[G.R. No. L-4855. October 11, 1951.

JOSE M. NAVA, ET AL., Petitioners, v. HON. MAGNO GATMAITAN, ETC., Respondent.

[G.R. No. L-4964. October 11, 1951. ]

AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, v. HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, ETC., Respondent.

[G.R. No. L-5102. October 11, 1951. ]

EUGENIO ANGELES, ETC., Petitioner, v. HON. GAVINO S. ABAYA, ETC., Respondent.

Laurel, Sabido, Almario & Laurel Antonio Barredo and Enrique Fernando, for petitioner Amado V.
Hernandez.

Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz, Solicitor Felix Makasiar and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo, for
respondent Judges Montesa and Gatmaitan.

City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles, in his own behalf.

Vicente A. Rafael and Macario L. Nicolas, for the respondents in case L-5102 except the respondent
judge.

Judge Gavino S. Abaya in his own behalf.

Abeto & Soriano and Fermin Z. Caram, Jr., for the petitioners in case L-4855.

Claro M. Recto, Jose P. Laurel, and Fred Ruiz Castro as amici curiae.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL. — This court resolved by majority vote to direct the respondent judge (in L-
5102) to hear the evidence of the prosecution to determine whether it is strong, and act accordingly.

Per BENGZON, J., L-4964: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL. — Because of the presidential proclamation, persons detained by the Executive
for rebellion or insurrection may not ask for bail. However, after an information is filed against them, they may
petition for and be granted bail in the proper criminal case: (a) If invoking the proclamation the judge refuses to
grant bail the accused are entitled to mandamus to require the judge to grant bail, if the information does not
describe a capital offense; (b) If the information describes a capital offense the judge should be required to hear
the People’s evidence to determine whether it is strong or not, and thereafter to deny bail or grant it accordingly;
(c) If in weighing the evidence the judge abuses his discretion, certiorari is available.

EXCERPTS FROM THE MINUTES OF OCTOBER 11, 1951 - "In Amado V. Hernandez v. Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, G.
R. No. L- 4964, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices Bengzon, Tuason, Reyes and Jugo held that the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not affect petitioner’s right to bail but Associate Justices Feria, Pablo,
Padilla and Bautista maintained that the suspension carried with it the suspension of the right to bail. Inasmuch as
the necessary majority (of six) could not be had, a rehearing was ordered. Thereafter upon a new deliberation
none found reasons to alter his views. Consequently, in accordance with Rule 56 section 2 in connection with Rule
58 section one, the petition is dismissed.

"The Chief Justice and Associate Justices Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason and Bautista attached to the record
opinions explaining their votes. Mr. Justice Feria dissented in a separate opinion."cralaw virtua1aw library

"In Angeles v. Abaya, G. R. No. L-5102, the Court, after considering the allegations of the parties and the opinions
expressed in Hernandez v. Montesa, G. R. No. L-4964, and Nava Et. Al. v. Gatmaitan, G. R. No. L-4855, resolved
by majority vote to direct the respondent judge to hear the evidence of the prosecution to determine whether it is
strong, and act accordingly.

"Associate Justices Feria, Pablo and Padilla reiterated their view that bail cannot be allowed.

"Associate Justice Tuason opines, as explained in his separate opinion, that Judge Abaya’s order should be
sustained, but in order to break the deadlock, he votes with the majority that the respondent Judge be directed to
allow the City Fiscal to introduce evidence.

"Associate Justice Bautista explained his vote in a separate opinion."

DECISION

Page 1
 PARAS, C.J.  :

By express mandate of the Constitution (Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 14) [In 1987 Constitution this Art. 3,
Sec. 15], the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended
wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist. The power to suspend the privileges of
the writ of habeas corpus in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the
public safety requires it, has been lodged by the Constitution (Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph 2) in the
President.

On January 31, 1905, for the first time in Philippine history, the writ of habeas corpus was suspended
in the provinces of Batangas and Cavite under the following Executive Order issued by Governor General Luke E.
Wright:jg

"WHEREAS, certain organized bands of ladrones exist in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas who are levying
forced contributions upon the people, who frequently require them, under compulsion, to join their bands, and
who kill or maim (wound seriously; impair) in the most barbarous manner those who fail to respond to their
unlawful demands, and are therefore terrifying the law-abiding and inoffensive people of those provinces; and

"WHEREAS, these bands have in several instances attacked police and constabulary detachments, and are in open
insurrection against the constituted authorities, and it is believed that the said bands have numerous agents and
confederates living within the municipalities of the said provinces; and

"WHEREAS, because of the foregoing conditions there exists a state of insecurity and terrorism among the people
which makes it impossible in the ordinary way to conduct preliminary investigations before the justices of the
peace and other judicial officers:

"In the interest of public safety, it is hereby ordered that the writ of habeas corpus is from this date suspended in
the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas." cralaw virtua1aw library

On October 22, 1950, for the second time in Philippine history, the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus was decreed by virtue of the following Proclamation No. 210 issued by the President:

"WHEREAS, lawless elements of the country have committed overt acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion for
the purpose of overthrowing the duly constituted authorities and, in pursuance thereof, have created a state of
lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of the state;

"WHEREAS, these acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion consisting of armed raids, sorties and ambushes and
the wanton acts of murder, rape, spoilage, looting, arson, planned destruction of public and private buildings, and
attacks against civilian lives and properties, as reported by the Commanding General of the Armed Forces, have
seriously endangered and still continue to endanger the public safety;

"WHEREAS, these acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion have been perpetrated by various groups of persons
well, organized for concerted action and well-armed with machine guns, rifles, pistols and other automatic
weapons, by reason whereof there is actual danger of rebellion which may extend throughout the country;

"WHEREAS 100 leading members of these lawless elements have been apprehended and are presently under
detention, and strong and convincing evidence has been found in their possession to show that they are engaged
in rebellious, seditious and otherwise subversive acts as above set forth; and

"WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken to insure the peace and security of
the population and to maintain the authority of the government;

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, ELPIDIO QUIRINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Article VII, section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus for the persons presently detained, as well as all others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the
crimes of sedition, insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or
on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith."cralaw virtua1aw library

The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. (Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39
Phil., 778, 788.) It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by
a court of justice, and to have ascertained if he is held under lawful authority. (Quintos v. Director of Prisons, 55
Phil., 304, 306.)

The necessity for suspending the writ of  habeas corpus in 1905 arose obviously from the fact that it was
"impossible in the ordinary way to conduct preliminary investigations before the justice of the peace and other

Page 2
judicial officers," so that undoubtedly it was never aimed at the indefinite detention of suspects, but at an
investigation (other than judicial) to determine whether there is evidence sufficient for the filing in court of the
necessary information.

The immediate cause for the issuance of Proclamation No. 210 on October 22, 1950, was the apprehension and
detention of 100 alleged leading members of lawless elements in whose possession strong and convincing
evidence was allegedly found showing that they are engaged in rebellious, seditious and otherwise subversive
acts. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had to be suspended not only because it was desirable for the
prosecuting officials to have sufficient time to investigate and file the necessary charges in court, but also because
a public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person
to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours, shall suffer the penalties provided in article 125
of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, the only effect of Proclamation No. 210 is that any person detained
thereunder has no right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice through
a writ of habeas corpus.

The important question is whether or not, after a person covered by the Proclamation has been formally
indicted in court by the filing against him of an information charging rebellion with multiple murder, arson and
robberies, he may be entitled to bail.

Under paragraph 16, Section 1, Article III of the Constitution [Now, Sec. 13, Art. III, 1987 Constitution], all
persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong. The crime of rebellion or insurrection is certainly not a capital offense, because it is
penalized only by prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 20,000 pesos . The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights are separate and co-equal. If the intention of the
framers of the Constitution was that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries or implies
the suspension of the right to bail, they would have very easily provided that all persons shall before conviction be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong and
except when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. As stated in the case of Ex parte Miligan, 4
Wall. 2, 18 Law Ed. 297, the Constitution limited the suspension to only one great right, leaving the rest to remain
forever inviolable.

"It is essential to the safety of every government that, in a great crisis, like the one we have just passed through,
there should be a power somewhere of suspending the writ of habeas corpus, In every war, there are men of
previously good character, wicked enough to counsel their fellow citizens to resist the measures deemed necessary
by a good government to sustain its just authority and overthrow its enemies; and their influence may lead to
dangerous combinations. In the emergency of the times, an immediate public investigation according to law may
not be possible; and yet, the peril to the country may be too imminent to suffer such persons to go at large.
Unquestionably, there is then an exigency which demands that the government, if it should see fit, in the
exercise of a proper discretion, to make arrests, should not be required to produce the person arrested in
answer to a writ of habeas corpus. The Constitution goes no further. It does not say after a writ of habeas
corpus is denied a citizen, that he shall be tried otherwise than by the course of common law, If it had intended
this result, it was easy by the use of direct words to have accomplished it. The illustrious men who framed that
instrument were guarding the foundations of civil liberty against the abuses of unlimited power; they were full of
wisdom, and the lessons of history informed them that a trial by an established court, assisted by an impartial
jury, was the only sure way of protecting the citizen against oppression and wrong. Knowing this, they limited the
suspension of one great right, and left the rest to remain forever inviolable.”

The purpose of the Proclamation has already been accomplished in respect of those who are now facing charges in
court, to be dealt with necessarily in accordance with the Constitution and the law. The court, in passing upon
petitions to bail and granting the same in proper cases, does not inquire into the cause of their detention which is
plainly under and by virtue of commitments issued by the court upon the filing of the information for rebellion with
multiple murder, arson and robberies. The court, therefore, cannot be said to be interfering in an act of the
Executive, for it cannot be seriously contended that, after the filing of the information, the accused continues to be
under detention as a result of an executive commitment and still covered by the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. Otherwise, the suspension will operate as a judgment of conviction, in violation of the
constitutional mandate that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law
(Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 15). "The laws which protect the liberties of the whole people must not be
violated or set aside in order to inflict, even upon the guilty, unauthorized though merited justice." Ex parte
Milligan, supra.

The right to bail, along with the right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to
face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf (Article III, Section 1,
Paragraph 17, of the Constitution), tends to aid the accused to prove his innocence and obtain acquittal. If it be
contended that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus includes the suspension of the distinct
right to bail or to be provisionally at liberty, it would a fortiori imply the suspension of all his other rights (even the
rights to be tried by a court) that may win for him ultimate acquittal and, hence, absolute freedom. The latter
result is not insisted upon for being patently untenable. It is not correct to say that, if a person covered by
Proclamation No. 210 is not entitled to be released before he is indicted in court, there is more reason to hold that
he should not be released after an information is filed against him, because it is then logical to assume that the
Government holds sufficient evidence. If he cannot secure his release before the filing of an information, it is
Page 3
because, in view of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the court cannot look into the
legality of his detention under an executive act, and not because he is assumed to be guilty. And, as already
stated, after the filing of the information, in granting bail in proper cases, the court does not determine the legality
of his prior detention which has already been superseded by a detention under judicial process, but merely
proceeds with and carries into effect its jurisdiction over the criminal case and grants a right guaranteed by the
Constitution. Besides, it is significant that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be
innocent (Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 17).

We are not insensitive to the proposition that the very nature of the crime of rebellion suggests the likehood that a
person accused thereof will jump his bail. The remedy, however, is unfortunately not in the hands of the court.
The lawmakers or the framers of the Constitution should have made the offense capital or even unbailable.

In the cases now before us, the accused have been charged with rebellion so complexed with other offenses as to
make them capital. Their right to bail is accordingly not absolute and may be denied when evidence of guilt is
strong. The filing of the information implies that the prosecution holds sufficient evidence for conviction, and it is
fair to suppose that the court will duly exercise its judgment when called upon to pass on the question of whether
or not the evidence of guilt is strong. At any rate, on admission to bail, the accused is delivered to the custody of
his sureties as a continuance of the original detention. (U. S. v. Addison and Gomez, 27 Phil., 563; U. S. v. Sunico
and Ng Chiong, 40 Phil. 826).

And it should be borne in mind that if the worse comes to the worst — to the extent that the security of the State
is in fact imperiled and the regular constitutional processes can no longer be observed with general safety to the
people, — the President is authorized by the Constitution (Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph 2) to "place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law." Even then, the primordial objective should be a "regime of
justice" as contemplated in the Preamble of the Constitution. The stubborn fact, however, is that the mere
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is an admission that the courts can function and are
functioning normally; otherwise, there is no need for the suspension as there will be no court to grant the writ.

Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PABLO, M., concurro: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

En tiempos normales la Constitucion de Filipinas rige en su totalidad. Algunos de los derechos individuales, como
el derecho del acusado a la libertad provisional bajo fianza, se hace efectivo por los juzgados por orden perentoria.
Cuando a un acusado se le detiene y no se resuelve su peticion de libertad bajo fianza, puede acudir a un tribunal
de superior categoria por medio de un recurso de mandamus para obligarle a actuar en un sentido u otro, que es
su deber imperativo. Un condenado por un juzgado sin jurisdiccion acude en certiorari a un tribunal superior para
pedir la anulacion de la condena. Un individuo ilegalmente detenido por alguna autoridad u otra persona, puede
acudir a los tribunales por medio de un recurso de habeas corpus y pedir que se le ponga en libertad. Los mismos
abogados en ejercicio indistintamente utilizan un recurso u otro. Existe confusion en cuanto a que clase de recurso
debe ejercitarse en cada caso. No es extraño. El regla mento dice que "el mandamiento de Habeas Corpus se hara
extensivo a todos los casos de confinamiento o detencion ilegales, en los cuales se prive a una persona de su
libertad, o impida a una persona ejercer sus legitimos derechos en la custodia legal de otra." Art. 1, Regla 102).
Revisando los expedientes de este Tribunal, se vera que en algunos casos se empleo el recurso de habeas
corpus para solicitar la libertad provisional de un acusado mediante prestacion de fianza, como en Herras
Teehankee contra el Director de Prisiones, Juez Rovira y otros 1 (43 Off. Gaz., 513); otros utilizaron los remedios
de certiorari y mandamus, como en el asunto de Marcos y Lizardo contra el Juez de Primera Instancia de Ilocos
Norte (VII Lawyers’ Journal, 66); en Payao contra Juez Lesaca, el recurso de mandamus; en Herras Teehankee
contra Rovira y otros 2 (42 Off. Gaz., 717), los recursos de certiorari y mandamus; y en el asunto de Montalbo
contra Juez Santamaria (54 Jur. Fil., 1026), el recurso de mandamus. Este Tribunal, desatendiendo tecnicismos,
decidio los asuntos en el fondo; tuvo en cuenta no el titulo sino la esencia de la solicitud, Galao y otro contra Juez
Diaz y otro 3 (41 Off. Gaz., 873).

Estos recursos de certiorari y mandamus no son mas que remedios derivativos del recurso de habeas corpus; los
tres se dirigen a un mismo fin: el obtener la libertad del que esta indebida o ilegalmente detenido.

En Estados Unidos el recurso de habeas corpus se utiliza para la obtencion de libertad provisional bajo fianza: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is proper to use the writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of securing admittance to bail." Ex parte Perkov, 45
F. Supp. (D.C. Cal. 1942), 864.

"The writ of habeas corpus may be had for purpose of letting prisoner to bail in civil and criminal actions as
authorized in Constitution." Ex parte Womack, 71 Pac. 2d (Okl. Cr, App. 1937), 494.

"Remedy of person in custody on criminal charge to secure release on bail is by habeas corpus." Bennett v. State,
118 So. (Fla. 1928), 18.

"Prisoner denied bail or asked excessive bail has absolute right to invoke habeas corpus remedy, and court’s duty
Page 4
to grant writ and to admit to bail is mandatory." Ex parte Stegman, 163 A. (N. J. Ch. 1933), 422.

"Persons held under indictment for capital offense are entitled as of right to hearing by way of habeas corpus upon
issue of bail." Ex parte Readhimer, 60 S. W. (2d) (Tex Cr. App. 1933), 788.

"The use of the writ of habeas corpus to speedily determine whether a person charged with an offense is entitled
to bail before trial and conviction is authorized by law, so as to render effective the rights to bail and to liberty as
provided by the Constitution." Ex parte McDaniel, 97 So. (Fla. 1923), 317.

"The use of the writ of habeas corpus to speedily determine whether a person charged with an offense is entitled
to bail before trial and conviction is authorized by law." Ex parte Hatcher, 98 So. (Fla. 1923), 72.

"A writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate and proper remedy in aid of bail." Mozorosky v. Hurlburt, 198 Pac. (Or.
1921), 556.

"Where a lieutenant in a military posse, seeking a deserter, was wounded by a shot in the dark, and fired at the
place where he saw the flash, and killed the shooter, who was found near an illicit still, and, although the
lieutenant was confined thereafter by the federal authorities for over a year, the state authorities had taken no
steps to bring the charge made against the lieutenant and another member of the posse by indictment to a
hearing conclusion, habeas corpus would issue to release both defendants on bail." State of Florida v. Tooher, 283
F. (U.S.D.C. Fla. 1922) 845.

"A person charged with being an accessory before the fact to murder by counselling, hiring, or otherwise procuring
murder to be committed is charged with a capital offense under statutes of this state, and when held in actual
custody under a mittimus issued by a committing magistrate to await the action of the grand jury has a right
upon habeas corpus proceedings before a justice of the Supreme Court to show by all the evidence proper in the
case, including that for the prosecution, that the proof is not evident and the presumption is not great of the guilt
of the accused of a capital offense, and that consequently the accused is entitled to bail under the Constitution."
(Syllabus No. 1, Ex parte Nathan, 50 So., 38.)

"On the lower court refusing bail on appeal being taken, habeas corpus proceedings therefor in the Supreme Court
is the proper practice." (Syllabus No. 2, Packenham v. Reed, 79 Pac., 786.)

"Any one who is in custody on a criminal charge for want of bail is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus admission to
bail, and the petitioner need only allege that he is confined for want of bail." (In re Haigler, 137 Pac., 423.)

"Under Const. U. S. art, 1, section 9, and Const. Wash. art. 1, section 13, providing that the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it;
section 20, providing that all persons charged with crime shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for capital
offenses; and section 22, providing that in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appeal; and
Rem. & Bal. Code, section 1077, providing relative to habeas corpus that the writ may be had for the purpose of
admitting to bail in civil and criminal actions — habeas corpus will lie to procure the release on bail of a person
held under a body execution pending an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate the order for the
issuance of such execution, notwithstanding Rem. & Bal. Code, section 1075, providing relative to habeas
corpus that no court or judge shall inquire into the legality of any judgment or process whereby the party is in
custody or discharge him when the term of commitment has not expired, when he is held upon any process issued
on any final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction." (State v. Foster, 146 Pac., 169.)

"Application for a writ of habeas corpus by Kizzie Nathan alleging that she is unlawfully restrained of her liberty in
the actual custody of the sheriff of Leon county on a charge of accessory before the fact to murder, by being
denied the right to bail; Held: Petitioner was permitted to give bail with sufficient sureties as required by law." Ex
parte Nathan (Before a Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida), 50 So., 38.

"Appeal from an order in habeas corpus refusing the petitioner admission to bail who is held on a charge of murder
in the first degree; Held: Looking at all of the evidence offered and viewing it in the light of the presumption of
innocence, and remembering that to grant bail is the rule and the refusal of it is the exception, petitioner is
admitted to bail with sufficient sureties in such sum as may be reasonable and just in view of all the circumstances
of the case." In re Haighler (Supreme Court of Arizona), 137 Pac., 423.

"Petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that an appeal was taken by the relator from an order of the inferior
court denying his motion to vacate an order of arrest. It appears that one Amy D. Bronson secured a judgment
against the relator for damages for injury to person, and the judgment being unsatisfied, an execution was issued
against his person and was arrested and taken into custody by the sheriff until the judgment is satisfied. The
petition prays for an order fixing bail pending determination of the appeal; Held: The writ of habeas corpus is an
appropriate and proper remedy in aid of bail. Writ of habeas corpus granted and relator released on bail upon a
bond of P3,000." State v. Foster (Supreme Court of Washington), 146 Pac., 169.

"Petition for writ of habeas corpus to admit to bail. Petitioner had been committed to the reform school of the state
of Washington until he should attain the age of 18 years, or until he should otherwise be regularly discharged
therefrom. Thereafter he gave notice of appeal. Bail was denied pending the hearing on appeal; Held: An infant
has a right of appeal when committed to the reform school, and incidentally a right to be admitted to bail pending
Page 5
such appeal. Habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy to bail." Packenham v. Reed, 37 Wash., 258, 79 Pac., 786.

"The writ of habeas corpus lies where the imprisonment is illegal and no other remedy is available to secure a
release therefrom. As in the case of other extraordinary prerogative writs, the writ of habeas corpus will not
ordinarily be granted where there is another adequate remedy, by appeal or writ of error or otherwise. But,
although another remedy exists, it is not necessarily exclusive so as to oust a court of jurisdiction to grant relief
on habeas corpus, and, in the exercise of its discretion, the writ may be granted notwithstanding the existence of
another remedy. Generally where another remedy is provided, failure to take advantage of it until the expiration of
the time within which relief may be had will not authorize relief in habeas corpus, but in such cases the writ may
issue in the discretion of the court. Defenses which might have been made in an action cannot be reserved as
grounds of attack in habeas corpus upon the judgment after rendition." (29 C. J., 17-18.)

"The fact of the existence of another remedy does not necessarily preclude a resort to the writ of habeas corpus to
obtain relief from illegal detention. Thus, while there are decisions to the effect that, even when a judgment is
wholly void, a defendant will not, except in rare and extraordinary cases, be relieved from imprisonment
thereunder if appropriate relief can be granted by writ of error or appeal, it is the well established general rule that
one restrained of his liberty by virtue of a judgment, order or sentence, void by reason of the court’s want of
jurisdiction to make the same, may be released by a writ of habeas corpus whether such release could have been
secured by writ of error or not. The existence of a statutory remedy whereby a person restrained of his liberty
may be released is usually held to be cumulative and not exclusive. Thus it has been ruled that the writ of habeas
corpus may be issued to determine the legality of the confinement of a person in a state insane asylum, without
first compelling a resort to a statutory proceeding for that purpose - at least where there is some doubt as to the
effect of the statute. And it has been held that a parent may have the writ issued for the purpose of securing the
release of his child from a benevolent institution although a remedy is given the parent by the act under which the
child was committed the remedy so provided being merely cumulative. The discretion of federal courts to issue
writs of habeas corpus or to require the petitioner to resort to appeal or writ of error if appropriate relief can be
thereby obtained is treated elsewhere in this article." (12 . C. L., 1186-1187.)

Y el Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos en Ex parte Bollman y Ex parte Swartwout, (2 Law. Ed., 554) dijo: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The appropriate process of bringing up a prisoner, not committed by the court itself, to be bailed, is by the writ
now applied for. Of consequence, a court possessing the power to bail prisoners not committed by itself, may
award a writ of habeas corpus for the exercise of that power." cralaw virtua1aw library

Si hemos de atenernos a la definicion del habeas corpus y a los precedentes americanos citados, el recurso que
tiene un acusado para pedir la libertad bajo fianza es el de habeas corpus. Pero no debe confundirse el remedio
de habeas corpus con el que originariamente obtuvieron los que luchaban por los derechos individuales contra las
demasias del monarca. El habeas corpus de la legislacion vigente es mas amplio en su esfera de accion; no se
dirige solamente contra las detenciones del Ejecutivo; es un instrumento procesal contra los juzgados que
indebidamente ordenan la detencion de una persona, contra la Comision de Inmigracion que detiene
provisionalmente a los que estan condenados a deportacion, contra el amo que priva de su libertad al criado,
contra la dueña de la casa de hetairas que priva a una pupila de su libertad, contra el superintendente de un
hospital que detiene ilegalmente a un paciente, contra el Senado de Filipinas y de los Estados Unidos por la
detencion de un condenado por desacato, contra la Camara de Representantes de los Estados Unidos, contra
cualquiera, ya sea un funcionario publico o no, que en una u otra forma detiene ilegalmente a alguna persona.

En casos de invasion, rebelion o insurreccion, o peligro inminente de ellas, cuando la seguridad publica lo requiera,
el privilegio del mandamiento de habeas corpus se suspende, o se declara la ley marcial en cualquier parte o en
toda la nacion.

En Estados Unidos no se determina quien puede suspenderlo. Su Constitucion dice asi: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases Of Rebellion or Invasion
the public safety may require it. (Par. 2, Sec. 9, Art. I, Constitution of the United States).

En Filipinas la Asamblea Constituyente tuvo a bien confiarlo al Presidente. El Articulo III, parrafo 14 de la
Constitucion dice textualmente: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"El Presidente sera el generalisimo de todas las fuerzas armadas, y, siempre que fuere necesario, podra llamarlas
para impedir o sofocar toda manifestacion de violencia ilegal, invasion, insurreccion o rebelion. En caso de
invasion, insurreccion o rebelion, o peligro inminente de ellas, cuando la seguridad publica lo requiera, podra
suspender el privilegio del mandamiento de habeas corpus o declarar la ley marcial en todo el pais o en cualquier
parte de el.

En 22 de octubre de 1950, el Presidente suspendio el privilegio del habeas corpus para aquellos detenidos por
rebelion o insurreccion. La razon por que se toma esta medida descansa en la seguridad publica.

No es un secreto para nadie las frecuentes matanzas a sangre fria de niños, viejos y mujeres, las emboscadas de
pasajeros inocentes, de la viuda del Presidente Quezon y comitiva, el robo a sangre y fuego, el secuestro de
particulares y de funcionarios publicos; el de inspectores de eleccion esta a la orden del dia; son victimas del
secuestro personas pertenecientes a diferentes partidos. No solamente existe el deseo de derrocar al gobierno
Page 6
establecido sino tambien el de sembrar el terror y la anarquia en todas partes para irustrar la expresion libre del
sufragio, que es el alma de la democracia. Para impedir la ola destructora de rebelion o insurreccion, el Poder
Ejecutivo, como medida de propia preservacion, detiene a todos cuantos tienen intervencion en ella. Si se suelta a
los detenidos, pueden volver a las andadas, pueden reunirse con sus compañeros y reduplicar su obra de
destruccion; de ahi la necesidad de suspender el recurso de habeas corpus. El gobierno, escudado por la
suspension del habeas corpus, podria con facilidad suprimir la rebelion e insurreccion deteniendo indefinidamente
a todos los sospechosos; pero eso daria lugar a muchas injusticias, la detencion de inocentes. Consciente de su
obligacion de velar por los derechos individuales, no se vale de este privilegio: detuvo pero entrego los detenidos a
los tribunales de justicia para que fuesen juzgados. Eso es motivo de satisfaccion. No quiere obrar solo; no quiere
ser despota; solicita la colaboracion de los tribunales. Desea que los juzgados — y no el — decidan quienes son los
culpables y quienes son los injustamente acusados. Pero debe entenderse que mientras no esten absueltos, no
deben ser puestos en libertad bajo fianza; su libertad pone en peligro la seguridad del Estado. En muchos
respectos la libertad de los acusados pone en peligro la seguridad nacional, ya facilitando ayuda economica o
provisiones de boca, proporcionando medicinas o trasmitiendo informes a los que estan en espera del momento
oportuno para dar el golpe de gracia y, lo que es peor aun, empleando el "sabotage." cralaw virtua1aw library

Si su detencion por el Poder Ejecutivo esta justificada por la seguridad publica

CASE DIGEST:

NAVA v. GATMAITAN
G.R. No. L-4855|11 October 1951

FACTS: On 22 October 1950, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was decreed by virtue of
the following Proclamation No. 210 issued by President Elpidio Quirino. The immediate cause for the issuance of
Proclamation No. 210, was the apprehension and detention of lawless elements in whose possession strong and
convincing evidence was allegedly found showing that they are engaged in rebellious, seditious and otherwise
subversive acts.

ISSUE: Whether or not, a person covered by Proclamation No. 210 which has been formally charged with rebellion
with multiple murder, arson and robberies, may be entitled to bail.

RULING: Yes. Under paragraph 16, Section 1, Article II of the 1935 Constitution, “all persons shall before
conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
strong.” The crime of rebellion or insurrection is certainly not a capital offense, because it is penalized only by
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed Php20,000.00. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights are separate and co-equal. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution was
that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries or implies the suspension of the right to bail,
they would have very easily provided that all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except
those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong and except when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended.

The right to bail; along with the right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel; to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him; to have a speedy and public trial; to meet the witnesses face to face; and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, tends to aid the accused to prove his
innocence and obtain acquittal. If it be contended that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
includes the suspension of the distinct right to bail or to be provisionally at liberty, it would a fortiori (from a stronger
argument) imply the suspension of all his other rights (even the rights to be tried by a court) that may win for him
ultimate acquittal and, hence, absolute freedom. The latter result is not insisted upon for being patently untenable.

Page 7