KALINGA COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INC

Provincial Rd, P5 Bulanao, Tabuk City

Kalinga 3800

MODULE IN HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION

Criminology III

NAME: Dawaton,Jayson B.

Prepared by:
GREG G. KINAUD
INSTRUCTOR

ACTIVITY: CITE 10 EXAMPLES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PHILIPPINE

SETTING.DEFINE THEM AND EXPLAIN HOW THEY ARE BEING VIOLATED AND GIVE
PENALTIES FOR THEIR VIOLATIONS
 1. Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.

GERMAN VS. SANTIAGO

EN BANC G.R. No. 68828, March 27, 1985 RELI GERMAN, RAMON PEDROSA,
TIRSO SANTILLAN, JR., MA. LUISA ANDAL, NIEVA MALINIS, RICARDO LAVIÑA,
CESAR CORTES, DANILO REYES, JOSE REYES, JOSEFINA MATE, LOURDES CALMA,
MILDRED JUAN, OLIVE GUANZON, FERNANDO COCHICO, SHERMAN CID, NAZARENO
BENTULAN, ROSLINA DONAIRE, MARIO MARTINEZ, BEATRIZ TEYLAN, ANGELINA
LAPID, ROSEMARIE FLORES, DANIEL VAN SOTO, EDGARDO MERCADER, NELLY
AGUSTIN, MARILY MAGCALAS, DAVID CHAN, ARSENIO SALANSANG, NELSON DE
GUZMAN, MARCIANO ARANETA, CESAR MENESES, DIONISIO RELLOSA, MARIO
SANTIAGO, SEVERINO SANTOS, LEONORA SANTOS, NIMFA DORONILLA, FLORENCE
GUINTO, ROSALINA MANANSALA, PERCIVAL OSTONAL, TOMMY MACARANAS, ROGER
NICANDRO, PETITIONERS, VS. GEN. SANTIAGO BARANGAN AND MAJOR ISABELO
LARIOSA, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking their constitutional freedom to religious worship and

locomotion, petitioners seek the issuance of [1] a writ of mandamus to
compel respondents to allow them to enter and pray inside St. Jude
Chapel located at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila; and [2] a writ
of Injunction to enjoin respondents from preventing them from getting
into and praying in said church.

The facts to be considered are the following:

At about 5:00 in the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners,

composed of about 50 businessmen, students and office employees
converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the ostensible purpose of
hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang
grounds located in the same street. Wearing the now familiar inscribed
yellow T-shirts, they started to march down said street with raised
clenched fists[1] and shouts of antigovernment invectives. Along the
way, however, they were barred by respondent Major Isabelo Lariosa,
upon orders of his superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan,
from proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was
located within the Malacañang security area. When petitioners'
protestations and pleas to allow them to get inside the church proved
unavailing, they decided to leave. However, because of the alleged
warning given them by respondent Major Lariosa that any similar
attempt by petitioners to enter the church in the future would
likewise be prevented, petitioners took this present recourse.

Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was

to pray and hear mass at St. Jude church. At the hearing of this
petition, respondents assured petitioners and the Court that they have
never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from
entering and worshipping at said church. They maintain, however, that
petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious
worship, but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place
close to the very residence and offices of the President of the
Republic. Respondents further lament petitioners' attempt to disguise
their true motive with a ritual as sacred and solemn as the Holy
Sacrifice of the Mass. Undoubtedly, the yellow T-shirts worn by some
of the marchers, their raised clenched fists, and chants of anti-
government slogans strongly tend to substantiate respondents
allegation. Thus, J.P. Fenix, commenting on the motive of petitioners'
mass action of October 2, 1984, wrote the following in his article
entitled "Mission Impossible", published in the October 12-18, 1984
issue of the "Mr. & Mrs." magazine:

"They couldn't go through Mendiola Bridge, and so they dared to get

even closer to the heart of the matter. But as in Mendiola, the barbed
wire barricades and the array of sheet metal shields got in the way of
the members of the August Twenty-One Movement (ATOM) as they tried
last October 2 to get to the pearly gates of power via the St. Jude
Chapel on Laurel St. St. Jude happens to be a neighbor of President
Marcos, his (sic) chapel being adjacent to Malacañang. x x x"
The foregoing cannot but cast serious doubts on the sincerity and good
faith of petitioners in invoking the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of religious worship and of locomotion. While it is beyond
debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to
religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights
for that matter, must be done in good faith. As Article 19 of the
Civil Code admonishes: "Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties x x x observe honesty and
good faith."

Even assuming that petitioners' claim to the free exercise of religion

is genuine and valid, still respondents reaction to the October 2,
1984 mass action may not be characterized as violative of the freedom
of religious worship. Since 1972, when mobs of demonstrators crashed
through the Malacañang gates and scaled its perimeter fence, the use
by the public of J.P. Laurel Street and the streets approaching it
have been restricted. While travel to and from the affected
thoroughfares has not been absolutely prohibited, passersby have been
subjected to courteous, unobtrusive security checks. The
reasonableness of this restriction is readily perceived and
appreciated if it is considered that the same is designed to protect
the lives of the President and his family, as well as other government
officials, diplomats and foreign guests transacting business with
Malacañang. The need to secure the safety of heads of state and other
government officials cannot be overemphasized. The threat to their
lives and safety is constant, real and felt throughout the world.
Vivid illustrations of this grave and serious problem are the gruesome
assassinations, kidnappings and other acts of violence and terrorism
that have been perpetrated against heads of state and other public
officers of foreign nations.

Said restriction is moreover intended to secure the several executive

offices within the Malacañang grounds from possible external attacks
and disturbances. These offices include communications facilities that
link the central government to all places in the land. Unquestionably,
the restriction imposed is necessary to maintain the smooth
functioning of the executive branch of the government, which
petitioners' mass action would certainly disrupt.

Freedom of religious worship is guaranteed under Section 8, Article IV

of the 1973 Constitution, thus:

"No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights."
Elucidating on the meaning and scope of freedom of religion, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut[2] said:

"The constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of

religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of
any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to
such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may
choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards
the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment
embraces two concepts, - freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be."
In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their
freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner
by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. This
curtailment is in accord with the pronouncement of this Court in
Gerona v. Secretary of Education,[3] thus:

"The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only
by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief,
including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may
believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable
the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the
scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of
belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of
road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with
the established institutions of society and with the law, then the
former must yield and give way to the latter. The government steps in
and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one
exercising it." (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners likewise invoke their freedom of locomotion under Section
5, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:

"The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health."
Suffice it to say that the restriction imposed on the use of J.P.
Laurel Street, the wisdom and reasonableness of which have already
been discussed, is allowed under the fundamental law, the same having
been established in the interest of national security.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

2. Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in

the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

[G.R. No. 49677. May 4, 1989.]

TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES, Petitioner, v.

NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION and ATTY. VIRGILIO SY, as Officer-in-
Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Respondents.

The Government Corporate Counsel for respondent NHC.

Raul E. Espinosa for intervenor PACIWU.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ONLY GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS

WITH ORIGINAL OR LEGISLATIVE CHARTERS, NOW COVERED BY THE CIVIL
SERVICE. — The civil service now covers only government-owned or
controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is
those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those
incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. The
situations sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution and expressed
by this Court in the National Housing Corporation case . . . appear
relegated to relative insignificance by the 1987 Constitutional
provision that the Civil Service embraces government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters and therefore, by clear
implication, the Civil Service does not include government-owned or
controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of
government-owned or controlled corporations under the general
corporation law." cralaw virtua1aw library

2. LABOR LAW; UNIONS OR EMPLOYEES’ ORGANIZATION; RIGHT TO FORM

RECOGNIZED AND GRANTED TO EMPLOYEES’ IN BOTH THE GOVERNMENTAL AND THE
PRIVATE SECTORS. — The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the
right to form unions or employees’ organizations. The right to unionize
or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to
employees in both the governmental and the private sectors. The Bill of
Rights provides that" (t)he right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged." This guarantee is reiterated in the second paragraph of
Section 3, Article XIII, on Social Justice and Human Rights, which
mandates that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law. . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

3. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO UNIONIZE. — Specifically

with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is
recognized in Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX B which provides
that" (t)he right to self-organization shall not be denied to
government employees."
cralaw virtua1aw library

4. ID.; NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION; BEING A GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND/OR

CONTROLLED CORPORATION WITHOUT AN ORIGINAL CHARTER, HOLDING OF A
CERTIFICATION ELECTION AMONG ITS WORKERS, WITHOUT IMPEDIMENT. — There
is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election
among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the
Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and or controlled
corporation without an original charter Statutory implementation of the
last-cited section of the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the
Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111.

5. ID.; CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS; DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TWO TYPES OF

GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS RENDERED ACADEMIC BY
SUBSEQUENT STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS. — The records do not show that
supervening factual events have mooted the present action. It is meet,
however, to also call attention to the fact that, insofar as
certification elections are concerned, subsequent statutory
developments have rendered academic even the distinction between the
two types of government-owned or controlled corporations and the laws
governing employment relations therein, as hereinbefore discussed. For,
whether the employees of NHC are covered by the Labor Code or by the
civil service laws, a certification election may be conducted.

6. ID.; DETERMINATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE AMONG

EMPLOYEES IN CORPORATIONS AND ENTITIES COVERED BY THE LABOR CODE. — For
employees in corporations and entities covered by the Labor Code, the
determination of the exclusive bargaining representative is
particularly governed by Articles 255 to 259 of said Code. Article 256
provides for the procedure when there is a representation issue in
organized establishments, while Article 257 covers unorganized
establishments. These Labor Code provisions are fleshed out by Rules V
to VII, Book V of the Omnibus Implementing Rules.

7. ID.; EMPLOYEES COVERED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE LAWS; GUIDELINES FOR THE
EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHT TO ORGANIZE COVERED UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
180. — With respect to other civil servants, that is, employees of all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the
government including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters and who are, therefore, covered by the civil service
laws, the guidelines for the exercise of their right to organize is
provided for under Executive Order No. 180. Chapter IV thereof,
consisting of Sections 9 to 12, regulates the determination of the
"sole and exclusive employees’ representative."

3. D E C I S I O N

REGALADO, J.:

The employees of the public sector comprise the largest bloc of

workers in our national work force. Governmental bureaucracy is
continually being reorganized to cope with the growing complexity of
the problems and needs of political and administrative governance.
As the increase in the number of government employees grows apace,
the need to enhance their welfare correspondingly becomes more
imperative. While it may be assumed that the Government is exerting
efforts to advance the interests of its employees, it is quite
understandable that the employees themselves should actively seek
arrangements whereby they can participate more meaningfully in
management and employment relationships. There is, thus, a
proliferation of unions or employees’ organizations, each seeking
concomitant representational recognition.

The antecedent facts which led to the filing of this special civil
action for certiorari are clear and undisputed. The juridical status
and relevant circumstances of respondent corporation have been
established in a case of illegal dismissal filed against it, as
previously decided by the Court and hereinafter discussed. However,
submitted this time for Our resolution is a controversy on the
propriety of and requirements for certification elections in
government-owned or controlled corporations like the Respondent.

Respondent National Housing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as

NHC) is a corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive
Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government
Corporations, dated January 1, 1951. Its shares of stock are and
have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from
its incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law. The
government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government
Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the
Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and
Development Corporation and the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation. 1 Petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied
Services (TUPAS, for brevity) is a legitimate labor organization
with a chapter in NHC.
chanrobles.com : virtual law library

On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a

certification election with Regional Office No. IV of the Department
of Labor in order to determine the exclusive bargaining
representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its
members comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation.
2 The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an
order, dated November 7, 1977, holding that NHC "being a government-
owned and or controlled corporation its employees/workers are
prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for
purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II,
Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code." 3

From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor

Relations 4 where, acting thereon in BLR Case No. A-984-77 (RO4-MED-
1090-77), Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal
and ordered the holding of a certification election. 5 This order
was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his
resolution of November 21, 1978 6 upon a motion for reconsideration
of respondent NHC.

In the instant petition for certiorari, TUPAS seeks the reversal of

the said resolution and prays that a certification election be held
among the rank and file employees of NHC.

In retrospect, it will be recalled that in a former case of illegal

dismissal involving the same respondent corporation, 7 We had ruled
that the employees of NHC and of other government owned or
controlled corporations were governed by civil service laws, rules
and regulations pursuant to the 1973 Constitution which provided
that "the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision
and instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations." 8

It was therein stressed that to allow subsidiary corporations to be

excluded from the civil service laws would be to permit the
circumvention or emasculation of the above-quoted constitutional
provision. As perceptively analyzed therein," (i)t would be possible
for a regular ministry of government to create a host of subsidiary
corporations under the Corporation Code funded by a willing
legislature. A government-owned corporation could create several
subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporations would enjoy
the best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be
privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required
by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission on
Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive
restraints of the open market nor to the terms and conditions of
civil service employment."  chanrobles law library : red

The rule, however, was modified in the 1987 Constitution, the

corresponding provision whereof declares that" (t)he civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies
of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters." 9

Consequently, the civil service now covers only government-owned or

controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that
is those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not
those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. As
We recently held —

". . ., the situations sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution

and expressed by this Court in the National Housing Corporation case
. . . appear relegated to relative insignificance by the 1987
Constitutional provision that the Civil Service embraces government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters and
therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not include
government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as
subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled corporations under
the general corporation law." 10

While the aforecited cases sought different reliefs, that is,

reinstatement consequent to illegal dismissal, the same lis mota
determinative of the present special civil action was involved
therein.
chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form

unions or employees’ organizations. The right to unionize or to form
organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees
in both the governmental and the private sectors. The Bill of Rights
provides that" (t)he right of the people, including those employed
in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged."
11

This guarantee is reiterated in the second paragraph of Section 3,

Article XIII, on Social Justice and
that the State "shall guarantee the
organization, collective bargaining
concerted activities, including the
with law. . . ."
Human Rights, which mandates
rights of all workers to self-
and negotiations, and peaceful
right to strike in accordance
cralaw virtua1aw library

Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to

unionize is recognized in Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX B 12
which provides that" (t)he right to self-organization shall not be
denied to government employees." The rationale of and justification
for this innovation which found expression in the aforesaid
provision was explained by its proponents, as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The government is in a sense the repository of the national

sovereignty and, in that respect, it must be held in reverence if
not in awe. It symbolizes the unity of the nation, but it does
perform a mundane task as well. It is an employer in every sense of
the word except that terms and conditions of work are set forth
through a Civil Service Commission. The government is the biggest
employer in the Philippines. There is an employer-employee
relationship and we all know that the accumulated grievances of
several decades are now beginning to explode in our faces among
government workers who feel that the rights afforded by the Labor
Code, for example, to workers in the private sector have been
effectively denied to workers in government in what looks like a
grotesque, (sic) a caricature of the equal protection of the laws.
For example, . . . there were many occasions under the old
government when wages and cost of living allowances were granted to
workers in the private sector but denied to workers in the
government for some reason or another, and the government did not
even state the reasons why. The government employees were being
discriminated against. As a general rule, the majority of the
world’s countries now entertain public service unions. What they
really add up to is that the employees of the government form their
own association. Generally, they do not bargain for wages because
these are fixed in the budget but they do acquire a forum where,
among other things, professional and self-development is (sic)
promoted and encouraged. They also act as watchdogs of their own
bosses so that when graft and corruption is committed, generally, it
is the unions who are no longer afraid by virtue of the armor of
self-organization that become the public’s own allies for detecting
graft and corruption and for exposing it. . . ." 13

There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification

election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are
covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and or
controlled corporation without an original charter Statutory
implementation of the last-cited section of the Constitution is
found in Article 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive
Order No. 111, thus: chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"Right of employees in the public service. — Employees of the

government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall
have the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their
respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall
have the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to
law."
cralaw virtua1aw library

The records do not show that supervening factual events have mooted
the present action. It is meet, however, to also call attention to
the fact that, insofar as certification elections are concerned,
subsequent statutory developments have rendered academic even the
distinction between the two types of government-owned or controlled
corporations and the laws governing employment relations therein, as
hereinbefore discussed. For, whether the employees of NHC are
covered by the Labor Code or by the civil service laws, a
certification election may be conducted.

For employees in corporations and entities covered by the Labor

Code, the determination of the exclusive bargaining representative
is particularly governed by Articles 255 to 259 of said Code.
Article 256 provides for the procedure when there is a
representation issue in organized establishments, while Article 257
covers unorganized establishments. These Labor Code provisions are
fleshed out by Rules V to VII, Book V of the Omnibus Implementing
Rules. chanrobles law library

With respect to other civil servants, that is, employees of all

branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the
government including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters and who are, therefore, covered by the civil
service laws, the guidelines for the exercise of their right to
organize is provided for under Executive Order No. 180. Chapter IV
thereof, consisting of Sections 9 to 12, regulates the determination
of the "sole and exclusive employees’ representative." Under Section
12, "where there are two or more duly registered employees’
organizations in the appropriate organizational unit, the Bureau of
 Labor Relations shall, upon petition, order the conduct of
certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive
representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organizational
unit."cralaw virtua1aw library

Parenthetically, note should be taken of the specific qualification

in the Constitution that the State "shall guarantee the rights of
all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law" and that" (t)hey shall also participate in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law." 14 (Emphasis supplied.)

ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed resolution of the

Bureau of Labor Relations, dated November 21, 1978, is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE and the conduct of a certification election among the
affected employees of respondent National Housing Corporation in
accordance with the rules therefor is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

3. Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use

without just compensation.

[G.R. NO. 147245. March 31, 2005]

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION

ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
FRANCISCO DIAZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF THE LATE MANUEL DIAZ, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the

Decision2 of 26 January 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
57493. The Court of Appeals modified the Decision3 of 28 November 1996
of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28 in Civil
Case No. 1593-AF, but affirmed the trial court's award of P4 million
to respondent.

Antecedent Facts

Manuel Diaz owned approximately 172 hectares of tenanted agricultural

land ("Property") devoted to the planting of palay. The Property was
located in La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, and allegedly yielded
between 132 to 200 cavans of palay per hectare every year. After
Manuel Diaz's death, his son, Franciso Diaz ("respondent"), was
appointed administrator of the Property.

In 1972, the National Irrigation Administration ("NIA") bulldozed

about ten (10) hectares of the Property to build two irrigation canals
("canals"). Although the canals when finished occupied only a portion
of the 10 hectares, the entire area became prone to flooding two
months out of every year because of the side-burrow method NIA used in
the construction of the canals.4 NIA completed the canals without
instituting expropriation proceedings or indemnifying the Property's
owners.
Respondent sought compensation from NIA for the land affected by the
canals, as well as for losses due to unrealized profits. He submitted
various documents requested by NIA officials and even traveled to
NIA's Manila office to present his claims.

In 1980, NIA belatedly offered to buy the portions of the Property

occupied by the canals pursuant to NIA's expansion program. Respondent
and then NIA Acting Administrator Pelagio Gamad, Jr. signed three
deeds of sale5 ("1980 deeds of sale") on 24 December 1980 to convey
15,677, 1,897 and 4,499 square meters, or a total of 22,073 square
meters, of the Property to NIA. For reasons that neither party has
adequately explained, NIA and respondent did not push through with the
sale. The 1980 deeds of sale were never implemented. Respondent did
not receive any consideration pursuant to these deeds.

On 20 August 1993, respondent, as administrator of the Property, filed

an action for damages and just compensation against NIA. Respondent
sought P10 million from NIA as just compensation, P3 million as
unrealized profits or lucro cessante, P1 million attorney's fees, and
costs of suit. Respondent later filed an Amended Complaint,6 in which
respondent additionally prayed that, in the alternative, the court
order NIA to vacate and surrender the Property to respondent, and to
pay damages, interest, attorney's fees and costs of suit. The trial
court accepted and gave due course to the Amended Complaint in its
Order of 22 July 1994.

NIA countered that respondent's right to bring the action had

prescribed in accordance with Republic Act No. 3601 ("RA 3601"), as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 5527 ("PD 552"). NIA also argued
that respondent's failure to pursue the implementation of the 1980
deeds of sale amounted to laches.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court found that NIA took between 9 to 11 hectares of the
Property. NIA never paid respondent for the use of the land or for the
subsequent loss of crops.

The trial court also ruled that respondent's right to seek damages had
not lapsed. The trial court's Decision of 28 November 1996 ("trial
court's decision") reads in part:

xxx Defendant should not waylay the plaintiff by prolonging the

negotiation and then later on invoked (sic) prescription of action as
a defense, this is a plain and simple way of defrauding others which
Courts of Justice should not countenance. While it is true that R.A.
No. 3601 is (sic) amended by PD 552 sets a limit on [or] capped the
time within which to file the claims against acts and/or usurpation by
the NIA, running of the prescriptive period should not be absolute but
must be dependent on the circumstances attendant to each case, because
of the confiscatory nature of the law.

IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION of the matters relevant

to the instant case, the Court finds for the plaintiff and judgment is
hereby rendered directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
following:
1. the sum of Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) representing payment
to the 11 hectares of riceland occupied by the irrigation canal that
traversed on the property of the Diazes;

2. the sum of Six Million Six Hundred Seventy Nine Thousand Two
Hundred Pesos (P6,679,200.00) representing the loss of 23,396 cavans
of palay on account of the destruction made when the two irrigation
canals were constructed on the property of the plaintiff through side-
burrow instead of the earthfilling method, thus resulting further
depression on the lots of the plaintiffs where during rainy season
water stays for months and (sic) cannot be planted with palay;

3. the sum of P500,000.00 by way of attorney's fees; and defendant is

likewise directed to pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.

4.Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be

passed.
Philamlife vs. Auditor General
Posted on September 9, 2015
Philamlife vs. Auditor General [GR. 19255 January 18, 1968]

Facts: On January 1950, Philippine American Life Insurance Co.

(PHILAM) and, foreign corporation, American International Reinsurance
Co.(AIRCO) entered into a reinsurance treaty where PHILAM agreed to
reinsure with AIRCO the excess of life insurance on the lives of
persons written by PHILAM. In their agreement it is also stipulated
that even though PHILAM is already on a risk for its maximum retention
under policies previously issued, when new policies are applied for
and issued they can cede automatically any amount, within the limits
specified.

No question ever arose with respect to the remittances made by

Philamlife to Airco before July 16, 1959, the date of approval of the
Margin Law.

Subsequently, the Central Bank of the Philippines collected the sum of

P268,747.48 as foreign exchange margin on Philamlife remittances to
Airco made subsequent to July 16, 1959.

PHILAM then filed with the CB a claim for refund for the same amount
arguing that the reinsurance premiums remitted were paid on January
1950 and is therefore exempt from the 25% foreign exchange margin fee.
The Acting legal counsel of the Monetary board resolved that
reinsurance contracts entered into and approved by the Central Bank
before July 17, 1959 are exempt from the payment of the 25% foreign
exchange margin, even if remittances thereof are made after July 17,
1959.

Still the Auditor of the CB denied PHILAM’s claim for refund and
reconsideration was denied, hence the petition.
Issue: Whether PHILAM’s claim was covered by the exemption

Held: The Court held in the negative stating that for an exemption to
come into play, there must be a reinsurance policy or, as in the
reinsurance treaty provided, a “reinsurance cession” which may be
automatic or facultative.

To distinguish, a reinsurance policy is a contract of indemnity one

insurer makes with another to protect the first insurer from a risk it
has already assumed. On the other hand, a reinsurance treaty is merely
an agreement between two insurance companies whereby one agrees to
surrender and the other to accept reinsurance business pursuant to
provisions specified in the treaty. Treaties are contracts for
insurance; reinsurance policies or cessions are contracts of
insurance.

Although the reinsurance treaty precedes the Margin Law by over nine
years nothing in that treaty obligates PHILAM to remit to AIRCO a
fixed, certain, and obligatory sum by way of reinsurance premiums. All
that the reinsurance treaty provides on this point is that PHILAM
“agrees to reinsure.” The treaty speaks of a probability; not a
reality.

PHILAM’s obligation to remit reinsurance premiums becomes fixed and

definite upon the execution of the reinsurance cession. Because, for
every life insurance policy surrendered to AIRCO, PHILAM agrees to pay
premium. It is only after a reinsurance cession is made that payment
of reinsurance premium may be exacted, as it is only after PHILAM
seeks to remit that reinsurance premium that the obligation to pay the
margin fee arises.

5. Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies

and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person
by reason of poverty.

G.R. No. 207535, February 10, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICARDO LAGBO A.K.A

RICARDO LABONG Y MENDOZA, Accused-Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant Ricardo

Lagbo (Lagbo) assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
June 15, 2012, in CA-GR. CR-HC No. 04060, which affirmed with modification
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City, Branch
169, in Criminal Case Nos. 28711-MN, 28712-MN and 28713-MN, finding Lagbo
guilty of three counts of qualified rape.

The antecedents are as follows:

The eldest of six (6) children, AAA,3 was born on February 17, 1988, as
evidenced by her certificate of live birth.4 She was 12 years old when her
father, accused-appellant, first raped her.

One afternoon in October 2000, AAA was washing dishes inside their house.
She was alone with her father, as her mother was at the marketplace
selling vegetables while her siblings were playing outside the house. All
of a sudden, accused-appellant grabbed her and forcibly removed her short
pants and her panty. After removing his short pants, accused appellant
pushed AAA and made her lie down on their "papag". Thereafter, he boxed
AAA's face twice and threatened to kill her mother and siblings. He then
placed himself on top of AAA and made pumping motions while covering her
mouth and pulling her hair. AAA felt pain and cried as accused-appellant's
sex organ penetrated hers. After gratifying himself, accused-appellant put
on his clothes, sat beside AAA and told her to stop crying. AAA did not
relate this incident to her mother for fear that accused-appellant would
make good his threat to harm her mother and siblings.

In March 2001, accused-appellant, again, violated AAA's womanhood.

Reminiscent of the first rape, while she and accused-appellant were alone
inside their house, the latter again boxed AAA's face, forced her to lie
down on the "papag", undressed her, threatened her, placed himself on top
of her, covered her mouth and pulled her hair while repeatedly making
pumping motions. This time, however, AAA mustered the courage to relate
the incident to her mother when the latter arrived. To AAA's
disappointment, though, her mother refused to believe her.

Accused-appellant committed the third rape on February 14, 2002. He and

AAA were again left alone inside their house. She was made to lie down on
the kitchen floor where accused-appellant succeeded in sexually defiling
her.

AAA was finally able to report her rape to the police when her mother
filed a complaint against accused-appellant, on April 3, 2003, for
allegedly mauling her. Taking advantage of this opportunity, AAA related
her misfortune to the authorities.

Thus, in three (3) separate Informations,5 all dated April 4, 2003,

accused-appellant was indicted for rape qualified by his relationship
with, and the minority of, AAA. Pertinent portions of the Information in
Criminal Case No. 28712-MN read as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

That sometime in the month of October, 2000 in the Municipality of

Navotas, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of [AAA]
exercising moral ascendancy and overwhelming influence over the latter,
with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
the said [AAA], a minor of 12 years old, by then and there inserting his
organ at the victim's vagina against her will and without her consent,
which act debases, degrade[s] or demeans the instrinsic worth and dignity
of a child as a human being thereby endangering her youth, normal growth
and development.6
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The two other Informations, which were docketed as Crim. Case Nos. 28711-
MN and 28713-MN, are similarly worded as to place, the elements of the
crime charged, and the persons involved, except for date of the commission
of the crime and the age of the victim. In Crim. Case No. 28711-MN, the
crime was alleged to have been committed in March, 2001 when AAA was
already fifteen (15) years old, while in Crim. Case No. 28713-MN, AAA was
also fifteen (15) years old but the crime was allegedly committed on
February 14, 2002.

On July 9, 2003, accused-appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to

the charges.7 The cases were jointly tried after accused-appellant waived
his right to pre-trial.8 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On March 2, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision finding accused-appellant

guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused RICARDO LAGBO A.K.A. RICARDO

LABONG, is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts
of Qualified Rape. For each count, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA without eligibility for parole, and he is further
ordered to pay the victim in the amount of SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P75,000.00) as civil indemnity; SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00)
as moral damages; and TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) as exemplary
damages, plus costs.

SO ORDERED.9 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The RTC gave full faith and credence to the testimony of AAA and held that
accused-appellant's mere denial without any corroborative evidence leaves
the court without any option but to convict him.

Accused-appellant appealed the RTC Decision with the CA.

On June 15, 2012, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision affirming, with
modification, the judgment of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads, thus: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED

and the assailed Judgment dated March 2, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 169, Malabon City in Criminal Cases No. 28711-MN, 28712-MN and
28713-MN are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the award of
exemplary damages which is hereby increased to Thirty Thousand Pesos
(Php30,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

6. Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses

punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.

G.R. No. 213847, Aug. 18, 2015

Juan Ponce Enrile

vs.
Sandiganbayan (3rd division) and People of the Philippines
 

Facts:
Year 2014, Sen. Enrile was charged with plunder before the
Sandiganbayan for their alleged involvement in the diversion and
misuse of appropriation under the PDAF. When his warrant was issued,
Sen. Enrile voluntarily surrendered to the CIDG and was later confined
and detained at the PNP General Hospital, he then filed a motion to
fix bail where he argued that:

1. He should be allowed to post bail as a matter of right;

2. Although charged with plunder his penalty would only be
reclusion temporal considering that there are two mitigating
circumstances, his voluntary surrender and that he is already
at the age of 90;
3. That he is not a flight risk and his medical condition must be
seriously considered.
The Sandiganbayan however, denied his motion on the grounds that:

1. He is charged with a capital offense;

2. That it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of his
bail because the prosecution have not yet presented its
evidences.
Sen. Enrile then filed a certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:  
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for denying his motion to
fix bail?

Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored
the objective of bail and unwarrantedly disregarded Sen. Enrile’s
fragile health and advanced age. Bail is a matter right and is
safeguarded by the constitution, its purpose is to ensure the personal
appearance of the accused during trial or whenever the court requires
and at the same time recognizing the guarantee of due process which is
the presumption of his innocence until proven guilty. The Supreme
Court further explained that Bail for the provisional liberty of the
accused, regardless of the crime charged should be allowed
independently of the merits charged, provided his continued
incarceration is injurious to his health and endanger his life. Hence,
the Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen. Enrile be granted the
right to bail it will enable him to have his medical condition be
properly addressed and attended, which will then enable him to attend
trial therefore achieving the true purpose of bail.

7. Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal

offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

LAUREL VS. MISA

Not Cited Recently

G.R. No. L-200, March 28, 1946 ANASTACIO LAUREL, PETITIONER, VS.
ERIBERTO MISA, AS DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

BENGZON, J.:

Anastasio Laurel demands his release from Bilibid Prison, mainly

asserting that Commonwealth Act No. 682, creating the People's Court,
specially section 19, under which he is detained as a political
prisoner, is unconstitutional and void. The Solicitor General, meeting
the issue, sustains the validity of the whole law.

According to the pleadings, the petitioner, a Filipino citizen, was

arrested in Camarines Sur in May, 1945, by the United States Army, and
was interned, under a commitment order "for his active collaboration
with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation," but in September,
1945, he was turned over to the Commonwealth Government, and since
then has been under the custody of the respondent Director of Prisons.

The legality of the petitioner's arrest and detention by the military

authorities of the United States is now beyond question.[1] His present
incarceration, which is merely a continuation of his previous
apprehension, has lasted "more than six hours" counted from his
delivery to the respondent; but section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682
provides in part as follows:

"Upon delivery by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the

United States in the Philippines of the persons detained by him as
political prisoners, to the Commonwealth Government, the Office of
Special Prosecutors shall receive all records, documents, exhibits and
such other things as the Government of the United States may have
turned over in connection with and/or affecting said political
prisoners, examine the aforesaid records, documents, exhibits, etc.,
and take, as speedily as possible, such action as may be
proper: Provided, however, * * *. And, provided, further, That, in the
interest of public security, the provisions of article one, hundred
twenty-five of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be deemed, as
they are hereby, suspended, insofar as the aforesaid political
prisoners are concerned, until the filing of the corresponding
information with the People's Court, but the period of suspension
shall, not be more than six (6) months from the formal delivery of
said political prisoners by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the United States in the Philippines to the Commonwealth
Government."
In view of this provision, and the statement of the Solicitor-General
that even on the date the petition was presented his office had, ready
for filing, an information charging herein petitioner with treason, we
fail to see how petitioner's release may now be decreed.

However, he contends that the aforesaid section violates our

Constitution, because it is (a) discriminatory in nature; (b) unlawful
delegation of legislative powers; and (c) retroactive in operation.

(a) It is first argued that the suspension is not general in

application, it being made operative only to "the political prisoners
concerned," that other citizens are not denied the six-hour limitation
in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, that such discrimination is
unexcusable and amounts to denial of the equal protection of the laws.

It is accepted doctrine in constitutional law that the "equal

protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall
operateso long as the classification is not unreasonable.[2] Instances
of valid classification are numerous. The point to be determined then,
is whether the differentiation in the case of the political prisoner
is unreasonable or arbitrary.

One of the proclamations issued by General MacArthur upon his arrival

in Leyte (December 29, 1944) referred to those Filipino citizens who
had voluntarily given aid, comfort and sustenance to the Japanese. It
announced his purpose to hold them in restraint for the duration of
the war, "whereafter they shall be turned over to the Philippine
Government for its judgment upon their respective cases." When active
hostilities with Japan terminated, General MacArthur ordered the
delivery to the Commonwealth of all the prisoners theretofore taken
under his said proclamation. There were 6,000 in round numbers. The
problem was momentous and urgent. Criminal informations against all,
or a majority, or even a substantial number of them could not be
properly filed in the six-hour period. They could not obviously be
turned loose, considering the conditions of peace and order, and the
safety of the prisoners themselves. So the President, by virtue of his
emergency powers, promulgated Executive Order No. 65 suspending
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, for not more than thirty days,
with regard to said detainees or internees, having found such
suspension necessary "to enable the Government to fulfill its
responsibilities and to adopt temporary measures in relation with
their custody and the investigation, prosecution and disposal of their
respective cases." The Order added that it shall be in force and
effect until the Congress shall provide otherwise. Congress later
approved Commonwealth Act No. 682, establishing the People's Court and
the Office of Special Prosecutors for the prosecution and trial of
crimes against national security committed during the second World
War. It found the thirty-day period too short compared with the
facilities available to the prosecution, and set the limit at six
months.

Considering the circumstances, we are not prepared to hold the

extension of the period for the political detainees was unreasonable.
The Legislature chose to give the prosecutor's office sufficient time
to investigate and to file the proper chargeor to discharge those whom
it may find innocent. If time had not been granted, the prosecutor
would perhaps have been forced to indict all the detainees
indiscriminately; reserving, of course, its right subsequently to
request the liberation of those it may think not guilty. But such
wholesale indictment was obviously neither practical nor desirable. We
will allow that there may be some dispute as to the wisdom or adequacy
of the extension. Yet the point is primarily for the Legislature to
decide. The only issue is the power to promulgate special rules for
the custody and investigation of active collaborationists, and so long
as reasons exist in support of the legislative action courts should be
careful not to deny it.

In this connection, it must be stated there can really be no

substantial ground to assail the six-month extension, in view of the
provisions authorizing the release under bail. Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code was intended to prevent any abuse resulting from
confining a person without informing him of his offense and without
permitting him to go on bail. Commonwealth Act No. 682 gives no
occasion to such abuse.

The political prisoners know, or ought to know, they are being kept
for crimes against national security. And they are generally permitted
to furnish bail bonds.

(b) There is hardly any merit to the argument that as "the duration of
the suspension of article 125 is placed in the hands of the Special
Prosecutor's Office," the section constitutes an invalid delegation of
legislative powers; for as explained by the Solicitor-General, the
resultsome informations filed before, others afterwardsis merely the
"consequence of the fact that six thousand informations could not be
filed simultaneously, and that some one had to be first or some one
else, necessarily the last." The law,. in effect, permitted the
Solicitor-General to file the informations within six months. And
statutes permitting officers to perform their duties within certain
periods of time may not surely be declared invalid delegations of
legislative power.

(c) Nor is the position correct that section 19 is retro-active in its

operation. It refers to detention after its passagenot before.
Incidentally, there is no constitutional objection to retroactive
statutes where they relate, to remidies or procedure.[3]

The argument is advanced that when he was arrested, (May, 1945),

article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was in force, and petitioner
could have asked for release after six hours and, therefore,
Commonwealth Act No. 682 that takes away that right is Ex Post Facto,
retroactive and fundamentally objectionable. The premises are
incorrect. In May, 1945, he could not have asked for release after six
hours. In other words, he would not have been discharged from custody.
(Raquiza vs. Bradford, supra.) Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
was in force, it is true; but not as to him. The laws of the
Commonwealth were revived in Camarines Sur by operation of General
MacArthur's proclamation of October 23, 1944, upon its liberation from
enemy control; but subject to his reservation to hold active
collaborationists in restraint "for the duration of the war." So,
persons apprehended under that directive, for treasonable
collaboration, could not necessarily invoke the benefits of article
125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Undoubtedly the Legislature could validly repeal section 125 of the

Revised Penal Code. Had it done so, herein petitioner would have no
ground to protest on constitutional principles, as he could claim no
vested right to the continued enforcement of said section.
[4] 
Therefore, A Fortiori he may not complain, if, instead of repealing
that section, our law-making body merely suspended its operation for a
definite period of time. Should he counter that such repeal or
suspension must be general to be valid, he will be referred to the
preceding considerations regarding classification and the equal
protection of the laws.

Wherefore, we perceive no irreconcilable conflict between the

Constitution and the challenged portions of section 19 of Commonwealth
Act No. 682.

The other features of the People's Court Act which are the subject of
denunciation by petitioner do not, in our opinion, require specific
elucidation at this time, because he has not as yet been held into
that court, and the issues appear to have no important or necessary
connection with his current deprivation of liberty.[5]

The petition for the writ of Habeas Corpus will be denied. With costs.

8. Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it.

G.R. No. L-4855           October 11, 1951

JOSE M. NAVA ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. MAGNO GATMAITAN, ETC., respondent.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-4964           October 11, 1951

AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON, AGUSTIN P.MONTESA, ETC., respondent.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-5102           October 11, 1951

EUGENIO ANGELES, ETC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. GAVINO S.ABAYA, ETC., respondent.

Laurel, Sabido, Almario and Laurel, Antonio Barredo and Enrique Fernando
for petitioner Amado V. Hernandez.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz, Solicitor Felix Makasiar and
Solicitor Matriniano P. Vivo for respondent Judges Montesa and Gatmaitan.
City fiscal Eugenio Angeles, in his own behalf.
Vicente A. Rafael and Macario L. Nicolas for the respondents in case L-
5102 except the respondent judge.
Judge Gavino S. Abaya in his own behalf.
Abeto and Soriano and Fermin Z. Caram, Jr. for the petitioners in case L-
4855.
Claro M. Recto, Jose P. Laurel, and fred Ruiz castro as amici curaie.

PARAS, C.J.:

By express mandate of the Constitution (Article III, Section 1, Paragraph

14), the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended
whenever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.
The power to suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus in case
of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when
the public safety requires it, has been lodged by the Constitution
(Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph 2) in the President.

On January 31, 1905, for the first time in Philippine history, the writ
of habeas corpus was suspended in the provinces of Batangas and Cavite
under the following Executive Order issued by governor General Luke E.
Wright:

WHEREAS, certain organized bands of ladrones exist in the Provinces

of Cavite and Batangas who are levying forced contributions upon the
people, who frequently require them, under compulsion, to join their
bands, and who kill or maim the most barbarous manner those who fail
to respond to their unlawful demands, and are therefore terrifying
the law-abiding and inoffensive people of those provinces; and

WHEREAS, these bands have in several instances attacked police and

constabulary detachments, and are in open insurrection against the
constituted authorities, and it is believed that the said bands have
numerous agents and confederates living within the municipalities of
said provinces; and

WHEREAS, because of the foregoing conditions there exists a state of

insecurity and terrorism among the people which makes it impossible
in the ordinary way to conduct preliminary investigations before the
justices of the peace and other judicial officers:

In the interest of public safety, it is hereby ordered that the writ

of habeas corpus is from this date suspended in the Provinces of
Cavite and Batangas.

On October 22, 1950, for the second time in the Philippine history, the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was decreed by
virtue of the following Proclamation No. 210 issued by the President:

WHEREAS, lawless elements of the country have committed overt acts

of sedition, insurrection and rebellion for the purpose of
overthrowing the duly constituted authorities and, in pursuance
thereof, have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting
public safety and the security of the state;
 WHEREAS, these acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion
consisiting of armed raids, sorties and ambushes and the wanton acts
of murder, rape, spoilage, looting, arson, planned destruction of
public and private buildings, and attacks against civilian lives and
properties, as reported by the Commanding General of the Armed
Forces, have seriously endangered and still continue to endanger the
public safety;

WHEREAS, these acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion have

been perpetrated by various groups of persons well organized for
concerted action and well armed with machine guns, rifles, pistols
and other automatic weapons, by reason whereof there is actual
danger of rebellion which may extend throughout the country;

WHEREAS, 100 leading members of these lawless elements have been

apprehended and are presently under detention, and strong and
convincing evidence has been found in their possession to show that
they are engaged in rebellious, seditiuos and otherwise subersive
acts as above set forth; and

WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action

be taken to insure the peace and security of the population and to
maintain the authority of the government;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, ELPIDIO QUIRINO, President of the Philippines, by

virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, section 10,
Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus for the persons presently detained, as
well as all others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the
crimes of sedition, insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes
and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occassion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith.

The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relive persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. (Villavicencio vs, Lukban, 39
Phil., 778,788.) It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of
his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have
ascertained if he is held under lawful authority. (Quintos vs. Director of
Prisons, 55 Phil., 304, 306.)

The necessity for suspending the writ of habeas corpus in 1905 arose
obviously from the fact that it was "impossible in the ordinary way to
conduct preliminary investigations before the justice of the peace and
other judicial officers," so that undoubtedly it was never aimed at the
indefinite detention of suspects, but at an investigation (other than
judicial) to determine whether there is evidence sufficient for the filing
in court of the necessary information.

The immediate cause for the issuance of Proclamation No. 210 on October
22, 1950, was the apprehension and detention of 100 alleged leading
members of lawless elements in whose possession strong and convincing
evidence was allegedly found showing that they are engaged in rebellious,
seditious and otherwise subversive acts. The privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus had to be suspended not only because it was desirable for
the prosecuting officials to have sufficient time to investigate and file
the necessary charges in court, but also because a public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail
to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the
period of six hours, shall suffer the penalties provided in article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code. In other words, the only effect of Proclamation
No. 210 is that any person detained thereunder has no right to have the
cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice
through a writ of habeas corpus.
The important question is whether or not, after a person covered by the
Proclamation has been formally indicted in court by the filing against him
of an information charging rebellion with multiple murder, arson and
robberies, he may be entitled to bail.

Under paragraph 16, Section 1, Areticle II of the Constitution,all persons

shall before conviction be bailable by sufficientsureties, except those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. The crime
of rebellion or insurrection is certainly not a capital offense, because
it is penalized only by prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
20,000pesos. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the right to
bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights are separate and co-equal. If the
intention of the framers of the Constitution was that the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries or implies the
suspension of the right to bail, they would have very easily provided that
all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
strong and except when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. As stated in the case of Ex parte Miligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 Law
Ed. 297, the Constitution limited the suspension to only one great right,
leaving the rest to remain forever inviolable.

It is essential to the safety of every government that, in a great

crisis, like the one we have just passed through, there should be a
power somewhere of suspending the writ of habeas corpus. In every
war, there are men of previously good character, wicked enough to
counsel their fellow citizens to resist the measures deemed
necessary by a good government to sustain its just authority and
overthrow its enemies; and their influence may lead to dangerous
combinations. In the emergency of the times, an immediate public
investigation according to law may not be possible; and yet, the
peril to the country may be too imminent to suffer such persons to
go at large. Unquestionably, there is then an exigency which demands
that the government, if it should see fit, in the exercise of a
proper discretion, to make arrests, should not be required to
produce the person arrested in answer to a writ of habeas corpus.
The constitution goes no further. It does not say after a writ
of habeas corpus is denied a citizen, that he shall be tried
otherwise than by the course of common law. If it had intended this
result, it was easy by the use of direct words to have accomplished
it. The illustrious men who framed that instrument were guarding the
foundations of civil liberty against the abuses of unlimited power;
they were full of wisdom, and the lessons of history informed them
that a trial by an established court, asisted by an impartial jury,
was the only sure way of protecting the citizen against oppression
and wrong. Knowing this, they limited the suspension of one great
right, and left the rest to remain forever inviolable.

The purpose of the proclamation has already been accomplished inrespect of

those who are now facing charges in court, to be dealtwith necessarily in
accordance with the constitution and the law.The court, in passing upon
petitions to bail and granting thesame in proper cases, does not inquire
into the cause of their detention which is plainly under and by virtue of
commitmentsissued by the court upon the filing of the information
forrebellion with multiple murder, arson and robberies. The
court,therefore, cannot be said to be interfering in an act of
theExecutive, for it cannot be seriously contended that, after thefiling
of the information, the accused continues to be underdetention as a result
of an executive commitment and stillcovered by the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. otherwise, the suspension will
operate as a judgment of conviction, in violation of the constitutional
mandate that no person shall be held to answer for criminal offense
without due process of law (Article III, section 1, Paragraph 15). "The
laws which protect the liberties of the whole people must not be violated
or set aside in order to inflict, even upon the guilty, unauthorized
though merited justice." Ex parte Milligan, supra.
The right to bail, along with the right of an accused to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf (Article III, Section 1, Paragraph
17, of the Constitution), tends to aid the accused to prove his innocence
and obtain acquittal. If it be contended that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus includes the suspension of the
distinct right to bail or to be provisionally at liberty, it would a
fortiori imply the suspension of all his other rights (even the rights to
be tried by a court) that may win for him ultimate acquittal and, hence,
absolute freedom. The latter result is not insisted upon for being
patently untenable. it is not correct to say that, if a person covered by
Proclamation No. 210 is not entitled to be released before he is indicted
in court, there is more reason to hold that he should not be released
after an information is filed against him, because it is then logical to
assume that the Government holds sufficient evidence. If he cannot secure
his release before the filing of the information, it is because, in view
of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the court
cannot look into the legality of his detention under an executive act, and
not because he is assumed to be guilty. As already stated, after the
filing of the information, in granting to bail in proper cases, the court
does not determine the legality of his prior detention which has already
been superseded by a detention underjudicial process, but merely proceeds
with and carries into effect its jurisdiction over the criminal case and
grants a right guaranteed by the Constitution. Besides, it is significant
that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be
innocent (Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 17).

We are not insensitive to the proposition that the very nature of the
crime of rebellion suggests the likehood that a person accused thereof
will jump his bail. The remedy, however, is unfortunately not in the hands
of the court. The lawmakers or the framers of the Constitution should have
made the offense capital or even unbailable.

In the cases now before us, the accused have been charged with rebellion
so complexed with other offenses as to make them capital. Their right to
bail is accordingly not absolute and may be denied when evidence of guilt
is strong. The filing of the information implies that the prosecution
holds sufficient evidence for conviction, and it is fair to suppose that
the court will duly exercise its judgment when called upon to pass on the
question of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. At any rate,
on admission to bail, the accused is delivered to the custody of his
sureties as a continuance of the original detention. (U.S. vs. Sunico and
Ng Chiong, 40 Phil. 826).

And it should be borne in mind that if the worse comes to the worst — to
the extent that the security of the State is in factimperiled and the
regular constitutional processes can no longerbe observed with general
safety to the people, — the President isauthorized by the Constitution
(Article VIII, Section 10,Paragraph 2) to "place the Philippines or any
part thereof undermartial law." Even then, the primordial objective should
be a"regime of justice" as contemplated in the Preamble of the
Constitution. The stubborn fact, however, is that the meresuspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is anadmission that the courts
can function and are functioningnormal; otherwise, there is no need for
the suspension as therewill be no court to grant the writ.

Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.

9. Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against

himself.
G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 March 3, 1975

CLEMENTE MAGTOTO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MIGUEL M. MANGUERA, Judge of the Court of First Instance (Branch
II) of Occidental Mindoro, The PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, IGNACIO
CALARA, JR., and LOURDES CALARA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-37424 March 3, 1975

MAXIMO SIMEON, LOUIS MEDNATT, INOCENTES DE LUNA, RUBEN MIRANDA,

ALFONSO BALLESTEROS, RUDOLFO SUAREZ, MANUEL MANALO, ALBERTO GABION,
and RAFAEL BRILL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Criminal
Circuit Court of Pasig, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

G.R. No. L-38929 March 3, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ASAALI S. ISNANI, District Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, Branch II, VICENTE LONGAKIT, and JAIME
DALION, respondents.

Felipe S. Abeleda for petitioner Clemente Magtoto.

Joaquin L. Misa for petitioners Maximo Simeon, et al.

Alan L. Roxas for respondents Ignacio Calara, Jr., et al.

Organo Law Office for respondent Vicente Longakit, et al.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant

Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza for respondent and petitioner
People of the Philippines.

FERNANDEZ, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

The present cases involve an interpretation of Section 20, Article IV

of the New Constitution, which reads:têñ.£îhqwâ£

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against

himself. Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence,

and specifically, the portion thereof which declares inadmissible a

confession obtained from a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense who has not been informed of his right (to
remain silent and) to counsel.1

We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has

and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect.
Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under investigation
for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his
right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the
same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution
on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in
evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the
effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January
17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to
counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed
before that date.

Accordingly, We hereby sustain the orders of the respondent Judges in

G.R. No.
L-37201-022 and G.R. No. L-374243 declaring admissible the confessions
of the accused in said cases, and We hereby set aside the order of the
respondent Judge challenged in G.R. No. L-389294 which declared
inadmissible the confessions of the accused in said case, although
they have not been informed of their right to remain silent and to
counsel before they gave the confessions, because they were
given before the effectivity of the New Constitution.

The reasons for these rulings are as follows:

Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution granted, for the first

time, to a person under investigation for the commission of an
offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right. And
the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that any confession
obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence,
can and should be given effect only when the right already existed and
had been violated. Consequently, because the confessions of the
accused in G.R. Nos. L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929 were taken before the
effectivity of the New Constitution in accordance with the rules then
in force, no right had been violated as to render them inadmissible in
evidence although they were not informed of "their right to remain
silent and to counsel," "and to be informed of such right," because,
We repeat, no such right existed at the time.

The argument that the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, which was added by Republic Act No. 1083 enacted in l954,
which reads as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the

cause of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his
request, to communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel.

impliedly granted to a detained person the right to counsel and to be

informed of such right, is untenable. The only right granted by said
paragraph to a detained person was to be informed of the cause of his
detention. But he must make a request for him to be able to claim the
right to communicate and confer with counsel at any time.

The remark of Senator Cuenco, when Republic Act No. 1083 was being
discussed in the Senate, that the bill which became Republic Act No.
1083 provides that the detained person should be informed of his right
to counsel, was only the personal opinion of Senator Cuenco. We grant
that he was, as We personally knew him to be, a learned lawyer and
senator. But his statement could reflect only his personal opinion
because if Congress had wanted Republic Act No. 1083 to grant a
detained person a right to counsel and to be informed of such right,
it should have been so worded. Congress did not do so.
As originally worded, Senate Bill No. 50, which became Republic Act
No. 1083, provided: "In every case the person detained shall be
allowed, upon his request, to have the services of an attorney or
counsel. In the period of amendment, the phrase "have the services of"
was changed to the present wording "communicate and confer anytime
with his." As the Solicitor General points out in his able memorandum,
apparently the purpose was to bring the provision in harmony with the
provision of a complementary measure, Republic Act No. 857 (effective
July 16, 1953), which provides:têñ.£îhqwâ£

SECTION 1. Any public officer who shall obstruct, prohibit,

or otherwise prevent an attorney entitled to practice in the
courts of the Philippines from visiting and conferring
privately with a person arrested, at any hour of the day or,
in urgent cases, of the night, said visit and conference
being requested by the person arrested or by another acting
in his behalf, shall be punished by arresto mayor.

None of these statutes requires that police investigators inform the

detained person of his "right" to counsel. They only allow him to
request to be given counsel. It is not for this Court to add a
requirement and carry on where both Congress and the President
stopped.

The history behind the new right granted to a detained person by

Section 20, Article IV of the New constitution to counsel and to be
informed of said right under pain of a confession taken in violation
thereof being rendered inadmissible in evidence, clearly shows the
intention to give this constitutional guaranty not a retroactive, but
a prospective, effect so as to cover only confessions taken after the
effectivity of the New Constitution.

To begin with, Section 29, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,

provides:têñ.£îhqwâ£

Confession.—The declaration of an accused expressly

acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, may be given
in evidence against him.

And according to Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court:

Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction.—An

extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient
ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti.

Extrajudicial confessions of the accused in a criminal case are

universally recognized as admissible in evidence against him, based on
the presumption that no one would declare anything against himself
unless such declarations were true. Accordingly, it has been held that
a confession constitutes an evidence of a high order since it is
supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind
would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by
truth and conscience. (U.S. vs. Delos Santos, 24 Phil. 329, 358).

The fundamental rule is that a confession, to be admissible, must be

voluntary. And the first rule in this connection was that before the
confession could be admitted in evidence, the prosecution must first
show to the satisfaction of the Court that the same was freely and
voluntarily made, as provided for in Section 4 of Act 619 of the
Philippine Commission (U.S. vs. Pascual, August 29, 1903, 2 Phil.
458). But with the repeal of said provision of law by the
Administrative Code in 1916, the burden of proof was changed. Now, a
confession is admissible in evidence without previous proof of its
voluntariness on the theory that it is presumed to be voluntary until
the contrary is proved (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p.
264; People vs. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53, 57, citing U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil.
308; People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64; People v. Singh, 45 Phil. 676;
People v. Pereto, 21 SCRA 1469).

And once the accused succeeds in proving that his extrajudicial

confession was made involuntarily, it stands discredited in the eyes
of the law and is as a thing which never existed. It is incompetent as
evidence and must be rejected. The defense need not prove that its
contents are false (U.S. vs. Delos Santos, 24 Phil. 329, 358; U.S. vs.
Zara, 42 Phil. 325, November, 1921). The same rule was followed
in People vs. Nishishima. "Involuntary confessions are uniformly held
inadmissible as evidence — by some courts on the ground that a
confession so obtained is unreliable, and by some on the ground of
humanitarian principles which abhor all forms of torture or unfairness
towards the accused in criminal proceedings. ... ." (57 Phil. 26, 48,
51; 1932).4 * In the concurring opinion of Justice Butte, he said:
"Apart, from the fact that involuntary confessions will be
declared incompetent and are therefore utterly futile, it is high time
to put a stop to these (third degree) practices which are a blot on
our Philippine civilization."

This rule was, however, changed by this court in 1953 in the case
of People vs. Delos Santos, et al., G.R. No. L-4880, citing the rule
in Moncado vs. People's Court, et al., 80 Phil 1, and followed in the
case of People vs. Villanueva, et al. (G.R. No. L-7472, January 31,
1956), to the effect that "a confession to be repudiated, must not
only be proved to have been obtained by force or violence or
intimidation, but also that it is false or untrue, for the law rejects
the confession when by force or violence, the accused is compelled
against this will to tell a falsehood, not when by such force and
violence is compelled to tell the truth." This ruling was followed in
a number of cases.5

But the ruling in Moncado vs. People's Court et al., 80 Phil 1, which
was the basis of the leading case of People vs. Delos Santos, supra,
was overruled in the case of Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383, June
19, 1963), holding that evidence illegally obtained is not admissible
in evidence. So, We reverted to the original rule. As stated by this
Court, speaking thru Justice Teehankee in People vs. Urro (44 SCRA
473, April 27, 1972), "involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by
force or intimidation are null and void and are abhorred by law which
proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman methods to secure a
confession." "A coerced confession stands discredited in the eyes of
the law and is as a thing that never existed." The defense need not
prove that its contents are false. Thus, We turned full circle and
returned to the rule originally established in the case of U.S. vs.
Delos Santos, 24 Phil. 323 and People vs. Nishishima, 42 Phil. 26.
(See also People vs. Imperio, 44 SCRA 75).

It must be noted that all these Philippine cases refer to coerced

confessions, whether the coercion was physical, mental and/or
emotional.

In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court decided the following
cases: Massiah vs. United States (377 U.S. 201, 1964), Escobedo vs.
Illinois (378 U.S. 478, 1964); and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436,
1966). In Miranda vs. Arizona, it was held:têñ.£îhqwâ£
 To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the
authorities in any significant way and is subjected to
questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is
jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to
protect the privilege *[384 U.S. 479]* and unless other
fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of
his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the
right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures
are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to
exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warning have been given, and such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and
intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer
questions or make statement. But unless and until such
warning and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at
trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can
be used against him. (Miranda vs. Arizona, supra, p. 478)
[Emphasis Ours]

When invoked in this jurisdiction, however, the Miranda rule was

rejected by this Court. In the cases of People vs. Jose (37 SCRA 450,
February 6, 1971) and People vs. Paras 56 SCRA 248, March 29, 1974),
We rejected the rule that an extrajudicial confession given without
the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence. This Court in
the Jose case(as in the Paras case), held:têñ.£îhqwâ£

The inadmissibility of his extrajudicial statements is

likewise being questioned by Jose on the other ground that
he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial
interrogations. He cites the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States in Massiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S.
201), Escobedo vs. Illinois (37 U.S. 478) and Miranda vs
.Arizona (384 U.S. 436).

The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in

point is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, par. 17 of
which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall ... enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel
... ." While the said provision is identical to that in the
Constitution of the United States, in this jurisdiction the
term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court
in U.S. vs. Beechman, 23 Phil 258 (1912), in connection with
a similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights
(Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902), to mean
proceedings before the trial court from arraignment to
rendition of the judgment. Implementing the said
Constitutional provision, We have provided in Section 1,
Rule 115 of the Rules of Court that "In all criminal
prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled ... (b) to be
present and defend in person and by attorney at every state
of the proceedings, that is, from the arraignment to the
promulgation of the judgment." The only instances where an
accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so
requests, are during the second stage of preliminary
investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the
arrest(Rule 113, Section 18). The rule in the United States
need not be unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction,
 not only because it has no binding effect here, but also
because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution the
meaning attached hereto at the time of the adoption thereof
should be considered. And even there the said rule is not
yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the absence of
unanimity in the voting by the members of the United States
Supreme Court in all the three above-cited cases. (People
vs. Jose, supra, at page 472).

The Constitutional Convention at the time it deliberated on Section

20, Article IV of the New Constitution was aware of the Escobedo and
Miranda rule which had been rejected in the case of Jose. That is the
reason why the Miranda-Escobedo rule was expressly included as a new
right granted to a detained person in the present provision of Section
20, Article IV of the New Constitution.

When Delegate de Guzman (A) submitted the draft of this Section 20,
Article IV to the October 26, 1972 meeting of the 17-man committee of
the Steering Council, Delegate Leviste (O) expressly made of record
that "we are adopting here the rulings of US Supreme Court in the
Miranda-Escobedo cases." And We cannot agree with the insinuation in
the dissenting opinion of Justice Castro that the Delegates did not
know of the existence of the second paragraph of Art. 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Hence, We repeat, this historical background of Section 20, Article IV

of the New Constitution, in Our considered opinion, clearly shows that
the new right granted therein to a detained person to counsel and to
be informed of such right under pain of his confession being declared
inadmissible in evidence, has and should be given a prospective and
not a retroactive effect. It did not exist before its incorporation in
our New Constitution, as We held in the Jose and Paras cases, supra.

The authors of the dissenting opinions ignore the historical fact that
the constitutional and legal guarantees as well as the legal
precedents that insure that the confession be voluntary, underwent a
slow and tedious development. The constitutional guarantee in question
might indeed have come late in the progress of the law on the matter.
But it is only now that it had come under Section 20 of Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution. That is all that our duty and power ordain Us
to proclaim; We cannot properly do more.

Furthermore, to give a retroactive effect to this constitutional

guarantee to counsel would have a great unsettling effect on the
administration of justice in this country. It may lead to the
acquittal of guilty individuals and thus cause injustice to the People
and the offended parties in many criminal cases where confessions were
obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution and in
accordance with the rules then in force although without assistance of
counsel. The Constitutional Convention could not have intended such a
a disastrous consequence in the administration of justice. For if the
cause of justice suffers when an innocent person is convicted, it
equally suffers when a guilty one is acquitted.

Even in the United States, the trend is now towards prospectivity. As

noted in the memorandum of the Solicitor General:têñ.£îhqwâ£

... That survey indicates that in the early decisions

rejecting retroactivity, the United States Supreme Court did
not require "pure prospectivity;" the new constitutional
requirements there were applied to all cases still pending
on direct review at the time they were announced. (See
 Linkletter vs. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (on admissibility
of illegally-seized evidence); Tehan vs. Shott, 382 U.S. 406
(1966) (on the self-incrimination rule of Griffin vs.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). But the Court began a new
course with Johnson vs. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). It
departed from Linkletter and Tehan and came closer to "pure
prospectivity" by refusing to permit cases still pending on
direct review to benefit from the new in-custody
interrogation requirements of Miranda vs. Arizona. As Chief
Justice Warren observed in Jenkins vs. Delaware, 395 U.S.
213 (1969), "With Johnson we began increasing emphasis upon
the point at which law enforcement officials relied upon
practices not yet prescribed." "More recently," he
continued, "we have selected the point of initial reliance."
That development began with Stovall vs. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967) (on the line-up requirements of United States vs.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert vs. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967). These new rulings were held applicable only
in the immediate cases "and all future cases which involve
confrontation for identification purposes conducted in the
absence of counsel after the dates of Wade and Gilbert." The
fact that Wade and Gilbert were thus the only beneficiaries
of the new rules was described as an "unavoidable
consequence of the necessity that constitutional
adjudications not stand as mere dictum." In Jenkins vs.
Delaware itself, the Court held that the Miranda requirement
did not apply to a re-trial after June 13, 1966 — the cut-
off point set for the Miranda requirement by Johnson vs.
New Jersey — because Jenkins original trial had begun before
the cut-off point.

Thus, the remarkable thing about this development in judge-

made law is not that it is given limited retroactive effort.
That is to be expected in the case of judicial decision as
distinguished from legislation. The notable thing is that
the limited retroactivity given to judge-made law in the
beginning by Linkletter vs. Walker has been abandoned as
the Supreme Court in Johnson vs. New Jersey and in Jenkins
vs. Delaware moved toward "pure prospectivity" (pp. 26-28)
(Respondents' memorandum, Feb. 16, 1974).

The provision of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code that:têñ.£îhqwâ£

Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a

retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty
of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at
the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence
has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same,

is not applicable to the present cases: First, because of the

inclusion We have arrived at that the constitutional provision in
question has a prospective and not a retrospective effect, based on
the reasons We have given; second, because the "penal laws" mentioned
in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code refer to substantive penal
laws, while the constitutional provision in question is basically
a procedural rule of evidence involving the incompetency and
inadmissibility of confessions and therefore cannot be included in the
term "penal laws;"6 and third, because constitutional provisions as a
rule should be given a prospective effect.7
Even as We rule that the new constitutional right of a detained person
to counsel and to be informed of such right under pain of any
confession given by him in violation thereof declared inadmissible in
evidence, to be prospective, and that confessions obtained before the
effectivity of the New Constitution are admissible in evidence against
the accused, his fundamental right to prove that his confession was
involuntary still stands. Our present ruling does not in any way
diminish any of his rights before the effectivity of the New
Constitution.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitions for writs of certiorari in

G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 and G.R. No. L-37424 are denied and that in G.R.
No. L-38929 is granted. As a consequence, all the confessions involved
in said cases are hereby declared admissible in evidence. No costs.

10. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.

G.R. No. L-3580             March 22, 1950

CONRADO CARMELO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
RIZAL, respondent-appellees.

Jose A. Fojas for petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor
Martiniano P. Vivo for respondents.

MORAN, C.J.:

Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First Instance of

Rizal, on December 27, 1949, with frustrated homicide, for having
allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and
with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different parts of the
body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days,
and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same
period of time. On December 29, 1949, at eight o'clock in the morning,
the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and at 10:15 in
the evening of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds.
Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on January 3,
1950, and on the following day, January 4, 1950, an amended
information was filed charging the accused with consummated homicide.
The accused filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging
double jeopardy, motion that was denied by the respondent court;
hence, the instant petition for prohibition to enjoin the respondent
court from further entertaining the amended information.

Brushing aside technicalities of procedure and going into the

substance of the issues raised, it may readily be stated that amended
information was rightly allowed to stand. Rule 106, section 13, 2d
paragraph, is as follows:

If it appears at may time before the judgment that a mistake has

been made in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss
the original complaint or information and order the filing of a
 new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would
not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require
the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

Under this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss the first
information and order the filing of a new one for the treason that the
proper offense was not charged in the former and the latter did not
place the accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical
offense.

"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense," according to article III, section 1 (20) of our
constitution. The rule of double jeopardy had a settled meaning in
this jurisdiction at the time our Constitution was promulgated. It
meant that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner
without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged
with the same or identical offense. This principle is founded upon the
law of reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the maxim of
the civil law non bis in idem, in the common law of England, and
undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence, and instead of having
specific origin it simply always existed. It found expression in the
Spanish Law and in the Constitution of the United States and is now
embodied in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of
the citizen.

It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition

is against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception
being, as stated in the same Constitution, that "if an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." The
phrase same offense, under the general rule, has always been construed
to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the
one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses
are identical. There is identity between the two offenses when the
evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient
to warrant a conviction for the other. This so called "same-evidence
test" which was found to be vague and deficient, was restated by the
Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate form. Under said Rules
there is identity between two offenses not only when the second
offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the second
offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or
when it necessary includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information. (Rule 113, sec. 9; U.S. vs. Lim
Suco, 11 Phil., 484; U. S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., vs. Martinez, 55
Phil., 6.) In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily
include another when some of the essential ingredients of the former
as alleged in the information constitute the latter. And vice-versa,
an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when all
the ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements
constituting the latter (Rule 116, sec. 5.) In other words, on who has
been charged with an offense cannot be again charged with the same or
identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the
former. "As the Government cannot be with the highest, and then go
down step to step, bringing the man into jeopardy for every
dereliction included therein, neither can it begin with the lowest and
ascend to the highest with precisely the same result." (People vs.
Cox, 107 Mich., 435, quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Lim Suco, 11
Phil., 484; see also U. S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., 431 and People vs.
Martinez, 55 Phil., 6, 10.)

This rule of identity does not apply, however when the second offense
was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the
simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the
accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense
that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with
physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the
charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy. This is the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the Philippines case of Diaz vs. U. S., 223 U. S.
442, followed by this Court in People vs. Espino, G. R. No. 46123, 69
Phil., 471, and these two cases are similar to the instant case.
Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where after the first
prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is
responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together
with the fact existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct
offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicated for the new offense.

This is the meaning of "double jeopardy" as intended by our

constitution for was the one prevailing in jurisdiction at the time
the Constitution was promulgated, and no other meaning could have been
intended by our Rules of Court.

Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be

necessarily included in another offense, for the purpose of
determining the existence of double jeopardy, when both offenses were
in existence during the pendency of the first prosecution, for
otherwise, if the second offense was then inexistence, no jeopardy
could attach therefor during the first prosecution, and consequently a
subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute second jeopardy. By
the very nature of things there can be no double jeopardy under such
circumstance, and our Rules of Court cannot be construed to recognize
the existence of a condition where such condition in reality does not
exist. General terms of a statute or regulation should be so limited
in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an
absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that
exceptions have been intended to their language which would avoid
results of this character. (In re Allen, 2 Phil., 641.)

When the Rules of Court were drafted, there was absolutely no

intention of abandoning the ruling laid down in the Diaz case, and the
proof of this is that although the said Rules were approved on
December 1939, yet on January 30, 1940, this Court decided the Espino
case reiterating therein the Diaz doctrine. Had that doctrine been
abandoned deliberately by the Rules of Court as being unwise, unjust
or obnoxious, logically it would have likewise been repudiated in the
Espino case by reason if consistency and as a matter of justice to the
accused, who should in consequence have been acquitted instead of
being sentenced to a heavy penalty upon the basis of a doctrine that
had already been found to be wrong. There was absolutely no reason to
preclude this Court from repealing the doctrine in the Espino case,
for as a mere doctrine it could be repealed at any time in the
decision of any case where it is invoked, is a clear proof that the
mind of the Court, even after the approval of the Rules, was not
against but in favor of said doctrine.

For these reasons we expressly repeal the ruling laid down in People
vs. Tarok, 73 Phil., 260, as followed in People vs. Villasis, 46 Off.
Gaz. (Supp. to No. 1), p. 268. Such ruling is not only contrary to the
real meaning of "double jeopardy" as intended by the Constitution and
by the Rules of Court but is also obnoxious to the administration of
justice. If, in obedience to the mandate of the law, the prosecuting
officer files an information within six hours after the accused is
arrested, and the accused claiming his constitutional right to a
speedy trial is immediately arraigned, and later on new fact
supervenes which, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a more serious offense, under the Tarok ruling, no way is
open by which the accused may be penalized in proportion to the
enormity of his guilt. Furthermore, such a ruling may open the way to
suspicions or charges of conclusion between the prosecuting officers
and the accused, to the grave detriment of public interest and
confidence in the administration of justice, which cannot happen under
the Diaz ruling.

Before closing, it is well to observe that when a person who has

already suffered his penalty for an offense, is charged with a new and
greater offense under the Diaz doctrine herein reiterated, said
penalty may be credited to him in case of conviction for the second
offense.

For all the foregoing, the petition is denied, and the respondent
court may proceed to the trial of the criminal case under the amended
information. Without costs.

Ozaeta, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BENGZON, J., concurring and dissenting:

I agree that People vs. Tarok and People vs. Villasis should be

overruled. But I submit that the effect of such overruling should be
prospective, in the sense that it should not affect the herein
petitioner who has relied thereon in presenting his case. (Moncado vs.
Tribunal del Pueblo, 45 Off. Gaz., p. 2850.)