it
validly under the middle term and the syllogism is valid, since it
assumes some particular mode of signifying. But the major is again
false, for its sense is: under whatever mode of signifying 'Muse'
and 'poet' are understood. Since it is a valid syllogism, there is no
Fallacy of Word-figure there. If one says it distributes only for the
quality which is the thing signified, then there will be four terms,
since it would assume another quality, as in this:
'every white man is running
an Ethiopian is black
therefore an Ethiopian is running':
this way nothing is taken under the middle term, neither truly nor
plausibly; for that reason, there is no Fallacy of Word-figure.
On the second Mode
96 The second mode of the Fallacy of Word-figure arises when
we change one mode of a word (dictio) signifying a universal into
another mode of a word also signifying a universal. This happens in
three ways: first, a mode generally found in any predicament (as in
in what) is changed into a mode proper to another predicament (as
in in what sort or in how many or in in relation to what). The
mode called in what is found in any predicament, since any genus
or species is predicated in what of its inferiors; but 'what sort'
means the mode peculiar to Quality; 'how much', that of Quantity,
and 'to something', the mode peculiar to Relation. A paralogism is
formed as follows:
'whatever you saw yesterday, you see today
but yesterday you saw white
therefore you see white today';
'white' (album) of itself means what sort, even when taken abso
lutely; but since it is taken under a middle term meaning what,
because of that mode being subordinate to it, it seems to signify
what. So 'white' contains within it diverse modes of signifying, one
truly, the other seemingly; that is why what is changed into what
sort.
A second way one mode of a word signifying a universal is
changed into another mode of a word signifying a universal, is when
the mode peculiar to one predicament is changed into the proper
mode of another, as how much changes into what sort. As in:
'however much you bought, you ate
but you bought raw
therefore you ate raw';
'(something) raw' (crudum) means what sort, and since it is taken
under how much, it seems to have the mode of quantity, and so has
within itself one mode truly, the other apparently. Because of this
seeming likeness, how much is changed into what sort.
The third way one mode becomes another is when the mode
peculiar to one predicament is changed into another mode of that
same predicament, as how much changes into how many, in:
'as many fingers as you had, you now have
but you had ten fingers
therefore you now have ten fingers';
'a ninth' and 'a tenth' predicate a discrete quantity through the
mode what, since they are species of number, and species means
what. But 'nine' and 'ten', which are derived from them denom-
inatively, mean a discrete quantity and through the mode of discrete
quantity. 'As much as' (quantumcumque) says something in a mode
of continuous quantity, so when the one is taken under the mode of
the other, how much is changed into how many. This second mode
is subdivided three ways and is usually labelled predicamental com
mutation, not because the content (res) of one predicament is chang
ed into the content of another, but because one mode is changed into
another mode, as we said. So here:
'whatever you saw yesterday, you see today

yesterday you saw whiteness
therefore today you see whiteness'
this is no Fallacy of Word-figure, since just as 'whatever' means

what (quid) commonly in any predicament, but not substance, so
too 'whiteness' (albedinem) means 'what'. But if ('yesterday you
saw) white' (album) were assumed, it would become a Fallacy of
Word-figure because of diverse modes, as we said.
On the third Mode
97 The third mode of the fallacy of word-figure arises when

'what sort of thing' is interpreted as 'this particular thing',55 that
is, when a common mode is changed into a singular mode. Or the
converse, extending the label (nomen) 'common' to simply com
mon, like man or animal, and to common by addition of another
expression, like 'Coriscus the musician', where the common term
'musician' is adjoined to a singular one. Aristotle says 56 this kind of
paralogism results:
'Coriscus is 'a third man' other than man

but Coriscus himself is a man
therefore he is 'a third man' other than himself';
'man', as Aristotle says 57 and every common term, signifies not

this particular thing but a sort of thing or to something, and so
for the other common modes. But what Coriscus means is this
particular thing, that is, a discrete thing and one signified as
singular, which cannot be in several things, but can be common. So
'Coriscus' taken simply has the mode of individuation or singularity
and as taken under 'man', seems to contain within it the mode a
sort of thing, like 'man'. This way it seems to involve several
modes, while 'man' on the contrary is simply a sort of thing, since
it is simply common. This mode what sort is nothing other than an
aptitude for existing in several things, but since 'man' is in this and
that singular thing, both of which are this individual thing, it
seems 'man' is this individual thing too, and so 'man' involves
several modes, one truly (which is a sort of thing) another seemingly
(namely this particular thing). So too any other common thing,
55: tode t i .
56: Soph. El. 22, 178b 37-39.
57: Soph. El. 5, 166b32-33.
which is what a genus and a species is, has two modes. So when I
say: 'Coriscus is 'a third man' other than man', it is not true unless
man is a sort of thing. But if man were this individual thing, as
Socrates is and other individuals are, it would not be predicated of
any individual any more than 'Coriscus' would be predicated of Soc
rates or Plato. So 'Coriscus is 'a third man' other than man' is not
true unless man is a sort of thing. When I say: 'Coriscus himself is
man', I am accepting sort of thing as subordinated to this indiv
idual thing, so I am changing sort of thing into this individual
thing by concluding: 'therefore Corsicus is other than himself'. For
all paralogisms of word-figure are contrary to rules of inference, as
was said. But if man were this particular thing, this would follow
validly:
'Coriscus is 'a third man' other than man

but Coriscus himself is man
therefore he is 'a third man' other than himself;'
but the minor would be false, as this one is:
'Coriscus is 'a third man' other than Plato,

granted there are three;
but Coriscus is Plato
therefore Coriscus is 'a third man' other than himself'
follows validly, but the minor is false. Aristotle mentions another

paralogism like this: 58
'Coriscus is different from Coriscus the musician

but Coriscus the musician is Coriscus
therefore Coriscus is different from Coriscus'.
The first 'Coriscus' signifies this individual. The second, 'Coriscus

the musician', signifies of some sort. Since the difference of plain
Coriscus to Coriscus-as-musician is signified, as the quality of being
the musician Coriscus is signified, not the Coriscus who is this
individuad, concluding to the otherness of Coriscus changes of some
sort into this individual. And so the inference is invalid.
98 Notice that in the first paralogism, what genus or species

is, is labelled what sort of thing. For genus or species, as common,
has the nature what sort of. But as predicated in what, it
58: Soph. El. 17, 175b 21-22.

signifies what. So too for what sort of thing, since it is common

and predicated in what. But in the second paralogism, Aristotle
labels 'Coriscus the musician' as what sort of thing, so musician
which is a quality, means what sort. The subject of that quality,
Coriscus, Aristotle calls what, so Coriscus the musician is a sort
of thing. Notice how Aristotle extends what sort of thing to these
two, since in the predicament of substance, only genera and species
mean what sort of thing. So there he takes what sort of thing
properly, here by extended denomination. In the same way, what
sort of thing is interpreted here as this individual:
'Socrates is an animal
Plato is an animal
and so on for individuals;
therefore every man is an animal'.
Since animal is what sort of thing, and as it signifies the same

thing as 'Socrates', it seems to have the mode of this particular
thing. So concluding: 'therefore every man is an animal' changes
the mode truly in animal (i.e., what sort of thing) into one
seemingly there (i.e., this particular thing). And so it does not
follow. But if that seeming mode were truly there, it would follow
validly, since then animal would be this individual simply, as in:
'Socrates is Socrates
Socrates is Plato, Socrates is Cicero
and so on for individuals;
therefore Socrates is every man'
follows validly. Propositional falsity is no barrier to an argument's

validity.
99 They and those like them are wont to label this paralogism
a shift 'from from several determinate suppositions to a single
determinate', since 'animal' has determinate supposition both in
premises and conclusion. But it is nothing, since going from one
determinate supposition to another produces no fallacy unless some
other defect accompanies it. As here:
'a white animal moves

a white animal runs
therefore a white animal both moves and runs';
59: Soph. El. 22, 179a 1-2.

60: Categ. 5, 3b 13-16, D. 52.
in premises and conclusion, 'animal' has determinate supposition.
Similarly, wherever they say a shift is made from simple to personal
supposition, that either does not produce Fallacy of Word-figure, or
what sort of thing should be interpreted as this particular thing, as
'man is a species
this man is a man
therefore this man is a species',
since 'man' signifies what sort of thing and 'this man' signifies
'this particular thing', as is clear enough from what was said. And
this:
therefore every man is this animal';
and this as well:
'every animate body aside from an animal is insensitive
therefore aside from this animal';
for in both, 'animal' signifies what sort of thing, while 'this
animal' signifies this particular thing; so what sort of thing is
interpreted as this particular thing.
100 Notice also that different genera, as found simply in the
same word (dictio) are principles of deceiving on the basis of
equivocation, as:
'a priest celebrates Mass
a woman is a priest
therefore a woman celebrates Mass'.
Diverse genera, not only as in the same but different words (dictio),
such that one has its own proper genus and seemingly has the genus
of the other, are principles of deceiving on the basis of Fallacy of
Word-figure as to the first mode, as was clear above.
This fallacy has been diffusely discussed because of its many
difficulties.
ON EXTRALINGUISTIC FALLACIES
101 A fallacy is called extralinguistic (extra dictionem) if its

plausible cause and cause of non-existence is in a thing (in re).
Through this it differs from linguistic (in dictione) fallacies. They
are the ones with their plausible cause in expression (dictione) and
their cause of non-existence in a thing.
There are seven nonlinguistic fallacies: The first is Accident,
the second After a fashion and simply (secundum quid et simplic-
iter), the third Ignorance of the point in Question (ignorantia
elenchi), the fourth Begging the Question or Search for what was
originally conceded (petitio ejus quod erat in principio), the fifth
Consequence, the sixth Non-cause as cause, and the seventh,
Many questions as a single one.
ON ACCIDENT
102 We must first discuss Fallacy of Accident. Aristotle

posits this sort of nature for it: 'Fallacy of Accident arises
when someone claims that any (attribute) belongs to a thing and its
accident in like manner.' As in:
'man is a species
Socrates is a man
therefore Socrates is a species';
where man is subject and Socrates its Accident; and the claim is
that 'species' belongs to both man and Socrates in like manner,
for species belongs to both as an accident belongs to its subject.
103 Notice that wherever there is a Fallacy of Accident, a
double sort of accident is required: one an accident of the subject,
the other assigned being-in to the thing that is subject and its
accident. Each is assigned in the common nature of paralogisms of
accident just mentioned. So if someone asks how 'accident' is to be
taken here, reply that the question itself is ambiguous because of
that two-sided sort of accident always required for a paralogism on
the basis of Accident. So if the question is about that accident
assigned being-in to both, say Accident in that sense is not what
61: Soph. El. 5, 166b28-30.

62: rationem; here: 'definition'.
Porphyry takes as one of the five predicables, nor what Aristotle
takes as one of the four predicates in Topics . Nor is it Accident
distinguished as an opposite to Substance, when we say: 'whatever
is, is either Substance, Accident, or the Creator of Substance and
Accident.' That accident is the same as 'non-necessary in consequ
ence', for 'non-necessary' is said ambiguously. One way is in being
predicate or subject, like 'Socrates is a man' or 'an animal is a
substance'. It depends on whether the higher is in a way an accident
of its inferior, or the converse when an inferior is an accident of its
superior: 'something non-necessary' is not taken that way here. The
other way, it is non-necessary in consequence, as we said; that is
how 'an accident that is assigned being-in to both' is taken here. So
accident taken this way is opposed to what 'happen of necessity' is.
I do not mean 'happen of necessity' as an inferential necessity is
caused by quality, quantity and order of propositions, - what is
opposed to. that necessity is labelled 'useless selection' in Prior
Analytics64 - but I do mean 'happen of necessity' insofar as
inferential necessity is caused by relationships of Topic, as in
dialectics, or by cause or effect, as in demonstrations. To this
inferential necessity is opposed accident assigned being-in to both,
because that way 'happen of necessity' is predicated ambiguously.
So 'accident' this way is the same as 'non-necessary in conse
quence' as opposed to that inferential necessity we mentioned.
If one inquires about that accident which is an accident of the
thing that is subject, I say it is extraneous or diverse in respect to
some third thing. So 'man' as standing under the predicate 'spec
ies', has all inferiors as its accidents and all superiors similarly; so
from both sides it is an accident, if any one of them is an accident.
As in:
'man is a species
man is a substance
therefore a substance is a species'
or:
'man is a species
Socrates is a man
this way, both being superior and being inferior is an accident of
man with respect to some third thing.
63: Topica I 3, 102b 4-7, et passim.

64: Anal. Priora I 28, 44b26; cf. Scholia in Anal Priora 1, ad loc.,
p. 317, ed. Minio-Paluello.
104 Notice also that some have said the accident required for
this fallacy was of an intermediate sort, partly the same as, and
partly different from, the extremes. They were wrong in two ways.
First, since in any syllogism, the middle term should be partly the
same and partly different from each extreme. They were also wrong
since they were supposing that a single mode of accident is required
for this fallacy, which is false, since, as we have said, a double kind
of accident is always required.
105 Note too that a double identity of middle term is required
in any valid syllogism. One tolerates diversity within itself - and
this identity is that of the middle term with respect to extremes, as
we said - the other identity is that of the middle in itself as the
repeated middle term in the premises, or as it stands in its nature
of repeated middle. Given that the middle term is to be repeated in
the premises, it should be simply the same. It is against this identity
in the middle term that this fallacy offends.
On C a u s e s and M o d e s of Accident
106 Now we have seen the common nature of paralogisms of
Accident and that a two-fold sort of accident is always required for
such paralogisms and how two modes of accident are and are not to
be taken there, and that a two-fold identity is required in any
syllogism, causes and modes of Accident are now to be discussed.
The motive principle of a Fallacy of Accident is the partial
identity of the middle term as repeated in the premises. I say 'as
repeated in the premises' so its partial identitity as middle term
itself to extremes be not understood, but itself as repeated. The
deficient principle is diversity of a repeated middle term on the
basis of definition. For instance:
'man is a species
Socrates is a man
here an accident as middle term ('man') is substantially the same in
the premises, as repeated. But it is not identical as to definition,
since 'man' is subject in the major for what is common in itself, not
as it is in Socrates or based on the comparison it has to its inferiors
- but in the minor proposition, it is predicated of Socrates on the
basis of the latter comparison, rather than the former. So it is
identical in substance, diverse in definition, as repeated. But when I
say:
'every man runs

Socrates is a man
therefore Socrates runs',
this is a valid syllogism, since 'run' is predicated of man on the

basis of how 'man' compares to its inferiors. So the middle term is
not taken in diverse definitions, as when subordinated to a species.
107 If anyone objects that the middle term is taken on the

basis of different accidental comparisons, therefore it is an accident
in this fallacy, say this does not follow. Although a middle term
may be taken in different accidental comparisons, this is not
because it is others 1 accident, but because other things are its
accidents: just as being a species is an accident of man and
Socrates is an accident of man differently, as was said before.
108 Modes of this fallacy are distinguished from the aspect of

accidents of a subject: they can be antecedent, consequent, or
convertible. In one way, an inferior is its superior's accident.
Aristotle says in his general solution of paralogisms of Accident, 65
that Socrates is accidental to man. In Second Topics , he says
being equilateral is as accidental to a triangle as being an isosceles
is; an equilateral has three equal sides, an isosceles only two, while
a quadrilateral has all sides of different length. A superior is its
inferior's accident differently. So in his chapter on reduction to
Ignoring the Point, Aristotle says being a figure is accidental to a
triangle, and in the beginning of his earlier Metaphysics , that
man is accidental to Socrates. 'Accident' is taken a third way on
the basis of one convertible beings accidental to its matching
convertible, as will be clear later . That is why I say that
sometimes a superior is an accident of its inferior, sometimes an
inferior of its superior, sometimes one convertible is an accident of
its matching convertible.
Understand things in similar fashion about antecedent and

consequent and convertible, whether they are predicables or not,
since this fallacy is an accident in predicables and nonpredicables.
65: Soph. El. 5, 166b35-36.

66: Topica II 3, 110b 24-25.
67: Topica II 3, 110b 24-24, p. 35.
68: Metaph. I 1, 981a 19-20, p.35.
On the first Mode
109 The first mode of the Fallacy of Accident is when an

antecedent is an accident of its antecedent. As in:
'man is a species
Socrates is a man
therefore Socrates is a species'
or:
'an animal is an ass
a man is an animal
therefore a man is an ass'
or:
'an animal is running
a man is an animal
therefore a man is running
or:
'every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles

an isoceles is a triangle
therefore an isosceles has three angles equal to two right angles'
or:
'every metal is natural
but every cast statue is metal
therefore every cast statue is natural'
or:
'all stones or wood are natural
but a house is made of stones and wood
therefore every house is natural'.
In the first paralogism, Socrates, which is man's antecedent, is its

accident and species is assigned being-in to both. In the second,
man is an accident to animal and ass is assigned being-in to both.
It would be similar if animal were predicated of both, in which case
the paralogism would be made in the second figure, as:
'an ass is an animal

a man is an animal
therefore a man is an ass'.
In the next paralogism man is an accident to animal and run is

assigned being-in to both. In the fourth, isosceles is accidental to
triangle and having three sides is assigned being-in to both.
69: below, p. 132 ff.

110 Notice that in the paralogism, whether a dialectician or
logician (demonstrator) prove 'having, three angles, etc.' about an
isosceles triangle as about an adequate or convertible subject, it is
still a sophistry of Accident. But if each proves possession of three
sides about an isosceles as of a particular subject through a suitable
middle term, one through a dialectical middle term, the other by a
demonstrative one, it will still be a valid syllogism for both: a good
dialectical syllogism for one, a valid particular demonstration for
the other.
111 Notice that if 'triangle' is taken as predicable of an
isosceles triangle, it is a dialectical middle term; if taken as
containing the proximate cause of the capacity (passio) of 'having
three sides', and made middle term to prove that capacity about an
isosceles as of a particular subject, it is a demonstrative middle
term, and for that reason, a particular demonstration. So the same
thing, taken on the basis of different definitions, can be a dialectical
or a demonstrative middle term. So one claiming that in the para
logism cited there is a Fallacy of Accident for logical demonstrators
but a valid syllogism for dialecticians, is saying nothing. Even
though 'triangle' be taken as containing the proximate and immed
iate cause of that capacity, it is still a Fallacy of Accident, as long
as the same capacity is proven of an isosceles triangle as of a proper
subject. It is obvious that a middle term so taken is not just dialect
ical. So it should be understood as we have said.
112 So too, cast statue is as accidental to metal as home
is to wood and stones, insofar as the middle term stands under the
predicate 'be natural' or 'be from nature'. In all these, antecedent
is accidental to consequent, but in the last two, 'antecedent' and
'consequent' are not taken peculiarly in predication: metal is not
predicated of a cast statue as a Peculiarity, nor are stones and
wood of a house. If one object that there is an accident in this:
'every animal runs
therefore every man runs',
since man is accidental to animal, and run assigned being-in to
both, say as before, that there is no accident here, since animal is
the subject of run discretely and expressly in the major for any
inferior, and by the same token, animal is predicated of man in
the minor by comparison with everything contained under man. The
middle term is thus substantially identical and taken on the basis of
the same comparison, so the middle term is taken on the basis of a
single form, not different ones.
On the second Mode
113 The second mode of the Fallacy of Accident occurs when
a consequent is accidental to its antecedent, for example:
'man is a species
man is a substance
therefore a substance is a species';
and:
'every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles
but every triangle is a figure
therefore a figure has three angles, etc.';
or:
'a doctor is healing Socrates
but Socrates is a man
therefore a doctor is healing Man';
'Socrates is a monk
Socrates is white
therefore Socrates is a White Monk70';
'I know Coriscus
and Coriscus is coming
therefore I know the one who is coming';
'every house is an artifact
every house is made of stones and wood
therefore stones and wood are artifacts'.
In the first, substance is accidental to man and species assigned
being-in to both as to its proper, adequate subject. So it is a
sophism of Accident.
In the second, figure is accidental to triangle. But having
three etc, is assigned being-in to both as to a proper, adequate
subject. So it is a similar fallacy.
In the next, homo is accidental to Socrates; for every
change and all operations have to do with singulars. That is why a
doctor heals Man only by accident in healing just Socrates or Plato.
70: A 'White Monk' is a Cistercian or Premonstratensian (Norbert-

ine) Monk; a 'Black Monk' is a Dominican.
In the next, being a monk is accidental to Socrates and
white assigned being-in to both. But to be a monk is a common
accident and so it has the nature of a consequent, so a consequent is
accidental to its antecedent. So too, coming is accidental to
Coriscus and being known by me assigned being-in to each. In the
last one, stones and wood are accidental to house as standing
under the predicate  an artifact' or 'be due to art'. For stones
and wood are neither artificial things nor due to some art; indeed
they are natural things, but their being squared or gilded comes from
an art. So they are accidents with respect to that predicate.
In all the above in the second mode, a consequent is accident
to an antecedent.
On the third Mode
114 The third mode of the Fallacy of Accident occurs when
one convertible is accident to its matching converitible, as in:
'man is a species
what can laugh is a man
therefore what can laugh is a species';
man is subject of species essentially, not by the nature whereby it
can laugh; so what can laugh is accidental to man with respect to
the predicate 'species'. Again:
'to be able to laugh is a Peculiarity
a man is able to laugh
therefore man is a Peculiarity';
man is here accidental to able to laugh, since able to laugh is a
subject of the concept Peculiarity (proprium) in such a way that it
is not accidental by the nature of man. That way man is accident
al to able to laugh, and that way one convertible is accidental to
another convertible. So too here:
'a father is in a superordinate position
therefore so is a son',
insofar as father stands under that predicate, son is accidental to
it and so father is subject and son accidental to its subject and be
in a superordinate position is an accident assigned being-in to
both. It is thus non-necessary insofar as son followed upon father,
and so non-necessary in consequence. So too here:
'that which is a father is naturally prior to a son

therefore a father is naturally prior to a son'.
In this, the subject of paternity is the thing that is subject, (i.e., that
which is a father) and father is accidental to the thing that is sub
ject, and to be naturally prior to a son is assigned being-in to both.
115 Notice that this convertibility is different from those dis

cussed above, since 'father' is convertible with 'that which is
father' / the subject of paternity just like a relation with its
peculiar subject in which it has being or becoming when it is itself
compared to another. 'Able to laugh' is not paired with 'man' that
way, but as a peculiar capacity (passio) with its peculiar subject.
Nor are 'father' and 'son' paired by either of the modes mentioned,
but as one correlative with another. Many and diverse are the
causes of convertibility.
From all this it is obvious that one convertible is an accident

of its match on the basis of some third thing.
116 Notice that wherever a Fallacy of Word-figure is found,

an accident is always involved but not the converse. That comes
about by diverse principles and diverse natures accompanying each
other. Take to see: this has two different pairings or two diverse
respects accompanying it: to see is paired with eye as its organ and
with color as its object; the two respects are always found together
in the same act of seeing, though they are diverse. So too where
there is a Fallacy of Word-figure: a mode of signifying is paired
with a word (dictio) and belongs to it as instrument or sign; it is also
paired with the thing signified, and is its object or significate. It is
also its subject.
I understand this of a mode of signifying as appropriate to all

modes of word-figure / all its species, namely according as this
mode of signifying has these two diverse respects. That is why I say
that if this mode of signifying were the motive principle, to the
extent that it is in its sign which is a word (dictio), then there is
linguistic (in dictione) deception, so a Fallacy of Word-figure. But
if 'mode of signifying' is taken on the basis of the other pairing,
namely as paired with a thing to which it belongs as to a subject, and
this way is made the motive principle, then there is extralinguistic
(extra dictionem) deception, and thus it is an accident. So wherever
there is Fallacy of Word-figure, there an accident is always found,
but not the converse. A thing's nature does not depend on that of a
word (dictio), while a word's nature does depend on the nature of a
thing, since a word is a sign of a thing and related to it purposively.

Perfection comes from purpose and fulfillment in what pertain to
purpose, but not the other way around; for which reason there
cannot be the nature of a word (dictio) without the nature of a thing.
117 Notice that wherever there is Fallacy of Accident, I say

the middle term / that of which it is truly predicated that being-in
is assigned to both, is the thing that is subject; and that the minor
extremity / what is an extremity on the part of the minor is an
accident of the thing that is subject (whether it can be subject or
predicate of the middle term or not); and that the major extremity
/ an extremity on the part of the Major, I say is an accident
assigned being-in to both. This is the other sort of accident that is
non-necessary in consequence.
118 This is not contrary to what Aristotle says in Second

Elenchi, that sometimes what is in an accident is predicated of
the subject. So it seems that we do not demonstrate something
sophistically about accident only through the thing that is subject,
but also through its accident. For I am saying that some paralogisms
of Accident include only one part of a contradiction (as is clear in
the above) while others have both parts. And this both implicitly
and explicitly, as in:
'I know Coriscus

I have no knowledge about the one coming
therefore I know and I have no knowledge about the same person';
this conclusion has an implicit contradiction and takes one part from
the side of the subject, the other from the side of an accidental.
But when I say:
'I know Coriscus

and I do not know the one coming
therefore I know and I do not know the same person',
the contradiction is explicit. In those with both parts of a contra-

dicition it seems to be what Aristotle is saying. In the same
place, he says on some occasions it seems to be so and they state
it, but in other cases they do not say. In those which conclude to
one part of a contradiction, it is always demonstrated through the
71: Soph. EL 24, 179a 27-29.

72: Soph. El. 24, 179a29-30.
thing that is subject that something suits an accident, or whether
some terms are taken predicatively or not.
119 It might be solved another way - one I think better,
though the first one is true - by saying there is nothing to those
further objections, since in any such paralogism there is virtually a
pair. So one should understand a third proposition in the premises,
as follows:
'I know Coriscus
I have no knowledge about the one who is coming
and Coriscus is the one who is coming
therefore I know and I have no knowledge about the same
person';
and they are put together as:
'I know Coriscus
Coriscus is that one who is coming
therefore I know that one who is coming';
Again:
'I have no knowledge about the one coming
and the one coming is that person who is coming
therefore I have no knowledge about that person who is coming
therefore I know and I have no knowledge about the same person'.
In the first paralogism, through 'Coriscus', which is the thing that is
subject, it is demonstrated that that person who is coming is known
to me, since that knowledge pertains to the minor extremity and is
accidental to Coriscus to the extent that 'Coriscus' is subject of
'that person who is coming'. In the second, it is demonstrated
through 'the one coming', the thing that is subject, that 'that
person who is coming' is unknown to me and so the one coming is
both the thing that is subject and the middle term; 'that person who
is coming' is the major extremity and 'I have no knowledge about'
the minor extremity, an accident to the one coming to the extent
that 'the one coming' stands under that predicate.
So it is universally clear what should be assigned as the thing

that is subject and what should be assigned as accident to the thing
that is subject and what should be assigned as the accident which is
assigned being-in to both.
ON THE FALLACY AFTER - A - FASHIN
AND S I M P L Y
On the Definition of these Terms
120 We now take up the Fallacy After-a-Fashion and Simply
(secundum quid et simpliciter). First notice that 'after-a-fashion'
is used two ways. 'After-a-fashion' diminishes its whole in one way
as 'white-footed' (albus pedem) diminishes 'something white'
(album) simply taken, and 'dead man' does 'man'. Through this
sort of after-a-fashion, the Fallacy of After-a-fashion and
Simply arises.
The other way, 'after-a-fashion' does not diminish its whole
but simply posits it and makes an inference, as in 1 'curly headed';
therefore curly', or 'snub nosed; therefore snubbed . This is in any
form and in any accident denominating a whole by its part, like
curly, which denominates a man by his head; snubness or aquilinity
are only in a nose yet a man is said to be snubnosed or aquiline
because of them; blindness is in the eyes and by it, a man is said to
be blind; knowledge and virtue are in the soul as in a subject and
thereby a man is said to be knowledgable or having virtues; and so
for any other similar things that denominate a whole by a part.
All other forms and accidents of any sort are forms and accid
ents of a whole itself in such a way as not to pertain only to a part -
none of these, I say, can give a name to a whole unless they are in
that whole simply. It is in such as these that the fallacy After-a-
fashion and Simply falls, since a determination arising in that sort
as to part or as to some other respect, diminish the whole simply.
That kind of 'after-a-fashion' is taken here, not the other kind that
does not diminish.
From this it is clear that 'after-a-fashion' as taken here is
said to be a determination diminishing the nature of what it is
adjoined to. An undiminished thing is called one 'simply', whether
it is accident or substance, like '(something) white', '(something)
black', 'animal', 'man'.
On Causes and Modes of this Fallacy
121 The motive cause of this fallacy is the partial identity of
the same thing diminishing after-a-fashion, compared to itself
simply said. The cause of non-existence is their difference.
This fallacy arises in as many ways as adding a determination
to something diminishes it.
On the first Mode
122 First, on the basis of a part diminishing in mode. Like:
'he is a dead man
therefore he is a man';
this does not follow because 'dead' diminishes the nature of 'man'
itself. And
'a chimera is a matter of opinion
therefore there is a chimera';
for 'matter of opinion' [or 'famous' : opinabilis] diminishes 'to be'.
And:
'there is a pictured animal or a pictured eye
therefore there is an animal or an eye';
'pictured' diminishes the nature of these things. Aristotle forms
these paralogisms as follows:73
*what is not is a matter of opinion
like the chimera;
therefore what is not, is'.
You can form all the others the same way, like:
'what is not a man is a dead man
therefore what is not a man is a man'
'what is not an animal is a pictured animal
therefore what is not an animal is an animal'.
On the second Mode
124 The second mode is based on integral part. Like:
73: Soph. El. 5, 167a 1-2.

'an Ethiopian is white as to the teeth

therefore an Ethiopian is white'.
On the third Mode
125 The third mode comes from things which are relative (ad
aliquid). Like:
•riches are not good for the foolish man or the wastrel
therefore riches are not good';
even though they may not be good compared to something (ad ali
quid), they are still good in themselves.
And:
'an egg is potentially an animal
therefore an egg is an animal';
every potency is such relative to something, since it is related to the

actuality by which it is perfected.
On the fourth Mode
125 The fourth mode has to do with a Topic. Like:
'it is good to honor your father in Trivallis

therefore it is good to honor your father'
and:
'it is helpful to use a diet in hospitals
therefore it is helpful to use a diet';
though it might be expedient there, it is not expedient simply.
On the fifth Mode
126 The fifth mode has to do with when (quando). Like:
'he fasts during Lent

therefore he fasts';
and:
'it is helpful for someone to take medicine when ill
therefore it is helpful for someone to take medicine';
127 Note that wherever a fallacy of fashion and simply is

found, it is understood as and is a double contradiction, one in the
conclusion, which is a true contradiction, the other in the premises,
which is a diminished contradiction. The respondent says an Ethiop
ian is not white; his opponent says he is white as to the teeth; so he
does not contradict him except after-a-fashion. And from that
after-a-fashion contradiction, he infers a true one, as follows:
'therefore an Ethiopian is both white and not white1;
so it offends against After-a-fashion and Simply, because a
genuine contradiction does not follow from a contradiction after-a-
fashion. All others are dealt with the same way.
128 That is why Aristotle gives a general solution for all para
logisms of this fallacy, namely, to consider a conclusion as to
contradiction, that is, to compare the contradiction of a correct
conclusion to a contradiction in the premises, which is a contra
diction after-a-fashion. That is why the one does not follow from
the other.
129 Notice that it is the same fallacy to go from After-a-
fashion to Simply as to go from Simply, negatively taken, to
After-a-fashion itself, negated as far as its terms go. Like:
'it is not a man
therefore it is not a dead man';
or:
'he is not white
therefore he is not white as to the teeth',
for the motive principle remains the same, as does the defective
principle: neither fashion nor simply is motive, but the partial
match of the one with the other is.
130 Note also that you should not label things in which con
traries seem equally to be-in as diverse parts from the other
contrary. So if a shield is half white, half black, you ought not say,
'the shield is black or white', but 'partly thus and partly so'.
That is why this argument is invalid:
'there is no color except whiteness, blackness or the intermediate
color;
therefore nothing is colored except something white,
or black, or colored by the intermediate color',
74: Soph. El. 25, 180a 23-31.

some colored things are tinted with a single color, some with sever
al. That argument only holds for monochrome things. That is why
the argument is null, since it does not hold universally. Even allow
ing a shield is not tinted by an intermediate color, it still does not
follow that it is white or black. But this would be a valid argument:
'nothing is a color except black, white or the intermediate color;

therefore nothing is colored except something white
or black or something colored by that intermediate color,
or partly white, partly black, partly colored by that
middle color or by intermediate colors'.
So too in all contrary forms having a middle and inhering according

to diverse parts, as something blackly white (album nigrum) so too,
something coldly hot, softly hard, and whatever others that are-in
the same whole according to different parts.
ON IGNORING REFUTING EVIDENCE
On Refutation
131 A refutation (elenchus) is a syllogism of contradiction of

one and the same thing, not just of a name, but of both a thing and
its name, not of a synomym, but of the same thing, derived from
what have been necessarily granted, aside from the original point at
issue, on the same basis, as identically related, in the same way, and
at the same time. 75 There are two things in this definition of
'refutation': 'syllogism' and 'contradiction'. For a refutation is
nothing other than a syllogism whose conclusion contradicts the
conclusion of another syllogism. A refutation is then two syllogisms
contradicting each other, or whose conclusion contradicts a propos
ition previously assumed. A refutation is then a syllogism of one
thing with its contradiction. So a refutation is always a syllogism
with its contradiction.
132 In the definition of 'refutation' just given, some elements

are included by reason of syllogism, some by reason of contradiction,
some for both reasons. These are included by reason of syllogism:
'from what have been necessarily granted', 'aside from the original
point at issue', which remove the fallacy of assuming what was to
be proven (petitio ejus quod erat in principio), as will be clear
75: Soph. El. 5, 167a 23-27.

later 76 By reason of contradiction, these are posited: 'of one'

and 'the same', that is, of the one and the same subject and
predicate. Unless it were the same subject and the same predicate,
it would not be a contradiction, as in 'an Ethiopian is black', 'an
Ethiopian is not black as to the teeth' the predicate is not the
same; while in 'no dead man runs', 'some man runs', the subject is
not the same. The expressions 'on the same basis' (secundum idem),
'with identical relation' (ad idem), 'in the same way' (similiter)
and 'at the same time (in eodem tempore) are also included there
by reason of contradiction. Against these particulars the fallacy
called Ignoring the Point in Question (Ignorantia Elenchi) also
offends, it being one of thirteen mutually opposed fallacies, for in
another way, Ignorantia Elenchi offends against all these particulars
included in its definition, such that all fallacies reduce to this one,
as will be clear later. 77 For both reasons, these expressions are
included: not just of name only but of name and thing' and 'not of a
synonym, but of the same name', for both in a syllogism as well as
in a contradiction it is required that a name be one thing and a thing
something else. So this is not a contradiction: 'Marcus is running,
'Tullius is not running', because the same name does not occur
there, just a synomym; nor is: 'every dog is able to bark', 'a certain
dog is not able to bark', for we do not have the same objects here.
But in:
'every sword cuts

a particular instrument is a blade
therefore a particular instrument cuts'
there is no syllogism, since the same name is not repeated as the

middle term, just a synomym.
On Ignorance
132 bis 'Ignorance' is said in several ways. One is negative

ignorance, the way a child lying in the crib is ignorant of all
sciences. This is called negative ignorance because it affirms
nothing; the one who has this knows nothing. Another is dispos
itional ignorance: this is when one already knows a bit about a
thing, but does not know it as it is. This again is said ambiguously,
in one way called simple (that concerns principles or premised
propositions) the other composite or multiple, and this is about
conclusions. That is how Aristotle distinguishes Ignorance in the
76: p. 145 f below.

77: below, p. 159 ff.
First book of Posterior Analytics when he deals with pseudo-syllog
isms.78
133 You should understand further that each of these (simple
ignorance and the one that is composite or multiple) is still ambigu
ous. Simple dispositional ignorance can be about principles them
selves or about premised propositions, by apprehending them
contrarily, as in accepting those that are false. The other way,
simple ignorance can be about premised propositions, knowing
something about them correctly, without recognizing their whole
substance or power. So too, composite or multiple ignorance is
ambiguous as to conclusions, as when they were to be taken
contrarily, as in falsity, or if they were imperfectly known.
On Ignorantia Elenchi
134 Having seen what a refutation is and how many ways
'ignorance' is used, one must know that 'Ignoring the Point in
Question' (ignorantia elenchi) is taken here with reference to dis
positional, not negative ignorance. It is not about that sort of
dispositional ignorance which is multiple or composite, but the
simple one. Here, 'ignoring the point in question' should be taken
by reason of the perfection of refutation and of its complement.
That perfection is effected through determinations which are Pecul
iarities of a contradiction, i.e., those noted by the expressions 'with
identical relation' (ad idem), 'on the same basis' (secundum idem),
'in the same way' (similiter), and 'at the same time' (in eodem
tempore). It is further clear that dispositional ignorance should be
taken here as simple, because it is a principle of arguing and as such
should be paired as a principle is to a conclusion. So by this simple
ignorance, later composite or multiple ignorance is caused, since the
respondent is deceived through it by arguing sophistically.
On the Causes and Modes of this Fallacy
The cause of this fallacy's plausibility is the compatibility of

two things taken after-a-fashion to two taken simply; the cause
of its falsity is their diversity.
There are four modes of this fallacy.
78: Post. An. I 16, 79b 23-23, 3acobi's translation, Minio Paluello's
edition, p. 34.
On the first Mode
135 The first mode is contrary to the particular 'with identic
al relation' (ad idem). For example:
'two is a double of one
but two is not a double of three
therefore a double and a non-double are the same'
does not follow because a double is not taken with identical relat
ion in both premises.
On the second Mode
136 The second mode offends against the particular 'on the
same basis' (secundum idem). For example:
'this is double that in length
this is not double that in breadth
therefore this is double and not double'
does not follow because 'double' is not taken on the same basis,
though double is predicated with respect to the same thing.
On the third Mode
137 The third mode is contrary to the particular 'in the same
way' (similiter).
'man is a species
no man is a species
therefore the same thing is a species and not a species';
there is no contradiction in the premises, because the term 'man' is
not taken the same way. In one it is taken for its inferiors, but in
the other it is not, but for itself.
On the fourth Mode
138 The fourth mode is contrary to the particular, 'at the
same time' (in eodem tempore). For example:
'my hand is closed at one time
and it is not closed at another time
therefore it is closed and it is not closed'.
VII: ON FALLACIES 1*5
139 Notice that in this fallacy, even though there is a true
contradiction in the conclusion, and another seeming one in the
premises, as mentioned in the fallacy After-a-fashion and Simply/"
this fallacy differs from that one, because this has a seeming con
tradiction in the premises with a defect in both parts of the contra
diction, as paralogisms of this fallacy show. But a fallacy After-a-
fashion and Simply has a seeming contradiction offending only in
one part. This one's solution differs from that one's, because
Aristotle80 teaches with respect to both that we solve by consider
ing the conclusion as a contradiction, i.e., by considering the true
contradiction of a conclusion in contrast to seeming contradiction in
the premises. Here we proceed by considering a true contradiction
in contrast to the seeming one because of diminution of both parts,
there, in contrast to the seeming one due to diminution only of the
one.
140 If one objects that fashion and simply should be part of

this fallacy, since a shift is made there from one taken after-a-
fashion to one taken simply, while here the shift is from a pair
taken after-a-fashion to a pair taken simply, so there really
should not be two fallacies because a part is not numerically ident
ical with its whole -, say neither is a part of the other, indeed they
are fallacies divided on opposing grounds, since it is not fashion
and simply themselves which constitute the fallacy After-a-fash
ion and Simply, but the relation of the one to the other. Just as
species and genus are not a Topic but a relationship of the one thing
to another. Even though 'man' is not numerically identical with
'animal', (being part of it), the relations are yet numerically
identical among themselves. For one of these relationships is a
generic Topic, while the other is a specific Topic. In the same way,
the relationship of one thing taken after-a-fashion to a another
thing taken simply is different from the relation of a pair taken
after-a-fashion to another pair taken simply, even though an
after-a-fashion unit is part of a pair, and a unit taken simply is
part of a pair.
So these two fallacies will be specifically different. Similarly,
though half a line is not numerically identical with a whole one,
being part of it, the relationships are numerically identical. For the
relationship of a whole line to its half is a double, while the relation
ship of a half to a whole line is subdouble or half.
79: p. 139 f.
80: Soph. El. 25, 180a23-3I and 26, 181al-l4.
ON ASSUMING THE POINT AT ISSUE
On its Definition
141 Determination about the seeking of what is in principle

(petitio ejus quod est in principio : 'begging the question' : 'assumine
the point at issue') is made according to truth in Prior Analytics 81
and according to opinion in Topics. 82 We treat here of assuming
the point at issue the second way.
It should be known that seeking what is a matter of principle

('begging the question', 'assuming the point at issue') as taken here, is
when a conclusion that should be proven is sought for in the
premises. Since therefore the same thing, under the same name,
cannot be proven of itself (for a proof of something is always
different from what is to be proven); but the same thing, under the
same name is neither something different nor does it seem to be
different; therefore the same thing under the same name cannot be
proven by itself. That is why what induces and what has been
induced cannot be of the same sort, as
'a man runs

therefore a man runs'.
Therefore in such as these there can be no seeking for what is a root

cause (quod est in principio). An argument like this is ridiculous,
falls under no art and assumes what is a root cause. It is one thing
to look for a principle and another to look for that which is in
principle, since to presume a principle is when the same thing is
inquired about under the same name, as in
'a man runs

therefore a man runs',
which produces no fallacy, because it is not contained under any

species of argumentation, neither according to truth nor according
to plausibility.
142 What causes the plausibility of the fallacy of assuming the

point at issue is the seeming diversity of a conclusion from its
premises; what makes it false is their identity.
That which is in principle is sought in five ways, as the end of

the Eighth Book of the Topics 8 3 has it.
On the first Mode
143 The first is when the thing defined is sought in its definit
ion, or the converse. As if there were a doubt about whether a man
is running and this were assumed:
'a rational, mortal animal is running

therefore a man is running'.
there is no proof here: since one of these was doubted, the other is
necessarily to be doubted. It is the same if one assumes the first,
then looks for the other in it.
On the second Mode
144 The second mode is when a particular is sought for in a

universal. As if it should be proven that there is a single discipline
concerned with all contraries, and the proof assumes this:
'of all opposites, there is the same discipline

therefore there is the same discipline of all opposites'.
here the proof seeks a conclusion in the premises.
On t h e t h i r d Mode
145 The third mode occurs conversely when a universal is
sought in particulars. As if it were to be proven that there is a
single discipline concerned with all contraries, and these are
assumed:
'of all opposites, there is the same discipline

of all privative opposites there is the same discipline
and so of the others;
therefore of all opposites, there is the same discipline'.
81: Anal. Prior. II 16, 64b 28ff.

82: Topica VIII 13, 162b 31ff.
83: Topica VIII 13, 162b34-35.
On the fourth Mode
146 The fourth mode is when something conjoined is assumed

in things that have been divided. As if it were to be proven that
medicine has to do with one who is sick as well as with one who is in
good health, and these be assumed:
'medicine is a science of the sick
medicine is a science of the ill
therefore medicine is a science of the sick and the ill'.
On the fifth Mode
147 The fifth mode is when one correlative is sought in the

other. As if it were to be proven that Socrates is the father of
Plato, and these are assumed:
'Plato is the son of Socrates
therefore Socrates is the father of Plato',
here, what ought to be proven is sought.
148 One should know that this fallacy does not impede a
demonstrative (inferens) syllogism, but a dialectic (probantem) one.
Syllogisms are either demonatrative only, or demonstrative and
dialectical.
149 Again: One should know there are two ways of knowing,
one that goes from the conceptually prior to the conceptually subse
quent, and this way is called conceptual; the other proceeds from
the sensibly prior to the sensibly subsequent, and this way is called
sensible. Those called conceptually prior are what are by their
essence (natura); those called sensibly prior are things more
pervious to the senses.
Therefore I say that in any of the paralogisms cited, there is a
dialectical Topic in one mode, a sophistical one in another. For if
something apt to be proven one way is primarily proven that same
way, the argument is valid, and a dialectical Topic is there. But if
something apt to be proven in one of those ways is proven primarily
in another (and that will be through what is subsequent in that same
way), then it is a sophistical Topic and the point in question will be
assumed. This is easy to see in any of the paralogisms quoted, for
anyone taking thought.
ON THE FALLACY OF CONSEQUENT

On Consequence
150 A Consequence is either simple or composite. Simple con
sequence like: 'if it is a man, it is an animal' or 'if he is an
adulterer, he is sleekly dressed or a night prowler'; and so of other
circumstances. A composite consequence is on the basis of opposit
ions. That is in contraries or contradictories, as in second Topics.
151 A consequence that is composite / based on oppositions,
has two species. One in a thing itself, the other the converse.
152 Consequence in a thing itself is when, from an anteced
ent's opposite, a consequent's opposite follows. For example: 'if it
is justice, it is a virtue; therefore if it is injustice, it is a vice';
here from an opposite of the antecedent 'injustice' follows a
consequent's opposite, 'vice'. There is consequence in a thing itself
in almost all contraries.
153 Contrary consequence is when, from a consequent's oppos
ite, an opposite of the antecedent follows. Like 'if it is a man, it is
an animal; therefore if it is a non-animal, it is a non-man'. Here,
from the consequent's opposite 'non-animal', follows an opposite of
the antecedent, 'non-man'. In contradictories, there can only be
contrary consequence.
154 Again: There are two species of simple consequence. One
on a Topic-relational basis. Like 'if it is a man, it is an animal';
Here this is a relation from species. The other is on the basis of
circumstances. That type is expected in Rhetoric.
155 Just as 'consequence' is taken commonly for all those
consequences, 'consequent' is taken commonly insofar as one soph
istical Topic is said to be based on a consequent. That Topic is call
ed consequent-based rather than antecedent-based because in it, a
consequent is made the principle of inferring on the basis that the
consequent is affirmed in the antecedent, but the sophistical Topic
is given its name from what induces rather than from what has been
induced, as it is in dialectic.
84: Topica II 8, 113b 15ff.

156 The motive principle of a fallacy of consequent is the fit
of a valid consequence has with its converse. The deficient principle
is falsity of the converse. Aristotle touches briefly on that double
cause when he says85 'because they think a consequence convert
ible', which it is not. That he says 'consequence' suggests valid
consequence, which is the motive principle for believing its con
verse; that he says 'is convertible' suggests its converse. This is
false consequence, the principle of deficiency.
Aristotle mentions three modes of consequence.86
On the first Mode
157 The first mode is when a consequence is made on the basis
of Topical relationships. Like
'if it is a man it is an animal
therefore if it is an animal it is a man';
this is from affirmation of a consequent, so there it is a fallacy of
consequent. So too here:
'if it is not an animal, it is not a man
therefore if it is not a man, it is not an animal';
is likewise from affirmation of a consequent. So too here:
'if it is honey, it is tawny
therefore if it is tawny, it is honey
but gall is tawny
therefore gall is honey'.
so too here:
'if it is raining, the ground is drenched
therefore if the ground is drenched, it is raining'.
In all of the above, some think a consequence convertible which is
not. So they offend against the fallacy of consequent.
On the second Mode
158 The second mode is when a consequence is thought to be

convertible because of some circumstances inherent in a person, as
happens in Rhetoric. For example:
if he is an adulterer, he is sleekly dressed or a night prowler
and so for other circumstances;
therefore if he is sleekly dressed or a night prowler, he is an

adulterer;
this is a fallacy of consequent, for if he is an adulterer, he has

some of an adulterer's circumstances, but not the converse, as in 'if
it is a man, it is colored' and not the converse. So too here:
'if he has stolen something, he has neither earned nor borrowed it

so if he has neither earned or borrowed it, he has stolen it'.
This does not follow; for they think a consequence convertible

which is not.
On the third Mode
159 The third mode of the fallacy of consequent occurs when

they think a consequence is convertible which is made on the basis
of oppositions. For example:
'if it is made, it has a source

therefore if it is not made, it has no source
but the world is not made, that is, generated
therefore the world has no source
therefore the world is infinite in duration, thus the world is eternal';
Mellisus87 offended against the fallacy of consequent in the first

deduction, for the correct consequence is this one:
'if it is made, it has a source'
85: Soph. El. 5, 167b 1-2.

86: Soph. El. 5, 167b 1-20.
87: Melissos of Samos, 5th cent. B.C.; (cf. Arist. Soph. El. 6, 168b
35-40).
whatever is generated has a source, since from nothing, something is

not made; so if something is made, it is made from something;
therefore if it is made, it has a source. But this does not follow:
'if it is not made, it has no source'.
This argues from negation of the antecedent and posits consequence
in the thing itself in contradictorily opposed things, since in them, a
contrary consequence is to be affirmed. For example:
'if it is made, it has a source
therefore if it does not have a source, it is not made';
then it follows validly. So too, this is a fallacy of consequent:
'if it is a man, it is an animal
therefore if it is not a man, it is not an animal'
from negation of the antecedent. Thus it is a fallacy of consequence
in the thing itself, though it should be from the contrary; for in
contradictories, it is not licit to argue consequence in a thing itself.
160 From what was said it is clear that wherever there is a
fallacy of consequent, there is a double consequence. That is clear
from the fact that wherever Aristotle speaks of a consequent, he
always 88forms word-groups of a consequent in double conse-
quence, as in 'if this exists, that exists'; and when that exists, it
is thought this exists.
161 Again: Substantial to any paralogism, linguistic as well as
nonlinguistic, are its motive and defective principles. Therefore if
in a fallacy of consequent, correct consequence is the motive princ
iple, and false consequence the defective one, wherever there is a
paralogism of consequent, double consequence is necessarily present.
162 Again on the same point: It is impossible for any consequ
ence to be converted unless there be a pair of them. For if a con
sequence is converted, one has the converted consequence and that
into which it is converted. Therefore there must be a pair of
consequences, wherever there is a fallacy of consequent, if the
cause Aristotle assigns is correct.
88: Soph. El. 5, 167b1ff.; 6, 168b 27ff.

163 Again: That is clearly proven by the solution Aristotle

sets down in Second Elenchi for paralogisms of consequent.89
There he says that there are two sorts of consequence: one where a
universal follows upon a particular, as in 'if it is a man, it is an
animal', the one we earlier called simple. The other he says is
based on oppositions, which we called composite. This is the division
of consequence we set down in the beginning.91 In both, one solves
by demonstrating that that one consequence is converted into
another. Therefore, if his solution is universal, there is necessarily a
twofold consequence wherever there is a fallacy of consequent,
namely, what is converted, and what it is converted into. We
concede all these points. So in arguments like: 'an animal is
running; therefore a man is running', or 'a man is running; there
fore Socrates is running' and in all like them, there is not a Fallacy
of Consequent, but one of Accident, as was earlier92 clarified in
word-groups of the Fallacy of Accident.
O N T H E F A L L A C Y OF
N O N - C A U S E AS C A U S E
On two kinds of Syllogism
164 Syllogisms are of two types, demonstrative and contra
dictory. A demonstrative syllogism is one that has only one con
clusion. An impossible syllogism is one which leads syllogistically to
an impossible conclusion, and for this reason one of the premises,
which is the cause of that impossible conclusion, is invalidated. So
such a syllogism always has two conclusions. For example, if we
ask: 'is a man an ass ?' and that is conceded, an counterargument
is:
'no ass is a rational, mortal animal
a man is an ass
therefore a man is not a rational, mortal animal
but this is impossible
therefore a man is not an ass';
This syllogism is in the Fourth Figure of the First Mood.
89: Soph. El. 28, 181a 23-27.

90: p. 149 above.
91: p. 129 ff.
92: p. 129 ff.
On the Fallacy of Non-cause as Cause
165 We should note that the Fallacy of Non-cause as Cause

always occurs in impossible syllogisms. Moreover the fallacy of non-
cause as cause occurs when a non-cause is supposed to be the reason
why something impossible seems to follow, and what appears to be a
cause is later invalidated. For example, if we ask: 'is Brunellus a
man ?' and that is conceded, the contrary argument is:
'no ass is a rational, mortal animal

a man is an ass and Brunellus is a man
therefore a man is not a rational, mortal animal
but this is impossible
therefore Brunellus is not a man'.
In this argumentation there is a fallacy of non-cause as cause, for

what is invalidated is what seems to be a cause of the impossible and
really is not, namely, 'Brunellus is a man', and without that premise
a contradiction follows from the other premises. It will be a syllog
ism in the fourth figure of the first mood, as we said earlier.
On the Causes of this Fallacy
166 The reason why this fallacy appears plausible is a

resemblance between what seems to be the cause and what is not
the cause, on account of some resemblance in some term signifying
the same thing. This is clear, since premises are the cause of a con
clusion, because they share some term. So a proposition that does
not effect an inference (and so is not a cause), appears to be a
cause of the conclusion if it shares some term with one of the
premises; so what is a non-cause is taken as a cause. The motive
principle in this fallacy is a resemblance between causes in some
term.
167 The cause of falsity / or the defective principle is the

diversity of a proposition that is a non-cause compared to the cause
of the conclusion itself. Aristotle gives an example of this
fallacy: 93
'are soul and life the same thing ?';
93: Soph. El. 5, 167b 27-31.

if this is conceded, a counterargument is:

'death and life are contraries
generation and corruption are contraries
but death is corruption
therefore life is generation
hence to live is to be generated;
This is contradictory: one who is living is not being generated, but
one who has been generated;
therefore soul and life are not the same thing';
in this final conclusion there is an offence involving non-cause as
cause. Without it, the contradiction follows from the other
premises. So one ought not deny that part, namely 'soul and life are
the same thing', but this one: 'death and life are contraries'.
In all of these, what is not a cause seems to be one, since it has
something in common with terms in other propositions from which a
contradiction follows.
168 From what has been said it is clear that this fallacy does
not occur in a demonstrative syllogism. For example:
'every man is running
Socrates is a man and the sun is in Cancer
therefore Socrates is running'
this is non-cause as cause, since the proposition 'the sun is in
Cancer' is not a cause nor does it seem to be one.
169 Notice that 'death and life are contraries' is ambiguous.
Yet it is false in both senses. In one way, death is a change by which
the soul is freed from the body, and that way, death and life are not
contraries, since they are simultaneously in the same thing. As long
as that change or dissolution is going on, a man is still living and will
continue to live until that dissolution comes to a stop. So this way,
it is necessary that death and life are simultaneously in the same
thing. That is why they cannot be contraries in this way. But in
another way, 'death' is taken, not for the very change of
separation, but for the endpoint of that separation or dissolution, in
which the soul is not being separated from the body, but has already
been separated. Death is not contrary to life this way, but they are
opposed privatively in a irreversible order with respect to the same

thing, like sight and blindness with respect to the eye. So the
proposition cited is false in both ways.
170 Again: 'Death is corruption' is ambiguous, since if 'death'

is taken the first way, it is true; when the soul is freed from the
body, a man corrupts. But if 'death' is taken the second way, it is
false, since so taken, death is not corruption, but an end point of
corruption.
So it is clear what propositions are to be invalidated in the

premises and how they are to be distinguished.
ON THE F A L L A C Y OF MANY QUESTIONS

AS O N E
On S t a t e m e n t , Proposition,
I n t e r r o g a t i o n and Conclusion
171 Statement, proposition, question, and conclusion are the

same thing subtantially, but they differ by functions (rationibus)
peculiar to each. For example, the word-group 'every man runs',
as signifying that a thing does or does not exist, is called a
statement; the same word-group, as put in premises to prove some
thing, is a proposition; with a mode of interrogation added, it is a
question, as in 'is every man running?'; as proven by another, that
identical word-group is a conclusion.
172 In terms of those peculiar functions, they can be defined

in the following ways. A statement is a word-group indicative of
something insofar as it signifies that things do or do not exist. A
proposition is an indicative word-group that is probative of another.
An interrogation is an indicative word-group taken under the mode
of asking a question. A conclusion is an indicative word-group
proven by one or more middle terms. But since a statement is
divided into one and many, as are a proposition and a question, it
should be known that the unity from which a statement or a propos
ition is said to be one differs from the unity from which an inter
rogation is said to be one.
173 To make this obvious, notice that there are several modes
of unity taken simply, on the basis of which a proposition and a
statement is said to be one. There is a sort of thing that is a unit
simply, signified by several names, derived from several things
signified by several names. Take a definition, like: 'rational mortal
animal'. Here there are several things from which a unit results.
There is one sort of unit simply that is one and under one name.
This is subdivided into five parts. The first is something that is one
proportionally, the sort predicated on the basis of prior and sub
sequent, as 'being' is of all beings and 'healthy' of all healthy
things, and 'good' of all good things, as is clear in the Topics.
The second mode is something that is one by genus, like soul or
color. The third mode is something that is one by species, like man,
whiteness. The fourth is something that is numerically one, like
Socrates or Plato. The fifth and last is something that is one by
accident. I call something one by accident, accidentally one; one by
genus, generically one, and one by species, specifically one.
174 So I say 'unity' taken commonly for all those modes of
unity, makes both a statement and a proposition one, when one of
those unities is subject and another predicate, as in: 'a stone is a
rational mortal animal'; 'a man is a rational mortal animal'; 'a stone
is a being'; 'a stone is an animal'; 'a man is an animal'; 'an ass is a
man'; 'Socrates is a man'; 'Socrates is Socrates'; 'Socrates is Plato';
'a man is able to laugh'; 'a man is white'. If one of the unities
mentioned is not there, there will not be one statement, but many,
and then many things are predicated of one, or one thing predicated
of many, or many of many out of which there is no unit. The unity
by which a question is said to be one is not that mentioned above,
but the unity of an interrogative mode added to the unity which
makes a proposition one, as in 'is a man an animal?': here, one of
the unities mentioned above is subject, (since it is a specific unity),
another is predicate, (since it is a generic unity), and to these unities
is added the unity of a mode of questioning. This unity, which is
that of an interrogative mode, is not unity simply taken, but unity
taken after-a-fashion. That unity on the basis of which a proposition
is one and a statement is one, is unity simply taken. So it is clear
when a question is one. It is also clear that for a single question, a
double unity is required, namely the unity of a thing divided earlier -
and this is quasi-material in a single question -, and the unity of an
interrogative mode, and that is completive of an interrogation.
175 A question is many when, in an interrogation, the unity of
question mode remains, and what makes a proposition one (which
was unity simply taken), is lacking. Since the unity of a mode of
94: Topica I 15, 107a 5-12, p. 24.

questioning remains, it is called an interrogation; since the other
unity, simply taken, is lacking, it is called many. So these two,
question and many, are well joined to each other, even though the
lack of concord between substantive and adjective is evident.
On the Causes and Modes of this Fallacy
176 Having seen how statement, proposition, question and con

clusion resemble and differ from each other, and in how many modes
'one simply' is predicated, when a statement is one or many, as well
as proposition and interrogation, and on what basis 'many question'
is well said - we must now discuss causes and modes of the fallacy
based on Many Question as One.
The plausible cause or motive principle of this fallacy is the
unity of the mode of questioning; the cause of its falsity is a lack or
privation of the unity of a single proposition. Unity after-a-fashion
claims to be unity simply, so it conceals a defect and makes what
does not exist seem to exist.
There are two modes of this fallacy.
On the first Mode
177 The first is when in singular number, several things are
subject or predicate, like 'isn't he and he a man ?' (after we have
pointed to Socrates and Brunellus). If we answer yes, 'therefore
Brunellus is a man'; if no, 'therefore Socrates is not a man'.
Answering a many question with a one response is invalid, and the
reply should have been: 'true for one, false for the other'.
On the second Mode
178 The second arises when several things are subject or
predicate in the plural, like 'are those things good ?' after pointing
to a good and a bad thing. If the answer is 'good', one can
conclude, 'then the bad is good'; if 'bad', 'then the good is not
good'. The answer should have been: 'one is good and the other is
not good'. But one conceding that definitions are given indifferently
in the plural or singular, like 'a blind thing is naturally apt to see
and doesn't' and 'blind things are naturally apt to see and do not',
will not escape refutation. Having proven one is blind and another
sighted, one could argue as follows:
'those are naturally apt to see and not seeing

therefore they are blind'
This way both will be blind. If it is said they are sighted, the
argument concludes, 'therefore both are sighted; therefore the
blind one sees'. It would not be said one is sighted and the other is
not, but a single response will be given because of the original
concession that definitions were given indifferently in the plural and
singular. That way one only answer is given.
ON REDUCTION OF ALL FALLACIES

On two kinds of Ignoring
the Point at Issue
179 A double distinction of Ignorance of the Point in Question
(ignorantia elenchi : 'ignoring a refutation or the point at issue') is
usually made, as specifically one of the thirteen fallacies, yet
generically the one to which all thirteen reduce. One way
Ignorance of the Point in Question is distinguished as specific is,
that it is caused by ignorance of the differences same relations,
same basis, same way, and same time. That way ignoring the
point at issue is contrary to the completive form of a refutation,
since those differences are completive of contradiction and so of a
refutation, contradiction itself being completive of a refutation.
But as Ignorance of the Point in Question is commonly caused by
ignorance of all differences posited in the definition of a refutation,
it is thus generic, and that way, all fallacies reduce to it.
Another way the distinction is made is that Ignorance of the
Point in Question is always contrary to all the differences of a
refutation, but in different ways, since in one way it is autonomous,
in another, different from a consequent. In the first way, there is a
single principle of deception from one opposite divided against the
others; the second way it is generic to all. One is said to ignore
refutation from a consequent when, since there is one name, he
believes there is one thing, though there is no one thing. Since he
believes there is one thing, he believes from the consequent that
there is one term; and from the consequent that there is one middle
term; and consequently one syllogism. And then further through
this, he believes that there is a single refutation. In this way,
Ignorance of the Point in Question is from a consequent.
Another way, the point at issue is ignored in itself and is
ignored in its parts from the consequent, when first it is believed
that there is a refutation when there is none. Believing there is a
refutation, one believes all differences of a refutation are present.
That way a refutation is overlooked first, its parts or all its

differences are overlooked as a consequence. In this way it is
specific, as happens in one way when going from defining things (as
from a genus and differences) to the thing defined, and conversely
from the thing defined to those that define it. Though the second
distinction is more subtle than the first, the third is more probable
and I believe it more to be true.
On generic Reduction
180 Reduction of paralogisms as well as fallacious refutations

to Ignorance of the Point in Question is of two sorts, generic and
specific. Generic reduction is in the fact that all are unmodified.
But 'lack of modification' is ambiguous, since its opposite, modific
ation, is ambiguous. Just as syllogistic necessity is ambiguous: one
sort is caused by quantity, quality, order of propositions and terms
of a syllogism; so too modification, as syllogistic moods are
determined in Prior Analytics. Lack of modification opposed to
modification is to be determined in Prior Analytics, where it is
called a useless selection. 96 Syllogistic necessity caused in a
specific syllogism is different. This necessity too is ambiguous,
since one is caused by Topical relationships, as in a dialectic
syllogism, the other by pairing cause to effect, as in a demonstrative
syllogism. In the same way, modification owed a specific syllogism
is ambiguous. But this is nothing other than inferential necessity
through Topical relationships as far as a dialectical syllogism is
concerned, or pairing cause to effect in a demonstrative one. Lack
of modification as opposed to modification caused by source topical
is discussed in the Elenchi, 97 since another sort of modification
lack (which has to do with the relation of cause to effect or the
converse), is determined in the Posterior Analytics, since it is a
pseudo-syllogism. So when Aristotle says they are all unmodified,
understand that for the modification lack which has to with with
modification caused by Topical relationships and not about others.
95: Anal. Prior. I 4-22.

96: ibid. I 28, 44b26.
97: Soph. El. 6, 168a 21ff.
98: Anal. Post. I 2, 71 b9ff.
99: Soph. El. 6, 168a 18-21.
On specific Reduction
181 Specific reduction is to demonstrate how, through each

sophistical Topic, common differences of syllogisms and contradict
ions are ignored, or differences peculiar to each. Through this, a
refutation is further ignored, because just as a difference added to a
genus constitutes a species, a contradiction added to a syllogism
constitutes a refutation. Therefore a contradiction is the complem
ent of a syllogism. So any difference of a refutation is either
common to a syllogism and a contradiction, or what is a peculiarity
of the former is a peculiarity of the latter. Therefore, through
ignorance of them, Ignorance of the Point in Question arises.
182 Therefore Aristotle reduces apparent syllogisms and

refutations to ignorance of the point at issue, saying 'equivocation,
word-group and similar formation are reduced in that they are
ambiguous. 100 He posits a double defect in term, syllogism and
contradiction, and for that reason, in a refutation. How ambiguity is
in word-figure was already discussed. 101 Anyone can see that in
equivocation and amphiboly. But composition, division and accent
reduce in that there is a different, not the same, word-group or
name. A word-group had to be somehow referentially the same, if
either a refutation or syllogism were to arise.
183 He next reduces seeming syllogisms and extralinguistic

refutations to ignorance of the point in question, saying: 'those con
nected with Accident are clear, once syllogism has been defined'. 102
For they pose a defect in the particular 'happening of necessity' put
into the definition of a syllogism. Thus a defect of Accident is
clear. In terms of this fallacy, specialists and the all-knowing are
refuted by the ignorant. On the basis of the fallacy of Accident
they produce apparent syllogisms against the wise. Those that are
fallacies after-a-fashion and simply are reduced, because affirm
ation and negation do not concern the same thing, as in 'an
Ethiopian is white as to the teeth', 'an Ethiopian is not white'.
184 Then he reduces those which are fallacies on the basis of

ignorance of the point in question insofar as it is specific, saying:
'clearest of all are the already cited fallacies based on ignorance of
the point in question, which is why they are called that.' 103
100: Soph. El. 6, 168a 24-25.

101: p. 115 ff. above.
102: Soph. El. 6, 168a 34-35.
185 He later reduces others, saying, 'paralogisms that are such

because the original point in question is assumed and those of non-
cause posited as cause are obvious by definition; a conclusion should
arise of necessity, from the fact that what were not in non-causes
would be so, and again a conclusion should follow without including
what was in principle, which those do not have which are based on
seeking what was in principle. 104
186 He later reduces Fallacies of Consequent, saying, 'fall

acies connected with the consequent are reduced like those of accid
ent, for a consequent is part of accident'. 105 That way, when a
fallacy of Accident is reduced, so is one of Consequence. That a
consequent is part of accident is clear from what we have said of
the latter, since as was said,106 in one way, an antecedent is
accident to its consequent, in another, a consequent is accident to
its antecedent, and in a third, one is convertible with the other. For
that reason, accident is common to what antecedes, follows upon,
and converts with it. A consequent / that which follows is thus
necessarily part of accident, since antecedent is common to these
three.
187 But notice that one Topic is not part of another. It cannot
be said the sophistical Topic as to consequent is a subjective or
integral part of the sophistical Topic as to accident. So understand
that a consequent is part of accident from the side of the terms in
which it arises, not from the side of those sophistical relationships
or sophistical Topics. Just as the Topic from species is not part of
the Topic from genus, but those things of which these are relation
ships are so constituted that one is part of the other. So a conse
quent is a quasi subjective part of an accident from the side of those
things in which they arise, and not from the side of those sophistical
relationships. This is what Aristotle proves according to which a
consequent is part of accident, when he says 'for a consequent is an
accident'. 107 It is true likewise that an antecedent is an accident
and likewise that a convertible is an accident, as was said in the
tract on accident. 108
103: Soph. El. 6, 168b 17-18.

104: Soph. El. 6, 168b 22-26.
105: Soph. El. 7, 169b6-7.
106: Soph. El. 6, 168b 28.
107: Soph. El. 6, 168b 28.
108: p. 129 ff.
188 The fallacy of Consequent has another reduction peculiar

to itself. It posits a defect against the syllogistic difference 'things
posited". This is clear, since affirming the greater does not affirm
the less, as 'animal' does not affirm 'man'. A consequent does not
affirm its antecedent, since it is greater, but the converse. So since
the difference 'things posited' speaks of the order of premises to
conclusion based on Topical relationships (sophistical Topics determ
ined in the Elenchi being contrary to a syllogism through Topic-
relationships), where there is a consequent, there is no order of
premises to conclusion on the basis of some Topic-relationships.
Because where there is a consequent, the difference 'things pos
ited' is not found. So through this 'things posited' difference, the
fallacy of consequent is of itself reduced, positing as it does a
defect in that difference.
Notice too, as often touched upon, that 'posit' is ambiguous in a

syllogism. One sort of positing is through quantity, quality and the
order of propositions and terms. That is how the difference 'things
posited' is taken in Prior Analytics. 109 A different sort of positing
in a syllogism is that through Topic-relationships; that is the sort
found in a dialectical syllogism. The sophistical source according to
the consequent is counter to this positing.
189 Those producing a fallacy because they make many quest

ions as one are reduced because they posit a defect contrary to the
unity of a proposition. A proposition is a unit about one thing, since
the definition of 'one only' is identical with that of 'thing taken
simply', like that 'man' and 'man only', and so of others. So if one
only proposition is what signifies one thing of one thing, it will be a
proposition simply, which signifies one thing of one thing. This is
the source from parts sufficiently enumerated.
190 Having concluded generic, then specific reduction on the

ing basis of differences of refutation and contradition, Aristotle
next determines which sophistical Topics are reduced from the
aspect of contradiction and which from the aspect of syllogism,
saying:110 'therefore those that are word-based are reduced since
there is an apparent contradiction, which is peculiar to refutation;
the others are reduced according to the definition of a syllogism'.
Let these remarks on fallacies and on their reduction suffice.
109: Anal, Priora I 1, 24b 18-19.

110: Soph. El. 6, 169a 19-21.
TRACT VIII
ON RELATIVES
On two kinds of Relative
1 There are two kinds of Relatives: one for which existing is
somehow to-be-to-another, so one of the ten Predicaments. The
other is what recalls something gone before, since as Priscian Major
has it, relation is a recalling of what is past. In 'Socrates, the one
who is debating, is running', the relative 'who' (qui) effects recall
of Socrates, who is what is past. Omitting relatives in the first
mode, we now have those of the second in mind.
On Substantive Relatives
2 Some relatives recall a substance, like '(the one) who' (qui),
'(that one) who' (ille), Kan other one') (alius), some recall an
accident, like '(the kind) who' (talis), '(such) that' (qualis), 'as
many (as)' (tantus), 'so much (as)' (quantus). A substantive relative
is one that recalls what is numerically identical with its antecedent,
like '(the one) who' (qui), '(that) one who' (ille). Again: Some
substantive relatives recall an identity, like '(the one) who' (oui),
'(that) one who' (ille); others recall something diverse, like vthe
first) one' (alter), '(the) other (one) who' (reliquus) and the like.
On Identical Relatives
3 A
Relative of Identity is what recalls and stands for the
same thing. In 'Socrates, the one who is debating, is running', the
relative 'who' recalls and stands for Socrates.
Some relatives of identity are nouns, like 'who' (qui), 'which'
(quod); some pronouns, like '(that) one' (ille), '(the) same (one)'
(idem); some reciprocal, like '(of) oneself' (sui), '(to) oneself'
1: cf. Aristot. Categ. 7, 8a31-32, editio compos, p. 62.

2: Inst. gramm. XVII.56. p. 141.
VIII: ON RELATIVES 165
(sibi), 'oneself (se), 'by oneself' (a se); others non-reciprocal,
like 'who' (qui), 'that' (ille), 'same' (Idem). A reciprocal is so-
called, not because it is what-is-undergoing-something (patiens), but
because it superimposes a patient mode on agent substance. Being a
patient is one thing, mode of patient another, as is clear from the
fact that a nominative can be a patient, like 'Socrates is being
struck'. But a nominative cannot have the mode of patient. That is
why mode of patient is always in oblique cases. It is thus clear that
patient is one thing and mode of patient another.
Questions
4 If asked what a reciprocal relative adds to an agent, say it
adds substantial identity to an agent and puts it under the mode of
patient, as in 'Socrates sees himself'. A substance previously under
the mode of agent is put under the mode of patient, as in the pro
noun himself' (se). So a reciprocal can be defined as follows: a
reciprocal is what signifies an agent substance under a patient mode.
5 Again: If asked why the pronoun '(of) oneself' (sui), '(to)
oneself' (sibi), oneself' (se), '(by) oneself' (a se) lacks a
nominative, say the solution is already obvious from what was said:
an agent cannot be signified as a patient, nor under the mode of
patient, except in oblique cases. But the nominative means mode of
agent. For that reason, the nature of nominative is repugnant to the
nature of the pronoun Kof) oneself' (sui), '(to) oneself' (sibi),
'oneself' (se), '(by) oneself' (a se). For that reason, that pronoun
cannot have an agent nominative.
6 From what was said it is clear that all relatives of identity
recall a substance identical with its antecedent and that they recall
and stand for the numerically same thing. It is also clear from this,
that more certainty is effected by a relative of identity than by its
antecedent substituted for a relative. In 'a man is running, a man is
debating', it is dubious whether the same man is spoken of or not.
But in saying: 'a man is running and that is the one who is debating',
it is certain that the same man is spoken of. This is clear by what
Priscian has in his Minor, that in saying: 'Ajax came to Troy, Ajax
fought bravely' it is dubious whether it is to be understood of the
same person. But if one says: 'Ajax came to Troy and the same one
fought bravely', it is understood to be about the same one. So it is
obvious that more certainty is effected by a relative of identity than
by its antecedent substituted for a relative.
3: Inst. gramm. XVII 56, p. 142.7-11.

Doubts
7 A doubt usually raised about relatives of identity is whether
deception resulting from diverse relation is one based on Equivoc
ation, Amphiboly, or some other fallacy. In 'a man sees an ass who
is rational' (homo videt asinum qui est rationalis) the relative
'who' can be referred to the term 'man' or the term 'ass'. There
are thus diverse statements there. Equivocation is wont to be
commonly assigned.
There are counterarguments: The noun 'who' (qui),4 as a
relative, signifies a single thing as equally related to every object
that exists under the mode of substance, as in 'a man who runs', 'a
color which is in a body', 'a place which contains a thing located1,
etc. Therefore deception from diverse relation is not a fallacy of
equivocation. Again: The noun 'who' as a relative, signifies sub-
stance indeterminately. But that substance is naturally apt to be
determined just as well by one antecedent as by another. Therefore
since substance taken indeterminately as such is a unit, able to
recall any antecedent whatever, therefore the signification of the
relative 'qui' will be unitary. Therefore it is not equivocation.
Again: The nature of any antecedent at all, as it is in a thing
related, is unitary, namely, this thing that is recalled. Therefore all
antecedents of a relative, on the basis of a relative noun, share a
single name and a single nature. Therefore a relative is univocal
insofar as recalling a thing gone before. Therefore particular
relatives, like 'who' (qui), 'that' (ille), 'other' (alius), insofar as
recalling their antecedents, are not equivocal.
If one object that the relative 'who' (qui) is of one nature as
taken in its antecedent 'man' and of another as taken in the
antecedent 'ass', as in the word-group above, therefore the noun is
common but has diverse natures, therefore it is equivocal - say that
argument is invalid. It could be proven in the same way that any
univocal is equivocal, as 'animal', taken as a man or as in a man,
has a one nature, and as it is in a horse or is a horse, another
nature. So the noun 'animal' is common yet not equivocal, but
univocal.
8 Solve this briefly by saying that just as univocals are said to
have the same nature, not of themselves, but in one using them uni-
vocally, like 'man', 'cow', 'horse' and the like in 'animal', so too,
4: English prefers 'a man who...', 'an ass which...' [fpd]

all relatives ought to have the same nature, not of themselves, but
in one using them to recall, or in what they recall, and that they also
have the same name. Univocals are therefore used univocally by
that fact. But his objection is about the nature of relative things as
such, so we concede the objector's contentions. I thus concede that
deception effected by diversity of relation is not equivocation.
Again: That sort of deception is in the ordering of words (dictio)
among themselves. Therefore it is in a word-group, since a word
ordering is nothing other than a word-group. Therefore it is not
equivocation, since equivocation is to be found only in a single word.
9 Again: I prove there is no amphiboly here, since wherever

amphiboly occurs there is a construction of one unit with another
unit, like the word-group 'Aristotle's book' for the first mode; in
'plow sand' (litus aratur) for the second, and 'knowing age' (scit
saeculum) for the third. So it is clear inductively through all the
modes of amphiboly, that wherever it exists, there is a construction
of one thing only with another single thing. But wherever a fallacy
of diverse relation arises, it is not a construction of one thing only
with another single thing, indeed it is a construction of one thing
with diverse things. Therefore deception from diverse relation does
not produce Amphiboly. Which we concede.
Again: Wherever there is deception from the fact that some

word (dictio) can be related to different things, there is a fallacy of
composition and division. But deception from diverse relation arises
from the fact that some word can be related to different things.
Therefore deception from diverse relation is a fallacy of compos
ition or division. And this we again concede.
On Relatives of Diversity
10 Next about Relatives of Diversity. A Relative of Diversity

is what stands for something other than what it recalls, as in 'Soc
rates is running and another is debating' (Sortes currit et alius
disputat). The relative 'another' (alius) recalls Socrates and stands
for someone other than Socrates, for the sense is 'Socrates is runn
ing and someone other than Socrates is debating' (Sortes currit et
alius a Sorrte disputat). And in this way it recalls Socrates to mind.
On a rule about a Relative of Diversity
11 This sort of rule is given for a relative of diversity:
If a r e l a t i v e of d i v e r s i t y i s a d d e d
to a s u p e r i o r a n d to an i n f e r i o r ,
w h a t is a d d e d t o t h e s u p e r i o r is m a d e
i n f e r i o r , a n d w h a t is a d d e d t o t h e
i n f e r i o r is m a d e s u p e r i o r .
For example, 'something other than animal; therefore something
other than man' (aliud ab animali; ergo aliud ab homine). This is a
Topic from Species, since in 'something other than animal', the
relative of diversity ('something other than') is added to 'animal',
which is superior to man, and in 'something other than man' it is
added to the inferior, namely 'man'. For that reason, 'something
other than animal' is inferior to 'something other than man'. And
for that reason, it is a Topic from Species or Subjective Part.
On a r u l e a b o u t a R e l a t i v e of I d e n t i t y
g i v e n by p r e d e c e s s o r s
12 A rule like this about a relative of identity is wont to be
given by earlier scholars.
No p r o p o s i t i o n begun by a relative
has a c o n t r a d i c t o r y .
They give a reason like this: in 'every man is running and he is
debating' (omnis homo currit et ille disputat), the relative 'he'
(ille) has respect to the antecedent 'man' because of the depend
ency of its relation. When negation comes to a proposition beginning
with a relative, expressed as follows: 'h is not debating' (ille non
disputat), then that negation negates the verb which follows, and
does not negate the respect of relation the relative has to its ante
cedent. Therefore the negation does not negate anything the
affirmation affirms. Therefore it does not contradict it. Therefore,
since this is the case in any proposition beginning with a relative, no
proposition beginning with a relative has a contradictory.
Objections
13 An objection is made against this. Whatever may negate

may also affirm something about any supposit. But a verb may make
a negation of any supposit, and so may make an affirmation. There
fore it may do that of a supposit that is a relative word (dictio).
Therefore any proposition beginning with a relative has a contra
dictory. Again: Any proposition or statement that is unitary has a
contradictory. But every proposition beginning with a relative, as
long as no equivocal word nor several subjects or predicates are in
it, is unitary. Therefore every proposition beginning with a relative
has a contradictory. Again: Aristotle, in the first book of On Inter
pretation, says a negation is opposed to any affirmation, and the
converse. Therefore an affirmation beginning with a relative.
We concede this, saying the rule quoted above is false.

14 We respond to their reason that a relative is paired both
with its antecedent and with the verb of which it is subject. Since
an affirmation and negation is a sentence affirming or denying one
thing of another (that is, a predicate of a subject), I say that, just as
is clear by the definition of affirmation and negation given, affirm
ation and negation regard only the pairing of subject to predicate.
Therefore in a proposition beginning with a relative, a contradiction
is taken only by pairing a subject to a predicate. Therefore only by
pairing a relative to the verb of which it is the subject, not by
pairing a relative to its antecedent. This way it is inappropriate to
deny the respect which a relative has to its antecedent, since that
respect is not there because of the nature of affirmation, nor
because of the dependence of subject-as-subject, but because of a
dependence of that which is the subject. For subject-as-subject is
one thing, that which is the subject another, just as predicate-as-
predicate is one thing, and that which is the predicate another. So
whatever is affirmed in a proposition beginning with a relative is
denied in its contradictory. And the contradictory of 'he is debat
ing' (ille disputat) is: 'it is not he debating' (non ille disputat),
with the negative preposed to the relative.
5: De interp. 6, 17a31-33.
On a certain rule about a
R e l a t i v e of I d e n t i t y
15 A rule like this about a Relative of Identity is given:
e v e r y n o n - r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i v e of identit
should have the same supposition as its
antecedent.
In 'every man is running and he is Socrates' (omnis homo currit et
ille est Sortes), the relative 'he' (ille) stands for every man, and
the sense is: 'that one is Socrates', that is, every man is Socrates.
But I say 'non-reciprocal', because in saying 'every man is seeing
himself' (omnis homo videt se), the sense is not 'every man is
seeing every man'. So in place of the reciprocal relative 'himself'
(se), it is illicit to put its antecedent; but in place of another, it is
licit.
On Relatives of Accident
16 Having discussed substantive relatives, we now must take
up Accidental Relatives. A Relative of Accident is what recalls the
same thing by way of denomination, as '(being) that sort' (tale),
'(being) which sort' (quale) and the like. So this is a difference
between a substantive and an accidental relative, that a relative of
substance recalls the univocal thing or recalls by its mode, which is
'(being) something' (quid), like 'whiteness which is in a wall', 'color
that is in a body', and so of the others - while a relative of accident
is what recalls the thing by mode of denomination, as 'Socrates is
white and Plato is that sort' (Sortes est albus et talis est Plato).
Another difference between them is that a substantial relative

recalls a numerically identical thing, while an accidental relative
recalls a specifically identical thing, as in 'Socrates is white and
Plato is that sort', since a numerically identical accident cannot
exist in different subjects, but a specifically identical accident can.
On division of a Relative of Accident
17 Accidental Relative is divided, since a relative of identity
like '(being) that sort' (talis) is one thing, while a relative of
diversity like '(being) of another sort' (alteriusmodi) is another. A
Relative of Identity in Accidents is what recalls a specifically ident
ical accident and stands for one and the same species, as in 'Socrat
es is white, and Plato is that sort'. A Relative of Diversity in Accid-
ents is what recalls a specifically identical Quality and stands for a
specifically different quality, as in 'Socrates is white and Plato is of
another sort' (Sortes est albus et alteriusmodi est Plato).
A relative of substantial identity differs from one of accid
ental identity, because a relative of substantial identity recalls a
numerically identical substance, while a relative of accidental
identity does not recall a numerically identical accident, but rather
one specifically identical.
On Relatives of Accidental Identity
18 Again: One kind of Relative of Identity in Accidents is a

Relative of Quality, like 'that sort' (talis), 'what sort' (qualis);
another is a Relative of Quantity, like '(so) many as' (tantus), '(so)
much as' (quantus). Again: Relatives of Quantity are either of
continuous quantity, like '(so) many as' (quantus) or Relatives of
Number, like '(so) many (as)' (tot), '(so) often (as)' (totidem).
Again: some Relatives of Number are nouns, like '(so) many (as)'
(tot), some adverbs, like 'so often as' (toties).
On t h e w o r d s ( d i c t i  ) s u c h , so g r e a t ,
so m a n y , a s o f t e n , so o f t e n
19 Note that 'such' (talis), 'so great' (tantus) 'so many'
(tot), and 'so often as' (totidem) can be relatives, demonstratives,
or responsives. Said of things present, they are demonstratives (e.g.,
pointing to a lake and saying 'just like the Nile' (talis est Nilus) or
to Hercules, with 'Plato is as big as he is' (tantus est Plato) and so
on. If not said of things present, i.e. by pointing at things that are
here, they are relatives or responsives. The latter are properly
responsive when answering a preceding question, like 'h is the sort
that Plato is' (talis est qualis est Plato) in answer to 'what sort of
a person is Socrates ?' (qualis est Sortes ?). They are relatives when
proferred though no question has been put, as in The way Plato is,
is the way Socrates was' (qualis est Plato, talis fuit Sortes), and
when adjective nouns of Special Accidents are mentioned, as in 'An
Ethiopian is black and such is a crow' (Ethiops est niger et talis est
corvus) or 'Socrates was white and such was Plato' (Sortes fuit
albus et talis est Plato).
And this should suffice about relatives.
TRACT IX
ON EXTENSIONS
On Personal Supposition
1 Personal Supposition is the acceptance of a common term
for its inferiors. One sort is determinate and the other diffuse, as
was clear above. Again: There is another division of personal
supposition: one restricted, the other extended. So Restriction and
Extension have to do with Personal Supposition.
On Restriction and Extension
2 Restriction is the narrowing of a common term from a
larger to a smaller supposition. In 'a white man is running' the
adjective 'white' restricts 'man' to standing for whites.
Extension is the broadening of a common term from a smaller
to a larger supposition. In 'a man can be the Antichrist', the term
'man' not only stands for those who exist, but also for those who
will, and so it is extended to men in the future. I say 'of a common
term', since a discrete term like 'Socrates' is neither restricted nor
extended.
On the Division of Extension
3 One type of Extension is effected by a verb, like 'can' in 'a
man can be the Antichrist'; by a noun, as in 'for a man to be the
Antichrist is a possibility' (hominem esse Antichristum est poss
ibile); by a participle, as in 'a man enabled to be the Antichrist'
(homo est potens esse Antichristus); by an adverb, as in 'a man is
necessarily an animal'. Here, 'man' is extended not only for present
time, but also for the future. For that reason, another division of
extension follows: one with respect to supposits, as in 'a man can
1: p. 71.
IX: ON EXTENSIONS 173
be the Antichrist', another with respect to time, as in 'a man is

necessarily an animal', as was said.
A Sophism
4 In connection with what was said, this sophism is questioned:
'the impossible can be true'. Proof: What is or will be impossible
can be true, as for the Antichrist not to have been (Antichristum
non fuisse) will be impossible after his time, yet it can be true now,
since it is true. Therefore the impossible can be true. Counterargu
ment: Whatever can be true, is possible. But the impossible can be
true. Therefore the impossible is possible. The argument is in the
third mood of the first figure. But the conclusion is false. There
fore one of the premises is false. Not the major. So the minor. But
this is the first. Therefore the first is false.
Solution: The first ('the impossible can be true') is simply
false. Its proof offends by Fallacy of Accident. When I say 'what is
or will be the impossible', I am talking about two things, namely the
subject of that impossibility, and impossibility itself, that which is
itself impossible. But for what is or will be the impossible, imposs
ibility or the impossible is an accident. So what is or will be
impossible is the subject matter and the impossible is its accident,
and 'can be true' is assigned being-in to each. As here:
'for the Antichrist not to have been will be the impossible
but for the Antichrist not to have been can be true
therefore the impossible can be true';
this is invalid, since for the Antichrist not to have been is the
subject and the impossible is its accident and can be true is
assigned being-in to both.
On two Rules
5 About Extension effected by reason of supposits, there is a
rule like this:
a c o m m o n t e r m w h i c h i s s u b j e c t of
a v e r b h a v i n g a b i l i t y t o e x t e n d , of
i t s e l f or f r o m a n o t h e r , is e x t e n d e d
to t h o s e t h i n g s w h i c h c a n be u n d e r
t h e f o r m of t h e s u b j e c t term
In 'a man is able to be white' (homo potest esse albus), the
term 'man' not only stands for present men, but is also extended to
all who will exist. I say 'of itself' because the verbal 'is able to be'
(potest) has of itself the nature of extending. I say 'from another'
because the participial 'having ability' (potens) and the nominal
'possibile' (possibile) confer ability to extend upon the verb to
which they are adjoined, as in 'a human is enabled to be white'
(homo est potens esse albus), or 'that an animal be white is
possible' (animal possibile est esse album).
6 About Extension effected by reason of tense, there is rule
like this:
a c o m m o n t e r m , s e r v i n g a s s u b j e c t or
a p p o s i t i v e of a v e r b h a v i n g a b i l i t y t o
e x t e n d as to t i m e , s t a n d s for t h o s e
t h i n g s w h i c h a r e a n d w h i c h will
always be.
In 'a man is necessarily an animal', both 'man' and 'animal' are

taken for things that are and always will be.
Let these remarks suffice about Extensions.
TRACT X
ON APPELLATIONS
On the Definition of Appellation

1 Appellation is the acceptance of a term for an existent
thing. I say 'for an existent thing' because a term signifying a non-
being like 'Caesar', 'Antichrist' and 'chimera' does not call up
anything (non appellat), and so on for the others.
Appellation differs from Supposition and from Signification,
since Appellation has only to do with an existent thing, while Signi
fication and Supposition concern both the existent and non-existent.
'Antichrist' signifies the Antichrist, and stands for the Antichrist,
but calls nothing up, but 'man' signifies man, and of its nature,
stands for both existents as well as non-existents, and calls up only
existent men.
On the Division of Appellation
2 One sort of Appellation is that of a common term like
'man'. Another is that of a singular term like 'Socrates'. A singular
term signifies, stands for, and calls up the same thing, because it
signifies an existent thing, like 'Peter' or 'John'.
On the Appellation of a Common Term
3 Again: one sort of common term Appellation is that of a
common term for the-thing-itself-in-common, as when a common
term has simple supposition, as in 'man is a species', or 'animcil is a
genus'. A common term then signifies, stands for, and calls up the
same thing, as 'man' signifies man-in-common, and stands for man-
in-common, and calls up man-in-common.
4 The Appellation of a common term for its inferiors is
another sort, as when a common term has Personal Supposition. In
'man rims', 'man' does not then signify, stand for, or call up the
same thing, but signifies 'man' in common, stands for particular
men, and calls up particular, existent men.
Let these remarks about Appellations suffice.
TRACT XI
ON RESTRICTIONS
On the definition of Restriction

1 Having discussed Extensions and Appellations, we must now
take up Restrictions. Restriction is the narrowing of a. common
term from a larger to a smaller supposition, as said before.
On the Division of Restriction
2 One kind of Restriction is effected by a noun. In 'a white
man', the term 'man' does not stand for blacks, nor for those of a
color in between, but is restricted to whites. Another is effected by
a verb. In 'a man is running', the term 'man' stands for men in
the present. Another is effected by a participle. In 'a man running
is debating', the term 'man' stands for men running. Another is by
a restrictive relative clause (implicatio). In 'the man who is white
is running' the 'who is white' restricts 'man' to whites.
On Restriction effected by a Noun
3 Again: One sort of nominal restriction is effected by an
inferior put next to a superior. In 'animal-man' the term 'animal'
stands only for animals that are men. Another is by a difference
added to a genus, a difference that is essential since it is constit
utive of a species. In 'rational animal', the term 'animal' stands
for rationals only. Another sort is by an accidental Adjective.
In 'a white man', the term 'man' stands for whites only.
On a rule about Restriction effected
by a N o u n
4 A rule like this about Restriction by a noun, taken common
ly, is given:
1: p. 172 above.
e v e r y noun not d i m i n i s h i n g , nor h a v i n g
a b i l i t y of e x t e n d i n g , a d j o i n e d f r o m t h e
same w o r d - g r o u p - p a r t to a common term,
r e s t r i c t s t h a t t e r m to s t a n d i n g for t h o s e
things its signification demands.
This is clear in the examples cited above. For 'man' by its signi
fication restricts 'animal' to animals that are men in 'animal-
man', and 'white' restricts men by its signification to white men
in 'white man'. Í say 'not diminishing' to exclude nominals dimin
ishing the nature of an adjunct, like 'dead', 'corrupt' and the like:
they do not restrict but rather destroy what they are adjoined to. I
say 'nor having ability of extending' to exclude extensive words
(dictiones) like 'possible', 'capable' and their like, which do not
restrict, but rather extend.
5 Note that the less always restricts the more common. That
is the case with 'white man', since 'man' is found in men white,
black and in between, but 'white' is not. To that extent, 'man' is
the more and 'white' the less common, so 'white' restricts man.
But as 'white' is found in men as well as in brute animals and stones
while 'man' is not, 'white' is the more and 'man' the less
common. So 'man' restricts 'white' to the whiteness existing in
men in 'white man'. And 'man' stands only for white men and
'white' is narrowed to whiteness in men. In this way, each narrows
the other, but as to different things.
On a rule about a Restricted Term
6 Again: A rule like this is given about a restricted term:
if a u n i v e r s a l m a r k e r c o m e s n e x t t o a
r e s t r i c t e d t e r m , it d o e s not d i s t r i b u t e
i t , e x c e p t for t h o s e to w h i c h it is
restricted.
Take 'every white man is running' for example: since 'man' is
restricted to white men, it cannot be distributed except for white
men.
On another rule about Restriction
7 Again: Another rule like this is given about Restriction:
n o t h i n g p o s i t e d from the p r e d i c a t e
side can r e s t r i c t a common term
XI: ON RESTRICTIONS 179
posited from the subject side as

to its p r i n c i p a l signification.
In 'a man is white', the term 'white' posited in the predicate

cannot restrict 'man' posited in the subject to whites. For if it
were restricted to whites, therefore (by the preceding rule) 'if a
universal marker comes next to it', it would only distribute it for
whites. So in 'every man is white', the term 'man' is taken only
for whites. Its sense is thus: 'every white man is white'. So these
are equipollent: 'every man is white' and 'every white man is
white'. Therefore if the first is true, so is the second; and if one is
false, so is the other. This is true: 'every white man is white'.
Therefore this will be true as well: 'every man is white'. But it is
false. Therefore the first one is false as well. Therefore in 'every
man is white', the term 'white' is not restricted to whites. And
that is how this rule is clear.
I say 'as to its principal signification', because a predicate

restricts its subject as to consignification. In 'a citizen is white'
(albus) the term 'citizen' is restricted to males and not whites, so
'white' restricts it as to consignification, which is gender, and not as
to its principal signification.
On t w o r u l e s a b o u t R e s t r i c t i o n effected
b y a R e s t r i c t i v e R e l a t i v e C l a u s e ( implicatio )
8 Again; A rule like this is given about Restriction by an

Restrictive Relative Clause (implicatio):
every implication immediately adjoined

to a c o m m o n t e r m r e s t r i c t s it just as
its a d j e c t i v e does.
In 'a man who is white is running', the term 'man' is restricted to

whites by the restrictive relative clause (implicatio) 'who is white'.
9 Again: A rule like this is given about the same Restriction:
as o f t e n as a u n i v e r s a l m a r k e r and an
i m p l i c a t i o n a r e p l a c e d in t h e same
l o c u t i o n , t h e w o r d - g r o u p is ambiguous.
This is from the fact that the marker can precede an implication and
thus distribute a common term for any of its supposits, as in 'every
man is running who is white'. Or the Implication can come first and
restrict the common term, then the universal marker that comes
after it does not distribute that term except for those to which it is
restricted, as in 'every man, who is white, is running'. It is then
equipollent to: 'every white man is running'.
On some rules about Restriction
e f f e c t e d by a Verb
10 Next, on restriction effected by the verb, about which
several rules are given. The first is like this:
a c o m m o n t e r m s t a n d i n g as s u b j e c t or
c o m i n g n e x t to a p r e s e n t t e n s e v e r b
t a k e n s i m p l y , not having a b i l i t y to
e x t e n d of i t s e l f n o r f r o m a n o t h e r , i s
r e s t r i c t e d to s t a n d i n g for w h a t a r e
u n d e r t h e f o r m of t h e s u b j e c t term.
I say 'of a common term' because a discrete term is neither re
stricted nor extended. I say 'present tense' to exclude verbs in
other tenses, because a common term has different supposition with
them. I say 'taken simply' to exclude diminishers like 'it is think
able' or 'unthinkable'. I say 'not having ability to extend', to
exclude extensive verbs like 'is able to'. I say 'neither of itself or
from another', because in saying 'is able to' or 'is possible to',
even though the verb 'is' does not of itself extend, it does have ex
tensive potential through its adjuncts. I say 'under the form of the
subject term', because 'man' stands for what are under humanity,
and 'animal' for what are under animality, in 'a man is an animal'.
11 Again: Another such rule is given:
a c o m m o n t e r m , s t a n d i n g as s u b j e c t or
c o m i n g n e x t to a p a s t v e r b s i m p l y taken
b u t n o t h a v i n g a b i l i t y t o e x t e n d o f it-
s e l f n o r f r o m a n o t h e r , is r e s t r i c t e d t o
s t a n d i n g for t h o s e t h i n g s w h i c h a r e or
w e r e u n d e r t h e f o r m of t h e s u b j e c t
term.
In 'a man was an animal', the term 'man' stands for those who are
or were men, if those who are men were men in the past, and
'animal' stands for those who are or were animals.
12 Again: Another rule:
a c o m m o n t e r m s t a n d i n g a s s u b j e c t or
c o m i n g n e x t to a f u t u r e v e r b e t c . ,
s t a n d s for t h o s e t h i n g s w h i c h a r e or
w i l l b e u n d e r t h e f o r m of t h e s u b j e c t
t e r m , if t h o s e t h i n g s t h a t a r e , w i l l b e
in t h e f u t u r e .
As in 'a man will be an animal'.

13 From what was said it is clear that a verb restricts as to
consignification, which is time, and not as to its Signification.
A Sophism
14 On the basis of all that, inquiry is made of this sophism:
'every animal was in Noah's ark. Proof: Man was in Noahs' ark;
Horse and Cow were in Noah's ark, and so on for each one. There
fore every animal was in Noah's ark.
Counterargument: Every kind of animal was in Noah's ark.
Caesar was an animal. Therefore Caesar was in Noah's ark. But
that is false. Therefore one of the premises is false. Not the minor.
Therefore the major. I prove the first premise is false, for there is a
rule3 that a common term standing for something, or coming next to
a verb, etc., is restricted to standing for what are, or were, or will
be, under the form of the subject term. Another rule4 is: if a uni
versal Marker accompanies a restricted term, it distributes it for
everything to which it is restricted. So in 'every animal was in
Noah's ark', the term 'animal' stands for every animal that existed
in the past. But there existed many animals in the past which were
not in Noah's ark. Therefore the first premise is false.
Again to the same point: In the proposition: 'every animal
which then existed, was in Noah's ark', the term 'animal' is more
restricted than in 'every animal was in Noah's ark', because in
'every animal was in Noah's ark', the term 'animal' is restricted to
what existed in the past simply, while in the former it is restricted
only to those which were in that past by the implication put there.
2: See below, p. 182.

3: See above, p. 180.
Therefore since only those which existed in that past were in Noah's
ark, and not others, this 'every animal was in Noah's ark' should be
false, since in it, more than that are stood for.
Solution: Some say 'every animal was in Noah's ark' is

ambiguous because there can be distribution for singulars within
genera, or for genera of singulars. In the first way it is false, since
when distribution is for singulars of genera, distribution is then for
all individuals under the genus and species. Then it would be
appropriate for all individuals contained under animal to have been
in Noah's ark. And that is false. But when distribution is made for
genera of singulars, there is only distribution for genera or species.
But there was no species of animal which would not have been in
Noah's ark. And in that way, the first premise is true.
I do not agree with that solution, because animal species were

not of themselves in Noah's ark, only individuals. So it did not have
truth at that time except for single members of genera, that is, for
individuals, not for genera of singulars. So I say the first premise
simply taken is false, and concede all arguments for this. But the
proof offends by Fallacy of Consequent from Insufficient Enumerat
ion, because it does not accept all parts of the distribution which are
in the subject of the proposition 'every animal was in Noah's ark'.
Question
15 It is usually asked whether terms are restricted in a negat

ive the same way they are in an affirmative proposition. It seems
they are not. Some say 'be' restricts to existents, and 'not be' to
non-existents. Again: It seems every negative in which 'be' is
simply negated, is therefore false, if terms are restricted similarly
in affirmative and negative. In 'there is a rose', the term 'rose1 is
restricted to existents. Therefore, if in 'a rose there is not' it is
similarly restricted to existents, its sense is 'a rose which there is,
is not'. This is false. Therefore so is 'a rose there is not'. So any
negative in which 'b' simply taken is negated, is false. But that is
false. So it seems that terms are not restricted the same way in the
affirmative and negative.
I prove they are similarly restricted: if in 'there is a man',

the term 'man' is restricted to existents, and in 'there is not a
man' to non-existents, both are therefore true, since of existents,
' is truly predicated; of non-existents, truly denied. Therefore
two contradictories are simultaneously true. Which is impossible.
Therefore what it follows from is impossible, namely, that terms are
not restricted the same way in the affirmative and negative.
Again: There is a rule that
every verb simply taken, lacking abil

i t y of i t s e l f or f r o m a n o t h e r t o extend,
r e s t r i c t s its s u b j e c t t e r m as to its
consignification ( w h i c h is t i m e ) , n o t as
to its signification.
Therefore Tense is the cause of that restriction. But tense remains

identical in affirmative and negative opposites, as in 'there is a
rose, 'there is not a rose'. Therefore for the same things, restrict
ion is effected in both.
And we concede these arguments.
16 To the first objection, say the verb 'be' no more restricts

to existents than 'run' restricts to runners, since no verb restricts
its subject term as to its signification, but as to consignification,
which is time. So it does not restrict to existent, but to present,
supposits. Present supposits can be in some terms, whether exist
ents or nonexistents. In 'it is assertable', the term 'assertable'
stands both for existents and non-existents. All assertions false in
the present, are present but non-existents, since no false thing is. 5
In this way, 'be' does not restrict to things existent but to things
present. So in like fashion, 'not be' does not restrict to non-
existents, but to things present, since tense is the same in both, and
that is the cause of Restriction.
17 To the second, say the form of a common term is ambigu

ous: one kind is that only realized in existent things, like
'humanity', the form of a man, and 'animality', that of an animal.
In such terms, all present supposits are existents. The other is form
of a common term realized both in existents and non-existents, like
'assertability', which is an assertable form, since some assertables
are existents, like 'God exists' and all true, others are non-
existents, like 'man is an ass' and all false. In such as these, when a
common term is restricted to things present, it is restricted to
existents and non-existents as well. So the sense of the proposition
'a rose there is not' is not: 'a rose which there is, is not', but
rather, 'a rose, taken presently, there is not'.
3: i.e., exists.
On Restriction effected by Usage
It is commonly held that another sort of restriction is effected
by usage. For example, 'there is nothing in the box', though the
box is full of air, since the term 'nothing' by usage stands for solid
or firm things. And 'the king is coming' stands for the king of one's
own country, and 'teacher is lecturing', for one's own teacher.
On R e s t r i c t i o n e f f e c t e d by a
verb's Transitivity
19 It is also commonly held that there is another kind of
restriction effected of the transitivity of a verb. In 'Socrates feeds
man', the term 'man' stands for someone other than Socrates by
virtue of the transitivity of the verb, since giver and receiver are of
themselves diverse. So feeder and fed should be different. If then
they are sometimes the same, this is by the accident that one and
the same thing is subject of the two, just as Duke and Bishop are
indentical by accident. So they say this does not follow:
'Socrates feeds himself
and he himself is a man
therefore he feeds man'.
Here there is a Fallacy of Accident, since the pronoun 'him-
self' cannot stand for someone different from Socrates, but 'man'
can.
And let these suffice on Restrictions.
6: trunk, strong-box, coffer.

TRACT XII
ON DISTRIBUTIONS
On the Definition of Distribution
1 Distribution is the multiplication of a common term effect
ed by a universal marker (signum). In 'every man', the term 'man'
is distributed or diffused for any of its inferiors by the marker
'every' (omnis), and that is the way multiplication of a common
term occurs. I say 'of a common term' because a singular term
cannot be distributed. That is why 'every Socrates', 'every Plato',
and their like are incongruous. Solecism in word-group-parts
(partes orationis) is also found there.
On Universal Markers
2 Some universal markers are distributive of Substance, such
as 'every (one)', 'not a (one)' (nullus) and the like. Others
distributive of Accidents, such as 'of whatever kind' (qualiscum-
que), 'of however many' (quantuscumque). A marker distributive of
substance is one distributing things defined through the mode 'what'
(quid), such as 'every (one)', 'not a (one)' (nullus) as in 'every
whiteness' and 'every blackness'. So 'substance' is taken commonly
with respect to things of whatever kind, when 'a marker distributive
of substance' is used. A marker distributive of accident is what
distributes things defined through the mode of an accident, as
through the mode of 'what kind' (qualis) or 'how many' (quanti), as
in 'of whatever kind' or 'of however many'.
On markers distributive of Substance

3 Again: Some markers distributive of substance are distrib
utive of Integral Parts, like 'whole' (totus), others of Subjective
Parts, like 'every (one)', 'not a (one? (nullus), 'either (one)'
(uterque). Again: some markers distributive of subjective parts are
distributive of pairs, like 'either', 'neither' and their like; others of
several things, like 'every', 'not a' and their like.
On the marker 'every'
4 We must first discuss markers distributive of substance and

first among them, the marker 'every' (omnis). Note that in plural
number it is taken two ways: collectively, as in 'all (omnes) the
apostles are (the) twelve', where 'therefore these are (the) twelve'
does not follow, even if some have been pointed out. It is also taken
distributively or divisively, as in 'all men naturally desire to know'.
What it may signify
5 It is then asked what the marker 'every' signifies. It seems

to signify nothing, since every thing is either universal or singular.
But the marker 'every' signifies neither a universal nor a singular.
Therefore the marker 'every' signifies not a thing. Again to the
same point: 'every' is not predicable of one nor of several. There
fore it is neither universal nor singular. And so it signifies nothing.
On the contrary: Depending on whether a thing exists or not, a

word-group is said to be true or false. Therefore if 'every signi
fies nothing, neither truth nor falsity is caused in a word-group by
putting it in or taking it out. This is true: 'an animal is a man';
therefore so is 'every animal is a man'; but that is false; therefore
so is the first, namely that 'every' signifies nothing.
Solution: Say to the first, that 'every' does not signify

something as a universal, but that something is taken universally
for it signifies that a common term is taken for every one, as in
'every man'. This way, 'every' signifies a kind of thing. But 'thing'
(res) is ambiguous: one kind of thing is what can be made subject or
predicate, like 'man' or 'animal', 'runs' or 'debates'. It is to this
thing that one objects first and it is true that 'every' signifies
nothing, since every thing of that sort is either universal or singular
and 'every' signifies neither a universal nor a singular. But there is
a different kind of thing: the disposition of a thing that can be made
a subject or a predicate. That is the sort of thing the marker
'every' signifies. Truth or falsity in a word-group is caused both by
this as well as by that other sort of thing.
1: Cf. Arist., Metaph. I 1, 980al.

2: Cf. Arist., Categ. 5, 4b9-10, p.54.
3: Cf. Arist., De interpr. 7, 17b11-12 and 10, 20a9-10.
XII: ON DISTRIBUTIONS 187
6 It is objected that 'every' does not signify a disposition of a

subject, because in every syllogism, the middle term should be
repeated with its dispositions in the minor proposition. Therefore
we should syllogize as follows:
'every man is an animal;

Socrates is every man;
therefore Socrates is an animal1,
since 'every' is a disposition of the subject in the major proposit

ion; therefore it should be repeated in the minor. But that is false;
therefore 'every' is not a disposition of the subject.
Solution: dust as 'predicate' means two things (what is the

predicate and predicate-as-predicate), 'subject' means two things
as well: (what is the subject, and subject-as-subject). Accordingly,
disposition of subject is ambiguous. One kind of subject-disposition
is what it is subject of, like 'white', 'black' and other independent
dispositions. These are the ones that should be repeated in the
minor with the middle term. But the other is a disposition of
subject-as-subject, like 'every', 'not a' and all markers, whether
universal or particular. Dispositions of that sort ought not be
repeated in the minor proposition with the middle term, since they
are respective; they dispose a subject as paired with a predicate.
In 'every white man is running', the disposition 'white' should be
repeated, because it is independent and thus pertains to what the
subject is. But the disposition 'every' ought not be repeated,
because it is respective of subject to predicate, and so pertains to.
subject-as-subject. Therefore we ought to say something like:
'every white man runs

Socrates is a white man
therefore Socrates runs'
not
'Socrates is every white man.'
Whether it demands three Appellates
7 Having discussed what the marker 'every' signifies, and

what sort of disposition it signifies, it is next asked whether it
demands three appellates. It seems that it does, since every
perfection is in threes, as the beginning of On heaven and earth has
4: Arist., De coelo I 1, 268all.

it. Therefore what is perfect is in threes; but entire (omne) and

perfect (perfectum) are the same, as it says in the same place;
therefore the entire is in threes; therefore 'every' requires three
appellates.
Again to the same point: Aristotle says there that we do not

say 'all men' but 'two men' of a pair, Of at least three, we do
say 'all men; therefore 'every' (omnes) needs three appellates.
On the contrary: In any demonstration, all propositions are

universal; but demonstrations are made about the sun and moon; so
one ought to say 'every sun' and 'every moon'; but 'sun' has only a
unique supposit; so too does 'moon'; therefore 'every' does not
need three appellates.
Likewise to the same point: 'Everything deprived of light by

earth's interposition is wanting'. This proposition is conceded by all,
since held by an authority. It is also universal. But what is
'deprived of light by earth's interposition' has but a unique supposit,
namely this single moon. Therefore 'every' does not always demand
three appellates.
Likewise to the same point: ' 'Every' signifies that it is uni

versally taken'.'8 But this 'universally taken' is a mode peculiar to
the universal itself. A peculiarity, however, is diversified according
to diversification of its subject: if man is taken simply, risible is
taken simply; if man is diminished, risible is diminished too; if
man is dead, risible is dead as well. But the universal is found
sometimes in several things, like man, horse and lion, sometimes
in one only, like sun and moon. Therefore 'every' sometimes is
found in several things, sometimes in one only. Therefore 'every'
sometimes needs three appellates, sometimes one only.
Again to the same point: Form is ambiguous: the one kind is a

material form (as my soul is my body's form and yours is that of your
body) and that form is a part and not predicated of what it is the
form of. The other is a form which is a predicable form, so all
superiors, like genera and species and differences, are called forms
3: ibid., 268a20-21.
6: ibid., 268al6-19.
7: Cf. Arist., Anal. Post. II 2, 90al6; Boeth., De top. diff. I,
1181 A 3.
8: See above, p. 186-7.
of their inferiors, like 'man', 'horse', 'animal' and their like. But
individuals of this predicable form are its matter. Therefore since
form exceeds its matter by neither of the modes mentioned, nor is
exceeded by it, therefore no universal exceeds its individuals nor is
exceeded by them. Therefore since 'every' means equation of a
universal with its individuals, like 'every man', it is then appropri
ate that, since the 'sun' (and 'moon', having but a unique individ
ual) is truly said to be 'every sun', so too 'every moon' and 'every
phoenix'.
We concede that, saying the above propositions are true:
'every' does not always demand three appellates, but when adjoined
to a universal term having several supposits, 'every' does need to
have several. But when conjoined with a universal term having one
only individual, it needs but one supposit.
As to the first objection (that every thing's perfection is in
threes), say it is true. The three are: the substance of a thing, its
potential, and its operation. Aristotle touches9 on the three in the
words: 'a nature aptly designed works so'. By saying 'nature', he
touches on a thing's substance; in 'apt', its potential; by 'works
so', its due operation. So a man is said to be perfect since he has a
man's substance, potential, and the operation due him. So too, the
marker 'every' has a universal marker's substance and potential,
since it is distributive, and it has its operation when it distributes.
In these three its perfection lies.
To the second objection, say 'man' and 'men' differ because

'man' means species itself as such, which is predicable of many,
while 'men' in the plural means species, not as such, but as actually
multiplied by individuals' numerically diverse matters. So 'every' in
the plural, by reason of the multiplicion effected by diverse matters,
demands at least three appellates. In the singular, since 'every'
regards species as such and not individuals' matter, it only demands
an essence naturally apt to be predicated of several, whether actu
ally shared in by several or by one only. For that reason it some
times demands three appellates, sometimes one only, depending on
the nature of the universal to which it is adjoined.
On a rule about what was discussed

8 There are some who say 'every' always needs at least three
appellates, and they give a rule like this:
9: where ? Perhaps in some comment in the De coelo.

as o f t e n as a u n i v e r s a l affirmative
m a r k er i s a d d e d t o a c o m m o n term
lacking a sufficiency of appellates,
an a p p e a l is m a d e t o a n o n - b e i n g .
Take 'every phoenix': since the term 'phoenix' has but a single
existent supposit, its marker 'every' appeals to non-existent
phoenices. For that reason, 'every phoenix' has the sense: 'some
phoenix and two other phoenices which do not exist'. So they say
these two propositions 'every phoenix exists' and 'some phoenix
does not exist' are at the same time false yet not contradictories,
since in the negative one, 'a phoenix which does exist' is stood for
and in the affirmative, 'two phoenices which do not exist', is stood
for. That way the subject is not the same in both.
On its Refutation
9 This can be refuted in several ways. First, because this

incongruity follows from the falsehood they posit: 'every' would
need at least three appellates, which has been shown above 10 to be
false. Second: Aristotle holds that a proposition in which a
universal, universally taken, is subject of a predicate, contradicts
the proposition where the same universal, not universally taken, is
subject of the same predicate. These are of that sort: 'every
phoenix exists' and 'some phoenix does not exist'. Therefore they
are contradictories. Which they deny. So their rule is false.
12
Again to the same point: the rule is:
a c o m m o n t e r m as s u b j e c t o f , or c o m i n g
n e x t t o , a v e r b in t h e p r e s e n t t e n s e ,
s i m p l y t a k e n , a n d not h a v i n g ability of
e x t e n d i n g of itself nor f r o m a n o t h e r ,
is r e s t r i c t e d to s t a n d i n g for w h a t a r e
u n d e r t h e f o r m of the s u b j e c t t e r m .
Therefore in 'a phoenix exists', the term 'phoenix' is restricted to

standing for one phoenix only, since there is but a unique supposit
there. Therefore by another rule given earlier, if a universal
10: Above, p. 189.

11: De interpr. 7, 176-18.
13: Above, p. 178-9.
marker is added to it, it does not distribute it except for a unique

supposit. Therefore there will be no appeal to non-existent phoen-
ices. Their rule is thus fallacious and founded on a fallacy. Which
we concede.
A Sophism
10 On the basis of what was said above, the sophism is quest

ioned: 'every man exists and anything differing from him is non-
man'. (omnis homo est et quodlibet differens ab illo est non-homo).
Proof: This is the sort of copulative in which each part is true.
Therefore the whole itself is true. Counterargument: Every man
exists and anything differing from him is non-man. Therefore
Socrates exists and anything differing from him is non-man. This is
false, since this is the sort of copulative in which one part is false;
therefore it is itself false.
Solution: 'Differing from every man' is less than 'differing

from Socrates', because 'differing from every man' stands only for
things other than man, while 'differing from Socrates' stands for
the same things, and for all men other than Socrates as well. So this
follows validly: 'differing from every man, therefore differing from
Socrates'. It is the Topic from Species or Subjective Part. So if a
universal marker is added, there is a shift from inferior to superior
with distribution. That way a Fallacy of Consequent occurs in the
proof, based on one sort of shift. Shift is ambiguous in proof. This
follows validly: 'every man, therefore Socrates', and is the Topic of
a Whole in Quantity. But this does not: 'anything different from
every man; therefore anything different from Socrates'; here there
is a Fallacy of Consequent, as was said; so too in: 'every man;
therefore every animal'.
Another Sophism
11 This sophism is likewise questioned: 'every man and (an)

other man exist' (omnis homo et alius homo sunt). Proof: Socrates
and an other man exist, Plato and an other man exist, and so on for
the others; therefore every man and an other man exist. Counter
argument: The relative '(an) other' is a relative of diversity; there
fore it stands for something differing from every man; but there is
not a man other than every man; therefore the first is false.
Solution: The first is false and the proof offends by Fallacy of

Word Figure, shifting from several determinates to a single determ
inate. For the term '(an) other' has determinate supposition in the
premises as well as conclusion. Again: The proof offends by the
Fallacy of Accident, since, though 'Socrates' and 'Plato' and
'Cicero' infer 'every man' of themselves, yet as conjoined with '(an)
other man', they cannot infer 'every man' in 'every man and (an)
other man exist'. Just as I know Coriscus in himself, but not under
the accident 'to come'.
On a certain rule
12 So a rule like this is given:
as o f t e n as o n e f o l l o w s u p o n a n o t h e r ,
c o n v e r s e l y or n o t , s h o u l d s o m e t h i n g
suit the o n e in s u c h a w a y as not to
suit the o t h e r , a n d an i n f e r e n c e is
d r a w n f r o m the o n e it d o e s suit a b o u t
the o n e it d o e s n o t , - t h e r e is a l w a y s
a F a l l a c y of A c c i d e n t .
For example: This follows validly: 'it is a man, therefore it is a sub-

stance'. And species suits man in a way it does not suit substance.
So if from 'man' an inference is drawn about substance, it will be a
Fallacy of Accident. Like: 'man is a species; therefore substance is
a species'; and: 'risibility is a peculiarity; therefore man is a pecul
iarity'; and: 'the house is worth a hundred marks; 'therefore so are
the walls'. Some of these follow conversely, like 'man' and 'risible',
but some do not.
Another Sophism
13 Again: This sophism is questioned: 'every man is every

man'. Proof: Socrates is Socrates; Plato is Plato; Cicero is Cicero,
and so on for singulars; therefore every man is every man. Or thus:
Boethius says no proposition is truer than the one in which the
same thing is predicated of itself. Therefore no proposition is truer
than this one. Counterargument: Its contradictory ('some man is
not every man') is true. Therefore it is itself false. Again to the
same point: Every man is every man; but Socrates is a man; there
fore Socrates is every man. But the conclusion is false. Therefore
so is the first, from which it follows.
14: Cf. In Arist. Periherm. ed. 1, p. 213.18-20; ed. 2, p. 480.7-9.

Solution: The first is simply false. And proof offends by the

Fallacy of Consequent from Insufficient Enumeration, since along
with what it does take up, it should also take up these from the side
of subject: 'Socrates is every man', 'Plato is every man' and so for
the others; and these also from the side of predicate: 'every man is
Socrates', 'every man is Plato', and so for singulars. It omits all
these, so offends by the Fallacy of Insufficient Enumeration. As to
the other, say the same thing is not predicated of itself, but that
'every man' is predicated of man taken for any part of himself.
On the marker'not a (one)' (nullus)

W h a t it m a y signify
14 Next on the marker 'not a (one)' (nullus) which signifies

negatively universally. So it signifies the same thing as the
marker 'every' with negation added later. Therefore 'not every'
('omnis non') and 'not a (one)' ('nullus') are equipollent.
On a Rule
15 For the marker 'not a (one)' a rule like this is given:
as o f e n as t h e m a r k e r ' n o t a ( o n e ) ' is
adjoined i m m e d i a t e l y to a c o m m o n term,
it d i f f u s e s it d i s t r i b u t i v e l y and m o b -
i l e l y ; and s i m i l a r l y , a t e r m to which
it is m e d i a t e l y adjoined.
For example, 'no man is an ass' (mullus homo est asmus). So descent
can be made below a subject as follows: 'therefore Socrates is not
an ass, nor is Plato' and so on of the others; below a predicate as
follows: 'no man is an ass; therefore no man is Brunellus nor
Fanellus', and so on for the others.
A Sophism
16 This sophism is questioned on the basis of what was said:

'no one man is every man' (mullus homo est omnis homo). Proof:
Socrates is not every man, Plato is not every man, and so on of the
others; therefore no one man is every man. Or as follows: its
contradictory ('some man is every man') is false; so it is true.
Counterargument: an opposite is predicated of an opposite there,
15: Cf. above, p. 186-7.

since 'every' and 'not a (one)' are opposites. Therefore the

locution is false.
Solution: The first is true simply taken. Respond to the

refutation by refuting it, because there, an opposite is not
predicated of an opposite, but 'to be every man' is removed from
'every man' for any supposit of 'every man', and that is true.
On the marker 'nothing' (ni hi1)

W h a t it m a y signify
17 Next about the marker 'nothing', which signifies the same

as the marker 'not a (one)' (nullus) and in addition, signifies the
term receiving its distribution, since 'nothing' (nichil) signifies
'not a thing' (nullam rem); for 'not a (one)' (nullum) is a universal
marker with negation, while 'thing' (res) is the term receiving its
distribution.
A Sophism
18 Accordingly, this sophism is questioned: 'one who is seeing

nothing is seeing something' (nichil videns est aliquid videns).
Proof: One who is not seeing this thing is one who is seeing some
thing, for one who is not seeing Socrates is one who is seeing Plato;
one who is not seeing that thing is one who is seeing something, and
so on for singulars; therefore one who is seeing nothing is one who is
seeing something. Counterargument: Here, opposite is predicated
of opposite, since 'to see something' (aliquid videre) is under what
'to see nothing' (nihil videre) is under. Therefore the locution is
impossible.
Some make a distinction about 'one who is seeing nothing is

one who is seeing something' from the fact that the word (dictio)
'nothing' can be in the accusative case, with the sense: 'one who is
seeing not a thing is one who is seeing something' (nullam rem
videns est aliquid videns). Or it can be in the nominative case, with
the sense: 'no thing that is seeing is a thing that is seeing some
thing' (nulla res videns est aliquid videns). On that basis they posit
amphiboly there from diversity of case. But this is no solution,
because it is false in both senses.
Others make a distinction about 'one who is seeing nothing is

one who is seeing something' on the basis that the negation found
within the term 'nothing' can negate the participle placed first, and
then its sense is: 'one who is not seeing any thing is one who is
seeing something' (quamlibet rem non videns est aliquid videns),

and this way it is divided. Or it can negate the verb 'is' (est) with
the sense: 'one who is seeing any thing is one who is not seeing
something1 (quamlibet rem videns non est aliquid videns), and this
way it is composite, since the negation is put into a more due posit
ion. But this again is no solution, for it is false in either sense, since
opposites are affirmed about the same thing.
So say the first is simply false and proof offends by the Fallacy
of Word Figure going from several determinates to a single determ
inate of the term '(one) seeing' (videns). For in the premises it has
determinate supposition, as it does in the conclusion, since both the
premises as well as the conclusion are nonfinite. It also offends by
the Fallacy of Accident, since see (videre) fits all premises as
such, not just as unified in this whole, '(one) seeing nothing'. For
this reason, whole is accidental to parts and to see something
(videre aliquid) is assigned to-be-in in each of them.
19 Note that all the premises are ambiguous, since negation

can determine the verb or the participle, as said before. That is
why predecessors held that the premises, but not the conclusion,
were ambiguous, because of a rule like this they gave:
as o f t e n as n e g a t i o n and distribution
are included within a single term,
w h a t e v e r t h e o n e c o n c e r n s , so d o e s the
other.
So, since distribution placed in an oblique cannot extend to the verb

in the sentence cited above, neither can negation.
Some other Sophisms
20 Again: A judgement about these sophisms is completely

identical:
'one having no head is one having some head'

(nullum caput habens est aliquod caput habens)
'one differing from no man is one differing from some man'

(a nullo homine differens est ab aliquo homine differens)
16: Above, p. 194 f.

'one having no eye is one having some eye'

(nullum oculum habens est aliquem oculum habens)
'you are someone or other or one differing from someone or other'

(tu es quilibet vel differens a quolibet)
'you are every man or one differing from every man'

(tu es omnis homo vel differens ab omni homine)
On markers distributive of Two
21 Next on markers distributive of two. These include: 'both

/ either' (uterque), 'neither' (neuter) and their like. They differ
from such as 'every', 'not a (one)' and their like, mentioned above,
since they distribute for all individuals of a common term, but
'both / either' and 'neither' distribute solely for pairs pointed out,
such as 'either of these', 'neither of these'.
A Sophism
22 On the basis of what was said, question is made of this

sophism: 'what is stated by both / either of these is true' (ab
utroque istorum enuntiatum est verum) given that Socrates says
'God exists', that Plato says 'a man is an animal' and that they both
say 'a man is an ass', and that the latter two are picked out by the
pronoun 'these' (isti). Proof of the first: What is stated by
Socrates is true; what is stated by Plato is true; therefore what is
stated by both of them is true. Counterargument: What is stated by
either of these is true; but nothing is stated by both of these except
that a man is an ass; therefore that a man is an ass is true.
Solution: The first is true and the refutation offends by the

Fallacy of Accident, because on Aristotle's authority, 17 this propos
ition is put as true: 'there is one and the same study of all contrar
ies', yet no particular study is of all contraries except study in
general, so this is a Fallacy of Accident:
'There is one and the same study of all contraries

but there is no study except this or that study,
and so on for the others;
therefore this or that study is of all contraries'
Which is false. And similarly,

'man is a species
but no man exists except Socrates or Plato or Cicero
and so of each one
therefore Socrates is a species or Plato or Cicero (is)'
This is accidental, as was clear in the Fallacy of Accident. 18 So too

in what was proposed, since the word (dictio) 'stated' and the word
(dictio) 'true' are taken for the same thing in general. And that
way what is stated by either is true. That is why 'stated1 is not
taken for a particular statement by either of them. That is why a
particular statement by either / both of these is accidental to what
is stated by either / both, as an inferior is to its superior, and to
be true is assigned being-in to both. And I call 'superior' in
general, everything greater, whether it be essential or accidental.
But some say the first is simply false and 'what is stated by
either / both' is taken for a particular statement by either of them,
and that 'true' is taken for a particular truth as well. The proof
offends by the Fallacy of Word Figure, going from several, to a
single determinate of the term 'what is stated', and the same for
the term 'true'.
But the first solution is better and more subtle.
Another Sophism
23 Again: Question is made of this sophism: 'having neither

eye you can see' (habendo neutrum ulum tu potes videre). Proof:
Not having the right eye, you can see; not having the left eye, you
can see; therefore having neither eye, you can see. Counterargum
ent: having neither eye you can see. Therefore while you have
neither eye, or if you have neither eye, or because you have
neither eye, you can see. Which is false. For a gerund ending in
-do is to be interpreted by while or by if or by because. But it is
false in any way. Therefore the first is simply false.
Solution: The first is simply false, and proof offends by the

Fallacy of Accident, since ability to see suits parts as such, insofar
as they are divided. It does not suit them insofar as they are united
within their whole / does not suit the whole itself; for a whole is
identical with all parts united at once. By a rule cited earlier,
17: Topica I, 14 105b5, p. 20 (and elsewhere).

18: Above, p. 129 ff.
since whole follows upon parts, and ability to see suits parts, not
whole, if an inference is made about a whole on the basis of parts, it
is consequently a Fallacy of Accident.
Whether Negation has ability

to distribute
24 Having discussed signs distributive of subjective parts, it is

next asked whether negation has the ability distribute or diffuse. It
seems it does, for Aristotle says in First Perihermenias that these
two are Contradictory: 'man is just' - 'non-man is just'. Therefore
the first is universal, since a common term is the subject. But only
if 'non-man is just' is universal. Therefore the term 'man' is
distributed. But there is nothing there by which it is distributed
except negation. Therefore it is distributed by negation.
On the contrary: If negation has ability to distribute, then just

as 'every Socrates' is incongruous, so too is 'non-Socrates'. Which
is false, since even though a distributive marker cannot be added to
a singular term, negation can be validly added to it. Again: Where
ver distribution is found, there is a common term taken universally.
Therefore it is fitting that a word (dictio) signifying universally be
there. But a universal marker signifies universally, while negation
does not. Therefore negation does not have ability to distribute.
We concede that, saying negation does not diffuse, only

negates, what it finds. So adjoined to a common term, it negates it,
but once a superior is negated, removal of any inferior follows, for
superior destroyed, any inferior is destroyed, just as if a genus is
destroyed, so too is any species of it. That way negation does not
diffuse but negates what it finds, whether it be a universal or a
singular.
The solution to the objection is now clear, for the fact that
'non-man is just' is universal is not because of the nature of
distribution found in negation, but because man in common is
negated, and once that is removed, so is any inferior.

20: De interpr. 10, 19b27-28.
On Distribution of an Aptitude
25 Again: Potential Distribution is often posited, as in 'every

man is afraid at sea', that is: is naturally apt to be afraid at sea.
On Accomodated Distribution
26 Again: Accomodated Distribution is often posited, as in

'the heavens cover all things', that is: all things other than
themselves; and 'God created all things', that is: all things other
than Himself.
But these two kinds of Distributions are not as proper as the

ones discussed above.
On the marker '(the) whole (of)' (t ot u s)
27 Next, on the marker '(the) whole (of)' (totus), which is

distributive of integral parts. This is clear in '(the) whole (of)
Socrates is white', with the sense: 'Socrates is white as to any part
of him'. So from '(the) whole (of) Socrates is white' two proposit
ions immediately follow: 'Socrates, as to any part of him, is white',
and 'any part of Socrates is white'. Proof: In the proposition: 'the
whole (of) Socrates is white', Socrates as such is the subject of
whiteness, while his parts are subjects of whiteness, not as such, but
insofar as they are parts of his whole. But insofar as they belong to
the whole, they belong to the form of the whole. Therefore they are
not subjects of whiteness except by means of the whole. Therefore
this follows initially: 'Socrates as to any part of him is white', and
subsequently: 'any part of Socrates is white'.
Again: In 'the whole (of) Socrates is while', a whole is a sub

ject of whiteness directly, parts indirectly, because in what is
a whole, parts are understood indirectly; in what is a part, the
whole is taken indirectly. This is clear by the definition of what a
whole is. As a house consists of wall, roof and foundation. Socrates
consists of parts of that sort. Therefore what a whole is gives us to
understand its indirect parts. Therefore upon: '(the) whole (of)
21: 'directly' translates in rectitudine. Nominative case is is casus

rectus (fpd).
22: 'indirectly' translates in obliquitate. A non-nominative case is
a casus obliquus (fpd).
Socrates is white', this follows immediately: 'Socrates as to any

part of him is white'; and subsequently: 'any part of Socrates is
white'.
Again to the same point: Whatever is a a part has no existence

except in its whole, for it has no perfection except from that
whole. Therefore it is not subject of anything except through its
whole. Therefore upon: '(the) whole (of) Socrates etc.', there
immediately follows: 'Socrates, as to any part of him, e t c . ' and
subsequently: 'any part of Socrates etc.'
A Sophism
28 According to what was said, this sophism is questioned:

'(the) whole (of) Socrates is less than Socrates' (totus Sortes est
minor Sorte). Proof: Any part of Socrates is less than Socrates.
Therefore Socrates, as to any part of him, is less than Socrates.
Therefore (the) whole (of) Socrates is less than Socrates. Counter
argument: (The) whole (of) Socrates is less than Socrates. But (the)
whole (of) Socrates is Socrates. Therefore Socrates is less than
Socrates. Which is false.
Solution: The first, '(the) whole (of) Socrates is less than

Socrates', is true and the refutation offends by the Fallacy of Acci
dent, since in '(the) whole (of) Socrates is less than Socrates', a
predicate is attributed to parts it truly suits, though it does not suit
the whole. Therefore this is simply false: 'Socrates is less than
Socrates'. Therefore, if an inference is drawn about a whole through
parts, it will be a Fallacy of Accident. Therefore (the) whole (of)
Socrates is the thing that is subject and Socrates is its accident
and to be less than Socrates is assigned to-be-in to both. The
refutation also offends by the Fallacy of Simply and After-a-
Fashion, since '(the) whole (of) Socrates is less than Socrates' does
not posit that Socrates is less than Socrates simply, but less as to his
parts; that way it posits Socrates is less than Socrates after-a-
fashion. And that way, since an inference is drawn simply as
follows: 'therefore Socrates is less than Socrates', it offends by the
Fallacy of After-a-Fashion and Simply. Just like: 'Socrates is less
than Socrates as to his foot; therefore Socrates is less than
Socrates'.
29 Again: Since sometimes '(the) whole (of) Socrates, there

fore Socrates' follows, as in '(the) whole (of) Socrates is white,
therefore Socrates is white', and sometimes it does not, one asks
when it does.
Say there are some accidents which indifferently suit whole

and part, such as white and black, hot, cold, to increase and to
decrease and their like. In such as these, '(the) whole (of) Socrates
is white; therefore Socrates', follows validly, as in '(the) whole (of)
Socrates is white; therefore Socrates is white', and so of the
others. But there are other accidents which fit parts and not the
whole and conversely, the whole and not parts, such as totality,
majority, minority and paucity. In such as these, '(the) whole (of)
Socrates exists, therefore Socrates exists' does not follow.
On markers distributive of Accidents
30 Next, on markers distributive of accidents. First among

these to be discussed are markers distributive of quality.
On markers distributive of Quality
31 A marker said to be distributive of quality which distrib

utes a thing defined by the mode of quality, such as '(of) any kind'
(qualelibet), the particular of which is '(of) some kind' (aliquale).
It is objected that since an accident is multiplied when its

subject is multiplied, therefore since markers distributive of
substance distribute or multiply a subject, it is appropriate that they
distribute or multiply the accident itself. Therefore markers
distributive of quality are superfluous.
Say accidental multiplication is ambiguous. One way, accident

is multiplied numerically; and this multiplication is effected by
markers distributive of substance, as in 'every man is white'. The
other way, accident is multiplied specifically; and this is effected
by markers distributive of accident, as in 'a thing of any kind runs',
that is, 'a thing having a quality of any kind runs'.
A Sophism
32 Based on what was said above, question is made of this

sophism: 'anything of any kind knows about anything of that kind
that it is itself of the kind which it is itself' (quodlibet qualelibet de
quolibet tali scit ipsum esse tale quale ipsum est). Assume Socrates
knows grammar, dialectic and rhetoric, that Plato and Cicero do
too, and that they know that they possess them; then let there be
another three men, of whom the first knows one of those studies, the
second a different one, and the last the third, and that these men do
not know they possess those studies, and of the others, they know
nothing; but the others know about themselves and about these; and
that there are no more men nor qualities.
Proof of the first: This thing of any kind knows, about any
thing of that kind, that it is itself of the kind which that is; that
thing of any kind, etc.; and so of the third. And there are no
more. Therefore anything of any kind knows about anything of that
kind e t c . Counterargument: anything of any kind etc.; therefore
anything grammatical knows of any thing of that kind etc..
Solution: The first is true and refutation offends by Fallacy of

Consequent, going from inferior to superior with distribution, since
'anything' stands for three only, but 'anything grammatical' stands
for that same three as well as for the one who possesses only
grammar; and in that way 'something grammatical' is in more than
'of any kind'. As a result, if distribution is added as follows:
'anything of any kind; therefore anything grammatical' a Fallacy
of Consequent arises, as in 'every man, therefore every animal'. So
too in the ablative, as in 'about anything of any kind; therefore
about anything grammatical' (de quolibet qualelibet; ergo de
quolibet grammatico), since it speaks of anything of that kind.
On markers distributive of Quantity
33 Next on markers distributive of quantity. They distribute a

thing defined by a mode of Quantity.
A Sophism
34 Accordingly this sophism is questioned: 'As many times as

you have been a Parisian, you have been a man' (quotienscumque
fuisti Parisius, fuisti homo). Proof: you have been a Parisian one
time, and that time you have been a man; another time you have
been a Parisian, e t c . and so on of the others; therefore the first is
true. Counterargument: As many times as you have been a Paris
ian, you have been a man; but you have been a Parisian twice;
therefore you have been a man twice. Which is false, since the word
(dictio) 'twice' posits an interruption of the act to which it is
adjoined; but the act of being a man was not interrupted in you.
Solution: The first is simply false. But solve the proof by

denying the disjunction, because the second part of the copulative
('that time you have been a man') is false. So far, you 'have been' a
man at no time, due to the fact that your life has not yet been cut
off in such a way that you would start to live again and later it
would be stopped. And that is what would be required for you to

*have been* a man twice, just as a race starts twice and ends twice,
so someone could run twice.
On the word (dic t i) 'twice'
35 Note that 'twice' (bis) does not imply an interruption in,

but an end of, that act to which it is adjoined; but upon an end there
does follow an interruption. If however a paralogism were formed
as follows:
'whenever you have been a Parisian, you have been a man

but twice you have been a Parisian
therefore twice you have been a man',
then the first is true but the refutation offends by the Fallacy of
Word Figure from Commutation of Predicament, since 'whenever'
(quandocumque) is in the predicament 'When' while 'twice' means
a mode of discrete quantity.
On the nominal 'infinite' (infinitum )

23
36 Next, on the nominal 'infinite'. This is said in five ways.
First, that is said to be infinite which cannot be penetrated, as
voice is said to be infinite with respect to sight, because it is
invisible, not naturally apt to be seen. Second, that is said to be
infinite which has incomplete penetration because it has as yet not
been gone through, yet is naturally apt to be penetrated, as when
someone is going through a space and has not yet come to its end.
Third, something is said to be infinite by addition, like an
augmentable number, which is infinite by addition of a unit or
another number. Fourth, something is called 'infinite' on the basis
of division, like a continuum: every continuum can go on being
divided infinitely. That is why it is defined by Aristotle 2 4 in VI
Physics as follows: 'A continuum is divisible into ever divisibiles'.
But in the fifth way, 'infinite' is said both ways, that is by addition
and division, like time. For time is a continuum, and it is infinitely
divisible, so infinite by division; and since one time comes after
another, by the addition of one time to another, time is infinite by
addition.
23: Cf. Boethius, De divisionibus, 888 D9ff.; Arist., Physica III 4,

204a2-7 and Thomas Aquinas, In HI Phys. lect. 7, 
24: Phys. VI, 3, 232b24-25.7
As to these three last significations, infinite is defined as

follows: something infinite, in things accepting Quantity, is that
whose nature it is, always to take up something extra. So, if after
one part of line, another is accepted and after that, a third, and its
end can never be reached, a line would then said to be infinite.
37 It is customarily held that 'infinite' is sometimes taken as

a common term, and then the proposition 'infinites are finite'
(infinita sunt finita) is equipollent to 'some infinites are finite'
(aliqua infinita sunt finita). Sometimes it is taken for a distributive
marker, and then that proposition 'infinites are finite' is equipollent
distributionally to: 'for one thing or another, many are finite'
(quolibet plura sunt finita). This is proven as follows: for one, many
are finite, for two, many are finite, for three, many are finite and so
on of the others; therefore for one thing or another, many are
finite. It is said to constitute interscalar, or interrupted, or
discontinuous distribution, because the word 'many' in the first
proposition stands for two and so on, in the second for three and so
on, thus always gradually, or ascending step by step. For that
reason, the word-group 'for one thing or another many' constitutes
interscalar distribution, since what I say with 'for one thing or
another' (quolibet) stands for some things, and what I say with
'many' stands for others, ascending numerically, as was said.
A Sophism
38 Based on what was said above, this sophism is queried:

'infinites are finite' (infinita sunt finita). Proof: Two are finite,
three are finite, and so on to infinity; therefore infinites are
finite. Counterargument: Opposites are there predicated of oppos-
ites; therefore the expression is impossible.
It can also be proven as follows: for one thing or another,

many are finite; therefore infinites are finite.
Solution: Some make the distinction that 'infinite' is equivoc

ated into 'infinite-for-us' and 'simply infinite'. As a result, if
'infinite' is taken merely with reference to us, the first is true and
an opposite is not predicated of an opposite, since things that are
infinite as far as we are concerned, like stars or grains of sand, are
simply finite. But if 'infinite' is taken simply, the first is false and
25: See Arist. Phys. III 6, 207a7.

26: Marginal note in the Cordoba manuscript: 'i.e., a term which is
commonly related to all indefinites (infinita).'
an opposite is predicated of an opposite. Others make a distinction
from the fact that 'infinite' can be a common term; that way the
first is false; or it can be a syncategorematic word (dictio) which of
itself entails distribution, as was said; and that way they hold it to
be true.
But neither of those solutions is valid, for if each distinction
were removed, and 'infinite' were taken simply and on the basis
that it is a common term, proof and refutation of the sophism still
remain. So say that the first is simply false and that the proof
offends by the Fallacy of After-a-Fashion and Simply, since infinite
by addition is infinite somehow or other, not simply infinite. So
when it accepts numerical parts by addition, like two, three, four, it
does not accept infinity simply, but somehow or other, or after-a-
fashion; and for that reason one cannot infer infinite simply from
them. In that way, since from infinite After-a-Fashion one con
cludes to infinite Simply, it offends on the basis of the Fallacy of
After-a-Fashion and Simply.
And let what has been said about distributions suffice.
I N D E X OF R E F E R E N C E S
(All reference numbers refer to pages)
ABELARD I, 2, 71b 9 ff. 181
see PETER I, 16, 79b 23-25 163
II, 2, 90a 16 213
(ANONYMOUS)
Topica
Scholia in Anal. Priora
I, p. 317; 147 I, 1, 101a 1-2 91
Comm. in De Caelo 214 1,5, 101b 38-102 22
I, 5, 102a 18-19 22
ARISTOTLE I, 5, 102b 4-7 146
I, 5, 102b 10-15 22
Categories I, 8, 103b 7-17 84
I, 14, 105b 5 223
1, la 1-15 26 I, 15, 107a 5-12 177
1, la 8-9 55 II. 3, 110b 24-25 149
5,3b 13-16 143 II,8,113b 15 ff. 169
5, 4b 9-10 40, 210 II,9,114a 27-34 76
7, 8a 31-32 185 III, 2, 117a 12 124
15, 15b 28-30 42 VII, 3, 153a 15-16 22
15, 15b 31-33 42 VIII, 13, 162b 31 ff. 166
VIII, 13, 162b 34-35 167
De Interpretatione
Sophistici Elenchi
2, 16a 20-21 110
2, 16a 22-25 110 2, 165b 4-7 91
3, 16b 6-8 119 3, 165b 12 ff. 95
6, 17a 13-33 190 4, 165b 27-30 96
7, 17b 11-12 211 4, 165b 30-166a 21 99
7, 17b 16-18 215 4, 165b 3 0 - 166a 6 99, 104
10, 19b 27-28 224 4, 166a 2-3 104
10, 20a 9-10 211 4, 166a 9-14 108
4, 166a 14-21 108
Anal. Priora 4, 166a 23-32 122
4, 166a 36-37 120
I, 1, 24b 18-19 184 4, 166b 4-5 129
I, 4-22 181 5, 166b 28-30 146
I, 27. 43a 20 ff 53 5, 166b 32-33 142
I, 28, 44b 26 147, 181 5, 166b 35-36 149
II, 16, 64b 28 ff. 166 5, 167a 1-2 158
5, 167a 23-27 162
Anal. Posteriora 5, 167b 1 ff. 172
Index of References 207
5, 167b 1-2 170 BOETHIUS

5, 167b 1-20 170
5, 167b 27-31 175 In arist. Categorias
6, 168a 18-21 181 172B 2 - C 9 27
6, 168a 21 ff. 181 de top. diff. I, 1181 A3 213
6, 168a 24-25 182 de divisionibus
6, 168a 34-35 182
6, 168b 1 149 886 A 5 f f. 21
6, 168b 17-18 182 888  9 ff. 230
6, 168b 22-26 182
6, 168b 27 ff. 172 DONATUS
6, 168b 28 183 Ars grammatica
6, 169a 19-21 184 I 5, 373 132
7, 169a 30-31 135
7, 169b 6-7 183 HORACE
11, 171b 16-21 91 Carmina
17, 175b 21-22 143 I 35, vss. 8-9 129
20, 177a 33-35 120
21, 178a 2-3 130 PETER ABELARD
22, 178b 37-39 142 Dialectica
22, 179a 1-2 143 V, 584 21
24, 179a 27-29 155
24, 179a 29-30 156 PORPHYRY
25, 180a 23-31 160, 165 Isagoge
26 181a 1-14 165 7.4-6 84
28, 181a 23-27 173 11.25-12.1 21
13.1-3 23
Physica
PRISCIAN
III, 4, 204a 2-7 230
III, 6, 207a 7 231 Institutiones grammaticae
IV, 3, 210a 14-24 26, 102
IV, 3, 210a 24 102 II 12, 51 131
VI, 3, 232b 24-25 230 II 16, 54 11
II 18,55 132
De Coelo V 22, 56-57 132
XI 8, 552 123
I, 1, 268a 11 215 XII 33. 21 ff. 193
I, 1, 268a 16-19 213 XVII 56, 142 187
I, 1,268a 20-21 215
THOMAS AQUINAS
Metaphysica
In III Arist. Physica
I, 1,980a 1 210 lect. 7  230
I, 1, 981a 19-20 149
INDEX OF WORDS AND THINGS
ablative peculiarity yet is in a thing

'hand' can determine the verb 22; what just chances to be
'touch' or the participle or not be in the same thing
'struck' in 'I touch the one 22; denominating a whole by
struck by hand' 102. ablative a part: 'curly headed' there
determination of an act, more fore 'curly' 137; for Por
ruly in verb than participle phyry, Topics, vs. substance &
108; case-form 'eyes' with 'non-necessary in consequ
'see' means instrument of ence' 127; both being super
sight in 'you see with your ior and inferior with respect
eyes the one struck' 108 to a third thing 127; accid
about being-in (de inesse) 12 ents of subject can be ante
accent cedent, consequent or con
word-group(s) need not be vertible 129; some grammat
true in one, false in another ical accidents of a word are
composition, division or ac not absolute but as relatable
cent 102; predicated of to others 97
breath equivocates 'common' accidental supposition
112; taken commonly as a acceptance of common term
consequent, not predicative- for those for which it de
ly 112; as principle of decep mands something added 70
tion: polysemy of word caus act
ed by diversity of accents act' or 'undergo' as essential
109; circumflex accent to verb are potential; as
sharpens a syllable and de actuality, accidental 114
presses it 109; grave de action (do: facere) 18, 27, 29,
presses a syllable and lowers 30, 32, 33, 33
it 109; acute sharpens or that by which we are said to
raises a syllable 109; law or act on what is subjected 33;
rule for ± raising one or parts action & passion take contrar
of a word-group 109; ieties and admit of more or
acceptance 69, 70, 71, 172, less 34; peculiar to action:
175 entail change (passio) of
accident 3, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, itself 33
26: what is present or absent adjacent 11
without its subject being de adjacent determination of a
stroyed 22; common (white) thing: arises by something-
or proper (Socrate's white adjoined (adjectivum) 11;
ness) 23; inseparable (snub- modal proposition 11; modal
nosed) 23; separable (sitting proposition: determined by 1
for man) or inseparable (black of those 6 modes 11; in mod
for crow) 23; what is neither ais, the verb should be sub
genus, species, difference nor ject, mode predicate 12;
Index of Words and Things 209
only that mode determining ent does not affirm less /

composition makes a proposit antecedent 163
ion modal 12; the 6 modes affirmation and negation 34
sometimes taken nominally or whatever may make a negat
adverbially 12; 4 proposit ion may also make an affirm
ions x 4 modes = 16 proposit ation about any supposit 169
ions 12; modal propositions After-a-Fashion
are contrary, subcontrary, arises in as many way as a
contradictory, or subalternate determination diminishes
14; ± similar relation of mode something 138; diminishes
14; chart of oppositions its whole like 'white-footed'
among modal propositions 16; does 'white' 137; does not
being substantival / adjectival diminish but posits and infers
are thing-, not signication- ('curly headed, therefore cur
modes 69 ly') 137; reversed still same
adjectival fallacy 140; involves double
69, 70; adjectivais and verbs contradiction 140
said to couple 69 agent 34
adjective cannot be signified as patient
sort of nominal adjective like nor under the mode of patient
'white' or 'black' 11; 'thing- except in oblique cases 163;
adjoined': ambiguous as to reciprocal relative adds sub
nominal or verbal adjective stantial identity & mode of
11; 'white' restricts 'man' to patient to agent 165; recip
whites in 'a white man is run rocal so-called because it sup
ning' 172; 'man' restricted erimposes patient mode on an
to standing for whites only by agent substance 165
accidental adjective 'white' ahead 36
177; implication adjoined to aliquis (some (one)) 4
common term restricts it just alter (the first (one)) 4
like its adjective 179 alteration
adjoined (adjective) change from contrary to con
11; adverb 11; verbal ad trary or to middle quality 36
jective as in 'a white man ambiguity 11
runs swiftly' 11 ambiguous
adjunct 'death and life are contraries'
verb 'is' does not extend of is ambiguous and false in both
itself, but has that potential senses 153; 'diversity of
through its adjuncts 180 word-group' involves number
adverb of ambiguities 99; 'dog'
'today' can determine the verb means something in sea, sky,
'are' or participle 'born' 109 or thing that barks 84; 'every
adverbially 11 dog is substance' can be true
affirm 4 in any of 3 senses, 'every dog
affirming greater / consequ is whiteness' is false in any
210 Index of Words and Things
102; 'posit' is ambiguous as imal' as superior restricted

to quantity, quality and order by its inferior 'man' in 'ani
of propositions and terms mal-man' to animals that are
163; universal marker & men 177; stands for those
implication in same locution who are or were animals in 'a
make it ambiguous 179 man was an animal' 180
amphiboly answer
principle of deception is from to 'what kind ?' is affirmat
a word-group simply one, yet ive or negative 4; to 'what
signifying several 90; its number ?' is universal, partic
plausibility: diversity of same ular, nonfinite or singular 4;
word-group 90; from amphi to 'what ?' must be categoric
(doubt) & bole (judgement) or hypothetic 4; answering a
or logos (speech) 90; (1) many question with one r e
word-group principally signi sponse is invalid 158
fies more than one, like 'Ar antecedent 9, 164, 165, 166,
istotle's book' 90; (2) from 168, 169, 170: the categoric
transfer: 'plough sand' trans to which the conjunction 'if' is
ferred to 'waste time' 91; immediately joined is called
(3) word-group signifies the antecedent, the other, the
several, each part only one: consequent 9; a substantive
'knowing age' 91; ambiguous relative is one that recalls
as to deception in word-group what is numerically identical
simply identical or deception with its antecedent 164;
caused in us 90; always certainty is greater from a
occurs in construction of one relative of identity than from
unit with another unit 167; an antecedent substituted for
from diversity of case 194 a relative 165
analogy Antichrist
description of what is said signifies and stands for the
analogically can be validly Antichrist but calls nothing
given 78 up 175
animal species any one at all (quilibet) 4
were not of themselves in 'anything'
Noah's ark, only individuals in this fallacy stands for three
182 things: 'anything grammatic
'animal' al' for more 202
signifies real & pictured; the apparent wisdom
name is common, natures di acquired by arguments from
verse 25; in 'animal is sophistical Topics 81
genus' stands for anim appellation 25
al-in-general, not one of its acceptance of a term for an
inferiors 70; diffused im- existent thing 175; one ap
mobilely since descent below pellation of a common term:
it is not allowed 72; 'an thing-itself-in-common 175;
differs from supposition and all methods 1; ridiculous

signification 173; has only to argument falls under no art
do with an existent thing 173; and assumes what is a root
appellation is that of a com cause 167
mon or singular term ('man' assertable
or 'Socrates') 173 In 'it is assertable', the term
apt naturally 4 'assertable' stands for both
'apt' existents and non-existents
touches on a thing's potent 183
ial 189 authority:
aptitude, not actuality 18 (here) judgement of an expert
argument in his field 66
reason grounding conviction in
debatable matter 49; adds to backwards 36
a middle term the power of bark 2
testing conclusion 49; middle be
term testing a conclusion to there is no medium between
be confirmed by argument be and not be 63; 'be' is
49; valid and invalid argum taken by factual demand for
ents based on color 141 as many essences as 'man' is
argumentation: for men 71; whatever is, is
four types: syllogism, induct either substance, or accident,
ion, example, enthymeme 30; or the creator of substance
explicitation of an argument and accident 127; 'be' r e
by a word-group 49; word- stricts to existents and 'not
group as a whole (premises & be' to non-existents 182; no
conclusion) 30; confirmed by more restricts to existents
Topics 31 than 'run' does to runners
Aristotle 183; or 'not-be' restricts to
21, 22, 23, 26, 37, 48, 67, 73, tense, not existence 183
77, 78, 80, 81, 84, 86, 88, 89, be-in
90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 100, 102, a universal proposition is one
103, 104, 106, 111, 112, 116, that signifies something as
122, 123, 124, 126, 127, 129, belonging to all or to not a
133, 138, 140, 142, 143, 130, one of something else 4; all
152, 133, 134, 160, 161, 162, propositions other than mod
163, 167, 169, 188, 189, 190, ais are about being-in 12;
196, 198, 203 (1) integral part in whole
Aristotle's book' (finger in hand); (2) integral
same as 'the book Aristotle whole in parts (house in wall);
made / owns' 90, 167 (3) species in genus (man in
armor 36 animal); (4) genus in species
art (animal in man, defining part
dialectic is an art facilitating in definition, defined things in
an approach to principles of
whole defined)' (5) (a) sub- may be subject to, or put next
stantal: peculiarly (soul in to 'eating' in 'bread eating
body), (b) accident (white in dog' 99; has specific identity
wall); (6) something in goal in material division: like boy-
(virtue in beatitude); (8) youth-man 100; always ident
thing located in place (some ical by perfection since this
thing in a vessel); (9) Boeth- word-group is completed by
ius subdivides (5) as mention the inflection found there
ed 26; mode of being-in as 100
accident in a subject one breath
thing, mode of being-in as first a syllable accident, then
part in a whole another 28 a word accident 112
beg question broaden 172
begging question: conclusion Brunellus 18
to be proven is sought for in buba 2
the premises 146
being case 2;
Being is predicated of these assigned a word so that one
ten, but said equivocally, so is word can be ordered to an
not a genus 18; though pre other 92; case-diversity
dicated according to a single deceives by amphiboly, not
name of all things, it is not equivocation 92; accusative
predicated according to a case: amphiboly from 194;
single nature 24; the nature case-ending 25, 35:
Being, said of a substance, is noun's accident insofar as
Being in itself; as predicated activity or passivity emanate
of the other 9 Predicaments, from nominative noun 97;
'Being in another' 24; noun's accident as activity /
bell 1 passivity pass into a noun as
belong to 4 in oblique cases 97; a noun-
bishop accident compared to a verb
Duke and Bishop are identical 97; a relational accident -
by accident 184 disposition of substance in r e
body 1, 30, 32, 36 spect to an act 97; case-
Boethius 21, 26, 192 endings and the like order
both (uterque) 4 words to each other 97; de
'both' ception from case-ending is
is said of 2, 'all' of 3 188 from word-ordering or word-
boxer 32 grouping: it results in amphi
'bread eating dog', boly, not equivocation 97
while materially identical, case-forms
may vary formally 99; 'bread other than nominative are not
eating dog' has potential nouns for the dialectician 2;
polysemy since the definition those deriving from a base
given suits it 99; 'bread' form (principale) 67
'cast statue' clothing 36

is as accidental to 'metal' as coat 36
'home' is to 'wood' and color
'stone' 131 every color is in a body 27;
categoric valid and invalid arguments
from kathegorizo:, same as based on color 141
'I predicate' 3 command 11
Cato 2 common 25, 28, 29, 30, 31:
cause 'man' is found in men who are
that upon whose being some- white, black and in between,
thing else naturally follows so it is more common than
58; efficient, material, form 'white' 178; 'white' is found
al and final 58 in men, brute animals and
cause of falsity stone, so is more common
accentual falsity: diversity of than 'man' in 'white man'
significates potentially in a 178
word by accent 109; accent common term 4;
ual plausibility: word unity on a common predicate term to
the basis of one accent 109; be taken simply; 71; narrow
in many-question-as-one: ing a common term from larg
lack / privation of one-pro er to a smaller supposition
position unity; see unit 177; an implication adjoined
certain one (quidam) 4 to common term restricts it
certainty just like its adjective does
certainty is greater from a 179; a preceding marker can
relative of identity than from distribute a common term for
an antecedent substituted for any supposit 179; common
a relative 165 term subject is restricted to
Change (motus) 29, 32, 33, 34, those things under the form of
35; species: generation, cor the subject 180; has dif
ruption, increase, diminution, ferent supposition with verbs
alteration and locomotion 36; in different tenses 180; its
pertains to individuals, so a supposition varies with its
doctor heals Man by accident verb's tenses 180
when curing just Plato 132 common(ly) 17, 20, 22, 23
changeability 29 commutation
chastity 32 predicamental commutation:
choice 2 the mode, not the content, of
circle one is changed into that of
is not its circumference but another 121
the surface a circumference compared-to-another (ad ali-
contains 115 quid : Relation) 31
'citizen' complete sense
in 'a citizen is white (albus)' 'the man is white' has com
restricted as to consignificat- plete sense, while white man'
ion (gender) 179 does not 3
completive the premises 38; of 3rd Fig

ignoring the point at issue is ure can only be a particular
contrary to the completive 44; an argument's attested
form of a refutation 139 proposition 49; of an indicat
complex 2 ive word-group proven by one
composite or more middle terms 136
composite word's significate concomitance
is constituted by the partial see parallell
concepts of its parts 93 conditional 9
composition 11 conjoin 3, 23
word-group(s) need not be conjoined
true in one and false in an something conjoined sought in
other composition, division or things divided 148
accent 102 conjugates
composition & division are, but case-forms are not,
of a word-group is expected conjugate with a univocal, ab
on basis of expression or sign stract, base form 66
103; composite or divided conjunction 9,
word-groups always have a common to 'link' or 'disjoin' as
difference on the side of per their genus 107; they are
fection and thereby of signif first disjunctive of word-
icate 98; composition com group parts, then of word-
mon to equivocation and am groups 108
phiboly: 'immortal' 93; com consequence
position proximate cause of two is an immediate consequ
'wildhorse' 's meaning; choice ence of there being one 33;
to compose it so, remote contrary: from consequent's
cause 93; composition's 2nd opposite, antecedent follows
mode: word in a word-group 149; in thing: from anteced
can determine different ent's opposite, consequent's
things 106; composition's opposite follows 149; on bas
motive principle from ex is of Topical relationships
pression, its principle of de 130; on basis of oppositions
ficiency from fact 103; de 151; thought convertible be
ception from diverse relation cause of personal circumstan
a fallacy of composition or di ces 131; illicit in contradict
vision 167 ories to argue consequence in
conclude directly: a thing itself 152; impossible
major extremity is predicated for any consequence to be
of the minor in the conclus converted without a pair 132;
ion 40; indirectly: minor in contradictories, only con
extremity predicated of the trary consequence 149; in a
major in the conclusion 40 thing itself in almost all con
conclusion: traries 149; wherever fallacy
what necessarily follows from of consequent, there a double
consequence 152
consequent 9 relative has a contradictory

a quasi subjective part of 169
accident 162; consequent / contraposition 8
what follows; necessarily contraries
part of accident 162; conse (1) in the same genus (2)
quent-based vs antecedent- maximally distant (3) mutu
based 149 ally exclude each other (4)
consignification 3 alternate in the same suscept
'citizen' in 'a citizen is white ibility 34; privative: those
(albus)' restricted as to con- having to to with same thing
signification (gender) 179; in irreversible order 34
predicate restricts its subject contrariety: 31, 33, 34, 36
as to consignification, not as opposition between contraries
to principal signification 179; like white and black 63; con
a term restricts another as to traries are mediate or immed
its consignification, not its iate 63
principal signification 179; a contrary 5
verb restricts its supposit as no particular study is about
to consignification, not as to all contraries 71
its signification 183 convention(al)
constitutive difference 21, 23 expressions mean by invent
constructed 2 or's choice 2; conventionally
constructed term significative 2; distinguishes
some things are said ± in con noun from naturally signific
struction, some are not 69 ant expressions 2
construction 25, 27, 167 converse 5, 7
noun-verb construction stays conversely
same though tense changes anything predicated converse
98; construction of one thing ly is a definition or peculiar
with diverse things: fallacy ity 73; anything predicated
of diverse relation 167; of nonconversely, if within the
one unit with another unit definition, is genus or differ
167 ence 73
contingent 7 conversion 8;
contingently 11 by accident: makes P out of S
continuous quantity 30 and the converse (quality
contradiction identical, quantity different)
opposition in which, as such, 8; contraposition: make P
there is no middle ground into S, S into P (quantity <5c
63; implicit and explict 135; quality identical) but determ
no contradiction without iden inates into nonfinite terms
tical subject and predicate 8; simple, by accident and by
142 contraposition 8; simple:
contradictory 5 make P out of S and the con
any proposition begun with a verse (quantity & quality
identical) 8; universal af de inesse (about Being-In) 12

firmative is converted by de re
accident into particular when a dictum stands for part
negative and universal negat of itself, word-groups are
ive into particular negative 8 called de re 106; de re
convert 8 word-groups label a dictum's
convertibly 31, 32, 34, 35, 36 own subject 106
coordinate death
'two and three are five' is and life are contraries 155;
categoric when composite is corruption 155; is not cor
with a coordinate subject 98 ruption but an end point in
copula corruption 136
is clear by analyzing 'man deception
runs' as 'man is running' 3 effected by diversity of relat
copulation ion is not equivocation 167;
acceptance of an adjectival from diverse relation is a
term for something 70 fallacy of composition or di
copulative 8 vision 167; from diversity of
in which each part is true relation is in the ordering of
191; in which one part is words among themselves 167;
false 191 definite
Coriscus 'definite' distinguishes noun
"a 'third man' other than from nonfinites like non-man
man" is false unless 'man' 2; 'definite' vs. non-finite
is 'a sort of thing' 123; like 'non-man' 2; vs. word-
signifies 'this individual'; group whose parts are separ
'Coriscus the musician' sign- ate signs 2; vs. oblique cases
ifies 'of some sort' 123 2; 'non-man' not a noun for
correlative 31 dialecticians but a nonfinite
one correlative is sought in noun 2; vs. non-significative
the other 148; seeking one expressions 2; 'without tense'
correlative in the other does vs. verb 2; non-nominatives
not impede demonstrative but are not nouns but cases or ob
dialectic syllogisms 148 liques for dialectician 2;
corruption: going from being conventionally significative
to non-being 36, 61 vocal expression 2; lacks
costume (habitus) 16, 36 tense, separately significant
creator parts and cases other than the
whatever exists is either sub- nominative 2
stance, accident or the creat definition
or of substance and accident a word-group signifying what
127 the essence of a thing is 22;
crow 23 it should consist of genus and
cubit 30, 36 differences 21; a statement
curvature 32 signifying a thing's essence
(quid est esse) 52; is of standing for all since only

something said univocally, not true if one is running 71
analogically 78; of 'one only' determine 4
identical with that of 'thing in 'what one only can bear
taken simply' 163 can bear man', 'only' can
definition in thing defined 26, determine the verbs 'can' or
28,31,32,36 'bear' 106
delight and sadden 33 dialectic: 1-14
demonstrative syllogism art facilitating approach to
involves reasoning from true principles of all methods 1;
and basic principles 77; only from 'dia' (two) and 'logos'
has one conclusion, contra (discourse) or 'lexis' (reas
dictory always has two 153 oning) 1; so discoursing or
demonstratives 4 reasoning of a pair 1
said of things present 171 dialectical disputation
denominative collects contradictions from
25, 32, 33: differ only by an probable premises 77; 3 kinds
ending from the noun basing like those of dialectic: dis
their appellation 24; should criminative, exercitative and
agree with a univocal in its doctrinal 79; tool: dialect
beginning 25; differ by case- ical syllogism concluding from
ending, which is material 25; probable premises 77;
differ by ending from base by dialectical syllogisms
which they have appellation are not faulty for starting
25 from false premises 77
denominatively dialectical topic:
'grammatical', 'strong', proof is primarily given by an
'white' and their like are apt mode 148
predicated senominatively 24 dialectic
denote dialectic's end: opinion acqu
a parallelism can be denoted ired by argments derived from
with respect to the verb dialectical Topics 81
'walk' 105 dialectician(s)
description 22 admit only noun and verb as
a word-group consisting of parts of the word-groups they
genus and peculiarity 54; a study 3
word-group signifying the dictum
being of a thing through (what was said) 12; as a unit,
accidentals 54 always subject of third-person
destroy verb 105; can stand for itself
nominals like 'dead' and or part of itself as subject to
'corrupt' destroy rather than some verb 104; may be a
restrict 178 thing, but not 'thing' as taken
determinate 172 here 106; a dictum's subject
called determinate though is not the dictum 106;
didactic disputation constitutes species; so too,

concludes from principles contradiction added to syllog
peculiar to each discipline ism constitutes refutation
77; is mathematical or sci 161; 'animal' as genus r e
entific (naturalis) 78; tool: a stricted by difference 'ration
demonstrative syllogism 77 al' in 'rational animal' to
differ animals that are rational 177
whose terms and definitions different
differ, differ from each other 'a:ra' and 'ara' mean differ
21 ent things 110; amatur'
differ specifically means different things if ±
'two and three are five' dif- aspirated 110; in syllogism
fers specifically from 'two are and contradiction, name and
five and three are five' 99 thing must be different things
difference 142; 'man' and 'white' r e
17, 21, 23, 24; said in as strict each other in 'white
many ways as 'same' 17; man', but as to different
(specific) predicated of sev things 178
eral specifically different differentiate 2
things with respect to 'what differing
kind ? 21; specific like man 'from every man' less than
differs from horse by ration 'differing from Socrates' 191
ality 21; said 3 ways.: com diffuse supposition 172
monly, peculiarly amd more diffused supposition
peculiarly 21; common when abolish previous distinction
one differs by a separable about diffused suppositions
accident 21; more peculiar 74
when one differs by a specific diffusion
difference 21; specific: men belief it is impossible for a
and gods are rational; we dif common predicate term to be
fer from them by 'mortal' 21; diffused ± mobilely 72; com
identical difference both con mon predicate term cannot be
stitutive and divisive 21; diffused mobilely or immob-
added to a genus constitutes a ilely 73; all diffusion due to
species, so labelled constitut a demand of mood 74; dif
ive or specificative 21; vs. fusing 'man' by marker 'ev
acc: accident can be more or ery' does not diffuse but con
less, difference cannot 23; tracts 'animal' 75; every
vs. species & peculiarity: diffusion by demand of mark
predicated of several species, er or mood 75
but species is not 23; 27, 28, diminish
29, 36: natural, moral and 'dead' diminishes 'man' 138;
linguistic divide science 27; 'pictured' diminishes nature
rational and irrational divide of 'animal' 138; 'taken simp
animal 27; added to genus ly' excludes diminishers like
'unthinkable 1 180 disputing 1

diminution: decrease in pre distinguish 2
existent quantity 36 distribute
discourse / sermo in 'every man is an animal'
cannot be held without vocal by marker demand, the term
expressions 1 'man' is diffused / distributed
discrete quantity 30 for any of its supposits 71;
discrete term 'man' as restricted to white
like 'Socrates' is neither re men in 'every white man is
stricted nor extended 172; running' cannot be distributed
neither restricted nor extend except for white men 178; a
ed 180 preceding marker can distrib
disjunction 9 ute a common term for any
disposition 32 supposit 179
subject dispositions like distribution:
'white' should be repeated in multiplication of common
the minor 187; like 'every' term effected by universal
respective: dispose subject as marker 185; placed in an ob
paired with predicate, to sub lique cannot extend to the
ject-as-subject so ought not verb, nor can negation 195;
be repeated in minor 187; wherever found, a common
like 'white' independent; term is taken universally
pertain to what the subject 198; accommodated often
is 187 posited with 'all' 199; pot
disputation ential often posited with 'apt
cannot be held without dis to' 199; interscalar, inter
course 1; disputation, dis rupted, or discontinuous 204
course, vocal expression and diverse 27
sound 1; activity of one per deception effected by divers
son syllogizing with another ity of relation is not equivoc
as to a proposal to be demon ation 167; deception from
strated 76; requires: oppon diverse relation a fallacy of
ent, respondent, proposal, dis composition or division 167
putation and its instrument diversity
76; disputation's difference, relative of diversity in accid
'to be demonstrated', blends ents recalls specifically ident
its activity & object 76; ob ical quality and stands for
ject: disputed facts 76; of 4 specifically different quality
kinds: didactic, dialectical, 170
tentative and sophistical 77; divided
said analogically of four types 'two are five and three are
78; Aristotle does not define, five' is copulative when divid
just divides disputation in ed 98; five are two and
Elenchi 78; prime and sec three' can be divided or com
ondary analogates vary 78 posite 107
division common term be diffused ?

one sort by negation 67; not 73; is deception from diverse
by negation are 6: 3 as such, relation based on equivocat
3 by accident 67; (1) given ion, amphiboly or on another
word can conjoin terms or fallacy? 166
propositions 107; (2) given downwards 36
case-form or a given determ
iner can be differently order E = universal negation 47
ed to different things 108; eager 33
by opposites is correct: so efficient Cause:
Aristotle's division is incorr what a beginning of change
ect 94; motive principle: comes from 59
word-group unity caused by emotion 32
division 107 ends
division not by negation: what is earlier in intention, is
genus into species; whole into later in execution 81
parts, word into its significat enthymeme
ions; substance into accid an imperfect syllogism inferr
ents; accidents into their ing a precipitate conclusion
subjects; accidents into ac 50; since it reduces to a syl
cidents 67 logism, it must have 3 terms
divisive difference 21, 23 50
do : Action (facere) 27, 29, 30, equal number 30
31, 32, 33, 34, 36 equiparity 31
doctor equipollence
being a doctor or geometric and consequence of modais
ian is in man, but not in every rule 14; of categoric propos
man 21; a doctor does not itions 7; of modais chart
cure man except by accident 16; rules 9; rules for modais
132 12-13
dog 2; equipollent 9, 12
'dog' is predicated by single 'every man, who is white, is
name, diverse nature of running' is equipollent to
barker, fish & star 24 'every white man is running'
double and half 34 180
doubts equivocal
does 'animal' have simple or whose name is common, sub
diffuse supposition in 'every stantial nature quite diverse
man is animal' ? 72; every 25; 'learn' equivocal as to
thing predicated predicated ± 'understand' or 'retain' what
conversely 73; if genus teacher says 85; 'run' and
stands as formally common, 'laugh' first signify run and
can it be multiplied as such ? laugh, then 'bloom' and
73; if whole in quantity can 'flow' 86; that any univocal
not be genus-as- genus, can is equivocal can be proven
this way 166
Equivocation deception effected by divers

diverse natures of things unit ity of relation is not equivoc
ed in same word, simply taken ation 167
83; principle of deficiency / essence 22
cause of non-existence / fals Ethiopian 22
ity: diversity of natures and 'every'
of things signified 83; mot 'every man runs', as proven
ive principle / plausible cause: by another word-group, is a
unity of a word simply taken conclusion 136; as put in
83; can be taken in itself or premises to prove something,
secondarily as having some it is a proposition 136; as
thing in common with amphi signifying a thing ± exists, a
boly 84; further requires our statement 136; a universal
inability to distinguish nom marker distributive of sub-
inal natures 84; is from stance, defined through the
word signification 89; same mode 'what' 183; universal
word equally signifies (1) marker distributive of sub-
diverse things (dog) 84; (2) stance 183; 'every Socrates'
different things analogically is a solecism in word- group
(health) 85; (3) from diverse parts 183; does not signify
consignification ('suffering' something as a universal, but
past and present) 87; from that something is taken uni
metaphor reduces to equivoc versally 186; in the plural is
ation (2) 86; divided by a taken collectively, distrib
term's being major, minor or utively or divisively 186; not
middle accidental 89; 1st predicable of one nor of sev
two modes arise from signifi eral 186; signifies a common
cation, 3rd from consignific term taken for every infer
ation 89; in words from sign ior 186; signifies disposition
ification or consignification of a thing that can be made
89; equivocation or definition subject or predicate 186;
better preserved where many signifies not a thing, but a
are equally signified than kind of thing, which is ambig
when one is signified first, uous 186; if 'every' signifies
then others 89; common nothing, its ± presence ±
modes of equivocation and affects truth value little 186;
amphiboly 92; (to signify as disposition of subject in the
several things principally) major, it should be repeated
more appropriate to word in the minor 187; seems to
than word-group 96; decept demand 3 appellates 187; as
ion from absolute accidents; 'universally taken' a mode pe
amphiboly: deception from culiar to the universal itself
respective accidents 98; 188; sometimes found in sev
equivocation, word-group and eral, sometimes only in one
similar formations reduced in 188; adjoined to a term hav
that they are ambiguous 161; ing several supposits 189;
has a universal marker's sub- neither extended nor restrict

stance, potential and operat ed 180; third rule about ex
ion 189; equation of a uni tension by verb 181;
versal with its individuals extension
189; in singular, regards 'what sort of thing' taken
species as such, so demands properly and by extended de
only an essence naturally apt nomination 124; broadening
to be predicated of several, of a common term from
actually or not 189; demands smaller to larger supposition
3 significates depending on 172; effected by verb, noun,
the nature of the universal participle or adverb 172; has
189; does not always demand to do with supposits or time
3 appellates 189; 'every 172; and restriction have to
phoenix' has but one supposit, do with personal supposition
demands 3, so appeals to non- 172; another rule for extens
existents 190; always de ion by verb 180;
mands 3 appellates according extensive words
to this rule 190; like 'possible', 'capable' do
Example: not restrict but extend 178
one particular is tested by extreme / extremity 38, 39, 40
another on the basis of a like extremity
ness 51 major: term taken in the
(non)existent 175, 176 major with the middle term
'expedient' 39; minor - term taken in the
first signifies 'good', then minor proposition with the
'something that necessarily middle term 39; - that which
happens in bad things' 85; is from the side of the major
signifies 'something good' and extremity I call 'an accident
'necessary in evils' 85 which is assigned being-in to
expressions both' 135; that which is from
(voces) are ±significative the side of the minor extrem
naturally or by convention 2 ity I call 'accident of the
extend thing subjected' 135
extensive words like 'poss
ible', 'capable', do not re fact(ual) 71, 74
strict but extend 178; some fallacies
words naturally extend rather lead to the ends of sophistical
than restrict 178; 'not having disputation 81
ability to extend' excludes Fallacy 192, 193, 195, 196,
extensive verbs like 'able to' 197, 198,200,202,203,205
180; another rule for extens - of Word-figure: shift from
ion by verb 180; verb 'is' many to one determinate 71;
does not extend of itself, but shift from simple to personal
has that potential through its supposition 70;
adjuncts 180; discrete term - of Accent: (1) substantially
identical word can be domin questions as one: in singular

ated by different accent 109; number, many made subject
motive principle: partial or predicate 158; many sub
identity of middle term as re ject or predicate in the plur
peated 128; principle of de al 158; nonlinguistic: Accid
ficiency: diversity of middle ent, After-a-Fashion and
term on basis of definition Simply, Ignoratio Elenchi,
128; not of time or breath Petitio principii, Conse
113; quence, Non-cause as Cause,
- of Accident: requires double Many Questions as one 126
accident 126; when anything false 3
is similarly assigned being-in any negative where 'b' simply
to both a subject & its accid taken is negated is false
ent 126 182; copulative's 2nd part
- o f Many Question as one: false 202
unity of mode of questioning falsely 11
158 falsity
- of Non-cause as Cause: al as goal: manifest proposition-
ways arises in contradictory al falsity demonstrated by
syllogisms 154; does not disputation 79; contradictory
occur in demonstrative syllog of propositional 79; proposit-
isms 155 ional falsity no barrier to arg
- of Consequent: ument's validity 124
words taken as things r{thEr fashion
than signs of things is fallacy not 'fashion' and 'simply, but
of consequent, not word-fig their relation constitutes the
ure 119 fallacy 145
- of Diverse Relation: father and son 30, 34
construction of one thing with figure
diverse things 167 15, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45,
- of Accident 200; 46, 47: ordering of 3 terms as
-of Consequent 191, 193, 202 to which is to be subject and
(from insufficient Enumer predicate 39: First: subject
ation 193); in first proposition predicate
- Simply and After-a-Fashion in the second 39; First Figure
200; has 9 Moods: 1-4 conclude di
- Word Figure 192 (from Com rectly, 5-9 conclude indirect
mutation of Predicament) ly 40; 2nd Figure: nothing
203; Aristotle proves 6 lingu follows if the major is a par
istic fallacies inductively & ticular existential 42; 2nd
syllogistically 81; ambiguous Figure, nothing follows from
as to our deception or its affirmations alone 43; con
cause / principle 83; called clusion is always negative 43;
extralinguistic if plausible contained by a boundary or
cause in a thing 126; many boundaries (circle contained
in circumference) 115; not a being 36, 64

word's vocalic boundary like generic reduction 160
-a in musa, but a conceptual generic(ally) 17, 18, 19, 23
one 115; first in natural, genus
then mathematical things, as collection 17; said 3 ways:
then in a word, since proport collection, source, or what
ionally 115; not word-accid species is subordinated to 17;
ent by proper, but by com what is predicated of several
mon, likeness: as accident, specifically different things
coincides with any accident as to essence (in eo quod quid
115; figure-similarity am est) 17; what species is sub
biguous in words 116 ordinate to 18; 'being' pre
final Cause / Purpose: dicated of the 10 divisions of
that for the sake of which Predicaments but equivocally
something is done 60 or in multiple ambiguity 18;
finger 36 being is not a genus 18; most
finite 2 generic has no genus above it
first (one) (alter) 4 (like substance) 18; most
first substance underlies 2nd generic is what, being genus,
28, 29 cannot be a species 18; most
footstep 1 generic has 10 divisions: sub-
footwear 36 stance, quantity, relation,
form quality, action, passion, loc
what gives being to a thing ation, when, where and cost
and keeps it in being 60; as ume: none above them 18;
predicable a superior to its subaltern: what, though
inferiors 188; ambiguous: genus, can still be a species
material form not predicated 18; substance first genus:
of what it is form of 188 below as genera / species:
form in matter 26, 31, 32, 33, body, animate etc. 19; spec
35, 36 ies specifies with respect to
further objection: genus 19; Porphyrian Tree
accept terms where premises 20; vs. difference: genus
are true, but the conclusion predicated as to 'what', dif
false 48 ference as to 'what kind' 23;
future 30 genus, difference, species,
future tense 172 peculiarity predicated univoc-
ally, accident denominatively
genera 23; genus, species & differ
different genera found simply ence equally shared by those
in same word principle of de of which they are predicated;
ception by equivocation 125 accident is not 23; predicated
generate 1 of more than the other pre
generation 17, 23: dicables 23; 'animal' as genus
process from non-being to is restricted by the difference
'rational' in 'rational animal' 83; of an animal, signifies its

to animals that are rational subject, of urine a sign, of
177 food, what effects it, of
genus in species 26, 28, 34, 36 drink, what prepares for it
geometrican 84; said first of an animal,
being a doctor or geometric then of what keeps it so: pre
ian is in man, but not in every position 'in' first means r e
man 21 lation of things to subject,
gerund then their relation to what
ending in -do interpreted by they effect or conserve 87
'while' or 'if' or 'because' hear 1
197 hearing and deafness 34
grammar hot and cold 32
not about all contraries, but house
the ± congruous 71; perfect consists of wall, roof &
tool a simple congruous sent foundation: Socrates has
ence, figuratives are incom parts of that sort 199
plete 76 hypothetic 4;
grammarian 28, 32, 33, 33 from 'hypos' (under) and 'thes-
grammatical is' (position) 8;
accident: non-present tense hypothetical 8
in the verb 2; 'grammatic
al', 'strong', 'white' and their I = particular affirmative 47
like are predicated senomin- identical 163, 170, 171
atively 24 half a line is not numerically
greater: identical with a whole one,
(here) what surpasses another but relationships are numeric
in power and ability 64 ally identical 145; numeric
greater-less 30 ally identical accident cannot
groan 2 exist in different subjects,
specifically identical accid
habit: 32, 36 ents can 170
a quality hard to change vs. identical numerically
disposition: a quality easy to numerically identical accident
change 32 cannot exist in different sub
have (habere) jects, specifically identical
27, 28, 32, 34, 33, 36, 37: accidents can 170
have armor on 23; shoes on identical specifically
27; a possession like a house numerically identical accident
or field 37; a wife 37; cannot exist in different sub
bushel 'has' grains of wheat jects, specifically identical
37; flask 'has' wine 37 accidents can 170
'healthy' identity, substantially
always signifies identical reciprocal relative adds sub
health, but by different modes stantial identity and mode of
patient to agent 165; relat the implication in 'a man who

ive of diversity in accidents is white is running' 179;
recalls specifically identical adjoined to common term r e
quality and stands for specif stricts it just like its adject
ically different quality 170 ive 179; universal marker &
ignorance implication in same locution
negative: an infant knows and make it ambiguous 179
denies nothing 142$ compos imply
ite / multiple about conclus verbs in tenses other than the
ions 143; dispostional: when present imply different sup
a bit, not all, known about a positions 180
thing 142; simple disposit impossible 9
ional ignorance can be about 'the impossible can be true' is
premises but incomplete 143; a fallacy of Accident 173
simple dispositional can take impossibly 11
principle falsely or accept inanimate 1
falsities 143 incompatible 7
ignorantia elenchi incomplete 3
(ignoring the point at issue) incongruous
caused by ignorance of cert why 'every Socrates' is incon
ain differences 159; always gruous 185
contrary to all refutation-dif increase:
ferences, but differently. 159; addition of a pre-existent
specifically one of the 13 fall quantity 36
acies; generically, the one to indefinite (nonfinite) 4
which all 13 reduce 159 indeterminate(ly) 166
ignoring the point in question indiciative 3
(ignorantia elenchi) (ignoring individiual:
the point at issue) what is predicated of only
as disposition, not as negative one 17; animal species were
ignorance 143; modes drawn not of themselves in Noah's
from peculiarities of Refutat ark, only individiuals 182
ion 143 induce
ill 1 word-group induces a univers
illness and health 32 al affirmative or negative or
immortal particular negative conclus
before he sinned, Adam was ion 50; what induces and
immortal, that is, able not to what has been induced cannot
die 93 be of the same sort 146
imperative 3 induct(ion)(ively) 28
imperfect 3 induction:
implication = a restrictive progression from particulars
relative clause to the universal 50; tool tor
implication disputation 76; induction,
'man' restricted to whites by enthymeme or example are all
imperfect tools for disputat dom' (philosopher) 54

ion 76 interrogation
infer 192, 203 indicative word-group taken
inference 192, 198, 200 under the mode of asking a
inferior 19, 22-24, 177 question 156
inferior Position 31 interscalar
'infinite' interscalar / interrupted dis
said 5 ways: (1) what cannot tribution 204
be penetrated, (2) what can, introduction
but has not yet been gone prior to narration in a speech
through (3) by addition (4) 35
by division (5) by both addit- inventor 2
ition and division (203); as to 'invite'
las 3 significations, defined can be a word or a word-group
as: whose nature it is, always 111
to take up something extra 'is'
204; customarily taken as and 'lives' equal as potential
common term 204; as dis 'verb simply', not in actual
t r i b u t i v e marker, makes pro ity 101; 'is' predicate of its
position 'infinites are finite' subject 'whatever lives' in
distributionally equipollent to 'whatever lives always is' 101
'for one or another, infinites 'is'
are finite 204; equivocated taken by factual demand for
as 'infinite-for-us' and 'simply as many essences as 'man' 71;
infinite 204; can be common verb 'is' does not extend of
term or syncategorematic itself, but has that potential
word 205; 'infinite by through its adjuncts 180
addition' is infinite somehow justice 32
or other, not simply 203 knowing age 167
inflection knowing
indicative, imperative & in (1) conceptual: goes from
finitival word-groups com conceptually prior to the
pleted by own proper inflect conceptually subsequent 148;
ions 100 (2) sensible: goes from sens
instrument 1 ibly prior to sensibly sub
intergral Whole: sequent 148; the conceptual
what is composed on quantit is prior by essence, the sens
ative parts 36 ible, prior by sensibles 148
intensifie or diminished 29 knowledge 32
interpretation:
exposition of one word by law
some other word 34;; (1): not of contradictories 8; of sub-
converted like 'hurting the alternates 8; of subcontrar-
foot' (laedens pedem) 54; (2): ies 8
converted, like lover of wis leftwards 36
lesser 'man'
surpassed by greater 64 predicated of Socrates, e t c .
less-greater 30 since answer to 'what is Soc
letters prior to syllables 35 rates ?' is 'man' 19; predic
lexis / reasoning 1 ated nominally of Socrates
like and Plato 24; said of Socrat
to be ±like is peculiar to es by name an nature 28; has
quality 33 diverse suppositions depending
like is like its like 30 on what are added to it 70;
linke or unlike 33 in 'man is species', stands for
line 30 man-in-general, not an inferi
linguistic fallacies or 70; taken as such, natural
amphiboly, composition, divis ly stands for all men who are,
ion, accent & word-figure 81 were or will be 70; 'atands
linguistic science 27 for' diffusely and mobilely
linker 3 since taken for every man 71;
lips 1 'stands for' mobilely since
location 18 descent can be made to any
locomotion supposit 71; diffused by
change of place 36; upwards, marker-demand in 'every man
downwards, ahead, back, is an animal' 71; said to
rightwards, leftwards 36 stand for things diffusely,
locution mobilely and distributively
a universal marker and an im 71; in 'a man runs' stands for
plication in the same locution its inferiors 71; with uni
make it ambiguous 179 versal marker, taken for
logically several, since for any one at
humanity is logically, not nat all of its supposits 71 ; 'man'
urally, identical in any indi signifies its own and the qual
vidual man 74; man logically ities of Socrates 114; means
(not naturally) constituted of 'sort of thing', 'Coriscus'
'rational' and 'animal' 74 means 'this particular thing'
lungs 1 122; in 'a man can be the
Antichrist' stands not only
major proposition: for those who exist but for
the first of two syllogistic those who will 172; in 'a man
premises 38 is able to be white' stands for
'man runs' present men, extended to all
analyzed into 'man is running' who will exist 174; in 'a man
shows is as copula or linker 3 is running' stands for present
'man' and 'white' men 177; restricted by parti
restrict each other in 'white ciple to men running in 'a man
man', but as to different running is debating' 177; r e
things 178 stricted by verb to present
men in 'a man is running 177; 'the other' etc. 4; marker

restricted to standing for (signum) 4; if in S of
whites only by accidental proposition to be converted,
adjective 'white' 177; re must have all P in its scope
stricted to whites by restrict and reduces that whole to S
ive relative clause in 'the man 8; universal markers include
who is white is running1 177; 'every', 'not a one', 'nothing',
does not stand for blacks but 'any', 'either', 'neither' 4;
restricted to whites in 'a white universal and particular mark
man' 177; as restricted to ers (signa) are not terms 69;
white men in 'every white man universal marker & implicat
is running', cannot be dis ion in the same locution make
tributed except for white men it ambiguous 179; preceding
178; found in men white, black marker can distribute a com
and in between so more mon term for any supposit
common than 'white' 178; r e 179; when 'marker distribut
stricted to whites by the im ive of substance' used, 'sub-
plication in 'a man who is white stance' is taken commonly for
is running' 179; stands for men things of any kind 185; dis
who are or were men in 'a man tributive of substance distrib
was an animal' 180; is utes things defined through
distributed / diffused for the mode of 'what' (quid) 185;
inferior by marker 'every' 185; some distributive of substance
means species as such: 'men' are distributive of subjective
means species as actually parts ('not a [one]') 185; some
multiplied 189 of integral parts ('whole');
'man' some distributive of subject
as a common term with per ive parts are distributive of
sonal supposition does not several things ('every') 185;
signify, stand for or call up distributive of accident dis
the same thing in 'man runs' tributes things defined by
176; as a common term with mode of acciednet as though
simple supposition signifies, mode 'what kind' (qualis) 185;
stands for, and calls up man- 'not a (one) (nullus; signifies
in-common 175; signifies and negatively universally 193;
stands for ± existent man but 'not every' (omnis non) and
only calls up existents 175 'not  ( (nullus) are
Marcus-Tullius 18 equipollent 193; 'nothing'
mare (nichil) signifies 'not a thing'
a particular mare is bred to a (nullam rem) 194; 'of what
particular ass for the gener ever kind' is a universal
ation of a mule 23 marker disrtibutive of accid
marker(s) ent 185; of pairs ('eihter',
(particular) include 'some 'neither') 196; of quality dis
ohe', 'a certin one', 'the first', tributes a thing defined by the
mode of quality 201; distrib Maxim Topic / Topic Differ

utive of quality are superflu ential of Maxim are both
ous 201; distribuytive of Topics', since they give
quantity distribute a thing solidity to argumentation 52
defined by the mode of quant mean
ity 202; distributive of two: 'po:pulus' and 'populus' mean
'both'/'either' (uterque), different htings 110; 'white'
'neither' (neuter) 196; '(the) means 'what sort', yet seem
ehole (of)' (totus) distributive ingly signifies 'what' 121
of integral parts 199; 'every' medicine
seems to signify nothing since is not about all contraries,
each thing is universal or only about sick and well 71
singular 186; is a universal metaphor
marker distributive of sub- ambiguous: a name or word-
stance and accidents 185; groud signifying one thing is
signifies universally; negation transferred to signify some
does not 198; 'not a (one)' thing else through a likeness;
(nullus) 183, 193, 194; 'not a a better-known expression is
(one)' (nullus) signifies the taken for one less well-known
same as 'every' with negation 65-6; common to equivocat
added 193; 'not a (one)' ion and amphiboly 93; trans
(nullus) is a universal with fer of better for less well-
negation 194; 'nothing' known expression pertains to
(nichil) signifies the same as dialectics 66; word's present
the marker 'not a (one)' metaphorical meaning will be
(nullus) 194 its proper one after usage is
master and servant 34 set 96; see transfer
materially 18 method 1
matter 7 middle
is what is in potency only 39; nature of 'middle' is accident
that from which one thing is al to a given word: it can also
made along with another 39; be a major or minor extreme
of two sorts: permanent and 89
transient 59; that animal-in- middle Term
general is this or that animal- what has two extremes 49;
ity is due to matter 75 for an argument to exist,
Maxim there must be a middle term
a proposition compared to able to test conclusion 50;
which no other is more basic 'triangle' as a dialectical and
51 demonstrative middle term
Maximal Differences: 131
simple terms by which a pair minor proposition:
of Maxims differ 52 second of two syllogistic pre
Maxim Topic misses 38
same as Maxim itself 51; mnemonic 5
mobile and mode of patient to agent

mobilely diffuse supposition 165; reciprocal is so-called
cannot coexist with simple because it superimposes pati
supposition 72 ent mode on agent substance
modal 165
'man runs swiftly' signifies his mode of signifying
running is swift, determining in noun. accidental in gender
the verb's sense 11; 'man' as well 114; in verb, actual
necessarily runs' signifies this (accidental) and potential
composition is necessary 11; (essential) 114; in word,
determines verb's mood, like lessential by what it can - or
adverbs of wishing and com does - signify 114; noun,
manding 11; determines verb, or any part of a word-
verb's sense: 'firmly' and group has a double mode of
'swiftly' 11; determine a signifying, essential and a c c
verb's tense as temporal ad idental 113; in word, ambig
verbs do 11; necessarily, uously substantial or accid
copntingently, possibly, im ental 113; word-figure a
possibly, truly and falsely mode of signifying accident
determine composition 11; ally in a word 115; word has
some determine verb on accidental mode of signifying
behalf of composition like a thing as an individual 117;
these six 11 word has an accidental mode
mode 163-7, 170 of signifying what is principle
mode 'in what' is in any Pre of ±congruity, like gender
dicaments; 'what sort' is 117; word has an accidental
peculir to Qualty; 'how much' mode of signifying due to the
to Quantity, 'to something' to thing signified 117; paired
Relation 120; 'what sort' is with expression as instrument
nothing other than aptitude of sign; with thing signified
for existing in several 122; as its object 134
nominative can be patient but mode of
cannot have mode of patient 25, 26, 28, 29, 35-7: being-in
165; nominative means mode equivocated in saying urine
of agent 165; substantive and animal are healthy 29;
relative recalls the univocal predication 25; patient is
thing, or by its mode, 'some one thing, mode of patient
thing 1 170 another 165
mode of patient modes of unity
agent cannot be signified as simply taken: 'rational mortal
patient nor under the mode of animal' - unity from several
patient except in oblique cas 156; accidental 157; 'unity'
es 165; is always in oblique taken for all modes of unity
cases 165; reciprocal relat makes both statement and
ive adds substantial identity proposition one, when one of
those unities is made subject polysemy: same word truly

and another predicate 157; has one mode of signifying
one unit lacking, not one and seemingly an opposed one
statement but many 157; an 116; potential polysemy is
interrogative mode complet when an identical word or
ive of an interrogation 137; word-group signifies different
for a single question, a double things depending on different
unity is required: thing divid perfections 98; imaginary
ed earlier and question mode polysemy is when the same
137; one numerically ('Soc word truly has one mode of
rates', 'Plato') 137; one gen signifying and seems to have
erically ('soul', 'color') 157; another 116
one proportionally ("being', multiplication
'healthy', 'good') 157; one it is fatuous to say multitute
specifically ('man', 'white comes from multiplication by
ness') 157; unity by which a predicate 74; accidental
proposition & statement are multiplication is ambiguous as
one is unity simply taken 157; to numerically and specific
unity of interrogative mode is ally 201
unity after-a-fashion, not mutual 31, 34
simply unity 157
modified 11 name 25, 26, 28, 29, 33, 36
mood 71, 74, 75 name extended 26
moral science 27 narration
more due position of negation in a speech, the introduction
195 is prior to narration by order
more or less 29, 30-1, 33-4 narrow 172
'mortal' in 'white man', 'white' is
added to genus 'rational narrowed to whiteness in
animal' constitutes 'man' 21 men 178; terms narrow each
most generic genus 18 other, but differently 178
most special species 19 narrowing 177, 178
motive natural
motive principle / motive natural expressions mean the
cause / plausible cause all same to all, like groans and
label an identical principle 83 barking 2; natural instru
mouth 1 ments of vocal expression:
multiple ambiguity (polysemy) lips, teeth, tongue, palate,
11, 18; three ways: actual, throat & lungs 1; naturally
potential and imaginary 82; apt 4; naturally significative
more truly realized in actual 2; nature 2
than in potential, in potential natural supposition
than in imaginary 82; actual acceptance of a common term
is polysemy simply taken, pot for all it is naturally apt to
ential is not 116; imaginary take part in 70
naturally apt 17, 19 negative 4

naturally apt universal: any negative where 'be' simply
what is naturally apt to be in taken is negated is false 182
several 17 neither (neuter) 4
naturally autonomous nichil (nothing) 4
in nature, my and your hum 'nine'
anity are autonomous 75 as well as 'ten' which are
nature of genus taken denominatively mean
if multiplied ±mobilely, it is discrete quantity through the
no longer genus 72 mode of discrete quantity
'nature' 121
touches on a thing's substance no syllogism
189 results from particular, non-
nature(-ural) 25, 27-9, 31-2, finite or singular terms alone
34-6 39; from negatives alone 40
necessarily 11 nominal mode
necessary 9 mode ambiguous: one through
amputation is bad, but nominal adjective, the other
necessary lest the entire body adverbial 11
become diseased 85 nominally 11
necessity nominally derived 32
'happen of necessity' ambigu nominally same 18, 24
ous 127; nouns and composit nominative 2
es signify by convention and a can be patient but cannot
kind of necessity as well 95 have the mode of patient
negate 165; means mode of agent
negate superior, inferior is 165; nature of nominative is
negated as well 198 repugnant to the pronoum '(of)
negated universally self' (sui) 165
(dici de nullo): when there is non-significative 2
nothing to take under the sub non-vocal
ject from which the predicate non-vocal sounds are gener
would not be removed 38 ated by clashing bodies 1
negation nonfinite 2-4
can determine the verb or not-run (a nonfinite) is not a
participle 195; does not verb for a dialectician 2
diffuse, only negates, what it not a (one) (nullus) 4
finds 198; lacks ability to nothing (nichil) 4
distribute 198; negation nothing is contrary to sub
within 'nothing' can negate stance 29-31, 33, 36
the participle placed first nothing follows
194; the negation within in 3rd Figure if the minor is
'nothing' can negate the verb an existential negative 44
195; can it distribute or
diffuse ? 198
'nothing' 24; 'man' is predicated nom

by usage stands for solid or inally of Plato and Socrates
firm things 184 24; see Topic from nominal
noun interpretation
a conventionally significative noun quality
vocal expression without ambiguous as to substantial or
tense, no separate part of accidental quality 113;
which signifies definite proper or appellative 113
things, in nominative case 2; nullus (not a [one]) 4
denominative noun should number
agree with a univocal in its a discrete quantity such as a
beginning 25; substantive number and a word-group 28;
nouns said to stand for, ad a multitude brought together
jectivais to couple 69; parts out of unities 28; an aug-
of a word signify nothing mentable number, infinite by
separately 93; a composite addition of a unit to another
noun's significate constituted number 203
from the partial concepts of numerically 17-19
those same parts 93-4; a things that can be counted are
composite noun signifies only numerically different (like
one thing, as far as amphiboly Socrates and Plato) 18; n.
is concerned; composites same said 3 ways: (1) same
signify by convention in one in name and definition (2) by
way, by necessity in another peculiarity (3) by accident
95; does not signify the same 17-19; the fourth is some
when pronounced with a grave thing numerically one, like
or acute accent 12; every Socrates and Plato 157; the
noun signifies with quality first is when in singular
essentially 113; has a double number, many are made sub
mode of signifying, substant ject or predicate 158
ial and accidental 114; non-
diminishing noun 178; equi
vocation from consignificat-  = particular negative 47
ion in simple nouns as well as oblique case
composites 97; all signify by agent cannot be signified as
convention as to remote patient nor under the mode of
cause, by necessity as proxim patient except in oblique
ate cause 95; 'numerically cases 165
same' said three ways: in oblique verb 2; noun or verb 2
name (nomen) or definition, omnis (every) 4
by peculiarity and by accident opponent 1
184; to be predicated univoc- opposed 73
ally = according to a single opposite
name (nomen) and nature tak (1) relatively (master-servant)
en according to that name (2) privatively (sight-blind-
ness) (3) contrarily (white- dicate, possibility imposed on

black) (4) affirmation & the dictum's subject 105; de
negation ('he is/is not sitting') noted with respect to verb
32 'walk', possibility imposed on
opposition 14-16, 34 dictum as a unit 105; implied
modal: contrary, subcontrary, by participle 'sitting' can be
contradictory, subalternate signified with respect to verb
14; propositional: relative, •walk' 105
contrariety, privative and paralogism
contradictory 62; relatively: for dialectician or logician
things just not found without 131; paralogisms cited have a
each other 62; privative: dialectical and a sophistical
those having to do with the Topic 148
same thing (sight & blindness) parentage
63 descended from the same
optative 3 ancestor 17
order 5 part 2, 30, 34, 36
if things could be ordered ability to see suits parts as
more suitably, so too should united within their whole, not
signs 101; word-ordering is the whole itself 197 ; in
nothing other than a wrod- what is a part, the whole is
group 167 taken indirectly 199; has no
ordering being but in its whole 200
figure or ordering 13 part in Place is a word embrac
ing one place adverbially 58
pair part of speech 3
pairing seeing and its visible particular
object shows union of what categoric proposition: a com
can be and is seen 76 mon term is made subject, de
palate 1 termined by a particular
paradox marker, as in 'some man runs'
what is contrary to opinion of 4; a syllogism cannot be
all, or of most, or of experts, made from solely particulars
and of these as of all, or of 39; if a premise is particular,
the majority, or of the best- the conclusion must be partic
known. So paradoc and the ular 40; see also categoric
improbable are substantially proposition
same but differ formally 79; participial
so-called since mind unwilling 'having ability' and nominal
to agree, but rejects it 80 'possible' confer ability to
parallel extend on the verb to which
can be debated with respect they are adjoined 174
to the predicate 105 participle
parallelism was invented to imply its
denoted with respect to pre parallelism to the verb 105;
'suffering' consignifies present dicate what the essence of a

time & imperfect past 88; in thing is 21-23; said four
present tense adjoined to ways 21; defined fourth way,
active/passive verb vary in it is one of five predicables
(con)signification 88; 'man' 22; vs. accident: peculiarity
restricted by participle to is predicated of only one
men running in 'a man species, accident of several
running is debating' 177 22; peculiarity vs. acc: a c c
particular 4 ident is first in individuals,
marker 4; sought in universal 2nd in genus and species; pe
147 culiarity is first in species,
parts of speech / word-group then in individuals 22
dialectician posits two (noun peculiarly / proprie 1
and verb): the rest are called pendere
syncategorematics 3 'pendere' has one perfection
parts of word-group / speech in the 2nd, another in 3rd con
constitute word-group's jugation 98; has different
significate but retain their meanings by accent 110
own proper significate 96 perfect 3
passion / passivity 18 a man is called 'perfect' who
passion / undergoing has man's due substance, pot
an effect and consequence of ential & operation 189
action 34; passivity: a qual perfection
ity of Being Affected 30; pe is called an act(uality) 99; is
culiarity: undergoing some in threes: entire and perfect
thing is not in an agent but in are the same 187; a thing's
a patient 34; peculiarity: to perfection is in three things:
be brought about by action 34 its substance, potential and
past 30 operation 189; a part has no
patient 34 being but in its whole, for it
is one thing, mode of patient has no perfection except in
another 165; nominative can that whole 200; every word-
be patient but cannot have group taken as composite or
the mode of patient 165; divided: some difference is
reciprocal relative adds sub always to be found on the side
stantial identity and mode of of perfection, and thereby, of
patient to agent 165 significates 98
peculiar(ity) / proprium personal supposition
17, 18, 21, 23,: what is acceptance of a common term
always in each member and for its inferiors; determinate
always only in a member 21; or diffuse 71, 172
defined by Aristotle: what is phoenix'
in species alone, predicated is restricted to one in 'a
conversely of that to which it phoenix exists', so their rule
is peculiar, and does not in is fallacious 190
place 30, 32, 34, 36 its expression side is ordered

place in nature to its potential for diverse
provides firm ground to natur significates 102-3; verb 'is'
al things, as a Topic, it con does not extend of itself, but
firms arguments 52 has that potential through its
plow sand 167 adjuncts 180
polysemy / multiple ambiguity precede
Alexander says polysemy a preceding marker can dis
(multiple ambiguity) is actual, tribute a common term for
potential or imaginary 82; any supposit of it 179
consists of both identity and Predicable
diversity in a word-group 99; 17-24: predicable / universal:
actual: one simply identical genus, species, difference,
word(-group) signifies several peculiarity (proprium) and
things 82; actual polysemy is accident 17; same as uni
polysemy simply taken 116; versal, but formally differ
it occurs in equivocation and ent 17; predicaebles are
amphiboly 82; imaginary: defined by being said, uni
the same word has truly one, versals by being 17; predic
and seemingly another, mode ated of several 17; all 5
of signifying 116; potential: alike in being predicable of
when an identical word or several 24
word-group signifes different Predicament 1 9 , 2 4 , 2 5 , 2 7 , 3 6
things depending on different predicate universally
perfections 98 (dici de omni): when there is
Porphyry 19,20, 22, 72, 127 nothing under the subject
posit(ing) etc. 38
ambiguous in syllogisms: one predicate, a
by quantity, quality and order what is said of the other 3;
of propositions and terms; predicate-as-predicate is one
the other which has to do with thing, that which is the pre
Topic-relationships 163 dicate another 169; restricts
possess / have / habere its subject as to consignific-
(l) quality (virtue) (2) size ation, not as to principal
(2 cubits) (3) have about the signification 179;
body (coat) (4) a member predicate, to 17-24:
(finger) (5) have contained in 3 ways: equivocally, uni-
(flask has wine) (6) a posses vocally, denominatively 25;
sion (house) (7) a wife - neither name nor nature of
furthest from posession 36-7 some things said of a subject
possibly 11 are predicated 28; white
postposed 10 may be predicated of a sub
potential ject but whiteness never is
the potential a word-group 28; 'white' as predicate of 'a
has for diverse species from man is white' cannot restrict
'man' as subject to whites preposition 'in'

179; 'white' in predicate 'in' here taken according to
cannot restrict 'man' in different relations; it primar
subject 179; means: ily signifies relationship of an
what-is-predicate & predic- illness to some efficient cause
ate-as-predicate 187; with 87; 'in' in 'in whatever ill
respect to what: reponsive to ness is found' means a relat
the question 'what ?', it is ionship of material cause as
predicated 'in quid' 18; with that-in-which 87; 'in' first
respect to 'what kind': an means health to its efficient
swers the question put by cause, then relation to its
'what kind ?' 23; univocally: subject 87; 'in' does not
according to a single name signify other than spatial r e
and nature according to that lations indifferently 87; 'in'
name 23; equivocally: by a first means spatial relation,
single name but a diverse nat then all others 86;
ures with respect to that prepositional
name 24; 'on the basis of' means effici
predicated of another 27, 28, ent and formal cause 86
29, 32 present
'predicated' 'man' in 'a man is running'
in the definition of species, stands for present men 177;
means aptitude, not actual 'man' restricted by verb to
ity 18 present men in 'a man is run
predication ning' 177; verbs in tenses
in nominative 73 other than present imply dif
premise - conclusion: ferent suppositions 180
one premise particular, con present tense 2, 174
clusion particular (not the primarily 28, 30
converse) 40; particular principal
premise, particular conclusion a univocal / an abstract / a
(but not the converse) 40; base (principale) form (which
premise negative, conclusion are the same thing) is said to
negative (and the converse) be conjugate with its denom
40; premised propositions, by inative, like 'justice' and
sharing a term, are the cause 'just' 67; principal parts 9;
of a conclusion 154; two principal member
premised syllogistic premises 'lives', as bound to the
= what have been posited 38 subject is not a principal
prepose 10 member of 'what lives always
preposition is' 101
any preposition entails one re principally signify
lationship first, others 'more than one' is common to
secondarily 86 equivocation and amphiboly
93; 'signify principally' is
found in nominals from impos pronoun 'self' (sui) 165

ition and composition 95 proof
principle of something is always differ
principle of effect / cause of ent from what is to be prov
non-existence / cause of fals en 146; the same thing,
ity are all identical 83 under same name, cannot be
principles proven of itself 146; that
are prior to conclusions 35 any univocal is equivocal can
prior be proven this way 166
(1) in time (2) subsequence proper(ly) 17, 21, 22-3
in subsisting (3) order (4) proportion
honor (5) natural or causal differs from Like by ± inher
(like a fact and sentence ent likeness 65; one proport
about it) 35; among convert ionally, the sort predicated on
ibles by natural essense, cause the basis of prior and subsequ
is said to be naturally priop ent, as 'being' is predicated
35; most call the more honor of all beings and 'health' of
able prior among them 35; all healthy things 157
conceptually prior are so by proposition
their essense; sensibly prior hypothetical copulative: in
are more pervious to the sens 'man runs', 'man' is subject,
es 148; since what is prior is 'runs' the predicate; what
not there, neither do its con conjoins them is the copula
sequences exist ? 118 3; only an indicative word-
Priscian 11, 105, 112, 113, 164, group (like 'man runs') can be
165 called a proposition 3; word-
privative opposition group meaning is something
does not hold distributively true or false 3; universal,
without a stable subject and a particular, nonfinite or sing
time span naturally set 64 ular 3; an indicative word-
privatively opposed 34 group 3; signifying some
probable thing true or false ('man
'simply probable': what seems runs') 3; principal parts sub
true to all, or most, or ex ject and predicate 3; univers
perts, and to these as the al - common term subject, de
majority, or all, or best- termined by a universal mark
known 78; for tentative syl er - 'every man runs' 4;
logism: probable after-a- universal signifies something
fashion 78; taken simply by as belonging to all or not a
the dialectician 77 one of something 4; categor
pronoun 4 ics affirmative or negative 4;
'self' (sui) lacks a nomin affirmative where predicate
ative: why ? 165; 'sui', 'sibi', affirmed of subject 4; negat
'se', 'se' 165; nature of nom ive where predicate removed
inative is repugnant to the from subject 4; nonfinite: a
common term is made subject ion 51; proposition / question

without a marker ('man runs') / conclusion are substantially
4; particular: common term identical, formally different
subject is determined by a 51; an indicative word-group
particular marker 4; some probative of another 156; is
categorics share both terms, a unit about one thing 163;
some only one 5; sharing no proposition begun by a r e
both terms: contrary, subcon- lative has a contradictory
tary, contradictory and sub- 168; no proposition truer than
alternate 5; some categorics one in which same thing is
share both terms in converse predicated of itself 192; pro
order 5; some categories position 'infinites are finite'
share both terms in the same held equipollent to 'some
order 5; subalternate: uni infinites are finite' 204;
versal affirmative / particular propositional law:
affirmative; universal negat contraries: (if one is true, the
ive / particular negative of other false, but not contrary)
same subject and predicate 5; 7; law of contraries varies
subcontraries: particular af with natural and contingent
firmative & particular negat matter 7; law of subaltern-
ive of the same subject and ates: universal true, partic
predicate 5; contradictory: ular true, but not converse
universal affirmative & part 7; law of subcontraries relat
icular negative; universal ed to law of contraries as a
negative / particular affirm contrary 7; law of subcon
ative of the same subject and traries: one false, the other
predicate 5; contraries: uni true, but not the converse 7;
versal affirmative and uni propositional matter: contin
versal negative of same sub gent: predicate ± present to
ject and predicate 5; chart subject 7; natural: predicate
of propositional oppositions is of subject's being or a
6; see conversion 8; condit Peculiarity of the subject 7;
ional: two categories linked remote: predicate is incom
by the conjunction 'if' 9; patible with the subject 7;
disjunctive: two categories proprie/properly/peculiarly 1
linked by conjunction 'or' 9; proprium or peculiarity 21-22
hypothetical has two categor proven
ies as its principal parts 9; same thing, under same name,
so-called as what is put in cannot be proven by itself
premises to test conclusion 146; this is clearly proven by
51; as already tested by an Aristotle's solution 153;
argument, it is a conclusion proximity 36
51; as posited to test an pseudo-argument
other, a proposition 51; as opposes demonstration 77,
something doubted, a quest 143, 160
quadrilaterality 32 identical but differ formally

qualis (what kind ?) 4 51; 'every man runs' with a
qualitative: mode of interrogation added =
predicated denominatively question 156
from quality not nominally quidam (a certain one) 4
derived 32; quilibet (any one at all) 4
Quality
8, 18, 23, 27, 30, 32, 33, 36: racer 32
that by which we are said to ratio 1
be of such a kind 32; species: is used in several ways 49: a
(1) habit & disposition (more middle term, inducing an arg
permanent) (2) ± capacity to ument's conclusion; common
± do something easily (3) essence predicable of sever
passivity (quality of being af al; definition, description;
fected) (4) form or shape of design or material shape;
a stable thing 32; peculiarity: mental ability to reason;
(a) contrariety in some, not reasons debaters advance 49
all (b) admit of more & less 'rational'
(c) things called ± so on the divides 'animal' with a dif
basis of quality 33 ference opposed to itself 21;
Quantity predicated of 'man' with
8, 18, 27, 29, 30, 36: com respect to 'what kind' 21
mons: (l) have no contrar 'raw'
ies (2) no more or less 30; means 'what sort', seemingly
continuous: linked to a com mode of quantity as taken
mon term 30; line, surface, under 'how much' 121
body, place and time 30; dis reason 1
crete: number is a multitude recall 164, 165, 166, 167,
brought together out of unit 170, 171: relative univocal as
ies: so too is a word-group; recalling a thing gone before
number and word-group lack 166
common terms 30 reciprocal 164, 170
que (what ?) 4 what signifies an agent sub-
question stance under a patient mode
'what kind ?' asks about the 165; so-called because it
quality of a proposition 4; superimposes patient mode on
'what number ?' asks about agent substance 165
the quantity of a proposition reciprocal conversion 13
4; 'what ?' questions the sub- reciprocal relative
stance of the proposition 4; adds substantial identity and
threefold: what ? what kind ? mode of patient to agent 165
what number ? 4; a proposit recta 2
ion which may be doubted 49; reduce 8
proposition, quetion and con reduce to Absurd:
clusion are substantially (reductio ad absurdum): infer
from the opposite of the con position (servant, half); of

clusion with one of the pre superior position (master) 31
mises, the opposite of the relation of identity
other premise 44 rule: a non-reciprocal relat
reduction ive of identity should have the
pairings reducing inferiors to same supposition as its a n t e
superior / superior to inferiors cedent 170; a relative of
are opposed 73 identity in accidents recalls a
reduction of all Fallacies 159 specifically identical accident
refutation and stands for one and the
denial of what was conceded same species 170
or concession of what was de relative clause (restrictive)
nied in the same disputation 'man' is restricted to whites
by force of argumentation by the restrictive relative
79; syllogism of contradiction clause in 'the man who is
of one and the same thing etc. white is running' 177
141; syllogism of one thing relative of accident
with its contradiction 141; recalls a thing by mode of de
syllogism whose conclusion nomination 170; what recalls
contradicts a proposition pre the same thing by way of de
viously assumed 141; two nomination 170;
syllogisms contradicting each relative of diversity
other 141; same as a syllog what stands for something
ism whose conclusion contra other than what it recalls 167
dicts that of another 141; relative of identity
syllogism with its contradict all relatives of identity that
ion 141; recall a substance identical
Relation 18 with their antecedent recall
relative defined: what is to and stand for the numerically
another or compared to an same thing 165; certainty is
other (double, father) 30; greater from a relative of
those for which to be is some identity than from an a n t e
how to be to another (peculi cedent substituted for a r e
ar to relation) 31; relative lative 165; recalls and stands
commons (1) not all con for the same thing 164
trariety is appropriate to re relative(s)
lative; (2) susceptible of (1) that for which to be is
more or less (3) said con- to-be-to-another (Predicam
vertibly; (4) relatives go ent) 164; (2) what recalls
together (5) mutually ± af something gone before, some
firm each other (6) knowing thing past 164; a relative is
one definitively, correlative univocal as recalling a thing
equally known 31; of equi- gone before 166; all have
parity: said by same word same nature, not of themselv
(like like like); of inferior es, but in the one using them
Index of Words and Things 2*3
to recall 167; any proposit dependence of that which is

ion begun with a relative has the subject 169
a contradictory 169; relativ respondent 1
es proferred when no question responsive
has been put 171; proferred proper responsives are an
when nouns of special accid swers to preceding questions
ent are mentioned 171; rule 171
about restriction by a re restrict
strictive relative clause 179 'citizen', in 'a citizen is
relative, substantial white (albus)' is restricted as
substantial relative recalls a to consignification (here,
numerically identical thing; gender) 179; 'man' is r e
accidental relative recalls a stricted to standing for whites
specificaly identical thing only by the accidental adject
170 ive 'white' 177; 'man' and
relatively opposed 3* 'white' restrict each other
relatives of accidental identity in 'white man', but as to dif
are relatives of quality or re ferent things 178; 'man' as
latives of quantity (continuous restricted to white men in
or number) 171; or respons- 'every white man is running'
ives not said of things pres cannot be distributed except
ent 171; recall identical or for white men 178; 'man'
diverse substances 164; a does not stand for blacks but
substantive relative recalls is restricted to whites in 'a
the univocal thing or by its white man' 177; 'man' is r e
mode 'something' 170 stricted by the participle to
relatives of identity men running in 'a man runn
are nouns or ± reciprocal pro ing is debating' 177; 'man' is
nouns 164 restricted by the verb to pre
remote sent men in 'a man is runn
propositions' matter is three ing' 177; 'man' is restricted
fold: natural, contginent and to whites by the restrictive
remote 7 relative clause in 'the man
remove (deny) 4 who is white is running' 177;
represent 1 'man' is restricted to whites
representation 69 by the implication in 'a man
repugnant 165 who is white is running' 179;
res (sense) 11 'white', as predicate of 'a
res; see thing man is white', cannot restrict
respect 'man' as the subject to
of relative to antecedent is whites 179; 'white' in the
not there because of the nat predicate cannot restrict
ure of affirmation nor the de 'man' in the subject 179;
pendence of subject-as-sub another rule about restrict
ject, but because of the ion 178, 179; extensive
words like 'possible', 'cap as to signification 183; by a

able 1 do not restrict but ex verb's ± transitivity 184; by
tend 178; implication adjoin usage 184;
ed to common term restricts restriction & distribution
it just like its adjective does restricted to 'white', can
179; a discrete term is neith only distribute for whites 178
er extended nor restricted restrictive relative clause
180; 'be' no more restricts to rule about restriction by a r e
existents than 'run' does to strictive relative clause 179
runners 183 rightwards 36
restriction 177, 178, 179, 180, ring 36
181, 182, 183, 184: narrowing risibility 18, 21-2
of a common term from larg rule
er to smaller supposition 172; relative of diversity rule 168;
and extension have to do with relative of diversity rule giv
personal supposition 172; en by predecessors 168; for
narrowing a common noun's restriction by a noun, com
supposition from larger to monly taken 177; another
smaller supposition 177; ef rule about restriction 178,
fected by noun, verb, parti for restriction by a noun 178;
ciple and restrictive relative about restricted term 178;
clause 177; effected by a about restriction by a restric
noun 177; by a restrictive tive relative clause 179; an
relative clause 177; by a other rule for extension by a
verb 177; by an accidental verb 180; about restriction
adjective 177; by an essent by a verb 180; (1) about r e
ial difference 177; by an in striction effected by the verb
ferior put next to a superior 180; about restriction of
177; by a participle 177; less common subject-terms of
always restrictes the more verbs in future tense 181;
common 178; by significat thid rule about extension by
ion 178; predicate restricts verb 181; about subject r e
its subject as to consignific- stricted as to time, not signi
ation, not as to principal sign fication 183; about fallacy
ification 179; rule about r e of accident 192; about neg
striction by a restrictive re ation and distribution 195;
lative clause 179; a term r e for marker 'not a (one)' 193;
stricts another as to consigni- rules:
fication, not principal signi universal for any Figure 39;
fication 179; rule about r e for the four moods concluding
striction by verb 180; are directly: 40; for 2nd figure
terms restricted in negatives 42; for 2nd figure 44 for
as in positive affirmations ? syllogisms concluding to a
182; verb restricts its suppos- particular negation 46
it as to consignification, not
Index of Words and Things 2*5
said of a subject true sentence is not a cause

27, 29, 36: said of and in a that a fact exists 35
subject (genus, species of in separate 2
feriors) 27; some in, but not shape 32
said of a subject (knowledge share 5
in soul) 27; some neither said shift
of, nor in, a subject (substant from simple to personal sup
ial individuals 27; some said position 72; from one de
of a subject but are in none terminate supposition to an
(substance, genus, species & other no fallacy without other
differences) 26; what is said defect 124; ambiguous in
of a predicate is said of the proof 191; from inferior to
predicate's subject 27 superior with distribution 191
same sight and blindness 34
said 3 ways: same in genus, sign 2, 29
species and number 17; spec words are signs of things
ifically: contained under the 101; signs as signs ought to
same species 17; generically: suit and contrast by reason of
contained under same genus their significates 101; a verb
17; nominally: materially is always the sign of what are
single, but with several names predicated of something else
18; by accident: one the acc 101; linguistic fallacies come
ident of the other 18; by de from the expression- or sign-
finition: one the definition of side 103;
the other 18; by peculiarity: significant part
one a peculiarity of the other lack of significant parts dis
18; generically, specifically tinguishes a noun from a
and numerically used similar word-group 2
ly 18; numerically: same in signification 1, 2, 25, 27, 29:
name / definition, peculiarity another signification: that of
or by accident 18; adjectival thing 69; through
same - different imposition of a vocal express
statement, proposition, quest ion on a thing to be signified
ion & conclusion substantially 69; signification & supposit
same, differ functionally 156 ion differ 69; one sort of
saw 33 signification: that of a sub
scope 8 stantive thing 69; signific
secondarily 28 ation of term: conventional
self-contained 22 representation of a thing by
sense 3 vocal expression (vox) 69;
sense (res) 11 not properly substantival or
sense of hearing 1 adjectival 69; singification
sentence : see word-group and supposition do not have to
called ± true depending on do with same things 70; sign
whether a fact ± exists 35; a ification prior to supposition
70; signification and suppos subject or predicate 72;

ition concern both existent singular 4
and non-existents 175; verb singular term
restricts its supposit as to one naturally apt to be pre
consignification, not as to dicated of on thing only 4;
signification 183 every change and all operat
signification (principal) ions have to do with singul
predicate restricts its subject ars 132; signifies, stands for,
as to consignification, not as and calls up the same thing
to principal signification 179; 175; cannot be distributed
term restricts another as to 185
consignification, not principal size 36
signification 179 snub-nosed 23
significative solecism
an expression is significative fault in constructing contrary
if it represents something to the rules of the art of
when heard 1; conventional grammar 80; 'man's runs' is a
and simple (noun, verb) or mistake of needed ending 97;
complex (word-group) 2; dis positing a solecism destroys
tinguishes noun from non- the nature of inference yet
significative expressions 2; leaves seeming conclusion
naturally: represents the 118; 'question is many' lacks
same to all (groans and bark concord but is well joined 157
ing) 2 some (one) (aliquis) 4
'signify' son-father 28
has to do with a vocal expres sophistic Disputation
sion 70 syllogizes from what seem,
signifying by convention repre but are not, probable 78; is
sents something depending on ordered to five goals: Refut
its inventor's choice (man) 2 ation, Falsity, Paradox, Sole
signum (marker) 3 cism & Trivialization 79;
simple proximate goal: apparent
conventional expressions are wisdom 80
noun and verb 2; simple con sophistical syllogism(s)
version 8; simple suppost- one that seems to be, but is
ion 70; the Fallacy After-a- not, a syllogism 78: divide
Fashion and Simply 137 like sophistical disputation 80
simple supposition sophistical Topic(s)
acceptance of common term thirteen fallacies: six lingu
for a universal thing signified istic, seven extralinguistic
by it 70; that of a common 81; proof is primarily in a
term after an exceptive word non-apt mode 148
like 'except' 70; that of a sophists
common term as subject or as prefer to seem wise and not
affirmative predicate 70; in be to being wise without
seeming so 80 said to stand for (supponere)

sound 69; has to do with term com
what is peculiarly perceived posed of vocal expression and
by the sense of hearing 1; a signification 70; 'man'
vocal or non-vocal 1; non- does not stand for blacks but
vocal generated by inanimate restricted to whites in 'a
bodies 1; to be discussed white man' 177; 'man' in 'a
before disputation 1 man is running' stands for
species 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, present men 177; in 'animal-
23: what is predicated of sev man', the term 'man' stands
eral numerically different only for animals that are men
things as to 'what (essential) 177; in 'rational animal',
kind' 18; subaltern: one 'animal' stands only for rat
which, though a species, can ionals 177; noun 'man' in
still be a genus 19; what is 'white man' does not stand
between most generic genus & for blacks 177; 'man' stands
most specific species: genera for men who are or were men
and species from alternate in 'a man was an animal' 180;
points of view 19; most in 'a man was an animal',
special: one below which 'animal' stands for those who
there is no lower species 19; are or were animals 180; in
most special: that which, 'man was an animal', 'man'
though species, cannot be a stands for those who are or
genus 19; also defined as were men 180; in 'every
that of which genus is predic animal was in Noah's ark',
ated, as to 'what kind ?' 19; 'animal' stands for past
only species is defined 21; animals 181; 'nothing' by
naturally prior to peculiarity; usage stands for solid or firm
peculiarity naturally posterior things 184; in 'it is assert-
" t o species 23; vs. difference: able', 'assertable' stands for
many differences conjoin in existents and non-existents
species, species don't conjoin 183; in 'Socrates feeds him
23; vs. genus: genus contains self', 'himself' cannot stand
all species without being con for other than Socrates 184;
tained 23; set up under genus in 'Socrates feeds man',
by addition of formal or final 'man' stands for another by
differences 80 the verb's transitivity 184
species in genus 26, 27, 28, 30, statement
32,36 word-group indicative of
specific reduction 161 something as signifying that
specifically 17, 18, 21, 21 things ± exist 156; state
stand for 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, ment, proposition, question
164, 165, 167, 170, 171, 172, and conclusion are the same
174, 171, 177, 178, 180, 181, thing substantially but differ
183, 184: substantive nouns by functions 156;
'stone' substance 4, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24

was imposed to signify a given substance (first)
sort of thing under given sort first substance: what is
of accidents 97 neither said of a subject nor is
straightness 32 in a subject (e.g., man); what
subalternate 5, 18, 19 is properly, principally and
subcontrary 5 maximally predicated; spec
subject 3, 26, 27, 28, 29, 33 ies is closer to first substance
that about which something is than genus, as underlying
said 3; animal is subject of more; substantial individuals
an illness, imbalance of hum are called first substance
ors its efficient cause 87; since they underly others;
subject-as-subject is one Most Special Species are
thing, that which is subject equally substances (man)
another 169; a common term 27; is a prior predicament
subject that is extensive is 27, 35; not to be in a subject
extended to what can be is not peculiar to substance:
under subject's form 173; a understood of substantial dif
common term subject or ap ference too; all substances
positive to verb having ability have in common not to be in a
to extend as to time stands subject; peculiarity of sub-
for those that are and will al stance to be susceptible of
ways be 174; 'white' as pre contraries 28; every first
dicate of 'a man is white' substance signifies this
cannot restrict 'man' as sub particular, numerically one,
ject to whites 179; 'white' in individual 29; every 1st sub-
predicate cannot restrict stance signifies 'this partic
'man' in subject 179; a pre ular thing' = individual, which
dicate restricts its subject as is numerically one; not susc
to consignification, not as to eptible of more or less 29
principal signification 179; substance (second)
'subject' second substance: species in
means: what-is-subject as which first substances and
well as subject-as-subject genera of these species are;
187 individuals' general / species:
subject and predicate they underly secondarily;
one kind of thing can be species is more substance
either subject or predicate, than genus is 28; all second
like 'man', 'animal', Vuns' substances and substantial
186 differences are predicated
subjective Part: univocally by name and
inferior under a universal 55 nature; second substance
subjunctive 3 does not signify 'this particul
subordinate 17, 18 ar thing' but something com
subsequence in subsisting 35 mon; what second substance
signifies is not one as signi position 71; determinate lab

fied by 1st substance 29 els what a common term has
substance / substantial 25, 26, when taken indefinitely or
27, 28, 29: extended to cover with a particular marker 71;
substantial genera, species & diffuse: acceptance of com
specific differences 26 mon term for several by med
substantial individual 28, 29 iation of a universal marker
'such' 71; diffuse by demand of
the words 'such' etc. can be marker or mood, or by fact
relatives, demonstratives or 71; diffuse immobilely can
responsives 171 coexist with simple supposit
superior 19, 22 ion 72; common term has
anything greater, essential or different supposition with
accidental 197; as accident verbs in different tenses 180
of inferior, inferior of super suppositive 8
ior, or convertible 129; 'an susceptible of more or less
imal' as superior restricted 29-31
by its inferior 'man' in 'ani swan 23
mal- man' to animals that are swarthiness 32
men 177 syllables
superior Position 31 in a word-group are not linked
supposit 173 to a common term: each is
a preceding marker can dis separate 30; accidents: dur
tribute a common term for ation, tenor, breath and num
any supposit 179; verb re ber of letters 112
stricts its supposit as to con- syllogis(m)tically 28
signification, not as to signi taste: sweet or bitter 32
fication 183; supposits are ± syllogism
existents depending on predic a word-group in which, once
ates 183 some things have been posit
supposition 175-177, 179, 180, ed, something else necessarily
183: acceptance of substant happens through what have
ival term for something 69; been posited 38; consists of
acceptance of term already 3 terms and 2 propositions
signifying something 69; 38; disputation's main tool.
common or discrete 70; is perfect and complete 76;
not signification 70; accid Aristotle divides tentative
ental: simple or personal 70; syllogism into three parts
common effected by common 77; tentative syllogisms
term like 'man' 70; natural argue from commons to com
or accidental 70; discrete mon or from commons to pe
supposition effected by a dis culiarities 79; dialectical of
crete term like 'Socrates' 70; 4 kinds: ± establish accident,
common term, taken indefin genus, peculiarity and defin
itely, with determinate sup ition 79
syllogistic Figures syllogistic Moods and Figures:

1st Figure; what is subected 1st Mood, 1st Figure: 2 af
in the first proposition is firmative universals conclude
predicated in the second; 39; to a universal affirmative 41;
2nd Figure: the same thing is 2nd Mood, 1st Figure: uni
predicate in both 39; versal negation & universal
3rd Figure: same term is affirmation conclude to uni
subject in both premises 44 versal negation 41;
3rd Figure: same thing is 3rd Mood, 1st Figure: uni
subject in both premises 39 versal affirmation & particul
syllogistic mood ar affirmation concluding to
39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, particular affirmation 41;
47: ordering of the 2 syllog 4th Mood, 1st Figure: univ
istic propositions in quality ersal negation & a particular
and quantity 39 affirmation conclude to a par
syllogistic Moods and Figures ticular negation 41;
1st Mood, 2nd Figure: 5th Mood, 1st Figure: two
universal negation & universal universal affirmations con
affirmation concluding to clude indirectly to a partic
universal negation 43; ular affirmation 41;
2nd Mood of 2nd Figure: 6th Mood of 1st Figure: a
universal affirmation & universal negation & a uni
universal negation concluding versal affirmation concluding
to universal negation 43; indirectly to a universal
3rd Mood of 2nd Figure: negation 41;
universal negation & partic 7th Mood of 1st Figure: uni
ular affirmation concluding to versal affirmation & partic
a particular negation 43; ular affirmation concluding
1st Mood, 3rd Figure: two indirectly to a particular af
universal affirmations con firmation 42
cluding to a particular affirm syllogistic reduction
ation 44; 1st Mood of 2nd Figure r e
2nd Mood of 3rd Figure: uni duces to 2nd Mood of 1st Fig
versal negation & universal ure by simple conversion of
affirmation conclude to a par major 43
ticular negation 45; 1st Mood of 3rd Figure r e
3rd Mood of 3rd Figure: duces to 3rd Mood of 1st
particular affirmation & uni Figure by accidental convers
versal affirmation concluding ion of minor 45;
to a particular affirmation 2nd Mood of 2nd Figure r e
45; duces to 2nd Mood of 1st Fig
4th Mood of 3rd Figure: uni ure by simple e t c (check) 43;
versal affirmation & particul 2nd Mood of 3rd Figure r e
ar affirmation concluding to a duces to 4th Mood of 1st Fig
particular affirmation 45 ure by accidental conversion
index of Words and Things 251
of the minor 45; tense

3rd Mood of 2nd Figure re distinguishes noun from verb
duces to 4 th Mood of 1st Fig 2; absolute accident of a
ure by simple conversion 43; word 97; 'man' stands for
4th Mood of 2nd Figure re men who are or were men in
duces to 1st Mood of 1st Fig 'a man was an animal;' 180;
ure by reductio ad absurdum common term has different
44; supposition with verbs in dif
3rd Mood of 3rd Figure re ferent tenses 180; verbs in
duces to 3rd Mood of 1st Fig tenses other than present im
ure by simple conversion of ply different suppositions
the minor 45; 180; tense being identical in
4th Mood of 3rd Figure r e affirmative and negative, r e
duces to 3rd Mood of 1st Fig striction identical 183; caus
ure by simple conversion of es a verb's rectriction, but
the minor 45; tense is identical in affirmat
5th Mood of 1st Figure prov ives and negatives 183;
en through 1st Mood of 1st tentative syllogism
Figure 41 tool: tentative syllogism
6th Mood reduces to 2nd by (concluding from things prob
simple conversion of the con able to the respondent) 77;
clusion 42 often called materially de
syncategorematic: fective by objectors 11;
word-group-part not noun or argues from what seem true
verb 3; syncategorematics = to the respondent & one pre
'consignificatives' 3; dialect tending to have knowledge
ician labels forms other than must know 77; argues from
noun or verb, 'syncategorem commonalities to commonal
atics 1 3 ities or from commons to
taken 17, 19, 21, 23, 24 peculiars 79
in multiple ambiguity through term 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74:
adverbs 12; 'taken simply1 common one naturally apt to
excludes diminishers like 'un be predicated of several sub
thinkable 1 180; any negative jects 4; two propositions
where 'be' simply taken is cannot be made from three
negated is false 182 terms without taking one
teeth 1 twice 38; term taken twice
temporal adverb 11 subject in one and predicate
temporal partial: in other or vice versa 38;
word signifying a bit of time term taken twice before con
adverbially 58 clusion called middle term
temporal totality: 38; middle Term must never
word embracing every time be put into the conclusion;
adverbially 58 40; each unconstructed term
tenor same as accent 112 signifies either substance, or
quality, or quantity, or relat a word's, but a word's nature

ion, or action, or passivity, does depend on that of a
etc. 69; significatino of a thing 134; undiminished
term (here) is the convetional thing is one called 'simply'
representation of a thing by a 137; same thing, under same
vocal expression 69; in name, cannot be proven of it-
'white man', 'man' is an un- self 146; thing defined
constructed term 69; term sought in its definition 147;
signifying a non-being does 'nothing' by usage stands for
not call up (non appellat) any solid or firm things 184 a
thing 175; restricts another different kind of thing: the
as to consignification, not dispostion of a thing that can
principal signification 179; be made subject or predicate
the form of a common term is 186; truth and falsity in a
ambiguous as to one realized word-group is cause both by
only in existent or in existents this and that other sort of
as well as non-existents 183 thing 186
the other (one) (reliquus) 4 thing present
thing (res) demonstratives are said of
peculiarity (proprium) is what things present 171
is in species alone, predicated thing subjected
conversely with that to which distinguish thing subjected
it is peculiar, and does not from accident to thing sub
indicate what the essence of a jected 136
thing is 22; this particular throat 1
thing (individual) 29; truth time
and falsity are in things as in something is first said to be
a subject 29; a thing is cause prior to another in time 35;
of the truth of a proposition those are said to be together
or sentence made about that whose generation is at the
thing itself 35; signified same time 35; a temporal
substantively or adjectivally totality is a word embracing
69; indifferently things them every time adverbially, like
selves, their double mode and 'always' 58
relations 83; things' double to 'stand for'
mode: consignification and is one thing, 'make true for'
signification 83; the thing another 71; see stand for
signified which is the princ 'to be said of a subject'
iple of truth and falsity 117; here: said of an inferior
'whiteness' as thing and mode (animal of man) 26; see said
of signifying 120; a fallacy is of
called extralinguistic if its to be-in
plausible cause and cause of 26, 29: taken as accident in a
non-existence is in a thing subject 26; as in a goal; as in
126; nature doesn't depend on a vessel; as in an efficient
cause 26; peculiarly 26, 27, 191; Whole in Quantity 191

2 8 , 2 9 , 3 0 , 3 1 , 33,34 Topics and Maxims: from:
to burn, be burned 27 - Authority: relation be
to saw, be sawn 27 tween authority and what is
to-be-in assigned 193, 197, proven by it 66; Maxim: ex
200; see be-in perts are trustworthy in their
to-be-to-another own field 66
peculiarly defines Relatives - Efficient Cause: relation
31 ship between a thing itself
'together' and its effect 39; both de
said 3 ways: (1) simultaneous structive and constructive
in generation (2) non-causal 39; Maxim: given an Effici
convertible (3) those dividing ent Cause, its effect is given
a genus (man, horse etc. div 39; whose Efficient Cause is
ide genus 'animal') 36 good is itself good 39
tolerated 9 - Effect of Efficient Cause
tongue 1 the converse of that from Ef
Topic ficient Cause 39
basis of Argument; from - Final Cause: relation be
which suitable argument de tween a thing itself and its
rives 31; Maxim Topic and effect 60; Maxim: if its pur
Topic Differential of Maxim pose is good, a thing itself is
31; Differential of Maxim: good 60; Maxim if its pur
that by which one maxim diff pose is evil, a thing is itself
ers from another 31; from evil 60
what are substantive to a - Formal Cause: relation be
thing, as from definition 32; tween a thing itself and its
Differential of Maxim = In effect 60; Maxim: formal
trinsic, Extrinsic and Middle cause removed, its effect is
32; Topic (locus) taken pro removed 60; given a formal
portionally to natural place cause, its effect is given 60
32; denominated from what - Material Cause: relation be
causes inference, not from tween a thing itself and its
what is inferred 54; intrins effect 39; both constructive
ic: from Substance or from and destructive 39; Maxim:
Concomitants of Substance given a material cause, a
32; extrinsic: from Opposit materialized thing may be
ions, Greater, Less, Likeness, given 39; given effect of per
Proportion, Transfer & Auth manent material cause, perm
ority 62; mediate: Conjug anent matter is itself given
ates, Case-forms and Divis 39; a permanent material
ion 66; Species and Genus cause removed, its effect is
not a Topic: relationship of removed 39; given effect of
one to other is 143; from transient matter, it must be
Species or Subjective Part that transient matter pre-
existed 60; moved, so too is definition

- Commonly coocurring: only 54; removed from thing de
sophistic, not a dialectic, fined, removed from definit-
Topic 62; Maxim: if the sec (Topics and Maxim continued)
ond is there, so is the first 62; ion as well 54; whatever
if the first is lacking, so is the thing defined is predicated of,
second 62; so too is definition 53; pre
- Concomitants of substance: dicated of thing defined, pre
argument taken from what dicated of definition as well
follow on terms posited in the 53;
Question 55; from Whole, - Derivates (case-forms): r e
Part, Cause. Generation, Cor lation between one derivate
ruption, Use, Commonly Co- and another 67; Maxim:
occurring 55 what suits one derivate suits
- Conjugates: relation be the others 67
tween one conjugate and an - Description: relation of de
other 67; Maxim: what in scription to thing described
heres in one conjugate inheres 54
in the other 67; if one con- - Difference: Maxim: ex
jugate is inherent, so is the trinsic: from things separate
other 67 from thing's substance as
- Corruption: relation of cor from opposites 52; middle:
ruption to thing corrupted 61; from things overlapping (e.g.
Maxim: if a thing's corruption univocal and denominative)
is evil, the thing is good 61; 52;
if a thing's corruption is good, - Division: relation between
it is itself evil 61 one exclusive term and an
- Definition has 4 arguments other 68; Maxim: given one
and 4 maxims: 52; relation of a pair equally divisive, the
between definition and thing other is removed 67; if one
defined 52; Maxim: pre of a pair of divisives is r e
dicated of definition, predic moved, the other is given 67
ated of thing defined as well - Generation: relation be
53; removed from definition, tween itself and what is gen
removed from thing defined erated 61; Maxim: if the
as well 53; definition predic thing generated is good, its
ated, thing defined is predic generation is as well 61; if
ated as well 53; removed what is generated is evil, so
from definition, removed too its generation 61; whose
from thing defined as well 53 generation is evil is itself
- Thing defined: 4 arguments evil 61; whose generation is
and 4 maxims 53; relation good is good itself 61
between thing defined and its - Greater: relation between
definition 53; Maxim: from more and less 64; always
whatever thing defined is re destructive 64; Maxim: if
seeming greater is not, neith - Relative Opposites: relat

er is lesser 64 ion of one correlative to an
Lesser: relation between other 63; both destructive
less and more 64; always de (Topic and Maxim continued)
structive; Maxim: if seeming and constructive; Maxim:
lesser is not, neither is the given one correlative, the
greater 64 other is given 63; one correl
Nominal Interpretation: re ative destroyed, so is the
lation between an interpetat- other 63
ion and the thing interpreted - Part in Place: Maxim: what
54; predicatively: what an ever a part in place does not
interpretation is predicated suit, neither does its Whole
of, so too is the thing inter 38;
preted 55; Maxim: predic - Part in Quantity: relation of
ated of Interpretation, predic parts in quantity taken all t o
ated of thing interpreted as gether in relation to whole
well 55; negatively: remov 51; both constructive and de
ed from interpretation, re structive 57; Maxim: if any
moved from the thing inter singular at all is true, its uni
preted as well 55; versal is true as well 57; if
- Like: relation between one universal is true, any singular
like thing and another 65; of it will be 57; removed
Maxim: like is judged by like from a Whole in Quantity, r e
65; if one like is absent, so is moved from any part 57; r e
the other 65; if one like is moved from parts in Quantity
present, the other is as well taken together, removed from
65 its Whole as well 57; predic
- Contradictory Opposites: re ated of all parts in Quantity
lation of one contradictory to taken together, predicated of
another 64; Maxim: if one its Whole as well 57
contradictory opposite is true, - Integral Part: relation be
the converse is false 64 tween a thing itself and its
- Contrary Opposites: whole 56; always destruct
Maxim: one immediate con ive 56; Maxim: given de
trary removed, other is given struction of an Integral Part,
while its subject persists 63; its Whole is destroyed as
given one of contraries, the well 56
other is removed 63; - Proportion: relation be
- Privative Opposites: relat tween one proportional and
ion between Privation / Habit the others 65; Maxim: pro
or Habit / Privation 63; portionals are judged proport
Maxim: given 1 of opposed ionally 65
privations, the other is re - Species / Subjective Part:
moved from the same thing relation between a thing itself
64 and its genus or whole 56;
always constructive 36; itself taken without determin

Maxim: predicate of species ation 58
predicated of genus as well - Whole in Place: relation be
36; Maxim: anything species tween a thing itself and its
is predicated of, so too its part 58; both destructive and
genus 36 constructive 38; Maxim: r e
- Substance: from Definition, lation between a thing itself
Description or Nominal Inter and its whole 58
pretation 32; taken from - Uses: relation of an operat
substance of terms posited in ion to its working or employ
the question 32 ment 61; Maxim: if its use
- Transfer: relation between is evii, it is evil itself 62; if
one transerred thing & some a thing's use is good, it is it-
thing else 66; different from self good 62
Nominal Interpretation, which transfer
invokes a word's exposition common to equivocation and
66; Maxim: what suits under amphiboly 93; transfer of
a familiar name suits under a better for less well-known ex
less familiar one 66 pression pertains to dialectics
- Whole: divided like a Whole: see metaphor 66
universal, integral in quantity, tree 1
in mode, in place and in time triangularity 32
55 trivialization
- Universal Whole or Genus: useless repetition 80; not
relation between a Universal repetition for greater ex
Whole or Genus itself & its pressivity 80
parts or species 55; always true 3
destructive 55; Maxim: Uni 'you are born today' is com
versal Whole or Genus remov posite and true or divided and
ed, so too is Subjective Part false 109
or Species 36 truly 11
- Whole in Quantity: a relat truth
ion between a thing itself and every true Conditional is
its part 51; both construct necessary, every false one is
ive and destructive 57; Max impossible 9; for a condit
im: predicated of a whole in ional to be false, an anteced
quantity predicated of any ent without consequent suf
part 57; fices 9; for conditional: an
- Integral Whole: relation be antecedent cannot be true
tween itself and its parts 36; without its consequent being
always constructive 36; true as well 9; for disjunct
Maxim: given an integral ives: one or the other part
whole, any part of it is given must be true 9; for copulat
36 ives: each part must be true
- Whole in Mode: a universal 9
truth & falsehood derived from several things

29, 35: in things as in a sub signified by several names
ject, in a word-group as in a [rational mortal animal]; (2) a
sign 29 unit simply that is one and
under one name: (a) one
uncomplex 2 proportionally ['being' of
unconstructed term: beings and 'healthy' of healthy
each signifies either sub- thing] (b) one by genus [soul
stance, accident, quantity, & color] (c) one by species
quality, relation, where, [man & whiteness] (d) one ny
when, be sited, action or accident 157
passion 27; unconstructed universal 4
terms mean (1) substance (here) something superior and
(man) (2) quantity (two-cub- substantial 55; universal
ited) (3) quality (white sought in particulars 147;
ness) (4) relation (double) universal marker & implicat
(5) where (in place) (6) ion in the same locution make
when (tomorrow) (7) posture it ambiguous 179
(sit) (8) have (have shoes universally 17
on) (9) action (burn) (10) univocal 25, 26, 29
passion (be burned) 27; a relative is univocal as r e
mean the following 69 calling a thing gone before
undergo : passion (pati) 27, 32, 166; have the same nature
33, 34 not of themselves but in the
underly 28, 29 one using them univocally
undiminished 166; that any univocal is
an undiminished thing is one equivocal can be proven this
called 'simply' 137 way 166
unit univocally 166, 167, 170
unity after-a-fashion claims unthinkable'
to be unity simply 158; con 'taken simply' excludes di-
struction of one unit with an minishers like 'unthinkable'
other unit 167 180
unitary 167, 169 unusable connexity
the nature of any antecedent pairing contrary to syllogistic
is unitary 166 rules prevents conclusion 48
unity upwards 36
by which a statement or urine
proposition is said to be one is as thing and sign 29
not that by which a question usage
is said to be one 156; modes proper signification of a word
of unity by which a statement is what usage commonly a c
and a proposition are said to cepts 96; 'nothing' by usage
be one: (1) a unit simply, stands for solid or firm things
signified by several names, 184
use nature of verb-as-verb) 101;

(here) the operation or em a verb has two modes of signi
ployment of a thing 61 fying, substantial and accid
useless ental 114; whenever we pre
trivialization is useless repet dicate a verb signifying a
ition from the same part of a mode of activity of something
word-group 94; see conjugat doing nothing, we predicate
ion potential 114; 'able to' has
uterque (both) 4 of itself the nature of extend
utterance ing 174; rules about restrict
the term 'man' stands for ion by verb 180; verbs in
every man, running or not, but tenses other than present im
it makes the utterance true ply different suppositions
for one man running 71 180; verb 'is' does not extend
of itself, but has that potent
valid ial through its adjuncts 180;
valid and invalid arguments 'not having ability to extend'
based on color 141 excludes extensive verbs like
verb 172, 174 'able to' 180; verb (extens
a conventionally significative ive) 'not having ability to
vocal sound with tense, no extend' excludes extensive
part of which signifies separ verbs like 'able to' restrict
ate things, finite and in the their supposits as to consign-
present tense (recta) 2; ification, not as to signific
what always consignifies time ation 183;
and is always the sign of what verb-part:
are predicated of something none signifies separately: a
else 101; 'finite' vs. non-fin verb is present tense and fin
ite like 'not-run' 2; 'present ite 2
tense' (recta) vs. obliques verse 14-15
(other tenses) 3; 'with tense' virtue
vs. noun, which is a sign with virtue and knowledge are in a
out tense 2; not-run is not a soul as in a subject 137
verb for dialectician but a vocal expression 69, 70; vocal
nonfinite verb 2; only in pre expression / vox: a sound
sent tense, indicative mood: produced from the mouth of
others called 'obliques' 3; the an animal, formed by natural
verb's sense (res) 11-12; ad instruments 1; genus in
jectivais and verbs are said to noun-definition 2; a signific
couple while nouns stand for ative vocal expression is that
69; 'is' is neither diffused which represents something to
mobilely or immobilely 74; the hearing 1; natural, like
'lives' is not actually predic groans of the ill 1; convent
ated but is bound to the sub ionally, depending on the will
ject (which si contrary to the of its inventor 2
warm and cool 33 genus, it is not possible that a

what (essential) kind 19, 21, common predicate term be
21, 23 diffused 73; ability to see
what (que) 4 suits parts as united within
what kind ? (qualis) 4 their whole, not the whole it-
what number ? (quantus) 4 self 197; identical with all
what sort of (quale) 33 parts united at once 197;
'what sort of thing' follows upon parts and ability
interpreted as 'this particular to see suits parts 198; sub
thing' 122 jected to whiteness directly,
when 16-21, 27, 29, 32-36 parts indirectly 199; in what
'whenever' is a whole, parts are under
is in predicament 'When'; stood indirectly 199; what a
'twice' means discrete quant whole is gives us to under
ity 203 stand its indirect parts 199;
where 18, 27 inference drawn about a
white and black 34 whole through parts is a fall
'white' acy of accident 200; some
is found in men, brute animals accidents fit parts but not the
and stone, so is more common whole 201; some accidents
than 'man' in 'white man' indifferently suit whole and
178; as predicate of 'a man part 201
is white' it cannot restrict whole in place
'man' as subject to whites a word embracing every place
179; in predicate cannot r e adverbially 58
strict 'man' in subject 179 whole in quantity
'who' a universal taken universally
as a relative signifies a single 57; ambiguous as to ± com
thing existing through the plete and ± diffused mobilely
mode of substance 166; sign 73; results simply if common
ifies substance indetermin term is multiplied simply 73;
ately 166 somehow or other results if
whole common term are multiplied
universal whole / genus 55; somehow or other 73
integral: one composed of wish 11
parts that have quantity and a with respect to 16-21, 24
part of it is called integral word(s) [dictio(nes)]
56; in quantity: a universal not so much a sign of many
taken universally 57; in things as a sign of significat
mode: a universal taken with ion or consignification 89;
out determination 58; in word's principal signification
place: a word embracing opposes its consignification &
every place adverbially 58 metaphoric signification 97;
if it is impossible for a whole are signs of things 101; a
in quantity to be genus as word has an accidental mode
of signifying a thing as an
individual 117; has an accid word meaning

ental mode of signifying what convention is the remote,
is principle of ± congruity, composition the proximate
like gender 117; has an acci cause of word meaning 95
dental mode of signifying due word-group (oratio): 166, 167
to the thing signified 117; a constructed / complex ex
here function as signs and in pression 3; conventionally
struments 119; taken as significative with separately
things rather than signs of meaningful parts 3; com
things is fallacy of consequ plete (perfect) or incomplete
ent, not word-figure 119; is 3; perfect / complete gener
a sign of a thing and related ates complete sense in hear
to it purposively 135; under er's mind ('man is white') 3;
stood by vocalic boundary as complete is either indicative,
signifying what, what sort, imperative, optative or sub
masculine, etc. 115; word's junctive 3; an incomplete
accidental mode of signifying generates incomplete sense
should come last naturally, ('white man' vs 'man is white')
not temporally 115; 'twice' 3; only indicative said to be a
posits an interruption of act proposition 3; need not be
to which it is adjoined 202; true in one, false in another
does not imply an interruption composition, division or a c
in, but an end of, an act 203 cent 102; can either be com
word or word-group posed of different letters, syl
'guies' can be a word or a lables or words, or of the
word-group 110; word-groups same in varied order 99;
± do share equally in word- word-group identity is ambig
group identity 100; 'metuo' uous as to identity of perfect
can be a word or a word-group ion or material 99; word-
ill groups are composite when
Word Figure 113 words ordered by their most
is a mode of signifying acc due position 101; divided if
identally in a word 115; not ordered according to most
motive principle of fallacy: due position 101; concepts of
likeness of accidental mode of simple words unanalyzable,
signifying 117; deficiency those of composites, analyz-
principle of Fallacy of Word- able 94; word ordering is
Figure: incompleteness or nothing other than a word-
diminution of likeness 117; group 167; said to be ± true
all word-figure fallacies are depending on whether a thing
contrary to the rules of infer ± exists 186
ence (e.g., which is middle 'works'
term) 118; words taken as in 'a nature aptly designed
things rather than signs of works so' touches on a thing's
things is a fallacy of consequ operation 189
ent, not word-figure 119;
INDEX OF SOPHISMS AND EXAMPLES
acceptance aquiline
I want fighter acceptance 92 21
Achilles apostle
left 30 of 100 men 108 all the apostles are (the)
Adam twelve 186
93 Aristotle
adulterer his book 90-93; whatever is
if an adulterer, he is suave Aristotle's is owned by Arist
62, 149, 151; or a night- otle 90
prowler 151 ark
afraid every animal was in Noah's
every man is afraid at sea 199 ark 181-82
age artefact
knowing age 91, 94, 167 132
Ajax ass
came to Troy and fought 48 ff, 193; man is an ass 6,
bravely 165 130, 154; man is an ass and
all Brunellus is a man 154; an
all (omnes) men 188 ass is a man 157; a man sees
always an ass who is rational 166;
58; whatever lives always is those asses are the bishops
101, 103 92; a horse is an ass 9
animal as big as
38, 39, 41-46, 48, 50-56, 69- Plato is as big as he is 171
75y 119, 123-25, 130 f, 138-9, as many times
147, 149-50, 152-4, 157, 168, as many times as you have
174, 178, 180-82; aninal-man been a Parisian, you have
177-78; every animal in been a man 202
Noah's ark 181; rational / ir as much as
rational animal 19; man / an 121
imal, animal / man 3; every assertable
animal is well or ill 107; it is assertable 183
every animal is non-man 8 astronomer
animate 66
sensitive animate substance Asturians
22 33
another sort axe
Socrates is white and Plato is cutting with axes 61
of another sort 170
Antichrist bad
61; a man can be the Anti the bad is good 158
christ 175 bark
see dog
262 Index of Sophisms and Examples
bear can
what one only can bear, can a man can be the Antichrist
bear many 106 172; the impossible can be
being true 173; a man is able to be
I have set you slave being white 174
free 101-02, 108 Cancer
bishop the sun is in Cancer 173
those asses are the bishops 92 cast
black cast statue 130
8, 74 ff Cato
blind 2
64; naturally apt to see and celebrate
not seeing 138 a priest celebrates Mass 125
blindness certain (one)
32 4
bloom changeable
65 the heavens are changeable 66
book chimera
Aristotle's book 90, 93, 100, 175; a chimera is a matter of
167 opinion 138
born Cicero
you are born today 109 17, 50, 71, 124, 192-3, 197,
borrowed 201
borrowed, earned or stolen citizen
13; see steal a citizen is white 179
both class
4 a sailor is to his ship as a
box teacher is to his class 65
nothing in the box 184 cleric
bread would that I were a good
38, 59; bread eating dog 99 cleric 3
Brunellus closed
16; Brunellus is a man 134, my hand is closed at one
158, 193 time 144
brute animal color
68 141; color which is in a body
buba 166, 170
2 colored
builder 141
39 column
buy he sees a column 92
however much you bought, you come
ate 121 I know the one who is coming
Caesar 132; I do not know the one
38 ff; 173, 181 who is coming 135; I have no
Index of Sophisms and Examples 263
knowledge about the one who ing 167; a man running is

is coming 133 debating 173
contingent
contingently 11 ff delight
contrary 34
study about all contraries is diet
the same study 71, 147-8, 1% diet is healthy 83; it is
cool helpful to use a diet 139
33 differ
Coriscus every man exists and anything
132, 133-6; Coriscus is a differing from him is non-
'third man' other than man man 191; one differing from
122-3; Coriscus the music no man is differing from some
ian 123 man 193; you are someone or
corrupt other differing from someone
173 or other 196; you are every
cover man or one differing from
the heavens cover all things every man 196
199 doctor
create a doctor is healing man 132
God created 199 dog
creature 24, 68, 83 ff, 93,93, 102,
man is the noblest of creat 142; bread eating dog 99-101
ures 72 double
crow a double and non-double are
23; every / no crow is black the same 144
9; an Ethiopian is black and drink
such is a crow 171 a drink is healthy 83
cure
88 earth
cut the earth is larger than the
every sword cuts 142 least of visible stars 79
eat
dead you ate something raw 121;
178; dead man 137, 138 bread eating dog 99- 101
death effective
death and life are contraries 83
133; death is corruption 133 egg
debate an egg is an animal 139
man debates 3; Plato de envy
bates 8; Socrates debates, 55; 66 ff
who is running 164; a man is Ethiopian
running and he is the one who 24; 79, 120, 139-40, 142, 161,
is debating 163; Socrates is 171
running and another is debat
even fire
five are even and odd 108 make a fire 3
every firmly
every sun 188; every moon he acts firmly 12
188; every phoenix 189 first (vs. the other)
everywhere 4
58 fish
except 93
every animal except man is ir five
rational 70 two and three are five 98, 99,
expedient 107; five are even and odd
85, 86 ff, 88 107
eye flower
you see this one struck with roses are the most beautiful
your eye 108; one having one of flowers 72
eye is one having some eye food
196; having neither eye you food is effective of health 83
can see 197 foot
white-footed 137
fail foundation
62 ff 68
falsely free
12 I have set you slave being
Fanellus free 101, 102, 108
193
flour gall
59,60 gall is honey 150
fast get up
he fasts during Lent 139 whoever was getting up is
father standing 8
63, 133 God
feed 58 196; God created all
Socrates feeds himself 184 things 199; my God, my God
fern 80; God is 8; God exists
60 183; God did nothing unwill
fighter ingly 110
I want fighter acceptance 92 good
figure the good is not good 158
132 grammar
finger 24; 25; 71
as many fingers as you had, grammarian
you now have 121 24, 25.; 28, 85 ff.
finite ground
some infinites are finite 204; if it is raining the ground is
for one thing or another, many drenched 150
are finite 204
hand als 139

my hand is closed at one time hot
1** 29,68
hang house
98, 111; just men should 5 6 , 5 9 , 6 1 ff; 68, 130, 132;
hang 110 the house is worth a hundred
have knowledge of marks 192
I have no knowledge about the humor
one coming 135 illness is found in imbalance
head of humors 87
having no head is having some
head 195 illness
heal 87
a doctor heals man 132 imbalance
healthy imbalance of humors 87
the word 'healthy' 83; food is immortal
healthy 83; urine is a healthy 93 ff.; 94, 95
thing 85 impossible
heavenly body the impossible can be true
24, 68 173;
heavens in
the heavens are changeable 87; 95
7; the heavens cover all 199 incorruptible
helpful 93 ff
helpful to take medicine 139 infinite
Hercules some infinites are finite 204;
171 see also finite
here injustice
58 if it is injustice, it is a vice
honey 145
if it is honey, it is tawny 150; iron
gall is honey 150 59
hook irrational
whatever is taken is caught 21, 108; see also animal
with a hook 110 isosceles
horse 130
6 1 , 5 ; a horse is a stone 9; a
horse is an ass 9; a horse can John
whinny 9; a horse is moved 175
5; if you come to me, I'll give just
you a horse 3 67 ff; justly 67; a just thing
horseback riding is a good thing 52; man is
61 just - non-man is just 198;
hospital just men should hang 110
helpful to use a diet in hospit
justice Lidia
67 ff; justice is good 52; if Lidia, do you sleep ? 111
it is justice, it is a virtue 145 life
are soul and life the same ?
kill(er) 154; death and life are con
62 traries 155; life is generat
king ion 155
a soldier can take the camp so light
a king can too 64; (one's everything deprived of light
own) king is coming 184 by earth's interposition is
knife wanting 188
59 line
know every line is straight or curv
all men naturally desire to ed 108
know 186; whatever is known lion
is true 108; knowing age 91, 188
94, 167; someone knows what live
he knows 91; anything of any whatever lives always is 101,
kind knows about anything of 102
that kind that it is itelf of the lover
kind which it is itself 201; I lover of wisdom 55, 66
know the one coming 132
made
labor if it is made, it has a source
you are wasting your labor 65 151
laugh man
a meadow laughs 65, 86, 93 men runs 80; man man runs
lazy 80; rational man 80; man is
29 man 80; man's runs 97; a
learn white man runs swiftly 10;
the literate learn 85 ff; lett no one man is every man 193;
ers which you now know how every man is every man 192;
to learn now is possible 106; ail men naturally desire to
the literate learn 85 know 186; non-man 2; every
Lent non-animal is a non-man 8;
he fasts during Lent 139 see also white, animal, ass,
Leonese run, dead. species, substance
51 manually
less I touch the one struck manual
the whole of Socrates is less ly 102
than Socrates 200 many
letters for one thing or another
letters which you know how to many 204
learn now is possible 106
Marcus just like the Nile 171

Marcus-Tullius 18 Noah
marine every animal was in Noah's
see dog ark 181-82
mark not a (one)
the house is worth a hundred 4; see also animal, head,
marks 192 man, eye
meadow nothing
a meadow laughs 65 4; nothing is nothing 11; one
medicine who is seeing nothing is seeing
it is helpful to take medicine something 194
139; 71; medicine is a sci now
ence of the sick and the ill 58
148 number
men every number is even or odd
men runs 80; just men should 108
hang 110
metal odd
130 five are even and odd 107;
monk every number is either even or
Socrates is a Cistercian 132 odd 108
moon of any kind
every moon 188, 189 a thing of any kind runs 201;
mortal anything of any kind knows of
21 anything of that kind that it is
mouth itself of the kind which it is
a meadow has a mouth 86 itself 201
move on basis of
124; a horse is moved 5; a preposition secundum means
man is moved 8 efficient cause 86
muse one
119 two are a double of one 144
mustang only
wildhorse: equiferus 95 you know only three men are
running 108
near opinion, matter of
near is near near 31 a chimera is a matter of opin
necessary ion 138; what is not is a
a man is necesarily an anim matter of opinion 138
al 172, 174; necessarily 12 opposite
neither of all opposites, there is the
4 same discipline 147; of all
never privative opposites there is
58 the same discipline 147
Nile
other (one) prowl

vs. (the) one 4 if an adulterer, he is a night-
other prowler 149, 151
other than Socrates 167;
other than animal 168; every rain
man and (an) other exists 191 if it is raining, the ground is
drenched 150
Parisian rational
as many times as you have man and gods are rational 21;
been a Parisian, you have been rational is difference 70; see
a man 202-03 also animal, man
people raw
every people is a tree 109 you ate something raw 121
Peter rector
168 a rector should not be chosen
philosopher by lot 65
54, 66 regret
phoenix he has not failed, so he has no
every phoenix 190-01; every regrets 62
phoenix exists 190 riches
pictured riches are not good 139
pictured animal 138, 139; risible
pictured eye 138 18, 39, 48, 70, 133; man is
pigpen risible 7
pigpen is in the eye 100 river
pilot a river is wet 117
a pilot is chosen for skill 65 roof
place one part of a house is a wall,
place: which contains a thing another the roof 68
located 166 rose
Plato there is / is not a rose 182-
every Plato 185; Plato is 83; the most beautififul of
every man 193; every man is flowers 71
Plato 193 run
plough runs: 3 et passim; was runn
plough sand 65, 91, 93 ing 3; ran 3; will run 3; is
poet running 3; whatever runs has
poet is feminine gender 119 feet 86; not-run 2 et passim
poplar sadden
every poplar is a tree 109 34
possible sailor
possibly 11 ff 65
sand
priest plough sand 65, 91, 93
a woman is a priest 125 saw(ing)
33 snub nosed
sea 21,23
every man is afraid at sea Socrates
199 every Socrates 209; Socrates
see is every man 193; the whole
76; 134; seeing nothing is of Socrates is white 199; the
seeing something 194; what whole of Socrates is less than
ever you saw yesterday you Socrates 200
see today 121; what one sees soldier
sees this 92; Socrates sees 64 ff
himself 165; a blind thing is someone
naturally apt to see and does 4
not 158 son
Seine 63, 133
86 sort
sensitive Socrates is white and Plato is
sensitive animate substance of that sort 170; just like the
22 Nile 171
set soul
I have set you slave being free are soul and life the same?
101 154
shield source
shield is black or white 141 if it is made it has a source
ship 152
65 ff species
sick Socrates is a species 126-28;
63 substance is species 127;
sight man is a species 127; what
34 can laugh is a species 133;
sighted the same thing is species and
he is sighted 64 non-species 144
similar state
things are called ± similar on whatever is stated by both is
the basis of ± similarity 86 true 196
sin statue
sin is evil 60 cast statue 130
sit steal
that Socrates is sitting is true if he has stolen something, he
64; the one sitting is stand has neither earned nor bor
ing 88; to one sitting, walk rowed it 151
ing is possible 104-05; I read stick
sitting 105 I touch the one struck with a
slave stick 102
I have set you slave being free stone
101/102, 108 39,41-46,48 ff, 55,97, 130,
132; not a man is a stone - taken

not a stone is a man 8; not a wine is taken / loved 110
man is a stone - some stone is teacher
not a man 8 teacher is lecturing 184
strength then
strong from strength 24 38
struck thing
Socrates is being struck 163; I (here) taken indifferently for
touch the one struck manual things themselves, their
ly 102; Î touch the one struck double mode or relations 83
with a stick 102; you see the thinkable
one struck with your eyes 103 it is ± thinkable 180
study third man
one study of all contraries Coriscus is 'a third man' other
81; one study of all opposit- than man 122-23
es 147: see also contrary. this
opposite if this exists, that exists 132
sty three
every sty is in the eye 110 two and three are five 98, 99,
suave 107; two are not double of
62; if he is an adulterer, he is three 144
suave 149 time
substance that time you have been a
38, 39, 41 ff; every substance man 202
is either corporeal or incorp today
oreal 108; substance is spec 38; you are born today 109
ies 127, 132, 192; sensitive tomorrow
animate substance 20 38
suffering tooth
88, 97; suffering then - suf white as to teeth 139, 140,
fering now 88; someone suf 161; black as to teeth 121
fering was being cured 88; touch
someone suffering is healthy I touch the one struck manual
ly 102; I touch the one struck
sun with a stick 102
is in Cancer 133; every sun triangle
188-89 130, 132
superordinate position tribe
a father is in a superordinate a tribe is a tree 109
position 133 true
swiftly 12 ff
a white man runs swiftly 11; Tullius
he runs swiftly 11 142; Marcus Tullius 18
sword two
every sword cuts 142 two and three are five 98, 99,
107; two are a double of one 179; man who is white is

144; two is not a double of running 177, 179; every
three 144 white man runs 187; every
unwilling white man is white 179; a
God made wine unwillingly citizen is white 179; white
111 monk 132; white-footed 137
urine whiteness
urine is healthy 83, 85; urine 60; which is in a wall 170
is a sing of healthiness 83 wildhorse
mustang (equiferus 95
vine wine
God made nothing on the wine is taken with a hook
vine 110-11 110; God made wine unwill
virtue ingly 111
60 wisdom
visible lover of wisdom: philosopher
89 54,66
wise
walk a wise man does not envy 66
it is possible for one sitting to woman
walk 104 a woman is a priest 125
wall wood
56, 68; see also house, white 130, 132
warm, to world
33 the world is infinite in durat
waste ion 151
waste labor 65 write
water that one not writing is writing
all water is wet 117 is possible 104
weapons
iron weapons 59 yesterday
weighed down
the one suffering is weighed
down 88 zealous
well 29
man runs well 11; an animal
is well 63; some animals are
well 68
whenever
whenever a Parisian, you have
been a man 203
whinny
a horse can whinny 65 ff; 9
white
73 ff; white man 3, 177, 178,

Language in Dispute: The Summulae Logicales

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Language in Dispute: The Summulae Logicales

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LANGUAGE IN DISPUTE: THE SUMMULAE LOGICALES

AMSTERDAM STUDIES IN THE THEORY AND

Series III - STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE LANGUAGE SCIENCES

Advisory Editorial Board

Ranko Bugarski (Belgrade); Jean-Claude Chevalier (Paris)

FRANCIS P. DINNEEN, S.J.

JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY

The origin of this translation was a Christmas vacation attempt

Washington, D.C., December 1988 F.P.D.

TRACT I : On Introductory Notions

TRACT III : On Predicaments

On the Topic from Substance 52

On the Topic from Conjugates 67

On the Definition of Fallacy 83

On the Definition of Amphiboly 90

ON COMPOSITION AND DIVISION 98

On the Definition of Accent 109

On the Mode of Signifying in a Word ( dictio ) 113

ON EXTRALINGUISTIC FALLACIES 126

On Causes and Modes of Accident 128

On the Definition of these Terms 137

On the second Mode 138

ON IGNORING REFUTING EVIDENCE 141

ON ASSUMING THE POINT AT ISSUE 146

On its Definition 146

ON THE FALLACY OF CONSEQUENT 149

ON THE FALLACY OF NON-CAUSE AS CAUSE 153

On two kinds of Syllogism 153

ON THE FALLACY OF MANY QUESTIONS AS ONE 156

On Statement, Proposition, Interrogation

On the first Mode 158

On the Definition of Restriction 177

TRACT XII : ON DISTRIBUTIONS 185

On the Definition of Distribution 185

On markers distributive of Two 196

INDEX OF REFERENCES 206

INDEX OF WORDS AND THINGS 208

INDEX OF SOPHISMS AND EXAMPLES 262

PETER OF SPAIN'S SUMMULAE, THE MODISTAE,

Hispanus was a contemporary of linguistic theorists called 'Modist-

Material or etic (as in phonetics) objects of study are definable in

The tract on Supposition is the 6th of this 12-part Summary of Dia­

Hispanus's treatment is of current interest because identical data

how noun and verb are to be used consistently in grammar or dia­

If words were technical terms like H2O instead of water, they

1: Hispanus' oratio is here almost invariably translated word-group,

When a construction constituted by two words like flying planes or

A Dialectic equipped to deal with properties of terms like supposit­

for the propositions man runs, or a man is running: p. 3.) A

Similarly, Circular shares principal meaning with Circle and over­

Significations are presented as abstract relationships speakers can

Some of the presuppositions behind these expressions are illustrat­

For instance, Latin consignificat (transliterated as consignifies)

1) Propositions relating predicates and subjects are demonstrably

Some dialectic rules of thumb proposed in the Summulae can be re­

some man some man

Asserting some anythings are whatever they are implicitly asserts

Propositions were related in a similar way (p. 14):

possible to be CONTRARY possible not to be

not possible to be Subcon. to you

Labels used here derive from a technique of subcategorization call­

This tree provided an imaginative constant for REpresenting how

Notice that both Porphyrian and TG Trees preclude division at two

The tract on Supposition is the 6th of this 12-part Summary of Dia

how noun and verb are to be used consistently in grammar or dia

A Dialectic equipped to deal with properties of terms like supposit

Similarly, Circular shares principal meaning with Circle and over

Some of the presuppositions behind these expressions are illustrat

Some dialectic rules of thumb proposed in the Summulae can be re

Labels used here derive from a technique of subcategorization call

Similarly, logical Subjects and Predicates are exocentric Constitu

SENSATION (concerned with) concrete, unique, intrins

signified relation, but one of a substitute-to-what-has-been- substit

Classifications recorded by Hispanus became part of Western trad

Vocal expression is sound produced from the mouth of an anim

9 Again: Categorematic Propositions are affirmative or neg

4 'Generically different', 'specifically different' and 'numeric