THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

I. Compositions and Qualifications

Purpose: To be a more effective instrument in maintaining the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot as the concrete expression of the will of the sovereign people.

Composition:
● One (1) Chairman
● Six (6) Commissioners

Appointment

All appointed by the President with the consent of Commission on Appointments for a term
of 7 years without reappointment.

➢ On those first appointed, three members shall hold office for seven (7) years
➢ Two members for five (5) years
➢ Last member for three (3) years
Without reappointment

Qualifications:
● At least thirty five years of age (35)
● Holders of a college degree
● Must not have been candidates for any elective position
● Majority of the members including the Chairman shall be members of the Philippine
bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
○ The appointment of a full complement of lawyers in the Comelec membership
is not precluded.
○ Ratio: this is required because of the duty reposed in them to be the sole
judge of certain election contests.

History of membership:
● During the Commonwealth charter there were only three (3) members
● This has been increased to nine (9) under the 1973 Constitution.
● And our present Constitution reduced it to seven

Ratio behind the decrease of membership:

It was intended to facilitate decisions of the commissioner en banc by concurrence of only
four members constituting a majority of the body.

The Commission on elections is a collegial body - “The act of the head of a collegial body
cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself”

Prohibition: Candidates in the immediately preceding elections are prohibited to be

appointed to the Commission on Elections.
II. Powers and Functions

1. Enforcement of Election laws - Enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

1.1 By virtue of this authority, the COMELEC can:

● Require compliance with the rules for the filing of certificates of candidacy.
● Prevent or Prosecute election offenses.
● Supervise the registration of voters
● Holding of polls, and see to it that the canvass of the votes
● The proclamation of the winners are done in accordance with law.
● Power to annul an illegal registry of voters
● To cancel a proclamation made by the board of canvassers on the basis of an
irregular or incomplete canvass.
● To oust the candidate proclaimed notwithstanding that he has already
assumed office.
● May reject nuisance candidacies.
● Refuse to give due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy.
○ Under sec. 29 of the Omnibus Election Code the Commission may
Motu Proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse
to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown
that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in
mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the
similarity of names of registered candidates or by other circumstances
or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no intention
to run for the office.
● Disqualify candidates.
● May order the correction of manifest error in tabulation or tallying of results
during the canvassing and petitions, maybe filed directly with the commission
even after a proclamation of the winning candidates.
○ Manifest error - is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding.

● May also take cognizance of pre-proclamation controversies (Sec. 241 OEC)

○ In questions pertaining/affecting the proceedings of the board of
canvassers (may be raised by any candidate/political party/coalition of
parties)
○ Any matter raised under
■ Sec. 233 election returns delayed, lost or destroyed
■ Sec. 234 Material defects in the election returns
■ Sec. 235 ER Tampered with or falsified
■ Sec. 236 ER discrepancies

In relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the

election returns (Sec. 243 OEC) ENUMERATES THE ISSUES WHICH CAN BE
RAISED IN A PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY:
 A. Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers
B. Canvassed election returns are:
a. Incomplete
b. Contain material defects
c. Appear to be tampered with or falsified
d. Or contain discrepancies

C. The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion,or

intimidation or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic.
D. When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places
were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing
of the aggrieved candidate/s.

1.2 Votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment,
particularly when the candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate
candidate - SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS STRAY BUT COUNTED IN FAVOR
OF THE LATTER.

This rule applies notwithstanding the automation of elections (De la Cruz v.

COMELEC)

● In the case of De la cruz Vs. COMELEC) The possibility of confusion in

names of candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on the
ballot on election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated, EVEN UNDER
AUTOMATED VOTING SYSTEM especially considering that voters who
mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate
instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer
ask for replacement ballots to correct the same.

1.3 A CANDIDATE MAY BE DISQUALIFIED - SEC. 68 OMNIBUS ELECTION

CODE:
Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having

● given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt

the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;

● committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;

● spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this

Code;
 ● solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95,
96, 97 and 104; or

● violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he
has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for
any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status
as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with
the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

1.4 A petition for disqualification under section 68 may be filed at any time after
the last day for filing of the certificates of candidacy BUT not later than the
candidate’s proclamation should he win in the elections.

1.4.1 A person disqualified under Section 68

● Is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate
● May be validly substituted but only by an official candidate of his
registered or accredited party.
○ A candidate may be substituted if he:
■ Dies
■ Is disqualified
■ Withdraws

1.5 A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY Sec. 78 MAY BE DENIED DUE

COURSE/CANCELLED:

If found to be containing material representations which are false and deliberately

made:
● Misrepresentation as to:
○ Age
○ Residence
○ Citizenship
○ Non-possession of natural-born status
○ Registration as a voter
○ Eligibility -
■ when one is precluded from running for a fourth term
because of the three-term limit rule.
■ One who claims to be eligible despite disqualification
on the basis of an accessory penalty imposed upon him
in connection with his conviction in a criminal case
(Sec. 12 OEC)
● UNLESS: Given plenary pardon, granted
amnesty

The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate. (Maquiling V.
COMELEC)
 A petition to deny due course to cancel a certificate of candidacy under
Section 78
Must be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the filing of the
certificate of candidacy.
● sec. 2 Rule 23 of COMELEC Rules of procedure - Said petition can be
filed within five days following the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy

A person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78

Is not treated as a candidate at all.

NOTE:
Mere technical irregularities in the preparation and submission of certificates of candidacy,
such as the signing of the same under oath, although considered mandatory prior to the
elections, SHALL NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO INVALIDATE THE SAME as these are merely
directory requirements after the elections “to give effect to the will of the people”

1.6 The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not necessarily render the
certificate of candidacy does not necessarily render the certificate void ab initio, once
filed, the permanent legal effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself
be subsequently withdrawn.

1.7A candidate may be substituted if he:

● Dies
● Is disqualified
● Withdraws

An earlier deadline is usually prescribed for substitutions by reason of withdrawal

( Sec. 12 RA 9006) to remove confusion, the name of the substitute candidate
should, as much as possible, bear the same surname as that of the substituted
candidate.

Federico V Comelec
The Court invalidated the substitution of a candidate for Mayor who withdrew her
candidacy for purposes of substituting her husband as candidate for governor
because of the latter’s death. Because the deadline for substitution has prescribed.

In addition, a candidate whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course may

likewise not be substituted. A cancelled certificate of candidacy is void ab initio and
cannot give rise to a valid candidacy.

1.8 Overlap of Section 68 and 78 - Aratea V. Comelec

● Permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country (Sec. 68)

 ● Non-resident (Sec 78)

The court clarified that one who would like to assail the candidacy may avail
himself of either remedy.

Abayon V. Comelec and Raul Daza

Proper grounds for election protest and not a pre-proclamation controversy:

● Abduction of a voter
● Killing of a political leader
● The threats which prevented the holding of a campaign aorties
● And the intimidation of voters
● Or of terrorism
● Massive vote-buying and bribery

A second placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner an election contest

● Topacio V. Paredes
● Ocampo V. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal - subsequent
disqualification of a winning candidate will not entitle his opponent.
● Geronimo Vs. Ramos - If winning candidate is not qualified/cannot qualify a
permanent vacancy is thus created.
The second placer is just that, a second placer.
To rule otherwise is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process.

Exception: A second placer is allowed only when two requisites concur namely:
1) The candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified.
2) The electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s
disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but
the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate.

Labo V. COMELEC (The disqualification of the candidate had not become final
before the elections)

Cayat V. COMELEC (The candidate was disqualified by final judgement)

Failure of Election may be declared Sec. 6 OEC

● The election has not been held
● The election has been suspended before the hour fixed by law
● The preparation and transmission of the election returns have given rise to
the consequent failure of elect.
● Force Majeure, Violence, Terrorism, Fraud other analogous causes.

Finally before the COMELEC grant a verified petition seeking to declare a

failure of election, the concurrence of 2 conditions must be established
namely:
 1. No voting has taken place in the precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if
there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in failure to elect.
2. The votes cast would affect the result of the election.

Sangcopan V COMELEC -
Annulment of election can only be done when there is pervasive terrorism and
election fraud and it is impossible to purge the illegal from the valid returns.

Datu Michael Abas Kida V Senate of the Philippines - That the authority of
COMELEC is limited under the law, it may not be compelled to conduct special
elections.

Lokin V COMELEC - Rules must not contravene the constitution or laws - It cannot
in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws validly impose qualifications
on candidates in addition to what the Constitution prescribes.

BANAT V COMELEC - There is no encroachment upon the prerogatives and

independence of SET, despite its authority to entertain pre-proclamation cases, It is
only after these winning candidates have been proclaimed that the set may exercise
jurisdiction over their election.

Sec. 2 rules of Court the following are given continuing authority as deputies to
conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints:
● Provincial and city prosecutors
● Their assistants

The complaints may be filed directly with the department of Justice

Or may be endorsed to them by the commission or its duly authorized
representatives.

Arroyo V Department of Justice

● Complaints may be filed with COMELEC
● Department of Justice
● May even initiate motu proprio
● May be exercised jointly by the Commission and DOJ

Lanot V Comelec - Distinguishment of Electoral and Criminal aspects of

disqualification case

The Electoral aspect -

● Whether the offender should be disqualified from being a candidate or from
holding office
● Proceedings are summary in character
● Require only clear preponderance of evidence
● An erring candidate may be disqualified even w/o prior determination of
probable cause in a preliminary investigation.
● May proceed independently of the criminal aspect
 The Criminal Aspect -
● Whether there is probable cause
● The prosecutor is the COMELEC through its law department.
● When there is probable cause, files the criminal information before the proper
court
● Proceedings demand a full blown hearing and require proof beyond
reasonable doubt to convict.
● A criminal conviction shall result in the disqualification of the offender, which
may include disqualification from holding office in the future public office.

II. Decision of election Contest

Exclusive original Jurisdiction is now vested in the commission

Relating to:
● Returns and
● Qualifications

Of all regional, provincial and and city officials, but limited to questions of law involving grave
abuse of discretion.

Exercises Appellate Jurisdiction over contests involving municipal or barangay officials, its
decisions in these cases shall be final, executory and non-appealable, not in conflict with the
Supreme Court, but may be challenged in a petition for certiorari.

Javier V COMELEC (validity of contested title)

Election refers to:

● Conduct of the polls
● Listing of voters
● Holding of the electoral campaign
● Casting and counting of the votes
Returns:
● Canvass of the returns
● Proclamation of winners
● Composition of board of canvassers
● Authenticity of the election

Section 251 OEC -

RTC - Have original jurisdiction over election protests involving barangay officials, including
sangguniang kabataan chairman.

Flores V COMELEC -
Sec 9 RA No. 6679 is unconstitutional COMELEC shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over
Municipal officials not Municipal/metropolitan trial courts.
Maliksi V COMELEC - COMELEC
● may not conduct recount proceedings in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction,
may do so ONLY with its exclusive jurisdiction over all election protests involving
elective regional, provincial and city officials,
● may take cognizance of petitions for certiorari against all acts or omissions of courts
in election cases including interlocutory orders of RTC.

Commission meets in 2 divisions consisting of three members each

● Decisions may be elevated in a motion for reconsideration
● May be reviewed by the Commission sitting en banc

GARVIDA V SALES JR.

The court held that it is the Commission sitting in division and not en banc, which has
jurisdiction over petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy.
Only final orders of the Commission in division may be raised before the Commission en
banc.

Sobejana-Condon V COMELEC -No law which sets Commission en banc on its resolution of
motions for reconsideration pending before it.

III. Decision of Administrative Questions

All questions affecting elections

● Including determination of the number and location of polling places
● Appointment of election officials and inspectors
● Registration of voters

Guevara V COMELEC - Purchase of ballot boxes, Inherently judicial prerogative, purely

administrative duties.

Note: Constitution prevents the exercise of its administrative powers and functions, to decide
questions involving the right to vote.
But, it may do so in the discharge of its duties concerning registrationof voters, except that
its decision shall be subject to judicial review.

IV. Deputation of Law Enforcement Agencies

This power may not be exercised without the consent of the President.
The Commission may merely “Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or
employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience, its decision, order, or directive .” the commission cannot
exercise direct disciplinary authority over them.

V. Registration of the Political Parties

Prohibitions in registration of political parties:

● Not religious
● Those which seek to achieve their goals through violation or unlawful means.
 ● Represents foreign government

Magdalo V COMELEC

VI. Improvement of Elections

● The Omnibus Election Code has expanded the list of prohibited election practices
● Changed the limitations on the expenses to be incurred by political parties or
candidates
● Allows the COMELEC to refuse to give due course to certificates of nuisance
candidates
● Assures equal treatment for all candidates, privileged or not
Consistently with the constitution

VII. Election period

Section 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period
shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.

1. Shall commence ninety days before the day of the election and shall end thirty days
thereafter.
2. Campaign period - shall end two days before the election, election offences may
happen during the campaign period.

VIII. Party System

● Under the 1971 Election code, only two major parties had representation in the
Registration board, in the Board of Election Inspectors, in the Committee on Printing
of official ballots sent to the provinces by the Bureau of Printing. These advantages
disappeared with the adoption in 1973 of Section9(2): “No party or candidate shall
have membership in the registration board, board of election inspectors, board of
canvassers, or other similar bodies.”
● The 1981 Amendments, however, restored the preferred position of the top two
political parties, if accredited, at least in registration boards, boards of election
inspectors, boards of canvassers, other similar bodies. Moreover, such accredited
parties “may by law be granted other rights or privileges.” Under the new
Constitution, the concept of accreditation and consequent advantages of accredited
parties disappeared. Moreover SEC. 8 now says:

Section 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list

system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election
inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to
appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

Thus, there is again a levelling of all political parties. In fact, the purpose of Section 8 and
Section 7 is to allow the growth of a multi-party system.
IX. Funds Sec. 11

● An added measure to ensure the independence of the Commission on Elections and

to guarantee the proper conduct of elections and other exercises calling for the
suffrages of the people, the Constitution provides that:

Section 11. Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to defray the expenses for
holding regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall be
provided in the regular or special appropriations and, once approved, shall be released
automatically upon certification by the Chairman of the Commission.

X.Judicial Review

● A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing of errors of judgment
While Certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, a decision without rational
deliberation.

CASES

1. Marquez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 244274, September 03, 2019 (EB)

FACTS:In October 2018, petitioner Norman Cordero Marquez filed his Certificate of
Candidacy forSenator in the May 13, 2019 national and local elections. He is a resident of
Mountain Province,a real estate broker, and an independent candidate.However, the
COMELEC Law Department filed a petition to declare Marquez a nuisancecandidate and
argued that: (1) Marquez was "virtually unknown to the entire country exceptmaybe in the
locality where he resides;" and (2) though a real estate broker, there is no clearproof of
financial capability, " to sustain the financial rigors of a nationwide campaign."Marquez
countered that, among others, he is the co-founder and sole administrator of an
animaladvocacy group based in Baguio, and is known in various social media and websites;
and thathas been interviewed in television and radio shows;He argued that the COMELEC
should not discount "the potential of those animal lovers, raisersand handlers, and the
existing local and foreign benefactors and donors who are willing andcapable to subsidize
the expenses of a social-media-enhanced national campaign."The COMELEC First Division
cancelled Marquez' CoC, citing this Court's ruling in Martinez vsHRET, that "in elections for
national positions, the sheer logistical challenge posed by nuisancecandidates gives
compelling reason for the Commission to exercise its authority to eliminatenuisance
candidates who obviously have no financial capacity or serious intention to mount
anationwide campaign."The amounts set forth in Section 13 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7166
15 "would at least require[Marquez] to prove that he can mount a viable nationwide
campaign" and "x x x running as an independent further decreases a candidate's chances
with even more limited resources at hisdisposal."Marquez, then filed a MR which the
COMELEC En Banc denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may use lack of proof of financial capacity to sustain
the financialrigors of waging a nationwide campaign, by itself, as a ground to declare an
aspirant for senatora nuisance candidate.

RULING: No. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it declared Marquez a
nuisancecandidate on the ground of lack of proof of his financial capacity to wage a
nationwidecampaign. By so doing, the COMELEC has effectively imposed a "property
qualificationsare inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system
ordained in ourConstitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same x x x" as
clearlyproscribed in the case of Maquera.

2. Aguam v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28955, May 28, 1968 (EB)

FACTS:
In this, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction, petitioner
Uso Dan Aguam seeks to annul the resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections
(Comelec) of April 17,1968 declaring that it has jurisdiction to open the ballot box in Precinct
8 of the municipality of Ganassi, Lanao del Sur, and to conduct an investigation into the
authentic electoral return therefrom, upon petition of respondent Alim Balindong. Petitioner
levels a major attack on the jurisdiction of Comelec to inquire into the matters set forth in
private respondent's petition therein, hereinafter to be recited. Petitioner reasons out that
that petition was filed out of time, and that after proclamation Comelec is bereft of power to
order the opening of the ballot box to determine the genuineness of an election return.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Commission on Elections (Comelec) has jurisdiction to open the ballot box in
Precinct 8 of the municipality of Ganassi, Lanao del Sur, and to conduct an investigation into
the authentic electoral return therefrom.

RULING:
Yes, The Supreme Court held that Balindong's petition before Comelec was timely filed; and
that Comelec has jurisdiction to inquire into the nullity of the November 20, 1967
proclamation, and consequently to inquire into the tampering of the election return in
Precinct 8.

3. Abcede v. Imperial, G.R. No. L-13001, March 18, 1958 (EB)

FACTS:
Prior to September 7, 1957, petitioner Alfredo Abcede filed, with the Commission on
Elections, his certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President of the Philippines, in
connection with the elections to be held on November 12 of the same year. On or about said
date, Abcede and other candidates were summoned by the Commission on Elections to
appear before the same on September 23, 1957, "to show cause why their certificates of
candidacy should be considered as filed in good faith and to be given due course," that their
failure to appear would be sufficient ground to deny said certificates. After due hearing, the
certificates were considered not given due course. A reconsideration of such resolution
having been denied, Abcede filed petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC can deny due course to a certificate of candidacy of an
aspiring candidate.

RULING: No. While the Constitution has given the Commission on Elections the "exclusive
charge" of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections," the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely "administrative
questions." It cannot determine who among those possessing the qualifications prescribed
by the Constitution, who have complied with the procedural requirements relative to the filing
of certificates of candidacy - should be allowed to enjoy the full benefits intended by law
therefor. This is a matter of policy, not of administration and enforcement of the law, which
policy must be determined by Congress in the exercise of its legislative functions.

4. Sanchez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-55513, June 19, 1982 (EB)

FACTS:

The Resolution of the Commission on Elections, dated May 15, 1980, in Pre-Proclamation
Case No. 41 entitled Virgilio Sanchez vs. Mayor Armando P. Biliwang and the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of San Fernando, Pampanga.

In the local elections held on January 30, 1980, Virgilio Sanchez was the official candidate of
the Nacionalista Party (NP) for Municipal Mayor of San Fernando, Pampanga, while
Armando Biliwang was the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan,s (KBL) official candidate for the same
position.

On February 1, 1980, Sanchez filed with the Commission on Elections a Petition to declare
null and void the local elections in San Fernando, Pampanga due to alleged large scale
terrorism. On the same day, the COMELEC denied the Petition for lack of merit. Sanchez
moved for reconsideration. On February 8, 1980, the COMELEC recalled its Resolution and
required Biliwang and the Municipal Board of Canvassers to answer. Hearings were
conducted thereafter.

On November 19, 1980, Sanchez filed a petition for Certiorari with this court, docketed as
G.R. No. 55513, wherein he seeks a modification of the portion of the COMELEC Resolution
of May 15, 1980 refusing to call a special election.

On December 6, 1980, Biliwang instituted, also with this Court, a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 55642, assailing the same COMELEC
Resolution and alleging that same body has no power to annul an entire municipal election.
These two Petitions were ordered consolidated and were heard by the court en banc on July
28, 1981.

ISSUES:

Does the COMELEC have the power to annul an entire municipal election on the ground of
post-election terrorism?

Does the COMELEC have the authority to call for a special election?

HELD:

Biliwang Asserts that COMELEC lacks the power to annul elections of municipal officials
particularly so because, under Section 190 of the 1978 Election Code, the power to try
election contests relative to elective municipal officials is vested in Courts of First Instance.

Be that as it may, it should be recalled that what COMELEC actually rejected were the sham
and illegal returns in San Fernando, and that kind of fraud and terrorism perpetrated thereat
was sufficient cause for voiding the election as a whole. Besides, COMELEC is empowered
motu proprio to suspend and annul any proclamation as, in fact, it did annul Biliwang’s
proclamation.

It may be true that there is no specific provision vesting the COMELEC with authority to
annul an election. However, there is no doubt either relative to COMELEC’s extensive
powers. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is tasked with the function to “enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.” The 1978 Election Code accords it
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections.

In other words, in line with the plenitude of its powers and its function to protect the integrity
of elections, the COMELEC must be deemed possessed of authority to annul elections
where the will of the voters has been defeated and the purity of elections sullied. It would be
unreasonable to state that the COMELEC has a legal duty to perform and at the same time
deny it the wherewithal to fulfill that task.

On this issue, the COMELEC opined that it had no power to order the holding of new or
special election.

Thus, the COMELEC deemed it imperative “to certify to the President/Prime Minister and the
Batasang Pambansa the failure of election in San Fernando, Pampanga, so that remedial
legislation may be enacted.

Again, the foregoing Opinions were rendered under the regime of the 1935 Constitution and
the former Revised Election Code, whereby there was no constitutional nor statutory precept
that empowered the COMELEC to direct a new election after one had already been held.
Under Section 8 of that former statute, authority was given to the President to postpone the
election upon the recommendation of the COMELEC. And Section 21 (c) of the same law
authorized the President to issue a proclamation calling a special election whenever the
election for a local office failed to take place on the date fixed by law. In other words, the
prerogative to postpone an election or call a special election, was formerly lodged with the
President.

As the laws now stand, however, COMELEC has been explicitly vested with the authority to
“call for the holding or continuation of the election.”

Clearly, under Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, when the election “results in a failure to
elect, the COMELEC may call for the “holding or continuation of the election as soon as
practicable.” We construe this to include the calling of a special election in the event of a
failure to elect in order to make the COMELEC truly effective in the discharge of its
functions. In fact, Section 8 of the 1978 Election Code, supra, specifically allows the
COMELEC to call a special election for the purpose of fillinf the vacancy or a newly created
position, as the case may be. There should be no reason, therefore, for not allowing it to call
a special election when there is a failure to elect.

5. Javier v. Comelec, G.R. Nos. L-68379-81, September 22, 1986 (EB)

Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in
the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter
had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May
13, 1984, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the
petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s men. Seven suspects,
including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Petitioner went to
the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints
were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division
of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation
was void because it was only made by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en
banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, the private respondent took his oath as a
member of the Batasang Pambansa. The case was still being considered by this Court when
the petitioner was gunned down.

Issue:
Whether or not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections is authorized to
promulgate its decision proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election.

Held:
NO. The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973
Constitution. As the Court sees it, the effect of this interpretation would be to divide the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections into two.: (1) over matters arising before the
proclamation, which should be heard and decided by division in the exercise of its
administrative power; and (2) over matters arising after the proclamation, which could be
heard and decided only by the en banc in the exercise of its judicial power. Stated otherwise,
the Commission as a whole could not act as sole judge as long as one of its divisions was
hearing a pre-proclamation matter affecting the candidates for the Batasang Pambansa
because there was as yet no contest; or to put it still another way, the Commission en banc
could not do what one of its divisions was competent to do. Moreover, a mere division of the
Commission on Elections could hear and decide, save only those involving the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa, all cases involving
elective provincial and city officials from start to finish, including pre-proclamation
controversies and up to the election protest. In doing so, it would exercise first administrative
and then judicial powers. But in the case of the Commission en banc, its jurisdiction would
begin only after the proclamation was made and a contest was filed and not at any time and
on any matter before that, and always in the exercise only of judicial power. All these came
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections insofar as they applied to the
members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa and, under Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973
Constitution, could be heard and decided only by the en banc.

6. Flores v. Comelec, G.R. No. 89604, April 20, 1990 (EB)

Facts:

Petitioner Roque Flores was proclaimed by the board of canvassers as having received the
highest number of votes for kagawad... his election was protested by... private respondent
who placed second in the election... sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong...
barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latter's total.

Judge Francisco O. Villarta, Jr. agreed that the four votes cast for "Flores" only, without any
distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been considered... invalid instead of being
divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad.
The judge held that the original total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, to
462, demoting him to second place

The petitioner then went to the Commission on Elections, but his appeal was dismissed on
the ground that the public respondent had no power to review the decision of the regional
trial court.

the Commission on Elections is faulted for not taking cognizance of the petitioner's appeal
and for not ruling that all the four questioned votes should have been credited to him under
the equity-of-the-incumbent rule in Section 211(2) of... the Omnibus Election Code.

The Commission on Elections was obviously of the opinion that it could not entertain the
petitioner's appeal because of the provision in Rep. Act No. 6679 that the decision of the
regional trial court in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay...
elections "on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable."... punong barangay is an
essentially executive officer
Issues: Whether he was entitled to the benefits of the equity-of-the-incumbent rule and so
subject to our review

Ruling:

Respondent because it apparently believed itself to be without... appellate jurisdiction over

the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Abra.

Rejecting the petitioner's claim, the court held that Roque Flores was not entitled to any of
the four contested votes because he was not incumbent as punong barangay (or barangay
captain, as the office was formerly called) on the date of... the election.

the petitioner was elected barangay captain directly by the voters, separately from the
candidates running for mere membership in the sangguniang barangay.

In this sense, it may be said that he is a candidate for both... offices. Strictly speaking,
however, the only office for which he may run - and for which a certificate of candidacy may
be admitted - is that of kagawad.

In fact, his certificate of candidacy was for kagawad and not for punong barangay.

The petitioner was no longer the incumbent punong... barangay on election day and so was
not entitled to the benefits of the equity-of-the-incumbent rule.

Principles:

Sec. 5. There shall be a sangguniang barangay in every duly constituted barangay which
shall be the legislative body and shall be composed of seven (7) kagawads to be elected by
the registered voters of the barangay. The candidate who... obtains the highest number of
votes shall be the punong barangay x x x.

"on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable.

Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the Commission on Elections
shall:

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided... by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.

Commission on Elections under its "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all contests x x x
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction."

Article IX-A, Section 7, of the Constitution, stating that "unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the... aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof."

The petitioner insists on the application to him of Section 211(2) of the Code, stating
pertinently that:

2. x x x If there are two or more candidates with the same full name, first name or
surname and one of them is the incumbent, and on the ballot is written only such full name,
first name or surname, the vote shall be counted in favor of the... incumbent.

because he should not have been considered resigned but continued to be entitled to the
office of punong barangay under Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 6679, providing as follows:

Sec. 8. Incumbent elective officials running for the same office shall not be considered
resigned upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. They shall continue to hold office
until their successors shall have been elected and qualified.

Section 8 that all incumbent elected officials should not be considered resigned upon the
filing of their certificates of candidacy as long as they were running for the same... position.

Under Rep. Act No. 6679, the person who wins the highest... number of votes as a kagawad
becomes by operation of law the punong barangay, or the executive of the political unit.

but this argument goes to the wisdom of the law, not its validity, and is... better addressed to
the legislature.

7. Guevara v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-12596, July 31, 1958 (EB)

FACTS:
Guevara was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt for having published in the newspaper an article which tended to interfere with and
influence the COMELEC awarding the contracts for the manufacture and supply of ballot
boxes; and which article likewise tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and undermine the
exclusive constitutional function of this Commission and its Chairman.

Petitioner, filed a motion to quash on the following ground that the Commission has no
jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article, as
neither in the Constitution nor in statutes is the Commission granted a power to so punish
the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt
proceedings against Guevara in connection with the publication of an article.

HELD:
Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between
several dealers that however merely refers to a ministerial duty, which the Commission has
performed in its administrative capacity. It only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not
exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish
for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. As this
Court has aptly said: “The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence
is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of
justice”. We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the Commission on Elections has no
power nor authority to submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline
him because of the publication of the article mentioned in the charge under consideration.

8. Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009 (EB)

DOCTRINE: Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses
only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and
express mandate of the law that “any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the
filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for
which he filed his certificate of candidacy.” Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the
express and clear language of the law that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.”

FACTS: Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta.
Monica, Surigao del Norte during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed
before the Office of the Regional Election Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region XIII), a
Petition for Disqualification against Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and
Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging in election
campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign
period. Andanar claimed that on 29 March 2007 – a day before the start of the authorized
campaign period on 30 March 2007 – Penera and her partymates went around the different
barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to vote
for them on the day of the elections.

Carpio, J.
DOCTRINE: Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses
only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and
express mandate of the law that “any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the
filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for
which he filed his certificate of candidacy.” Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the
express and clear language of the law that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.”

Preliminaries:
1. The ultimate winner in this case is Mayor Rosalinda Penera after the Supreme Court
promulgated its November 25, 2009 Decision overturning its earlier decision (September 11,
2009 Decision) after a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by aggrieved Mayor Penera.

2. This case was first decided by the COMELEC where both in the Division and the En Banc,
the COMELEC ruled against Mayor Penera and with Commissioner Rene Sarmiento being
the lone dissenter in both decisions. Effectively, through the final decision on the matter,
Comm. Sarmiento’s dissent was upheld by the Supreme Court.

FACTS: Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta.
Monica, Surigao del Norte during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed
before the Office of the Regional Election Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region XIII), a
Petition for Disqualification against Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and
Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging in election
campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign
period. Andanar claimed that on 29 March 2007 – a day before the start of the authorized
campaign period on 30 March 2007 – Penera and her partymates went around the different
barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to vote
for them on the day of the elections.

Penera alone filed an Answer denying the charges but admitted that a motorcade did take
place and that it was simply in accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities and
provinces, where the filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a
motorcade, which dispersed soon after the completion of such filing. The COMELEC
disqualified Penera but absolved the other candidates from Penera’s party from violation of
section 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

September 11, 2009 Decision:

ISSUE: Whether or not the new definition of the term “candidate” in Section 15 of RA 8436
as amended by RA 9369 is in conflict with Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code such
that premature campaigning may no longer be committed

HELD: In denying Penera’s petition, the Supreme Court, through Associate Justice Minita V.
Chico-Nazario, found that Penera and her witnesses admitted that the vehicles, consisting of
two jeepneys and ten motorcycles, were festooned with multi-colored balloons; the
motorcade went around three barangays in Sta. Monica; and Penera and her partymates
waved their hands and threw sweet candies to the crowd. Thus, for violating Section 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code, proscribing election campaign or partisan political activity
outside the campaign period, Penera was disqualified from holding the office of Mayor of
Sta. Monica.

The Court declared that “there is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning. It is possible to harmonize
and reconcile these two provisions and, thus, give effect to both.”
 9. Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978 (EB)

Facts:
The 1978 Election Code (Presidential Decree No. 1269) grants voters the option for straight
party or block voting where the vote for a party, group or aggrupation would be counted as a
vote for all its candidates

Issues: Whether or not block voting violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution

Held: No, The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classifications. What is
prescribes is a classification which iss arbitrary and unreasonable. It is not violated by a
reasonableclassification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies equally to all those
belonging to the same class.

10. Aratuc v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-49705-09, February 8, 1979 (EB)

FACTS:
Petition in G. R. Nos. L-49705-09 for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary
injunction filed by six (6) independent candidates for representatives to tile Interim Batasang
Pambansa who had joined together under the banner of the Kunsensiya ng Bayan which,
however, was not registered as a political party or group under the 1976 Election Code, P.D.
No. 1296, namely Tomatic Aratuc, Sorgio Tocao, Ciscolario Diaz, Fred Tamula,
Mangontawar Guro and Bonifacio Legaspi her referred to as petitioners, to review the
decision of the respondent Commission on Election (Comelec) resolving their appeal from
the Of the respondent Regional Board of Canvasses for Region XII regarding the canvass of
the results of the election in said region for representatives to the I.B.P. held on April 7,
1978. Similar petition in G.R. Nos. L49717-21, for certiorari with restraining order and
preliminary injunction filed by Linang Mandangan, abo a candidate for representative in the
same election in that region, to review the decision of the Comelec declaring respondent
Ernesto Roldan as entitled to be proclaimed as one of the eight winners in said election.

A supervening panel headed by Commissioner of Elections, Hon- Venancio S. Duque, had

conducted of the complaints of the petitioners therein of alleged irregularities in the election
records in all the voting centers in the whole province of Lanao del Sur, the whole City of
Marawi, eight (8) towns of Lanao del Norte, namely, Baloi, Karomatan, Matungao, Munai,
Nunungan, Pantao Ragat, Tagoloan and Tangcal, seven (7) towns in Maguindanao, namely,
Barrira, Datu Piang, Dinaig, Matanog Parang, South Upi and Upi, ten (10) towns in North
Cotabato, namely, Carmen, Kabacan, Kidapwan, Magpet, Matalam Midsayap, Pigcawayan,
Pikit, Pres. Roxas and Tulonan, and eleven (11) towns in Sultan Kudarat, namely,
Bagumbayan, Columbia Don Mariano Marcos, Esperanza, Isulan, Kalamansig, Lebak,
Lutayan, Palimbang, President Quirino and Tacurong, by reason for which, petitioners had
asked that the returns from said voting centers be excluded from the canvass. Before the
start of the hearings, the canvass was suspended but after the supervisory panel presented
its report, on May 15, 1978, the Comelec lifted its order of suspension and directed the
resumption of the canvass to be done in Manila.
Thus respondent Board proceeded with the canvass, with the herein petitioners presenting
objections, most of them supported by the report of handwriting and finger print experts who
had examined the voting records and lists of voters in 878 voting centers, out of 2,700 which
they specified in their complaints or petitions in Election Cases 78-8, 78-9, 78-10, 78-11 and
7812 in the Comelec. In regard to 501 voting centers, the records cf. which, consisting of the
voters lists and voting records were not available- and could not be brought to Manila,
petitions asked that the results therein be completely excluded from the canvass.

ISSUE:
WoN there is grave abuse of dicretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of
COMELEC.

HELD:
under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, "the Commission (on Elections)
shall have direct control and supervision on over the board of canvassers" and that relatedly,
Section 175 of the same Code provides that it "shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies." While nominally, the procedure of bringing to the Commission objections to
the actuations of boards of canvassers has been quite loosely referred to in certain quarters,
even by the Commission and by this Court, such as in the guidelines of May 23,1978 quoted
earlier in this opinion, as an appeal, the fact of the matter is that the authority of the
Commission in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction
conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the
Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to
it by the above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well
settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having
supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or
ought to have done.

11. Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferre, G.R. No. L-31455,
February 28, 1985

Facts:In preparation for the national elections of November 11, 1969, then respondent
Commissionersof the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued an Invitation to Bid on
September 16, 1969calling for the submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and
delivery of 1 1,000 unitsof voting booths. Among the seventeen bidders who submitted
proposals in response to the said Invitation werethe herein petitioner, Filipinos Engineering
and Machine Shop, (Filipinas for short) and theprivate respondent, Acme Steel
Manufacturing Company, (Acme for short). Acme's bid had to be rejected because the
sample it submitted was "made of black iron sheets,painted, and therefore not rust proof or
rust resistant," and that, "it is also heavy51 kilos inweight. The Committee instead
recommended that Filipinas be awarded the contract tomanufacture and supply the voting
booths, but that an "ocular inspection be made by all members of the Commission of all the
samples before the final award be made.” After the conduct of an ocular inspection, the
contract was awarded to Acme because it wasnoted that they submitted the lowest bid.
Since no restraining order had been issued againstthe holding of the national elections
scheduled on November 11, 1969, Acme complied with itscontract with the COMELEC.
Issue:Whether the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order
of theCOMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation to bid

Ruling: Yes.It has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of First
Instance, whichhas exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders or
rulings of theCOMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and enforcement of election
laws.We are however, far from convince that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract
to aprivate party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to
itsinvitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and
directlyappealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final orders,
rulingsand decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as
provided bylaw are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and
taken cognizance ofby the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers.

12. People v. Delgado, G.R. No. L-1446, March 4, 1949 (EB)

FACTS:

COMELEC received reports agains private respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. After conducting a preliminary investigation on said report, The Provincial
Election Supervisor found a prima facie case and recommended filing of an information
against each respondents for violation of Sec. 261 (y) (2) and (5) of the Omnibus Election
Code. The COMELEC en banc, in a minute resolution, resolved to file information against
the private respondents.

Informations were filed against the respondents in the RTC. The Regional Election Director
was designated by COMELEC to handle the prosecution with the authority to assign another
COMELEC prosecutor.

Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of
arrest with the respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was
conducted. RTC ordered the reinvestigation of the case and the suspension of the service of
the warrants pending submission of the reinvestigation report of the COMELEC.

COMELEC prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that only the Supreme
Court can review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC but was
denied.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not only the Supreme Court can review orders of the COMELEC.
RULING:

The Court held that "what is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions' of
the COMELEC reviewable on certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those
rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by said
body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." Thus, the decisions of the
COMELEC on election contests or administrative questions brought before it are subject to
judicial review only by this Court.

However, under Section 2(6), of Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC may
"investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including
acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices." Under Section
265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, through its duly authorized legal officers,
"have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same."

Section 268 of the same Code provides that: "The regional trial courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this
Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall
be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the
courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."

From the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear
that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election
contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with
the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of
election offenses punishable under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the
COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of
an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information
in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all
the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The
COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or
unless so ordered by the court.