KALINGA COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INC

Provincial Rd, P5 Bulanao, Tabuk City

Kalinga 3800

MODULE IN HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION

Criminology III

NAME: Salida, Jaden Fate S.

ADDRESS: Purok 5, Bulanao, Tabuk City

Prepared by:
GREG G. KINAUD
INSTRUCTOR

ACTIVITY: CITE 10 EXAMPLES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PHILIPPINE SETTING.DEFINE

THEM AND EXPLAIN HOW THEY ARE BEING VIOLATED AND GIVE PENALTIES FOR THEIR
VIOLATIONS.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES-ARTICLE III

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Republic of the Philippines vs.

Sandiganbayan, Major General
Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth
Dimaano, G.R. No. 104768. July
21, 2003
REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR No. 104768,2003-07-21
Facts:
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presidential Commission on
Good Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all... ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.
EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to
accomplish and carry out the purposes of this... order" and the power "(h) to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through
its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board") tasked to
investigate reports of... unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active
service or retired.
On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported
unexplained wealth of Ramas
Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La
Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of
3,327 square meters.
Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army,
stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of
respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house... of Elizabeth
Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces
and kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of
Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and... owned by MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and
is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items seized
in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General of
the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to... claim that she owns the
P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA No.
1379") [4] against Ramas.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until
1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine
Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to
February 1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas "acquired funds, assets and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from
legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or... using his power,
authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and
close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos."
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable
ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379.[6] The Amended Complaint prayed for,
among others, the forfeiture of respondents' properties,... funds and equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the
Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential
house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out... of proportion to his
salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash,
communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist
in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the
Philippine Constabulary raiding team.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly because of
its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its preliminary stage when
in fact the case had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan... ordered petitioner to prepare for
presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further evidence.
Giving petitioner one more chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to conform to its
evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The
Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private
respondents might take under the circumstances.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.[9] The Court held
in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by
reason of mere position... held without a showing that they are "subordinates" of former President
Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without
pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the
confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered... returned to
Elizabeth Dimaano
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:
(1.)The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v. Migrino[11] which involve the same issues.

(2.)No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against
Ramas and Dimaano.
(3.)The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.
(4.)There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
The raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56
ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications equipment, cash consisting of
P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
Issues:
The Issues
PCGG's Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents
Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case
Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
Ruling:
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the
filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired.[15] The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the
necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies... on the action to be taken based on its
findings.[16] The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGG's power under Section 3
of EO No. 1 "to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out the
purposes of this... order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the
following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all business... enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of
their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission
from time to time.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of
AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are:
(1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the... administration of former
President Marcos by being the latter's immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking
undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x x;[17] or (2) AFP personnel
involved in other... cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.
[18]
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas' case to the PCGG. Therefore,
Ramas' case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its
jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a... subordinate of former President
Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims
that Ramas' position enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably
making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under
EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a "subordinate" as this term is
used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this... wise:
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within
the term `subordinate.' The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten
wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,... his immediate family, relatives, and close
associates both here and abroad.
EO No. 2 freezes `all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his
wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or
nominees have any interest or participation.'
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-
`[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind or class as... those specifically mentioned
T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with
former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close
associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate,... dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.
There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his
close... association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
Ramas' position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major
General[19] does not suffice to make him a "subordinate" of former President Marcos for purposes of EO
No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima... facie showing that Ramas was a close
associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that business associates, dummies, agents or
nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close association is manifested either by
Ramas' complicity with former
President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by former President
Marcos' acquiescence in Ramas' own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioner's attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner argues
that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP Board conducted
the investigation pursuant to EO Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG
was acting within its jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that
Ramas was truly a subordinate of the former President. However, the... same AFP Board Resolution
belies this contention. Although the Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with the following
recommendation:
V.
RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for
violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA
1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully
Acquired Property."[20]
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any
relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1... and its amendments proves
fatal to petitioner's case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily
its powers must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that the
properties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a "subordinate" of his
commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned... and
suggested that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income without
showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association with former President Marcos.
Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does... not contain a finding that Ramas
accumulated his wealth because of his close association with former President Marcos
Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten
wealth was accumulated by a "subordinate" of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG.
EO No. 1[22] clearly premises the creation... of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten
wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind the
creation of the
PCGG.
However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling under the
foregoing categories, require a previous authority of the President for the respondent PCGG to investigate
and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive Order
No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized
investigating agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State
Prosecutor and his assistants and the state prosecutors. (Emphasis... supplied)
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions
not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth
amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman, while the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor
General.
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence of a
prima facie finding that Ramas was a "subordinate" of former President Marcos. The petition for
forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be... dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to
investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments apply to
respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that there are violations
of RA Nos. 3019 and Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas' case to the Ombudsman who
has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases.
Petitioner's argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture
petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first
place.
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for
violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the... forfeiture petition with
the Sandiganbayan.[32] The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not
subject to prescription, laches or estoppel.[33]
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has only
itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for
four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner... filed its Amended Complaint on 11 August
1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost two years to prepare
its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of
its evidence by filing... numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Even before the date set for
the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the
Complaint.
The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioner's... delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays
with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong even more the disposition of the
case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss
the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against private
respondents. This alone would have been sufficient... legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the
forfeiture case against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioner's evidence.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure
"on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution."[39] Petitioner argues that a
revolutionary government was operative at that time... by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the name and by the will of the
Filipino people."[40] Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the
operation of... the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents' exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all
rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic... stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in
evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitution
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino's
Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance of the provisions
of the 1973 Constitution."[41] The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government,
as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international... law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the
revolutionary government following the... cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986
(immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection
accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and
the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law
because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of
the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no... municipal law higher than the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not
invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of
Rights during the interregnum
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum
would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government
("PCGG") before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration... orders, which direct the
freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action,
would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by
no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights
because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon... the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill
of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum,
absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly
render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum.
Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant
and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for
the State's good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1)
of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect... and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights[45] recognized in the present Covenant." Under Article
17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be...
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence."
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum.
Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the
Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here.
Suffice it to... say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that
Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant.
The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the
revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the State's good faith compliance with its
treaty obligations under international law.
during the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by
petitioner's witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se,[53] and they
are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the
records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may... warrant, and
referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax
liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

Section 2.THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY- The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

Marquez v. Desierto (G.R. No. 135882)

Facts:

Petitioner Lourdes Marquez received an Order from respondent Ombudsman Aniano Desierto to
produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various
accounts maintained at the bank where petitioner is the branch manager. The accounts to be
inspected are involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo. It appears that a certain George Trivinio
purchased trail managers check and deposited some of it to an account maintained at petitioner’s
branch. Petitioner after meeting with the FFIB Panel to ensure the veracity of the checks agreed
to the in camera inspection. Petitioner being unable to readily identify the accounts in question,
the Ombudsman issued an order directing petitioner to produce the bank documents. Thus,
petitioner sought a declaration of her rights from the court due to the clear conflict between RA
6770 and RA 1405. Meanwhile, FFIB moved to cite petitioner in contempt before the
Ombudsman.

Issue:

Whether or not the order of Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the accounts is an
allowable exception of R.A. No. 1405.
Ruling: NO.

The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the subject accounts with the
Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a pending investigation at the
Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec.
3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and
AMARI.

We rule that before an in-camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before
a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection
limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The
bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and
such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority.
What is existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the office of
the ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado
Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which
would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.

Section 3. PRIVACY OF COMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

1. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon

lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

 It is considered as belonging to that class of rights which every human being possesses in his
natural state and which he does not lose or surrender by becoming a member of organized
society.

 It is founded in the belief in a person’s inherent right to enjoy his private life without having
incidents relative thereto made public against his will. The right has been equated with the right
to live as one chooses under the law, free from interference in the pursuit of one’s choices.

CASE: Roxas v. Zuzuaregui

 In his letter subject of this contempt proceeding, Atty. Roxas accused Justice Nazario of deciding
the case through "considerations other than the pure merits of the case." He averred that "we will
never understand what moved the Honorable Justice to decide as she did and what forces and
influences caused her to reason out her decision in such an unfair and unjust manner as to
compromise the reputation, integrity and dignity itself of the Supreme Court, as a venerable
institution of justice." He then ended by mocking her when he said "sleep well if you still can"
and that her "earthly life will [be] judged by the Supreme Dispenser of Justice where only the
merits of Your Honor's life will be relevant and material and where technicalities can shield no
one from his or her wrongdoings."

 In his letter of explanation, Atty. Roxas extended apologies to Justice Nazario, to the other
members of the High Court and to the High Court itself as a revered institution and ultimate
dispenser of justice. He said he was merely exercising his right to express a legitimate grievance
or articulate a bona fide and fair criticism of the Honorable Court's ruling. He explained that his
criticism of the assailed ruling was done in good faith with no intention whatsoever to offend any
member, much less tarnish the image of the Court. Instead of resorting to public criticism
 through media exposure, he chose to ventilate his criticism in a very discreet and private manner
by writing a personal letter confined to the hallowed halls of the Court and within bounds of
decency and propriety.

 We find the explanations of Atty. Roxas unsatisfactory. The accusation against Justice Nazario is
clearly without basis. The attack on the person of Justice Nazario has caused her pain and
embarrassment. His letter is full of contemptuous remarks tending to degrade the dignity of the
Court and erode public confidence that should be accorded it.

 To prevent liability from attaching on account of his letter, he invokes his rights to free speech
and privacy of communication. The invocation of these rights will not, however, free him from
liability. As already stated, his letter contained defamatory statements that impaired public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements directed
against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right.
Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the
exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or
public respect therefor and confidence therein. Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to
satisfy one's irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its
magistrates

VIOLATION:

Under the circumstances, we find Atty. Romeo G. Roxas guilty of indirect contempt of court under
Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Said section reads:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. - After a charge in writing has been
filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed
by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished for indirect contempt:

xxx

d. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
of justice; x x x.

xxx

Section 7, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides the penalty for indirect
contempt as follows:

PENALTY: Sec. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. - If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect
contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be
punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or
both. x x x.

The disrespect caused to the Court by Atty. Roxas merits a fine of P30,000.00 with a warning that a
repetition of a similar act will warrant a more severe penalty.

Section 4. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS-No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances.
CASE: The broadcast and print journalist Edgar Damalerio, had been assassinated on 13 May 2002 in the
southern Philippines city of Pagadian. Barely three months later, on August 19, another broadcast
journalist, Sonny Alcantara, was killed in broad daylight on a busy street in San Pablo City on the main
northern Philippine island of Luzon.
Local prosecutors have confessed to being fearful as a result of their involvement in cases. As a result, it
has taken initiatives by media organisations based in Manila to encourage the Department of Interior and
Local Government, which has legal authority over the police, to allow the investigations to continue. The
proceedings against Edgar Damalerio’s killer had been re-started in June 2005 after two years of delay.
The case was only able to move forward when the trial was moved from Pagadian, the ex-policeman’s
hometown, where the killing took place, to Cebu
The low rate of success in prosecuting cases has been a major factor contributing to the continuing use of
violence. The CMFR found that most of the journalists killed worked in the provinces, and that broadcast
journalists were more vulnerable. The reason behind the last fact is probably because broadcast media is
considered to be more powerful than other forms of media.

PENALTY: His killer, Guillermo Wapile, was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Section 5. FREEDOM OF RELIGION-No law shall be made respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

People vs. Cayat (G.R. No. L-45987)

PEOPLE V. CAYAT (1939) |EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
February 5, 2017
G.R. No. L-45987, 68 Phil 12, May 5, 1939
DOCTRINE: Protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The
classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class.                     

FACTS:
Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the non-Christian tribe was found guilty
of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an intoxicating liquor (one bottle of gin)
which is not a native wine.
Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a member of the non-Christian
tribe to buy, receive and possess any intoxicating liquor other than their so-called native wines.
Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides for its punishment.
Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies
the equal protection of the laws, violative of the due process and it is an improper exercise of police
power.
ISSUES:
Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?
RULING:
 No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection clause.
Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classifications. The
classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite, the classification rests on real and
substantial distinctions. The non-Christian tribes refer not to the religious belief, but in a way to the
geographical and more directly to the natives of the Philippines of a low grade of
civilization. Second, Act No. 1639 was designed to insure peace and order among the non-Christian
tribes. The experience of the past and the lower court observed that the use of highly intoxicating liquors
by the non-Christian tribes often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, which hamper the efforts of the
Government to raise their standard of life and civilization. Third, the said act is intended to apply for all
times as long as the conditions exist. Legislature understood that civilization of a people is a slow process
and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security. Fourth, the act applies equally
to all members of same class.

Section 6. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL-The liberty of abode and of changing the same within
the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law.

Caunca v Salazar (Constitutional Law)

Caunca v Salazar
GR. No. L-2690
January I, 1949

Liberty of abode and travel

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.

Facts:
This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores,
an orphan and an illiterate, who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia
Salazar, respondent herein. 

An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a
maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the
employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency
wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the province
should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.

Issue:
Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
advance payment it gave?

Held:
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has
absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted
to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom
of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom
may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the
existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other
psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the
will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim
is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of
liberty by duress or physical coercion.

Ratio:

On the hypothesis that petitioner is really indebted, such is not a valid reason for respondents to obstruct,
impede or interfere with her desire to leave. Such indebtedness may be multiplied by thousands or
millions but would not in any way subtract an iota from the fundamental right to have a free choice of
abode. The fact that power to control said freedom may be an effective means of avoiding monetary
losses to the agency is no reason for jeopardizing a fundamental human right. The fortunes of business
cannot be controlled by controlling a fundamental human freedom. Human dignity is not merchandise
appropriate for commercial barters or business bargains. Fundamental freedoms are beyond the province
of commerce or any other business enterprise.

Also, under the Revised Penal Code, penalties are imposed "upon any person who, in order to require or
enforce the payment of a debt, shall compel the debtor to work for him, against his will, as household
servant or farm laborer."

Moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of this writ, as where a housemaid is prevented from leaving
her employ because of the influence of the person detaining her.

Section 7. RIGHT TO INFORMATION-The right of the people to information on matters of

public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law.

 
RIGHT TO INFORMATION CASE DIGESTS

 
Chavez v. PEA-Amari
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents.

EN BANC

CARPIO, J.:

This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for
brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and
Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further
seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.

Facts:

On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a
contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to
reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of
Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in
consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating
PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to
develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."1 On the same date, then President
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and
offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its
contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP shall be funded and owned by PEA.”
Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981.

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 351, granting and
transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand
eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of
Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312,
in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the
southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total
land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One
(1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares.

On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a
private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an
additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the
Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into
the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA,
in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through
then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.

On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate
and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results
of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. Among the
conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA
are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore
PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void,
and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.

On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365
creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee
Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel, and the Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the
legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.

On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-
going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos.
According to these reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy
Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.

On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No.
132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the petition "for unwarranted disregard of
judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the proper court."

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant
Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA
of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987
Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the
sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Finally,
petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of
public dominion.

On December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the
renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the
case for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May
26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.

On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended JVA,"
for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the administration of then President
Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.

Issues:

The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:

(a) Whether principal relief prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because of subsequent
events;

(b) Whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the principle governing the hierarchy of
court;

(c) Whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies;

(d) Whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit;

(e) Whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations
before a final agreement;

(f) Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to Amari of certain
lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 Constitution; and

(g) Whether the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture
agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Held:

On the first issue, the Court has ruled that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its
approval by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA
and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended
JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA
and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the
renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the
government from alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA
indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already
implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract.

On the second issue, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however,
raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public.22 The Court can resolve this case
without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus
which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.

On the third issue, PEA claims petitioner's direct resort to the Court violates the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. It also violates the rule that mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Hence, The principal issue in the instant case
is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the
alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.

On the fourth issue, the rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement
of constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters of
transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.

On the fifth issue, Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on
matters of public concern. The court has held that the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute
definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several legislations.

On the sixth issue, the Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. The court has
summarized in their conclusions as follows:

1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer
needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA
has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public
domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the
592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the
public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of
such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.

On the last issue, Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to
rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination
of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint
Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.

SO ORDERED.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged.
First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military
Academy
GR Number 211362
Petition: Petition for Mandamus
Petitioner: First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia
Respondent: The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, The Honor Committee of
2014 of the PMA and HC members, and the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB)
Ponente: Peralta, J.
Date: February 24, 2014

Facts:
Petitioner, Cadet First Class Cudia, was a member of the Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the Philippine
Military Academy. He was supposed to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the
Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy Cadet graduate and be commissioned as an ensign navy.
Petitioner was issued a Delinquency Report (DR) because he was late for two minutes in his ENG 412
class, other cadets were also reported late for 5 minutes. The DRs reached the Department of Tactical
Officers and were logged and transmitted to the Company of Tactical Officers (TCO) for explanation.
Cudia incurred the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours.

Several days after, Cudia was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) per violation of the Honor Code.
Lying that is giving statements that perverts the truth in his written appeal stating that his 4thperiod class
ended at 3:00 that made him late for the succeeding class. Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the
honor report. The HC constituted a team to conduct the preliminary investigation on the violation, it
recommended the case be formalized.

Cudia pleaded not guilty. The result was 8-1 guilty verdict and upon the order of the Chairman, the HC
reconvened in the chambers, after, the Presiding Officer announced a 9-0 guilty verdict. The HC denied
Cudia’s appeal. The Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted a formal review and checking of
findings. Special orders were issued placing Cudia on indefinite leave of absence and pending approval of
separation from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of the
Commandant of Cadets requesting his re-instatement. The matter was referred to Cadet Review and
Appeals Board (CRAB) and it upheld the decision.
Cudia wrote a letter to President Aquino but the President sustained the findings of the CRAB.

CHR-CAR issued a resolution finding probable cause for Human Rights Violations.
Issue:

1. Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Cudia in
utter disregard of his right to due process and in holding that he violated the Honor Code through lying

2. Whether or not the court can interfere with military affairs

Ruling:
1. No. The determination of whether the PMA cadet has rights to due process, education,

1. No. the determination of whether the PMA cadet has rights to due process, education, and
property should be placed in the context of the Honor Code. All the administrative remedies
 were exhausted. A student of a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his
private interest for the proper functioning of the institution. The PMA may impose disciplinary
measures and punishments as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the institution.
PMA has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. PMA has a right to
invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of the internal rules and regulations.

2. Yes. The court is part of the

checks-and-balance machinery
mandated by Article VIII of
2. Yes. the court is part of check s-and- balance machinery mandated by ARTICLE VIII of the
Constitution. The court’s mandate (according to Section 1, Article 8) is expanded that the duty of the
courts is not only to “settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government” even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial functions. No one is above the law, including the military, especially in violations
of Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Dispositive:
The petition is denied. The dismissal of Cudia from PMA is affirmed

Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

DEVORAH E. BARDILLON vs. BARANGAY MASILI of Calamba, Laguna,

Res Judicata Expropriation not capable of pecuniary estimation

Facts: Two lots measuring 144 square meters was to be expropriated by Bargy Masili for the purpose of
constructing a barangay hall. However, the barangay and the lot owners could not agree with the purchase
price of Php 200,000. The first complaint was filed before the MTC. Whereas, the second complaint was
filed before the RTC. The MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of interest of the petitioner lot owners.
The RTC stated that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case. It also ruled in favor of Brgy Masili.

Issue/s: 1. WON the MTC has jurisdiction over the case of expropriation;
2. WON the State is barred from expropriating the property by reason of res judicata; and
3. Legality of entry into the premises subject of expropriation.
Ruling: The SC held that the expropriation proceedings is within the jurisdiction of the RTC because it is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. As discussed: “xx An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery
of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take
property for public use. As such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the
regional trial courts. xx” As regards to the second issue, the principle of res judicata does not apply
against the inherent powers of the State. The SC has this to say:
“xx Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or settled by
judgment. It provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action. The following are the requisites of res
judicata: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and
the second actions -- an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. Since the MTC had no
jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application even if the
Order of dismissal may have been an adjudication on the merits. xx” The entry in the premises of the
expropriated property was held to be justified by the SC. It ruled that:

“xx The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are expressly and
specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the part of local
government units, expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of the Local Government Code.
Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows:
(1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the
amount equivalent to 15 percent of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its
current tax declaration. In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent
after it had filed the Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required was proper, because
it had complied with the foregoing requisites. The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter
properly addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation proceedings. If petitioner objects to the
necessity of the takeover of her property, she should say so in her Answer to the Complaint. The RTC has
the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine
whether there is a genuine necessity for it. xx”

Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

CASE DIGEST: Abella vs NLRC G.R. No. 71813 July 20, 1987

Facts:

On June 27, 1960, herein petitioner Rosalina Perez Abella leased a farm land in Monteverde, Negros
Occidental, known as Hacienda Danao-Ramona, for a period of ten (10) years, renewable, at her option,
for another ten (10) years. On August 13, 1970, she opted to extend the lease contract for another ten (10)
years During the existence of the lease, she employed the herein private respondents. Private respondent
Ricardo Dionele, Sr. has been a regular farm worker since 1949 and he was promoted to Cabo in 1963.
On the other hand, private respondent Romeo Quitco started as a regular employee in 1968 and was
promoted to Cabo in November of the same year. Upon the expiration of her leasehold rights, petitioner
dismissed private respondents and turned over the hacienda to the owners thereof on October 5, 1981,
who continued the management, cultivation and operation of the farm.
On November 20, 1981, private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner for overtime pay,
illegal dismissal and reinstatement with backwages. 
Labor Arbiter Manuel M. Lucas, Jr., in a Decision dated July 16, 1982, ruled that the dismissal is
warranted by the cessation of business, but granted the private respondents separation pay. The First
Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated March 31, 1986, resolved to give due course to the petition;
and to require the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda. In compliance therewith, the Solicitor
General filed his Memorandum on June 18, 1986 and petitioner on July 23, 1986.
Issue: W/ON PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO SEPARATION PAY.

Held: Yes. Art. 284. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. There is no question that
Article 284 of the Labor Code as amended by BP 130 is the law applicable in this case. The purpose of
Article 284 as amended is obvious-the protection of the workers whose employment is terminated
because of the closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. Without said law, employees like
private respondents in the case at bar will lose the benefits to which they are entitled — for the thirty
three years of service in the case of Dionele and fourteen years in the case of Quitco. Although they were
absorbed by the new management of the hacienda, in the absence of any showing that the latter has
assumed the responsibilities of the former employer, they will be considered as new employees and the
years of service behind them would amount to nothing.