G.R. No.

149588 September 29, 2009

FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS and CARMELITA C. LLAMAS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BRANCH 66 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT IN MAKATI CITY and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Facts:

Petition is captioned as “Annulment of Judgment and Certiorari, with Preliminary Injunction”.

Petitioners were charged before the RTC with the crime of “Other Forms of Swindling”. The RTC
convicted them of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

This prompted the petitioner to appeal the decision to the SC. However, the SC denied the same
for failure to state the material dates. Consequently, the judgment of conviction became final and
executory. A warrant of arrest was issued against Carmelita and Francisco Llamas, but the latter
was nowhere to be found.

Almost a year thereafter, petitioner Francisco Llamas moved for the lifting of the warrant of arrest,
raising for the first time the issue that the RTC had no jurisdiciton over the offense charged.
However, since no action was taken by the RTC on Francisco’s motion, petitioners instituted an
action for the annulment of the judgment issued by the court.

Issue:
Whether or not the remedy of annulment of judgment is proper.

Held:
No.

The remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases.

Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of judgment
to the following:

Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a
criminal case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such recourse,
for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal cases. Section 18, Rule 124 thereof,
provides:

Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. – The provisions of Rules
42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court
in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable
and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to extend the scope of Rule 47 to criminal cases. As
SC explained in Macalalag v. Ombudsman, when there is no law or rule providing for this remedy,
recourse to it cannot be allowed.

Here, petitioners are invoking the remedy under Rule 47 to assail a decision in a criminal case.
Following the aforementioned provisions, SC cannot allow such recourse, there being no basis in
law or in the rules.

PEOPLE VS. MONTECLAROS - 589 SCRA 320

Facts:
The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida, and was 13 years old at the time of the
incident. Ida worked as a waitress in Bayanihan Beer House, Cebu. Ida and ABC rented a room in
a house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. On April 1, 1995, about 4:30 p.m., ABC testified
that she was in the house with Ida and Tampus who were both drinking beer at that time. They
forced her to drink beer and after consuming three and one-half glasses of beer, she became
intoxicated and very sleepy. While ABC was lying on the floor of their room, she overheard
Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be allowed to remedyo or have sexual intercourse with
her. Appellant Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he finished having sexual
intercourse with ABC. ABC fell asleep and when she woke up, she noticed that the garter of her
panties was loose and rolled down to her knees. She suffered pain in her head, thighs, buttocks,
groin and vagina, and notice that her panties and short pants were stained with blood which was
coming from her vagina. When her mother arrived home from work the following morning, she
kept on crying but appellant Ida ignored her.
ABC testified that on April 4, 1995 around 1:00am, Tampus went aside their room and threatened
to kill her if she would report the previous sexual assault to anyone. He abused her again. After
consummating the sexual act, he left the house. When ABC told appellant Ida about the incident,
the latter again ignored her.

On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her mother, ABC sought the help of her aunt, Nellie
Montesclaros (Nellie). She told Nellie about the rape and that her mother sold her, ABC, together
with Nellie and Norma Andales, a traffic enforcer, reported the incident of rape to the police.

Tampus was found guilty of two counts of rape as principal, and Ida was found guilty of being an
accomplice in one crime of rape. Tampus died pending appeal in the CA, hence the CA passed
judgement upon Ida.

The trial court ordered Tampus and Ida “jointy and severally”, to indemnify the offended party,
P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 013324-L. “The Court of Appeals, however, did not award any
civil indemnity to ABC, and only awarded moral and exemplary damages”.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused Bartolome Tampus of the crimes of
rape despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Held.
No. The trial court does not erred in convicting the accused Bartolome Tampus. Tampus was
positively identified by ABC as the person who had carnal knowledge of her against her will on
April 1, 1995. The denial of Tampus cannot prevail over the positive and direct identification by
the victim, ABC. Although ABC was asleep and unconscious at the time the sexual debasement
was committed by Tampus, circumstantial evidence established beyond doubt that it is Tampus
who raped ABC. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In cases like the one at bar, the Court takes into consideration the events that transpired before and
after the victim lost consciousness in order to establish the commission of the act of coitus.
The trial court correctly determined, thus:
The prosecution has clearly established by its evidence that accused Bartolome Tampus had carnal
knowledge of [ABC] on April 1, 1995 under the circumstance set forth in Article 335 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; that is, when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious.

HIPOS SR. VS. BAY - 581 SCRA 674

Facts:
Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness
were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos et al., before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. Petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City
Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes
charged. The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming
the Informations.
2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss
the Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August
2004, holding that there was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a
Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay. Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw
Informations in an Order of even date.

Issue:
Can the Supreme Court compel respondent judge bay to dismiss the case through a writ of
mandamus.
Held:
The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition
thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound
discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the prosecution
of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court is the best and sole judge on what
to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor before or
after the arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court.
The action of the court must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right
of the People to due process of law

PEOPLE VS. LORENZO - 619 SCRA 389

FACTS:
Two (2) Information where filed against accused-appellant Paterno Lorenzo y Casas (Lorenzo) for
violation of Section 5 and 11 of Article II of R.A No. 9165. Meanwhile, Conrado Estanislao y
Javier (Estanislao) was similarly charged in different Information (later acquitted due to
insufficiency of evidence in connection with the offense charged against him).
After entering the plea of “not guilty”, the case was set for trial. The prosecution presented as its
lone witness, Police Officer 1 (PO1) Noel Pineda, who was member of the buy-bust operation
team which ensued leading to the arrest of Lorenzo and Estanislao. On the other hand, the accused
interposes the twin defense of denial and frame-up.

RTC rendered its Decision convicting Lorenzo for Illegal Possession and Sale of Dangerous
Drugs, but acquitting Estanislao.
Invoking his innocence, Lorenzo appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals (CA),
questioning the procedure followed by the police operatives in the seizure and custody of the
evidence against him and that there is failure of the prosecution to convict him on the basis that
there arises a reasonable doubt in the case at bar. Moreover, he claims that the prosecution failed
to adopt required procedure by Section 21, Article II, RA. No. 9165, on the chain of custody and
disposition of confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs. CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution discharged its burden of proving Lorenzo’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged.

HELD:
No.
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle,
fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an
accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto,
conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense.
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if
there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be
established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are
present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same
substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude
as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.

PO1 Pineda testified that it was their confidential agent who purchased the shabu from accused-
appellant and that he only retrieved it from said informant. He further testified that he marked the
retrieved sachet of shabu together with the two other sachets of shabu that were allegedly seized
from the accused, but it was not certain when and where the said marking was done nor who had
specifically received and had custody of the specimens thereafter.

The Court also observes that the prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer who had personal
knowledge of the transaction. The lone prosecution witness was at least four meters away from
where accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer were. From this distance, it was impossible for him
to hear the conversation between accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer. The foregoing facts and
circumstances create doubt as to whether the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from accused-
appellant were the same ones that were released to Camp Crame and submitted for laboratory
examination. We therefore find that this failure to establish the evidence’s chain of custody is
damaging to the prosecution’s case.

In sum, the totality of the evidence presented in the instant case failed to support accused appellant
conviction of the crime charged, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all
elements of the offense.
Accordingly, presumption of innocence should prevail.

People of the Philippines

vs

RENE BARON et. al.

Facts:
At about 9 o’clock in the evening of June 28, 1995 at Hda. Sta. Ana, Brgy. Burgos, Cadiz City,
Negros Occidental, Philippines, the accused Rene Baron, Rey Villatima, and alias “Dedong”
bargo, conspiring, confederating and helping one another with evident premeditation and treachery
and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
stab to death one Juanito Berallo in order to rob, steal and take away the latter’s sidecar and
motorcycle, wallet, and wristwatch; and inflicted multiple stabbed wounds which directly caused
the victim’s death.
Appellant, Rene Baron, denied any participation in the crime. He claimed that on June 28, 1995,
at around 7 o’clock in the evening, he bought rice and other necessities for his family and
proceeded to the public transport terminal to get a ride home where he chanced upon the deceased
and his two passengers who insisted that he came along for the trip. During said trip, the two
passengers announced a hold-up and thereafter tied the driver’s hands and dragged him towards
the sugarcane fields while Baron stayed in the tricycle. Baron was then accompanied by the two
passengers back to his house where he and his wife were threatened at gunpoint not to report the
incident to the authorities.
On February 12, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision finding the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Before the appellate court, appellant alleged that the trial court erred in finding him guilty as
charged and in not appreciating in his favor the exempting circumstance of irresistible force and/or
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. However, the same was disregarded by the CA
holding that all the requisites for said circumstances were lacking.

Issue:
Is the appellant entitled to the exempting circumstances of irresistible force and/or uncontrollable
fear of an equal or greater injury?

Held:
No. The appellant’s attempt to evade criminal liability by insisting that he acted under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury fails to impress. To avail of this exempting
circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the
fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that
committed. A threat of future injury is insufficient. The compulsion must be of such a character as
to leave no opportunity for the accused to escape.
The Court found nothing in the records to substantiate appellant’s insistence that he was under
duress from his co-accused in participating in the crime. In fact, the evidence was to the contrary.
Villatima and Bargo dragged the victim towards the sugarcane field and left the appellant inside
the tricycle that was parked by the roadside. While all alone, he had every opportunity to escape
since he was no longer subjected to a real, imminent or reasonable fear. Surprisingly, he opted to
wait for his co-accused to return and even rode with them to Kabankalan, Negros Occidental to
hide the victim’s motorcycle in the house of Villatima’s aunt.
The appellant had other opportunities to escape since he traveled with his co-accused for more
than 10 hours and passed several transportation terminals. However, he never tried to escape or at
least request for assistance from the people around him. From the series of proven circumstantial
evidence, the inescapable and natural conclusion was the three accused were in conspiracy with
one another to kill the victim and cart away the motorcycle.

Felixberto Abellana

v.

People & Spouses Alonto

FACTS:

An Information was filed charging petitioner with Estafa through Falsification of Public Document
in connection with a Deed of Sale over a certain parcel of land owned by the spouses Alonto. After
trial in the RTC, the trial court found that petitioner had no intention to defraud and that the spouses
Alonto actually signed the document although they did not personally appear before the notary
public for its notarization. Hence, the RTC instead convicted petitioner of falsification of public
document. The trial court sentenced petitioner with imprisonment, ordered him to restore full
ownership and possession of the land to Sps. Alonto, and in case of his failure to do so, he shall
pay Sps. Alonto the value of the properties. He was further adjudged to pay damages and costs of
suit to Sps. Alonto. On appeal, CA acquitted petitioner as it opined that the conviction for an
offense not alleged in the Information or one not necessarily included in the offense charged
violated petitioner’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Nevertheless, the imposition of the civil liability was sustained. Petitioner then filed
a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, a Petition for Review on Certiorari
before the Court.

ISSUES:

1. W.O.N. petitioner could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal by the trial court
and the CA?

2. W.O.N. the alternative sentence imposed by the trial court to petitioner should be sustained?

HELD:
1. No. It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether
the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act
or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely
due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award
the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. In case of exoneration of the accused, the civil liability may still arise
when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage
to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the
acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses. Based on the records of the case, Court
found that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses
Alonto. Moreover, the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute
Sale, the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when
on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alonto’s
title and the issuance of new ones under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons,
no damage resulted to the spouses Alonto.

2. No. the Court cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the petitioner, to wit: to
institute an action for the recovery of the properties of spouses Alonto or to pay them actual and
other kinds of damages. Sentences should not be in the alternative. There is nothing in the law
which permits courts to impose sentences in the alternative. While a judge has the discretion of
imposing one or another penalty, he cannot impose both in the alternative. He must fix positively
and with certainty the particular penalty.

Wherefore, Petition granted.

People vs. Asis, 629 SCRA 250

Facts:
On or about February 10, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, Asis and Formento, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence upon person,
to wit: by then and there stabbing one Roy Ching with a bladed instrument on the different parts
of the body and thereafter robbed the victim against his will. As a result thereof, he sustained
mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death. When arraigned on
July 9, 1998, both appellants pleaded not guilty. Found to be deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not
only by a counsel de oficio, but also by an interpreter from the Calvary Baptist Church. After due
trial, appellants were found guilty and sentenced to death. On appeal, two things stand out: first,
there were no eyewitnesses to the robbery or to the homicide; and second, none of the items
allegedly stolen were recovered or presented in evidence. Appellants argued that the pieces of
circumstantial evidence submitted by the prosecution are insufficient to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution counters that these pieces of evidence, taken together,
necessarily lead to their conviction.

Issue:
Whether or not the evidences of the Prosecution is sufficient to warrant conviction.

Held:
The appeal is meritorious. The prosecutions evidence does not prove the guilt of appellants beyond
reasonable doubt; hence, their constitutional right to be presumed innocent remains and must be
upheld. Circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicions or gives room for conjecture is not
sufficient to convict. It must do more than just raise the possibility, or even the probability, of guilt.
It must engender moral certainty. Otherwise, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails,
and the accused deserves acquittal.

Basilonia vs. Villaruz

Facts:
On June 19, 1987, a decision was promulgated against the petitioners, wherein the court finds the
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of murder of Attorney Isagani Roblete
on September 15, 1983 in Roxas City, Philippines with no aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. The petitioners appealed but was denied by the CA. After two decades from the
entry of judgement Dixon Roblete the son of the deceased Atty. Roblete filed a motion for
execution on May 11, 2009, alleging, among others, that despite his request to the City Prosecutor
to file a motion for execution, the judgment has not been enforced because said prosecutor has not
acted upon is request. Pursuant to the trial court's directive, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed on
May 22, 2009 an Omnibus Motion for Execution of Judgment and Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.
That the petitioners would like to avail bail however they did not appear before the court which
forfeited their manifestation for bail and that the court issued a writ of execution.
Issue:
Whether or not a trial court has jurisdiction to grant writ of execution which was filed 20 years
ago
Held:
Yes because the prescription of penalty will only commence when they were put in custody or in
prison which does not happened in this case for the longest time, despite that they were sentenced
by final judgment, thus the prescription will not run in their favor. Therefore the court did not
commit any wrong to grant the execution. Moreover, thus every criminally liable is also civilly
liable therefore the writ of execution of final judgement does not expired and the court has
jurisdiction to issue and take eefect the writ of execution.

Morillo vs. People

Facts:
In July, 2003, Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, representing themselves as
contractors with business in Pamanga, bought contraction materials from Armilyn, worth
P500,054.00. Per their agreement, 20% of the amount should be paid within seven days, while the
remaining 80% shall be paid within 35 days, with post-dated checks. After the last delivery,
Richard paid P20,000.00 and issued two post-dated checks drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga
branch. Upon maturity, Armilyn deposited the checks in her account with Equitable PCIBank; they
were however dishonoured. When Armilyn communicated the fact of dishonour to Richard, the
latter replaced the checks with two post-dated Metrobank checks, which again were dishonored.
Despite demand, Richard and his partners failed to make good on the checks, hence Armilyn filed
a case for BP 22 against Richard and Milo Malong before the MeTC of Makati City. After trial,
the MeTC Makati City convicted Richard as charged, hence he appealed to the RTC, arguing that
the MeTC of Makati City had no jurisdiction over the case. He asserted that since the subject
checks were issued, drawn, and delivered to petitioner in Subic, the venue of the action was
improperly laid for none of the elements of the offense actually transpired in Makati City. He also
assailed the absence of the public prosecutor, as the latter delegated the prosecution of the case to
the private prosecutor. The RTC affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed
the lower courts. It ruled that MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case, as all the elements of the
crime of BP 22 happened in Pampanga. Since all the elements of the crime happened in Pampanga
the case should have been filed in Pampanga, not where Armilyn deposited the checks, in Makati
City. Armilyn appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the court of the place where the checks were deposited, had jurisdiction to try a
case for BP 22.

Held:
It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes.
In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of
the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be
validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.⁠

ESTINO

vs

PEOPLE

FACTS:
For review before the Court under Rule 45 are the April 16, 2004 Decision and June 14, 2004
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 26192 and 26193 entitled
People of the Philippines v. Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera.

In G.R. Nos. 163957-58, petitioners Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera appeal their
conviction of violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for failure to pay the Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) of the
provincial government employees of Sulu. In G.R. Nos. 164009-11, petitioner Pescadera alone
appeals his conviction of malversation of public funds under Article 217 Of the Revised Penal
Code for failure to remit the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) contributions of the
provincial government employees amounting to PhP 4,820,365.30.

In these consolidated appeals, petitioners pray for their acquittal.

ISSUE:

Whether a new trial is proper in the determination the guilt of the petitioners in non-payment
of RATA in violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019.

RULING:

YES. Petitioner’s defense is anchored on their payment of RATA, and for this purpose, they
submitted documents which allegedly show that they paid the RATA under the 1998 reenacted
budget. They also claim that the COA Report did not sufficiently prove that they did not pay the
RATA because the alleged disbursement vouchers, which were supposed to be annexed to the
COA Report as proof of nonpayment of RATA, were not submitted with said report. Rule 121 of
the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes final
when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would
probably change the judgment. Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly
not newly discovered, it appears to us that petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its
production during

Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of
conviction becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused
could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if
introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment. Although the documents offered
by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears to us that petitioners were mistaken in
their belief that its production during trial was unnecessary

Briones vs. People

Facts:
An Information was filed against Briones for the crime of robbery. Briones allegedly took the
service firearm of S/G Gual while the latter approached group where the former is involve in a
mauling. S/G Gual positively identified Briones. RTC found Briones guilty of the crime of simple
theft after giving weight to prosecutions positive testimony as against the defenses of denial and
alibi. On his appeal, he raised the issue of self-defense. The Court of Appeals found Briones guilty
of robbery under Article 293 in relation to par. of Article 294 of RPC and not of theft.

Issue:
Whether or not a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

Held:
No. For new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of
the following conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence must have been discovered after trial; (b)
the evidence could not have been discovered at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and
(d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and produce a different result if admitted. In this
case, although the firearm surfaced after the trial, the other conditions were not established.
Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due
diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court below. The determinative test is the
presence of due or reasonable diligence to locate the thing to be used as evidence in the trial. Under
the circumstances, Briones failed to show that he had exerted reasonable diligence to locate the
firearm; his allegation in his Omnibus Motion that he told his brothers and sisters to search for the
firearm, which yielded negative results, is purely self-serving. He also now admits having taken
the firearm and having immediately disposed of it at a nearby house, adjacent to the place of the
incident. Hence, even before the case went to court, he already knew the location of the subject
firearm, but did not do anything; he did not even declare this knowledge at the trial below. In
petitions for new trial in a criminal proceeding where a certain evidence was not presented, the
defendant, in order to secure a new trial, must satisfy the court that he has a good defense, and that
the acquittal would in all probability follow the introduction of the omitted evidence. The Court
find that Briones’ change of defense from denial and alibi to self-defense or in defense of a relative
will not change the outcome for Briones considering that he failed to show unlawful aggression
on the part of S/G Molina and/or S/G Gual – the essential element of these justifying circumstances
under Article 11 of the Code. The records show that prior to the taking of the firearm, S/G Molina
and S/G Gual approached Briones and his companions to stop the fight between Briones’ group
and another person. To be sure, there was nothing unlawful in preventing a fight from further
escalating and in using reasonable and necessary means to stop it. This conclusion is strengthened
by evidence showing that at the time of the incident, Briones was drunk and was with three
companions; they all participated in the mauling. For these reasons, the Court find that the CA did
not commit any reversible error when it denied Briones' motion for new trial. Likewise, we find
no error in the RTC and CA conclusion that he is criminally liable under the criminal information.

Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:
Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of Barangay Day Care
Centers without conducting a competitive public bidding as required by law, which caused damage
and prejudice to the government. An information was filed for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019
by causing undue injury to the Government. The information was quashed for failure to prove the
actual damage, hence a new information was filed, now for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by
giving unwarranted benefit to a private person. The accused moved for a new preliminary
investigation to be conducted on the ground that there is substitution and/or substantial amendment
of the first information.

Issue: Whether or not there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the information that
would warrant an new preliminary investigation.
Held:
No, there is no substitution and/or substantial amendment. Section 3. Corrupt practices of public
officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful: x x x x (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. That
there are two (2) different modes of committing the offense: either by causing undue injury or by
giving private person unwarranted benefit. That accused may be charged under either mode or
under both. Hence a new preliminary investigation is unnecessary.

Lumanog vs People

FACTS:

These cases were consolidated. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals
convicting Lumanog, Santos, Fortuna and De Jesus of the crime of murder for the death of Col.
Rolando Abadilla. Lumanog and Santos separately filed their motions for reconsideration seeking
the reversal of their conviction. They assailed the weight and credence accorded to the
identification of the accused by the lone eyewitness presented by the prosecution, security guard
Freddie Alejo.

Fortuna submitted an Affidavit executed by a certain Orencio Jurado, Jr. who claimed to be one of
the police officers initially assigned to investigate the case. Fortuna contended that said belated
statement would certainly cast doubt on the procedures undertaken by the police authorities in the
apprehension of the likely perpetrators.

ISSUE:

Whether or not introduction of additional evidence after the trial is valid to justify new trial

HELD:
No. Introduction of additional evidence after the trial is not valid to justify new trial.

Evidently, Fortuna seeks the introduction of additional evidence to support the defense argument
that there was no positive identification of Abadilla’s killers. To justify a new trial or setting aside
of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be shown that the evidence
was “newly discovered” pursuant to Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended. Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not,
by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court below.

Movant failed to show that the defense exerted efforts during the trial to secure testimonies from
police officers like Jurado, or other persons involved in the investigation, who questioned or
objected to the apprehension of the accused in this case. Hence, the belatedly executed affidavit of
Jurado does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that will justify re-opening of the trial and/or
vacating the judgment. In any case, we have ruled that whatever flaw that may have initially
attended the out-of-court identification of the accused, the same was cured when all the accused-
appellants were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitness during the trial.

Payumo vs Sandiganbayan

Facts:
A composite team of Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police units allegedly fired
at a group of civilians instantly killing one civilian and wounding seven others, including Edgar
Payumo. The accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. During the trial, the accused
interposed the defenses of lawful performance of duty, self-defense, mistake of fact, and alibi.
They insisted that the incident was a result of a military operation, and not an ambush as claimed
by the prosecution.
The Fifth Division promulgated its judgment dated November 27, 1998, convicting the accused of
the crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder. The accused filed their Supplemental
Omnibus Motion to Set Aside Judgment and for New Trial because there was serious irregularity
during the trial due to the erroneous admission of the testimonies of the witnesses of the petitioners,
such should be taken anew and to afford the accused the opportunity to present in evidence the
records of the Judge Advocate General Office (JAGO) relative to the shooting as to whether it was
an ambush or the result of a military operation. The omnibus motion was granted.
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the Sandiganbayan amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for nullifying the order of conviction and granting new trial, Edgar Payumo and et. al,
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or injunction to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the scheduled hearings
for a second new trial.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted a new trial in
favor of the accused.

Held:
Yes. Rule 121, Section 2 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure enumerates the grounds for a
new trial, to wit:

Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been
commited during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment.

It must be emphasized that an erroneous admission or rejection of evidence by the trial court is not
a ground for a new trial or reversal of the decision if there are other independent evidence to sustain
the decision, or if the rejected evidence, if it had been admitted; would not have changed the
decision.
The records of the JAGO relative to shooting incident do not meet the criteria for newly discovered
evidence that would merit a new trial. A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence
may be granted only if the following requisites are met:
1. that the evidence was discovered after trial;
2. that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of
reasonable diligence;
3. that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and
4. that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment.
It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the
evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. In this case, however, such
records could have been easily obtained by the accused and could have been presented during the
trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence.

MACAPAGAL

VS.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of
Estafa for misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of P800,000.00, which is the
value of the unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry. Petitioner received the decision on

January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an Order
dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She supposedly filed
a Notice of Appeal. On August 3, 2009, but the same was denied on June 29, 2010 for having been
filed out of time.

Issue:

Whether or not the regional trial court of manila, Branch 9 gravely erred in denying the notice of
appeal filed by the herein petitioner.

Held:

The Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural infirmities which this Court
cannot ignore and are fatal to petitioner’s cause. It appears that petitioner assails not only the denial
by the RTC of her notice of appeal but likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction for estafa. For
reasons that will be discussed below, the petition is bound to fail, because of petitioner’s complete
disregard of the procedural rules and the orders of the Court.
First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice of
appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the rules
on where, how and when appeal is taken.

Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for
violation of the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with
the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not be taken as granting parties the
absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be directed.
Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons
clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case.

Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an appeal of the
trial court’s decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another fatal
procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated earlier, petitioner elevated to this Court
not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but also the Decision convicting her of estafa and
the Order denying her motion for reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of procedure,
petitioner attached to the petition only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her notice of appeal
but she failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed
decision convicting her of estafa and the order denying her motion for reconsideration. A petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must contain a certified true copy or
duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or judgment. Failure to comply with such
requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

People of the Philippines, Appellee

vs
Roldan Morales y Midarasa, Appellant

Facts:
Morales was charged in two separate Informations before the RTC for possession and sale of
shabu. The testimonies of the police officers were presented by the prosecution. They held a buy-
bust operation in which Morales was caught having two sachets of shabu and the marked money.
Morales, in his statement, said that the two male persons in civilian clothing, who identified
themselves as the police, handcuffed and frisked him. Nothing was found on their way to the
station. The police officer produced a sachet of shabu from his pocket and at the station, presented
it as evidence against Morales. The trial court found Morales guilty.

Issue:
Whether or not Morales is guilty of possession and sale of illegal drugs.

Held:
No. Morales claims that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The arresting officers
did not place the proper markings on the alleged shabu and paraphernalia.

To be guilty of sale of illegal drugs, there should be proof that the transaction took place and the
illegal drug is presented in court as evidence. To be guilty of possession of illegal drugs, it should
be established that the person possesses an illegal drug and is freely aware of it.

The person to whom the police officers gave the drugs for delivery of seized items was not present
in the court, nor did these police officers testify that they properly marked the drugs after the arrest
of Morales. They also did not take photographs and had no representative from the media and the
Department of Justice or public official to sign an inventory of the seized items. Prosecution failed
to establish the chain of custody which is fatal to its cause.

QUIDET vs. PEOPLE 618 SCRA 1

FACTS:
In 1992, petitioner Quidet among others (Taban and Tubo) were charged with homicide before the
RTC of Misamis Oriental. On October 19, 1991, petitioner together with coaccused conspiring,
confederating, and [sic] helping one another, taking advantage of the darkness of the night, in order
to facilitate the commission of the offense with the use of sharp pointed instruments, stab one
Jimmy Tagarda thus the victim sustained several wounds in different parts of his body and as a
consequence of which the victim died immediately thereafter. The trial court found that the
stabbing of Jimmy and Andrew was previously planned by the accused. The active participation
of all three accused proved conspiracy in the commission of the crimes. The RTC convicted all of
them for the said offense. Of the three accused, only Quidet appealed. The CA confirmed the
decision of RTC but with modification. The CA convicted them for attempted homicide instead of
frustrated homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the favorable appeal of Quidet will extend to the other two accused who did not
appeal.

HELD:
Yes, Although Taban and Tubo did not appeal their conviction, this part of the appellate court's
judgment is favorable to them. The Supreme Court held that the CA correctly modified the
decision. The crime committed was attempted homicide and not frustrated homicide because the
stab wounds that Andrew sustained were not life-threatening. Thus, they are entitled to a reduction
of their prison terms. The rule is that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable
and applicable to the latter.

Balaba

vs.

People

Facts:

Accused Balaba, Assistant Municipal Treasurer of Guindulman, Bohol, was charged and convicted
with Malversation of Public Funds by the RTC on it’s decision dated December 9, 2002. On
January 14, 2003 filed his Notice of Appeal before the CA which was dismissed on its December
14, 2004 decision on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to act on the appeal because

SB has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case. Hence this appeal on the ground that CA
erred in dismissing his appeal instead of certifying the case to the proper court.

Issue:

WON CA erred in dismissing his appeal instead of certifying the case to the proper court?

Held:
No. An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the correction
in designating the proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once
made within the said period, the designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed even if
the records of the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. An appeal erroneously taken to the
Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.
In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the expiration
of the period to appealPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.

CHARMEN OLIVO y ALONG, NELSON DANDA y SAMBUTO, and JOEY ZAFRA y

REYES, Appellants.

FACTS:

Accused-Appellants were found guilty reasonable doubt for the crime of Robbery with Homicide
both by the RTC and Court of Appeals.

Based from the Information dated Nov.29, 2000, the three accused conspired to engaged in robbery
done in a hardware store. They were able to take 35,000, but on the process, they assaulted and
killed the store owner.

But when the case was appealed before the Supreme Court, it was found out that the accused-
appellants was arrested without a warrant during a buy-bust operation for selling illegal drugs and
not for robbery with homicide. Further, during the investigation at Camp Karingal, the accused
was made to stand in a police line- up and identified by the eyewitness who failed to identify them
three times.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused-appellants can be convicted guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
Robbery with homicide despite the dubious and questionable circumstances of the trial.

HELD:

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of RTC and CA for two reasons: One, the accused-
appellants were not arrested for the crime of robbery with homicide but were arrested during a
buy-bust operation; Second, the material fact that the lone alleged eyewitness, Maricel Permejo,
was not able to identify them as the perpetrators of the crime, their guilt has not been proved with
the required quantum of evidence.

SC ruled that with respect to the insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to convict appellants
beyond reasonable doubt, trial courts are mandated not only to look at the direct examination of
witnesses but to the totality of evidence before them. In every case, the court should review, assess
and weigh the totality of the evidence presented by the parties. It should not confine itself to oral
testimony during the trial. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the tribunals
ignored, misconstrued or misapplied facts and circumstances of substances such that, if considered,
the same will warrant the modification or reversal of the outcome of the case.

The accused-appellants upon appeal were acquitted. The other accused, Joey Zafra, who was
likewise convicted on the same evidence but did not perfect an appeal, was also acquitted
because the present rule provides that an appeal taken by one or more several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable
and applicable to the latter.

MERCEDITA T. GUASCH

vs.

ARNALDO DELA CRUZ

FACTS:

Respondent Arnaldo dela Cruz (respondent) filed a Complaint-Affidavit against petitioner

Mercedita T. Guasch (petitioner) with the City Prosecutor of Manila. On several occasions,
petitioner transacted business with him by exchanging cash for checks of small amount without
interest.

On July 26, 1999, petitioner went to his residence requesting him to exchange her check with cash
of P3,300,000.00. Initially, he refused. However, petitioner returned the next day and was able to
convince him to give her P3,300,000.00 in cash in exchange for her Insular Savings Bank Check
No. 0032082 dated January 31, 2000 upon her assurance that she will have the funds and bank
deposit to cover the said check by January 2000. On the date of maturity and upon presentment,
however, the check was dishonored for the reason that the account against which it was drawn was
already closed.

An information for estafa was filed against the petitioner.

After petitioner entered her plea of not guilty and after the prosecution rested its case, petitioner
filed a Motion with Leave to Admit Demurrer to Evidence with attached Demurrer to
Evidence. The trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer to evidence
and dismissing the case.

The trial court found that respondent’s assertion of misrepresentation by petitioner that her check
will be fully funded on the maturity date was not supported by the evidence on record.
Accordingly, her guilt not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner was acquitted.

On June 28, 2005, respondent received a copy of the said order. On July 14, 2005, respondent filed
a Manifestation with attached Motion to Amend Order dated June 16, 2005 (Motion to Amend) to
include a finding of civil liability of petitioner. Respondents counsel justified his failure to file the
motion within the reglementary period of 15 days because all postal offices in Metro Manila were
allegedly ordered closed in the afternoon due to the rally staged on Ayala Avenue.

Meantime, on August 30, 2005, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
praying that the trial courts Order dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer to evidence be set
aside. The trial court denied respondents Motion to Amend in its Order dated September 20, 2005
finding that counsel for respondent was inexcusably negligent; Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the same was denied by the trial court.

On December 7, 2005, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal informing the trial court that he was
appealing the Order but it was likewise denied.

Consequently, on February 13, 2006, respondent filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari with
the Court of Appeals to set aside the Orders.

The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision. On the issue of whether the issuance of the
Order dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer to evidence was made with grave abuse of
discretion, the Court of Appeals ruled in the negative as it found that the trial court did not anchor
the acquittal of petitioner on evidence other than that presented by the prosecution as contended
by petitioner. On the issue of whether the denial of respondents Motion to Amend was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals ruled in the affirmative. Motion to Amend Order
dated 16 June 2005 is hereby SET ASIDE.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied respondents Motion to Amend.

HELD:

As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within
the reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course must
be strictly enforced as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and
for orderly discharge of judicial business. The purposes for such statutory requirement are twofold:
first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business, and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of
occasional errors, which are precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely.
The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of
time.

However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of
due course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of
procedure. Certain elements are considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will
not be unduly prejudiced thereby.

Several of these elements obtain in the case at bar.

First, there is ostensible merit to respondents cause. The records show that petitioner admits her
civil obligation to respondent. Respondent did not waive, reserve, nor institute a civil action for
the recovery of civil liability. Hence, since the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal
action, the trial court was duty-bound to determine the civil liability.

Second, it cannot be said that petitioner will be unduly prejudiced if respondents Motion to Amend
for the sole purpose of including the civil liability of petitioner in the order of acquittal shall be
allowed. Respondent concededly has an available remedy even if his Motion to Amend was
denied, which is to institute a separate civil action to recover petitioners civil liability. However,
to require him to pursue this remedy at this stage will only prolong the litigation between the
parties which negates the avowed purpose of the strict enforcement of reglementary periods to
appeal, that is, to put an end to judicial controversies.

It is a cherished rule of procedure that a court should always strive to settle the entire controversy
in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. Given the
circumstances in this case, we find that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when
it denied respondents Motion to Amend.

PEOPLE vs. TARUC 579 SCRA 118

FACTS:
In November 1998 accused-appellant Francisco Taruc was charged before the RTC of Bataan with
the crime of murder in connection with the death of Emelito Sualog. RTC found Taruc guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of the crime of MURDER and with
the attending aggravating circumstance of treachery, was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
DEATH. The case was brought to the Court of Appeals for automatic review pursuant to A.M.
No. 00-5-03-SC. However, the PAO lawyer concerned informed the Court of Appeals that
accused-appellant escaped from prison on 23 August 2002. Said PAO lawyer claimed that he had
no means of knowing the current whereabouts of the accusedappellant. Thereupon, the PAO
lawyer asked the Court of Appeals to direct the Warden of the Provincial Jail in Balanga, Bataan,
to file a certification as to the accused-appellant’s escape. The Court of Appeals granted PAO’s
Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant’s Brief in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court
in People v. Flores, making the review of death penalty cases mandatory. The Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision affirming with modification of penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant appealed on questions of law and fact. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the accused-appellant has right to appeal his conviction even when he escaped
from jail and eluded arrest.

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that by escaping prison, accused-appellant impliedly waived his
right to appeal. Although Rule 124, Section 8 particularly applies to the Court of Appeals, it has
been extended to the Supreme Court by Rule 125, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused
himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the
accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication.
When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be
deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. The accused
cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court
or is otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against him. While at large, he
cannot seek relief from the court, as he is deemed to have waived the appeal. Thus, having escaped
from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to
its jurisdiction, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. Accused-
appellant, in the case at bar, has remained at large for most of the proceedings before the RTC, as
well as for the entirety of the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals, and even until
now when his appeal is pending before this Court. He cannot so audaciously hope that his appeal
before this Court would succeed.

TIU vs. COURT OF APPEALS 586 SCRA 118

FACTS:
The instant controversy stemmed from a criminal charge for slight physical injuries filed by
respondent Edgardo Postanes (Postanes) against Remigio Pasion (Pasion). On the other hand,
petitioner David Tiu (Tiu) filed a criminal charge for grave threats against Postanes before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City for poking a gun and utterring a threatening words.
However, the MeTC dismissed both charges for Slight Physical Injuries and the counter-charge of
Grave Threats for insufficiency of evidence. Tiu, through his counsel, filed a petition for certiorari
with the RTC of Pasay City and rendered a Decision declaring void the judgment of the MeTC.
Postanes moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC, he then filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari challenging the decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed Decision, reversing the RTC Decision and affirming the dismissal of Grave
Threats. The Court of Appeals held that the RTC "has granted upon the State, through the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the right to appeal the decision of acquittal which right the
government does not have." The prosecution had not been denied by the MeTC of its right to due
process. Hence, it was wrong for the RTC to declare the findings of the MeTC as having been
arrived at with grave abuse of discretion, thereby denying Postanes of his Constitutional right
against double jeopardy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari questioning the
acquittal of Postanes by the MeTC.

HELD:
Yes, at the outset, the Supreme Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not filed by
the Solicitor General. Instead, it was filed by Tiu,, through his counsel. Settled is the rule that only
the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or
represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals. Tiu is without legal personality to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals before the
Supreme Court. Nothing shows that the Office of the Solicitor General represents the People in
this appeal before this Court. On this ground alone, the petition must fail. Clearly, for this Court
to grant the petition and order the MeTC to reconsider its decision, just what the RTC ordered the
MeTC to do, is to transgress the Constitutional proscription not to put any person "twice x x x in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." Further, as found by the Court of Appeals, there is
no showing that the prosecution or the State was denied of due process resulting in loss or lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the MeTC, which would have allowed an appeal by the prosecution from
the order of dismissal of the criminal case.

Colinares

vs.

People of the Philippines

Facts:

Arnel Colinares was charged and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide by
the RTC of Camarines Sur. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from two years and four
months of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prison mayor, as
maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six
years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. On appeal by Colinares, the Court of Appeals sustained
the RTC’s decision. Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeal’s decision, petitioner then appealed to
the Supreme Court and took the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case
the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable, which was strongly
opposed by the Solicitor General reiterating that under the Probation Law, no application for
probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of
conviction. The Supreme Court, however, found that Colinares is guilty of attempted homicide
and not of frustrated homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not Arnel Colinares may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial
court

Ruling:

Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Colinares may apply for probation upon remand of his case to
the RTC. Ordinarily, an accused would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having
appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But in this case
the Supreme Court ruled to set aside the judgment of the RTC and found him only liable for
attempted homicide, if the Supreme Court follows the established rule that no accused can apply
for probation on appeal, the accused would suffer from the erroneous judgment of the RTC with
no fault of his own, therefore defying fairness and equity.

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). Hazing was
pre-requisite in joining for which Lenny was one of few who had undergone the process. After the
initiation, Lenny’s condition worsened due to the blows he received, the Aquilans rushed him to
the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35 Aquilans. Four of the accused
(Tecson, et. al.) were found to be guilty of homicide by the trial court but was reduced to crime of
slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor by the Court of
Appeals. However, upon appeal to the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General, the
Supreme Court ruled that they should be liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
instead.

In Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, Tecson et. al. clarified the effect of the decision
of the Supreme Court to their criminal liability. According to Tecson et. al., they immediately
applied for probation after the CA rendered its Decision lowering their criminal liability from the
crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical injuries, which
carries a probationable sentence. Hence, they have already been discharged from their criminal
liability and the cases against them closed and terminated by virtue of their granted Applications
for Probation for which the terms therein are already been complied with.

ISSUE:

Whether Tecson et. al. can be covered by the Probation Law despite their appeal of conviction?

HELD:
Yes. First, the Court in resolving this issue ruled that the RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to
act on the probation applications of Tecson et. al. for the law requires that an application for
probation be filed with the trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the
court of origin (Branch 121). Hence, its grant of probation with Tecson et. al. is void.

However, the Court abandoning its previous stance on ineligibility of those who have appealed
their conviction to probation, citing the then recent case of Colinares vs. People that the Probation
Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. Had the RTC
done what was right and imposed the correct penalty, he would have had the right to apply for
probation. Moreover, the Court was quick to clarify that it remains that those who will appeal from
judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply
for that privilege.

Dungo vs. People, G.R. No. 209464 – Case Digest

Post published:July 1, 2015

Reading time:3 mins read

FACTS

Petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr. (Sibal), was charged of violation
of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049-Anti-Hazing Law

That on January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba, City, Province of Laguna,
the above named accused, during an initiation rite and being then members of Alpha Phi Omega
fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers,
whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault
and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof
and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm,
resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.

The accused pleaded not guilty during the arraignment and filed a motion to quash for lack of
probable cause which was denied by the RTC.

RTC indicted Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law
and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The RTC explained that even if there was no evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated to bodily
assault and harm the victim, it was irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the resort for their
final initiation rites. Clearly, they did not merely induce Villanueva to attend the final initiation
rites, but they also brought him to Villa Novaliches Resort.

Also, the witnesses presented by the defense were partial and could not be considered as
disinterested parties.

The petitioners filed a notice of appeal on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and RA 8049 sec 4 is unconstitutional.

The CA denied the notice of appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioners but the same was denied.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 arguing that they were convicted of a crime
not stated in the information. While the evidence proved that they were guilty of hazing by
inducement this does not necessarily include the criminal charge of hazing by actual participation.
Thus, they cannot be convicted of a crime not stated or necessarily included in the information.

The Court argued that Dungo and Sibal were charged in the amended information with the proper
offense and convicted for such.

Dungo and Sibal were found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Their involvement in the hazing
of Villanueva is not merely based on prima facie evidence but was also established by
circumstantial evidence and an unbroken chain of events. Wherefore petition is denied.

ISSUE

Whether or not violation of Anti-Hazing law is mala in se or mala prohibita?

RULING

Violation of Anti-Hazing Law is mala prohibita. The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is
malum prohibitum. The Senate deliberations would show that the lawmakers intended the anti-
hazing statute to be malum prohibitum. The Congress created a special law on hazing, founded
upon the principle of mala prohibita.
In Vedana v. Valencia, the Court noted that in our nation’s very recent history, the people had
spoken, through the Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, an act previously
considered harmless by custom, as criminal. The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral, but
the law deems the same to be against public policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the
existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith
cannot be raised in its prosecution.