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Gustav Theodore Fechner Pendahuluan
Gustav Theodore Fechner Pendahuluan
Pendahuluan
Biografi
Buku 2012 Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–1887) was born in southeastern Germany,
the son of a Lutheran pastor. Fechner’s father was a free-thinking person who had shocked
his congregation by an apparent lack of faith: he installed a lightening conductor on the top of
his church’s steeple, rather than relied on prayer to God toprevent a lightening strike. Like
Weber, Fechner studied medicine at the University of Leipzig, but never qualified as a
medical practitioner. Fechner was philosophi- cally informed and made a significant
contribution in softening the boundary between empiricism, naturalism and science
(Heidelberger and Klohr, 2004). In addition, Fechner is credited with two main achievements.
First, he extended Weber’s discovery that the ratio of JND to stimulus intensity is constant.
Fechner examined what he called ‘Weber’s law’ in many different modalities and found that
the same rule applied. Weber’s law can be written as:
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Fechner, Gustav Theodor (1801–1887) His Elements of Psychophysics, one of the great orig-
inal classics in psychology, set forth a systematic approach to psychophysics. He proposed
several early psychophysical methods and helped lay the conceptual and methodological
foundations for the new discipline of psychology.
Fechner’s law An integration of Weber’s formula expressed as S = k log R, where S is a
mental sen- sation and R is a stimulus magnitude. Thus, accord- ing to the law, a mental
sensation is a logarithmic function of the stimulus multiplied by a constant.
Pokok Pikiran buku 2014 1
4).
Like Herbart, Fechner (1801–1887) employed the concept of threshold in his work. More
impor- tant to Freud, however, was that Fechner likened the mind to an iceberg,
consciousness being the smallest part (about 1/10), or the tip, and the unconscious mind
making up the rest. Besides bor- rowing the iceberg analogy of the mind from Fechner, Freud
also followed Fechner in attempt- ing to apply the recently discovered principle of the
conservation of energy to living organisms. Freud said, “I was always open to the ideas of G.
T. Fechner and have followed that thinker upon many important points” (E. Jones, 1953, p.
374).
By showing the continuity between humans and other animals, Darwin (1809–1882) strength-
ened Freud’s contention that humans, like nonhu- man animals, are motivated by instincts
rather than by reason. According to Freud, it is our powerful animal instincts, such as our
urges for sexual activity and willingness to be aggressive, that are the driving forces of
personality, and it is these instincts that must be at least partially inhibited for civilization to
exist.
At least as early as Fechner, there had been philosophical speculation about how the two
hemi- spheres related to conscious experience. Sperry’s work certainly energized such
questions (for a fasci- nating example, see Jaynes, 1976). Sperry himself had a lifelong
interest in the mind–body (brain) problem and how that problem relates to human values, and
many of his publications, especially his later ones, reflected those interests (see, for exam-
ple, Sperry, 1970, 1980, 1982, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1993). Sperry believed that consciousness
emerges from brain processes and, once emerged, has a causal relationship to behavior. Thus,
Sperry was an interactionist concerning the mind–body rela- tionship. He believed (some say,
as we will see in Chapter 19, incorrectly) that by correlating mental events directly to brain
processes, he avoided dual- ism. In his Nobel address, Sperry (1982) said,
[I]t remains to mention briefly that one of the more important indirect results of the
split-brain work is a revised concept of the nature of consciousness and its fundamen- tal
relation to brain processing.... The key development is a switch from prior non- causal,
parallelist views to a new causal, or “interactionist” interpretation that ascribes to inner
experience an integral causal control role in brain function and behav- ior. In effect, and
without resorting to dualism, the mental forces of the conscious mind are restored to the brain
of objective science from which they had long been excluded on materialist-behaviorist
princi- ples. (p. 1226)
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Fechner’s Elements of Psychophysics Fechner was aware of Weber’s research on thresh-
olds, but did not realize its significance until after his insight of 1850. The breakthrough for
Fechner was the conviction that sensations could be subjected to exact measurement by
assuming that jnd’s were subjectively equal in magnitude. Thus weights of 30 and 33 grams
are just noticeably different, as are weights of 60 and 66 grams. The differences in weight
between the two pairs of stimuli are 3 and 6 grams, respectively. Psychologically, however,
the difference between 30 and 33 feels the same as (i.e., is subjectively equal to) the
difference between 60 and 66, according to Fechner.
Fechner’s assumption of equal jnd’s was challenged almost immediately, and the
mathematical relationship he developed was shown to be true only under limited
circumstances. No matter. The endur- ing legacy of his Elements of Psychophysics was his
systematization of the methods used to establish thresholds, which are still in use both in the
laboratory and in such applications as vision and hear- ing tests. These are known today as
the methods of limits, constant stimuli, and adjustment.4 Consider them in the context of a
hearing test. In the Method of Limits, a stimulus is presented that is well above threshold and
then gradually reduced in intensity until the subject reports that it can no longer be heard.
This is called a descending trial, and it is followed by an ascending trial, in which the
stimulus is first presented below threshold, and then increased until the subject hears it for the
first time. Descending and ascending trials are alternated many times, and the threshold is
calculated as the average of all trials. In the Method of Constant Stimuli, sounds of varying
intensities are presented in a random order, and the subject’s task is to indicate whether or not
they are heard. This method solves a problem with the method of limits, which is a tendency
for the listener to anticipate the place where the threshold lies. In the Method of Adjustment,
the subject directly varies the intensity of the stimulus until it seems to be at threshold.
Ascending and descending trials can be used. Of the three techniques, a study using the
method of adjustment takes the least amount of time, but is the least accurate; the method of
constant stimuli is the most accurate, but takes the longest time (Goldstein, 1996). In an
actual hearing test, the method of limits with descending trials is normally used; “catch trials”
are inserted to prevent subjects from signaling (“I hear it”) when there is in fact no stimulus
presented.
Boring (1963b) referred to Fechner as the “inadvertent founder of psychophysics.” He
believed that Fechner’s main purpose was philosophical—to establish his day view while
defeating materi- alism (the night view). Unfortunately for Fechner, that goal was not
reached, and the philosophical implications of his work were largely ignored. Fortunately for
psychology, though, Fechner’s efforts resulted in the creation of a research program and a set
of methods that enabled others to see what Fech- ner did not—that psychological phenomena
could be subjected to scientific methodology. By creating psychophysics in 1860, Fechner
paved the way for another German physiologist, Wilhelm Wundt, to proclaim a New
Psychology a few years later.
Buku 2018
Gustav T. Fechner also introduced three psychophysical methods into psychology that were
very important to Wilhelm Wundt when he launched psychology as a laboratory- based
experimental science in 1879. The method of just noticeable differences or the method of
limits, as it is called today, requires a person to compare two stimuli with the intensity of one
varied (the comparison stimulus) until the person notices the comparison as just different
from the other or standard stimulus. The data described earlier in this sec- tion and the data
presented in Figure 8.1 have been collected using the method of limits. The method of
average effort or adjustment was Fechner’s second method and requires the person to adjust
or change continuously a variable stimulus until it matches a standard stimulus or appears just
different. This method can be used to measure both the differ- ence limen or threshold (DL,
the just noticeable difference) and/or the absolute limen or threshold (AL, that stimulus
energy that is detected on 50% of the trials with this statisti- cal value set somewhat
arbitrarily by the experimenter and thus can yield different ALs). In the method of constant
stimuli or right and wrong cases, comparison stimuli are paired randomly with a standard
stimulus and the person reports whether the comparison stimu- lus is greater than, equal to, or
less than the standard stimulus or, alternatively detected or not detected. This method is used
to measure both the difference and absolute thresholds, respectively. In all three of Fechner’s
psychophysical methods, repeated measures are taken yielding average values such that both
the difference and absolute thresholds are best thought of as statistical values rather than
fixed immutable values. Some variations of Fechner’s original three psychophysical methods
are still used today, for example, to mea- sure air quality or how much sweetener needs to be
added to a cereal so that it appears just sweeter than unsweetened cereal, which can save the
manufacturer large sums of money when tons of cereal are produced. Lastly, as any seasoned
cook well knows, we use some of Fechner’s methods when adding just the right amount of
herbs, condiments, and/or oils to produce our favorite dishes.
The Weber and the Weber–Fechner laws were the first laws to provide a mathemati- cal
statement of the relationship between the mind and the body based upon systematic
psychophysical methods employed in a laboratory setting. Weber and, especially, Fechner
were revolutionary in their thinking and methods of study pointing psychology in the
direction of examining potential lawful relationships in the field. These laws, along with
Fechner’s three psychophysical methods, the advances in brain localization, nerve physiol-
ogy, and philosophy stressing empiricism and associationism, provided the fundamental
calculus to launch the new science of psychology (Fechner, 1966/1860).
Inti pemikiran fechner
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Method of Adjustment Method of psychophysics, described by Fechner, in which the subject
directly controls a physical stimulus, adjusting it until it is just barely detected.
Method of Constant Stimuli Method of psychophysics, described by Fechner, in which
stimuli of varying physical intensities are presented in random order.
Method of Limits Method of psychophysics, described by Fechner, which alternates
ascending trials (stimulus is first below threshold, then increased until detected) and
descending trials (stimulus is first well above threshold, then decreased until no longer
detected).
Kritik
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Wundt’s Use of Introspection
To study the basic mental processes involved in immediate experience, Wundt used a variety
of methods, including introspection. Wundt’s use of introspection bore little resemblance,
however, to how the empiricists and sensationalists used it to study ideas and association.
Wundt distinguished between pure introspection, the relatively unstruc- tured
self-observation used by earlier philosophers, and experimental introspection, which he
believed to be scientifically respectable:
Experimental introspection made use of laboratory instruments to vary the condi- tions and
hence make the results of internal perception more precise, as in the psycho- physical
experiments initiated by Fechner or in the sense-perception experiments of Helmholtz. In
most instances saying “yes” or “no” to an event was all that was needed, without any
description of inner events. Sometimes the subject responded by press- ing a telegraph key.
The ideal was to make introspection, in the form of internal perception, as precise as external
perception. (Hilgard, 1987, p. 44)
Almost everything in Principles can be seen as a critical evaluation of what James perceived
Wundt’s approach to psychology to be. James (1890/1950) was especially harsh in the
following passage:
Within a few years what one may call
a microscopic psychology has arisen in Germany, carried on by experimental methods, asking
of course every moment for introspective data, but eliminating their uncertainty by operating
on a large scale and taking statistical means. This method taxes patience to the utmost, and
hardly could have arisen in a country whose natives could be bored. Such Germans as Weber,
Fechner ... and Wundt obviously cannot; and their success has brought into the field an array
of younger experimental psychologists, bent on studying the elements of the mental life,
dissecting them from the gross results in which they are embedded, and as far as possible
reducing them to quantitative scales. The simple and open method of attack having done what
it can, the method of patience, starving out, and harassing to death is tried; the Mind must
submit to a regular siege, in which minute advantages gained night and day by the forces that
hem her in must sum themselves up at last into her overthrow. There is little left of the grand
style about these new prism, pendulum, and chronography-philosophers. They mean
business, not chivalry. What generous divi- nation, and that superiority in virtue which was
thought by Cicero to give a man the best insight into nature, have failed to do, their spying
and scraping, their deadly tenacity and almost diabolic cunning, will doubtless some day
bring about. (Vol. 1, pp. 192–193)
James, of course, was responding to Wundt the experimentalist. If James had been able to
probe deeper into Wundt’s voluntarism and into his later Völkerpsychologie, he would have
seen a remarkable similarity between himself and Wundt. In any case, it was Wundt the
experimentalist who, after read- ing James’s Principles, commented, “It is literature, it is
beautiful, but it is not psychology” (Blumenthal, 1970, p. 238).
Although James appreciated Fechner’s excursions into the supernatural (James wrote a
sympathetic introduction to the English translation of Fechner’s The Little Book of Life After
Death), he did not think much of Fechner’s scientific endeavors, which had so impressed
Wundt (James, 1890/1950, Vol. 1, pp. 534, 549).
Like James, Köhler was highly critical of Fechner and offered psychophysics as an example
of what could happen if measurement precedes an understanding of what is being measured:
Apparently [Fechner] was convinced that measuring as such would make a science out of
psychology.... Today we can no longer doubt that thousands of quantitative
psychophysical experiments were made almost in vain. No one knew precisely what he was
measuring. Nobody had studied the mental processes upon which the whole procedure was
built. (Köhler, 1929/1970, p. 44)
Köhler believed that U.S. psychologists were making a similar mistake in their widespread
accep- tance of operationism (see Chapter 13). He gave as an example the operational
definition of intelli- gence in terms of performance on intelligence tests. Here, he said, the
measurements are precise (as they were in Fechner’s work), but it is not clear exactly what is
being measured. In the quota- tion that follows, note the similarity between Köhler’s
(1929/1970) criticisms of the use of IQ tests and those of Binet (see Chapter 10):
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This brief description of the major psychophysicists reveals quite different ori- entations. On
the one hand, Fechner studied sensory and perceptual events from the perspective of the
underlying mental activity characteristic of the German tradition. On the other, Helmholtz
studied the same phenomena and developed interpretations consistent with an empirical
orientation, related more to the British tradition. However, both scientists succeeded in
pointing to an area of investigation not easily accommodated in physics, physiology, or
natural philosophy alone, and that was the emerging subject matter of psychology.
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The brief quote that opens this chapter comes from the preface of the epoch-making
two-volume Prin- ciples of Physiological Psychology, published in 1873–1874. It was written
by the German most often described as the “founder” of experimental psychology, Wilhelm
Wundt. To claim, as Wundt did, that one is making an “attempt to mark out a new domain of
science” is the kind of statement that separates founders from their contemporaries. Clearly,
Fechner’s work on psychophysics entitles him to a claim as the first experimental
psychologist. We’ve seen, however, that Fechner had other, more philosophical,
purposes—defeating materialism. Thus, as Boring (1950) pointed out, founders are
promoters. They might not be the first to accomplish something, but they are the first to
proclaim that their accomplish- ment breaks new ground. They make important scientific
contributions, but they also have a talent for propaganda. Wundt had that talent.
One indirect effect of Fechner’s Elements of Psychophysics is that it helped launch
the experimental study of human memory. This occurred sometime in the mid-1870s, when a
young German philosopher named Hermann Ebbinghaus (Figure 4.4) stumbled on a copy of
Fechner’s book while browsing in a used bookstore in Paris. Fechner’s demonstration that the
mind could be subjected to scientific methods inspired Ebbinghaus, who was wrestling with
the philosophical problem of the association of ideas at the time.
As a philosopher, Ebbinghaus was thoroughly familiar with the British
empiricist–associationists and their analysis of association processes. As you recall from
Chapter 2, the British philosophers considered association to be an essential component of the
mind’s organizational structure, but they differed over the basic laws of association—for
example, is contiguity sufficient to explain associations (Hartley), or are other principles
necessary (Hume)? For Ebbinghaus, Fechner’s scientific approach to the mind’s sensory
processes apparently triggered a creative leap. If sensations could be measured, why not other
mental processes? Why not associations? Sometime during the late 1870s, Ebbinghaus
became resolved to study the formation and retention of associations scientifically. By the
middle of the next decade, he had produced Memory: A Contribution to Experimental
Psychology (1885/1964). This brief book (123 pages in a 1964 reprinting) inaugurated a
research tradition that continues today and includes results that are still described in
textbooks of general psychology. As Ernest Hilgard pointed out in an introduction to the 1964
reprinting, “[f]or the experimental study of learning and memory there is one source that is
pre-eminent over all others: this small monograph by Ebbinghaus” (Hilgard, 1964, p. vii).