Ciudad Guayana

a planned growth pole on the Orinoco

A critical assessment
on the role of spatial planning

course: Regional Strategies and Territorial Governance

professors: Vincent Nadin & Dominic Stead

Ricardo Avella
Ciudad Guayana: a planned growth pole on the Orinoco 1
Introduction
This essay will study the creation of Ciudad Some authors have studied the creation of the
Guayana, and how a small company town company town in the 1950s (Rovira 2003); many
became a major growth pole in the southeast have written about the plan made by the Joint
of Venezuela. Ciudad Guayana is located in Center in the 1960s (Snyder 1963; Rodwin 1969;
the less populated region of the country since Appleyard 1976; Almandoz 2016); and very few
colonial times (Fig.1), and in the crossing of its have analyzed the participatory process of the
two most important rivers: the Orinoco and the POU approved in 1994 (Angotti 2001). Research
Caroní (Fig.2). In less than 50 years, it became shows that scholars concentrate in specific
the sixth most populated city in Venezuela. And periods, and it seems that little efforts have been
it could be argued that no other city has been as made to study the overall evolution of the city.
influenced by planning like this one in the whole This essay will try to fill that gap. And it will do
country (with the exception of Caracas, maybe), so by analyzing how planning and the notion
making it a particularly interesting case study. of development have also changed in time,
linking these shifts with the history of the city.
This essay will be divided in four chapters, What is planning for, what (and whose) values
very much related with the history of Ciudad does it pursue, and who benefits from it? These
Guayana. The first one will study the creation underlying questions will allow to cross the four
of a company town called Puerto Ordaz, chapters transversally, and giving an extra layer of
planned and built by foreign companies with a complexity to the evolution of Ciudad Guayana.
concession to exploit natural resources in the
Guayana region. The second chapter will analyze
the plan made by the Joint Center for Urban
Studies for the new city of Ciudad Guayana, Keywords:
which aimed to transform a collection of small
Ciudad Guayana; Venezuela; Company
and dispersed settlements into an integrated
Town; New Town; Growth Pole; Core Region;
city, while developing the industrial potential
Developmentalism; Participatory Planning
of the region. The third chapter will focus on
the POU (Urban Development Plan), elaborated
by the Municipality of Caroní in 1994. This is
a particularly interesting chapter in the history
of Ciudad Guayana, because it was the first
plan made in Venezuela with open public
participation. And finally, the last chapter will
analyze how a large infrastructural project
managed to have a positive impact in the quality
of life of the citizens of Ciudad Guayana, even
though the project was not part of a plan at all.

Fig. 1. Population
density in Venezuela.
Fig. 2. Location of
Ciudad Guayana in
Venezuela, in the
crossing of the Caroní
and the Orinoco
CIUDAD CIUDAD rivers.
GUAYANA GUAYANA

2 EMU | Regional Strategies and Territorial Governance

 Puerto Ordaz
a company town planned for a foreign corporation

Ever since the 16th century, the Spanish

conquistadores struggled to found a permanent
city on the Orinoco (Fig.3). There were at least four
different attempts on different locations, but Dutch
and English pirates kept destroying the settlements
while trying to find the golden city of El Dorado
(Fig. 4).
Centuries passed and not gold, but large iron ore
deposits were found in the region by American
mining companies in the 1940s (Fig.5). In
accordance with the national policy of exploiting
natural resources by giving concessions to foreign
companies, the government allowed Bethlehem
Steel and the U.S. Steel corporations to open
the Cerro Bolívar and the mines of El Pao in the
beginning of the 1950s (Fig.6). Two subsidiary
companies of the aforementioned corporations
were created: Iron Mines and the Orinoco Mining
Company (Snyder 1963: 405).

Fig. 3. Santo Tomé de

Guayana (1637).

Fig. 4. Nicolas
Sanson’s 1656 map
of the northwestern
parts of South
America shows
the mythical Lake
Parime, where Manoa
(the legendary
city of El Dorado)
was supposed to
be located, on the
northwest corner of
the lake.

Ciudad Guayana: a planned growth pole on the Orinoco 3

 Fig. 5. Resources of
the eastern region of
Venezuela.
The region shows
extraordinary
resources, with
large quality iron
and aluminum
ore deposits, and
petroleum and natural
gas fields at close
distance. Source:
Rodwin 1969: 10

Fig. 6. Aerial
photography of the
iron ore deposits of
the Cerro Bolívar.
Fig. 7. Railroad built
by the OMC, that
connected Puerto
Ordaz with the Cerro
Bolívar.

4 EMU | Regional Strategies and Territorial Governance

Fig. 8. Aerial view
of Puerto Ordaz, as
planned by Town
Planning Associates.
Source: Rovira 2003:
163.

When these companies came there was nothing
but unspoiled nature and a small fishing village
called San Félix on the eastern bank of the Caroní
River. Large investments had to be made in order
to exploit the mines, process the raw material,
and settle the workers. For this, the Orinoco
Mining Company hired the services of TPA (Town
Planning Associates), a New York based office led
by Paul Lester Wiener and Josep Lluis Sert (Rovira
2003: 163). Together with Venezuelan architects
Moisés Benacerraf and Carlos Guinand Baldó,
they sketched the first plan for a company town
called Puerto Caroní on the western bank of the
Caroní River, commonly known as Puerto Ordaz.
This town was already built by 1951.
Puerto Ordaz was basically a small settlement
for the workers of the mining companies, and it
was connected by roads and railroads with the
mines, the steel mill, and with a couple of ports
along the Orinoco that allowed the material
to be taken out of the country (Fig.7; 8; 11).
Particularly interesting was the Civic Center,
shaped by the ‘Heart of the City’ concept that
Sert had promoted in the 7th and 8th CIAM
congresses (Rovira 2003: 168-169). Puerto Ordaz,
together with the existing town of San Félix, had
a population of little more than 5000 inhabitants
(Fig.9).
It is evident that the role of the planner and the
role of the architect-designer were very much
related. We could even argue that there were
no boundaries between the two roles, basing
this assumption from Sert’s designs for the
housing units and the Civic Center (Fig.10). These
projects were very detailed, but they fostered
social segregation nevertheless. The houses in

Fig. 9. Planimetry
of Puerto Ordaz,
developed by TPA for
the Orinoco Mining
Company. Source:
Rovira 2003: 163.

Ciudad Guayana: a planned growth pole on the Orinoco 5

 Fig. 10. Civic Center.
Model of the Civic
Center designed by
TPA (Town Planning
Associates) between
1951-1953.
Source: Rovira 2003.

the company town of Puerto Ordaz were built

for the high-skilled expatriate employees that
the American mining companies brought; the
low-skilled workers settled instead in the village
of San Félix, on the other side of the Caroní River.
But the creation of this town was completely
dependent on the extractive dynamics of the
American mining companies. And since their only
purpose was to make profit while the concessions
lasted, the impact they could have in local
development was not their main concern.
Fig. 11. Diagramatic
structure of the
Company Town of
Puerto Ordaz. Source:
made by author.

6 EMU | Regional Strategies and Territorial Governance


Fig. 12. Rómulo Betancourt.
Known as the ‘the Father of
Venezuelan Democracy’.
Fig. 13. The steel mill in Matanzas,
managed by the CVG, on the
western side of the Caroní River.
Ciudad Guayana
a new industrial city planned for the national government
In 1959 the dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez
was overthrown, and democracy was installed
in Venezuela (Fig.12). The main policy of the
democratic government was to overcome the
import dependency by strengthening and
diversifying the national economy. This approach,
founded on the theory of developmentalism, was
strongly backed up by the United States throughout
Latin America (Almandoz 2016; Angotti 2001).
Venezuela’s economy was boosting since the
1930s, but it relied completely on oil revenues.
The idea was to reinvest these revenues on the
industrialization of the country.
The iron and aluminum deposits of the Guayana
region, along with the incredible potential for
hydroelectric power that could provide cheap
energy to the industrial plants, made Puerto Ordaz a
desirable location for the state-owned investments
(Snyder 1963: 405) (Fig.13). It also provided an
opportunity to create an urban growth pole in the
less populated region of the country (Snyder 1963:
408), that could help relieve growth pressures in the
north (Angotti 2001: 331).
Ciudad Guayana: a planned growth pole on the Orinoco 7

For this reason, the government of Rómulo
Betancourt nationalized the American mining
companies and created the CVG –Corporación
Venezolana de Guayana–, a regional authority
modelled after the British New Towns
corporations and the Tennessee Valley Authority
(Almandoz 2016: 44-45). Its mission was not
only to manage the state-owned industries, but
also to plan, build and manage a new industrial
city along the Orinoco River, where the American
company town had been settled ten years before.
Rafael Alfonzo Ravard, a respected general and
civil engineer graduated from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, was appointed as the first
president of the CVG.
This prompted him to hire the services of the
Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT and
Harvard University, in order to develop the
plan for the new industrial city (Fig.15). The
team was led by Lloyd Rodwin, and among the
professionals that came to work in Venezuela
with him were Donald Appleyard, John
Friedmann, Lisa Peattie and Willo von Moltke.
All of them had a Venezuelan counterpart in the
planning team, and their task was to link the
8 EMU | Regional Strategies and Territorial Governance
Fig. 14. The
topological structure
found by the planners
of the Joint Center,
with a diversity of
settlements scattered
among the landscape
and the Caroní River
as a natural barrier.
Source: Rodwin 1969:
173.
potential of the region (and the new industrial
city that they were planning) with the national
economic strategy (Rodwin 1969: 26).
Planners found the small town of San Félix on the
eastern bank of the Caroní River, and the Civic
Center of Puerto Ordaz and the steel mill built
by the Orinoco Mining Company on the other
bank, with many informal settlements scattered
in between (Fig.14; 16). Their idea was to make
one integrated city by joining these fragments,
creating a central development spine and a
macro grid (Fig.17). To achieve this integration,
a bridge and a city center close to Puerto Ordaz
were fundamental (Snyder 1963: 409-410). From
San Félix to the steel mill there were more than
25 kilometers, and a river that had to be crossed
by small ferries. Most of the local workers lived
in San Félix, and they spent many hours a day
trying to get to their jobs. Planners thought that
a bridge over the Caroní would bring jobs closer
and integrate the isolated settlements, and that
the city center of Alta Vista could attract the
growing population and direct the expansion of
the city towards the west (Fig.18).
Fig. 15. MIT’s Lloyd
Rodwin. Director of
the plan made by the
Joint Center for Urban
Studies.Source: Vale
2008: 29.
Fig. 16. The informal
settlement of El
Roble. Source:
Rodwin 1969: 49.
Fig. 17. City highway scheme
for 1970. It can be seen that
a freeway system acts as the
backbone of the new city.
Source: Appleyard 1976: 196.
Fig. 18. Comprehensive
physical cocept for Ciudad
Guayana (drawn by von Moltke
in 1964). Source: Appleyard
1976: 139.

Ciudad Guayana: a planned growth pole on the Orinoco 9

Fig. 19. Perspective
of the new Alta Vista
center. Source:
Rodwin 1969: 202.
Fig. 20. Aerial
view of the CVG
headquarters,
designed by Jesús
Tenreiro Degwitz.
Source: Rodwin 1969:
146.

But the city center of Alta Vista never came to
be (Angotti 2001: 333-334) (Fig.19). The oil
crisis of 1973 and the rising competition of other
mining countries simply put into evidence that
the government had put too much faith on a
future founded on sustained and unstoppable
economic growth. The development of Alta Vista
was put into hold for decades (Fig.20; 21); and in
consequence, it never became the magnet that
was supposed to attract the growth of the city
towards the western bank of the Caroní River.
San Félix continued to grow rapidly and with no
planning whatsoever. Puerto Ordaz also grew,
but not as much as San Félix and a rather slower
pace, since it depended on the financial muscle
of the CVG –the owner of the land.
The planned growth pole was not as strong as
everybody thought it would be, and this reflects
in the comparison between the population
growth that was projected by the planners in
the 1960s and the one that actually occurred
(Fig.22; 23). Regarding the diversification of
the national economy (one of the main goals
of the regional plan), Ciudad Guayana was a
partial success. The industry was healthy enough,
but it never became what the government had
aimed for. Although the city witnessed sustained
economic growth for many years, it did not solve
the problems of urban inequality and poverty.
We could say that the steel workers of Ciudad
Guayana did not have a fair share in the general
prosperity that the heavy industry created for the
country, and that there was a disconnection from
the health of the local industry and the quality of
life of the people who made it possible.
There was a rather weak emphasis on the
social dimension of this top-down plan.
Instead, a notion of development based on
quantitative economic growth was promoted
by the government and unquestioned by the

Fig. 21. Aerial view of

the Alta Vista center.
Source: Rodwin 1969:
147.

10
Fig. 22. Urban and
population growth
projections (for 1966,
1970 and 1980).
Source: Appleyard
1976: 188.

planners (with the exception of Lisa Peattie). But that ultimately guide the planning process.
if we place the plan for Ciudad Guayana in its And in a top-down approach (like in the plan
historical context, we can realize that the vast for Ciudad Guayana), the principles and values
majority of the plans made during the era of of a particular group are always privileged and
Developmentalism (between the 1940s and the imposed over others. Therefore, it should not be
1970s), were also framed by the very same idea a surprise that the plan made by the Joint Center
of development. was more concerned with quantitative economic
issues such as growth, income and employment.
This is very much related to the question that
Pike, Rodríguez-Pose and Tomaney invites us
to make when looking at any plan: what kind
of local and regional development has been
fostered, and for whom? (Pike, Rodríguez-
Pose & Tomaney 2007). Different notions of
development are based on different sets of
principles, values and theoretical frameworks

Fig. 23. Population

growth in Ciudad
Guayana, 1950-2017.
Source: made by
author, with data
taken from official
population censuses.

Ciudad Guayana: a planned growth pole on the Orinoco 11

The POU
participatory planning by the municipality of Caroní
By the second half of the 1980s, the government
was facing a major fiscal crisis and there was
widespread criticism of corruption. The national
economy was not as strong, and the power of
the government to stir changes and promote
development had declined or at least stagnated.
It became evident that the overcentralized
government in Caracas was unable to deliver
an adequate service to all its citizens (Angotti
2001: 335), and that certain decisions could be
perfectly taken by local authorities. The principle
of subsidiarity, which states “that powers should
be retained at the lowest possible level and
not ceded upwards unless action cannot be
effectively undertaken at the lower levels” (Dühr,
Colomb & Nadin 2010; Nadin & Shaw 1999),
guided the structural adjustments made by the
Venezuelan Congress during those years. A
process of political decentralization had begun,
and the privatization of certain state-owned
companies was also part of the agenda.
Until then, all mayors and regional governors
had been directly appointed by the presidency
in Caracas. But in 1989, for the first time in
democratic history, local and regional elections
were held in Venezuela (Angotti 2001: 335).
12 EMU | Regional Strategies and Territorial Governance
The citizens of Ciudad Guayana –Municipality 3
Clemente Scotto
of Caroní– chose Clemente Scotto as their first was part of La Causa
mayor that year.3 And in 1991, he began to Radical, a left-wing
political party that
elaborate a POU (an urban development master
was very popular in
plan, or plan de ordenación urbanística by its the Bolívar State,
acronym in Spanish). where Ciudad
Guayana is located.
It was finished in 1994, and even though in
form it may seem like any other land-use plan,
in content it was rather revolutionary (Fig.24).
According to Tom Angotti, it was the first plan in
Venezuelan history with open public participation
(Angotti 2001: 335). Such approaches, which
considered community consultations and
were more socially oriented, emerged as an
alternative notion of development in the 1980s
and were already common in some countries
of the western hemisphere (Pike et al. 2007:
1254). “But in Venezuela, where all plans were
discussed and finalized in planning offices with
no consultation at all, this turnaround was
nothing less than extraordinary” (Angotti 2001:
335).
The range of stakeholders was broadened,
a shared vision for the future was built, and
Fig. 24. The POU of
concepts such as ‘sustainability’, ‘livability’ and
Ciudad Guayana.
‘governance’ were discussed. Moreover, the
Fig. 25. Aerial view of
Ciudad Guayana.

hegemonic power of the CVG in the construction account structural constraints) that which
and the management of the city was partially might become is ‘imposed’ on that which
over, since the process of decentralization is, and it is ‘imposed’ for the purpose of
also meant that it had to transfer many of its changing what is into what might become”
competences to the municipality. Nevertheless, (Albrechts 2001: 1117).
the CVG hierarchy objected to any decision-
The kind of local and regional development
making process that did not involve them. As a
fostered by this plan was different from the
result, the POU technical team included planners
preceding ones. The approach shifted from a
from the municipality, the CVG, and the national
much too narrow one with a dominant economic
planning ministry (MINDUR); and this particular
focus to a broader notion of development,
circumstance facilitated the cooperation of
more concerned with social and qualitative
multiple levels of government.
issues. Indeed, the objects of the plan were the
Even though the plan was approved, it was people and their quality of life. The role of the
never fully implemented. Specific projects for planner also changed. Instead of preparing and
the city were supposed to be developed in a implementing informed decisions from an office,
further step, but four years later Hugo Chávez they now empowered others to build a shared
won the presidency and once again the national vision for the future. A vision that, as Albrechts
government centralized all power in Venezuela. says, symbolized some qualities and virtues that
Nevertheless, the approach of this POU is the present lacked (Friedmann et al. 2004: 63;
very reminiscent of what Louis Albrechts calls Albrechts 2001: 1120).
‘transformative practices’. When reflecting on the
notion of structural change, Albrechts states that:
“Transformative practices simply refuse to
accept that the current way of doing things
is necessarily the best way; they break free
from concepts, structures and ideas that only
persist because of the process of continuity
(…) In this way, transformative practices
become the activity whereby (taking into

Ciudad Guayana: a planned growth pole on the Orinoco 13

The Macagua Dams
good planning without a plan
A series of important infrastructural projects
were also being discussed at the time of the
POU. In a time were hydroelectric dams were
being seriously questioned around the world for
their environmental externalities, the national
government was planning the construction of
two new dams on the Caroní River, next to the
Macagua Dam built during the dictatorship in the
1950s. Together, the Macagua II and Macagua III
dams would have a capacity of 2.768 megawatts
which, added up to the capacity of the other
dams already present on the river, could provide
energy to almost 70% of the country. The project
was promoted by EDELCA (Electrificación del
Caroní, a subsidiary of the CVG in charge of
managing the hydroelectric potential of the river),
and partially financed by the IDB.
The Inter-American Development Bank
demanded from EDELCA an environmental
compensation project in order to fund the
construction of the dams. And even though this
compensation project was not part of the POU
promoted by Scotto (or any other plan by that
matter), the two hydroelectric dams resulted in
1. Macagua II
2. Macagua III
3. Leopoldo Sucre Avenue
4. La Llovizna National Park
5. Plaza del Agua
6. Ecomuseo del Caroní
3
1
2 4
6
the delivery of public goods for the whole city
(Fig.26). According to John Friedmann, plans are
not always necessary to good planning. He even
suggests that sometimes, “planning without
plans may not be such a bad idea” (Friedmann
et al. 2004: 54). The fact is that the dams were
planned with a strategic approach, and this
turned them into more than a simple piece of
infrastructure. By 1997, when they were fully
operational, a series of complementary projects
had also been built in Ciudad Guayana, and
the whole endeavor had a tremendous positive
impact in the quality of life of all citizens. Fig. 26. Aerial view
of Ciudad Guayana.
Among the projects triggered by the dams, the The Macagua II and
large recreational park called La Llovinza stands Macagua III dams
can be seen to the
out (Fig.29). But there was also an Eco-Museum
left. Their construction
(Fig.30); a public space called Plaza del Agua triggered other
(the water plaza) (Fig.28); and a scenic road projects, such as the
wonderfully integrated with the landscape which park of La Llovizna,
connects San Félix with Puerto Ordaz, passing the Eco-Museum, and
above the dams and through the river (Fig.27). the Plaza del Agua.
A scenic road that
The new artery created a ring road, relieving the connected both sides
old bridge upstream from traffic congestion, of the river was also
and improving overall accessibility in the city. built.
5
3
It is important to state that this road was not
made only for private cars: it also made space for
pedestrians and bicycles, becoming a major path
for recreation.
But as Albrechts fairly states, there is no such
thing as a ‘happy accident’; especially when it
comes to things like spatial quality, sustainability
and equity (Albrechts 2001: 1124). Further
research needs to be done in order to fully
understand to what extent the POU actually
influenced the final outcome of these large
infrastructural projects. Because of their scale
and their national importance, it is possible that
they have simply been one more experience
in the long Venezuelan tradition of top-down
projects. But it could be argued that a set of
long-term goals had been developed during the
participatory planning process, and that these
goals may have finally served as a guide to action.

Fig. 27. The new scenic road Fig. 29. La Llovizna

that connects San Félix with National Park.
Puerto Ordaz to the south,
Fig. 30. The viewpoint,
along the park and over the
inside the Ecomuseo del
dam.
Caroní, allows visitors to
Fig. 28. The Plaza del see the machine room.
Agua, in front of the Eco-
Museum.
Ciudad Guayana
evolution of the city and planning in time

San Félix
before the 1950s

What kind of planning?

Distinctions were based on: Pike et al. 2007

Puerto Ordaz
Puerto Ordaz
1945-1958 Policies Strategy

Autonomy: supra-national
Economic
Direction: top-down Zoning
Investment
Institution: foreign company
Objects: places
Subjects: extraction

Puerto Ordaz and San Félix

during the 1950s

Ciudad Guayana
Ciudad Guayana
1959-1989 Policies Strategy

Autonomy: regional, national

Economic
Direction: top-down Zoning
Investment
Institution: state corporation
Objects: places
Subjects: economic growth

Ciudad Guayana
during the 1960s and 70s

POU POU

1990-2000
Policies Strategy

Autonomy: local
Direction: bottom-up
Economic
Institution: municipality Zoning
Investment
Objects: people
Subjects: equity, sustainability

Macagua dams Macagua Dams

1985-1997
Policies Strategy
Autonomy: national, supra-national
Direction: top-down
Institution: state corporation Zoning Economic
Investment
Objects: people, places
Subjects: equity, sustainability
Ciudad Guayana
by 1997
 Conclusions
from top-down plans to participation
and planning through projects

Ciudad Guayana never managed to diversify the set of long-term goals were developed. Further
national economy –today, oil continues to be the research needs to be done in order to understand
major source of revenues in Venezuela. But it did if these goals influenced in some way the project
succeed in becoming a growth pole in the less of the hydroelectric dams, which resulted in a
4 populated region of the country.4 Nevertheless, positive impact for the city even though it was
Nowadays, Ciudad
Guayana is the sixth the city did not grow as the planners of the Joint not part of any plan.
most populated city in Center had predicted, nor expanded towards
Venezuela. According The future of Ciudad Guayana is an issue that
to the last census
where they had intended. Nowadays, 75% of
the population lives in San Félix and a similar needs to be addressed. The city was born and
made in 2015, it has a
population of 850.000 percentage of the jobs are located in Puerto planned in relation with the exploitation of
inhabitants. Ordaz, all because of land-use planning (Fig.31). natural resources, but the performance of the
mining industry has declined in the last decades.
As Paul Barker says, positive planning (the kind Moreover, the sector has always evoked a bad
of restrictive planning that says how and where environmental image. Is sustainable mining a
things should happen) almost always proved contradiction? This certainly is a wicked problem
unsuccessful. “For a start, it is usually based on with no easy solution (Rittel and Webber 1973).
incorrect forecasts about the future. No one is Rachael Bartels thinks that “metals and mining
clever enough to know, in advance, how cities companies have a chance to become a driving
will grow. (…) Nor can we tell how people will force behind the sustainability solution and leave
decide to organize their lives, or how their tastes behind the all-too-common perception that they
in patterns of living will develop. A city is not are part of the problem” (Bartels 2014). But
a computer program. It has a life of its own” actions need to be taken if mining is to become
(Barker 1999; 108). more sustainable in this region, and stakeholders
need to follow a shared path if that goal is to
But planning evolved, and the POU of 1994 and be achieved. Certainly, a vision for a region that
the final outcome of the hydroelectric dams are promotes sustainable mining could help in the
clear examples of these changes. A shift from creation of an identity for Ciudad Guayana.
traditional top-down planning to a bottom-up
approach took place in the 1990s. Paraphrasing
Albrechts, we could say that leaders, planners
and civil society realized that the past was no
blueprint for how to go forward, and that
together they challenged conventions and
traditional structures (Albrechts 2010: 1123).
This allowed them to address the problem in
Fig. 31. Satellite view new ways, and facilitated intragovernmental
of Ciudad Guayana,
cooperation. Even if this plan was never
today. Source: Google
Maps. implemented, a shared vision was built and a
Bibliography

• Rovira, J. (2003). José Luis Sert 1901-1983. Milano: Electa.

• Rodwin, L. (1969). Planning urban growth and regional development: The experience
of the Guayana program in Venezuela. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Appleyard, D. (1976). Planning a pluralist city: Conflicting realities in Ciudad Guayana.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Angotti, T. (2001). ‘Ciudad Guayana: From growth pole to metropolis, central planning
to participation’. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 20(3), 329-338.
• Snyder, D. (1963). ‘Ciudad Guayana: A planned metropolis on the Orinoco’. Journal of
Inter-American Studies, 5(3), 405-412.
• Almandoz, A. (2016). ‘Towards Brasilia and Ciudad Guayana. Development,
urbanization and regional planning in Latin America, 1940s-1960s’. Planning
Perspectives, 31(1), 31-53.
• Albrechts, L. (2010). ‘More of the same is not enough! How could strategic spatial
planning be instrumental in dealing with the challenges ahead?’ Environment and
Planning B: Planning and Design, 37(6), 1115-1127.
• Barker, P. (1999). ‘Non-Plan revisited: or the real way cities grow. The tenth Reyner
Banham memorial lecture’. Journal of Design History, 12(2), 95-110.
• Pike, A., Rodríguez-Pose, A., & Tomaney, J. (2007). ‘What kind of local and regional
development and for whom?’ Regional Studies, 41(9), 1253-1253.
• Dühr, S., Colomb, C., & Nadin, V. (2010). European spatial planning and territorial
cooperation. London: Routledge.
• Friedmann, J., Bryson, J., Hyslop, J., Balducci, A., Wiewel, W., Albrechts, L., & Healey,
P. (2004). ‘Strategic spatial planning and the longer range’. Planning Theory & Practice,
5(1), 49-67.
• Rittel, H., & Webber, M. (1973). ‘Dilemmas in a general theory of planning’. Policy
Sciences: Integrating Knowledge and Practice to Advance Human Dignity, 4(2), 155-
169.
• Bartels, R. (2014, Feb 20). How can mining become more sustainable? Retrieved from
https://www.weforum.org

18 EMU | Regional Strategies and Territorial Governance

european master in urbanism
Ciudad Guayana: a planned growth pole on the Orinoco 19