APLN   CNND  
  Policy  Brief  No.  12   1    
APLN/CNND  

Asia  Pacific  Leadership  Network  for  Nuclear   Centre  for  Nuclear  Non-­‐Proliferation  and    
   Non-­‐Proliferation  and  Disarmament   Disarmament  
 
Policy  Brief  No.  18                                                                                    December  2014  

Should  India  Revise  its  Nuclear  Doctrine?  

 
Rakesh  Sood  
 

Summary   the   news   that   Pakistan   had   developed   a   short  

range   nuclear   capable   missile   Hatf   IX   (Nasr),  
India’s   nuclear   position   is   unique   in   two   ways.   described  as  a  tactical  nuclear  weapon  and  In-­‐
First,   in   view   of   the   restraint   shown   by   India   in   dia   should   therefore   review   its   no-­‐first-­‐use  
demonstrating   its   capability   in   1974   but   going   (NFU)   posture.   Meanwhile   some   foreign   ana-­‐
nuclear   after   nearly   a   quarter   century   in   1998,   lysts   questioned   the   notion   of   “credible   mini-­‐
and   secondly,   as   the   only   nuclear-­‐armed   state   mum  deterrent”  when  India  faces  two  potential  
that   remains   committed   to   abolition   of   nuclear   adversaries   (Pakistan   and   China)   with   widely  
weapons   as   stated   policy.   India’s   nuclear   doc-­‐ varying  capabilities.    
trine   is   a   work   in   progress.   The   last   authorita-­‐
tive   public   pronouncement   was   in   2003,   and   2.   This   questioning   received   a   fillip   when   the  
that   250-­‐word   document   is   part   doctrine   and   Bharatiya  Janata  Party  (BJP)  came   out   with   its  
part   nuclear   policy.   While   some   countries   have   election   manifesto   in   April   this   year.   Claiming  
chosen  to  adopt  an  opaque  policy,  as  a  democra-­‐ that   the   strategic   gains   during   the   Atal   Bihari  
cy  India  chose  to  go  public  with  its  doctrine,  both   Vajpayee   government   (1998–2004)   had   been  
to  explain  the  rationale  for  its  decision  and  also   “frittered   away”   by   the   Congress   government  
to   reassure   its   own   public.   Its   doctrine   is   based   in   the   following   decade   (without   elaborating  
on   a   ‘credible   minimum   deterrent’   which   is   still   how),   the   manifesto   promised   a   “two-­‐pronged  
being   developed   along   with   other   related   capa-­‐ independent   nuclear   program,   unencumbered  
bilities   and   infrastructure.   While   the   basic   ele-­‐ by  foreign  pressure  and  influence.”  On  the  civil-­‐
ments   of   the   doctrine   are   sound   and   form   a   co-­‐ ian   side,   it   emphasized   the   importance   of   nu-­‐
herent   whole,   in   order   to   convey   credibility   and   clear  power  in  India’s  energy  mix  and  commit-­‐
assurance,   the   doctrine   should   be   reviewed   and   ted   to   “invest   in   India’s   indigenous   Thorium  
updated   periodically   to   take   into   account   re-­‐ Technology   Programme.”   On   the   military   side,  
gional   and   global   developments.   Although   no   the   manifesto   committed   to   “study   in   detail  
major  revisions  to  the  doctrine  are  necessary  at   India’s  nuclear  doctrine  and  revise  and  update  
present,  the  exercise  of  periodic  reviews  will  sub-­‐ it,   to   make   it   relevant   to   challenges   of   current  
ject  the  doctrine  to  a  rigorous  analysis  so  that  its   times,   [and]   maintain   a   credible   minimum   de-­‐
credibility  is  reaffirmed  and  the  Indian  public  is   terrent  that  is  in  tune  with  changing  geostrate-­‐
reassured.   Furthermore,   it   will   strengthen   the   gic  realities.”    
relevant  institutions  and  ensure  that  India’s  nu-­‐
clear  policy  reflects  a  broad  political  consensus.   3.   The   latter   attracted   commentary,   both   in  
India  and  abroad,  as  it  was  interpreted  to  indi-­‐
cate  a  shift  from  the  NFU  policy.  Since  then,  this  
 
apprehension   has   been   put   to   rest   by   Prime  
Minister   Narendra   Modi   by   reaffirming,   on  
Introduction  
more   than   one   occasion,   that   India   has   no   in-­‐
1.  In  recent  months,  there  have  been  a  number   tention   of   moving   away   from   the   NFU   policy.  
of  articles  and  seminars  involving  the  strategic   His   most   recent   affirmation   of   this   was   on   29  
community   questioning   India’s   nuclear   doc-­‐ August  2014  to  a  group  of  Japanese  journalists  
trine,   and   suggesting   that   it   should   be   revised   prior  to  his  official  visit  to  Japan.  
as   it   lacked   credibility.   Some   of   the   criticism  
was   domestic,   led   by   the   hardliners,   driven   by  
    
2 Policy  Brief  No.  18   APLN/CNND  

4.   Does   this   mean   that   there   will   not   be   any   7.   A   second   is   the   need   to   create   an   environ-­‐
“revision”?   Or,   that   none   is   needed?   After   all,   ment   in   which   India   can   realize   its   economic  
the   release   of   the   Indian   nuclear   doctrine   for   potential   in   a   manner   that   contributes   to  
public   dissemination   took   place   on   4   January   greater   equity   within   a   democratic   polity.   For  
2003,   more   than   a   decade   ago.   Many   changes   this,   while   a   network   of   diplomatic   engage-­‐
have  taken  place  in  the  regional  and  global  se-­‐ ments  is  essential,  a  degree  of  strategic  auton-­‐
curity   environments   during   this   period.   So   a   omy  is  also  needed.  In  other  words,  independ-­‐
periodic   review   is   certainly   appropriate   and,   ent   India’s   first   leaders   believed   that   joining  
based   on   its   analysis,   India’s   existing   nuclear   alliances   would   constrain   the   country’s   newly  
doctrine  may,  or  may  not,  require  revisions.     won   freedom   of   action,   and   alignment   with  
either  bloc  in  the  Cold  War  was  therefore  con-­‐
5.  This  brief  is  divided  into  three  sections.  The   sidered   neither   feasible   nor   desirable.   While  
first  section  examines  the  historical  and  politi-­‐ India’s  size  and  its  civilizational  past  created  a  
cal   moorings   of   India’s   nuclear   doctrine.   Even   sense   of   conviction   that   it   was   India’s   destiny  
though   India   became   a   nuclear-­‐armed   state   to   emerge   as   a   great   power,   the   path   was   not  
only   in   1998,1  it   had   maintained   a   nuclear   op-­‐ through   a   military-­‐led   restoration   of   an  
tion   since   1974   and   consequently   developed   a   “akhand  Bharat”  (great  Indian  empire).  Rather,  
nuclear   policy   narrative   over   several   decades,   it   was   through   greater   development   and   re-­‐
elements   of   which   form   an   integral   part   of   its   sponsible   engagement,   especially   in   the   neigh-­‐
nuclear   doctrine.   Discarding   these   elements   bourhood   and   along   the   arc   ranging   from   the  
would   be   difficult   as   these   lend   both   ideologi-­‐ Suez   to   the   Straits   of   Malacca.   Given   the   coloni-­‐
cal   coherence   to   the   Indian   doctrine   and   also   al   past   and   the   non-­‐violent   struggle   for   inde-­‐
provide   a   degree   of   reassuring   continuity.   The   pendence,   India   inherited   a   tradition   of   “re-­‐
second   section   looks   at   nuclear   doctrines   of   straint”  with  regard  to  employment  of  military  
some   of   the   other   countries,   not   for   the   pur-­‐ force,   though   it   sought   to   have   the   capability   to  
pose  of  undertaking  a  comparative  analysis  but   “compel”  or  “coerce”  and  only  use  it  if  core  in-­‐
more   to   observe   moments   when   doctrinal   terests  were  threatened  and  all  else  had  failed.  
shifts  have  occurred  and  how  these  have  been   So   while   India   has   not   formally   articulated   a  
communicated,   domestically   and   to   the   outside   national   security   doctrine,   the   preceding   ele-­‐
world.   Against   this   framework,   the   third   sec-­‐ ments  provide  some  perspective  on  the  issue.    
tion   takes   up   the   arguments   put   forward   in  
favour  of  a  revision  of  the  Indian  doctrine  and   8.   India’s   nuclear   doctrine   contained   in   the  
analyzes   whether   and   where   doctrinal   revi-­‐ press   statement   of   4   January   2003   consists   of  
sions  are  feasible.   less  than  250  words.  It  is  a  neither  a  White  Pa-­‐
per   nor   a   Nuclear   Posture   Review   and   there-­‐
Analyzing  the  Indian  Nuclear  Doctrine   fore   looking   for   elements   found   in   such   docu-­‐
ments   would   be   just   a   speculative   exercise.   A  
6.   A   “doctrine”   is   akin   to   a   “grand   strategy.”   It   better   appreciation   might   come   from   the   per-­‐
provides   a   framework   for   developing   strate-­‐ spective  of  the  evolution  of  India’s  nuclear  pol-­‐
gies   that   can   help   safeguard   core   interests   icy   and   the   elements   of   national   experience,  
identified   in   the   doctrine.   India   has   never   for-­‐ thought   and   inheritances   that   shape   India’s  
mally   presented   a   national   security   doctrine   security  framework.    
(nor  a  nuclear  posture  review).  However,  there  
are  a  few  common  strands  of  thought  that  have   9.  A  good  starting  point  is  that  India  is  a  reluc-­‐
remained   fairly   consistent.   These   are   drawn   tant   nuclear-­‐armed   state   which   places   it   in   a  
partly   from   the   legacy   of   the   British   Raj   and   unique   position.   India   demonstrated   its   capa-­‐
partly   from   the   ideological   moorings   of   the   bility  in  1974  by  conducting  a  “peaceful  nucle-­‐
independence  struggle  that  together  represent   ar   explosion”   (PNE)   but   maintained   nearly   a  
a   unique   mix   of   realpolitik   and   ‘moralpolitik’.   quarter  century  of  restraint  before  events,  both  
Safeguarding  its  political  and  territorial  integri-­‐ global   and   closer   to   home,   obliged   India   to  
ty  has  been  a  core  interest  for  India.  Maintain-­‐ again   test   in   1998   and   declare   itself   a   nuclear  
ing   its   diversity   and   plurality   while   managing   weapons   possessor   state.   The   restraint   grew  
both   internal   and   external   threats   has   re-­‐ out  of  India’s  world-­‐view  coupled  with  a  strong  
mained  a  key  objective.     conviction   that   a   nuclear-­‐weapon-­‐free-­‐world  
was   a   desirable   objective   because   it   enhanced  
both  India’s  security  and  global  security.    
                                                                                                                                       
1  CNND  uses  “nuclear-­‐armed  state”  as  a  factual  description  
of  any  country  that  possesses  nuclear  weapons.  
Rakesh  Sood   Should  India  Revise  its  Nuclear  Doctrine?   3  

10.   India   continued   to   take   initiatives   in   the   jihad   against   the   USSR   in   Afghanistan,   was   able  
field   of   nuclear   disarmament,   beginning   with   to   come   up   with   a   new   strategy.   On   the   as-­‐
calls   for   cessation   of   nuclear   testing   in   1950s   sumption  that  any  robust  Indian  military  reac-­‐
and   following   up   with   more   comprehensive   tion   could   be   deterred   through   nuclear   black-­‐
approaches   in   the   1960s.   The   outcomes   –   a   mail  and  an  apprehension  about  international-­‐
Partial  Test  Ban  Treaty  (1963)  banning  atmos-­‐ ization   of   the   Kashmir   issue,   extremist   ele-­‐
pheric   testing   that   merely   drove   nuclear   test-­‐ ments   were   deployed   to   create   an   insurgency  
ing   underground   and   the   Nuclear   Non-­‐ in  Kashmir  which  could  be  passed  off  as  a  self-­‐
Proliferation  Treaty  (NPT,  1968)  which  created   determination  movement.    
its   own   nuclear   apartheid   –   fell   far   short   of  
what   had   been   envisaged   and   India   chose   to   12.  Like  the  NPT  in  the  1960s,  the  Comprehen-­‐
stay  out  of  the  NPT.  Attempts  to  obtain  security   sive   Nuclear   Test   Ban   Treaty   (CTBT)   negotia-­‐
assurances  from  the  USA,  UK  and  then-­‐USSR  to   tions  in  1995–96  had  taken  a  turn  which  made  
address   concerns   arising   out   of   China’s   nuclear   the   CTBT   more   an   instrument   of   non-­‐
capability   proved   fruitless.   During   the   Bangla-­‐ proliferation   than   a   step   towards   nuclear   dis-­‐
desh   crisis   of   1971,   the   entry   of   the   nuclear-­‐ armament.   India   decided   to   stand   aside   from  
armed   USS   Enterprise   aircraft   carrier   group   these  negotiations  because  subscribing  to  such  
into  the  Bay  of  Bengal  conveyed  an  unambigu-­‐ a   CTBT   would   shrink   India’s   “nuclear   option”  
ous   message   to   the   Indian   leadership,   leading   into   a   1974   device,   while   Pakistan’s   capabili-­‐
to  the  1974  nuclear  test.  Yet,  after  demonstrat-­‐ ties   in   terms   of   weapon   design   and   missiles  
ing   its   capability,   India   refrained   from   weapon-­‐ were   expanding   significantly   with   Chinese   help.    
izing   the   device   and   continued   to   take   more  
disarmament  initiatives,  including:    13.   Much   of   this   has   been   detailed   in   a   paper  
entitled   “Evolution   of   India’s   Nuclear   Policy”  
• The  call  for  a  “nuclear  freeze”;     which   was   tabled   by   Prime   Minister   Vajpayee  
in   parliament   shortly   after   the   1998   tests.2  In  
• A   proposal   for   negotiating   a   conven-­‐
fact,   it   was   the   first   comprehensive   document  
tion   prohibiting   the   use   or   threat   of  
on   this   subject   and   also   contained   elements   of  
use  of  nuclear  weapons;  
what   would   later   become   the   “nuclear   doc-­‐
• The   Five-­‐Continent,   Six-­‐Country   Dis-­‐ trine.”   It   categorically   stated   India’s   stand   that  
armament  Initiative;     “nuclear   weapons   were   not   weapons   of   war”  
• Prime   Minister   Rajiv   Gandhi’s   Action   and   that   “a   nuclear-­‐weapon-­‐free-­‐world   would  
Plan   presented   at   the   Third   Special   enhance   not   only   India’s   security   but   also   the  
Session   of   the   UN   General   Assembly   security  of  all  nations.”  Vajpayee  declared  that  
devoted  to  Disarmament  in  1988,  call-­‐ India’s  nuclear  arsenal  was  for  self  defence  and  
ing  for  a  phased  program  for  the  elim-­‐ “to   ensure   that   India   was   not   subjected   to   nu-­‐
ination   of   nuclear   weapons   and   the   clear   threats   or   coercion.”   He   went   on   to   de-­‐
creation   of   a   nuclear-­‐weapon-­‐free   clare  “a  voluntary  moratorium”  on  further  test-­‐
world;   ing  and  committed  India  to  participation  in  the  
• Support   for   the   1996   reference   to   the   fissile   material   cut-­‐off   treaty   (FMCT)   negotia-­‐
International   Court   of   Justice   (ICJ)   of   tions  and  the  maintenance  of  “stringent  export  
the   legality   of   use   of   nuclear   weapons   controls   to   ensure   that   there   is   no   leakage   of  
in   terms   of   moral   and   humanitarian   our   indigenously   developed   know   how   and  
laws.     technologies.”   All   these   elements   reflected   a  
  degree   of   continuity   with   earlier   pronounce-­‐
11.   By   the   end   of   the   1980s,   the   world   had   ments   and   are   developed   in   the   draft   report  
changed   dramatically.   The   Cold   War   was   over   from   the   National   Security   Advisory   Board   on  
but  the  optimism  that  it  would  enhance  multi-­‐ Indian  Nuclear  Doctrine  released  on  17  August  
lateralism   was   soon   dispelled.   The   indefinite   1999,3  and   then   in   the   2003   document   which  
and   unconditional   extension   of   the   NPT   in  
1995   perpetuated   an   order   that   India   had  
found   difficult   to   accept.   Furthermore,   in   its                                                                                                                                          
2  Atal  Bihari  Vajpayee,  “Evolution  of  India’s  Nuclear  Poli-­‐
own  neighbourhood,  Pakistan  had  developed  a  
cy,”  27  May  1998,  
nuclear   capability   with   overt   Chinese   collabo-­‐ http://pib.nic.in/focus/foyr98/fo0598/Foc2705982.html.  
ration  and  cooperation  in  the  missile  field  was   3  India’s  Draft  Nuclear  Doctrine,  http://mea.gov.in/in-­‐
also   proceeding   apace.   Pakistan   had   used   ir-­‐ focus-­‐
regular  forces  both  in  1947–48  and  in  1965  but   arti-­‐
cle.htm?18916/Draft+Report+of+National+Security+Advis
having   successfully   experimented   now   with  
ory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine.  
    
4 Policy  Brief  No.  18   APLN/CNND  

emerged   as   a   decision   of   the   Cabinet   Commit-­‐ pared   nuclear   forces,   a   robust   command-­‐and-­‐
tee  on  Security,  chaired  by  the  prime  minister.4     control   system,   effective   intelligence   and   early  
warning  capabilities,  the  will  to  employ  nuclear  
14.  Briefly,  the  elements  of  India’s  nuclear  doc-­‐ weapons,   and   effective   conventional   military  
trine  as  spelt  out  in  2003  are:   capabilities.   All   these   would   be   maintained   in   a  
manner   that   raises   the   threshold   both   for   a  
i. Building   and   maintaining   a   credible   conventional  as  well  as  for  a  nuclear  conflict.    
minimum  deterrent;  
ii. A  posture  of  no-­‐first-­‐use;     17.  The  1999  draft  provided  for  “punitive  retal-­‐
iii. Nuclear   retaliatory   use   in   response   to   iation   with   nuclear   weapons   to   inflict   damage  
a  nuclear  attack  on  Indian  territory,  or   unacceptable  to  the  aggressor”  only  in  case  of  a  
on  Indian  forces  anywhere;     nuclear   attack   “on   India   and   its   forces.”   These  
elements  were  modified  in  the  2003  document  
iv. Nuclear   retaliation   to   be   massive   and  
–   nuclear   retaliation   would   be   launched   in   re-­‐
inflict  unacceptable  damage;  
sponse  to  a  nuclear  attack  on  “Indian  territory  
v. Non-­‐use   of   nuclear   weapons   against   or   on   Indian   forces   anywhere”;   retaliation  
non-­‐nuclear-­‐weapon  states;     would   be   “massive   and   designed   to   inflict   un-­‐
vi. Option   of   nuclear   retaliation   in   re-­‐ acceptable  damage”;  and  the  trigger  for  nuclear  
sponse  to  chemical  or  biological  attack   retaliation   was   broadened   to   be   able   to   re-­‐
on   India,   or   on   Indian   forces   anywhere;     spond  to  “a  major  attack  against  India,  or  Indi-­‐
vii. Continuation   of   strict   export   controls   an  forces  anywhere,  by  biological  and  chemi-­‐
on  nuclear  and  missile  related  materi-­‐ cal   weapons.”   These   modifications,   to   which  
als  and  technologies;     we   will   return   a   little   later   in   this   brief,   led   to  
some   speculative   interpretation   which   the  
viii. Participation  in  the  FMCT  negotiations;    
government  chose  not  to  address.    
ix. Continued   observance   of   the   morato-­‐
rium  on  nuclear  tests;     18.  In  addition,  the  1999  draft  stated  that  Indi-­‐
x. Continued  commitment  to  the  goal  of  a   an  nuclear  forces  will  need  to  be  “effective,  en-­‐
nuclear-­‐weapon-­‐free-­‐world,   through   during,   diverse,   flexible,   and   responsive”   and  
global,   verifiable   and   non-­‐ will   be   “based   on   a   triad   of   aircraft,   mobile  
discriminatory  nuclear  disarmament.   land-­‐based   missiles   and   sea-­‐based   assets.”   It  
  promised   assured   capability   to   shift   from  
15.  While  many  of  these  elements  are  in  keep-­‐ peacetime   deployment   to   fully   employable  
ing   with   PM   Vajpayee’s   paper,   some   reflect   forces  “in  the  shortest  possible  time.”  The  1999  
new   thinking.   The   defensive   role   of   nuclear   draft  talked  of  civilian  control  which  was  elab-­‐
weapons   and   the   fact   that   these   are   not   war   orated   in   2003,   as   consisting   of   a   Nuclear  
fighting  weapons,  the  conviction  that  a  nuclear-­‐ Command   Authority   (NCA)   with   a   Political  
weapon-­‐free  world  is  a  desirable  objective  not   Council   (chaired   by   the   Prime   Minister   and  
just   in   terms   of   a   moral   goal   but   from   a   nation-­‐ including   members   of   the   Cabinet   Committee  
al   security   point   of   view,   characteristic   of   re-­‐ on  Security)  and  an  Executive  Council  (chaired  
straint   implying   no-­‐first-­‐use,   testing   moratori-­‐ by  the  National  Security  Adviser  and  including  
um,   engaging   in   FMCT   negotiations   and   im-­‐ the  three  Service  chiefs  and  the  Strategic  Forc-­‐
plementing  stringent  export  controls  on  sensi-­‐ es  Commander).    
tive   technologies   are   elements   which   were  
spelt  out  in  the  paper.     19.   The   Strategic   Forces   Commander   provides  
the   inputs   for   decision   making   and   also   exe-­‐
16.   The   1999   Draft   Nuclear   Doctrine   also   con-­‐ cutes   the   Political   Council’s   directives.   A   Stra-­‐
tains   these   elements   but   places   them   in   a   tegic   Forces   Command   manages   and   adminis-­‐
broader   political   context.   It   links   India’s   doc-­‐ ters   all   strategic   forces.   The   Strategy   Pro-­‐
trine   to   the   “right   to   self   defence”   provided   gramme  Staff  is  a  unit  in  the  National  Security  
under   the   UN   Charter.   It   brings   in   the   idea   of   Council   (NSC)   Secretariat   that   collates   intelli-­‐
“credible,  minimum  deterrent”  and  defines  it  as   gence   regarding   potential   adversaries   and  
sufficient,   survivable   and   operationally   pre-­‐ works  on  a  10-­‐year  perspective  plan  for  India’s  
nuclear  deterrent.  Matters  relating  to  the  safe-­‐
                                                                                                                                        ty   and   security   of   nuclear   assets   and   delivery  
4  Prime  Minister’s  Office,  Press  Release,  4  January  2003,  
vehicles,   during   storage   and   transfer,   are   han-­‐
“Cabinet  Committee  on  Security  Reviews  Progress  in  Oper-­‐
ationalizing  India’s  Nuclear  Doctrine,”  
dled  by  the  Strategic  Armament  Safety  Authori-­‐
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/040 ty,  under  the  NCA.    
12003/r040120033.html.  
Rakesh  Sood   Should  India  Revise  its  Nuclear  Doctrine?   5  

20.  Thus  there  is  both  a  degree  of  continuity  in   the  US  Atomic  Energy  Commission  had  approx-­‐
the   three   documents   and   together   they   also   imately   50   weapons   and   needed   a   team   of   40  
articulate   a   uniquely   Indian   world-­‐view.   Re-­‐ persons   which   would   take   two   days   to   assem-­‐
flecting   the   long   held   conviction   that   nuclear   ble   it;   by   1950   the   number   was   250   and   by  
weapons   are   political   in   nature   and   not   weap-­‐ 1960,   more   than   15,000!   Therefore   “massive  
ons   of   war   fighting,   these   documents   seek   to   retaliation”  or  “giving  it  all  you  have  got”  made  
explain   India’s   quest   for   security   in   a   nuclear-­‐ no   sense   any   longer.   President   Dwight   D.   Ei-­‐
ized   environment,   the   unique   restraint   and   senhower’s  Science  Advisor  George  Kistiakow-­‐
finally   its   emergence   as   a   reluctant   nuclear-­‐ sky  raised  the  issue  of  redundancies  and  lack  of  
armed   state.   While   the   documents   outline   control   and   coordination.   In   1959,   centralized  
broad   principles   for   the   development,   deploy-­‐ target   planning   authority   was   finally   intro-­‐
ment  and  employment  of  India’s  nuclear  forces,   duced   with   the   Strategic   Air   Command   which  
they  also  seek  to  establish  India’s  role  as  a  re-­‐ then  gave  birth  to  the  Single  Integrated  Opera-­‐
sponsible   nuclear-­‐armed   state   that   is   willing   to   tional   Plan   (SIOP).   When   President   John   F.  
pursue   confidence-­‐building   measures   (CBMs)   Kennedy   was   briefed   about   SIOP-­‐62,   he   found  
and   nuclear   risk   reduction   measures   in   its   re-­‐ that   he   would   be   obliged   to   authorize   the  
gion,  can  be  a  responsible  member  of  multilat-­‐ launch   of   more   than   3,200   weapons   to   meet  
eral   non-­‐proliferation   export   control   regimes,   the   defined   military   objectives,   which   he   con-­‐
and  is  prepared  to  support  measures  towards  a   sidered   to   be   a   paralyzing   decision.   Asked   to  
nuclear-­‐weapon-­‐free-­‐world.   That   is   why   even   refine   the   options,   Defense   Secretary   Robert  
the   2003   document,   the   shortest   of   the   three,   McNamara   came   up   with   a   set   of   escalatory  
includes  elements  that  do  not  find  reference  in   steps   on   the   nuclear   ladder,   each   step   with   its  
other   declared   doctrines   and,   as   a   corollary,   own   targeting   lists,   described   as   “flexible   re-­‐
omits  issues  which  are  included  in  the  calculus   sponse.”    
of  those  states  that  attribute  a  different  role  to  
their  nuclear  weapons.     23.   By   1980,   the   US   target   lists   covering   the  
adversary’s   nuclear   and   conventional   forces  
An  Overview  of  Nuclear  Doctrines     and   military,   industrial   and   economic   centres  
had   grown   to   40,000,   with   correspondingly  
21.   Any   county’s   nuclear   doctrine   has   two   bloated   arsenals,   added   on   account   of   Defense  
principal  objectives.  First,  it  provides  guidance   Secretary   James   R.   Schlesinger’s   “selective   re-­‐
to   its   own   military   forces   together   with   reas-­‐ taliation.”   Meanwhile,   flexible   response   had  
surance   to   its   citizens   and   allies.   Second,   it   given   way   to   counterforce   targeting   and   then  
sends   a   clear   or   coded   message   to   potential   the   Countervailing   Doctrine   after   Assured   De-­‐
adversaries.   Because   nuclear   weapons   are   un-­‐ struction   was   quickly   interpreted   as   MAD   (Mu-­‐
like   conventional   weapons,   there   is   also   a   third   tually   Assured   Destruction).   During   President  
objective  –  preventing  a  nuclear  war  –  but  this   Ronald   Reagan’s   years,   countervailing   was   re-­‐
is   implemented   differently   by   different   coun-­‐ placed   by   “prevailance”   which   meant   ensuring  
tries.   A   country   with   a   no-­‐first-­‐use   policy   US   victory   rather   than   merely   denying   the   op-­‐
would  interpret  this  as  deterring  an  adversary   ponent’s   objectives.   Naturally,   each   change   in  
from  resorting  to  a  first  use  of  nuclear  weapons,   the  doctrine  was  designed  to  enhance  its  “cred-­‐
whereas  another  country  which  adopts  a  first-­‐ ibility”  and  the  SIOPs  were  updated  according-­‐
use   could   justify   deterrence   being   served   also   ly.    
by  the  threat  of  pre-­‐emption.    
24.  The  end  of  the  Cold  War  led  to  calls  for  a  re-­‐
The  United  States   think  and  since  1994,  the  US  has  produced  pe-­‐
riodic   Nuclear   Posture   Reviews   (NPR)   mandat-­‐
22.   Most   of   the   publicly   available   literature   on   ed   by   the   Congress   and   SIOPs   have   been   re-­‐
this   subject   relates   to   the   evolution   of   the   US   placed   by   CONPLAN   (Contingency   Plan)   8044.  
nuclear  doctrine.5  The  original  US  concept  was   After  President  Barack  Obama’s  famous  Prague  
“massive   retaliation”   which   lasted   through   the   speech   in   2009,   the   2010   NPR   indicated   that  
1950s.   Meanwhile,   as   US   intelligence   assess-­‐ the  US  is  seeking  to  reduce  the  role  of  nuclear  
ments  about  the  size  of  the  Soviet  arsenal  grew,   weapons   and   defined   their   role   “to   deter   nu-­‐
the   US   also   added   to   its   own   arsenal.   In   1948,   clear  attack  on  the  US,  its  allies  and  partners;  in  
                                                                                                                                        extreme   circumstances   to   defend   the   vital   in-­‐
5  Scott   D.   Sagan,   Moving   Targets:   Nuclear   Strategy   and   terests   of   the   US,   its   allies   and   partners.”   Con-­‐
National   Security   (Princeton:   Princeton   University   Press,   sequently,   first-­‐use   has   been   retained   and   in  
1989).   order   to   provide   a   nuclear   umbrella   to   both  
 
    
6 Policy  Brief  No.  18   APLN/CNND  

Japan  and  South  Korea,  even  “sole  purpose”  not   Russia7  

adopted   (nuclear   retaliation   can   be   contem-­‐
plated   against   conventional   attack   in   “extreme   27.   Russia’s   doctrine   has   evolved   during   the  
circumstances”).  Deterrence  by  denial  also  im-­‐ past   decade   and   today   reflects   considerable  
plies  a  greater  future  role  for  “missile  defence.”     similarity   to   the   US   doctrine.   During   the   Cold  
War,  the  USSR  may  have  been  less  public  with  
France  and  the  United  Kingdom6   its   doctrine   but   its   arsenal   certainly   kept   in  
step  with  the  expansion  of  the  US  stockpile.  In  
25.  France  has  sought  to  project  its  doctrine  as   fact,   the   USSR   declared   a   no-­‐first-­‐use   doctrine  
“independent,”   especially   since   1967   when   it   during   the   Cold   War   years.   However,   neither  
quit   NATO’s   integrated   structure   in   protest   at   the   nature   of   its   arsenal   nor   its   deployment  
the   US   adoption   of   “flexible   response”   which   pattern   was   consistent   with   the   declaratory  
the   French   interpreted   as   a   dilution   of   the   US   posture   and   in   the   post-­‐Cold   War   period,   no-­‐
nuclear   security   guarantee.   France   adopted   the   first–use   was   quietly   dropped.   Today,   Russia  
notion   of   “final   warning”   –   a   single   limited   envisages   using   its   nuclear   weapons   in   re-­‐
strike   on   military   targets   as   a   message   to   an   sponse  to  the  use  of  nuclear  weapons  and  oth-­‐
adversary   who   may   have   underestimated   er   WMD   against   Russia   and   its   allies;   or   in   re-­‐
French   resolve.   French   interpretation   of   the   sponse   to   conventional   aggression   where   the  
right  of  self  defence  under  Article  51  of  the  UN   existence  of  the  Russian  state  is  threatened.  In  
Charter   is   absolute   and   not   constrained   by   other   words,   Russia   envisages   first   use,   is   not  
“proportionate  response”  and  it  also  considers   bound  to  “sole  purpose”  and  provides  a  nuclear  
all   nuclear   weapons   to   be   “strategic.”   Rather   umbrella   to   its   allies   through   extended   deter-­‐
than   a   “counter-­‐force”   strategy   that   would   de-­‐ rence,   a   position   very   similar   to   that   followed  
stroy  the  enemy’s  nuclear  assets,  its  retaliation   by  the  US.  
is   designed   to   inflict   “unacceptable   damage”   by  
targeting   populations.   Two   significant   speech-­‐ China8    
es   by   President   Jacques   Chirac   (on   8   June   2001  
and   19   January   2006)   framed   the   evolution   to   28.  China’s  nuclear  doctrine  has  been  different  
deal   with   threats   emanating   from   state   spon-­‐ from   the   outset   reflecting   its   own   world-­‐view.  
sors   of   terrorism   and   the   possibility   of   terror-­‐ Both   Chairman   Mao   Zedong   and   his   successor  
ists  using  weapons  of  mass  destruction  (WMD).   Deng   Xiaoping   considered   nuclear   weapons   as  
This   also   envisaged   the   use   of   an   electro-­‐ tools   for   deterring   nuclear   aggression   and   co-­‐
magnetic   pulse   to   disable   an   adversary’s   elec-­‐ ercion   and   not   as   weapons   of   war.   Deterrence  
tronic  networks.     could   therefore   be   ensured   through   assured  
retaliation   which   required   a   small   arsenal.   Ac-­‐
26.   The   UK   doctrine   is   dovetailed   closely   with   cordingly,   China   adopted   a   no-­‐first-­‐use   policy.  
the   US   because   it   is   unlikely   that   there   can   be   a   Initially,  China’s  arsenal  was  designed  to  resist  
threat   to   the   UK   where   it   has   to   exercise   its   nuclear  blackmail  by  the  US  but  soon  after,  the  
nuclear   option   on   its   own.   Yet,   given   its   limited   USSR   was   also   defined   as   an   adversary.   Mao  
size,   rather   than   “counter-­‐force,”   Britain   too   described   nuclear   weapons   as   “paper   tigers”  
emphasizes   retaliation   causing   unacceptable   which   was   consistent   with   the   importance   he  
damage.  The  Defence  White  Paper  of  2006  jus-­‐ attached   to   “people’s   war.”   This   different   view  
tified   the   continuation   of   the   limited   subma-­‐ of   nuclear   weapons   also   contributed   to   China  
rine-­‐based   deterrent   also   to   deliver   “an   over-­‐ taking  a  more  relaxed  view  about  nuclear  pro-­‐
whelming   and   devastating   response”   to   a   re-­‐ liferation,   especially   during   1970s   and   1980s  
gional   WMD   threat   and   decided   to   undertake   when   it   contributed   actively   to   Pakistan’s   nu-­‐
the   replacement   of   the   four   ageing   Vanguard   clear   weapon   development   program   and  
class   ballistic   missile   submarines   (SSBNs)   that   shared  sensitive  technologies  with  other  coun-­‐
carry   the   Trident   (D-­‐5)   missiles   with   a   new   tries,  including  North  Korea  and  Iran.    
platform   which   will   become   operational   by  
2024.     29.   For   over   three   decades,   China   maintained   a  
capability   that   according   to   Western   analysts  
was  both  vulnerable  and  lacked  an  operational  
doctrine.  China’s  NFU  policy  only  gained  credi-­‐
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
6  Bruno  Tertrais,  A  Comparison  Between  US,  UK  and  French   7  NTI  Country  Profiles,  http://www.nti.org/country-­‐

Nuclear  Policies  and  Doctrines,   profiles/.  

http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/fil 8  China’s  Defence  White  Papers,  
es/art_bt.pdf.   http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/.  
Rakesh  Sood   Should  India  Revise  its  Nuclear  Doctrine?   7  

bility   in   the   late   1990s   when   it   developed   the   liberally   using   the   “grand-­‐fathering”   approach.  
capability   of   absorbing   a   first   strike   and   retain-­‐ Behind  the  possible  Chinese  shift  are  two  driv-­‐
ing   a   survivable   arsenal,   delivery   systems   and   ers   –   first,   that   domestic   technological   and   fi-­‐
command,   control   and   communication   systems   nancial  constraints  on  designing  new  weapons  
to   ensure   devastating   retaliation.   China   re-­‐ and   delivery   systems   are   no   longer   as   restric-­‐
mained   unperturbed   by   the   foreign   question-­‐ tive,   and   secondly,   US   development   of   Com-­‐
ing   of   its   doctrine   and   maintained   that   lack   of   mand,   Control,   Communications,   Computers,  
transparency   compensated   for   its   weakness   Intelligence,   Surveillance   and   Reconnaissance  
and  added  to  the  credibility  of  its  deterrent.     (C4ISR   in   US   military   jargon)   and   missile   de-­‐
fence   capabilities,   together   with   growing   abil-­‐
30.  After  the  mid-­‐1990s,  China’s  posture  start-­‐ ity   to   undertake   long-­‐range   precision   strikes  
ed   evolving.   Beginning   in   1996,   China   has   with  conventional  warheads.  
brought   out   eight   Defence   White   Papers.  
Though  the  arsenal  has  grown  modestly  in  size,   Pakistan10  
the   significant   shift   has   been   in   terms   of   its  
modernization  with  development  of  long-­‐range   33.  Pakistan  has  not  made  its  nuclear  doctrine  
intercontinental   ballistic   missile   (ICBM)   and   public,   claiming   that   ambiguity   and   the   result-­‐
SSBN   capabilities,   developing   MIRV   (multiple   ing   uncertainty   is   helpful.   However,   certain  
independently  targetable  re-­‐entry  vehicle)  and   elements  can  be  deduced  from  statements  and  
MaRV   (manoeuvrable   re-­‐entry   vehicle)   tech-­‐ writings   of   military   leaders   and   senior   officials.  
nologies,   deploying   rail-­‐mobile   ICBMs,   moving   The   key   is   that   Pakistan’s   doctrine   is   India-­‐
from   liquid   fuelled   to   solid   fuelled   launchers,   centric.   It   has   defined   its   deterrent   as   mini-­‐
and  the  development  of  short  range  or  tactical   mum   credible   deterrent   (and   sometimes   as  
nuclear   weapons.   The   2006   White   Paper   con-­‐ minimum  defensive  deterrent)  though  its  actu-­‐
tained  a  more  complete  explanation  of  Chinese   al  numbers  will  be  a  function  of  India’s  capabil-­‐
nuclear   posture   while   retaining   the   basic   ele-­‐ ity.  It  is  intended  to  deter  nuclear  use  by  India  
ments  of  NFU  and  “assured  retaliation.”     and   also   act   as   an   equalizer   against   India’s  
conventional   superiority.   Consequently,   Paki-­‐
31.  However,  its  growing  capabilities  have  also   stan   rejects   NFU.   Other   elements   include   ob-­‐
generated   questions   about   whether   China   is   serving   a   moratorium   on   testing   (unless   India  
now   shifting   from   “minimum   deterrence”   to   tests),   participation   in   FMCT   negotiations  
“limited  deterrence”  (or  moderate  deterrence).   (which   has   actually   meant   blocking   them   by  
For  the  first  time,  the  2013  White  Paper  omit-­‐ insisting   on   introducing   “existing   stockpiles”),  
ted  a  reference  to  NFU  (though  it  was  reiterat-­‐ and   support   to   international   arms   control  
ed   subsequently   when   its   absence   was   ques-­‐ measures  that  are  non-­‐discriminatory.    
tioned).   The   omission   was   not   accidental   and  
at   the   very   least,   reflects   an   internal   debate   in   34.  In  its  search  for  full-­‐spectrum  (that  is,  con-­‐
China  about  the  utility  of  retaining  such  a  con-­‐ ventional   as   well   as   nuclear)   deterrence,   Paki-­‐
straining  posture  and  whether  it  should  be  re-­‐ stan  has  adopted  much  of  NATO’s  terminology  
placed  by  a  more  permissive  policy  that  offers   of   the   early   Cold   War   which   relied   on   tactical  
greater   flexibility   in   both   deployment   and   em-­‐ nuclear   weapons.   But   this  ignores  the  political  
ployment.   Furthermore,   there   is   ambiguity   compulsion   of   “extended   deterrence”   and   also  
about   whether   no-­‐first-­‐use   applies   to   conflicts   that   by   the   end   of   the   1980s,   based   on   new  
associated   with   disputed   territories   or   “local   findings,   tactical   nuclear   weapons   were   found  
wars,”   together   with   reports   that   the   People’s   to  be  militarily  useless  (remember  the  phrase  –  
Liberation   Army’s   targeting   is   not   limited   to   the   shorter   the   range,   the   deader   the   Germans).  
counter-­‐value   targets   as   in   the   past   but   also   Since   April   2011,   Pakistan   has   conducted   a  
covers   offensive   capabilities   of   an   adversary,   number  of  tests  of  its  60  km  range  missile  (Hatf  
designed  to  bring  an  end  to  the  conflict.9     IX/Nasr).   In   2012,   Pakistan   also   established   a  
Naval   Strategic   Force   Command   and   is   ex-­‐
32.  Post-­‐1990,  China  has  also  begun  tightening   pected   to   deploy   nuclear   missiles   on   surface  
its   non-­‐proliferation   policies   and   export   con-­‐ vessels.   Both   these   developments   pose   ques-­‐
trols,   except   when   it   comes   to   Pakistan   whose   tions   with   regard   to   Pakistan’s   claims   about  
nuclear   capability   it   continues   to   support   by   maintaining   centralized   command-­‐and-­‐control  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
9  M.  Taylor  Fravel  and  Evan  S.  Medeiros,  China’s  Search  for   10  Brig  Gen  (Retd)  Naeem  Salik,  The  Evolution  of  Pakistan’s  
Assured  Retaliation,   Nuclear  Doctrine,  
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_ http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/Research/
a_00016.   NuclearLearning/6%20Nuclear%20Learning_Salik.pdf)  
    
8 Policy  Brief  No.  18   APLN/CNND  

and  separation  of  warheads  from  delivery  sys-­‐ and   technical   capabilities.   Doctrines   also  
tems.   Considering   that   Pakistan   is   host   to   a   evolve   taking   into   account   growing   technical  
number  of  groups  of  non-­‐state  actors  with  vio-­‐ capabilities   and   geopolitical   changes.   The   cred-­‐
lent   agendas,   this   has   also   raised   concerns   ibility  of  the  doctrine  comes  from  its  coherence  
about   the   safety   and   security   of   Pakistan’s   nu-­‐ and   consistency   between   declared   objectives  
clear  assets.     and   actual   behaviour.   Generally,   democratic  
countries   are   more   prone   to   public   pro-­‐
Israel  and  North  Korea11   nouncements   regarding   their   security   and   nu-­‐
clear   doctrines   because,   being   open   societies  
35.   Israel   has   never   acknowledged   possessing   they   are   held   to   higher   standards   of   accounta-­‐
nuclear  weapons,  making  it  the  worst  kept  se-­‐ bility   by   their   citizens.   Policy   changes   are   in-­‐
cret   in   nuclear   history,   preferring   to   maintain   tended   to   impart   greater   credibility   to   the   nu-­‐
opacity  for  political  reasons,  both  domestic  and   clear   doctrine   in   the   eyes   of   the   potential   ad-­‐
external.   Its   public   position   since   1965   has   versaries   and   also   reassurance   to   its   own   citi-­‐
been   that   it   shall   not   be   the   first   to   introduce   zens.  (Israel  is  an  exception  in  that  its  publicly  
nuclear   weapons   in   the   Middle   East.   The   most   articulated   stand   has   remained   opaque   and  
explicit  accounts  about  Israel’s  nuclear  capabil-­‐ consistent  for  nearly  fifty  years,  despite  geopo-­‐
ities   came   from   Mordechai   Vanunu’s   disclo-­‐ litical  changes  and  a  significant  expansion  in  its  
sures  in  the  1980s  and  it  would  fair  to  assume   capability,  yet  its  doctrine  is  perceived  as  being  
that   Israel’s   nuclear   capabilities   would   have   “credible.”)    
grown  since,  to  include  a  triad  with  missile  ca-­‐
pability   including   ICBMs.   However,   there   is   a   38.  A  number  of  arguments  have  been  put  for-­‐
disconnect   between   Israel’s   capability   and   its   ward  to  justify  why  India  should  review  its  nu-­‐
declaratory  posture.  But  since  the  latter  serves   clear   doctrine.   Broadly,   these   fall   into   three  
its   security   objectives,   this   merely   highlights   categories.  The  first  is  the  criticism  that  India’s  
the  political  character  of  nuclear  weapons.     doctrine  is  not  credible  because  its  capabilities  
are  limited  and  its  armed  forces  are  not  in  the  
36.  North  Korea  is  a  quintessential  outlier,  hav-­‐ loop.   The   second   set   of   arguments   question   the  
ing   announced   its   decision   to   quit   the   NPT   in   credibility  of  the  no-­‐first-­‐use  policy  by  pointing  
1993,   put   the   decision   in  suspension   in   return   to   the   domestic   cost   of   absorbing   an   adver-­‐
for   two   US   light   water   reactors   and   when   the   sary’s  first  strike,  questioning  India’s  ability  to  
deal   soured,   finally   quitting   the   NPT   in   2003.   deliver   massive   retaliation,   doubting   whether  
With   Chinese   help,   it   had   developed   a   fairly   use   of   a   tactical   nuclear   weapon   would   justify  
robust   missile   capability   and   expanded   its   ac-­‐ massive   retaliation   and   suggesting   that   India  
cess  to  enrichment  and  reprocessing  technolo-­‐ may   be   better   served   by   replacing   NFU   by   ei-­‐
gies   by   trading   know-­‐how   with   the   Pakistani   ther   first-­‐use   or   ambiguity.   The   third   category  
metallurgist   A.   Q.   Khan’s   ‘nuclear   Wal-­‐Mart’!   of   arguments   is   more   fundamental   and   sug-­‐
After   having   conducted   three   nuclear   tests   in   gests   that   Indian   security   has   been   adversely  
2006,  2009  and  2013,  it  is  estimated  to  possess   impacted  by  going  overtly  nuclear  because  Pa-­‐
between   six   to   eight   devices   but   not   yet   the   kistan   is   also   a   nuclear-­‐armed   state.   Thus   In-­‐
capability  to  make  a  warhead  compact  enough   dia’s   nuclear   weapons   were   unable   to   deter  
to   fit   onto   its   missiles.   North   Korea’s   nuclear   Pakistan   from   launching   the   Kargil   incursions  
policy   is   driven   by   regime-­‐related   existential   in   1999   but   did   deter   India   from   a   more   robust  
concerns   and   together   with   Chinese   influence,   military   response.   Each   of   these   categories   of  
the   extent   of   which   is   sometimes   debated,   in-­‐ questions  merits  proper  examination.    
creases   the   opaqueness   of   North   Korea’s   doc-­‐
trine.     The  Credibility  of  India’s  Nuclear  Doctrine  

Calls  for  Revising  the  Indian  Doctrine   39.   Indian   doctrine   is   a   brief   document   and  
only   spells   out   certain   basic   principles   which  
37.   As   the   preceding   section   makes   clear,   nu-­‐ reflect   a   uniquely   Indian   world-­‐view.   Further-­‐
clear   doctrines   reflect   a   world-­‐view   invariably   more,   it   also   dwells   on   issues   (nuclear   testing,  
shaped   by   a   country’s   historical   experiences   export   controls   etc.)   which   do   not   fall   within  
and   the   vision   of   its   leaders   (political,   military   the  ambit  of  a  “nuclear  doctrine”  and  therefore  
and   scientific),   its   threat   perceptions   and   the   a   comparison   with   NPRs   or   White   Papers  
role  it  assigns  to  nuclear  weapons,  political  will   brought   out   by   other   countries   serves   little  
                                                                                                                                        purpose.  Third,  the  doctrine  is  both  declaratory  
11  NTI  Country  Profiles,  http://www.nti.org/country-­‐ and  aspirational,  implying  that  nuclear  capabil-­‐
profiles/.  
Rakesh  Sood   Should  India  Revise  its  Nuclear  Doctrine?   9  

ities  are  still  being  built  up.  Long-­‐range  missile   adopt  in  China  or  Pakistan  but  in  a  democratic  
capability   and   the   submarine   leg   of   the   triad   society,  the  government  has  to  create  a  broad-­‐
are   being   developed.   Similarly,   ensuring   a   based   national   consensus   which   requires   for-­‐
command-­‐and-­‐control   infrastructure   that   can   mulating,  sharing  and  publicly  articulating  pol-­‐
withstand   a   first   strike,   building   a   deterrent   icy  rationales.    
that  is  both  sufficient  and  survivable  to  ensure  
retaliation,   and   improving   C4ISR   capabilities,   42.   Any   change   of   doctrine   is   not   merely   the  
are   attributes   that   can   only   be   improved   over   change  of  a  few  words  here  and  there.  Rather,  
time.   This   is   why   the   deterrent   is   defined   as   a   in  order  for  it  to  be  credible,  it  must  be  coher-­‐
“credible   minimum   deterrent”   but   without   ent  with  other  elements  of  the  doctrine,  namely  
specifying   a   numerical   limit.   Together   with   posture,   size   and   composition   of   the   arsenal,  
“sole  purpose”   and   NFU,   this   indicates   that   In-­‐ storage   and   employment   protocols   and   com-­‐
dia  does  not  intend  to  engage  in  a  nuclear  arms   mand-­‐and-­‐control   procedures.   There   is   also  
race   with   any   country.   It   is   also   consistent   with   the   issue   of   consistency   with   the   historical  
centralized   command-­‐and-­‐control   and   ensur-­‐ world-­‐view   –   the   notion   of   India   being   a   “re-­‐
ing   safety   and   security   as   the   warheads   and   sponsible”  state  that  observes  “restraint”  in  the  
delivery  systems  can  be  stored  separately.     exercise   of   force   and   remains   committed   to   the  
idea   of   a   nuclear-­‐weapon-­‐free   world.   The   cur-­‐
40.   Since   India’s   leaders   have   considered   nu-­‐ rent   doctrine   displays   both   coherence   and   con-­‐
clear   weapons   as   political   weapons,   the   ele-­‐ sistency   though   admittedly,   absorbing   a   first  
ments   of   the   nuclear   doctrine   have   been   au-­‐ strike  would  be  a  high  price,  particularly  when  
thored   by   the   political   leadership.   After   1998,   elements  of  the  deterrent  are  still  being  put  in  
the   military   services   have   been   involved   with   place.  However,  any  doctrinal  change  will  have  
nuclear   planning   but   command-­‐and-­‐control   to   be   carefully   managed   and   implemented   so  
rests   firmly   with   the   civilian   leadership.   The   that   it   enhances   India’s   security   and   sustains  
relatively   late   entry   of   the   services   into   nuclear   stability.    
decision   making   only   underlines   the   fact   that  
Indian   political   leadership   sees   nuclear   weap-­‐ Implications  of  Doctrinal  Asymmetry  
ons   very   differently   from   conventional   weap-­‐
ons.  Moreover,  since  the  deterrent  is  a  work  in   43.  The  criticism  that  nuclear  weapons  did  not  
progress,   a   greater   role   for   the   military   or   a   prevent   the   Kargil   war   is   invalid   because   the  
shift  to  a  first-­‐use  policy  is  not  going  to  address   Indian  doctrine  does  not  claim  that  it  was  or  is  
the   technical   shortcomings.   The   setting   up   of   intended   to   deter   a   Kargil-­‐like   conflict.   India’s  
the  Strategic  Forces  Command  and  the  creation   deterrent   is   solely   intended   to   deter   nuclear  
of   the   Strategy   Programme   Staff   in   the   NSC   aggression   and   nuclear   blackmail.   In   fact,   the  
Secretariat   provide   for   greater   engagement   of   latter   was   a   key   reason   that   India   was   obliged  
the   military   in   strategic   and   target   planning   to   test   in   1998   and   declare   itself   a   nuclear  
and   operational   execution,   and   also   for   better   weapons   possessor   state.   Pakistan   had   under-­‐
civil–military  coordination.     taken   a   “cold   test”   and   assembled   its   first  
weapon  (based  on  a  validated  Chinese  design)  
No-­‐First-­‐Use   by   1987,   leading   to   an   increased   sense   of   vul-­‐
nerability   in   India.   The   only   way   out   for   India  
41.  Closely  linked  is  the  logic  of  the  no-­‐first-­‐use   to   end   the   nuclear   blackmail   under   whose  
policy   because   nuclear   weapons   are   not   per-­‐ shadow   Pakistan   was   pursuing   its   covert   war  
ceived   by   the   Indian   political   leadership   as   was  to  go  nuclear  overtly.  That  Pakistan   could  
weapons  of  war  fighting.  Therefore  the  attempt   follow   within   two   weeks   with   six   explosive  
has   been   to   ensure   successful   deterrence   tests   demonstrates   that   it   had   been   assembling  
(hence   the   efforts   to   build   a   triad)   that   can   weapons   for   some   time.   The   Kargil   war   ex-­‐
guarantee   unacceptable   retaliatory   (second   posed  the  Pakistani  strategy  and  subjected  Pa-­‐
strike)  damage.  Any  other  policy  of  first-­‐use  or   kistan   to   widespread   criticism   that   its   army  
its  variant  would  run  the  risk  of  drawing  India   had   engaged   in   reckless   and   irresponsible   be-­‐
into  a  nuclear  arms  race.  Since  it  would  envis-­‐ haviour.    
age   use   other   than   “strategic,”   it   would   also  
lead   to   dilution   of   the   centralized   command-­‐ 44.  Pakistan  has  chosen  to  maintain  an  opaque  
and-­‐control   system   by   delegation   of   launch   doctrine  because  it  would  find  it  difficult  to  get  
authority  and  the  need  to  maintain  the  arsenal   support   for   a   nuclear   war   fighting   policy   and  
at  a  higher  level  of  alert  status  than  is  currently   nothing  else  would  explain  its  recourse  to  tac-­‐
the   position.   Ambiguity   or   opacity   is   easier   to   tical   nuclear   weapons.   As   the   only   country  
    
10 Policy  Brief  No.  18   APLN/CNND  

whose  nuclear  program  and  weapons  are  con-­‐ erate   concerns   about   the   “nuclear   flashpoint  
trolled   by   the   army   and   not   by   the   civilian   hypothesis.”   Nuclear   terminology   has   tradi-­‐
leadership,  the  role  of  its  nuclear  weapons  has   tionally  used  the  term  “massive  retaliation”  but  
been  defined  by  the  army  which  retains  its  ob-­‐ even   this   terminological   change   by   Indian   au-­‐
session  with  changing  the  status  quo  with  India   thorities,  from  “punitive”  to  “massive,”  without  
using   covert   means   by   seeking   space   below   the   corresponding   changes   in   arsenals   and   pos-­‐
nuclear  threshold.   Naturally,  this  creates  a  doc-­‐ tures,   has   only   contributed   to   speculative   in-­‐
trinal  asymmetry,  but  the  answer  to  that  is  not   terpretation.  This  is  why  any  change  in  the  doc-­‐
for   India   to   give   up   its   NFU   but   to   strengthen   trine   has   to   be   carefully   managed   so   that   co-­‐
its  intelligence  and  conventional  capabilities.     herence   and   consistency   are   not   lost.   Creating  
uncertainty   in   the   mind   of   an   adversary   is   a  
45.   Unlike   the   India–Pakistan   equation,   the   legitimate   objective   but   it   must   be   done   with-­‐
India–China  equation  is  perceived  as  more  sta-­‐ out  diminishing  domestic  trust  and  confidence.    
ble,   even   though   the   Chinese   arsenal   is   far  
larger   and   more   sophisticated   than   the   Indian   48.   Another   change   in   the   2003   document   is  
deterrent   and   there   have   also   been   boundary   the  qualification  in  the  earlier  no-­‐first-­‐use  that  
incursions   and   air   space   violations   in   recent   introduces   the   option   for   nuclear   retaliation  
months.   The   reason   is   that   neither   country   is   against   an   attack   using   chemical   or   biological  
seeking   to   change   the   status   quo   by   exploring   weapons.   The   reason   for   this   has   never   been  
space  below  the  nuclear  threshold.  The  prima-­‐ spelt  out.  However,  there  have  been  suspicions  
ry   driver   of   India’s   nuclear   doctrine   remains   that   Pakistan   may   have   been   dabbling   with  
China.   However,   the   nuclear   dyad   with   Paki-­‐ building   up   a   clandestine   biological   weapon  
stan   attracts   greater   international   attention   as   capability.   But   since   attribution   of   such   a   use  
a   ‘potential   nuclear   flash-­‐point’   but   the   under-­‐ will   be   difficult,   it   is   not   clear   whether   the  
lying  reason  is  the  doctrinal  asymmetry.     threat   of   nuclear   retaliation   actually   acts   as   a  
deterrent.   Therefore,   this   qualifier   has   not  
Changes  from  1999  to  2003   added   much   to   ‘credibility’   but   dropping   it   to-­‐
day  should  be  considered  as  part  of  an  overall  
46.   There   have   been   some   changes   between   review  package.  
the  1999  and  the  2003  documents  which  have  
attracted   comment   and   attention.   One   change   Different  Policy  Approaches  for  Differ-­‐
has   been   replacing   the   1999   formulation   of   “a   ent  Nuclear  Ages  
nuclear   attack   on   India   and   its   forces”   (1999)  
by   “nuclear   attack   on   Indian   territory   or   on   49.   It   is   universally   accepted   that   nuclear  
Indian   forces   anywhere”   in   the   2003   document,   weapons   are   qualitatively   different   from   con-­‐
as   attracting   a   retaliatory   nuclear   strike.   The   ventional   weapons   but   from   this   point   on,   dif-­‐
term   “punitive   retaliation”   used   in   the   1999   ferences   begin   to   emerge.   One   school   of  
draft   doctrine   has   been   replaced   by   “massive   thought  maintains  that  the  sole  purpose  of  nu-­‐
retaliation”   in   2003   document.   However,   both   clear   weapons   is   to   deter   an   opponent   from  
elaborate   it   by   using   the   term   “to   inflict   unac-­‐ using  nuclear  weapons.  In  other  words,  nuclear  
ceptable   damage”   on   the   aggressor.   The   ques-­‐ weapons  should  only  address  the  threat  of  nu-­‐
tion  as  to  whether  the  use  of  a  tactical  nuclear   clear  aggression.  A  no-­‐first-­‐use  policy  is  there-­‐
weapon  if  used  on  Pakistani  soil  to  halt  an  ad-­‐ fore   entirely   consistent   with   such   an   under-­‐
vancing   Indian   armour   column   should   merit   a   standing;   it   is   both   stabilizing   and   permits   a  
“massive”  response  and,  if  not,  whether  such  a   posture   that   enhances   the   safety   and   security  
stand   is   credible   reflects   the   nuclear   war   of   the   nuclear   stockpile.   Differences   begin   to  
fighting   approach.   India   considers   any   use   of   emerge   when   nuclear   deterrence   is   defined   to  
nuclear   weapons   as   “strategic”   and   rejects   the   address   a   wider   range   of   security   threats   (such  
attempt  to  somehow  equate  a  low  yield  nuclear   as  full-­‐spectrum  deterrence).  Such  an  approach  
weapon   with   just   another   more   destructive   invariably   leads   to   first-­‐use   and   escalatory  
conventional  weapon.     steps,  which  in  turn  lead  to  planning  to  enable  
domination   at   each   stage,   and   consequently,  
47.   That   is   why   the   Indian   doctrine   declares   nuclear  arms  racing.    
that  the  objective  of  nuclear  weapons  is  not  to  
deter   war   (not   full-­‐spectrum   deterrence)   but   50.   In   a   nuclear   dyad,   these   different   ap-­‐
only   to   deter   the   use   or   threat   of   use   of   nuclear   proaches   will   invariably   lead   to   a   mismatch   of  
weapons.   Attributing   a   larger   role   would   only   doctrines   or   doctrinal   asymmetry.   The   Cold  
serve   to   lower   the   nuclear   threshold   and   gen-­‐ War   which   broadly   coincided   with   the   first  
Rakesh  Sood   Should  India  Revise  its  Nuclear  Doctrine?   11  

nuclear   age   was   dominated   by   the   US–USSR   tions   that   the   changes   between   the   1999   and  
nuclear   dyad   and   its   dynamics   determined   2003   documents   have   attracted   indicate   that  
progress  in  arms  control  and  non-­‐proliferation,   the  impact  of  any  changes  have  to  be  carefully  
whether  bilateral  or  multilateral.  The  situation   evaluated   by   India’s   strategic   planners   and  
today  is  different  even  though  the  US  and  Rus-­‐ political  leaders.  
sian  arsenals  are  still  much  larger  than  those  of  
other   states.   Reducing   the   nuclear   equations   to   Recommendations  
dyads  quickly  throws  up  the  challenges  of  tack-­‐
ling   doctrinal   asymmetry,   which   is   a   dead   end   54.   Periodic   reviews   of   the   nuclear   doctrine  
because  changes  in  nuclear  doctrines  cannot  be   should   be   undertaken   so   that   it   retains   credi-­‐
externally  driven.     bility  vis-­‐a-­‐vis  the  potential  adversary  and  car-­‐
ries  reassurance  for  the  Indian  people  that  the  
51.   The   second   nuclear   age   is   very   different   doctrine   takes   into   account   growing   technical  
because   the   centre   of   gravity   is   shifting   from   capabilities  and  geopolitical  changes  impacting  
the   Euro–Atlantic   to   the   Indo–Pacific   which   India’s   security   environment.   Periodic   reviews  
brings  in  a  multiplicity  of  players  whose  equa-­‐ will   realign   nuclear   doctrine   to   India’s   assess-­‐
tions   cannot   be   reduced   to   dyads   and   the   su-­‐ ment   of   its   security   environment,   particularly  
perpowers  have  become  history.  A  nuclear  ex-­‐ the  nuclear  dimension,  thereby  explaining,  up-­‐
change   between   two   players   will   therefore   dating  and  refining  India’s  rationale  for  its  nu-­‐
draw  in  others,  unlike  in  the  past  when  the  su-­‐ clear  policy.  
perpower  nuclear  dyad  was  so  overwhelmingly  
in   the   Euro–Atlantic.   Therefore   doctrines   of   55.  Periodic  doctrinal  reviews  will  serve  also  to  
war   fighting   involving   flexible   response   or   its   enhance   the   engagement   of   India’s   defence  
iterative   variants   only   add   to   unpredictability   forces   (army,   air   force   and   navy   high   com-­‐
in  the  second  nuclear  age.     mands)   and   facilitate   greater   civil–military   co-­‐
ordination   in   all   aspects   of   nuclear   policy   for-­‐
52.  This  complexity  would  indicate  that  the  age   mulation.  
of  bilateral  (US–Russia)  arms  control  will  have  
to   yield   to   a   multilateral   understanding   in   or-­‐ 56.   The   review   should   highlight   the   differences  
der  to  have  a  stabilizing  influence  in  the  Indo– between   the   first   and   the   second   nuclear   ages  
Pacific.   While   global   nuclear   disarmament   so   that   it   exposes   shortcomings   of   applying  
might   seem   a   distant   goal,   two   of   the   nuclear   Cold   War   thinking   to   today’s   world,   together  
players   (India   and   China)   have   a   no-­‐first-­‐use   with   the   challenges   of   coping   with   doctrinal  
policy  and  if  others  can  be  persuaded  to  follow   asymmetry   with   the   shift   from   the   Euro–
similar   approaches,   it   can   lead   to   a   multilat-­‐ Atlantic   to   the   Asia–Pacific.   This   will   also   help  
eralization  of  NFU,  a  small  first  step  forward.     to  dispel  some  of  the  misperceptions  about  the  
Indian  policy.  
53.   Given   the   evolution   of   India’s   position  
which  places  it  in  a  unique  position  and  the  fact   57.   India’s   current   doctrine,   based   on   the   polit-­‐
that  it  is  a  democracy,  India  cannot  be  opaque   ical   nature   of   nuclear   weapons   and   NFU,   is  
about  its  doctrine.  It  therefore  needs  to  be  de-­‐ both   coherent   and   consistent   with   India’s  
veloped  further  for  which  periodic  reviews  are   world-­‐view  and  does  not  need  to  be  revised  at  
needed.   Periodic   reviews   would   also   reassure   this   stage   as   India’s   capabilities   are   still   a   work  
the   Indian   citizenry   that   the   doctrine   remains   in  progress.    
open   to   adaptation   and   improvement   and   is  
thereby   responsive   to   contemporary   security   58.  Based  on  the  strategic  logic  spelt  out  in  the  
challenges.   One   area   which   was   covered   briefly   periodic  reviews,  India  should  continue  to  take  
in  1998  but  has  since  been  excluded  is  a  review   disarmament   initiatives,   consistent   with   its  
of   doctrinal   and   arsenal   related   developments   unique   position   as   a   reluctant   nuclear-­‐armed  
in  other  nuclear  weapon  states.  This  would  add   state.  
to   the   credibility   of   the   Indian   position.   How-­‐
 
ever,   the   basic   elements   of   its   doctrine   appear  
sound  and  form  a  coherent  whole  which  is  con-­‐
sistent  with  India’s  world-­‐view  and  provides  a  
reassuring   continuity.   The   limitations   of   the  
nuclear   deterrent   which   is   in   the   process   of  
being   developed   cannot   be   addressed   by   doc-­‐
trinal   adjustments.   The   speculative   interpreta-­‐
    
12 Policy  Brief  No.  18   APLN/CNND  

   
The  Author   APLN/CNND  Policy  Briefs  
 
 
These  express  the  views  of  the  authors,  and  do  
RAKESH   SOOD   served   in   India’s   Foreign   Ser-­‐
not   necessarily   reflect   the   views   of   APLN  
vice   and   was   India’s   Ambassador   to   Nepal,   Af-­‐
members   or   the   CNND,   or   other   organizations  
ghanistan   and   France   and   the   country’s   first  
with   which   the   authors   may   be   associated.  
Ambassador   in   charge   of   Disarmament   in   Ge-­‐
They   are   published   to   encourage   debate   on  
neva.   He   was   Prime   Minister   Manmohan  
topics   of   policy   interest   and   relevance   regard-­‐
Singh’s   Special   Envoy   for   Disarmament   and  
ing  the  existence  and  role  of  nuclear  weapons.  
Non-­‐Proliferation  (2013–14)  before  retirement.  
 
He   was   Joint   Secretary   Disarmament   and   In-­‐
ternational   Security   Affairs,   a   division   that   he    
set  up  and  headed  from  1992  to  2000.  
 
 
 
APLN  and  CNND   Funding  Support  
 
 
The  Asia  Pacific  Leadership  Network  (APLN)  
comprises   some   forty   former   senior   political,   APLN   and   CNND   gratefully   acknowledge   the  
diplomatic,   military   and   other   opinion   leaders   generous   support   of   The   Australian   National  
from   fourteen   countries   around   the  region,   University;   the   Government   of   Australia,   in  
including   nuclear-­‐weapons   possessing   states   particular   the   Department   of   Defence   and   the  
China,   India   and   Pakistan.   The   objective   of   the   Department   of   Foreign   Affairs   and   Trade;   the  
group,   convened   by   former   Australian   Foreign   Nuclear   Threat   Initiative;   and   The   Simons  
Minister   and   President   Emeritus   of   the   Inter-­‐ Foundation  of  Vancouver,  Canada.  
national  Crisis  Group  Gareth  Evans,  is  to  inform    
and   energize   public   opinion,   and   especially  
high-­‐level   policy-­‐makers,   to   take   seriously   the    
very   real   threats   posed   by   nuclear   weapons,    
and   do   everything   possible   to   achieve   a   world  
in   which   they   are   contained,   diminished   and    
ultimately   eliminated.   See   further    
http://apln.anu.edu.au.    
   
 
The   Centre   for   Nuclear   Non-­‐Proliferation  
and   Disarmament   (CNND)   contributes   to   Contact  Us  
worldwide   efforts   to   minimize   the   risk   of   nu-­‐  
clear-­‐weapons   use,   stop   their   spread   and   ulti-­‐
Centre  for  Nuclear  Non-­‐Proliferation    
mately   achieve   their   complete   elimination.   It  
and  Disarmament  
works   in   partnership   with   the   Geneva   Centre  
Crawford  School  of  Public  Policy  
for   Security   Policy   (GCSP)   and   the   Stockholm  
The  Australian  National  University  
International   Peace   Research   Institute   (SIPRI),  
Canberra  ACT  0200  AUSTRALIA  
and   acts   as   the   Secretariat   for   APLN.   The   direc-­‐
Email:  cnnd@anu.edu.au  
tor   of   the   Centre   is   Professor   Ramesh   Thakur,  
Tel:  +61  2  6125  0912;  0466  465  835  (cell)  
former   UN   Assistant   Secretary-­‐General,   and   it  
 
is  assisted  by  a  distinguished  International  Ad-­‐
visory   Board   chaired   by   Professor   Gareth   Ev-­‐
ans.  See  further  http://cnnd.anu.edu.au.