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Journal of Retailing 83 (3, 2007) 325–337

Consumers’ perceptions of the fairness of price-matching refund policies


Monika Kukar-Kinney a,∗ , Lan Xia b,1 , Kent B. Monroe c,d,2
a Robins School of Business, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA 23173, United States
b Bentley College, 175 Forest Street, Waltham, MA 02452, United States
c University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, United States
d Robins School of Business, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA 23173, United States

Abstract

This paper examines the antecedents and consequences of perceived price-matching policy fairness. Among the antecedents, we study the
effects of the refund depth if a lower competitive price is identified, the degree that the retail product assortment is available at competing
retailers, and the consumers’ inference as to the retailer’s motive for the price-matching policy. Product assortment uniqueness is identified
as a key driver of fairness perceptions, both directly and indirectly through inferred motive. The three experiments show that consumers’
perceptions of the fairness of a store’s pricing policy influence their price fairness perceptions, consequently influencing their retail shopping
intentions.
© 2007 New York University. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Price-matching policy; Consumer perceptions; Price fairness; Shopping intentions

Introduction ified period after the purchase (Moorthy and Zhang 2006).
They are store-level policies and usually apply to identi-
The issue of consumers’ perceptions of price fairness has cal items sold at competitive outlets. Due to the frequent
received increasing attention from marketing and consumer use of price-matching policies by retailers, how consumers
researchers (for a review see Xia et al. 2004). Prior research respond to price-matching policies has received a grow-
has focused on consumers’ perceptions of the fairness of ing interest from researchers (e.g., Biswas et al. 2002;
prices or price increases for individual products or product Jain and Srivastava 2000; Kukar-Kinney and Grewal 2006;
categories. However, no research to date addresses con- Kukar-Kinney and Walters 2003; Srivastava and Lurie 2001;
sumers’ fairness perceptions of store-wide pricing policies, Srivastava and Lurie 2004). This previous research shows
such as price-matching guarantees, and whether consumers’ that price-matching policies affect consumers’ store price
perceptions of pricing policy fairness influence their price and value perceptions, as well as their search and purchase
fairness perceptions. behaviors. Prior research has shown that consumers may infer
Price-matching guarantees3 are retail offers to meet or beat the presence of a price-matching policy to mean the store’s
competitive prices at the time of purchase or within a spec- prices are relatively low if the policy is perceived as enforce-
able (Srivastava and Lurie 2004) or is offered by a high-price
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 804 287 1880; fax: +1 804 289 8878. image store (Biswas et al. 2002). Hence, when consumers’
E-mail addresses: mkukarki@richmond.edu (M. Kukar-Kinney), cost of search is high, they are more likely to accept a price-
lxia@bentley.edu (L. Xia), kentmonroe@comcast.net (K.B. Monroe).
1 Tel.: +1 781 891 2468; fax: +1 781 788 6456. matching policy to be a signal of low prices and consequently
2 Tel.: +1 804 269 5519; fax: +1 804 269 7614. reduce competitive price search (Srivastava and Lurie 2001).
3 The term “price-matching guarantee” is commonly used to generically Also, research has shown that consumers’ perceptions of the
refer to both price-matching and price-beating guarantees (Moorthy and believability and value of the policy are influenced by the
Zhang 2006). For example, Staples advertises its policy as “we 110 percent depth and the scope of the guarantee, thereby influencing
price-match guarantee it,” while Sears describes its policy as “Price Matching
Plus Policy”. Thus, in the present research, we use the expression “price-
consumers’ intentions to patronize the store (Kukar-Kinney
matching” to refer to both price-matching and price-beating pricing policies. and Walters 2003).

0022-4359/$ – see front matter © 2007 New York University. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jretai.2007.03.005
326 M. Kukar-Kinney et al. / Journal of Retailing 83 (3, 2007) 325–337

While previous research offers valuable insights into how Second, we contribute to price fairness theory by propos-
consumers respond to price-matching refund policies, it has ing and empirically establishing a link between pricing policy
not examined consumers’ perceptions of the fairness of this (i.e., pricing procedure) fairness and price outcome fairness.
policy. Understanding how the perceptions of price-matching Studies 2 and 3 demonstrate that perceived pricing policy
policy fairness are formed is important because of their likely fairness influences price fairness perceptions irregardless of
influence on consumers’ purchase behaviors (Xia et al. 2004). whether the pricing policy influences the final price paid.
Previous research has shown that consumers use a store- Thus, we integrate the existing price-matching and price fair-
level pricing policy to infer the store’s price level and the ness research domains.
relative value offered. Past research has also shown that per- Third, we empirically establish the role of perceived value
ceptions of price fairness influence consumers’ perceptions as a partial mediator of the effects of price outcome fairness
of value and patronage intentions. However, characteristics on purchase intentions. Existing research has found either a
of a price-matching policy and the sponsoring retailer may direct effect of price fairness perceptions on purchase inten-
influence consumers’ perceptions of the policy fairness, and tions (Campbell 1999) or an indirect effect through perceived
consequently, their perceptions of price fairness and behav- value (Martins 1995). We show that price fairness perceptions
ior towards the retailer. Nevertheless, previous research on influence purchase intentions both directly and indirectly
the influence of a price-matching policy has not studied con- through perceived value.
sumers’ perceptions of the fairness of that policy, or its effects
on price fairness perceptions and consumer behavior. Since
a price-matching policy may serve as a signal of a store’s The concept of price fairness
price level and may also indirectly determine the final price
consumers pay for a product, consumers’ perceptions of the Price fairness refers to consumers’ assessments of whether
policy likely will influence their price fairness perceptions. a seller’s price is reasonable, acceptable or justifiable (Xia
Thus, a price-matching policy provides an excellent context et al. 2004). Fairness judgments can be separated into two
to study the joint effects of the fairness of a pricing pro- parts, that is, the outcome and the procedure leading to the
cedure (i.e., pricing policy fairness) and a price outcome outcome. The principle of distributive justice, or fairness of
(i.e., fairness of the final price paid) on consumers’ shop- outcomes, maintains that individuals judge the fairness of a
ping intentions, a topic not yet investigated in the marketing relationship based upon the allocation of rewards resulting
and consumer behavior research to date. from their relative contributions to the relationship (Adams
1965). Thus, equal ratios of profits to investments between
Research contributions all parties involved in an exchange relationship result in
perceived fairness and unequal ratios create perceptions of
Using three studies, the present research contributes to unfairness.
research on consumers’ responses to price-matching poli- Procedural justice, on the other hand, concerns judgments
cies in several ways. Study 1 examines how retail product of whether the processes or procedures are based on pre-
assortment uniqueness influences consumers’ responses to vailing norms and behaviors (Thibaut and Walker 1975).
the presence (versus absence) of a price-matching pol- Distributive and procedural fairness do not always function
icy. Consumers’ perceptions of the fairness of the overall independently. In many situations people make a fairness
store pricing policy, individual prices, and the consequent judgment when they know the distribution of the outcome
effects on their shopping intentions are examined in this as well as the procedure that leads to the outcome. When
first study. Studies 2 and 3 expand the contribution by iden- people receive process information before outcome informa-
tifying (1) perceived price-matching policy fairness as an tion, they are more apt to be influenced by the fair process
important consumer response when a price-matching guar- effect (the tendency for evaluations of outcomes and subse-
antee is present; (2) potential determinants of perceived quent behaviors to be influenced by perceptions of procedural
price-matching policy fairness (i.e., retail product assortment fairness). One explanation for this effect is that procedural
uniqueness, refund depth,4 and inferred motive for the pol- information is used in a heuristic manner, that is, as a sig-
icy); and (3) the influence of perceived price-matching policy nal that the fairness of an outcome would be consistent with
fairness on perceived price outcome fairness and subsequent the perceived fairness of the procedure or process leading
effects on customers’ perceptions of value and shopping to that outcome (Collie et al. 2002). However, when people
intentions. receive outcome information before process information they
are affected by the fair outcome effect or fair equity effect
(the positive influence of perceived distributive fairness on
subsequent behavioral responses) (van den Bos et al. 1997).
4 While price-matching refund depth has been examined in a broader
Various factors including types of cost increases, inferred
price-matching context in prior research (Kukar-Kinney and Walters 2003),
the present research is the first to identify the motive for the policy and
motives of the seller, and types of retail stores can be used
the retailer’s product assortment uniqueness as determinants of consumer to infer the underlying procedure used to determine the final
responses to price-matching guarantees. price. Research has shown these factors do influence fair-
M. Kukar-Kinney et al. / Journal of Retailing 83 (3, 2007) 325–337 327

ness perceptions (e.g., Bolton et al. 2003; Kahneman et make unique product models for different retailers making it
al. 1986; Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal 2003). However, no difficult to find identical product models at competing outlets
research has examined the effect of a store-wide pricing (Bergen et al. 1996).
policy, such as a price-matching guarantee, as a pricing pro- Consequently, if a retailer offers a price-matching guar-
cedure that may influence price fairness perceptions. Buyers antee that applies only to a limited proportion of the store’s
typically receive information on price-matching guarantees products (i.e., high product assortment uniqueness), then the
before or at the time of being exposed to the product’s price. overall store pricing policy may be perceived as less fair than
Moreover, the actual final price that buyers will pay for a when the price-matching guarantee applies to a relatively
product may depend on the specific policy. Thus, a price- larger proportion of the store’s assortment. However, if no
matching policy offers an excellent case to study the joint price-matching guarantee is offered, then product assortment
effect of perceived pricing policy (i.e., procedure) fairness uniqueness should not influence consumers’ perceptions of
and perceived price outcome fairness on consumers’ shop- the fairness of the store’s pricing policy, since no formal
ping intentions. Price outcome fairness refers to consumers’ comparison of product models across competing stores is
perceptions of the fairness of the final price they will pay for a required. Thus, we propose that an interaction will exist
product. between the presence of a price-matching policy and prod-
uct assortment uniqueness on consumers’ perceptions of the
fairness of a store’s pricing policy.
Conceptual model and hypotheses
H2. Product assortment uniqueness negatively influences
How are consumers’ perceptions of the fairness of an consumers’ perceptions of the fairness of a store’s price-
overall store pricing policy influenced by the presence of a matching policy only when a price-matching policy is
price-matching policy? Existing research suggests that con- present, but has no effect when there is no price-matching
sumers interpret the presence of a price-matching policy as a policy.
signal of competitively lower store prices (e.g., Kukar-Kinney
2003; Srivastava and Lurie 2004). Moreover, in the presence When the store’s procedures and policies are perceived to
of a policy, consumer price referent standards shift higher, be fair, then it is more likely that the outcome (i.e., price)
consequently resulting in consumers evaluating the retailer would be perceived as fair (the fair process effect; Collie et
more positively than when a price-matching guarantee is not al. 2002). Hence, the perceived fairness of the store’s overall
offered (Lurie and Srivastava 2005). Due to the shift of the ref- pricing policy should positively affect consumer perceptions
erent standard associated with a presence of a price-matching of price fairness:
policy (Biswas et al. 2002; Lurie and Srivastava 2005), we
propose that the presence of a price-matching policy will H3. There will be a positive relationship between con-
induce consumers to perceive that the store’s overall pricing sumers’ perceived fairness of the store’s pricing policy and
policy is fairer than when a price-matching guarantee is not their perceptions of price fairness.
offered. Hence,
Xia et al. (2004) have proposed that the influence of
H1. A store’s overall pricing policy will be perceived by price unfairness perceptions on purchase intentions will
consumers to be fairer when a price-matching policy is be partially mediated by consumers’ perceptions of value.
present compared to when there is no price-matching policy. Perceptions of value are determined by the tradeoff of con-
sumers’ perceptions of gains or benefits associated with the
While the presence of a price-matching guarantee policy acquisition of the product or service relative to their percep-
may have a positive effect on policy fairness perceptions, tions of costs associated with acquiring the product or service
consumers may use details of the policy or characteristics of (Grewal et al. 1998; Zeithaml 1988). Previous research has
the store to infer whether the policy is a true signal of lower demonstrated that unfairness perceptions have a negative
prices. Retail product assortment uniqueness is the propor- effect on perceived value (Martins and Monroe 1994; Martins
tion of the retailer’s product assortment that is unique to the 1995). Therefore,
participating retailer (i.e., cannot be found at competitive out-
lets). Assortment uniqueness is an important feature of the H4. Perceived value will be positively influenced by per-
store that determines whether a price-matching policy applies ceived price fairness.
to a specific product. Although a price-matching guarantee
is a store-level policy, typically it applies only to identical Consumer shopping intentions refers to the likelihood of
brands and models found in competitive stores. However, consumers shopping at the particular retailer for a specific
many retailers carry a unique assortment of products not purchasing task. Prior research indicates that perceptions of
eligible for price-matching, such as store brands and other fairness positively influence consumers’ shopping intentions
brands for which the retailer may have an exclusive distri- (Campbell 1999). Moreover, previous research also has estab-
bution. For example, manufacturers of national brands often lished that shopping or purchase intentions are influenced
328 M. Kukar-Kinney et al. / Journal of Retailing 83 (3, 2007) 325–337

Fig. 1. Antecedents and consequences of perceived pricing policy fairness.

by perceptions of value (Della Bitta et al. 1981; Grewal et Manipulations


al. 1998). Since research has also shown that perceptions of
price fairness influence perceptions of value (Martins 1995), Price-matching policy presence was manipulated in the
we expect that price fairness perceptions will exert an indi- scenario by including or excluding a description of the store’s
rect effect on shopping intentions through perceived value. price-matching policy. When present, the policy stated that
In addition, since price fairness pertains to the perceptions should a consumer find a lower price for an identical product
of the actual price consumers will pay for a product at the at any local competitor within 30 days of purchase, Elec-
retailer, we expect that perceived price fairness will also have tronic Connections will match the lower price by refunding
a direct positive effect on consumers’ willingness to shop at the difference in the prices. Further, in the high product
the retailer (see Fig. 1). Therefore, assortment uniqueness condition, 80 percent of the retailer’s
product assortment was unique to the retailer, whereas in
H5. Consumers’ intentions to shop at the retailer will be the low uniqueness condition only 20 percent of the product
positively influenced by their perceptions of: assortment was unique to the retailer. The low uniqueness
manipulation was phrased as follows:
(a) price fairness, and
(b) value. Over 80 percent of the product assortment carried by Elec-
tronic Connections consists of well-known, national brands
available at several other local stores, which are covered under
this low price guarantee. Less than 20 percent of the prod-
Study 1
uct assortment in the store consists of store brands and other
brands which are not available elsewhere in the local market,
A 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment in which price-
and are therefore not covered by the guarantee.
matching refund policy (present or absent) and product
assortment uniqueness (high or low) were manipulated was
conducted to test the above hypotheses. The manipulations Measures
were contained within a description of Electronic Connec-
tions, a consumer electronics store. Participants read a store Both pricing policy fairness and price fairness were mea-
description with the two manipulated variables embedded in sured with a set of four items: fair, acceptable, unfair, and
the description. After reading the scenario, participants were satisfactory. We adapted this measure from previous research
asked to respond to questions about their perceptions of the (Campbell 1999) and added additional items. Perceived value
overall store pricing policy fairness. Then, they were given a was measured with three items, adapted from Grewal et al.
task of purchasing a DVD player and were asked to indicate (1998). Shopping intentions were measured using three state-
how likely they would shop at this particular retailer. Further, ments, similar to what has been used in prior research (e.g.,
participants’ price fairness perceptions and perceived value Dodds et al. 1991; Grewal et al. 1998).
of this potential transaction were measured. Finally, the 144 Item reliability was assessed by examining standard-
undergraduate student participants (average age 21.3 years, ized item loadings, which all exceeded .50. All constructs
45 percent males) responded to a set of manipulation checks. exhibited sufficient reliability (>.80) as well as discriminant
M. Kukar-Kinney et al. / Journal of Retailing 83 (3, 2007) 325–337 329

Table 1
Scale items and measurement properties
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3

IR SR IR SR IR SR
Price-matching policy fairness
I believe the low price guarantee offered by this store is:
Fair .88 .84 .96 .90 .90 .89
Acceptable .82 .88 .80
Unfair (r) .71 .79 .84
Satisfactory .62 .73 .74
Price fairness
I think the price I would have to pay if I bought the DVD player from this store would be:
Fair .95 .89 .94 .91 .90 .87
Acceptable .89 .95 .87
Unfair (r) .73 .74 .73
Satisfactory .75 .79 .68
Value
If I bought the DVD player at this store, I feel I would be getting my money’s worth. .83 .89 .95 .91 .92 .91
If I bought the DVD player at this store, I think I would be getting good value for my money. .95 .94 .94
Buying the DVD player at this store would be a worthwhile acquisition because it is reasonably priced. .79 .78 .76
Shopping intentions
I would be willing to shop at (store name). .91 .97 .84 .94 .87 .93
It is very likely that I would shop at . .98 .97 .94
The probability that I would shop at is very high. .97 .94 .91
Inferred motive
I believe the store’s low price guarantee is offered because:
The retailer offers the low-price guarantee to serve its own interests. – – .48 .74 .33 .62
The retailer offers the low-price guarantee to increase profits at the expense of consumers. – – .86 .73
The retailer intends to take advantage of customers by offering the low price guarantee. – – .78 .71
IR: item reliability; SR: scale reliability.

validity, as all inter-construct correlations were significantly tion than in the high uniqueness condition (t = 10.87, df = 134,
less than one. Further, average extracted variances exceeded p < .01, Meanlow uniqueness = 5.08, Meanhigh uniqueness = 2.78).
the squared inter-construct correlations for all constructs Second, the respondents in the price-matching policy condi-
(Fornell and Larcker 1981). The factor loadings and con- tion were more likely to indicate that the store offered a low
struct reliabilities are displayed in Table 1, and construct price guarantee than those in the condition where it was absent
inter-correlations in Table 2. (chi-square = 25.36, df = 1, p < .01). Thus, both manipulations
were successful.
Analysis The causal model was assessed using latent variable
structural equation modeling in AMOS. Manipulated vari-
The manipulation check for the assortment uniqueness ables were represented in the model as dummy (observed)
was: “The percentage of the product assortment in the store variables. The overall fit of the model was significant
consisting of national brands available elsewhere in the local (chi-square = 252, df = 112, p < .01). However, additional
area is” (1 = very small, 7 = very large). As intended, the goodness-of-fit indices (IFI = .93, TLI = .91, CFI = .93, and
respondents perceived that the retailer offered a significantly RMSEA = .09) all were at acceptable levels indicating that
larger portion of national brands in the low uniqueness condi- the model fits the data well (Bagozzi and Yi 1988). Summary

Table 2
Inter-construct correlations in Study 1
Policy fairness Price fairness Value Shopping Price-matching Uniqueness Policy presence ×
intentions policy presence Uniqueness
Policy fairness 1
Price fairness .69 1
Value .57 .50 1
Shopping intentions .41 .61 .47 1
Price-matching policy presence .09 .20 .02 .30 1
Uniqueness −.35 −.37 −.26 −.37 −.06 1
Policy presence × Uniqueness −.29 −.16 −.22 .03 .56 .56 1
330 M. Kukar-Kinney et al. / Journal of Retailing 83 (3, 2007) 325–337

Table 3
Testing the relationships in the overall pricing policy fairness model (Study 1)
Hypothesis: sign Path from → to Study 1 (N = 144)
Standardized estimate t-value
H1: + Price-matching policy presence → overall pricing policy fairness .33 2.90a
Not hypothesized Uniqueness → overall pricing policy fairness −.15 −1.36b
H2: − Price-matching policy presence × Uniqueness → overall pricing policy fairness −.39 −2.82a
H3: + Policy fairness → price fairness .76 7.88a
H4: + Price fairness → value .57 6.01a
H5a: + Price fairness → shopping intentions .47 4.93a
H5b: + Value → shopping intentions .23 2.59a
Goodness-of-fit statistics
Chi-square (df) 252 (112)
IFI .93
TLI .91
CFI .93
RMSEA .09
a p < .01.
b p < .10.

results for the tested model and the standardized structural tions of price fairness would positively influence perceived
path parameter estimates are presented in Table 3. The spe- value (β = .57, t = 6.01, p < .01). Finally, the prediction that
cific results are presented next. consumers’ intentions to shop at the store would be positively
As H1 proposed, the presence of a price-matching pol- influenced by perceived price fairness (H5a) and value (H5b)
icy positively influenced perceived fairness of overall store was supported, as perceived price fairness (β = .47, t = 4.93,
pricing policy (β = .33, t = 2.90, p < .01). Moreover, a signif- p < .01) and perceived value (β = .23, t = 2.59, p < .01) both
icant interaction between the presence of a price-matching significantly affected shopping intentions.
guarantee and retail product assortment uniqueness existed
(β = −.39, t = −2.82, p < .01). As shown in Fig. 2, con- Discussion
sumers’ perceptions of store pricing policy fairness in
the presence of a price-matching guarantee were signifi- Study 1 findings suggest that an existence of a price-
cantly lower in the high as compared with low product matching policy enhances the fairness perceptions of a store’s
assortment uniqueness condition (Meanlow uniqueness = 5.79, overall pricing policy. Moreover, support for the fair process
Meanhigh uniqueness = 4.64, F1,139 = 28.42, p < .01). There was effect (Collie et al. 2002) was found, as pricing policy fairness
no significant difference when the guarantee was not (i.e., procedural fairness) had a strong effect on perceptions of
offered (Meanlow uniqueness = 5.19, Meanhigh uniqueness = 4.96, price fairness (i.e., outcome fairness). Thus, retailers should
F1,139 = 1.1, p > .10), supporting H2. Further, a positive rela- consider offering a price-matching policy when they desire to
tionship between perceived pricing policy fairness and price enhance consumers’ price fairness perceptions, and thereby
fairness existed (β = .76, t = 7.88, p < .01), as predicted by H3. increase consumer patronage behavior. However, we also
The results supported hypothesis H4 that consumer percep- found that the ability of a price-matching policy to influence

Fig. 2. Interaction effect of price-matching policy presence and product assortment uniqueness on perceived overall pricing policy fairness (Study 1).
M. Kukar-Kinney et al. / Journal of Retailing 83 (3, 2007) 325–337 331

perceptions of policy fairness was influenced by a specific degree to which the retailer’s assortment is eligible for con-
store characteristic (i.e., product assortment uniqueness). The sumer price-matching and the depth of the refund if a lower
high unique product assortment condition resulted in lower price is found elsewhere. Further, consumers will use the pro-
judgments of the fairness of the store’s pricing policy than portion of the retailer’s product assortment that is unique to
did the low unique product assortment condition when the infer the retailer’s motive for the policy. The inferred retailer’s
price-matching policy was present. motive will also influence consumers’ perceptions of the fair-
To further investigate potential drivers of policy fairness ness of the price-matching policy (see Fig. 1).
perceptions in the presence of a price-matching refund policy
we conducted two additional studies. Assortment uniqueness

As shown in Study 1, product assortment uniqueness neg-


Studies 2 and 3 atively influenced consumer perceptions of the fairness of
the store’s pricing policy in the presence of a price-matching
Motivation policy. Consequently, as previously predicted in H2, high
product assortment uniqueness will reduce perceived fairness
In Studies 2 and 3, we examine an important charac- of the price-matching policy itself.
teristic of a price-matching policy: refund depth. Refund
depth refers to the relative amount of money that the retailer Inferred motive
offers to refund, should a consumer find a lower competitive
price. Price-matching retailers can offer to match the identi- Existing research indicates that a firm’s motive influ-
fied lower price or beat the lower price by a predetermined ences consumers’ fairness perceptions of a price increase
amount. When matching competitors’ price offers consumers (Campbell 1999; Kahneman et al. 1986). The rationale for
receive the lower competitive price as the retailer promised. this relationship is based on attribution theory, according
Beating a competitor’s price acts as a gesture that the retailer to which attributions that people make for other people’s
will punish itself for not offering the lower price. Refund (firms’) actions are influenced by the other’s intentions or
depth has been shown to enhance consumers’ perceptions of their inferred motives (Weiner 1992). Similarly, retailers
value and consequently increase purchase intentions (Kukar- have certain motives for offering store-wide pricing policies
Kinney and Walters 2003). We examined the impact of refund such as price-matching guarantees. The consumers’ inferred
depth to determine whether it might mitigate the negative motive pertains to the consumers’ inferences of the objec-
effect of product assortment uniqueness. Further, the extent tive the retailer seeks to achieve by using a price-matching
to which consumers use the price-matching policy as a low guarantee. This motive may be positive (e.g., the retailer
price signal may depend on their examination of the char- is customer-oriented) or negative (e.g., the retailer wants to
acteristics of the policy itself and perceptions of whether the increase its profits at the expense of consumers).
retailer is sincere in offering a lower price. As such, one infer- Consumers may infer the store’s motive from the specific
ence during this process that consumers may make pertains terms of the price-matching policy. One factor likely influ-
to the retailer’s motive for the policy. Inferring the retailer’s encing customers’ inferences about the retailer’s motive for
motive may help consumers decide whether the retailer is offering the price-matching policy is the extent that its assort-
sincere in offering the policy and the lower price. Hence, in ment is unique, that is, not available for purchase at competing
Studies 2 and 3 we examined price-matching refund depth stores. Since price-matching guarantees are store-wide poli-
and inferred motive for the retailer’s price-matching policy cies, consumers are more likely to infer a negative motive for
in addition to product assortment uniqueness as determinants offering the guarantee if the policy applies to a relatively small
of perceived pricing policy fairness. portion of the store’s products relative to when the policy
Furthermore, Study 1 identified perceived pricing policy applies to most products in the store. Thus,
fairness as an important factor influencing price fairness per-
ceptions. In Studies 2 and 3, we extend this conclusion by H6. If a retailer offers a price-matching guarantee, then the
investigating whether perceptions of the pricing policy fair- more its assortment is unique, the less favorable will be the
ness have an effect on price fairness perceptions even when consumers’ inferences as to the retailer’s motive.
the price paid for the product is not influenced by the price-
matching policy. Thus, Studies 2 and 3 are placed in a context As reported above, it has been found that if consumers
wherein the price-matching policy either does or does not perceive that the enforcement cost of the guarantee (i.e., issu-
influence the potential final price paid. ing refunds) would be high for a higher-priced retailer then
consumers may interpret the presence of a price-matching
Conceptual model guarantee as a low price signal (Srivastava and Lurie 2004).
However, while consumers may associate such guarantees
How do consumers judge the fairness of a specific price- with lower prices, price-matching retailers do not necessarily
matching policy? We propose that consumers will assess the claim to offer the lowest prices (Srivastava and Lurie 2004).
332 M. Kukar-Kinney et al. / Journal of Retailing 83 (3, 2007) 325–337

If a retailer does not offer prices lower than its competitors, to be fairer than a price-matching policy (i.e., a policy that
but instead uses the price-matching guarantee to signal low offers a refund that only equals the price difference).
prices, the policy may mislead a segment of consumers. If
consumers believe that the retailer’s motive for offering a Effects of perceived price-matching policy fairness
price-matching policy is to signal low prices to obtain addi-
tional sales and profits (a negative motive), the policy might Consistent with hypothesis H3, we would expect that there
be perceived as unfair. If so, buyers may conclude that the will be a positive relationship between consumers’ perceived
prices are higher than implied by the price-matching pol- price-matching policy fairness and their perceptions of price
icy. At the same time, with an inferred sales-oriented motive, fairness when the final price paid is influenced by the price-
buyers may perceive the selling price of a product is not nec- matching policy. Furthermore, even when the price-matching
essarily low and is, therefore, unfair. On the other hand, if policy does not directly influence the final price paid, the
consumers perceive that the retailer’s motive is more cus- fair process effect implies that perceptions of the fairness or
tomer focused (a positive motive), such as wanting to reward unfairness of a price-matching policy will still influence price
consumers who by searching and comparing prices bring fairness perceptions. For example, consumers may perceive
the retailer competitive price information, the policy itself, that since the price-matching policy is not a true signal for
and the resulting prices might be perceived as fair. Existing lower prices, the store’s overall product prices may be rel-
research has demonstrated that an inferred negative motive atively high and not fair. Hence, the price-matching policy
for a price increase leads to lower perceptions of price fairness unfairness perceptions may carry over to the price fairness
(Campbell 1999). Hence, in addition to price-matching pol- evaluations.
icy fairness, an inferred motive may also influence perceived Moreover, perceived value will be influenced positively
price fairness. Therefore, by perceived price fairness (H4). Further, consumers’ inten-
tions to shop at the price-matching retailer will be positively
H7. The more positive the inferred motive for the price- influenced by perceived price fairness (H5a) and perceived
matching policy, the higher the perceptions of value (H5b).

(a) price-matching policy fairness, and Research design and procedures


(b) price fairness.
Two studies each employing a 2 (depth of refund) × 2
Refund depth (degree of product assortment uniqueness) between-subjects
experimental design were conducted to test the proposed
Refund depth refers to the relative amount of money that hypotheses. Similar to Study 1, the manipulations were con-
the retailer offers to refund, should a consumer find a lower tained within a description of Electronic Connections, a
competitive price. Consistent with equity theory (Adams consumer electronics store that now offered a price-matching
1965), fairness is judged according to the input/output rela- guarantee in all experimental conditions. In each study,
tionship between the exchange parties. In the price-matching participants first read a scenario where a store-wide price-
scenario, if the store’s remedy is to match a lower com- matching policy was outlined and then responded to questions
petitive price, consumers need to expend extra effort and about their perceptions of the fairness of the price-matching
hassle to return to the store and request the refund (i.e., price policy. Then, they were given a task of purchasing a DVD
difference) to obtain the same price that could have been player. The participants were also asked to fill out measures of
obtained from a lower-priced competitor. Thus, their input shopping intentions, price fairness perceptions, and perceived
(what they give) may be perceived as higher than the output value of the potential transaction, and finally, manipulation
(what they receive). However, a refund that is greater than checks. In Study 2, 229 undergraduate students, averaging
the price difference rewards consumers for the extra effort it 20.5 years (45 percent males) participated for course credit.
takes to return to the store to get the refund, and as such, the In Study 3, 339 undergraduate students, averaging 20.7 years
exchange relationship between the retailer and the consumer (56 percent males) participated for course credit.
is restored to a more equitable level. Consequently, a refund
that compensates for the additional costs incurred by the Manipulations
customer should enhance the restoration of the input/output
relationship between the exchange parties (Adams 1965), Product assortment uniqueness and refund depth were
resulting in higher perceptions of pricing policy fair- manipulated in the same way across the two studies. Product
ness relative to a refund that equals the price difference. assortment uniqueness at Electronic Connections was manip-
Hence, ulated as high (80 percent of the products were unique to
the store) or low (20 percent of the products were unique to
H8. A price-beating policy (i.e., a policy that offers a refund the store), as in Study 1. The two levels of the refund depth
exceeding the price difference between the price-matching were the store’s price-matching guarantee promising either
retailer and the competitive lower price) will be perceived to match competitive prices in the low refund condition or
M. Kukar-Kinney et al. / Journal of Retailing 83 (3, 2007) 325–337 333

Table 4
Inter-Construct Correlations in Studies 2 and 3
Policy fairness Price fairness Inferred motive Value Shopping intentions Refund depth Uniqueness
Policy fairness 1 .50 .35 .42 .41 .07 −.31
Price fairness .56 1 .37 .68 .50 −.06 −.08
Inferred motive .36 .35 1 .21 .22 −.08 −.15
Value .41 .64 .29 1 .53 −.04 −.03
Shopping intentions .42 .60 .34 .54 1 .01 −.11
Refund depth .00 −.01 −.04 .07 .02 1 −.00
Uniqueness −.34 −.12 −.17 −.07 −.05 .00 1
Numbers above diagonal represent Study 2 (national brand) correlations, and numbers below the diagonal represent Study 3 (store brand) correlations.

beat any lower competitive price by 10 percent in the high manipulation check for the product assortment unique-
refund condition. The only difference was that in Study 2, ness was identical to the one used in Study 1. Univariate
participants were asked to buy a national brand DVD player ANOVAs were performed on each manipulation check,
that was available at many local stores, while in Study 3, par- with refund depth and product assortment uniqueness being
ticipants were asked to buy a store brand of the same product the fixed factors. In Study 2, only the refund depth was
that was unique to the store. a significant predictor of the manipulation check for the
refund depth (F1,225 = 17.43, p < .01, Meanlow refund = 3.49,
Measures Meanhigh refund = 4.26). The respondents also perceived that
the retailer offered a significantly larger portion of national
Perceived price-matching policy fairness, price fairness, brands in the low product assortment uniqueness condition
perceived value and shopping intentions were measured with than in the high uniqueness condition (F1,225 = 320, p < .01,
the same items used in Study 1. A new measure was developed Meanlow uniqueness = 5.25, Meanhigh uniqueness = 2.28). No evi-
to measure the inferred retailer’s motive (see Table 1). The dence of confounding crossover effects was observed. For
items, item reliabilities and construct reliabilities are shown Study 3, all manipulation and confounding checks were also
in Table 1, and construct inter-correlations are in Table 4. successful.

Manipulation and confounding checks Measurement properties of the scales

The manipulation check for the refund depth was the Item reliability was assessed by examining standardized
statement: “The relative size of the refund the store item loadings (see Table 1). Only one item loading (item
promises, should a consumer find a lower price for the 1 for the inferred motive) was not sufficiently high. Since
identical product is” (1 = very small, 7 = very large). The the item-to-total correlation for the item with the low load-

Table 5
Testing the relationships in the price-matching refund policy fairness model (Studies 2 and 3)
Hypothesis: sign Path from → to Study 2 (N = 229) Study 3 (N = 339)

Standardized estimate t-value Standardized estimate t-value


H2: − Uniqueness (U) → policy fairness −.26 −4.15a −.29 −5.44a
H6: − Uniqueness (U) → inferred motive −.15 −1.96b −.15 −2.22b
H7a: + Inferred motive → policy fairness .31 3.86a .28 3.64a
H7b: + Inferred motive → price fairness .22 2.88a .16 2.33b
H8: + Refund depth → policy fairness .09 1.43c .01 .17
H3: + Policy fairness → price fairness .43 6.05a .52 8.21a
H4: + Price fairness → value .68 9.95a .64 10.77a
H5a: + Price fairness → shopping intentions .27 3.21a .45 6.35a
H5b: + Value → shopping intentions .35 4.09a .25 3.81a
Goodness-of-fit statistics
Chi-square (df) 254 (144) 354 (144)
IFI .97 .95
TLI .95 .93
CFI .97 .95
RMSEA .058 .066
a p < .01.
b p < .05.
c p < .10.
334 M. Kukar-Kinney et al. / Journal of Retailing 83 (3, 2007) 325–337

ing exceeded .40 (Study 2), it was kept for further analysis ceptions. These findings highlight the need for retailers to
(Hair et al. 1998). By keeping the item, we were able to con- consider the extent that their products can be found at compet-
sider the measurement error associated with this construct. itive retail outlets when establishing a price-matching policy.
All constructs exhibited sufficient discriminant validity since A high level of product assortment uniqueness may inadver-
all inter-construct correlations were significantly lower than tently damage consumers’ fairness perceptions.
one (Table 4). Also, average extracted variances exceeded the Consistent with prior research indicating that larger
squared inter-construct correlations for all constructs, as rec- refunds are associated with greater consumer value than
ommended by Fornell and Larcker (1981), satisfying a more smaller refunds (Kukar-Kinney and Walters 2003) we
stringent test of discriminant validity. found that refund depth enhanced perceived fairness of the
price-matching policy. This finding suggests that the price-
Study 2 results matching retailers may be able to at least partially compensate
for the negative effects of a negative inferred motive or high
The causal model was assessed using latent variable struc- assortment uniqueness by promising a refund greater than the
tural equation modeling in AMOS. The goodness-of-fit indices price difference, such as 10 percent off the lowest competitive
(chi-square = 254, df = 144, p < .01; IFI = .97, TLI = .95, CFI = .97, price.
RMSEA = .058) all meet the recommended levels and provide evi- One of our key findings pertains to the significant link
dence that the model fits the data well (Hu and Bentler 1999). between consumers’ perceptions of price-matching policy
Summary results for the tested models and the standardized struc-
fairness and price fairness. This relationship suggests that a
tural path parameter estimates are in Table 5. The model for Study
3 also fit the data well (see Table 5).
price-matching policy, which may determine the final selling
price, does influence consumers’ price fairness perceptions.
In this study, the final price of the product in the purchase
Consumers’ perceptions of price-matching policy fairness
Product assortment uniqueness exerted a significant direct neg-
task depended on the perceived likelihood that consumers
ative effect on perceived price-matching policy fairness (β = −.26, would find a lower competitive price and obtain the refund.
t = −4.15, p < .01), supporting H2. Moreover, product assortment Consequently, perceptions of price-matching policy fairness
uniqueness indirectly affected the perceptions of policy fairness enhanced perceptions of the fairness of the store’s prices,
through inferred motive, as the effect of uniqueness on the inferred including the price of the product under consideration.
motive was negative (H6; β = −.15, t = −1.96, t < .05) and the effect Another important finding is that consumers’ perceptions
of inferred motive on price-matching policy fairness perceptions of price fairness contributed to their shopping intentions
was positive (H7a; β = .31, t = 3.86, p < .01). Inferred motive also directly as well as indirectly through perceived value. We
positively influenced perceptions of price fairness, supporting H7b empirically demonstrated this partial mediation effect, which
(β = .22, t = 2.88, p < .01). Refund depth had a positive effect on per- integrated existing research results showing either a direct or
ceptions of price-matching policy fairness (β = .09, t = 1.43, p < .10),
an indirect effect of price fairness on shopping intentions.
lending support to H8.
Study 3 results
Price-matching fairness and its effects
There was a positive link between perceived price-matching The goal of Study 3 was to examine further the link between
policy fairness and perceived price fairness (H3; β = .43, t = 6.05, price-matching policy fairness and price fairness in a context when
p < .01). When the price-matching policy was perceived as fairer, the price-matching policy was not directly applicable to the con-
the price of a product related to a potential transaction was also per- sumers’ purchase. We also further investigated the partial mediation
ceived as fairer. As predicted in H4, perceived price fairness (β = .68, effect of perceived value observed in Study 2. Recall that Study 2
t = 9.95, p < .01) positively influenced perceived value. Finally, price involved a scenario in which the participants were considering pur-
fairness (β = .27, t = 3.21, p < .01) positively influenced shopping chasing a national brand product available at several local stores,
intentions directly as well as indirectly through perceived value and hence, the policy was applicable to the purchase at hand. Study
(β = .35, t = 4.09, p < .01). Thus, H5a and H5b were supported. 3 placed the participants in a situation where a purchase of a brand
unique to the store was considered. In such a scenario, since the pol-
Study 2 discussion icy did not apply to their purchase, buyers would not benefit from
the price-matching policy.
The primary goal of Study 2 was to examine the If the link between the pricing policy fairness and price fairness
antecedents and consequences of perceived price-matching observed in Study 2 was because a price-matching policy potentially
policy fairness when the policy was applicable to the cur- could change a product’s final selling price, then this link conceiv-
ably would not be significant in Study 3. Nevertheless, we expect
rent purchase. Product assortment uniqueness influenced
price-matching policy fairness will still influence price fairness per-
consumers’ fairness perceptions in two ways: directly, and ceptions via the fair process effect. For example, consumers may
indirectly through inferred motive. Inferred motive mediated perceive that since the price-matching policy is not applicable to the
the effect of assortment uniqueness on both price-matching product under consideration, the product’s price will not necessarily
policy fairness and price fairness. Consistent with previous be low, competitively, as the retailer does not have to compete with
research (e.g., Campbell 1999), the more positive consumers’ other stores on price when offering a store unique product (Gourville
inferred motive, the more positive were their fairness per- and Moon 2004).
M. Kukar-Kinney et al. / Journal of Retailing 83 (3, 2007) 325–337 335

Consumers’ perceptions of price-matching policy fairness Overall, the results of Study 3 were consistent with those
Consistent with Study 2, a significant direct effect of product of Study 2. Our findings highlight the potential that price-
assortment uniqueness on price-matching policy fairness percep- matching policies have to influence consumers’ perceptions
tions existed (H2; β = −.29, t = −5.44, p < .01). The respondents’ and behavior across different purchase situations, not only
perceptions of the fairness of the price-matching policy decreased when a price-matching policy applies to the purchase, but
as their perceptions of the uniqueness of the retailer’s product
also when the store-unique nature of the product purchase
assortment increased. Product assortment uniqueness also nega-
tively influenced the inferred motive for the price-matching offer
makes the guarantee inapplicable.
(H6; β = −.15, t = −2.22, p < .05), while the inferred motive posi-
tively affected both the perceptions of price-matching policy fairness
(β = .28, t = 3.64, p < .01) and price fairness (β = .16, t = 2.33, Conclusions, limitations and future research
p = .01), supporting H7a and H7b. In contrast with Study 2, the
refund depth did not exert a significant influence on price-matching The present research offers theoretical contributions to
policy fairness perceptions (H8; β = .01, t = .17, p > .10). consumer research. Our research is the first one to demon-
strate the relationship between pricing policy fairness and
Price-matching fairness and its effects price fairness and their consequent effects on shopping inten-
Similar to Studies 1 and 2, a significant relationship between tions. Three studies confirmed the influence of consumers’
price-matching policy fairness and price fairness occurred (H3; perceptions of pricing policy fairness on price fairness judg-
β = .52, t = 8.21, p < .01). Even when the specific purchase task was
ments, whether the policy had a direct impact on the final
not influenced by the price-matching policy, the perceived fairness of
the policy still influenced price fairness perceptions. Furthermore,
selling price of a product or not. Perceptions of price-
price fairness had a direct positive effect on shopping intentions matching policy fairness influenced consumers’ shopping
(H5a; β = .45, t = 6.35, p < .01), as well as an indirect effect through intentions indirectly through perceived price fairness, while
perceived value (i.e., a positive effect of price fairness on value, H4, perceptions of price fairness influenced consumers’ shopping
β = .64, t = 10.77, p < .01, and a positive effect of perceived value on intentions directly. In addition, price fairness perceptions
shopping intentions, H5b, β = .25, t = 3.81, p < .01). influenced shopping intentions indirectly through perceived
value, consistent with previous research (Martins and Monroe
Study 3 discussion 1994; Xia et al. 2004). Further, we examined factors that
influence consumers’ price-matching policy fairness per-
The goal of Study 3 was to assess the extent that the ceptions, specifically, product assortment uniqueness, the
findings of Study 2 would apply to a store-unique product inferred retailer’s motive and the refund depth, thus contribut-
purchase scenario. The strong and significant relationship ing to research on price-matching guarantees.
between price-matching policy fairness and price fairness Our research also has important managerial and pub-
suggests that a retailer’s price-matching policy has an impor- lic policy implications. To the extent that price-matching
tant effect on consumers’ price fairness perceptions even guarantees may mislead consumers, they may be unethical
when the policy cannot influence the final price that con- retail practices. Although consumers develop marketplace
sumers pay. We reasoned that price-matching policy fairness knowledge and knowledge of seller persuasion attempts with
influenced price fairness through consumers’ perceptions of age and experience (Friestad and Wright 1994; Obermiller
overall store price level via the fair process effect. Addition- and Spangenberg 1998; Wright 2002), nevertheless, not all
ally, the inapplicability of the price-matching policy may have consumers may be aware of potential deception that may
alerted consumers to the fact that the retailer does not have occur with price-matching policies. For example, consumers
to compete with other stores on the price of such a prod- may be unaware of the extent of products eligible for price-
uct (Gourville and Moon 2004), enhancing the influence of matching or whether an individual product can be found at
price-matching policy fairness on price fairness perceptions competing outlets, and may assume that the policy will apply
in Study 3. Future research should examine the underlying to their purchase regardless. Public policy officials need to
mechanism of how pricing policy fairness influences price consider whether guidelines need to be established to protect
fairness perceptions in different situations. consumers from potentially being deceived.
Consistent with Study 2, inferred motive was a func- Our research is the first one to examine the effects of
tion of product assortment uniqueness. In addition, inferred specific price-matching factors and inferred motive on con-
motive continued to produce an important effect on both sumers’ fairness perceptions of the policy. Results show that
price-matching policy fairness and price fairness percep- consumers inferred a store’s motive for the policy based on
tions. their knowledge of the relative uniqueness of the retailer’s
Finally, unlike Study 2, depth of refund did not have product assortment. Inferred motive was a key factor in
a significant effect on consumer perceptions of fairness of determining pricing policy fairness perceptions, as even the
price-matching policy. A possible explanation for this find- influence of factors such as product assortment uniqueness
ing is that consumers were not affected by the refund depth in was at least partially mediated through inferred motive. Our
Study 3 because of their inability to use the price-matching findings also indicate that price-matching refund depth can
guarantee on their store unique product purchase. increase price-matching policy fairness perceptions in the sit-
336 M. Kukar-Kinney et al. / Journal of Retailing 83 (3, 2007) 325–337

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