Reintegration in China under the Warlords, 1916-1927

Shelly Yomano

Republican China, Volume 12, Number 2, April 1987, pp. 22-27 (Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/790760/summary

[ Access provided at 16 Dec 2021 20:05 GMT from University of Toronto Library ]
 REINTEGRATION IN CHINA UNDER THE WARLORDS, 1916-192 7

Shelly Yomano

In the last few decades the analysis of the warlords and their
alliance s has advanced greatly. From earlier narrativ es filled with
stereoty pic denuncia tions of warlord predatio ns and boorishn
ess to
individu al biograph ies of leading warlords to studies of cliques
and
factions , historia ns have penetrat ed deeper and deeper into
the
historic al reality of the warlords . But the attempt to develop an
analytic concept that makes sense of the entire period has met
with
limited results. What is depicted is a jumble of names and battles.
The major warlords have been identifi ed, their lives chronicl
ed, and
their bonds with subordin ates analyzed . However, there is no sense
of historic al developm ent. in this depictio n, no real sense of
change
or becoming . The account historia ns now present is one of
equilibr ium, of a bogging down after Yuan Shikai's death that
remains
unreliev ed until the victorio us march of the Northern Expediti
on.
Due to a preconce ption of stagnati on, historia ns write about
groups
allying in various ways in rapid successi on without breaking out
of a
balanced , static situatio n.

There is a major trend in this period that has been ignored.

Occasion ally an author will mention the fact that all warlords
realized the inevitab ility of a reunifie d China, or discuss
a
war~ord's desire to become the leader of a
reunifie d China. But the
genuine trend toward reunific ation has been overlook ed.
James
Sheridan depicts the period as one of increasi ng disinteg ration.[
!]
Andrew Nathan[2 ] and Hsi-shen g Ch'i(3] have both describe d an
era of
equilibr ium and unmitiga ted division . No one has focused on the
continua l attempt at integrat ion that illumina tes these years.
I
would like to present this as a new way of looking at the
warlord
period, a way that begins to make sense of the chaos and places
the
period in historic al perspec tive by showing it to be a critical
link
between the Yuan Shikai presiden cy and the rise of the Guominda
ng.
The most importan t recent advances in the historiog raphy
of
Chinese warlords lie in the attempts to analyze warlord interact
ions
in factiona l .terms. Nathan has identifi ed •cliente list ties•
between
warlords within a faction, a •nonasc riptive two-pers on relation
ship
founded on exchang e.•[4] Ch'i has looked closely at the types
of
ties that cemented these relation ships within a warlord faction.
[S]
There should perhaps be more attentio n paid to the extreme fluidity
of the relation s (and the ubiquito us possibi lity for apostasy
), as
well as the very hierarch ical nature of these factions . But I am
more concerne d with the equilibr ium inherent in the factiona l
system
of both Nathan and Ch'i. Nathan's second •mode of conflict • states:

22
 Sinc e fact ions are inca pabl e of
buil ding suff icie nt powe r to rid
the poli tica l syste m of riva
l fact ions , they have littl
ince ntiv e to do so.[ 6] e

Like wise Ch'i relie s on a stat ic

mode l of facti onal ism from Mort
Kapl an, in whic h rule numb er thre e stat on A.
es that a fact iona l acto r
will :

Stop figh ting rath er than elim

inate an esse ntia l natio nal
acto r.[7]

That this is not a very good

desc ripti on of how Chin ese warl ords
acte d can be show n in two ways
.

Firs t let us look at the term

s of subm issio n prop osed by the
vict ors of the majo r wars of 1920
and 1922 . At the end of the Zhil
Anfu War of 1920 , the vict ors prop i-
osed :
( 1) Puni shme nt of Xu Shuz heng (fou
nder of the Anfu Club
and Duan Oiru i's follo wer) .
(2) Disc harg e of all troop s unde r Duan
Oiru i (the Anfu
lead er).
(3) Dism issal of the parli ame nt (con
troll ed by the Anfu
fact ion) .
(4) Dism issal of the thre e Anfu cabi
net mini sters .
( 5) Supp ressi on of the Anfu Club (the Anfu poli
orga niza tion ).[& ) tica l

Sim ilarl y, at the end of the

Firs t Zhil i-Fe ngti an War of 1922 ,
vict orio us Zhil i lead ers prop osed the
:
(1) Dism issal of Zhan g Zuol in (the
Feng tian lead er).
(2) Dism issal of Lian g Shiy i, Ye Gong
zhuo , and Zhan g Hu
(the Feng tian- spon sore d prem ier
and min ister s).
(3) Paym ent of an inde mnit y to the
Zhil i forc es and the
peop le of Zhil i prov ince .(9]

It shou ld be note d that neit her

of thes e settl eme nts was desig ned
spar e the defe ated fact ion. to
The fact iona l lead ers were to
strip ped of all troo ps, and the be
fact ion' s poli tica l supp orter s
to be strip ped of thei r offi ces. were

Next let us look at the actu al

outco me of the 1920 war. Afte r
rapi d camp aign, the Anfu forc es a
unde r Duan Oiru i were overc ome.
the after math of the war, the Anfu In
facti on lost cont rol of six of
eigh t prov ince s; only Zhej iang its
and Fuji an rema ined unde r (nom
Anfu gove rnor s. The Anfu Club was dism antle d, inall y)
fact ion was left with no poli whic h mean t that the
tica l orga n with whic h to dom inate
parl iame nt. Not leas t in impo the
rtanc e, Duan Oiru i with drew to Tian
jin,

23
 where he lived in retirem ent until late in 1924--
after the Second
Zhili-F engtia n War was over. The remain ing Anfu govern ors got the
messag e and began to hunt around for new leader s.
In Ch 1 i 1 s terms.,
the Anfu faction had ceased to functio n as an essent
ial actor. Here
was no balanc ing act, no pullin g back from the elimin
ation of a rival
faction . The Anfu group had to all intent s been
destro yed.[1 0]
My point is that a view of the period that stress
es the static
or equili bratin g aspect s of the warlor d system obfusc
ates a very real
develop ment that was taking place in the 1920s.
China did not
gradua lly slide into every greate r confus ion and
disinte gratio n from
1916 to 1926. By 1916 China was alread y in a fractu red, divide
d
state. For ten years it strugg led with increa sing succes
s to crawl
out of its predica ment. Let us review the histor
y of faction alism in
Republ ican China, beginn ing with the death of Yuan
Shikai .
The collap se of Yuan's monarc hical moveme nt in
1915-1 916 left
rebelli ous provin ces claimi ng their autonom y in
the.so uth. Althou gh
Yuan had achiev ed a high degree of unific ation,
China rapidl y
fragme nted follow ing his death, becomi ng more splinte
red in 1916 than
at any time during the subseq uent decade . His death
left a number of
his genera ls to fight among themse lves for promin
ence in the north.
From 1916 to 1918 the major warlor ds formed
loose allianc es and
develo ped strong er ties with their follow ers,
slowly establ ishing
their contro l over blocks of provin ces.
The result was the
appear ance of three major faction s (Anfu, Zhili,
and Fengti an) by
1918, amid a scatte ring of unallie d smalle r forces
. Each of these
major groups had a distin ct leader , a factio nal
hierarc hy, and a
territo ry. The streng th that had accrue d to these hierar chical
ties
is shown in the failur e of Duan Qirui' s 1918 attemp
t to woo Wu Peifu
away for Cao Kun. Tensio ns among these faction s led to the Zhili-
Anfu· War of 1920 in which, as we have seen, one
of the major faction s
was · elimin ated. Thus in the first five years after Yuan Shikai
,
confus edly and loosel y allied warlor ds develo ped
three main faction s
and then reduce d one of them to impote nce. Much had alread y been
accomp lished in the reunif ication of China.

Beginn ing in 1920, the story of China' s reunif

ication revolv es
around the Zhili factio n and its milita ry leader
Wu Peifu.
Histor ians have ignore d or slighte d the vast expans
ion of Wu's power
in the early 1920s and his nearly succes sful effort
to unite China
under the contro l of the Zhili factio n. Wu's biogra
pher, Odoric Y.K.
Wou, has concen trated on the intern al divisio
ns within the Zhili
faction , exagge rating its lack of unity. Wou does note the rapid
rise to power of Wu Peifu, but he portra ys this
as a phenom enon of
the Zhili faction rather than as an integr al part
of the nation al
phenom enon of reinte gratio n. The expans ion of territo
ry and milita ry
forces contro lled by Wu should be viewed in the
contex t of nation al
consol idation .

24
 As a resu lt of the 1920 war, the
Zhil i facti on expan ded from
cont rol of three prov inces and parts
of two more to nomi nal cont rol
of eigh t prov inces (incl udin g
Zhil i, the capi tal's prov ince) .
Feng tian powe r had also expan ded,
but the new cont rol of Suiyu an,
Chah ar, and Rehe brou ght littl e weal
th or pres tige to Zhang Zuol in.
Thus , as Cao Kun and Wu Peifu of
the Zhil i facti on clea rly reali zed,
the Zhil i facti on was in a good
posi tion to pursu e Chin a's
reun ifica tion. And they proce eded
to do so.
In July- Augu st 1921 , the Zhil i facti
on repla ced the gove rnor of
Huna n, nomi nally thei r agen t, with
the more relia ble Xiao Yaon an.
The Zhil i leade rs force d Zhang
Zuol in to aband on his attem pt to
cont rol the cabi net throu gh Liang
Shiy i in early 1922 . In May of
1922 the Zhil i facti on emerg ed
victo rious from the first Zhil i-
Feng tian War; the facti on now had no majo r adve rsary
Grea t Wall . south of the
Late r in the same year Li Yuan hong,
cont rol, was place d into the presi unde r stric t Zhil i
denc y. In Marc h of 1923 Sun
Chua nfang and Zhou Yinre n were
sent to win Fujia n for the Zhil
facti on, acco mpli shing this by May i
of 1924 . At the same time Wu's
subo rdina te Yang Sen invad ed Sichu
an and estab lishe d hims elf in that
prov ince. In the mean time Cao Kun had bribe
presi denc y. d his way into the
By autum n of 1924 the Zhil i facti
most of the prov inces of Chin a and on had cont rol over
exer ted grea t influ ence in the
Beij ing gove rnme nt. Ther e still exist ed three main anta
the south Sun Yatse n was strug gling goni sts. In
to main tain cont rol of Cant on;
he seem ed to pres ent no threa t
to Cao Kun and Wu Peifu . In the
north east lay the doma in of Zhang
Zuol in, a powe rful and vind ictiv
enem y. In Shan ghai and Zhej iang lay the last e
Lu Yong xiang was work ing stren uous remn ant of Anfu powe r;
ly to deve lop stron ger ties with
Zhan g Zuol in to prot ect his smal
l fiefd om. Lu Yong xiang was
obvi ously next on the Zhil i facti on's
agen da for reun ifica tion.
On Septe mber 3, 1924 , the Jiang
su-Z hejia ng War brok e out,
pitti ng the Zhil i facti on's Sun Chua
nfeng and Qi Xieyu an agai nst Lu
Yong xiang . Afte r forty days of seve re figh ting,
fled to Japan . The Zhil i facti on Lu and his offic ers
now cont rolle d all of cent ral Chin
and could attac k Zhan g Zuol in in a
the north east with virtu ally no
fear of a two- front war. Zhan g, howe
ver, had seen the writi ng on the
wall and had attac ked the Zhil i force
s in north Chin a even befo re the
Jiang su-Z hejia ng war had ended .
As the secon d Zhili -Fen gtian war
bega n, the Zhil i force s were taken
by surp rise and pushe d back . But
Wu Peifu quic kly ralli ed the Zhil
i force s and conta ined the Feng tian
adva nce.

This was a criti cal mome nt in mode

rn Chin ese histo ry. The Zhil i
facti on was figh ting its last majo
r camp aign in its long serie s of
battl es to reun ify Chin a. If Wu Peifu were victo rious (and
posi tion looke d favo rable ) he could his
conc eivab ly elim inate Zhang
Zuol in from powe r. It would then
take littl e to overc ome the pock ets
of resis tanc e that were sprea d unco
ordin ated throu ghou t Chin a. But

25
 on Octob er 23 Wu's hopes were destro yed when
Feng Yuxian g joined
forces with Zhang Zuolin and occup ied Beijin
g for the Fengti an
factio n. In the face of this defec tion, Wu's campa ign
collap sed and
the Zhili attemp t to reunif y China ended. North
China remain ed under
Zhang Zuoli n's contro l and south China was
split among a numbe r of
warlo rds.

In the end the Zhili factio n's attemp t to reunif

y China failed .
But we should not let that fact obscu re the
attem pt. From 1918 to
1924 the Zhili leader s contin ually worked toward
reunif icatio n, and
they were within a hair's breadt h of their
goal when Feng Yuxia ng's
defect ion foiled them. One might objec t that other warlo rds,
unalli ed with the Zhili factio n, were still
in contro l of provin ces
and part of provin ces in 1924; but which of these was strong enough
to oppose the armies under Wu Peifu? Likew ise one might argue that
Zhili reunif icatio n would have been purely
nomin al, with each
subor dinate warlor d strugg ling to mainta in
his own person al power .
But how does this differ from the reunif
icatio n of 1928 under
Guomi ndang auspic es?

The point I am trying to make is that there

was a contin ual
tenden cy toward reuni ficati on, beginn ing in
1916. This tenden cy can
be used to inves tigate and partia lly explai n
a numbe r of develo pment s
in the early Repub lican period . One is the growth in.num bers of men
under arms: 500,00 0 in 1916, 1,000, 000 in 1918, over 1,500,
1924. 000 in
As factio ns develo ped and clashe d, their strugg
les involv ed
more and more men and became blood ier. If one compa res the major
wars in 1920, 1922, and 1924, one sees a steady
escala tion from one
to the next: a great rise in casua lties, an expan sion of
the battle
zone, and a length ening of the durati on of
the campa igns. These are
all explai ned in part by the growin g animo
sity and vengea nce as the
fi~ld of conten ders for, reuni fier
of China narrow ed and as the Zhili
factio n drew closer to accom plishin g its goal.

In short, the warlor d period is not an era of

disint egrati on and fragm entati on. growin g
It is a time of contin ual
coales cing, of a fusing togeth er whose final
result was to be the
reuni ficati on of the Northe rn Exped ition.
The proces s of reuni fi-
cation was almos t carrie d out by Cao Kun
and Wu Peifu in 1924.
Histo rians -looki ng for ways of better under
standi ng this period
should not be conten t with theori es of equili brium and
disint egrati on. The focus in studyi ng the warlor ds should not
the chaos , the muddle or lack of ideolo gy, be on
or the warlo rd£' self-
servin g nature but on the ever-p resent and
contin uous develo pment
toward reinte gratio n.

A gradu ate studen t in histor y at Corne ll

Unive rsity, Shelly
Yomano is curren tly resear ching the Jiangs u-Zhe
jiang War of 1924.

26
 NOTES

1. Jame s She rida n. Chin a in Disi nteg ratio n. New York , 1975 .
2. Andr ew Nath an. Peki ng Poli tics , 1918 -192 3.
Berk eley , 1976 .
3. Hsi- shen g Ch'i . War lord Poli tics in Chin a 1916
1976 . -192 8. Stan ford ,

4. Nath an, pp. 29ff .

5. Ch'i , pp. 36ff .

6. Nath an, p. 38.

7. Ch'i , p. 204.

8. Nort h Chin a Hera ld. Aug ust 24, 1920 . p. 209.

9. Nort h Chin a Hera ld. May 13, 1922 . pp. 441- 42.
10. The gene ral hist oric al even
s cite d in this pape r can be
in Coli n Mac Kerr as'.H oder n Chin foun d
a& A Chro nolo gy (Lon don,
and in the biog raph ical essa 1982 )
y on Wu Peif u in How ard Boor
Rich ard How ard's Biog raph ical man and
Dict iona ry of Repu blica n Chin
(New York , 1970 ), vol. 3, pp. a
444- 50.

27