MAHARASHTRA JUDICIAL ACADEMY, UTTAN.

CASE-LAWS FOR ONLINE WORKSHOP DATED 20 MARCH 2021

SCHEDULED CASTES AND SCHEDULED TRIBES (P.O.A.) ACT
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BEING A MEMBER OF SC OR ST

1. Caste not changed upon mere Marriage: A women not belonging to SC or ST marries a person from
SC or ST does not become member of SC or ST just because of her marriage for the purpose of Section
3(1)(x)-State of Maharashtra Vs. Suresh Sakharam Sawant 2020 (2) ABR (CRI) 33.

2. Conversion itself does not render change of caste: SC and ST Act S.3 Religious Conversion itself
does not render to change of caste. The question as to whether a person is a member of the Tribe or
has been accepted as such, despite his conversion to another religion, is essentially a question of fact. A
member of a Tribe despite his change in the religion may remain a member of the Tribe if he continues
to follow the tribal traits and customs.- State of Kerala and Anr. Vs. Chandramohanan, (2004) 3
SCC 429.
3. On Reconversion a person from SC comes within the fold of the community and became
member of SC: If the parents of a person are converted from Hinduism to Christianity and he is born
after the conversion and embraces Hinduism and the members of the caste accept him, he comes within
the fold of the caste.- Guntur Medical College v. Y. Mohan Rao, (1976) 3 SCC 411 & K.P. Manu
Vs. Chairman Scrutiny Committee (2015) 4 SCC 1 (Education & Service Matters)
4. Migration to another State: "A person does not cease to belong to his caste/tribe on migration to an
area more advanced with a more liberal atmosphere. The long residence in such State of migration
could result in the handicaps suffered by belonging to a socially disadvantageous community being
tempered down..."-Shweta Santalal Lal v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 2 Mah LJ 904. (Service Matter).

5. Non-production of caste certificate and investigation by other than Dy.SP. : Caste certificate
was not produced or investigation by a police officer of rank of Deputy Superintendent was not done,
are the technicalities and hardly a ground for acquittal.- Kailas and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra
T.R. Taluka P.S., AIR 2011 SC 598.
CASETE OF ACCUSED

6. Proof that the Accused is not SC or ST: S.3(1)(x) read with S.6: Prosecution must establish that the
accused was not member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and the aggrieved person was member
of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe [Framing single question of 15 to 20 lines in statement under
S.313 was depricated] -Ashabai Ganeshrao Khote Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 5 Bom 113.

OFFENCES

7. Dishonour of victim: S.3(1)(xi) and S.354, I.P.C.: The only difference is the caste or the tribe. The
other difference is that in S.3(1)(xi) dishonour of such victim is also made an offence.- Vidyadharan Vs.
State of Kerala, (2004) 1 SCC 215.
8. Mens Rea -Offence should have been committed on the basis of SC/ST: S.3(2)(v): Condition for
applicability of is that the offence should be committed on the basis that the victim is a member of SC or
ST.-Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 3 SCC 557.

9. To attract S.3(2)(v), the offence should be committed "on ground that such person is
member of SC or ST": In Ramdas and ors Vs. State of Maharashtra Cri. Appeal 1156 of 2005 decided
on 07.11.2006 Supreme Court held that when there is no evidence that the offence i.e. Rape was

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 committed "on ground that victim belongs to SC", mere fact that victim happended to be a girl belonging
to SC does not attract S.3(2)(v).

10. S.376(2)(f), IPC: For want of evidence that the offence was committed because she belonged to SC,
Life sentence only awarded.Held S.3(2)(v) was not applicable. Hence, life imprisonment stands reduced
to 10 years-Dinesh @ Buddha Vs. State of Rajasthan 2006 ALL MR (Cri) 1848 (SC).

11. Land Grabbing: S.3(1)(v): Not only wrongful dispossession of a member of SC or ST from his land or
premises but also interfering with the enjoyment of his rights over any land, premises or water is also
made punishable under S.3(1)(v).-Yashwant Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2003 Cri.L.J. 2765.

INTERPRETATION OF PLACE WITHIN PUBLICE VIEW

12. Place within Public View: S.3(1)(x): The act of insult or intimidation must be visible and audible to the
public in order to constitute such act to be an offence. The word "view" refers to that "public" but
previxed by the expression "in any place within". The word public not only relates to the location defined
by the word place but also to the subjects witnessing the incidence of insult or intimidation to the
member of SC or tribe. Therefore, the incident of incult or intimidation has to occur in a place accessible
to and in the presence of the public.- Pradnya Pradeep Kenkare Vs. State of Maharashtra,
(2005)34 AIC 303 (Bom) (DB).
13. Allegation in FIR that first informant was insulted by calling him a "chamar" when he stood near car
which was partked at gate of premises. Held that "Place iwthin public view" must not be confused with
"Public place" -Swaran Singh and ors Vs. State through Standing Counsel and anr (2008) 8
SCC 435.
14. Place within Public View: In absence of reference to "Place within Public View" in the complaint, held
FIR was liable to be quashed by allowing prosecution for offence under Section 7(1)(d) of Protection of
Civil Rights Act.-V.P. Shetty Vs. Senior Inspector of Police 2005 Cri.L.J. 3560 (Bom DB).

15. Effect of amendment w.e.f. 26.01.2016, Knowledge that the complainant belongs to SC/ST:
Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act has now been amended by virtue of
Amendment Act 1 of 2016. By way of this amendment, the words “… on the ground that such person is
a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe” have been substituted with the words “…
knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe”. Therefore, if
subsequent to 26-1-2016 (i.e. the day on which the amendment came into effect), an offence under the
Penal Code which is punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more, is committed upon a
victim who belongs to SC/ST community and the accused person has knowledge that such victim
belongs to SC/ST community, then the charge of Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities
Act is attracted. Thus, after the amendment, mere knowledge of the accused that the person upon
whom the offence is committed belongs to SC/ST community suffices to bring home the charge under
Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act.- Asharfi v. State of U.P., (2018) 1 SCC
742.
16. As per FIR, allegations of abusing informant were within four walls of her building and not
within public view. Hence, S.3(1)(x) not attracted. The offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act
would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member
of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence
under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the
Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the Society is subjected to
indignities, humiliations and harassment. In the present case, there is dispute about possession of land
which is subject matter of civil dispute between parties as per informant herself. Due to dispute,
appellant and others were not permitting informant to cultivate land for the last six months. Since
matter is regarding possession of property pending before Civil Court, any dispute arising on account of
possession of said property would not disclose an offence under Act unless victim is abused, intimated or
harassed only for reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Therefore, offence
under Act is not established merely on fact that informant is member of Scheduled Caste unless there is
an intention to humiliate member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for reason that victim belongs

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 to such caste. In present case, parties are litigating over possession of land. Allegation of hurling of
abuses is against person who claims title over property. If such person happens to be Scheduled Caste,
offence under S. 3(1)(r) of Act is not made out. Appellant had sought quashing of charge-sheet on
ground that allegation does not make out an offence under Act against appellant merely because
informant was a Scheduled Caste since the property dispute was not on account of the fact that
informant was Scheduled Caste. Property disputes between vulnerable section of society and person of
upper caste will not disclose any offence under Act unless, allegations are on account of victim being
Scheduled Caste. Still further, finding that appellant was aware of caste of informant is wholly
inconsequential as knowledge does not bar, any person to protect his rights by way of procedure
established by law.-Hitesh Verma Vs. State of Uttarakhand AIRONLINE 2020 SC 812.

17. Proceedings quashed for want of allegation that the humiliation took place in public view:
Complainant alleging that accused abused him with name of his caste. No allegation in complaint that
accused was not S.C. or S.T. Allegations of intentional humiliation in place within public view also
absent. Complaint lacks in basic ingredients of offence. Continuance of proceedings would be abuse of
process of law.- 2008 AIR SCW 6901 Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A. P. and Ors.

18. Offence not attracted if public was not present: The public must view the person being insulted
for which he must be present. No offence on allegations under said section gets attracted if person is
not present. Kerala High Court's observations of Para No.12,13 and 18 in E. Krishnan Nayanar case were
referred to Supreme Court inAsmathunnisa Vs. State of A. P. represented by the Public
Prosecutor, High Court of A. P., Hyderabad and another AIR 2011 SC 1905.

Kerala High Court observed in paras 12, 13 and 18 of E. Krishnan Nayanar VS. Dr. M.A. Kuttappan and
ors as under: "12. A reading of Section 3 shows that two kinds of insults against the member of
Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes are made punishable - one as defined under Sub-section (ii) and
the other as defined under Sub-section (x) of the said section. A combined reading of the two Sub-
sections shows that under section (ii) insult can be caused to a member of the Scheduled Castes or
Scheduled Tribes by dumping excreta, waste matter, carcasses or any other obnoxious substance in his
premises or neighbourhood, and to cause such insult, the dumping of excreta etc. need not necessarily
be done in the presence of the person insulted and whereas under Sub-section (x) insult can be caused
to the person insulted only if he is present in view of the expression "in any place within public view".
The words "within public view", in my opinion, are referable only to the person insulted and not to the
person who insulted him as the said expression is conspicuously absent in Sub-section (ii) of Section 3
of Act 3/1989. By avoiding to use the expression "within public view" in Sub-section (ii), the Legislature,
I feel, has created two different kinds of offences an insult caused to a member of the Scheduled Castes
or Scheduled Tribes, even in his absence, by dumping excreta etc. in his premises or neighbourhood
and an insult by words caused to a member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes "within public
view" which means at the time of the alleged insult the person insulted must be present as the
expression "within public view" indicates or otherwise the Legislature would have avoided the use of the
said expression which it avoided in Sub-section (ii) or would have used the expression "in any public
place". 13. Insult contemplated under Sub-section (ii) is different from the insult contemplated under
sub-section (x) as in the former a member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes gets insulted by
the physical act and whereas is the latter he gets insulted in public view by the words uttered by the
wrongdoer for which he must be present at the place. 18. As stated by me earlier the words used in
sub-section (x) are not "in public place", but "within public view" which means the public must view the
person being insulted for which he must be present and no offence on the allegations under the said
section gets attracted. In my view, the entire allegations contained in the complaint even if taken to be
true do not make out any offence against the Petitioner."
19. Disallowing going out of office for Tea is not offence: Section 3(1)(r) & (y): Incident in cabin
where except the accused and complainant no other was present held as not in a place within public
view. Preventing from going outside office to have tea does not amount to prevention from having
access to which public have right to use-Dr. Manali Makrand Kshirsagar Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2020
(1) ABR (Cri) 904. (Bom DB).

20. Utterance in Private Place audible to passers-by is covered: If offensive language is used even
at a private place and said offensive language is audible to passers-by or said incident of using abusive
language and assault in private place is visible to public at large then definitely the accused will have to

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 be convicted under penal provision of Atrocities Act, because though act is committed at private place, it
is committed within public view. The soul of clause (x) of S. 3(1) of the Atrocities Act, is 'Public View'
and not 'Public Place'.-Raju Dashrath Sadar Vs. State of Maharashtra 2019 (1) ABR (CRI) 814
(Bombay).

FACEBOOK POSTS & WHATSAPP MESSAGES

21. Delhi High Court held Posts on facebook as a place within public view: When a member
registered with facebook changes the privacy settings to "public" from "private", it makes his/ her
writings on the "wall" accessible not only to the other members who are befriended by the author of the
writings on the "wall", but also by any other member registered with facebook. However, even if privacy
settings are retained by a facebook member as "private", making of an offending post by the member -
which falls foul of Section under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, may still be punishable if any of the
befriended facebook members do not suffer from the limitations carved out in Daya Bhatnagar (supra),
i.e. if any of the befriended facebook members of the author of the offending post is an independent
and impartial and not interested in any of the parties, i.e. is not a person having any kind of close
relationship or association with the complainant. Therefore, to my mind, it would make no difference
whether the privacy settings are set by the author of the offending post.- Ms. Gayatri alias Apurna
Singh v. State 2018(1) ADR 384 (Delhi HC):
22. Message on Whatsapp is not covered: Accused allegedly sent insulting messages on Whats App of
his girlfriend and attack on her caste by stating that "You are bad for society. If shoe is kept on head,
then head would get dirty. Reservation did not add any intelligence; You have got Govt. service with
ease" - Offences under SC/ST Act not made out since massages sent were not in public view nor any
assault happened - FIR liable to be quashed.- Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra
AIR 2019 SC 4010.
ANTICIPATORY BAIL

23. Utterances in absence: Accused made statement in departmental meeting against students belonging
to SC and ST that the students belonging to SC or ST are educationally backward and that they are
fourth grade students who are incapable of understanding anything, even if they are tutored well. As the
statement was made not in a public meeting but in departmental meeting, Kerala High Court held that
Section 3(1)(u) is not attracted and hence bar of Section 18 is not applicable and hence anticipatory bail
cannot be cancelled-Rajeesh R. Vs. M.A. Raveendran AIR Online 2020 Ker 220.

24. Anticipatory Bail: Adequate safeguards have been provided by a purposive interpretation by this Court
in the case of State of M. P. v. R. K. Balothia, 1995 3 SCC 221. The consistent view of this Court that if
prima facie case has not been made out attracting the provisions of SC/ST Act of 1989, in that case, the
bar created under section 18 on the grant of anticipatory bail is not attracted. Thus, misuse of the
provisions of the Act is intended to be taken care of by the decision above.-Prithviraj Chouhan Vs.
Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 1036.

25. Anticipatory Bail Granted as Act was not attracted:. No prima facie case made out in Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act . Act of alleged sexual relations can not be
said that without recipients consent. Anticipatory bail, granted. -Satyawan @ Satish Vithal Pawar Vs.
State of Maharashtra AIRONLINE 2019 BOM 532 (D.B.)

26. Anticipatory Bail Rejected: In view of bar of S.18 of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, anticipatory bail rejected.-Ashok Dagdurao Vaigunde Vs. State of
Maharashtra, AIRONLINE 2019 BOM 3235 (D.B.).

27. Court to verify Averments: S.18 read with S.438, Cr.P.C.: A duty is cast on the Court to verify the
averments in the complaint and to find out whether an offence under S.3(1) has been made out. When
an offence is registered against a person under the Act, no Court shall entertain an application for
anticipatory bail, unless it prima facie finds that such an offence is not made out. Observed in this case
that specific averments were there in the complaint that the petitioner and other accused abused
complainanat and her husband calling their caste (mahar) and assaulted them-Vilas Pandurang Pawar
Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 8 SCC 795.

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28. No appreciation of evidence in bail : While considering the application for bail, scope for appreiation
of evidence and other material on record is limited-Vilas Pandurang Pawar and anr Vs. State of
Maharashtra and ors AIR 2012 SC 3316.

VICTIM'S NAME NOT TO BE DISCLOSED

29. Victimls name not to be disclosed: Dinesh Budda Vs State of Rajasthan,AIR 2006 (SC) 1267: SC and
ST Atrocities Act The Court observed that socio-economic status, religion, race, caste or creed of the
accused or the victim are irrelevant considerations in sentencing policy. After giving due consideration to
the facts and circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarded for
an offence, the aggravating and mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has been
committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of relevant circumstances in a dispassionate
manner by the Court.

DISCHARGE

30. No discharge on mere non-compliance of Priyanka Srivastava's directions: Patna High Court
held in Daljit Singh Vs. State of Bihar AIR Online 2018 Pat 246 that the ground of the informant's non-
compliance of the directions given in Priyanka Srivastava and Another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Others (2015) 6 SCC 287 cannot be a ground to discharge under Section 227, Cr.P.C.

QUASHING THE PROCEEDINGS

31. Not mentioning in FIR that the accused did not belong to SC or ST was considered as not a valid plea to
quash the proceeding. Observed that whether accused belongs to SC or ST can be gone into when
matter is being investigated-Ashabai Machindra Adhagale Vs. State of Maharashtra and ors AIR 2009 SC
1973.

32. FIR cannot be quashed for not mentioning caste of accused: S.3: It is not requirement of S.3 to
disclose the caste of the accused in the report. Investigating Officer can record it in the investigation.
Hence, the F.I.R. cannot be quashed on that ground.-Pushpa Vijay Bonde Vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2009) 3 Mah.L.J. 489 (FB).
33. Power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to be exercised sparingly: Some categories of cases where
inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (i) where it manifestly appears
that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings; (ii) where the
allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there
is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge-
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866.
34. On Quashing u/s 482, Cr.P.C.: Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. and Others (2006)
6 SCC 736, cautioned about a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into
criminal cases. The court noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming
and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. The court further observed that "any
effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure
through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged."

35. Supreme Court held that the fact that investigation was not made by Competent Police Officer, cannot
be ground to quash entire proceeding-State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Babbu Rathore AIR Online
2020 SC 38.

INVESTIGATION BY OTHER THAN DESIGNATED OFFICER

36. In Vidyadharan Vs. State of Kerala (2004) 1 SCC 215 after referring to Gangula Ashok and Anr. v.
State of A.P. 2000 Cri.L.J. 819 conviction and sentence under SC & ST POA Act was set aside while
maintaining the same for IPC offences.

37. Objection after charge about investigation by other than DYSP not tenable: Due to the view
taken in Ramnath Sadashiv Koltharkar v. State of Maharashtra 1999 (2) Mah LJ 743 contrary to the view
in Yunus Daud Bhura v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2001 (3) Mah LJ 783, the matter was referred

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 to Division Bench in Shatrughna Shravan Kamble Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2003
Cri.L.J. 790. Division Bench observed that "The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 is a special Act enacted with an object to prevent the commission of offences of
atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, to provide for Special
Courts for the trial of such offences and for the relief and rehabilitation of the victims of such offences
and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. A perusal of the provisions of the Act would
show that the object of the Act is to uphold the dignity and respect of the members belonging to the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes so that they need not suffer any ignominy or harassment or
insults by virtue of belonging to the said castes or Tribes. In order to ensure that in the course of
investigation the members belonging to the said Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes do not suffer any
prejudice on account of their castes and tribes, there is bar for the applicability of the provisions of
Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure under which the High Courts and the Sessions Courts are
empowered to grant what is commonly known as anticipatory bail to the accused. The said rights are
further sought to be protected, inter alia, by Rule 7 of the Rules which were made by the Central
Government in the year 1995 whereby the offence committed under the provisions of the Act has to be
investigated by a police officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police. The wording of
the said rule considered in the context or juxtaposition of the object of the Act would leave no doubt
that the said provision was intended to be mandatory so that the investigation in the offences
committed under the provisions of this Act cannot be made by a police officer below the rank of a Dy. S.
P. or equivalent thereto." Refering to the landmark judgments of H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi AIR
1955 SC 196, State of M. P. v. Mubarak Ali AIR 1959 SC 707 observed that "The object of such
mandatory rule is not difficult to unravel. A higher officer of the rank of Dy. S. P. is mandated to
investigate the matter under this Act not only with a view to protect the accused from being prosecuted
falsely or wrongly, as may be argued, but the main object seems to be to protect and advance the rights
given to the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes under the provisions of the Act
and the prosecution does not suffer for improper or faulty investigation likely to be made by the officers
of lower rank which would defeat the protection afforded to the members of the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes under the Act. If the prosecution is allowed to be quashed simply on the ground of
the investigation being made by an officer of lower rank than prescribed under the rules even in the
absence of any prejudice caused to the accused, it would be easier to defeat the object of provisions of
the Act whenever inadvertently or otherwise the investigation is entrusted to or conducted by an officer
lower in rank than the Deputy Superintendent of Police."

SPECIAL COURT & JURISDICTION

38. Special Court is a Session Court for other aspects: S.14, 2(1)(d) and 3: Sessions Court, even after
being Special Court, would continue to be a Sessions Court and hence Chapter 18, Cr.P.C. is applicable
for the trials. Trial of offence of rape by it is not without jurisdiction. Setting aside conviction on
technical ground of jurisdiction raised for first time in High Court defeats object of S.465, Cr.P.C.- State
of H.P. Vs. Gita Ram, (2000) 7 SCC 452.
39. Cr.P.C. S.465 Expression "a court of competent jurisdiction" envisages a validly constituted court
conferred with jurisdiction to try offences. Competence would remain uneffected by con-compliance of
procedural requirement like taking cognizance without committal order-State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.
Bhooraji & ors, 2001 Cri.L.J. 4228 (SC).
GENERAL

40. Not Proved and False: S.3(1)(viii): There is a difference between the terms "not proved" and "false".
Merely because a party is unable to prove a fact, the same cannot be categorized as false in each and
every case.-Ravinder Singh Vs. Sukhbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 245.

41. Suspension of Sentence S.389, Cr.P.C.: Mere fact that the accused was on bail during the trial and
had not misused liberty does not per se warrant grant of bail. The bail during trial loses significance
when on completion of trial accused is found guitly- Gomti Vs. Thakurdas & ors 2007 ALL SCR
1565.