CWP 1851 of 2021 Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. Govt of NCT of Delhi Volume Iv

703
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

(EXTRAORDINARY WRIT JURISDICTION)
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1851 OF 2021
IN THE MATTER OF:
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi … .Petitioner-in-person
Versus
Govt of NCT of Delhi & Ors. ….Respondents
INDEX-VOLUME IV
S.NO PARTICULARS PAGES
1. ANNEXURE P-23(COLLY): /1 Legal Notice No. SSO/Act 712-50
10 of 1994/3 under Section 80 CPC dated 03.06.2019 on two
false affidavits filed, 17.07.1990 filed by Sh. Ranbir Singh,
Secretary DDA & 13.02.1991 filed by Sh. Ashok Kapoor,
Commissioner Housing, DDA (unreplied till date) (39pp.) /2 751-54
Typed copy of Order dt. 08.11.1996 passed by Sh. Pradeep
Chaddah, MM New Delhi in Ct. Case Sher Singh vs. Chand
Bhatnagar etc [Order with adverse inference on DDA upheld
by Sessions Court in Revision; DDA never challenged
adverse inference against it in this order, now irrevocable by
efflux of time] (4pp.) /3 DDA Possession Letter 15.09.1989 755-56
per contra DDA Possession Slip 15.09.1989 attracts mischief
“Making the allotment in such a hasty manner itself is
arbitrary and unreasonable and is hit by Article 14 of the
Constitution. This Court has consistently held that "when a
thing is done in a post-haste manner, malafide would be
presumed." Anything done in undue haste can also be termed
as "arbitrary and cannot be condoned in law." [Fuljit Kaur
v. State of Punjab, (2010) 11 SCC 455 at SCC p.467 para 25,
MANU/SC/0411/2010 at MANU para 26] (2pp.) /4 DDA 757
Diary No. 14897 dt. 08.11.1989 receiving P.S. Vasant Kunj
(FIR?) No. 4563 dt. 07.11.1989 [In DDA affidavits of
17.07.1990 filed by Sh. Ranbir Singh, Secretary DDA &
13.02.1991 filed by Sh. Ashok Kapoor, Commissioner
Housing, DDA has flatly denied receipt of any inquiry from
P.S. Vasant Kunj in 1989] (1pp.) /5 Copy of rejoinder 758-64
affidavit of Sh. Sher Singh in SLP (C) 16436/1991 titled Shri
704
Sher Singh v. Vice Chairman, D.D.A. and others dt.

07.10.1992 (7pp.) /6 Copy of rejoinder affidavit of Sh. Sher 765-75
Singh in SLP (C) 19369/1994 titled Sher Singh v. Delhi
Development Authority dt. 24.04.1995 [allegedly filed by
impostor] (11pp.) /7 Typed copy of Order dt. 21.08.1998 776-78
passed by Sh. Daya Prakash, MM New Delhi in Ct. Case
Sher Singh vs. Chand Bhatnagar etc summoning the accused
(3pp.) /8 Typed copy of Order dt. 20.07.1999 passed by Sh. 779-81
L.D. Malik, Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi in Cr.
Rev. 31/1998 [Upheld Order dt. 08.11.1996 – order for
summoning quashed for courts failure to record pre-charge
evidence, with liberty to accused to take this ground at later
stage] (3pp.) /9 DDA letter No. F.125 (2864)/83/SFS/VK/ 782
2203/22 dt. 07.01.2000 “there is legal dispute pending to the
title of the property. Conversion shall not be allowed till the
legal dispute is settled as per the policy on the subject.”
(1pp.) /10 Counter Affidavit dt. 29.05.2001 of DDA in W.P. 783-94
(Civil) 7438/2000 titled Sher Singh v. Union of India once
again denied receipt of any inquiry from P.S. Vasant Kunj in
1989 at para 2 of the affidavit (12pp.) /11 Century Spinning 795-99
and Manufacturing Company Ltd. v. The Ulhasnagar
Municipal Council, (1970) 1 SCC 582, MANU/SC/0397/
1970 at MANU para 8 “But the discretion is judicial : if the
petition makes a claim which is frivolous, vexatious, or
prima facie unjust, or may not appropriately be tried in a
petition invoking extra-ordinary jurisdiction, the Court may
decline to entertain the petition. But a party claiming to be
aggrieved by the action of a public body or authority on the
plea that the action is unlawful, high-handed, arbitrary or
unjust, is entitled to a hearing of its petition on the merits.”
(5pp.) [Fits the facts of this case fair and square] /12 800-01
Submission of information under “otherwise” category
under section 340 CrPC in administration of justice matters
by Sh. Sher Singh through his counsel Sh. A.K. Bakshi,
Advocate, vide letter dt. 01.12.2002 to Hon’ble Chief Justice
of Delhi High Court (unreplied to date) (2pp.) /13 Orders dt. 802
17.12.2008 and 20.02.2009 of Ms. Geetanjali, Civil Judge
(West), THC, Delhi exhibiting that plaintiffs neither
appearing nor submitting documents in evidence – the
705
continuing position since defendant no. 1 applied in 2002

that plaintiffs must now start by leading their evidence, since
DDA on 07.01.2000 has delayed conversion process on sole
ground of “there is legal dispute pending to the title of the
property” (1pp.) /14 Orders dt. 31.03.2009 of Ms. 803
Geetanjali, Civil Judge (West), THC, Delhi “present suit is
dismissed for non-appearance as well as non-prosecution”
[Ld. Civil Judge fell into grave error of law - written
statements and counter and rejoinder had been filed by all
parties - hence there was violation of clear law laid down by
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi on 09.01.2006, which law was
later noted with approval by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India on 21.03.2012, and reiterated by Hon’ble High Court
of Delhi on 14.01.2015 in Christopher Daruwala v. Leena
Baretto, 2015 (147) DRJ 368 at DRJ pp.370-373 paras 6-8
holding that whomsoever may have brought the suit, duty of
court is to provide a judicial determination, concluding “.7.
.. The said rights can be adjudicated merely on filing of
written statement or by the pleadings of the parties itself.
…….What is important is that in either event it is an action
before the court and the court adjudicates upon it. If that is
done then, the 'bare minimum' requirement of 'due process'
or 'due course' of law would stand satisfied as recourse to
law would have been taken. …. when a party approaches a
court seeking a protective remedy … and it fails in setting up
a good case, can it then say that the other party must now
institute an action in a court of law for enforcing his rights
i.e. for taking back something from the first party who holds
it unlawfully…..? I would think not.”] (1pp.) /15 Judgement 804-15
and Order dt. 06.05.2013 passed by Hon’ble High Court of
Delhi in W. P. (Crl.) 588/2013 titled Lt Col (Retd)
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. The High Court of Delhi
through its Registrar General and Ors. (12pp.) /16 816-18
Judgement and Order dt. 21.05.2013 passed by Hon’ble
High Court of Delhi in Review Petition (Crl.) No. 8259/2013
in W. P. (Crl.) 588/ 2013 titled Lt Col (Retd) Sarvadaman
Singh Oberoi v. The High Court of Delhi through its
Registrar General and Ors. (3pp.) /17 Legal Notice No. 819-91
B&V/LN/JY/2015 under Section 53B DDA Act & Section
706
80 CPC dated 04.05.2015 (unreplied till date) (73pp.) /18 892-98

Judgement &Order dt. 25.07.2015 of Ld. District & Sessions
Judge, South, Delhi in Misc Crl 496/2015 titled Sher Singh
@ Surinder Singh Dhariwal v. The South Delhi Estate
Association, declaring orders after cut-off date sans
jurisdiction and directing petitioner to be present before Ld.
District & Sessions Judge, New Delhi on 30.07.2015 for next
proceeding (7pp.) /19 Judgement & Order dt. 30.07.2015 of 899
Ld. District & Sessions Judge, New Delhi in Misc DJ
552/2016 titled Sher Singh @ Surinder Singh Dhariwal v.
The South Delhi Estate Association (1pp.) [Doma
Choudhary v. Ram Naresh Lal, AIR 1959 Pat 121,
MANU/BH/0030/1959] /20 Kanailal v. Ram Chandra Singh 900-02
MANU/SC/1100/2017 at MANU para 10 “10. …Reasons
introduce clarity in an order. On plainest consideration of
justice, the High Court ought to have set forth its reasons,
howsoever brief, in its order indicative of an application of
its mind, all the more when its order is amenable to further
avenue of challenge. The absence of reasons has rendered
the High Court's judgment not sustainable.” (3pp.) /21 903-04
Order dt. 19.09.2016 of Ld. M.M., New Delhi in Ct Case
47295/2016 titled Lt Col Sarvadaman Singh v. Chand
Bhatnagar[Case disposed on 17.10.2017] (2pp.) /22 Order 905-07
of dismissal with grant of liberty dt. 24.08.2018 passed by
Ld. Special Judge (PC Act): CBI-5, PHC, New Delhi in Ct
Case 6/2016 titled Lt Col (Retd) Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi
v. Sh. Chand Bhatnagar etc “Considering that inspite of long
efforts of the complainant, no sanction has been granted to
prosecute public servants under Section 197 Cr.PC or under
Section 19 of PC Act, 1988, present complaint is dismissed
as non-maintainable. The complainant may file a complaint
against private persons, if so desired and may take such
action as permissible under law as and when sanction to
prosecute the public servants is granted to him.” (3pp.) /23 908-13
Christopher Daruwala v. Leena Baretto, 2015 (147) DRJ 368
(6pp.) /24 Judgement and Order passed by Hon’ble Justice 914
Sanjiv Khanna & Hon'ble Justice Najmi Waziri on
19.05.2016 (1pp.) [Whereas Hon’ble DB II (September
1991; Hon’ble Justice S.B. Wad & Hon’ble Justice Usha
707
Mehra) passed Judgement and Order dt. 24.09.1991 in WP

(Civil) 699/1990 titled Sher Singh v. Vice Chairman DDA,
the 340 CrPC Crl. M.A. No. 6982/2016 was not placed
before the successor Hon’ble DB II (May 2016; Hon’ble
Justice Badar Durrez Ahmed & Hon’ble Justice Sanjeev
Sachdeva) but before Hon’ble DB VI which was not the
successor court] On 01.08.2016 matter not listed before
Hon’ble DB II but before Hon’ble DB V /25 On 14.09.2016 915
matter not listed before Hon’ble DB II but before Hon’ble
DB VIII: Judgement and Order (DB VIII) passed on
14.09.2016 by Hon’ble Justice G.S. Sistani & Hon'ble
Justice I.S. Mehta (who in any case was disabled from
hearing the matter by reason of having dealt with this very
matter on 02.12.2014 in T.P.(C) 189/2014 DLND01-
006143-2014 (1pp.) (Hon’ble Bench issued (avoidable)
notice to DDA in 340 CrPC matter; Thereafter on
25.10.2016 340 CrPC matter was correctly (finally) placed
before Hon’ble DB II, which flatly declined to hear the
matter. On the same day matter was placed before Hon’ble
DB III, which also refused to hear the matter. This is how the
matter landed up before Hon’ble DB IV at 2.30 PM on
25.10.2016. Hon’ble DB IV consisted on that date of
Hon’ble Justice Pradeep Nandrajog & Hon'ble Ms. Justice
Pratibha Rani (who in any case was disabled from hearing
the matter by reason of adverse 340 CrPC order in this matter
itself in W.P. Crl. 588/2013. Matter was adjourned for
04.01.2017 /26 Hon’ble DB IV re-constituted as Hon’ble 916-18
Justice Pradeep Nandrajog & Hon’ble Justice Yogesh
Khanna, now having unfettered jurisdiction to hear this 340
CrPC, passed Judgement and Order dt. 04.01.2017 albeit
with a minor correctible defect by not choosing to express
any opinion one way or the other (per strict mandate of
special law of 340 CrPC) whether it was expedient or not in
the interests of justice that inquiry be carried out upon the
grave allegation of informant supported by extensive
documentation that DDA had filed two patently false
affidavits, one on 17.07.1990 filed by Sh. Ranbir Singh,
Secretary DDA & second on 13.02.1991 filed by Sh. Ashok
Kapoor, Commissioner Housing, DDA) (3pp.) /27 Hon’ble 919-20
708
DB IV Judgement and Order dt. 25.01.2017 most frankly

admits that matter has not been examined by it on merits of
340 CrPC (2pp.). That all subsequent orders passed by other
benches are without jurisdiction as only this Bench or
(absent Hon’ble Justice Pradeep Nandrajog) a Bench of
which Hon’ble Justice Yogesh Khanna is one of the
members is/was only competent to decide (per strict
mandate of special law of 340 CrPC) whether it was
expedient or not in the interests of justice that inquiry be
carried out upon the grave allegation of informant supported
by extensive documentation that DDA had filed two patently
false affidavits in 1990/1991. /28 Judgement and Order 921-24
passed by Hon’ble Ms Justice Hima Kohli & Hon'ble Ms
Justice Rekha Palli on 04.09.2018 (DB VI) (4pp.) /29 925
Judgement and Order passed by Hon’ble Justice S.
Muralidhar & Hon'ble Justice Sanjeev Narula on 14.11.2018
(DB V) (1pp.) /30 Judgement and Order passed by Hon’ble 926-28
Ms Justice Hima Kohli & Hon'ble Ms Justice Rekha Palli on
30.11.2018 (DB VI) (3pp.) /31 Judgement and Order passed 929
by Hon’ble Justice Siddharth Mridul & Hon'ble Ms Justice
Sangita Dhingra Sehgal on 19.12.2018 (DB VIII) (1pp.) /32 930-33
Judgement and Order passed by Hon’ble Justice Siddharth
Mridul & Hon'ble Ms Justice Sangita Dhingra Sehgal on
01.02.2019 (DB VIII).[ Note: All the Orders From /24 to /32
having been passed under 340 CrPC jurisdiction allotted on
the administrative side do not enjoy the armour cloak of
Article 226 and are therefore not immune to attack under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is quite surprising
that, in spite of being pointed out, all the Hon’ble Judges
failed to note 340 CrPC jurisdictional fact qua Hon’ble
Justice Yogesh Khanna, and invoked delay and res judicata
to dismiss this 340 CrPC matter (in reverse of the ratio of the
Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi
Marwah, 2005 (4) SCC 370 at SCC pp.386-387 paras 23-24
(rejecting the contentions of Dr. Singhvi at paras 17-18)
holding that “23… The broad view of clause (b) (ii), as
canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants, would
render the victim of such forgery or forged document
remediless. Any interpretation which leads to a situation
709
where a victim of crime is rendered remediless, has to be

discarded. 24… complaint case may not proceed at all for
decades specially in matters arising out of civil suits where
decisions are challenged in successive appellate for a which
are time-consuming…..This important consideration
dissuades us from accepting the broad interpretation sought
to be placed upon clause (b)(ii).”, whereas this was a simple
case of deciding whether or not on the facts as alleged and
the five volumes of documents submitted on 29.04.2016, to
show in excruciating detail, fraud successfully played upon
justice since 1990, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi whether
it was or was not of the opinion “..upon an application made
to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that
it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should
be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of Sub-
Section (1) of section 195, which appears to have been
committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court”]
(4pp.) [Paramananda Mohapatra v. The State, AIR 1968 Ori
144, 34 (1968) CLT 627, MANU/ OR/0040/1968] /33 Order 934-36
dt. 19.03.2019 of Ld. M.M., New Delhi in Ct Case
15958/2018 titled Lt Col Retd Sarvadaman Singh v. Chand
Bhatnagar & Ct Case 27631/2016 titled Sher Singh v. Chand
Bhatnagar [Cases adjourned sine die with liberty on
19.03.2019] (3pp.) /34 Order dt. 10.07.2019 of Ld. M.M., 937-41
New Delhi in Ct Case 9250/2019 titled Lt Col Retd
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. Chand Bhatnagar [Unrequited
cost ₹ 25,000 upon informant in administration of justice
information - no notice for opportunity of defence before
punishment in an ancillary criminal proceeding u/s 195
CrPC in Ct. Case No. 9250/2019 filed after vetting by o/o
CJM, PHC, New Delhi in view of earlier dismissal of similar
340 CrPC information, Ct. Case No. 8827/2019 filed
01.07.2019, in disposed case, was listed on 03.07.2019 after
vetting by o/o CJM, PHC, New Delhi. Order ignored CrPC
Sections 195(1)(b) & 340 (1) without examining the case
disposed on 19.03.2019. (5pp.) /35 /1 Judgement and Order 942
dt 16.07.2019 passed by Sh. Satish Kumar Arora, Ld. ASJ-
02 (FTC), PHC, New Delhi in Criminal Appeal 136/2019,
DLND01-012298-2019 (1pp.) /35 /2 Judgement and Order 943
710

DLND01-012298-2019 (1pp.) /35 /3 Judgement and Order 944-46
DLND01-012298-2019 (3pp.) /36 Judgement and Order dt. 947
08.08.2019 passed by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Crl.
M.C. 3915/2019 titled Lt Col (Veteran) Sarvadaman Singh
Oberoi V. State of Delhi NCT (1pp.) /37 Judgement and 948-49
Order dt. 21.01.2020 passed by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi
in W. P. (Crl.) 588/2013 titled Lt Col (Retd) Sarvadaman
Singh Oberoi v. The High Court of Delhi through its
Registrar General and Ors. (2pp.) /38 Judgement and Order 950
dt. 24.01.2020 passed by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in W.
P. (Crl.) 588/2013 titled Lt Col (Retd) Sarvadaman Singh
Oberoi v. The High Court of Delhi through its Registrar
General and Ors. NDOH: 09.02.2021 (1pp.) /39 Judgement 951
and Order dt. 24.01.2020 passed by Hon’ble High Court of
Delhi in Crl. M.C. 3915/2019 titled Lt Col (Veteran)
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi V. State of Delhi NCT NDOH:
09.02.2021 (1pp.) /40 RTI Reply No. 8964/RTI/DHC/ 952
101/10 dt. 16.03.2010 of the Public Information Officer,
Delhi High Court, New Delhi. (1pp.) /41 RTI Application dt. 953-56
24.06.2014 to three police officers informing them that “ASI
Subhash, the present I.O. has reportedly obtained a 64 page
reply from advocate of Sh. Chetan Dhawan containing some
potentially valuable documents, including a photocopy of so
far missing Possession Slip dt 15/21 September 1989, office
copies allegedly destroyed by errant DDA officials. In June
2014 Sh. Chetan Dhawan has fraudulently filed a mutation
in re DDA Flat No. C1/1489 Vasant Kunj, with DDA LAB
(Housing) basis a 1988 will registered at NOIDA…” (4pp.)
/42 RTI Reply dt. 01.07.2014 by DDA Vigilance. [Opinion 957
of Chief Legal Advisor, DDA] (1pp.) /43 RTI Reply dt. 958-60
14.07.2014 by DDA Vigilance. Admitted that no Vigilance
Inquiry was ever carried out and case was closed on
23.07.1994 without investigation/ F.I.R. (3pp.) /44 RTI 961-65
Appeal dt. 02.08.2014 to three police officers (5pp.) /45 966
DDA letter No. F.125 (2864)/83/SFS/VKII/ 6/ 754 dt.
711
30.07.2015 “With reference to your letter regarding

sanction for prosecution, you are requested to attend the
office ofDy. Director/LAB/SFS(H) on any Monday, Tuesday
and Thursday between 2.30 PM to 5.00 PM alongwith
original documents i.e. proof ofpossession letter i.e. NOC,
demand letter, allocation letter, GPA/ATSrelated to saidflat
No. 1489, Pkt-1, Sec-C, SFS Cat-II at Vasant Kunj, New
Delhias a evidence andto confirm the genuinenessfor your
claim for the said flat” [Detailed reply was given to this
letter. It is also that the matter is sub-judice.] (Ipp.) /46 Cri. 967-83
M.A.No. 17171/2015 dt. 28.
10.2015 in W. P. (Crl.) 588/2013 titled Lt Col
(Retd) Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. The High Court ofDelhi
(17pp.) /47 /1 Judgement and Order dt. 29.07.2019 passed 984
by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in W. P. (Crl.) 588/2013
titled Lt Col (Retd) Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. The High
Court of Delhi through its Registrar General and Ors. “Vide
order passed today Tr.P. 47/2015 stands disposed of. Now,
only W.P.(CRL) 588/2013 survives.” (1pp.) /47 /2 Affidavit 985-
of Service dt. 13.09.2017 in Tr.P. 47/2015 titled Sher Singh 1001
through attorney Lt Col (Retd) Sarvadaman Singh Oberoietc
v. Chand Bhatnagar & Ors (17pp.) /48 Extract of Pages 258- 1002-
259 Annexure W-10(Colly)/ VolumeII Cri. M.C. 3915/2019 03
titled Lt Col (Veteran) Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi V.State of
Delhi NCT NDOH:09.02.2021 (Hon'ble Delhi High Court)
(2pp.) /49 Paramananda Mohapatrav. The State, AIR 1968 1004-
Ori 144, 34 (1968) CLT 627, MANU/OR/0040/1968 (7pp.) 10
/50 Madan Lal Mokhawal v. DDA 2005 (80) DRJ 625 (Spp.) 1011-5
Continued in Volume V
Place: New Delhi
Dated: 26.01.2021
Petitionerin-petson
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi
1102, Tower 1, Uniworld GardenI, Sector 47 Gurugram-122018,
Mob.No. 9818768349
Email: manioberoi@gmail.com
712
ANNEXURE P-23(COLLY)/1
BY SPEEDPOST
No. SSO/Act 10 of 1994/3 PLACE:GURUGRAM
DATE: 03.06.2019
FROM,
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi, 1102, Tower 1, Uniworld Garden I, Sector 47,
Gurugram, Haryana, 122018, Email: manioberoi@gmail.com
Phone No: +91-9818768349
TO,
1.The Hon’ble Registrar General, The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, New
Delhi-110503 Email: delhihighcourt@nic.in
2. The Cabinet Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India,
Rashtrapati Bhawan, New Delhi 110004 Email: cabinetsy@nic.in
3. The National Human Rights Commission, through its Secretary General,
National Human Rights Commission, Manav Adhikar Bhawan Block-C, GPO
Complex, INA, New Delhi 110023 Email: sgnhrc@nic.in
LEGAL NOTICE UNDER SECTION 80 CPC/ DELHI HIGH COURT

RULES READ WITH ARTICLE 226/227 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA REPORTING GRIEVIOUS MISTAKE OF THE HIGH
COURT REGISTRY NOT LISTING MATTER PER MANDATE OF
LAW BEFORE APPROPRIATE BENCH RESULTING INTO
INADVERTENT VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 14, 19 & 21
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE APPLICANT/ ALSO
INFORMANT U/S 340 CrPC IN CRL.M.A. 6982/2016 IN W.P.(C)
699/1990 TITLED SHER SINGH V. VICE CHAIRMAN, DELHI
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.:: ::SIMILAR MATTER
CURRENTLY PENDING FOR 29.07.2019 IN W.P.(CRL.) NO. 588/2013
TITLED LT.COL.RETD. SARVADAMAN SINGH OBEROI V. THE
HIGH COURT OF DELHI THR. ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL & ORS.
CONNECTED TO CRL.M.C. NO. 282 OF 2013 TITLED
LT.COL.RETD. SARVADAMAN SINGH OBEROI V. JUSTICE
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL:: ::RAISING ISSUES OF
‘WHISTLEBLOWER’, ‘THE AUTHORITY OF LAW’, ‘THE FORCE
OF LAW’, ‘LEGAL IMPACT’, ‘ACT OF THE COURT SHOULD NOT
PREJUDICE ANYONE’, ‘WRIT LANCET’, ‘APPARENT ERROR OF
LAW’, ‘QUESTION OF LAW ARISING ON THE FACE OF THE
FACTS’, ‘SUB SILENTIO’, ‘ERRONEOUS LAW’, ‘HIDING THE
LEGAL ERROR BY BLANKING OUT’, ‘INSCRUTABLE FACE OF
THE SPHINX’, ‘QUASI-JUDICIAL...PROCESSUAL JUSTICE’,
‘COLLATERAL ATTACK’, ‘NEW LIGHT SHED BY THE BENIGN
CLAUSES OF PART IV MUST ILLUMINE EVEN PRE-
INDEPENDENCE STATUTES IN THE INTERPRETATIVE
PROCESS’, ‘LOCK-JAW THE VICTIM’, ‘RES IPSA LOQITUR’ &
‘CORRUPTION AND REPRESSION – COUSINS IN SUCH
SITUATION’:: ILLEGALITY OF LISTING MATTER OF 340 CrPC
ARISING FROM JUDGEMENT AND ORDER DATED 24.09.1991 - ON
AND AFTER 24.09.1991 TILL 10.04.1992/ 23.04.1996 BEFORE A
BENCH INCLUDING HON’BLE JUSTICE S.B. WAD/ HON’BLE
JUSTICE P.K.BAHRI - ON AND AFTER 24.04.1996 TILL 01.05.2016
1
713
BEFORE A BENCH OF TWO JUDGES AS MAY BE NOTIFIED BY

HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE AS MASTER OF THE ROSTER -
ON AND AFTER 02.05.2016 TILL 19.05.16 BEFORE A BENCH OF
HON’BLE JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA/ HON’BLE JUSTICE NAJMI
WAZIRI - ON AND AFTER 19.05.2016 (DATE OF RECUSAL OF
HON’BLE JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA) TILL TODAY, BEFORE A
BENCH OF HON’BLE JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI AND ONE JUDGE
WHO MAY BE NOTIFIED BY HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE AS
MASTER OF THE ROSTER::ILLEGALITY OF NOTIFICATION
F.6/13/2011-JUDL./SUPTLAW/721-725 DATED JUNE 14, 2011,
CONSTITUTING THE SPECIAL COURT OF ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE 01 IN EACH DISTRICT AS HUMAN RIGHTS
COURT:: ::CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT IN SECTIONS 30/31, ACT
10 OF 1994
1. That this is a notice, mischief ‘Repression’, [In Re Special Courts Bill,
1978, 1979 (4) SCC 380 (7 judges) at SCC p.440 para 107] under Section
80 CPC/ Delhi High Court Rules read with Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, in a “collateral attack” [Bharati Reddy v. State of
Karnataka, 2018 (6) SCC 162 (3 judges), at SCC p.181 para 30] by a
“whistleblower” [Common Cause v. Union of India, 2015 (6) SCC 332
(3 judges) at SCC p.344 para 39 and Indirect Tax Practitioners Assn vs
R.K. Jain, 2010 (8) SCC 281 at SCC pp.310-312 paras 37-41] regarding
grievous unintended mistake of the high court registry (while working
under confusing and antiquated pre-Constitution Rules that appear to
attract the mischief “new light shed by the benign clauses of Part IV must
illumine even pre-independence statutes in the interpretative process”-
Rohtas Industries Ltd v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union, 1976 (2) SCC
82 at SCC p.98 para 32) in not listing the matter per mandate of law before
appropriate bench resulting into inadvertent violation of Articles 14, 19 &
21 fundamental rights of the applicant/ also informant (who as per law of
340 CrPC may even be an unconnected third party with or without interest
in the case matter) u/s 340 to 352 CrPC Chapter XXVI qua CrPC Section
195 in CRL.M.A. 6982/2016 in W.P. (C) 699/1990 titled Sher Singh v.
2
714
Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority & Ors, and also in
W.P.(CRL.) NO. 588/2013 titled Lt.Col.Retd. Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi
v. The High Court of Delhi Thr. Its Registrar General & Ors. NDOH:
29.07.2019 connected to CRL.M.C. NO. 282 of 2013 titled Lt.Col.Retd.
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul r/w Sections 30
& 31 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (Act 10 of 1994), all
related to huge possession scam in DDA Flat C-1/1489 Vasant Kunj, New
Delhi.
2. That separately applicant also raises the new issue of the matter of illegality
of Delhi High Court Notification F.6/13/2011-Judl./Suptlaw/721-725
dated June 14, 2011, constituting the Special Court of Additional Sessions
Judge 01 in each District as Human Rights Court. That also raised is the
matter of failure over last 25 years of the Union of India and this Hon’ble
Court to have notified Special Public Prosecutor (enjoying independence
from State Control under its International Obligations under two
International Covenants of 1966) in accord with Constitution and law,
more particularly Article 246 thereof, as per the constitutionally defective
mandate of Section 31 of Act 10 of 1994. That the Constitutional Defect in
Sections 30 & 31 of Act 10 of 1994 is also raised in this legal notice.
3. That on 24.09.1991 the matter W.P. (C) 699/1990 titled Sher Singh v. Vice
Chairman, Delhi Development Authority & Ors was dismissed in limine,
by a Bench of Hon’ble Justice S.B. Wad & Hon’ble Justice P.K.Bahri, only
because the Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority & Ors
deliberately withheld relevant facts which were later found to have been all
along on the record of the Delhi Development Authority files. That the
Delhi Development Authority files revealed active misrepresentation by its
3
715
officials in the affidavits filed in accord with High Court Rules Volume V,
Chapter 1 Part E – ‘The Making and Filing of Affidavits in the High Court’
on two dates, 17.07.1990 filed by Sh. Ranbir Singh, Secretary DDA &
13.02.1991 filed by Sh. Ashok Kapoor, Commissioner Housing, DDA.
That the factual matrix of collusion by officials of Delhi Development
Authority was confirmed by adverse comments of the trial court of MM-
02, New Delhi in CC 62/2010 vide an Order dated 08.11.1996, passed after
recording statements of officials of Delhi Development Authority, which
have attained finality having been upheld by the Sessions Court in
Revision, adverse comments not having been challenged before this
Hon’ble Court.
4. That a very similar matter, almost the same matter, is currently pending in
W.P.(CRL.) NO. 588/2013 titled Lt.Col.Retd. Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi
v. The High Court of Delhi Thr. Its Registrar General & Ors. NDOH:
29.07.2019 (connected to CRL.M.C. NO. 282 of 2013 titled Lt.Col.Retd.
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul.)
5. In CBI v. Keshub Mahindra, 2011 (6) SCC 216 (5 judges) at SCC
p.219 para 11, it was mandated “No decision by any court, this Court not
excluded, can be read in a manner as to nullify the express provisions of
an Act or the Code…”. That High Court Rules Volume III Chapter 8 Part
A ‘Offences Affecting the Administration of Justice’ is therefore not
relevant in this 340 CrPC saga.
6. That the relevant law applicable to the High Court, for allocation of the
340 CrPC matter needs must be as laid down in M.S. Sherif v. State of
Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397 (5 judges), Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab,
AIR 1956 SC 391 (5 judges), Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr vs Meenakshi
4
716
Marwah & Anr, 2005 (4) SCC 370 (5 judges), Pritish v. State of
Maharashtra, 2002 (1) SCC 253 (3 judges), N. Natarajan v. B.K. Subba
Rao, 2003 (2) SCC 76, Parmananda Mohapatra v. The State, AIR 1968
Ori 144, Gauri Shanker and Ors. v. Om Prakash Gupta, 1983 SCC
OnLine All 565, Ratti Ram Agarwala and Ors. v. The State, 1959 SCC
OnLine Pat 40, and Vijay Kumar Bansal v. State, 2003 (66) DRJ 277.
7. That in Jayantilal Amratlal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana and Ors., 1964 SCC
OnLine SC 40, AIR 1964 SC 648, [1964] 5 SCR 294 (5 judges) at SCR
para 38, it was mandated
“38…. The essence of that definition is that an order or notification in
order to be law must have the force of law. The expression "force of
law" must be distinguished from "the authority of law". Many orders
issued by Government have the authority of law behind them but all of
them cannot invariably be said to have the force of law, for in order that
they may have the force of law they must satisfy the basic concept of
law, i.e., they must contain a rule or body of rules regulating the course
of conduct of a person or persons living in that community enforceable
through courts or other machinery provided therefore. Thus if an order
is issued under the authority of law but it does not prescribe a course
of conduct regulating the action of a person or persons living in the
community, it cannot be law, for such an order would not necessarily
require enforcement by courts or other machinery, for no question of
its breach requiring enforcement arises as it prescribes no course of
conduct for the community to obey. Such an order may have the
authority of law behind it and in a State governed by the rule of law it
will usually be so, But "the authority of law" as we have said already
5
717
must be distinguished from "the force of law" and every order that has
the authority of law behind it would not be one having the force of law,
unless it complies with the basic concept of law as mentioned above. It
has however been urged that an order having "the authority of law"
would be enforced by courts and therefore it may be said to have the
force of law. There is in our opinion a misconception in this argument.
An order having "the authority of law" behind it may be recognised by
courts but unless it prescribes a rule of conduct which a person or
persons living in the community must obey there is no question of its
being enforced by a court of law or other authority. The recognition of
an order having the authority of law by courts or other authorities is in
our opinion different from its enforcement by courts or other
authorities, and it is only when the order can be enforced by courts or
other authorities that it can be said to have the force of law. The courts
or other authorities may even recognize orders of Government which
have no direct authority of law behind them but which are not opposed
to any law. Such orders cannot be said to have the force of law and be
enforceable by courts or other authorities and thus claim to have the
force of law, for they lack the basic concept of law as already referred
to.”
8. That the Rules (Delhi High Court Act, 1966 Sec. 7) Volume V, Chapter 3
Jurisdiction Part B Rule 1 (updated vide No. 182/Rules/DHC dt. 11.05.12)
has no applicability in this 340 CrPC line of cases, arising from the root/
primary DB Writ Jurisdiction matter dating back to 27.02.1990 involved
herein arising in and/ or from the intricately inter-connected line of writ
petitions/ criminal petitions WP (C) 699/1990 (27.02.1990) titled Sher
6
718
Singh v. Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority & Ors, WP (C)
5365/1993 titled Sher Singh v. DDA (Impostor Case?), WP (C) 7438/2000
titled Sher Singh v. Union of India & Ors., WP (Crl.) 588/2013 titled
Lt.Col.Retd. Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. The High Court of Delhi Thr.
Its Registrar General & Ors. NDOH: 29.07.2019 (connected to CRL.M.C.
NO. 282 of 2013 titled Lt.Col.Retd. Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. Justice
Sanjay Kishan Kaul.) That all these are intricately inter-connected matters
and cannot and should never have been heard in disparate compartments
so as to destroy the very essence of the case itself.
9. That the matter of 340 CrPC arising from Judgement and Order dated
24.09.1991 on and after 24.09.1991 till 10.04.1992/ 23.04.1996 mandates
listing before a Bench including Hon’ble Justice S.B. Wad/ Hon’ble Justice
P.K.Bahri, on and after 24.04.1996 till 01.05.2016 mandates listing before
a Bench of two judges as may be notified by Hon’ble the Chief Justice as
Master of the Roster, on and after 02.05.2016 till 19.05.16 mandates listing
before a Bench of Hon’ble Justice Sanjiv Khanna and Hon’ble Justice
Najmi Waziri, on and after 19.05.2016 (Date of Recusal of Hon’ble Justice
Sanjiv Khanna) till today, mandates listing before a Bench of Hon’ble
Justice Najmi Waziri and One Hon’ble Judge who may be notified by
Hon’ble the Chief Justice as Master of the Roster.
10.That on 01.08.2016 (upon recusal of Hon’ble Justice Sanjiv Khanna) the
Registry was therefore in accord with law laid down as adumbrated in para
6 mandated to list the matter before a Special Bench composed of Hon’ble
Justice Najmi Waziri and one Hon’ble Judge to be nominated by Hon’ble
The Chief Justice as master of the roster, and before NO OTHER BENCH,
and the failure of the Registry to do so attracts the mischief of the ratio laid
7
719
down in Kesavananda Bharati v. State Of Kerala And Anr, 1973 (4)
SCC 225, S.M. Sikri, C.J., speaking for the majority approvingly quotes
Taschereau, J., “It is a well settled proposition of law that jurisdiction
cannot be conferred by consent.” Hence any order passed by a Court
having no jurisdiction is a nullity. [Dissenting opinion of
Venkatachalliah, M.N., J. in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, 1988 (2) SCC
602 (7 judges)“The superior court has jurisdiction to determine its own
jurisdiction and an error in that determination does not make it an error
of jurisdiction.” is not good law].
11.That in wrongly allocating listing of W.P. 699/1990 on 01.08.2016 to a
Bench of which Hon’ble Justice Najmi Waziri was not a member, the
human rights violation by the Registry cannot be agitated under Article 32
as it was categorically held in 1988 (2) SCC 602 that if in an Article 226
matter, a Court of Record has committed some act without jurisdiction,
remedy lies, not in Article 32, but in collateral proceedings before that very
Court of Record, as it has ample inherent judicial powers to correct its own
errors of jurisdiction, maybe caused by misunderstanding of 340 CrPC law
by the Registry.
12.That all subsequent listings before various Benches on 14.09.2016,
25.10.2016, 04.01.2017, 24.01.2017, 25.01.2017, 20.07.2018, 04.09.2018,
14.11.2018, 30.11.2018, 19.12.2018, 11.01.2019 and 01.02.2019 are also
human rights violation of applicant, by the Registry. That every Order
passed on 01.08.2016, 14.09.2016, 25.10.2016, 04.01.2017, 24.01.2017,
25.01.2017, 20.07.2018, 04.09.2018, 14.11.2018, 30.11.2018, 19.12.2018,
11.01.2019 and 01.02.2019 in W.P. (C) 699/1990 titled Sher Singh v. Vice
Chairman, Delhi Development Authority & Ors, no doubt has the
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720
“authority of law” demanding obedience for the time being, however, it
lacks the “force of law’ spoken of in Jayantilal Amratlal Shodhan v. F.N.
Rana and Ors., 1964 SCC OnLine SC 40, AIR 1964 SC 648, [1964] 5
SCR 294 (5 judges) at SCR para 38. [See para 7 above]
13.That the Notification of the Special Court (Human Rights) is defective.
.That the criminal law (List III matter) does not apply at all in re a special
Act like Act 10 of 1994 passed under Article 246 (GOI Act 1935, Sections
100 & 104) Seventh Schedule List I Item 13 (GOI Act 1935, Seventh
Schedule List I Item 3) falls in the Union List and hence the exception
clause of Seventh Schedule List III Item 1 (GOI Act 1935, Seventh
Schedule List III Item 1) needs must be appositely interpreted in terms of
Order 27A Rule 2 (applicability of Articles 132 & 147) which applies to
trial courts of original jurisdiction including a court under Section 30 of
Act 10 of 1994, which is to be read harmoniously with Article 147, that
applies only to courts of record. See also Seventh Schedule List I Item 95,
List II Item 65 & List III Item 46 (pari materia GOI Act 1935, Seventh
Schedule List I Item 53, List II Item 2 & List III Item 15). That since the
human rights courts are non-functional the only remedy against this
violation of human rights (held also to be an Article 21 right) by the
Registry is in a collateral proceedings against the Union of India and the
Registrar General of this Hon’ble Court, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court
in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, 1988 (2) SCC 602 (7 judges)“[See para
11 above]
14.That such casual mistake of Registry resulted into in limine dismissal of
the matter with costs on 01.02.19 for which mistake (error jurisdiction)
petitioner cannot justifiably be faulted or punished with dismissal in limine
9
721
as laid down in Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Spangles
and Glue Manufacturers, ILR 1967 (2) P&H 694 (DB) at ILR p.699 at
lines 7 to 10, "No party can be made to suffer for any mistakes made by the
Court or its official and even if the copies which were despatched should
not have been despatched, the appellant cannot be made to suffer for any
such lapses."
15.That “legal impact” & “act of the Court should not prejudice anyone”,
including application of writ jurisdiction in such a matter, is
comprehensively captured in State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Mohnot,
2014 (14) SCC 77 at SCC p.92 paras 28-29. In Rohtas Industries Ltd v.
Rohtas Industries Staff Union, 1976 (2) SCC 82 (3 judges) Justice V.R.
Krishna Iyer for the Bench shone illumination on writ jurisdiction by
discussing certain legal terms such as "writ lancet", "apparent error of
law", "question of law arising on the face of the facts", "sub silentio",
"erroneous law", "hiding the legal error by blanking out", "inscrutable
face of the sphinx", "quasi-judicial...processual justice", "new light shed
by the benign clauses of Part IV must illumine even pre-Independence
statutes in the interpretative process" at SCC p.89 para 12, SCC pp.91-92
para 17 & SCC p.98 para 32:
“12. Should the Court invoke this high prerogative under Article 226 in
the present case? That depends. We will examine the grounds on which
the High Court has in the present case, ... keeping in mind the settled
rules governing judicial review ... Suffice it to say an award ... is not
only not invulnerable but more sensitively susceptible to the writ lancet
being a quasi-statutory body's decision. Admittedly, such an award can
be upset if an apparent error of law stains its face."
10
722
xxxxx
17....What is important is a question of law arising on the face of the
facts found and its resolution ex facie or sub silentio ..... Even then such
cute silence confers no greater or subtler immunity on the award than
plain speech. The need for a speaking order, where considerable
numbers are affected in their substantial rights, may well be a facet of
natural justice or fair procedure, although, in this case, we do not have
to go so far. If, as here, you find an erroneous law as the necessary
buckle between the facts found and the conclusions recorded, the award
bears its condemnation on its bosom. Not a reference in a narrative but
a clear legal nexus between the facts and the finding. The law sets no
premium on juggling with drafting the award or hiding the legal error
by blanking out. The inscrutable face of the sphinx has no better title to
invulnerability than a speaking face which is a candid index of the mind.
We may, by way of aside, express hopefully the view that a minimal
judicialisation by statement, laconic or lengthy, of the essential law that
guides the decision, is not only reasonable and desirable but has, over
the ages, been observed by ... quasi-judicial .... processual justice".
xxxx
32.....The new light shed by the benign clauses of Part IV must illumine
even pre-Independence statutes in the interpretative process.”
16.That prohibition of courts resorting to “lock-jaw the victim” has been
discussed comprehensively in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election
Commissioner, 1978 (1) SCC 405 (5 judges) at SCC pp.436-437, para 56.
17.That Section 7 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 states, inter alia:
11
723
“7. Practice and procedure in the High Court of Delhi. Subject to the
provisions of this Act, the law in force immediately before the appointed
day with respect to practice and procedure in the High Court of Punjab
shall, with the necessary modifications, apply in relation to the High Court
of Delhi and accordingly the High Court of Delhi shall have all such
powers to make rules and orders with respect to practice and procedure as
are immediately before the appointed day exercisable by the High Court of
Punjab and shall also have powers to make rules and orders with respect to
practice and procedure for the exercise of its ordinary original civil
jurisdiction:
Provided that any rules or orders which are in force immediately before
the appointed day with respect to practice and procedure in the High Court
of Punjab shall, until varied or revoked by rules or orders made by the High
Court of Delhi, apply with the necessary modifications in relation to
practice and procedure in the High Court of Delhi as if made by that High
Court.”
18.That judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in NDMC v.
Prominent Hotels Limited, 2015 SCC OnLine 11910, according to para
31.4 & 32, most emphatically states, inter alia:
“31.4. The Registrar General shall ensure the compliance of these
directions by all the Courts below. Copy of this judgment be sent to the
Registrar General.
32. Considering the principles of law discussed in this judgment, copy of
this judgment be sent to the Delhi Judicial Academy. The Delhi Judicial
Academy shall sensitize the judges with respect to the principles relating
to the consequences for not following the well settled law.”
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724
19.That it is most respectfully informed that Practice Direction No.
53/Filing/DHC/2015 dt. 22.08.15 has always been scrupulously adhered to
in these matters:
“HIGH COURT OF DELHI: NEW DELHI
No. 53/Filing/DHC/2015
Dated: 22.08.2015
PRACTICE DIRECTION
It is circulated for information of all concerned that in all the fresh cases
the Memo of Parties shall not reflect Hon'ble the Chief Justice as
respondent and in such matters Hon'ble High Court of Delhi should be
impleaded as a Respondent through Registrar General only.
Sd/-
Registrar General”
20.That the facts discussed above reveal “error jurisdiction” not only before
the Special Judge (Human Rights), also reveal grave “error jurisdiction”
caused by an inept Registry before the Court of Record, only because of
the glaring omission of the Registry of the Delhi High Court, which has
been a most unfortunate and perhaps unintended saga. Because petitioner
has grievously suffered on this account he is entitled to seek remedial
measures in writ jurisdiction, finding his fundamental and human rights
under Articles 14, 19 & 21 of the Constitution of India stand breached and
he is left remediless not even having been granted any certificate under
Article 134A(a) of the Constitution of India making it illusory to attempt
an Article 136 remedy; hence “collateral attack” on the Registry of the
Delhi High Court for unintended violation of the applicant’s fundamental
rights is now his only viable remedy.
13
725
21.That the facts herein speak for themselves. (res ipsa loqitur) That in
Uttamrao Shivdas Jankar vs Ranjitsinh Vijaysinh Mohite Patil, 2009
(13) SCC 131 at SCC pp.146-147 paras 32-34, it was held :
“32. Indisputably, there exists a distinction between a decision-making
process adopted by a statutory authority and the merit of the decision.
Whereas in the former, the court would apply the standard of judicial
review, in the latter, it may enter into the merit of the matter. Even in
applying the standard of judicial review, we are of the opinion that the
scope thereof having been expanded in recent times, viz., other than, (i)
illegality, (ii) irrationality, and (iii) procedural impropriety, an error of
fact touching the merit of the decision vis-à-vis the decision making
process would also come within the purview of the power of judicial
review.
33. In Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G. Thirugnanasambandam, 2005
(3) SCC 241, this Court observed qua “res ipsa loqitur”: (SCC p.253,
paras 34-35)
"34. ... It is now well settled that a quasi-judicial authority must pose
unto itself a correct question so as to arrive at a correct finding of
fact. A wrong question posed leads to a wrong answer. In this case,
furthermore, the misdirection in law committed by the Industrial
Tribunal was apparent insofar as it did not apply the principle of res
ipsa loquitur which was relevant for the purpose of this case and,
thus, failed to take into consideration a relevant factor and
furthermore took into consideration an irrelevant fact not germane
for determining the issue, namely, that the passengers of the bus
were mandatorily required to be examined. The Industrial Tribunal
14
726
further failed to apply the correct standard of proof in relation to a
domestic enquiry, which is "preponderance of probability" and
applied the standard of proof required for a criminal trial. A case for
judicial review was, thus, clearly made out.
35. Errors of fact can also be a subject-matter of judicial review. (See
E. v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt., 2004 QB 1004) Reference
in this connection may also be made to an interesting article by Paul
P. Craig, Q.C. titled 'Judicial Review, Appeal and Factual Error'
published in 2004 Public Law, p.788."
34.In S.N. Chandrashekar v. State of Karnataka, 2006 (3) SCC 208,
this Court observed: (SCC p.221, paras 33-34)
"33. It is now well known that the concept of error of law includes
the giving of reasons that are bad in law or (where there is a duty to
give reason) inconsistent, unintelligible or substantially inadequate.
(See De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th Edn.,
p.286.)
34. The Authority, therefore, posed unto itself a wrong question.
What, therefore, was necessary to be considered by BDA was
whether the ingredients contained in Section 14-A of the Act were
fulfilled and whether the requirements of the proviso appended
thereto are satisfied. If the same had not been satisfied, the
requirements of the law must be held to have not been satisfied. If
there had been no proper application of mind as regards the
requirements of law, the State and the Planning Authority must be
held to have misdirected themselves in law which would vitiate the
impugned judgment."
15
727
(See also Indian Airlines Ltd. v. Prabha D. Kanan, 2006 (11) SCC
67, SCC p.88, para 47 and Meerut Development Authority v. Assn.
of Management Studies. 2009 (6) SCC 171)”
22.That in order to illustrate the substantiated foundation of the alleged “error
jurisdiction” it is also pertinent and judicious to examine the Article 246
questions of law in Act 10 of 1994, raised before the various judicial fora
in India from 22.03.2018 to 15.01.2019 starting from the level of Special
Judge (Human Rights), and going up to the Division Bench of Hon’ble
High Court of Delhi. That the judgements below speak for themselves. (res
ipsa loquitur):
“22.03.2018
‘SPECIAL JUDGE HUMAN RIGHTS/ASJ-02 GURUGRAM ZIMNI
Lt. Col. Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi (Retd.) versus State
CNR number: HR-GR-01-005629 of 2015 CIS: 179/2015
Present: Petitioner Lt. Col. Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi (Retd.) in person
Sh. S.S. Gulia, Public Prosecutor for State
Petitioner, in furtherance of statement at bar made on 20.02.2018 submitted
documents substantiating certain important aspects of human rights law.
Petitioner has submitted seven documents today. Item number 2 of these
documents is an extract of Exh.A-1(i) which is letter dated 05.03.2018
addressed to Union of India and nine others wherein at pages 28 to 32 in
para no.18 certain extracts of Article 246 and Schedule VII have been
reproduced. That an examination of Article 246 of The Constitution of
India read with Items 13, 14 and 95 of List I, Items 1,2 and 46 of List III
and Item 65 of List II suffice to establish that jurisdiction as regards matters
which are the subject of any International treaties, agreement and
16
728
conventions lie strictly within the domain of Union of India being matters
in the Union List. It is, therefore, reasoned contention of the petitioner that
State Governments and the Union Territories shall lack jurisdiction to
legislate or make Rules in the matters falling under the Protection of
Human Rights Act, 1993 in view of the fact that the Statement of Objects
and Reasons of the Act itself states that "India is a party to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,1966 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on the 16th December, 1966" and
that taking into account the views expressed in subsequent discussions on
these Conventions, the said Act was brought before Parliament and
received the assent of the President on 8th January, 1994. Petitioner has
also produced certain other letters of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and the Ministry of Home Affairs in the
Union of India at Items 3 to 5 which indicate that the matter has been stated
to be of judicial nature and the Ministry of Home Affairs has referred the
Delhi Human Rights matter to the Law Commission Division in the
Ministry of Law on 09.02.2018. According to the petitioner, the matter
would be coming up before the Special Judge, Human Rights, Patiala
House, New Delhi on 11.04.2018 and all these points would also be
agitated before that court in the complaint case no.20/2018 titled
"Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi versus Union of India and others" wherein
Union of India is a party.
It is noteworthy that the Union of India is not a party in any of the human
rights cases presently pending before this court. Petitioner further states
that it would take a few months before any out come can be expected in the
17
729
matter which is before the Special Judge, Human Rights, Patiala House,
New Delhi.
More over, there is presently no independent Public Prosecutor appointed
under Section 31 of the Act 10 of 1994 and the Regulations thereof have
also not been notified.
Keeping in view the above facts and law mentioned above, this Court is of
the considered opinion that no purpose will be served by hearing these
matters on day-to-day basis and the matter is, thus, adjourned Sine die with
liberty to petitioner to move this court for taking up the matters as and when
there is some progress in the above mentioned matters.
As six other connected petitions are also continuing before this court at the
behest of petitioner, hence copy of present order be also pasted in those
connected matters for passing appropriate orders of the sine die
adjournment in those matters.
File be consigned to record room with a red ink note that its record not to
be weeded out without obtaining a specific permission for the same from
this court as the case is running adjourned sine die with liberty to the
petitioner to get it restored/revived.
Let copy of this order be given dasti to the petitioner under the seal of the
court for his record sake.
Date of Order: 22.03.2018 [ J.S. Kundu ]

yogesh stenographer-I Additional Sessions Judge,
Gurugram
[UID no. HR-0069]’
07.05.2018
‘$~47
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
DECIDED ON : 7th MAY, 2018
18
730
+ TR.P.(CRL.) 24/2018
SARVADAMAN SINGH OBEROI ..... Petitioner
Through : Petitioner in person.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through : None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.P.GARG
S.P.GARG, J. (Oral)
1. File has been put up for transfer of the complaint case instituted by
complainant/ petitioner - Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi.
2. I have heard the complainant / petitioner who is present in person and
have examined the file.
3. The Complaint Case No.20/2018 filed by the complainant/ petitioner
came to be listed for consideration before the learned Addl. Sessions
Judge-01, Patiala House Court. After hearing the complainant on
11.04.2018, the matter was listed for orders on 23.04.2018 at 02.00 p.m.
On that day, the learned Presiding Officer was on leave and the matter was
listed for 24.04.2018.
4. On 24.04.2018, the learned Trial Court dismissed the said complaint
case.
5. On 27.04.2018, application was received by the said Court by way of
assignment for recalling the orders dated 11.04.2018 and 24.04.2018.
Record reveals that initially it was stated by the complainant that he did not
want to say anything as he was a whistleblower. When the matter was kept
aside telling the complainant that the order would be passed after going
19
731
through the record, the complainant stated that he feared ‘bias’ from the
Court. On that, learned Addl. Sessions Judge placed the matter before
learned District & Sessions Judge, New Delhi on 28.04.2018 for
appropriate orders.
6. By an order dated 01.05.2018, learned District and Sessions Judge noted
that since the Court of learned Addl. Sessions Judge-01 was the only Court
in the District to deal with the matter relating to Human Rights Act as per
Notification No.F.6/13/2011-Judl./Suptlaw/721-725 dated 14.06.2011, the
matter was placed before the Registrar General of this Court for 03.05.2018
for assignment to some other Court.
7. Order dated 24.04.2018 which is under challenge was passed by the
learned ASJ-01, Patiala House Court, a designated Court. At that time, the
complainant did not seek transfer of the complaint case for any reason.
After the dismissal of the complaint case on 24.04.2018 by a detailed order,
subsequently application for recall of the orders dated 11.04.2018 and
24.04.2018 was filed by the complainant. On 27.04.2018, the complainant
appeared in person and initially he did not want to say anything being
whistle-blower. Subsequently, for no reasons, the complainant informed
that he feared ‘bias’ from the Court. Apparently, there was no sufficient
reason for the complainant to fear ‘bias’ as the application in question was
only to recall the orders dated 11.04.2018 and 24.04.2018. The Trial Court
was also not expected to transfer the matter merely because the
complainant feared unfounded ‘bias’.
8. This Court finds no sufficient reasons to transfer the matter from the
Court of learned ASJ-01 to any other Court.
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732
9. Let the matter be listed before the learned ASJ-01 on 23rd May, 2018
for disposal of the application for recalling of the orders dated 11.04.2018
and 24.04.2018 on merits after giving hearing to the complainant /
petitioner as per law.
10. The petitioner is directed to appear before the said Court on 23rd May,
2018.
11. Record be sent back immediately with the copy of the order.
(S.P.GARG)
JUDGE
MAY 07, 2018 / tr’
15.05.2018
‘$~42
+ TR.P.(CRL.) 24/2018
Through: Petitioner in person.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ..... Respondent
Through: None
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.P.GARG
ORDER
% 15.05.2018
Crl.M.A.No.9241/2018 (under Sections 165 of Indian Evidence Act and
151 CPC)
1. I have heard the petitioner/applicant, who is present in Court today.
21
733
2. The petitioner/applicant’s contention is that no Human Rights Courts
have been established in the entire country so far. No Special Public
Prosecutor has been appointed. The notification issued by the Central
Government is defective.
3. The applicant further urges that the learned Registrar General should
have dealt with the transfer petition on the administrative side, it was not
required to be listed before the Single Bench. He prays that the petition be
listed before the Registrar General for appropriate orders.
4. A perusal of the file reveals that by an order dated 07th May, 2018, the
matter has already been disposed of by this Court. The applicant has been
permitted to address arguments on merits before the Court concerned on
23rd May, 2018.
5. The instant application to place on record certain documents, cannot be
considered as no matter is pending before this Court. The petitioner will be
at liberty to produce the documents before the Court concerned as per law.
6. Since no matter is pending before this Court, no directions to list the
matter before the Registrar General as urged can be given.
7. The application stands disposed of.
S.P.GARG, J.
MAY 15, 2018
Neelam’
12.10.2018
‘$~10
+ LPA 306/2018
SARVADAMAN SINGH OBEROI ..... Appellant
22
734
Through: Appellant in person.
versus
THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS ..... Respondents
Through:
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO
ORDER
% 12.10.2018
1. The appellant in person has filed this appeal against order dated May 07,
2018 and May 15, 2018 passed in TR.P.(Crl.) 24/2018 and CRL.M.A. No.
9241/2018 in TR.P.(Crl.) 24/2018 respectively by the learned Single Bench
of this Court.
2. By order dated May 07, 2018, the learned Single Bench has observed
that merely on the basis of ‘bias’ alleged the case in question cannot be
transferred and dismissed the transfer application of the appellant /
petitioner.
3. By order dated May 15, 2018 the learned Single Bench has disposed of
the application of the appellant / petitioner with the observation that the
application to place on record certain documents and to list the matter
before the Registrar General of this Court cannot be considered, as no
matter is pending before this Court, with liberty to produce the documents
before the Court concerned as per law.
4. Today before us, the notification being F.6/13/2011-Judl./Suptlaw/721-
725 dated June 14, 2011, constituting the Special Court of Additional
Sessions Judge 01 in each District as Human Rights Court, is being
23
735
challenged by the appellant in person. The appellant is required to
challenge the notification in an appropriate proceeding and not in this
appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent.
5. The order of the learned Single Bench dated May 07, 2018 and May 15,
2018, in our considered view, do not call for interference.
6. However, in case the appellant feels that the Special Court has been
constituted in violation of the provision of the Human Rights Act, the
appellant is at liberty to challenge the said notification in accordance with
law.
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.
CHIEF JUSTICE
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J
OCTOBER 12, 2018/aky’
15.01.2019
‘$~38
+ CRL.REV.P. 53/2019
Through: In person.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR
ORDER
% 15.01.2019
24
736
In this abstract petition, declaration is sought that the imposition of costs
by subordinate courts is foreign to criminal procedure.
This petition appears to be in nature of Public Interest Litigation. No case
for invoking extra ordinary inherent jurisdiction is made out.
The petition is dismissed.
(SUNIL GAUR)
JUDGE
JANUARY 15, 2019
p’ma’”
“06.04.2019
‘Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi (Retd.) versus Union of India
CNR number: HRFB01-010367-2018 CIS: 132/2018
Present: Applicant in person.
ORDER
The applicant submits as under:
1. The petitioner has today made a statement at bar that the controversy of
the jurisdiction of Human Rights Courts under Section 30 & 31 of the
Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (Act 10 of 1994) involves
substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of
India.
2. The petitioner relies upon the judgment dated 22.03.2018 passed by the
Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon, in case titled Lt. Col. Sarvadaman
Singh Oberoi (Retd.) Versus State of Haryana and others (HR-GR-01-
005629-2015) and relevant extracts of which are as under:
“That an examination of Article 246 of The Constitution of India
read with Items 13, 14 and 95 of List I, Items 1,2 and 46 of List
25
737
III and Item 65 of List II suffice to establish that jurisdiction as
regards matters, which are the subject of any International
treaties, agreement and conventions lie strictly within the domain
of Union of India being matters in the Union List. It is, therefore,
reasoned contention of the petitioner that State Governments and
the Union Territories shall lack jurisdiction to legislate or make
Rules in the matters falling under the Protection of Human Rights
Act, 1993 in view of the fact that the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the Act itself states that “India is a party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 1966 adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on the 16th December, 1966 and that taking into account
the views expressed in subsequent discussions on these
conventions, the said Act was brought before Parliament and
received the assent of the President on 8th January, 1994.
xxxx.
Moreover, there is presently no independent Public Prosecutor
appointed under Section 31 of the Act 10 of 1994 and the
Regulations thereof have also not been notified. Keeping in view
the above facts and law mentioned above, this Court is of the
considered opinion that no purpose will be served by hearing
these matters on day-to-day basis and the matter is, thus,
adjourned Sine die…...”
3. The petitioner submits that the substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the Constitution of India have been referred by the Hon’ble
26
738
Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in CRM-M-44361/17
titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi Versus Union of India and others vide order
dated 06.12.2017, which states:
“The petitioner who is present in person, prays that CWP-24079-
2015, involving similar questions of law, is pending adjudication
before a Division Bench of this Court on 29.01.2018, this petition
may be referred to the same Division Bench. To avoid any
multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting views, be put up before
the same Division Bench, after obtaining appropriate orders,
from Hon’ble the Chief Justice.”
In CRM-M-34001 of 2012 titled Parvesh Kataria Vs. State of Haryana and
others, and CRM-M-5280 of 2015 titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi Vs.
Unknown with State of Haryana, our Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court
vide order dated 10.12.2018 states :
“The petitioner submits that the petition bearing CRM-M-43361
(44361) of 2017 involving the point of law, upon which the
decision of the present case would be depending, is already
pending before the Division Bench of this Court for 28.01.2019. It
is submitted by the counsel that either this petition be sent to the
Division Bench, so that both the cases can be heard together or
this case may be taken up after the above said case is decided by
the Division Bench of this Court. Learned counsel for the State
has no objection if the present case is taken up after the above
said CRM-M-43361 of 2017 is decided by the Division Bench.
Adjourned sine die. To be taken up after the above said CRM-M-
43361 of 2017 is decided by the Division Bench of this Court.”
27
739
4. The real matter is stated to be pending before the Hon’ble Division
Bench No.1 of Hon’ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana in CWP 24079/15
titled Ram Devi Versus National Human Rights Commission and CRM-
M-44361/17 titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi Versus Union of India and
others pending for 23.07.2019.
5. It may take a few months or years to obtain closure in these constitutional
questions of law.
6. Keeping in view of the above facts and that this case is primarily about
the jurisdictional aspect itself, this court is of the considered opinion that
no purpose will be served by hearing these matters on day to day basis, and
the matter is, thus, adjourned sine-die with liberty to petitioner to move this
court for taking up these matters, as and when there is some progress in the
above mentioned matters.
7. The connected (disposed of) matters would need to be protected
depending on the final outcome of this case. These matters are as follows:
i) HRFB-03-005174-2014 titled Shriram Transport Co. Ltd. Vs. Sunil
decided on 30.09.2015;
ii) HRFB-03-005117-2014 titled Shriram Transport Co. Ltd. Vs. Sunil
iii) HRFB-01-008943-2015 titled Sunil Versus Sriram Transport Co. Ltd.
iv) HRFB-01-008942-2015 titled Sunil Versus Sriram Transport Co. Ltd.
v) HRFB-01-012326-2017 titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi Versus Union
of India decided on 01.08.2018;
28
740
vi) HRFB-01-012372-2017 titled Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi Versus Union
of India decided on 01.08.2018;
vii) HRFB-01-015154-2017 titled Shriram Transport Co. Ltd. Vs. Sunil
viii) HRFB-01-001413-2018 titled Shriram Transport Co. Ltd. Vs. Sunil
ix) HRFB-01-001414-2018 titled Shriram Transport Co. Ltd. Vs. Sunil
8. All these case files be consigned to record-room with a red ink note that
its record not to be weeded out without a specific permission for the same
from this court, with the liberty aforesaid to the petitioner.
9. Let copy of this order be given dasti to the petitioner and file be
consigned to the record-room.
Date of order : 06.04.2019. (Rajesh Malhotra)

Gautam Lal Addl. Sessions Judge,
Faridabad. 06.04.2019
UID No.HR0059
23.That in Bharati Reddy v. State of Karnataka, 2018 (6) SCC 162 it was
held by the 3 judges Bench at SCC p.181 para 30:
“30. The distinction between a void and voidable order was considered in
the case of Nawabkhan Abbaskhan Vs. State of Gujarat, 1974 (2) SCC 121.
The Court noted the dictum of Rubinstein that, when an act is not voidable
but void, it is a nullity and can be disregarded and impeached in any
proceedings, before any Court or Tribunal and whenever it is relied upon.
In other words, it is made subject to “collateral attack”. The Court
observed that illegal act of authorities, if can be defied on self-determined
voidness, startling consequences will follow. It, however, made an
exception of cases where the order is passed by the jurisdictional authority
29
741
without hearing the party affected, which entails injury to a
Constitutionally guaranteed right to the affected party. It held that such
orders may be treated as void and ineffectual to bind the parties from the
beginning. That is not the case on hand. The underlying principle is that,
in cases such as the one under consideration, the Income and Caste
Certificate can only be invalidated after affording opportunity to the holder
of the certificate. It will be useful to reproduce the legal position summed
up by the Court in paragraph 18 as follows (SCC p.132):
“18. ............Decisions are legion where the conditions for the
exercise of power have been contravened and the order treated as void.
And when there is excess or error of jurisdiction the end product is a
semblance, not an actual order, although where the error is within
jurisdiction it is good, particularly when a finality clause exists. The
order becomes "infallible in error”, a peculiar legal phenomenon like
the hybrid beast of voidable voidness for which, according to a learned
author, Lord Denning is largely responsible. The legal chaos in this
branch of jurisprudence should be avoided by evolving simpler
concepts which work in practice in Indian conditions. Legislation,
rather than judicial law-making will meet the needs more adequately.
The only safe course, until simple and sure light is shed from a
legislative source, is to treat as void and ineffectual to bind parties,
from the beginning, any order made without hearing the party affected
if the injury is to a constitutionally guaranteed right. In other cases, the
order in violation of natural justice is void in the limited sense of being
liable to be avoided by Court with retroactive force.”
(emphasis in original and supplied)
30
742
As the subject certificate still holds the field and until it is invalidated by
the Competent Authority, it is unfathomable as to how the appellant can be
said to have occupied the public office without legal authority so as to
invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of issuing a writ of quo
warranto.”
24.That In Re Special Courts Bill, 1978, 1979 (4) SCC 380, (six judges
concurring, Shingal J., partially dissenting) Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer’s
judgement is at SCC pp.439-451 at paras 104-141, wherein at SCC p.440
para 107 it was held:
“The impact of 'summit' crimes in the Third World setting is more terrible
than the Watergate syndrome as perceptive social scientists have
unmasked. Corruption and repression – cousins in such situation – hijack
development process and in the long run lagging national progress means
ebbing people’s confidence in constitutional means to social justice.”
25. That therefore the applicant/ petitioner would most humbly pray and
makes kind request for the competent officer duly nominated as mandated
by Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment Salem Advocates Bar
Association (II) v. Union of India, 2005 (6) SCC 344 at SCC p. 370 at
para 39 for the Registry of the High Court/ Union of India-Cabinet
Secretary/ NHRC, to comply with Section 80 CPC and furnish detailed
para wise reply as mandated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment
Salem Advocates Bar Association (II) v. Union of India, 2005 (6) SCC
344 at SCC p. 370 at paras 38-39, hopefully in the time limited window of
two months or even earlier, please.
26.This matter is of grave national and international importance involving
Ministries of Law, Foreign Affairs & Home. The 25 years delay in not
31
743
implementing in letter and spirit a solemn International obligation of India
exposes Indian Democracy, Constitutional and Parliamentary Institutions
to the ignominy of an unspeakable inaction in the arena of Human Rights.
Hence this matter needs must be dealt under the procedures and policies
envisaged in Government of India (Allocation of Business) (AoB) Rules,
1961 and the Government of India (Transaction of Business) (ToB) Rules,
1961 which have been framed under Article 77 (3) of the Constitution of
India, and consolidated at one place in the “Government of India Cabinet
Secretariat Handbook on writing Cabinet notes” dated 24.04.2018
issued under signature of the Cabinet Secretary. (updated to 15.04.2018).
27.That a copy of this Notice under Section 80 CPC, may kindly be kept on
record with your kind offices, as has also been kept as part of record with
the applicant herein.
PLACE:GURUGRAM
DATE: 03.06.2019
Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi,
1102, Tower 1, Uniworld Garden I
Sector 47, Gurugram, Haryana, 122018
Email: manioberoi@gmail.com
Phone No: +91-9818768349
Enclosures: Pages 33-39

1. Case Status WP (C) 699 of 1990 as on 02.06.2019
4. Case Status Crl.M.C. 282 of 2013 as on 02.06.2019
5. Case Status WP (Crl) 588 of 2013 as on 02.06.2019
32
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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Case No : W.P.(C)-699/1990 Date of Filing :

Date of Registration :
Status : DISPOSED Judgement Date of Disposal : 04-jan-2017
SHER SINGH
Vs.
THE VICE CHAIRMAN, DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS
Filing Advocate : RAVI PRAKASH GUPTA
1 01-feb-2019 Listed In Court 34 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SIDDHARTH MRIDUL, HON'BLE MS.
JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL) As Item No 1
2 11-jan-2019 Listed In Court 34 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SIDDHARTH MRIDUL, HON'BLE MS.
3 19-dec-2018 Listed In Court 34 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SIDDHARTH MRIDUL, HON'BLE MS.
4 07-dec-2018 CM APPL.-53626/2018 For MISCELLANEOUS Filed By SARVADAMAN SINGH On
Behalf of petitioner SHER SINGH Vide Diary No : 531290/2018
5 30-nov-2018 Listed In (CASES PERTAINING TO SPL.DIVISION BENCHES) As Item No 35
6 14-nov-2018 Listed In (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI, HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI
SINGH) As Item No 64
7 14-nov-2018 Listed In (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI, HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI
SINGH) As Item No 57
8 01-nov-2018 CRL.M.A.-47182/2018 For CRPC UNDER 437 Filed By SARVADAMAN SINGH On
9 04-sep-2018 Listed In Court 3 (HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI, HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE
REKHA PALLI) As Item No 1
10 13-aug-2018 Certified Copy of ORDER Applied By SANJEEV Vide Diary No : 13213/2018
11 20-jul-2018 Listed In Court 11 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU) As Item No 16
12 05-jul-2018 CRL.M.A.-27986/2018 For CRPC UNDER 437 Filed By SARVADAMAN SINGH
OBEROI On Behalf of petitioner SHER SINGH Vide Diary No : 160960/2018
13 25-jan-2017 CM APPL.-3526/2017 For MISCELLANEOUS Filed By APPLICANT IN PERSON On
14 25-jan-2017 Listed In (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG)
15 25-jan-2017 Listed In (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG) As Item No 8
16 24-jan-2017 Listed In Court 2 (HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDIRA BANERJEE, HON'BLE MR.
JUSTICE A. K. CHAWLA) As Item No 10
17 21-jan-2017 CRL.M.A.-1345/2017 For CRPC UNDER 437 Filed By SARVADAMAN SINGH
18 04-jan-2017 Listed In Court 4 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, HON'BLE MR.
JUSTICE YOGESH KHANNA) As Item No 9
19 14-dec-2016 Vakalatnama Filed by SURUCHI MITTAL on behalf of Vide Diary No :
326994/2016
20 25-oct-2016 Listed In Court 4 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, HON'BLE MS.
JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI) As Item No 14
21 25-oct-2016 Listed In Court 3 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED, HON'BLE MR.
JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR) As Item No 2 (Deleted from Causelist)
22 25-oct-2016 Listed In Court 2 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO, HON'BLE MS.
JUSTICE INDIRA BANERJEE) As Item No 31
23 13-sep-2016 Listed In Court 15 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI) As Item No 20
24 01-aug-2016 Listed In Court 4 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT, HON'BLE MS.
JUSTICE DEEPA SHARMA) As Item No 15
25 25-may-2016 Listed In Court 4 (HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE GITA MITTAL, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE
I.S.MEHTA) As Item No 29
26 19-may-2016 Listed In Court 4 (HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE GITA MITTAL, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE
I.S.MEHTA) As Item No 1
33
745
27 10-may-2016 Listed In Court 6 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA, HON'BLE MR.
JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI) As Item No 1
28 02-may-2016 Listed In Court 8 (HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE
SUNIL GAUR) As Item No 46
29 29-apr-2016 Listed In Court 6 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA, HON'BLE MR.
JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI)
30 29-apr-2016 Listed In Court 6 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA, HON'BLE MR.
JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI) As Item No 20
31 25-apr-2016 CRL.M.A.-6982/2016 For CRPC UNDER 437 Filed By SARVADAMAN SINGH
32 25-apr-2016 CM APPL.-15610/2016 For MISCELLANEOUS Filed By PET IN PERSON On Behalf
of petitioner SHER SINGH Vide Diary No : 115789/2016
33 19-apr-2016 CM APPL. Filed By NEW NO. 119778 DUE TO TECHNICAL ERROR On Behalf of
petitioner CANCEL Vide Diary No : 119777/2016
34 19-apr-2016 CM APPL. Filed By NEW NO. 119778 DUE TO TECHNICAL ERROR On Behalf of
petitioner CANCEL Vide Diary No : 119246/2016
35 07-apr-2016 Advocate SAVITA KISHORE appeared on behalf of
36 04-nov-2011 Certified Copy of DOCUMENT Applied By S S OBEROI Vide Diary No :
15958/2011
37 24-sep-1991 Listed In Court 2 ()
38 ------------- Consigned to Record room.
34
746
2.Case Status WP (C) 5365 of 1993 as on 02.06.2019
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35
747

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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Case No : W.P.(C)-7438/2000 Date of Filing :

Date of Registration : 07-dec-2000
Status : DISPOSED Judgement Date of Disposal : 15-jul-2002
SHER SINGH
Vs.
UOI & ORS.
Dealing Assistant : WRT-D0

Filing Advocate : LT.COL.(RETD.)SS OBEROI
Subject 1 : MISCELLANEOUS DDA CASES (NOT COVERED BY ANY ABOVE
CATEGORY)
1 11-jul-2013 Certified Copy of ORDER Applied By ITEM NO.2 NOT GIVEN Vide Diary No :
13898/2013
2 13-jun-2013 Certified Copy of DOCUMENT Applied By S S OBEROI Vide Diary No :
12994/2013
3 04-nov-2011 Certified Copy of DOCUMENT Applied By S S OBEROI Vide Diary No :
15960/2011
4 09-jun-2011 received REQUEST FOR DOCUMENT/FILES LYING IN THE RECORD OF DHC
5 28-nov-2002 Certified Copy of ORDER Applied By A.K. BAKSHI Vide Diary No : 21984/2002
6 27-nov-2002 Certified Copy of ORDER Applied By K.K. BHUCHAR Vide Diary No :
21783/2002
7 26-nov-2002 DOCUMENT Filed by A.K.BAKSHI Vide Diary No : 42465/2002
8 23-nov-2002 Certified Copy of ORDER Applied By KK BUCHAR Vide Diary No : 21526/2002
9 22-nov-2002 Certified Copy of ORDER Applied By A.K BAKSHI Vide Diary No : 21445/2002
10 23-jul-2002 Certified Copy of ORDER Applied By A.K. BAKSHI Vide Diary No : 12126/2002
11 17-jul-2002 Certified Copy of ORDER Applied By A.K. BAKSHI Vide Diary No : 11670/2002
12 16-jul-2002 Certified Copy of ORDER Applied By KAMLESH K. BHUCHAR Vide Diary No :
11630/2002
13 15-jul-2002 Listed In Court 15 ()
14 13-mar-2002 Process Fee (Rs. ) Filed By A.K.BAKSHI Vide Diary No : 11145/2002
15 29-may-2001 AFFIDAVIT Filed by V.K.SHARMA Vide Diary No : 21109/2001
16 27-jan-2001 Process Fee (Rs. ) Filed By LT.COL.S.S.OBEROI Vide Diary No : 3665/2001
17 15-dec-2000 DOCUMENT Filed by S.S.OBEROI Vide Diary No : 43340/2000
18 ------------- Vakalatnama Filed by A.K.BAKSHI on behalf of Vide Diary No : 49708/2000
19 ------------- Consigned to Record room.
36
748
4. Case Status Crl.M.C. 282 of 2013 as on 02.06.2019

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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Case No : CRL.M.C.-282/2013 Date of Filing : 22-jan-2013

Date of Registration : 24-jan-2013
Status : DISPOSED Judgement Date of Disposal : 31-jan-2013
LTD. COL. REGD. SARVADAMAN SINGH OBEROI

Vs.
JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
Filing Advocate : PETITIONER IN-PERSON

Subject 1 : OTHER CRIMINAL MISC. PETITIONS
Lower Court Details : SAKET COURTS, NEW DELHI, Case No-CRA -8/2013 Decision Date-
08-JAN-13
1 28-sep-2016 Consigned to Record room.

2 14-mar-2013 Certified Copy of DOCUMENT Applied By S SINGH Vide Diary No : 6203/2013
3 08-mar-2013 Listed In Court 35 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR) As Item No 32
4 04-mar-2013 CRL.M.A.-3003/2013 For RECALLING OF ORDERS Filed By PETITIONER IN-
PERSON Vide Diary No : 34990/2013
5 04-mar-2013 Listed In Court 26 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT) As Item No 27
6 26-feb-2013 CRL.M.A.-2759/2013 For RECALLING OF ORDERS Filed By PETITIONER IN-
7 14-feb-2013 Certified Copy of ORDER Applied By SARUADHMAN Vide Diary No : 3399/2013
8 31-jan-2013 Listed In Court 29 (HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA) As Item No 31
9 28-jan-2013 Listed In Court 29 (HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA) As Item No 38
10 24-jan-2013 CRL.M.A.-946/2013 For EX-PARTE STAY/INJUNCTION/INTERIM STAY/STATUS
QUO/I Filed By
11 24-jan-2013 CRL.M.A.-945/2013 For EXEMPTION FROM FILING CERTIFIED COPIES ETC Filed
By
37
749
5. Case Status WP (Crl) 588 of 2013 as on 02.06.2019

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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Case No : W.P.(CRL)-588/2013 Date of Filing : 11-apr-2013

Date of Registration : 12-apr-2013
Status : PENDING Judgement
LT.COL.RETD. SARVADAMAN SINGH OBEROI

Vs.
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI THR. ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL & ORS.
Dealing Assistant : CRL-WRT

Filing Advocate : PETITIONER IN-PERSON
Subject 1 : Other criminal writ petitions
Lower Court Details : SAKET COURTS, NEW DELHI, Case No-CRLA -8/2013 Decision
Date-08-MAR-13
1 29-jul-2019 To Be Listed In Court 26 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A. K. CHAWLA)

2 07-mar-2019 Listed In Court 31 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI) As Item No 31
3 06-mar-2019 Vakalatnama Filed by SURUCHI MITTAL on behalf of Vide Diary No :
204799/2019
4 11-dec-2018 Listed In Court 31 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI) As Item No 34
5 09-aug-2018 REPLY Filed by SYED AHMED SAUD Vide Diary No : 204010/2018
6 26-jul-2018 Listed In Court 30 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI) As Item No 62
7 13-apr-2018 Listed In Court 30 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.P.GARG) As Item No 17
8 22-jan-2018 Listed In Court 30 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.P.GARG) As Item No 18
9 19-sep-2017 Listed In Court 25 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.R. MIDHA) As Item No 16
10 25-may-2017 Listed In Court 36 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A. K. CHAWLA) As Item No 37
11 19-may-2017 Listed In Court 31 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE I.S.MEHTA) As Item No 11
12 23-jan-2017 Listed In Court 33 (HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE GITA MITTAL, HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE
ANU MALHOTRA) As Item No 6
13 23-jan-2017 Restored in court 32
14 07-oct-2016 Listed In Court 34 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIPIN SANGHI) As Item No 47
15 18-jul-2016 Listed In Court 34 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIPIN SANGHI) As Item No 5
16 27-apr-2016 Listed In Court 30 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.P.GARG) As Item No 6
17 07-apr-2016 Listed In Court 29 (HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI) As Item No 18
18 01-feb-2016 Listed In Court 29 (HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI) As Item No 35
19 28-jan-2016 CRL.M.A.-1774/2016 For RESTORATION OF MAIN CASE Filed By PETITIONER
IN-PERSON On Behalf of petitioner LT.COL.RETD. SARVADAMAN SINGH
OBEROI Vide Diary No : 23322/2016
20 21-jan-2016 Listed In Court 29 (HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI) As Item No 4
21 27-nov-2015 Listed In Court 36 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SIDDHARTH MRIDUL) As Item No 42
22 04-nov-2015 CRL.M.A.-17171/2015 For MISCELLANEOUS Filed By PETITIONER IN
23 21-may-2013 Listed In Court 29 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR) As Item No 13
24 17-may-2013 received NOTICE OF MOTION RECD FROM LT COL SARVADAMAN SINGH
OBEROI GURGAON. SP NP. ED896427639IN.
25 15-may-2013 CRL.M.A.-8259/2013 For RECALLING OF ORDERS Filed By PETITIONER IN-
26 06-may-2013 Listed In Court 27 (HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI) As Item No 15
27 03-may-2013 Listed In Court 27 (HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI) As Item No 16
31 15-apr-2013 Listed In Court 36 (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR) As Item No 57
38
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32 12-apr-2013 CRL.M.A.-4572/2013 For EX-PARTE STAY/INJUNCTION/INTERIM STAY/STATUS

QUO/I Filed By
33 12-apr-2013 CRL.M.A.-4571/2013 For EXEMPTION FROM FILING CERTIFIED COPIES ETC
Filed By
39
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ANNEXURE P-23(COLLY)/ 2
TYPED COPY
IN THE COURT OF SH. PRADEEP CHADDAH: M.M.: N. DELHI.
Sher Singh vs. Chand Bhatnagar etc

P.S. Vasant Kunj
ORDER
It indeed is very amazing and shocking that in Capital city of
India a few kilometers away from the seat of the Central Government
criminals scam operate without any fear of being caught and punished
at all. Their dare devil manner of operation really comes as a shock. A
complaint case titled as Sher Singh Vs. Chand Bhatnagar is one such
case which will shock any law abiding citizen.
2. Case of the complainant Mr. Sher Singh is that he booked a flat
in Self Financing Scheme of D.D.A. in 1982. He also paid four
instalments totaling Rs. 1,72,800/-. Complainant thereafter received a
notice for a payment of final instalment of Rs. 37,065/-. The said
notice was dt. 19.6.89. Alongwith notice he had received a set of
documents. Accused no. 1 and late father of accused no. 2 entered into
criminal conspiracy with officials of Delhi Development Authority to
cheat and defraud the complainant. They prepared forged and false
Power of attorney. They thereafter deposited Rs. 37,065/- in the name
of complainant with D.D.A. Accused no. 1 is a property dealer
working in the name of South Delhi Estate Agency and his brain is
behind the act. Mr. H.L. Dhawan late father of accused no. 2 in
connivance with officials of D.D.A. got the possession of flat no. C-
1/1489 Vasant Kunj, New Delhi. After death of Mr. H.L. Dhawan his
son Yogesh Dhawan accused no. 2 is in illegal and unlawful
possession of said flat.
3. Complainant made a complaint with the police. He ran from
pillar to post but nothing came out of it. The said acts of the accused
persons gave shock of his life to the complainant and he suffered from
heart ailment. Complainant has claimed that he never made or signed
any Power of Attorney.
752
Accused no. 1 and father of accused no. 2 committed forgery for the
purpose of cheating. They dishonestly use forged Power of Attorney
as genuine and in connivance with officials of D.D.A. committed
offence. Ultimately complainant has prayed that accused persons be
summoned, tried and punished.
4. In support of his case complainant entered into the witness box
as CW-1. He testified on the lines of the complaint. He claimed that
he had booked a flat in Self Financing Scheme, Vasant Kunj. He had
paid Rs. 10,000/- towards booking of the flat and had paid in all a sum
of Rs. 1,72,800/-. He thereafter received a letter for depositing the 5th
instalment of Rs. 37,065.35/-. The said amount was to be deposited
within three months. Accused no. 1 and Mr. H.L. Dhawan and father
of accused no. 2 conspired with officials of D.D.A. They prepared a
forged Power of attorney in the name of complainant which he had
never signed. Those people then in the name of complainant deposited
the last instalment of Rs. 37,000/- with D.D.A. D.D.A. officials
thereafter handed over the possession of the flat to Mr. H.L. Dhawan.
Accused no. 1 is a property dealer operating from Safdarjung Enclave.
Accused no. 2 is son of late Sh. H.L. Dhawan. They illegally and
unauthorisedly took over the possession of the flat. He had lodged
report with P.S. Vasant Kunj. A report was also lodged with D.C.P.
Another report was also made to Lt. Governor. Police officials did not
take any action whatsoever and so he was forced to file the instant
complaint. He also examined an official Mr. Pawan Sharma, U.D.C.
from D.D.A. in support of his case. Mr. Sharma testified that
complainant had paid four instalments to D.D.A.
5. I have heard Ld. Counsel for the complainant at length. I have
also gone through the file. From the copies of the documents and the
receipts which have been placed on record it is very clear that the
complainant had booked a flat in D.D.A. Self Financing Scheme. It is
very clear that he
753
had deposited four instalments totaling Rs. 1,72,800/-. He has claimed

that he never executed any Power of Attorney in favour of the accused
persons. Accused persons had deposited the last instalment in the
name of complainant with the D.D.A. They had also obtained
possession of flat no. C-1/1489 Vasant Kunj. The original letter
demanding 5th instalment remained with the complainant and accused
persons deposited the amount on a photocopy. One thing which stands
out like a sore thumb that all this could not have been possible without
active connivance and abetment of D.D.A. officials. Ld. Counsel for
the complainant submitted at bar that D.D.A. took very minor action
against the delinquent officials. They merely were transferred from
the seats which they were holding. At the stage of summoning of the
accused court has just to satisfy itself whether any prima facie case
appears to be made out against the accused persons or not. Taking of
possession of a flat on basis of Power of Attorney which was never
executed just goes to show that some forgery was committed by
accused no. 1 and late father of accused no. 2. If possession of father
of accused no. 2 was unlawful then certainly possession of accused
no. 2 cannot be termed as lawful. His status in the property remains as
that of a trespasser in illegal occupation. As per section 441 of IPC
where a person even if he entered lawfully remains there unlawfully is
said to commit criminal trespass. I, therefore, take cognizance against
accused no. 1 u/s 420/467/468/471 of IPC as it is apparent from the
complaint and the evidence tendered that he (accused no. 1) had
conspired with late father of accused no. 2 and had prepared forged
documents which he had used for the purpose of cheating. He had
used the said documents which was a
754
Power of Attorney as a genuine document. As regards accused no. 2

prima-facie case u/s 447 of IPC is made out. Cognizance against him
under said section. Let both accused be summoned for next date of
hearing.
Sd/-
(PRADEEP CHADDAH)
Announced in the open M.M. N. DELHI
Court on 8/11/96
(1+2)
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TYPED COPY
IN THE COURT OF SH. DAYA PRAKASH: M.M.: NEW DELHI.
No. 52/97
SHER SINGH VS.CHAND BHATNAGAR
ORDER.
By this order I shall dispose the application of accused
for dropping of proceedings after summoning the accd. As per the
accused, the accused have been summoned in this case U/s.
420/468/471/446/467/34/120-B IPC. As per the accused the
complainant has intentionally suppressed material facts from the
court and even the complaint is time barred by limitation of time as
prescribed under law. Accused further submits that power of attorney
dt. 4.4.88 duly executed was registered with the Sub-Registrar Noida
dt. 5.4.88 in favour of H.L. Dhawan. The matter regarding power of
attorney is subjudice in the court. It is further stated that the
complainant has signed the G.P.A. and also signed the agreement of
sale and purchase and received a sum of Rs. 2 lacs vide draft No.
094088 dt. 30-3-88 drawn on National Bank Moti Bagh, N.D. issued
from the account of Smt. Krishna Dhawan wife of H.L. Dhawan.
R/o. D-7, Ist floor, Anand Niketan N.D. Amount has been duly
credited in the account of Sher Singh. It is further submitted that the
complainant has falsely suppressed that a case was filed before the
777
competent jurisdiction of consumer disputes Redressal Forum which
was dismissed on the ground that the matter dispute facts and
appropriate remedy can be sought by filing a civil case. The
complainant instead of filing of civil suit, filed present complaint
long after expiry of interim relief from Supreme Court dt. 13.11.92.
It is further submitted that complainant has falsely suppressed the
fact of Rs. 2 lacs has been accepted by him. In reply complainant
submits that cause of action is still continuing and accused are not
entitled for discharge. The question of suppressing of facts does not
arise and present is a criminal case. It is further submitted thst the
complainant has not signed any power of attorney etc. and not
received single penny what to say of Rs. 2 lacs.
Contd...2/-
778
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Both the complainants as per as accused’s counsel had stick to their
averments in the application as well as the reply.
Present complaint was filed on 24.5.95 accused was
summoned vide order to appear on 15.1.97. However accused
appeared on 16.1.97. On 24.3.98 the accused made present
application for dropping of proceedings no ground has been made for
dropping the proceedings against the accused. Hence, application for
dropping of proceedings of accused is dismissed. Put up for notice
on 3.12.1998.
ANNOUNCED.
Sd/-
M.M : NEW DELHI : 21.8.98

779
TYPED COPY
IN THE COURT OF SHRI L.D. MALIK:ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE:
NEW DELHI.
1. Chand Bhatnagar,
S/O Sh. Harsaran Dass Bhatnagar
R/O B-1/ 188A, Safdarjung Enclave,
New Delhi.
2. Yogesh Dhawan
S/O Sh. H.L. Dhawan
R/o Pocket C-1/1489,
Vasant Kunj, New Delhi ………Petitioners
Versus
1. Sher Singh
S/O Late Shri Ram Singh.
R/O Pocket C/112-A,
Mayur Vihar, Phase-II,
Delhi-110 091
2. State (NCT of Delhi) ……..Respondents
Cr. Revision No. 31/98

ORDER
This order shall dispose of a revision petition filed by the
petitioner (accused persons in the complaint case) challenging order
dated 8.11.96 passed by Shri Pradeep Chadha, Metropolitan Magistrate,
New Delhi summoning them as accused persons to stand trial for
offences U/S 420/467/468/471 IPC in the complaint case filed by
respondent No. 1 Sher Singh (complainant in the complaint case) and
another order dated 21.8.98 passed by Shri Daya Prakash, Metropolitan
Magistrate, New Delhi whereby the Ld. Magistrate refused to drop the
proceedings against the petitioners on the basis of an application moved
by them to that effect.
2. I have heard Shri Sandeep Roy, Advocate and Shri A.K. Bakshi,
Ld. Counsel for the respondent No. 1 and carefully perused the trial court
record which has been summoned from the trial Court. During the course
of
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arguments Ld. Counsel for the petitioners do not press the revision
petition assailing the summoning order and the order whereby their
application for dropping the proceedings was dismissed except
directions in the last portion of order dated 21.8.98 passed by the Ld.
Magistrate ordering the service of notice upon the petitioners. The said
order has been assailed on the ground that the petitioners had been
summoned for offences U/S 420/467/468/471 IPC which were warrant
trial and pre-charge evidence was required to be recorded and notice was
not be served upon the petitioners straightaway. Ld. Counsel for the
petitioners, however state that the petitioners reserve the right to
challenge the order passed against the petitioners, if any, after pre-charge
evidence is recorded or any other right accruing to them before charge.
Ld. Counsel for respondent No. 1 conceded the submissions on behalf of
the petitioners that pre-charge evidence was required to be recorded and
that orders of the Ld. Magistrate directing the service of notice may be
set aside.
3. I have given my careful consideration to the rival contention with
reference to the record. Keeping in view the submission made by Ld.
Counsel for the petitioners that the revision petition challenging the two
orders was not pressed on merits except the direction contained in order
dated 21.8.98 that notice be served upon the petitioners which portion
was not legal since pre-charge
781
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evidence was required to be recorded, the revision petition filed by the
petitioners is dismissed as not pressed. However. I am of in agreement
with the submissions made by Ld. Counsel for the Petitioners and very
fairly conceded by Ld. Counsel for respondent No. 1 that order dated
21.8.98 passed by Shri Daya Prakash, Metropolitan Magistrate, New
Delhi directing the service of notice on the petitioners is not legally
maintainable. Since the summoning of the petitioners was U/S
420/467/468/471 IPC in which pre-charge evidence was required to be
recorded. Hence, the Ld. Magistrate shall record pre-charge evidence in
the case and notice shall not be served upon the Petitioners as ordered.
4. In view of the above discussion, revision petition is disposed of in
terms of the above directions. Trial court records alongwith copy of the
Order be returned to the concerned court for further proceedings in
accordance with law. Parties are directed to appear before the Ld. Trial
Court on 30.7.99.
Sd/-
Announced in open Court Addl. Sessions Judge
Dated: 20.07.99 New Delhi
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MANU/SC/0397/1970
Equivalent Citation: AIR1971SC 1021, 1971(73)BOMLR510, 1971MhLJ81(SC ), (1970)1SC C 582, [1970]3SC R854
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2130 and 2131 of 1969
Decided On: 27.02.1970
Appellants:Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent:The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.N. Grover, J.C. Shah and K.S. Hegde, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: C.K. Daphtary, Suresh A. Shroff, P.C. Bhartari and
O.C. Mathur, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: H.R. Gokhale, N.H. Gurshani, and N.N. Keswani, Advs.
for respondent No. 1 B.D. Sharma and, S.P. Nayar, Advs. for respondent No. 2.
JUDGMENT
J.C. Shah, J.
1 . The High Court of Bombay dismissed in limine a petition filed by the Century
Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. hereinafter called 'the Company'--for the issue of
a writ restraining the respondent Municipality from enforcing the provisions of the
Maharashtra Municipalities Act 40 of 1965 relating to the levy, assessment, collection
recovery of octroi and in particular Section 105 and Sections 136 to 144 thereof, and
from enforcing the Maharashtra Municipalities (Octroi) Rules, 1967, and from acting
upon resolutions passed by the Municipal Council dated September 9, 1968 and
September 13, 1968, and from levying, assessing, collecting, recovering or taking
any other step under the Act, rules or the resolutions, and for an order restraining the
Municipality of Ulhasnagar from levying, assessing, collecting any octroi on the
goods imported by the Company within the limits of the Municipal Council for a
period of 7 years from the date of its first imposition. With special leave, the
Company has appealed against the order rejecting the petition.
2 . The Company was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913. It set up
its factory in 1956, within the limits of village Shahad, Taluka Kalyan, on a site
purchased from the State of Bombay, and within an area known as the 'Industrial
Area'. No octroi duty was then payable in respect of goods imported by the Company
into the Industrial Area for use in the manufacture of its products. On October 30,
1959, the Government of Bombay issued a notification announcing its intention to
constitute a Municipality for certain villages, including the Industrial Area. The
Company and other manufacturers who had set up their plants and factories objected
to the proposed Constitution of the Municipal Area. On September 20, 1960, the State
of Maharashtra (successor to the State of Bombay) published a notification
constituting with effect from April 1, 1960 the Municipality including the area in
which the Industrial Area was included. Representations were then made by the
Company and other manufacturers for excluding the Industrial Area from the
Ulhasnagar Municipal District Area. On April 27, 1962 the Government of Maharashtra
(the new State of Maharashtra having been constituted under the Bombay
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796
Reorganization Act, 1960) proclaimed that the Industrial Area be excluded from the
Municipal jurisdiction. The District Municipality then made a representation to the
Government of Maharashtra that the proclamation dated April 27, 1962, be withdrawn
by the Government. The Municipality agreed to exempt the existing factories viz., the
Company and other manufacturers whose factories were then existing in the
Industrial Area from payment of octroi for a period of seven years from the date of
levy of octroi and for exempting new industrial units from payment of octroi for a
similar period from the date of establishment. The Government of Maharashtra
acceded to the request of the Municipality to retain the Industrial Area within the
local limits of the Municipality.
3. On August 24, 1963, the District Municipality passed a resolution to implement the
agreement. It was resolved that the Municipality "agrees to give a concession to the
existing factories by exempting them from the payment of octroi for a period of 7
years from the date of levy of octroi tax and by exempting new factories from the
payment of the octroi tax for a period of 7 years from the date of their establishment
as recommended by the Government of Maharashtra".
4 . On October 31, 1963, the Government of Maharashtra issued a notification
withdrawing the proclamation dated April 27, 1962, and the Industrial Area became
part of the Ulhasnagar Municipal District. Relying upon the assurance and
undertaking given by the Municipality the Company claims that it had expanded its
activities and commenced manufacturing new products by setting up additional plant
which it would not have done "but for the concessions given, assurances and
representations made and agreement arrived at on May 21, 1963".
5 . On September 10, 1965, the Legislature of the State of Maharashtra enacted the
Maharashtra Municipalities Act which repealed the Bombay District Municipal Act 3 of
1901. The notification declaring the area of the former District Municipality of
Ulhasnagar into the Ulhasnagar Municipality became effective as from June 15, 1966.
The Ulhasnagar Municipality took over as successor to the Ulhasnagar District
Municipality, the assets and the affairs of that body. On September 9, 1968 the
Ulhasnagar Municipality resolved "to levy minimum rates of octroi duty as shown in
columns 4 and 6 on all items shown in Sch. I to the Rules", and by resolution dated
September 13, 1968, the Municipality adopted with effect from January 1, 1969, the
rates for the imposition of octroi duty on the goods imported for use, sale and
consumption within the Municipal Council limits.
6. At a special meeting held on December 24, 1968, the Municipal Council considered
the letters written by the Government of Maharashtra dated November 22, 1968 and
December 10, 1968, drawing the attention of the Municipality to the circumstances in
which the Industrial Area was included and retained in the local limits of the
Ulhasnagar District Municipality and continued to remain within the local limits of the
Municipality, and "advised the Municipality to pass a resolution confirming such
exemption and honour the commitments of its predecessor." The Municipality ignored
the advice and resolved that the Government of Maharashtra be informed that the
Municipality would consider afresh on merits any representation of a tax-payer for
exemption from payment of octroi, and if any such representation was made by the
factories situate in the Industrial Area, the Council would consider the same and take
such action as it would deem fit. Thereafter the Municipality sought to levy octroi
duty and to recover from the Company octroi duty amounting to approximately Rs. 15
lakhs per annum.
7. The Company moved a petition before the High Court of Bombay under Article 226
of the Constitution for the writs set out earlier seeking to restrain the Ulhasnagar

797
Municipality from enforcing the octroi Rules.

8 . The High Court may, in exercise of its discretion, decline to exercise its extra-
ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. But the discretion is
judicial : if the petition makes a claim which is frivolous, vexatious, or prima facie
unjust, or may not appropriately be tried in a petition invoking extra-ordinary
jurisdiction, the Court may decline to entertain the petition. But a party claiming to
be aggrieved by the action of a public body or authority on the plea that the action is
unlawful, high-handed, arbitrary or unjust, is entitled to a hearing of its petition on
the merits. Apparently the petition filed by the Company did not raise any
complicated questions of fact for determination, and the claim could not be
characterised as frivolous, vexatious or unjust. The High Court has given no reasons
for dismissing the petition in limine, and on a consideration of the averments in the
petition and the materials placed before the Court we are satisfied that the Company
was entitled to have its grievance against the action of the Municipality, which was
prima facie unjust, tried.
9. The Company pleaded that the Ulhasnagar Municipality had "entered into a solemn
arrangement" not to levy octroi duty for a period of seven years from the date of its
imposition. The evidence relating to the undertaking was contained in public records.
The Government of Maharashtra advised the Municipality that it was acting in
violation of the terms of that undertaking. By its resolution the Municipality declined
to abide by the undertaking of its predecessor.
10. There is undoubtedly a clear distinction between a representation of an existing
fact and a representation that something will be done in future. The former may, if it
amounts to a representation as to some fact alleged at the time to be actually in
existence, raise an estoppel, if another person alters his position relying upon that
representation. A representation that something will be done in the future may result
in a contract, if another person to whom it is addressed acts upon it. A representation
that something will be done in future is not a representation that it is true when
made. But between a representation of a fact which is untrue and a representation--
express or implied--to do something in future, there is no clear antithesis.
A representation that something will be done in future may involve an existing
intention to act in future in the manner represented.
If the representation is acted upon by another person it may, unless the statute
governing the person making the representation provides otherwise, result in an
agreement enforceable at law; if the statute requires that the agreement shall be in a
certain form, no contract may result from the representation and acting thereupon but
the law is not powerless to raise in appropriate cases an equity against him to
compel performance of the obligation arising out of his representation.
1 1 . Public bodies are as much bound as private individuals to carry out
representations of facts and promises made by them, relying on which other persons
have altered their position to their prejudice.
The obligation arising against an individual out of his representation amounting to a
promise may be enforced ex contractu by a person who acts upon the promise :
when the law requires that a contract enforceable at law against a public body shall
be in certain form or be executed in the manner prescribed by statute, the obligation
may be if the contract be not in that form be enforced against it in appropriate cases
in equity.
In Union of India and Ors. v. Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd., MANU/SC/0021/1967 :
[1968]2SCR366 this Court held that the Government is not exempt from the equity

798
arising out of the acts done by citizens to their prejudice, relying upon the
representations as to its future conduct made by the Government. this Court held that
the following observations made by Denning, J., in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions,
[1949] 1 K.B. 227 applied in India :
The Crown cannot escape by saying that estoppels do not bind the Crown for
that doctrine has long been exploded. Nor can the Crown escape by praying
in aid the doctrine of executive necessity, that is, the doctrine that the Crown
cannot bind itself so as to fetter its future executive action.
12. We are in this case not concerned to deal with the question whether Denning,
L.J., was right in extending the rule to a different class of cases as in Falmouth Boat
Construction Co. Ltd. v. Howell, [1950] All. E.R. 538 where he observed
Whenever Government officers in their dealings with a subject take on
themselves to assume authority in a matter with which the subject is
concerned, he is entitled to rely on their having the authority which they
assume. He does not know, and cannot be expected to know, the limits of
their authority, and he ought not to suffer if they exceed it.
13. It may be sufficient to observe that in appeal from that judgment (Howell v.
Falmouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd.) Lord Simonds observed after referring to the
observations of Denning, L.J. :
The illegality of an act is the same whether the action has been misled by an
assumption of authority on the part of a government officer however high or
low in the hierarchy.... The question is whether the character of an act done
in force of a statutory prohibition is affected by the fact that it had been
induced by a misleading assumption of authority. In my opinion the answer
is clearly : No.
1 4 . If our nascent democracy is to thrive different standards of conduct for the
people and the public bodies cannot ordinarily be permitted. A public body is, in our
judgment, not exempt from liability to carry out its obligation arising out of
representations made by it relying upon which a citizen has altered his position to his
prejudice.
15. Mr. Gokhale appearing on behalf of the Municipality urged that the petition filed
by the Company apparently raised questions of fact which in the view of the High
Court could not appropriately be tried in the exercise of the extra-ordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226. But the High Court has not said so, and on a review of
the averments made in the petition this argument cannot be sustained.
Merely because a question of fact is raised, the High Court will not be justified in
requiring the party to seek relief by the somewhat lengthy, dilatory and expensive
process by a civil suit against a public body. The questions of fact raised by the
petition in this case are elementary.
16. The order passed by the High Court is set aside and the case is remanded to the
High Court with a direction that it be readmitted to the file and be dealt with and
disposed of according to law. The High Court will issue rule to the Municipality and
the State and dispose of the petition. We recommend that the case may be taken up
for early hearing.
1 7 . We had during the pendency of the appeal in this Court made an order
restraining the levy of octroi duty. We extend the operation of the order for a

799
fortnight from this date to enable the Company to move the High Court for an
appropriate interim order pending hearing and disposal of the writ petition. There will
be no order as to costs in this Court. Costs in the High Court will be costs in the
cause.
18. Since we have granted special leave against the order dismissing the petition, we
do not deem it necessary to consider whether the order rejecting the application for
certificate was erroneous. Civil Appeal No. 2131 of 1969 is therefore dismissed.
© Manupatra Information Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

800
801
802
803
804
$~15
% Date of Decision : 6th May, 2013
+ W.P.(CRL) 588/2013 & Crl.M.A. No.4572/2013 (Stay)
LT. COL. RETD. SARVADAMAN

SINGH OBEROI ..... Petitioner
Through : Petitioner in person.
versus
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI THR.

ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL AND ORS. .... Respondents
Through : None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI
%
PRATIBHA RANI, J. (ORAL)
W.P.(Crl.) No.588/2013
1. In Greek mythology, phoenix is a long lived bird that is cyclically
regenerated or reborn. Associated with the sun, the phoenix obtains new
life by arising from the ashes of its predecessor.
2. The phoenix has risen again.
3. This is the fifth round of litigation in the High Court in respect of
litigation, which germinated more than two decades ago, over Flat No.C-
1/1489, Vasant Kunj, DDA Flats, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as
flat) allotted to Sh.Sher Singh. The possession of the said flat was given
W.P.(Crl.)No.588/2013 Page 1 of 12
805
by DDA to Mr.H.L.Dhawan in the year 1989 on the basis of Power of

Attorney alleged to have been executed by Sh.Sher Singh (the allottee) in
favour of Mr.H.L.Dhawan.
4. Sh.Sher Singh expired in the year 2008 and till his death, there
were numerous rounds of litigation and complaints to various Courts and
authorities. The petitioner is claiming interest in the said flat on the basis
of registered will dated 28.06.1999 executed in his favour by Sh.Sher
Singh. The petitioner is now fighting this lone battle not only by
claiming interest in the flat but also in exercise of his right as concerned
citizen of the country to fight for justice. Despite repeatedly losing
before the High Court and Supreme Court, the undying spirit of a soldier
in Lt.Col.(Retd.)Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi is not letting him give up.
Although the writ petition contains the detailed history of the litigation in
respect of the said flat, the basic issue which is being agitated before this
Court is the fraud played upon the Court by some imposter personating
himself as Sher Singh while filing C.W.P. No.5365/1993. The petitioner
prays for initiation of proceedings under Section 340 CrPC against
known/unknown persons involved in playing fraud on the Court by filing
CWP No.5365/1993 as well SLP No.19369/1994 before the Supreme
Court.
5. In order to understand the grievance of the petitioner, it is
necessary to refer to the previous litigations filed in this Court by
Sh.Sher Singh as well the present petitioner Lt.Col.(Retd.)Sarvadaman
Singh Oberoi. To appreciate the contentions of the petitioner, who is
conducting this case in person, record of previous litigations in respect of
W.P.(Crl.)No.588/2013 Page 2 of 12
806
the flat has been requisitioned from the Registry for perusal by this
Court.
(I) W.P.C. No.699/1990
6. The first round of litigation in respect of the flat was by filing
W.P.C. No.699/1990 by Sh.Sher Singh against Vice Chairman, DDA and
three other officers of DDA. The prayer made in the said writ petition
was for issuance of writ of Mandamus commanding the respondents to
deliver the possession of the flat No. Flat No.C-1/1489, Vasant Kunj,
DDA Flats, New Delhi or any other flat in Vasant Kunj to the petitioner.
7. The response of the DDA was that the possession has been handed
over to the authorised representative of the petitioner. DDA also filed
copy of the plaint filed before the lower Court in respect of Flat No.C-
1/1489, Vasant Kunj, DDA Flats, New Delhi as per which the said flat
had been sold by Sh.Sher Singh to Smt.Krishna Dhawan, W/o
Sh.H.L.Dhawan by executing the documents known in common parlance
as Power of Attorney sale.
8. The above writ petition was dismissed by this Court vide order
dated 24.09.1991 which is as under :-
„C.W.699/90
This petition discloses highly disputed questions of facts for

which writ petition is not a remedy. If so advised, the petitioner
may file a suit.‟
9. SLP No.16436/1991 preferred against the order dated 24.09.1991,

was dismissed by the Supreme Court.
W.P.(Crl.)No.588/2013 Page 3 of 12
807
(II) C.W.P. No.5365/1993

10. Another Writ Petition No.5365/1993 titled as Sher Singh vs. Vice
Chairman, DDA was filed wherein the prayer made was to issue a writ of
mandamus directing the respondent to refund the entire amount of the
cost of the flat with interest at market rate to the petitioner. Herein also,
the response of DDA was identical. The order dated 15.09.1994 passed
by this Court dismissing the writ petition was to the effect :-
„CW.5365/93 & CM 1224/94
The petition involves disputed question of facts which cannot

appropriately be gone into in exercise of jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 226 of The Constitution of India. The petition is
accordingly, dismissed.‟
11. SLP No.19369/1994 allegedly preferred by some imposter before

the Supreme Court against the order dated 15.09.1994, was also
dismissed.
12. The petitioner is not questioning the filing of C.W.P.No.699/1990
and SLP No.16436/1991 by Sher Singh. Only in respect of
C.W.P.No.5365/1993 and SLP No.19369/1994, it has been alleged that it
was filed by some other person impersonating himself as Sher Singh
thereby playing fraud on the Court and thus requiring action against him
in accordance with the provisions of Section 340 CrPC.
(III) C.W.P. No.7438/2000
13. Thereafter C.W.P. No.7438/2000 was filed by Sh.Sher Singh
impleading 58 respondents (as per memo of parties), however, the
proceedings dated 08.12.2000 in C.W.P. No.7438/2000 record the
W.P.(Crl.)No.588/2013 Page 4 of 12
808
submissions made by the petitioner, who appeared in person before the

Court, as as under :-
‘Petitioner submits that as far as his grievance regarding
investigation of criminal offence is concerned and the allegations
of forgery, fabrication of documents and other offences under the
Indian Penal Code, he would delete these references from the
petition. Petitioner further states that he would delete from the
present writ petition the several respondents numbering 60, who
have been arrayed as respondents without prejudice to his rights to
take action against them as admissible at law. He further states
that he would confine his relief in the writ petition to the
possession of the flat. Let the petitioner file amended writ petition
as desired by him.
Let the matter be listed as and when the amended petition is filed.‟
14. C.W.P. No.7438/2000 was dismissed on 15.07.2000. Subsequent

application seeking clarifications and review were also dismissed.
(IV) Crl.M.C. No.282/2013
15. Thereafter petitioner filed Crl.M.C. No.282/2013 which was
dismissed by the Court vide order dated 31.01.2013. Subsequent
Crl.M.A. No.2759/2013 praying for recalling of the order dated
31.01.2013 was also dismissed.
(V) W.P.(Crl.) No.588/2013
16. After disposal of Crl.M.C. No.282/2013, the petitioner has filed
this W.P.(Crl.) No.588/2013 with the following prayer :-
„(a) Writ of certiorari may kindly issue, in the interests of
upholding the majesty of law, directing the designated court of
jurisdiction under Section 340 CrPC, in the matter, for action as
may be considered appropriate in the facts and circumstances of
the matter of fraud played upon this Court in CWP 5365/93, and
W.P.(Crl.)No.588/2013 Page 5 of 12
809
(b) Writ of certiorari may kindly issue, in the interests of upholding

the majesty of law, directing the designated court of jurisdiction
under Section 340 CrPC, in the matter, for action as may be
considered appropriate in the facts & circumstances of the matter
of fraud played upon this court in FAO (OS) 140 of 2000 (2003
(71) DRJ 470 (DB) and FAO(OS) 140 of 2000 (2001 (57) DRJ 345
(DB)).‟
17. On perusal of the writ petition and being pointed out to the
petitioner that many irrelevant facts have been incorporated by the
petitioner to give the background/history and most of them are not open
to challenge now, the petitioner sought liberty to summarise the facts for
purpose of disposal of this petition. Taking note that the petitioner, who
is a retired Army Officer and conducting this case in person, he was
permitted to do so by summarising the facts relevant for the purpose of
relief claimed in this writ petition. The petitioner tried to place on record
the facts and his grievance alongwith the case law.
18. Petitioner has been heard at length. During course of hearing, his
main grievance was that in C.W.P. No.5365/1993 the counsel did not file
the vakalatnama and in subsequent writ petition filed in the year 2000,
Sh. Sher Singh denied having filed the said writ petition. He submitted
that so far as averments made in respect of events regarding which legal
remedy has already been availed and attained finality, he would be
satisfied if his grievance is redressed to the extent that the complaints
made by Sh.Sher Singh on 30.08.2000 and by his counsel on 01.12.2002
are disposed of.
19. In respect of prayer (b), the petitioner submitted that in para 74 of
the petition, he has stated that while doing research of this case, he came
W.P.(Crl.)No.588/2013 Page 6 of 12
810
across two orders in I.A. No.9004/98 by two different Benches on two

different dates. The petitioner submitted that he has given the citation in
prayer (b) just as a concerned citizen to draw the attention of this Court
that such type of practice should not be permitted and it was the duty of
the Counsel to inform the Court that I.A. No.9004/1998 had already been
disposed of on 20.10.2000, thus could not have been again disposed of in
March, 2003 by another Division Bench.
20. On being questioned by the Court as to whether he has checked
the record to ascertain in what circumstances I.A. No.9004/1998 again
came for disposal before another Division Bench, he pleaded ignorance.
21. The petitioner is claiming ignorance about the circumstances in
which hotly contested restoration application i.e. I.A. No.9004/1998
earlier disposed of by Division Bench consisting of Hon’ble Mr.Justice
Devinder Gupta and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mukul Mudgal, again came up
for disposal before the Division Bench consisting of Hon’ble Ms.Justice
Usha Mehra and Hon’ble Mr.Justice Pradeep Nandrajog i.e. whether it
was on review/recalling of the previous order or any other circumstance.
The record of FAO(OS) No.140/2000 revealed that on the basis of order
dated 28.09.2001, review application bearing RA No.1479/2001 was
allowed and judgment dated 20.10.2000 in FAO(OS) No.140/2000 was
recalled. There is hardly any necessity to further deliberate on this
aspect as the petitioner is not pressing the prayer (b) in the writ petition.
22. On 03.05.2012, during hearing in the Court, in respect of prayer
(a) made in the petition, the petitioner made prayer (hand written) to the
following effect :-
W.P.(Crl.)No.588/2013 Page 7 of 12
811
„I limit my prayer to pages 163-165 of WP(Crl).588/2013 in Civil

(W.P.) 5365/93 apparently filed by imposter and committing
prima facie offence u/s 340 CrPC (Annexure P-9 colly.)”
(Annexure P-9 is at Pages No.163 to 165 of W.P.(Crl.) No.588/2013. At

page 163, there is a copy of complaint dated 30.08.2000 made by Sher
Singh and at pages 164-165, there is a copy of complaint dated
01.02.2012 made by Mr.A.K.Bakshi, Adv.)
23. The petitioner submitted that from the beginning, Sher Singh had
been claiming that C.W.P. No.5365/1993 was not filed by him and a
fraud was played upon the Court by someone. Thus justice demands that
such imposter must be punished by the Court by resorting to the
provisions of Section 340 CrPC and this Court may give directions for
disposal of the two complaints (Annexure P-9) pending for over a
decade.
24. Once the petitioner limited his prayer to above extent, efforts were
made to find out the fate of the complaint referred to above. Record of
Writ Petition upto the year 2000 was also perused. Success could be
achieved only while going through C.P.W. No.7438/2000. This file
contains the original complaint dated 01.12.2002 sent through speed post
to Hon’ble The Chief Justice, High Court of Delhi, New Delhi (on
Administrative Side). The subject of the complaint is ‘Request for final
order on complaint dated 30.08.2000’. Alongwith the complaint, copy of
complaint dated 30.08.2000 addressed to Registrar, High Court of Delhi
is also enclosed.
25. Since the petitioner is restricting his prayer only in respect of
above mentioned two complaints for the purpose of seeking directions
W.P.(Crl.)No.588/2013 Page 8 of 12
812
from this Court to initiate action under Section 340 CrPC in respect of
fraud played upon this Court in C.W.P. No.5365/1993, it becomes
necessary to extract the two complaints. The complaint (copy) dated
30.08.2000 is as under :-
“FROM
Shri SHER SINGH s/o Ram Singh,
No. 112A, Pkt-C, MAYUR VIHAR, PHASE-II,
NEW DELHI-110091
Tel: 2478555
To
THE REGISTRAR
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
NEW DELHI-110003
CWP No.5365/93 FILED BY PERSON(S) IMPERSONATING AS SHRI

SHER SINGH IN SHER SINGH vs DDA.
Sir,
During examination of D.D.A. Files, as per directions of Sh.DAYA
PRAKASH, M.M., Patiala House Courts, in Cr.Complaint No.5012/94 it was
found that four cases have been filed by person(s) impersonating me in the
Supreme Court of India, High Court of Delhi, Distt. Forum-II, New Delhi (IN
PERSON) and State Commission (CDRC), Delhi (IN PERSON) during 1993-
96 (Next DOH 6.9.2000)
The details of the cases are at Serials 5, 6, 8 and 9 of Annexure enclosed.

It is requested that the guilty person(s) who have gravely abused the due
process be identified and punished to avoid recurrence of such malpractices.
DETAILS OF IMPERSONATION
Ser 5 CWP No.5365/93 Decided on 15-9-94.
“SHER SINGH vs. DDA”
Shri P.S. Madhan, Mr.K.K.Khetan, Advs. for petitioner
Mr.SK Kaul, Mr.NK Kaul, Mr.Nitin TambwekarAdvs for
Respondents.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
W.P.(Crl.)No.588/2013 Page 9 of 12
813
(SHER SINGH)
30-8-2000
Annx. Encl
Complete Details of Cases in R/o
C-1/1489 VASANT KUNJ, NEW DELHI”
The complaint dated 01.12.2002 which seems to be a reminder to earlier

complaint reads as under :-
“To,
The Hon‟ble Chief Justice

(On Administrative Side)
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
(Through Registrar General, High Court of Delhi)
Sir,
(1) It is most respectfully submitted that my client Shri Sher Singh states that
he had submitted a complaint dated 30-08-2000 to Registrar High Court of
Delhi, wherein my client had reported that some person(s) had impersonated
him and had filed C.W.P.No.5365/93 titled „Sher Singh vs. DDA‟. A copy of
complaint dated 30-08-2000 is Annexure I.
(2) My client states that the said C.W.P. 5365/93 was dismissed on 15-9-94
against which order, someone impersonating as Sher Singh, had filed
S.L.P.No.19369/94 which was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 1-5-95.
(3) My client states that he learnt about the said forgery/impersonation

sometimes early 2000, during the course of proceedings of criminal case filed
by my client before the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, and when the
DDA brought case record file in the said criminal case.
(4) My client states that he had applied for a DDA flat in 1982 and in 1989 he
was allotted DDA flat no.C-1/1489, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi. However, the
possession of the said flat was illegally given by the DDA to one Mr.H.L.
Dhawan who has since expired but his son and grandson are in illegal
possession of the flat at present.
(5) My client states that he had filed C.W.P.699/90 in High Court of Delhi
which was disposed of on 24-9-91.
W.P.(Crl.)No.588/2013 Page 10 of 12
814
(6) My client states that based on new facts he had filed C.W.P. 7438/2000 in
High Court of Delhi which was dismissed on 15-7-2002. In the said C.W.P.
my client (the petitioner) had stated at paras 35 and 38 of the Amended Writ
Petition (read with Annexure P-24) that some impostor had filed C.W.P.
5365/93.
(7) My client states that the said C.W.P. 7438/2000 was dismissed on 15-07-
2002 and in the order it was stated that the C.W.P. 5365/93 had been
dismissed earlier and S.L.P. had also been dismissed, thereby subjecting my
client to adverse inference on the basis of C.W.P.5365/93 and S.L.P. which
had NOT been filed by my client.
(8) My client states that he is suffering great injustice due to non-availability

of final report by the Hon‟ble Chief Justice of High Court of Delhi on the
Complaint dated 30-08-2000 submitted by my client.
(9) My client therefore submits that your kind self (on Administrative Side)
may be pleased to pass final order on the complaint of my client dated 30-08-
2000, on urgent basis to enable my client to proceed further in the dismissed
C.W.P.7438/2000 by way of filing L.P.A./S.L.P.
sd/-
Sher Singh
(Complainant)
Petitioner in C.W.P.7438/2000
sd/-
Date: 1.12.2002 A.K.BAKSHI
Place: New Delhi ADVOCATE”
26. The complaints were examined at appropriate levels and noting

dated 15.01.2003 by the Registrar is to the following effect which was
put up before Hon’ble The Acting Chief Justice for approval :-
„In view of orders on judicial side, no further action is called for in
the matter and the complaint might, if approved, be filed.‟
27. The above complaints have been ordered to be filed on 15.01.2003

on the basis of report submitted by Registrar General and approved by
Hon’ble The Acting Chief Justice.
W.P.(Crl.)No.588/2013 Page 11 of 12
815
28. The complaints dated 30.08.2000 and 01.12.2002 made by/on

behalf of Sh.Sher Singh were on the administrative side. To invoke the
provision of Section 340 CrPC, the proceedings must be before the Court
and not before an officer in his administrative/executive capacity. The
complaint can be filed only by a Court acting in judicial capacity. Since
the complaint dated 30.08.2000 addressed to Registrar and complaint
dated 01.12.2002 addressed to Hon’ble The Chief Justice are specifically
invoking the powers in their respective administrative capacity, in any
circumstance, the petitioner cannot seek the relief under the provisions of
Section 340 CrPC.
29. Since the grievance of the petitioner that the complaints dated
30.08.2000 and 01.12.2002 have not been disposed of by the Registrar
and Hon’ble The Chief Justice for over a decade, no longer survives for
the reason that the complaints stand disposed of on 15.01.2003, no relief
can be granted by this Court in W.P.(Crl.) No.588/2013.
30. W.P.(Crl.) No.588/2013 is hereby dismissed. All pending
applications are also dismissed.
31. No costs.
PRATIBHA RANI, J
May 06, 2013
„st‟
W.P.(Crl.)No.588/2013 Page 12 of 12
816
TYPED COPY
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
W .P.(CRL) 588/2013
LT.COL.RETD. SARVADAMAN
versus

ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL and ORS. ..... Respondents
Through:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI
ORDER
21.05.2013
Review Petition (Crl.) No.8259/2013 in W.P.(Crl.) No.588/2013
1. The petitioner has filed the present review petition with the prayer that paragraphs 28 and
29 of order dated 06.05.2013 passed in W.P.(Crl.) No.588/2013 may be
recalled/reviewed/revised.
2. Heard.
3. The petitioner has submitted that the order dated 15.01.2003 passed on the complaints
dated 30.08.2000 and 01.12.2002 was never conveyed to the complainant Sher Singh and
the said order was conveyed to him (petitioner) only on 06.05.2013 at about 2.30 pm while
pronouncing the order in W.P.(Crl.) No.588/2013. It has been further submitted that in the
given circumstances, it is necessary that power under Section 340 CrPC be invoked by the
Court by making a complaint to the competent Court.
4. I have considered the submissions made by the petitioner. The writ petition bearing
W.P.(Crl.) No.588/2013 was disposed of by this Court on 06.05.2013 and the grievance of
the petitioner is that paragraphs 28 and 29 of the order be recalled/reviewed/revised.
5. Paragraphs 28 and 29 of the order passed on 06.05.2013 in W.P.(Crl.) No.588/2013 read
as under :
"28. The complaints dated 30.08.2000 and 01.12.2002 made by/on behalf of Sh.Sher Singh
were on the administrative side. To invoke the provision of Section 340 CrPC, the
proceedings must be before the Court and not before an officer in his
administrative/executive capacity. The complaint can be filed only by a Court acting in
judicial capacity. Since the complaint dated 30.08.2000 addressed to Registrar and
complaint dated 01.12.2002 addressed to Hon'ble The Chief Justice are specifically invoking
the powers in their respective administrative capacity, in any circumstance, the petitioner
cannot seek the relief under the provisions of Section 340 CrPC.
29. Since the grievance of the petitioner that the complaints dated 30.08.2000 and
01.12.2002 have not been disposed of by the Registrar and Hon'ble The Chief Justice for
over a decade, no longer survives for the reason that the complaints stand disposed of on
15.01.2003, no relief can be granted by this Court in W.P.(Crl.) No.588/2013."
Page 120 of 137

817
6. A bare perusal of the above two paragraphs reveals that only the legal and factual position
has been incorporated in these two paragraphs. During the course of hearing, the petitioner
concedes that there is nothing wrong in these two paragraphs which can be
recalled/reviewed. The petitioner has submitted before the Court that his grievance is only
to the extent that Sher Singh was never communicated about the filing of complaints dated
30.08.2000 and 01.12.2002 and he just wanted to bring these facts on record for redressal if
legally permissible.
7. There is no provision in Code of Criminal Procedure under which the petitioner can seek
recall/review of order passed by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482
CrPC.
8. The petitioner is seeking recall/review of the paragraphs 28 and 29 of the order dated
06.05.2013 which was passed by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction and powers under
Section 482 CrPC. The question that falls for determination is whether the High Court in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction can recall/review its order. This question came up for
consideration before Supreme Court in the case of State rep. By D.S.P., S.B.CID, Chennai
vs. K.V.Rajendran and Ors. AIR 2009 SC 46. The Supreme Court, referring to the earlier
decisions, in paragraphs 14 to 20 of the report clarified the legal position as under :-
"14. Before we take up the questions for our decision, we may look into the law on the
questions posed before us.
15. In the case of Hari Singh Mann v. MANU/SC/0665/2000 :Harbhajan Singh Bajwa and
Ors. 2001 CriLJ 128 , this Court held:
There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure authorizing the High Court to
review its judgment passed either in exercise of its appellate or revisional or original
criminal jurisdiction. Such a power cannot be exercised with the aid or under the cloak of
Section 482 of the Code. Section 362 CrPC has extended the bar of review not only to
judgment but also to the final orders other than the judgment. Section 362 is based on an
acknowledged principal of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said
court in the absence of statutory provision becomes functus officio and is disentitled to
entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order is set aside by a court of
competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The court becomes functus officio the
moment the official order disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered
except to the extent of correcting a clerical or an arithmetical error.
16. Yet, in the case of Simrikha v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee and Anr. : 1990
CriLJ 1599, this Court held:
Page 121 of 137

818
The inherent power under Section 482 is intended to prevent the abuse of the process of the
Court and to secure ends of justice. Such power cannot be exercised to do something, which
is expressly barred under the Code. If any consideration of the facts by way of review is not
permissible under the Code and is expressly barred, it is not for the Court to exercise its
inherent power to reconsider the matter and record a conflicting decision. If there had been
change in the circumstances of the case, it would be in order for the High Court to exercise
its inherent powers in the prevailing circumstances and pass appropriate orders to secure
the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. Where there is no such
changed circumstances and the decision has to be arrived at on the facts that existed as on
the date of the earlier order, the exercise of the power to reconsider the
same materials to arrive at different conclusion is in effect a review, which is expressly
barred under Section 362.
17. Keeping the principles, as laid down by the aforesaid decisions of this Court in mind, let
us now look to Section 362 of the Code, which expressly provides that no Court which has
signed its judgment and final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except
to correct clerical or arithmetical error saved as otherwise provided by the Court. At this
stage, the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code may be looked into.
18. Section 482 enables the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to give
effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The inherent powers, however, as much are
controlled by principle and precedent as are its express powers by statutes. If a matter is
covered by an express letter of law, the court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisions
and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction.
19. In the case of Smt Sooraj Devi v. MANU/SC/0228/1981: Pyare Lal and Anr. 1981 CriLJ
296, this Court held 'that the inherent power of the Court cannot be exercised for doing that
which is specifically prohibited by the Code.'
20. Similar view was expressed in the case of Sankatha Singh v. MANU/SC/0142/1962: State
of U.P. AIR 1962 SC 1208, in which it was held:
It is true that the prohibition in Section 362 against the Court altering or reviewing its
judgment is subject to what is 'otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the
time being in force'. Those words, however, refer to those provisions only where the Court
has been expressly authorised by the Code or other law to alter or review its judgment. The
inherent power of the Court is not contemplated by the saving provision contained in Section
362 and, therefore, the attempt to invoke that power can be of no avail."
9. In view of the legal position enumerated above, the Review Petition No.8259/2013 is
hereby dismissed.
PRATIBHA RANI, J
MAY 21, 2013
'st'
$ R-3
Page 122 of 137

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IN THE COURT OF SH. AMAR NATH: DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE
NEW DELHI
M29/13
Sher Singh & Ors. vs South Delhi Estate
30.07.2015
Present : Applicant Lt.Col.(Retd.) Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi in person.
This case has been received by way of transfer from the court of Ms.Anu
Malhotra, Ld.District & Sessions Judge(South), New Delhi wherein stated that the
property involved in the dispute is situated in the area of Vasant Kunj, New Delhi and the
court of the South District ceased the territorial jurisdiction on account of the notification
dated 11.09.2012 published in the Delhi GazetteExtraordinary(Govt. of National Capital
Territory of Delhi) whereby territory of Delhi was altered and modified as per Annexure I
& II . Each District/Sessions Division and the SubDivision under the District shall be
known by the name specified in column 2 and column 3 respectively of the Annexure I.
Jurisdiction of each District shall extend to the areas of SubDivisions mentioned in
column no.3 as so mentioned in the aforesaid notification. The area of Vasant Kunj falls
under the jurisdiction of New Delhi District. Since some more matter between the parties
are pending adjudication before the court of Sh.Mukesh Kumar, Ld.ADJ04, New Delhi
therefore, this matter also stands transferred to the said court for disposal in accordance
with law.
Petitioner is also directed to file the memo of parties forthwith. He is also
directed to appear before the court of Sh.Mukesh Kumar, Ld.ADJ04, New Delhi on
10.08.2015.
( AMAR NATH )
District & Sessions Judge
New Delhi/30.07.2015
900
MANU/SC/1100/2017
Equivalent Citation: AIR2017SC 5677, 2018(2)ALD33, 2017 (125) ALR 911, 2017(4) C HN (SC ) 7, 2018(1)C LJ(SC )1, 2018(3)C TC 667, 2018-1-
LW1, 2017(II)OLR964, 2017(4)RC R(C ivil)466, 2017(2)RC R(Rent)291, 2018 138 RD489, 2017(11)SC ALE163, (2018)13SC C 715, 2017 (7) SC J
735, 2018(1)UC 700
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4165 of 2008
Appellants: Kanailal and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: Ram Chandra Singh and Ors.
R.K. Agrawal and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Shekhar Kumar, Adv.
For Respondents/Defendant: Bijan Kumar Ghosh, Adv.
JUDGMENT
R.K. Agrawal, J.
1. This appeal is filed by the Defendants against the final judgment and order dated
09.09.1999 passed by the High Court of Calcutta in S.A.T. No. 1082 of 1999 (re-
numbered as S.A. No. 740 of 1999) whereby the appeal filed by the Appellants was
summarily dismissed Under Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as "the Code").
2. Few relevant facts need mention in brief infra.
3 . The Appellants herein are the Defendants whereas the Respondents are the
Plaintiffs in the civil suit out of which this appeal arises.
4. The Respondents filed the civil suit being Title Suit No. 37 of 1991 before the Sub
Divisional Court of the Munsif, Jhargram, District Midnapore against the Appellants
inter alia seeking partition in relation to the suit properties. The Appellants filed their
written statement and denied the plaint averments. Parties went to trial on the issues
framed for its determination.
5 . By judgment/decree dated 26.06.1992, the Trial Court dismissed the suit. The
Respondents, felt aggrieved, filed first appeal being Title Appeal No. 240 of 1992
before the Additional District Judge, 6th Court, Midnapore. By judgment/decree dated
28.01.1999, the first Appellate Court (Additional District Judge, 6th Court) allowed
the appeal filed by the Plaintiffs, set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court
and decreed the Plaintiffs' suit.
6. The Appellants (Defendants), felt aggrieved, filed second appeal being S.A.T. No.
1082 of 1999 (re-numbered as S.A. No. 740 of 1999) before the High Court. By
impugned judgment, the High Court dismissed the appeal in limine, which has given
03-01-2021 (Page 1 of 3) www.manupatra.com SARVADAMAN OBEROI

901
rise to filing of this appeal by special leave before this Court by the Defendants.
7. The impugned order reads as under:
This appeal is summarily dismissed Under Order 41 Rule 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
There will be no order as to costs.
8. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of
the case, we are constrained to allow the appeal and while setting aside of the
impugned order, remand the case to the High Court for deciding the second appeal
afresh after framing proper substantial questions of law, if found to arise in the case.
9. Mere perusal of the impugned order quoted supra would go to show that the High
Court while deciding the appeal neither set out the facts nor the submissions urged
by the Appellants in support of their appeal and nor given any reason as to why the
submissions urged by the Appellants have no merit and why the appeal does not
involve any substantial question of law as is required to be made out Under Section
100 of the Code. (See- 2011 (6) SCC 455 -Jayanmti De and Anr. v. Abani Kanta
Barat and Ors., (2011) 6 SCC 455 and Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari
(Deceased) by L.Rs., MANU/SC/0091/2001 : (2001) 3 SCC 179).
10. This Court has consistently emphasized the need for assigning reasons in support
of its conclusion and while doing so must deal with all the issues raised by the
parties to the lis. Indeed, this Court has made the following very pertinent
observations on this issue in Union of India and Ors. v. Jai Prakash Singh and
Ors., MANU/SC/1165/2007 : (2007) 10 SCC 712 which read as under:
Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest consideration of
justice, the High Court ought to have set forth its reasons,
howsoever brief, in its order indicative of an application of its mind,
all the more when its order is amenable to further avenue of
challenge. The absence of reasons has rendered the High Court's
judgment not sustainable.
Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the
controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at.' Reasons
substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is
that if the decision reveals the 'inscrutable face of the sphinx', it can, by its
silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their
appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the
validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound
judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of
mind to the matter before court. Another rationale is that the affected party
can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary
requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made,
in other words, a speaking out. The 'inscrutable face of a sphinx' is
ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.
11. That apart, Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code which deals with the contents, date and
the signature of judgment is also apposite to take note of. It reads as under:
31. Contents, date and signature of judgment.- The judgment of the

902
Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state--

(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision; and
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the
relief to which the Appellant is entitled, and shall at the time
that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by
the Judges concurring there in.
12. It is clear from mere reading of the Rule 31(a) to (d) that it makes it legally
obligatory upon the Appellate Court (both-first and second Appellate Court) as to
what should the judgment of the Appellate Court contain.
13. Sub-clause (a) provides that the judgment must formulate and state the points
arising in the case for determination. Sub-clause(b) provides that the Court must give
decision on such points and sub-clause(c) provides that the judgment shall state the
reasons for the decision. So far as Sub-clause (d) is concerned, it applies in those
cases where the Appellate Court has reversed the decree. In such case, the Court has
to specify the relief to which the Appellant has become entitled to as a result of the
decree having been reversed in appeal at his instance.
14. While deciding the second appeal which lies only to the High Court, the Court
has to further ensure compliance of the requirements of Section 100 of the Code in
addition to the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code set out above.
15. In other words, the High Court while hearing the second appeal at the time of its
admission has to first find out whether the second appeal involves any substantial
question(s) of law and if the Court finds that the appeal does involve any substantial
question(s) of law then such question(s) is/are required to be formulated. The appeal
can be then heard finally only on such formulated question(s). (See Santosh
Hazari (supra).
1 6 . If however, the Court, at the time of hearing the appeal on the question of
admission, comes to a conclusion that the appeal does not involve any such question
within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code, then it has to pass a reasoned order
keeping in view the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 set out above. Indeed, this
being the mandatory requirements of law, its non-compliance by the Appellate Court
render their judgment bad in law.
1 7 . As mentioned above, since the judgment impugned does not satisfy the
requirements of either Section 100 or/and Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code, it is legally
unsustainable.
1 8 . In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is, accordingly,
allowed. Impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for
hearing of the appeal afresh in accordance with law keeping in view the
aforementioned observations.

903
CC No. 47295-16
19.09.2016
Fresh complaint received by way of assignment. It be
checked and registered.
Present: Complainant with counsel.
At request, Put up with connected matter/main file on

06.10.2016.
(LOVLEEN)
MM-02/PHC, New Delhi
19.09.2016
904
Back
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, PHC

Case Details
Case Type : Ct Cases - COMPLAINT CASES
Filing Number : 81511/2016 Filing Date: 15-09-2016
Registration Number : 47295/2016 Registration Date: 19-09-2016
CNR Number : DLND02-018047-2016
Case Status
First Hearing Date : 19th September 2016
Decision Date : 17th October 2017
Case Status : CASE DISPOSED
Nature of Disposal : Uncontested--DISPOSED
Court Number and Judge : 14-
Petitioner and Advocate

1) LT COL SARVADAMAN SINGH
Respondent and Advocate

1) SHER SINGH VS. CHAND BHATNAGAR
Acts
Under Act(s) Under Section(s)
Cr. P. C. 362
Main Matters
Main Case No. : /0027631/2016
History of Case Hearing
Registration Number Judge Business On Date Hearing Date Purpose of hearing
47295/2016 Metropolitan Magistrate 19-09-2016 06-10-2016 Misc./ Appearance
47295/2016 17-10-2017 Disposed
Orders
Order Number Order Date Order Details
1 19-09-2016 COPY OF ORDER
Back
905
CC No.6/16
Lt. Col. (Retd.) Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi

v
Sh. Chand Bhatnagar etc.
24.08.2018
Present: Complainant in person.
This complaint is pending since 28.05.2013.

The complaint of the complainant is that one Sh. Sher Singh
was alloted a DDA flat vide demand notice dated 19.06.1989 but the public
servants and private persons entered into criminal conspiracy and
prepared a forged Power of Attorney of Sh. Sher Singh and took the
possession of the flat.
On 11.07.2013, directions for complainant's evidence were
given. However, on the adjourned date, a request was made by the
complainant to re-address arguments on the consideration of the complaint
instead of complainant's evidence. He had stated that he does not want to
lead Pre Summoning Evidence as yet.
The complainant was given permission to inspect the files in
the office of DDA to address arguments.
On 10.08.2015, it was noted that DDA had asked for 02
months time for working on sanction. On 22.11.2016, the complainant
requested for an opportunity to lead evidence that public servants are no
more holding the same office to which the present complaint pertains. Vide
orders dated 25.02.2017, the application of the complaint to declare him
deemed public prosecutor was declined.
DL-0375
906
On 13.07.2018, it was noted that in the present complaint A-

1, A-2 & A-3 are private persons and A-4 to A-9 are public servants. It was
noted that the complainant is well aware of the legal position that sanction
under section 197 of Cr.PC is required to prosecute public servants and all
these years the complainant could not get the sanction for prosecution of
the public servants. It was also noted in the said order that the alleged
offence was committed by public servant in discharge of their official duties
that is why the complainant had approached Ministry of Urban
Development for seeking sanction and he had also approached CVC who
had advised the Central Vigilance Officer of Ministry of Urban Development
to ask DDA to decide the question of sanction at the earliest.
It was also noted that according to the complainant himself,
the complaint cannot proceed till the time the sanction under Section 197
of Cr.PC for prosecuting public servant is received.
Faced with this situation, the complainant sought to rely on
Article 51-A, 141 and 375 of the Constitution of India and sought directions
from this court for initiating contempt proceedings against sanctioning
authority for failing to take decision either way on the point of sanction to
prosecute the public servants. He has submitted that these directions be
given by this court in the light of the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of “Vineet Narayan”. However, copy of the judgment
relied on by him is not given and citation thereof is given. No other
precedent of any other superior court has been cited for issuing contempt
proceedings against sanctioning authority of the public servants.
Considering that inspite of long efforts of the complainant, no
sanction has been granted to prosecute public servants under Section 197
Cr.PC or under Section 19 of PC Act, 1988, present complaint is dismissed
DL-0375
907
as not maintainable. The complainant may file a complaint against private

persons, if so desired and may take such action as permissible under law
as and when sanction to prosecute the public servants is granted to him.
All pending misc. applications also stand dismissed.
The complaint be consigned to record room.
(ARUN BHARDWAJ)
Special Judge (PC Act): CBI-5
PHC, New Delhi : 24.08.2018
DL-0375
908
2015 (147) DRJ 368

HIGH COURT OF DELHI
CM(M) 743/2014 & CM 12946/2014 (stay)
Christopher Daruwala............ Petitioner
Versus
Leena Baretto............ Respondent
Mukta Gupta, J.
Decided on 14.01.2015
Civil Procedure Code, 1908
Order 7 Rule 11 — Permanent injunction — Dispossession —
Cause of action — Rejection of plaint — Scope of — Plaintiff was an
old lady, working as domestic servant for the last 8 years with
defendant No.1 being the mother of petitioner was impleaded as
defendant No.2 — Plaintiff was allotted a servant quarter during the
course of her employment for residence of the plaintiff — Plaintiff
demanded her earned wages/salary for the entire period —
Defendants instead of paying extended threat to vacate the suit
premises immediately otherwise they would dispossess her forcibly
and illegally — Senior civil judge order for handing over the
possession — Civil Judge held that the Civil Judge had no right to
reject the plaint for non-disclosure of cause of action and further no
right to give directions to the plaintiff to hand over possession
within one month —A person in settled possession cannot be ejected
without a court of law having adjudicated upon his rights qua the
true owner — Plaintiff's failure to make out a case for an injunction
909
Christopher Daruwala v. Leena Baretto 369
does not mean that its consequent cessation of user of the said two
rooms would have been brought about without recourse to law —
Impugned judgment of the Senior Civil Judge is set aside and the
order of Civil Judge is restored.
[Paras 4, 8]
Cases Referred :
A. Shanmugam v. Aria Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya
Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam (2012) 6 SCC 430
Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes and Ors. v. Erasmo Jack De
Sequeira (Dead) through LRs. (2012) 5 SCC 370
Thomas Cook (India) Ltd. v. Hotel Imperial 18 (2006) 88 DRJ 545
PRESENT: Mr. Prosenjeet Banerjee with Ms. Princy Ponnan, Advs. for
Petitioner.
None for Respondent.
Mukta Gupta, J. (Oral)
1. Despite pass over none is present on behalf of the respondent. Even
on the last date despite pass over none was present on the respondent. I
have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the paper book.
2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 10th February, 2014
passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller whereby the
order of the learned Civil Judge dated 13th November, 2013 was reversed.
Learned Civil Judge vide order dated 13th November, 2013 had allowed the
application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC filed by the petitioner/defendant in
Suit No. 923/2013 thereby rejecting the plaint.
3. A brief background of facts is that the respondent/plaintiff filed a suit
before the learned Civil Judge seeking permanent injunction against the
petitioner/defendants before learned Civil Judge seeking permanent
injunction against the petitioner and his mother from dispossessing the
respondent/plaintiff from the suit property bearing No. E-56 (Garrage)
Sujan Singh Park, New Delhi without due process of law. In the plaint it
was the case of the respondent/plaintiff that the plaintiff was an old lady,
working as domestic servant for the last 8 years with defendant No. 1 being
the mother of petitioner herein who was impleaded as defendant No. 2. The
plaintiff/respondent was allotted a servant quarter bearing No. E-56
(Garrage) Sujan Singh Park, New Delhi by defendant No. 1 during the course
of her employment for residence of the plaintiff/respondent and her family
members and since then the plaintiff is in peaceful possession of the said
quarter. The plaintiff had got installed a telephone connected in the name
of her husband in the suit premises. However, electricity connection was got
installed in the suit premises in the name of husband of defendant No. 1 at
her own cost. When the plaintiff was employed with defendant No. 1 as
domestic servant the husband of defendant No. 1 was bedridden due to old
age ailments. The plaintiff was looking after him and doing other household
910
370 DELHI REPORTED JUDGMENTS 2015 (147) DRJ ....
work. Defendant No. 1 had agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 5000/- per month
besides allotting the suit premises for residential purposes and had assured
that when the plaintiff would be in need of money, the entire salary/wages
will be given. In the month of February, 2007 the plaintiff demanded her
earned wages/salary for the entire period from the defendants but the
defendants instead of paying any heed to the requests and demands of
plaintiff extended threat to vacate the suit premises immediately otherwise
they would dispossess her forcibly and illegally. It is further stated that on
10th March, 2007 the defendants came at the suit premises and threatened
the plaintiff and her family members to vacate the suit premises. With this
cause of action the suit was filed seeking injunction as noted above. It may
be noted that there was no prayer for recovery of the salary in the plaint.
4, An application was filed by the petitioner/defendant no.2 under Order
7 Rule 11 CPC pleading that no cause of action arose in the suit and the suit
was not maintainable. On hearing the parties, the learned Civil Judge vide
order dated 13th November, 2013 allowed the application relying on the
decision of the Supreme Court in Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes
and Ors. v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (Dead) through LRs.(2012) 5
SCC 370. It was held that the plaintiff had no right in the suit premises as
according to her own averment she was allotted the suit premises on the
ground that she was the servant of the defendants. Thus directions were
issued to the plaintiff to hand over possession of the suit premises within
one month from the date of the order and the plaint was rejected. Against
the order dated 13th November, 2013 passed by the Civil Judge, the
respondent/plaintiff preferred an appeal before the learned Senior Civil
Judge who vide order dated 10th February, 2014 set aside the judgment of
the learned Civil Judge and held that the Civil Judge had no right to reject
the plaint for non disclosure of cause of action and further no right to give
directions to the plaintiff to hand over possession within one month. While
setting aside the order dated 13th November, 2013, the matter was
remanded back to learned Civil Judge to proceed with the trial on merits.
The suit of the plaintiff was restored.
5. As noted above, there is no dispute on facts. The respondent/plaintiff
in the suit has admitted that the suit premises was given to her for residing
as she was the domestic servant in which electricity meter was also in the
name of husband of defendant No. 1. In the month of February, 2007 she
was asked to vacate the suit premises.
6. It is trite law that an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC has to
be considered by way of demurer on the basis of averments made in the
plaint. The legal position with regard to possession of a
care-taker/watchman/ servant was considered by the Supreme Court in
Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes (supra) and while crystallizing
the law it was held-
911
Christopher Daruwala v. Leena Baretto 371
"97. Principles of law which emerge in this case are crystallised as

under:
(1) No one acquires title to the property if he or she was allowed to
stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by long possession of years or
decades such person would not acquire any right or interest in the said
property.
(2) Caretaker, watchman or servant can never acquire interest in the
property irrespective of his long possession. The caretaker or servant
has to give possession forthwith on demand.
(3) The courts are not justified in protecting the possession of a
caretaker, servant or any person who was allowed to live in the premises
for some time either as a friend, relative, caretaker or as a servant.
(4) The protection of the court can only be granted or extended to the
person who has valid, subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or
licence agreement in his favour.
(5) The caretaker or agent holds property of the principal only on
behalf of the principal. He acquires no right or interest whatsoever for
himself in such property irrespective of his long stay or possession."
7. These principles were further reiterated by the Supreme Court in A.
Shanmugam v. Aria Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya
Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam, (2012) 6 SCC 430 wherein the
following propositions were laid down:-
"43.6. The watchman, caretaker or a servant employed to look after
the property can never acquire interest in the property irrespective of
his long possession. The watchman, caretaker or a servant is under an
obligation to hand over the possession forthwith on demand. According
to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, the courts are not
justified in protecting the possession of a watchman, caretaker or ser-
vant who was only allowed to live into the premises to look after the
same.
43.7 The watchman, caretaker or agent holds the property of the
principal only on behalf of the principal. He acquires no right or interest
whatsoever in such property irrespective of his long stay or possession.
43.8 The protection of the court can be granted or extended to the
person who has a valid subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or
licence agreement in his favour."
8. In Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes (supra) while
discussing the due process of law the Supreme Court reiterating the decision
of this Court in Thomas Cook (India) Ltd. v. Hotel Imperial, 18 (2006)
88 DRJ 545 held that "due process", "due course of law" and "recourse to
law" have been interchangeably used in the decision. However, "due process
of law" would not mean a full-fledged trial. It simply means that a person
in settled possession cannot be ejected without a court of law having
912
adjudicated upon his rights qua the true owner. The said rights can be
adjudicated merely on filing of written statement or by the pleadings of the
parties itself. The Court further noted that it was not necessary that only if
a suit for eviction was filed by the respondent claiming the suit premises
then only orders of eviction can be passed. Even in a suit for injunction filed
by the caretaker/watchman/servant directions for handing over the
possession can be passed by the Court concerned. It was held:
79. Due process of law means that nobody ought to be condemned
unheard. The due process of law means a person in settled possession
will not be dispossessed except by due process of law. Due process means
an opportunity to the defendant to file pleadings including written
statement and documents before the court of law. It does not mean the
whole trial. Due process of law is satisfied the moment rights of the
parties are adjudicated upon by a competent court.
80. The High Court of Delhi in Thomas Cook (India) Ltd. v. Hotel
Imperial [(2006) 88 DR.J 545] held as under: (DRJp. 566, para 28)
"28. The expressions ‘due process of law’, ‘due course of law’ and
‘recourse to law’ have been interchangeably used in the decisions
referred to above which say that the settled possession of even a person
in unlawful possession cannot be disturbed forcibly’ by the true owner
taking law in his own hands. All these expressions, however, mean the
same thing—ejectment from settled possession can only be had by
recourse to a court of law. Clearly, ‘due process of law’ or ‘due course of
law’, here, simply mean that a person in settled possession cannot be
ejected without a court of law having adjudicated upon his rights qua
the true owner.
Now, this ‘due process’ or ‘due course’ condition is satisfied the moment
the rights of the parties are adjudicated upon by a court of competent
jurisdiction. It does not matter who brought the action to court. It could
be the owner in an action for enforcement of his right to eject the person
in unlawful possession. It could be the person who is sought to be ejected,
in an action preventing the owner from ejecting him. Whether the action
is for enforcement of a right (recovery of possession) or protection of a
right (injunction against dispossession), is not of much consequence.
What is important is that in either event it is an action before the court
and the court adjudicates upon it. If that is done then, the ‘bare
minimum’ requirement of ‘due process’ or ‘due course’ of law would stand
satisfied as recourse to law would have been taken. In this context, when
a party approaches a court seeking a protective remedy such as an
injunction and it fails in setting up a good case, can it then say that the
other party must now institute an action in a court of law for enforcing
his rights i.e. for taking back something from the first party who holds
it unlawfully, and, till such time, the court hearing the injunction action
must grant an injunction anyway? I would think not. In any event, the
913
373
‘recourse to law’ stipulation stands satisfied when a judicial determina-
tion is made with regard to the first party’s protective action. Thus, in
the present case, the plaintiffs failure to make out a case for an
injunction does not mean that its consequent cessation of user of the said
two rooms would have been brought about without recourse to law."
We approve the findings of the High Court of Delhi on this issue in the
aforesaid case.
9. Considering the legal position as noted above in the two decisions of
the Supreme Court and of this Court, the impugned judgment of the learned
Senior Civil Judge cannot be sustained and is set aside and that of learned
Civil Judge dated 13th November, 2013 is restored. 10. The petition and
application are disposed of.
914
$~1
+ W.P.(C) 699/1990 & Crl.M.A. No.6982/2016 & CM Nos.15610-
11/2016, 15646-48/2016
SHER SINGH ..... Petitioner
Through: Petitioner in person
versus
THE VICE CHAIRMAN, DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

& ORS ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Dhanesh Relan, Standing
Counsel for the DDA
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI
ORDER
% 19.05.2016
Subject to orders of Hon’ble the Chief Justice, the applications may

be listed before another Bench, of which one of us (Sanjiv Khanna, J.) is not
a member, on 25th May, 2016.
SANJIV KHANNA, J
NAJMI WAZIRI, J
MAY 19, 2016
tp
915
$~20
+ W.P.(C) 699/1990 and C.M.Nos.15610-11/2016 & 15646-48/2016
SHER SINGH
..... Petitioner
Through: Ms. (appearance not given) with the
petitioner in person.
versus

& ORS
..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Dhanesh Relan and Ms.Ankita
Minocha, Advocates for DDA.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE I.S.MEHTA
ORDER
% 14.09.2016
Matter is taken up today, as 13th September, 2016 was declared

holiday on account of Idul Zuha.
Counsel for the respondent-DDA submits that she has not received
copies of applications filed by the petitioner. Let copies of all applications
be supplied to counsel for the DDA by counsel for the petitioner.
List on 25th October, 2016.
G.S.SISTANI, J
I.S.MEHTA, J
SEPTEMBER 14, 2016/‘dc’
916
$~9
+ W.P.(C) 699/1990

Represented by: Ms.Suruchi Mittal, Advocate with
applicant Mr.Sarvadaman Singh
Oberoi
versus
THE VICE CHAIRMAN, DELHI

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS ..... Respondents
Represented by: Mr.Dhanesh Relan, Advocate with
Ms.Isha Garg, Advocate for DDA
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE YOGESH KHANNA
ORDER
% 04.01.2017
CM No.15646/2016
Allowed.
CM Nos.15610-11/2016, 15647-48/2016 & Crl.M.A.No.6982/2016
1. The applicant claims right under an un-probated will purportedly
executed in his favour by Sher Singh. On strength thereof, applicant desires
proceedings to be initiated under Section 340 Cr.P.C. against officers of
DDA.
2. The writ petition filed by Sher Singh was dismissed o September 24,
1991 by a Division Bench of this Court noting that highly disputed
W.P.(C) 699/1990 page 1 of 3
917
questions of fact arise for consideration and for which the writ petition is not
a remedy. Sher Singh was advised to file a suit.
3. After 25 years above captioned applications have been filed.
4. Documents have been filed on strength whereof it is sought to be
pleaded that officers of DDA misled the Court on facts resulting in the order
dated September 24, 1991 being passed.
5. We do not think so.
6. In the writ petition, Sher Singh claimed to be a registrant with DDA
under the 5th Self Financing Scheme. He claimed that in a draw of lots held
on March 29, 1989 Flat No.C-1/1489, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi was allotted
to him. He claimed possession of the flat to be handed over to him.
7. In the reply filed by DDA stand taken was that Sher Singh had
executed a power of attorney on September 12, 1989 in favour of one
Sh.H.L.Dhawan to whom possession of the flat allotted to Sher Singh was
handed over.
8. In the rejoinder, Sher Singh questioned the execution of the said
power of attorney.
9. Sh.H.L.Dhawan having died, his wife sent a letter to this Court
enclosing therewith receipts executed by Sher Singh evincing transfer of
interest by Sher Singh in favour of H.L.Dhawan. She never sought any
formal intervention. On October 22, 1999 the Division Bench noted receipt
of the documents on the administrative side and directed that the same
should be handed over to the petitioner who could file a response to the said
documents.
10. On February 12, 1991 Commissioner Housing DDA filed an affidavit
W.P.(C) 699/1990 page 2 of 3
918
informing the Court that a suit for declaration and consequential relief was
filed by one South Delhi Estate Agents Associations.
11. Order dated January 17, 1991 records the direction to DDA to
produce the record.
12. Proceedings lingered on till when the writ petition was dismissed on
September 24, 1991.
13. The same disputed questions of fact would arise for consideration in
Crl.M.A.No.6982/2016.
14. In view of the fact that nobody’s rights were adjudicated when the
writ petition was dismissed and the issue was left open to be decided at a
trial we find no reasons to initiate proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C.
after 25 years of the writ petition being dismissed.
15. All above captioned applications are accordingly dismissed.
16. No costs.
PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J.
YOGESH KHANNA, J.
JANUARY 04, 2017
mamta
W.P.(C) 699/1990 page 3 of 3

919
$~8
+ W.P.(C) 699/1990
SHER SINGH
..... Petitioner
Represented by: None
versus
THE VICE CHAIRMAN, DELHI DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORITY & ORS
..... Respondents
Represented by: Mr.Dhanish Relan and
Ms.Akshita Manocha, Advs.
for DDA
Applicant in person
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE YOGESH KHANNA
ORDER
% 25.01.2017
CM No.2964/2017
Exemption is allowed subject to all just exceptions.
Crl.M.A.No.1345/2017 & CM Nos.------/2017, ------/2017, ------/2017
1. The applicant has filed three civil miscellaneous applications which
have been summoned from the registry. Notwithstanding the objections
raised the three applications are taken on record with a direction to the
registry to number the applications.
W.P.(C) 699/1990 Page 1 of 2
920
2. The applicant is not the relative of the petitioner Sher Singh. He

litigates concerning Flat No.C-1/1489, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi, registrant
thereof was Sher Singh. The applicant claims an interest in the flat in
question on the basis of a Will executed by Sher Singh and it is the case of
the applicant that the Will has been proved. The applicant has been asked
whether he has a document showing probate of the Will being granted. He
states that he does not have any.
3. We had given reasons in our order dated January 4, 2017 as to why
various applications and Crl.M.A.No.6982/2016 filed by the applicant were
being dismissed.
4. We see no merit in the instant applications and maintain the same
reasons which are contained in the order dated January 4, 2017.
5. The fear of the applicant that he would be prejudiced in other
proceedings is misfounded because we have not rejected the prayer made on
merits. We have not dealt with the merits of the issues raised. We have only
held that the view taken by this Court on September 24, 1991 is correct that
these questions are highly disputed questions of fact and remedy has to be at
a forum where evidence can be led. Surely, if the applicant approaches a
forum where evidence can be led he would be entitled to lead evidence and
based thereon a final decision.
PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J
YOGESH KHANNA, J
JANUARY 25, 2017
VLD
W.P.(C) 699/1990 Page 2 of 2

921
$~1
+ W.P.(C) 699/1990
versus

Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA PALLI
ORDER
% 04.09.2018
C.M. No. 27986/2018 (by the applicant, Mr. S.S. Oberoi)
1. This is the second application filed by the applicant praying inter alia
for initiating proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C.
2. Prior hereto, the petitioner had filed a similar application under
Section 340 Cr.P.C. that was listed before the Predecessor Bench and
dismissed vide order dated 04.1.2017, reproduced below:-
“CM Nos.15610-11/2016, 15647-48/2016 &
Crl.M.A.No.6982/2016
1. The applicant claims right under an un-probated will
purportedly executed in his favour by Sher Singh. On
strength thereof, applicant desires proceedings to be
initiated under Section 340 Cr.P.C. against officers of DDA.
2. The writ petition filed by Sher Singh was dismissed on
September 24, 1991 by a Division Bench of this Court noting
W.P.(C) 699/1990 Page 1 of 4
922
that highly disputed questions of fact arise for consideration

and for which the writ petition is not a remedy. Sher Singh
was advised to file a suit.
3. After 25 years above captioned applications have been
filed.
4. Documents have been filed on strength whereof it is
sought to be pleaded that officers of DDA misled the Court
on facts resulting in the order dated September 24, 1991
being passed.
6. In the writ petition, Sher Singh claimed to be a registrant
with DDA under the 5th Self Financing Scheme. He claimed
that in a draw of lots held on March 29, 1989 Flat No.C-
1/1489, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi was allotted to him. He
claimed possession of the flat to be handed over to him.
7. In the reply filed by DDA stand taken was that Sher
Singh had executed a power of attorney on September 12,
1989 in favour of one Sh.H.L.Dhawan to whom possession
of the flat allotted to Sher Singh was handed over.
8. In the rejoinder, Sher Singh questioned the execution of
the said power of attorney.
9. Sh.H.L.Dhawan having died, his wife sent a letter to this
Court enclosing therewith receipts executed by Sher Singh
evincing transfer of interest by Sher Singh in favour of
H.L.Dhawan. She never sought any formal intervention. On
October 22, 1999 the Division Bench noted receipt of the
documents on the administrative side and directed that the
same should be handed over to the petitioner who could file
a response to the said documents.
10. On February 12, 1991 Commissioner Housing
DDA filed an affidavit informing the Court that a suit for
declaration and consequential relief was filed by one South
Delhi Estate Agents Associations.
11. Order dated January 17, 1991 records the
direction to DDA to produce the record. 12. Proceedings
lingered on till when the writ petition was dismissed on
September 24, 1991.
W.P.(C) 699/1990 Page 2 of 4

923
13. The same disputed questions of fact would arise

for consideration in Crl.M.A.No.6982/2016.
14. In view of the fact that nobody’s rights were
adjudicated when the writ petition was dismissed and the
issue was left open to be decided at a trial we find no
reasons to initiate proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C.
after 25 years of the writ petition being dismissed.
15. All above captioned applications are accordingly
dismissed.
16. No costs.”
3. We have enquired from the applicant as to whether he had challenged

the order dated 04.1.2017, to which the answer is in the negative. Instead, he
draws our attention to the order dated 25.01.2017, whereby three
miscellaneous applications filed by him were dismissed by the Division
Bench with the following observations:
“Crl.M.A.No.1345/2017 & CM Nos.------/2017, ------/2017, ------/2017
1. The applicant has filed three civil miscellaneous applications

which have been summoned from the registry. Notwithstanding the
objections raised the three applications are taken on record with a
direction to the registry to number the applications.
2. The applicant is not the relative of the petitioner Sher Singh. He
litigates concerning Flat No.C-1/1489, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi,
registrant thereof was Sher Singh. The applicant claims an interest in
the flat in question on the basis of a Will executed by Sher Singh and it
is the case of the applicant that the Will has been proved. The
applicant has been asked whether he has a document showing probate
of the Will being granted. He states that he does not have any.
3. We had given reasons in our order dated January 4, 2017 as to
why various applications and Crl.M.A.No.6982/2016 filed by the
applicant were being dismissed.
4. We see no merit in the instant applications and maintain the same
reasons which are contained in the order dated January 4, 2017.
5. The fear of the applicant that he would be prejudiced in other
proceedings is misfounded because we have not rejected the prayer
made on merits. We have not dealt with the merits of the issues raised.
We have only held that the view taken by this Court on September 24,
W.P.(C) 699/1990 Page 3 of 4
924
1991 is correct that these questions are highly disputed questions of

fact and remedy has to be at a forum where evidence can be led.
Surely, if the applicant approaches a forum where evidence can be led
he would be entitled to lead evidence and based thereon a final
decision.”
4. The applicant has yet again filed the present application invoking the
provisions of Section 340 Cr.P.C. in a matter dismissed as long back as on
24.04.1991 on the ground that highly disputed questions of fact have been
raised that cannot be adjudicated by invoking judicial review.
5. We are refraining from imposing costs on the applicant, though we
were inclined to do so for his having filed such a misconceived application,
when the petition itself was decided as long back as 25 years ago and no
steps have been taken by him to assail the orders dated 04.01.2017 and
25.01.2017.
6. The application is dismissed as being barred by res judicata.
HIMA KOHLI, J
REKHA PALLI, J
SEPTEMBER 04, 2018
ap/na
W.P.(C) 699/1990 Page 4 of 4

925
$~57
+ W.P.(C) 699/1990
versus
THE VICE CHAIRMAN, DELHI

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS ..... Respondents
Through: None.
CORAM:
JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
ORDER
% 14.11.2018
CM APPL. 47182/2018
This application, in effect, seeks review of the order dated
4th September 2018 passed by the Bench of Justice Hima Kohli and Justice
Rekha Palli. Therefore, it be placed before the same Bench on
30th November 2018, subject to the orders of the Hon’ble Chief Justice.
S. MURALIDHAR, J.
SANJEEV NARULA, J.
NOVEMBER 14, 2018/sapna
926
$~2 (Special Bench)
+ W.P.(C) 699/1990
versus

Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA PALLI
ORDER
% 30.11.2018
CRL. M.A 47182/2018 (By the applicant, Mr. S.S. Oberoi)
1. The present application has been placed before this Bench in terms of
the order dated 14.11.2018, passed by the Roster Bench wherein, it has been
observed that the captioned application, in fact, seeks review of the order
dated 04.09.2018, passed by this Court and the same be placed before this
Bench, subject to the orders of Hon’ble the Chief Justice.
2. The prayer made in the present application is to the effect that
substantial question of law of review has been raised in
Crl.M.A.No.27986/2018 which was dismissed in limine on 04.09.2018.
Further, the applicant seeks condonation of delay of 50-60 days from the
date of passing of the order dated 04.09.2018 up to the date of filing the
present review petition.
W.P.(C) 699/1990 page 1 of 3
927
3. We may also note that in para 6 of the present application, the

applicant has stated that a Review Bench was constituted for hearing
Crl.M.A. 27986/2018, which ought to have been decided by a Division
Bench comprising of Justice Pradeep Nandrajog and Justice Yogesh
Khanna, who had passed an earlier order dated 04.01.2017, dismissing
Crl.M.A. No. 6982/2016 filed by the applicant for initiation of proceedings
u/S 340 Cr. P.C. against officers of the DDA. Further, the applicant has
averred in the same para that at least one of the members of the Bench that
had passed the order dated 04.01.2017, i.e., Justice Yogesh Khanna who is
still available ought to have been a part of the Bench before whom Crl.M.A.
No. 6982/2016 was listed.
4. It is noteworthy that Crl.M.A. No. 27986/2018 was not moved as an
application for seeking review of the earlier order dated 04.01.2017 passed
in Crl.M.A.No.6982/2016 for the Registry to have treated the same as
review application and place it before the appropriate Bench of which one of
the members would have been Justice Yogesh Khanna. The prayer made in
the said application was as follows:
“(i) Decide, jus cogens and erga omnes, the substantial
questions of law raised in this application regarding as to
which of the two decisions of this Hon’ble Court referred
to above, both dated 04.01.17, lays down the correct law
on dismissal in limine.
(ii) grant exemption from filing certified and/or

original documents and typed copies of annexures at this
stage.
(iii) grant any other relief as may be fair and just in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.”
W.P.(C) 699/1990 page 2 of 3
928
5. This being the position, Crl.M.A. No. 27986/2018 filed by the

applicant and dismissed on 04.09.2018 cannot be permitted to be treated as
an application for seeking review of the earlier order dated 04.01.2017,
passed in Crl.M.A. No. 6982/2016.
6. The present application is accordingly dismissed as not maintainable.
HIMA KOHLI, J
REKHA PALLI, J
NOVEMBER 30, 2018
savita/mamta
W.P.(C) 699/1990 page 3 of 3

929
$~14
+ W.P.(C) 699/1990
Through Mr. Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi,
Applicant in person
versus
Through None
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SIDDHARTH MRIDUL
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL
ORDER
% 19.12.2018
CM. APPL. No.53626/2018
At request of Col. Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi, applicant in
person, in order to enable him to serve the advance copies of the
present application on the non-applicants/respondents, the hearing of
the application is adjourned.
List on 11.01.2019.
SIDDHARTH MRIDUL, J
SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL, J

DECEMBER 19, 2018
as
930
$~1
+ W.P.(C) 699/1990
Through: Ms.Surushi Mittal, Adv
versus

Through: Mr.Dhanesh Relan, SC for DDA with
Mr.Rajeev Jha and Ms.Komal Sorout,
Advs
Mr.Sushil Kumar Pandey and
Ms.Neha Sharma, Advs for UOI
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SIDDHARTH MRIDUL
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL
ORDER
% 01.02.2019
CM No. 53626/2018
Mr.Dhanesh Relan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the DDA,
invites our attention to an order dated 04.01.2017, whereby an earlier
application instituted on behalf of the present applicant seeing similar reliefs
was dismissed by this court. In this behalf, it would be profitable to extract
the order dated 04.01.2017 in extenso: -
“CM No.15646/2016
Allowed.
CM Nos. 15610-11/2016, 15647-48/2016 & Crl.M.A.No.
6982/2016
1. The applicant claims right under an un-probated will
purportedly executed in his favour by Sher Singh. On strength
thereof, applicant desires proceedings to be initiated under
Section 340 Cr.P.C. against officers of DDA.
931
2. The writ petition filed by Sher Singh was dismissed on

September 24, 1991 by a Division Bench of this Court noting that
highly disputed questions of fact arise for consideration and for
which the writ petition is not a remedy. Sher Singh was advised
to file a suit.
3. After 25 years above captioned applications have been filed.
4. Documents have been filed on strength whereof it is sought to
be pleaded that officers of DDA misled the Court on facts
resulting in the order dated September 24, 1991 being passed.
6. In the writ petition, Sher Singh claimed to be a registrant with
DDA under the 5th Self Financing Scheme. He claimed that in a
draw of lots held on March 29, 1989 Flat No.C-1/1489, Vasant
Kunj, New Delhi was allotted to him. He claimed possession of
the flat to be handed over to him.
7. In the reply filed by DDA stand taken was that Sher Singh had
executed a power of attorney on September 12, 1989 in favour of
one Sh.H.L.Dhawan to whom possession of the flat allotted to
Sher Singh was handed over.
8. In the rejoinder, Sher Singh questioned the execution of the
said power of attorney.
9. Sh.H.L.Dhawan having died, his wife sent a letter to this Court
enclosing therewith receipts executed by Sher Singh evincing
transfer of interest by Sher Singh in favour of H.L.Dhawan. She
never sought any formal intervention. On October 22, 1999 the
Division Bench noted receipt of the documents on the
administrative side and directed that the same should be handed
over to the petitioner who could file a response to the said
documents.
10. On February 12, 1991 Commissioner Housing DDA filed an
affidavit informing the Court that a suit for declaration and
consequential relief was filed by one South Delhi Estate Agents
Associations.
11. Order dated January 17, 1991 records the direction to DDA
to produce the record.
932
12. Proceedings lingered on till when the writ petition was

dismissed on September 24, 1991.
13. The same disputed questions of fact would arise for
consideration in Crl.M.A.No.6982/2016.
14. In view of the fact that nobody’s rights were adjudicated
when the writ petition was dismissed and the issue was left open
to be decided at a trial we find no reasons to initiate proceedings
under Section 340 Cr.P.C. after 25 years of the writ petition
being dismissed.
15. All above captioned applications are accordingly dismissed.
16. No costs.”
A perusal of the averments made in the present application clearly

reveal that the factum of the present applicant having filed a similar
application on an earlier occasion is conspicuous by its absence.
A perusal of another order dated 30.11.2018, passed by a Division
Bench of this Court (CRL.M.A. 47182/2018 in W.P.(C) 699/1990) further
reflects that, instead of filing an application seeking review of the earlier
order dated 04.01.2017, referred to hereinabove, the applicant filed an
application praying as follows:-
“(i) Decide, jus cogens and erga omnes, the substantial
questions of law raised in this application regarding as to
which of the two decisions of this Hon’ble Court referred to
above, both dated 04.01.2017, lays down the correct law on
dismissal in limine.
(ii) grant exemption from filing certified and/or original

documents and typed copies of annexures at this stage.
(iii) grant any other relief as may be fair and just in the peculiar
facts and circumstances of this case.”
933
Vide the said order dated 30.11.2018, that application also came to be
dismissed by this Court.
Admittedly, the factum of the said order dated 30.11.2018, passed by
this Court, as well as, the application on which it was rendered has not been
brought to the notice of this Court in the present application.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the present application is an
abuse of the process of this Court and the act of omission of the applicant is
tantamount to suggestio veri, suppressio falsi.
We are, therefore, of the considered view that the present application
is devoid of any merit. The same is accordingly dismissed with costs of
Rs.20,000/- to be deposited with the Delhi High Court Legal Services
Authority.
SIDDHARTH MRIDUL, J
SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL, J

FEBRUARY 01, 2019
SU
W.P.(C) 699/1990 Page 4 of 4

934
CC No. 15958-16 & 27631-16
13.03.2019
Present: Complainant/Attorney of the wife in person.
It is submitted by the complainant that the controversy
involved in this matter was before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi
for July 2019 and now he has also moved the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India as well in this matter. Complainant further submits
that matter may be adjourned sine die.
Heard. Record perused.
File be sine-die with direction to be revived as and when
complaint files an application to revive the matters.
File be consigned to Record Room.
(Ambika Singh)
MM-02/PHC, New Delhi
13.03.2019
OLD NUMBER 62 OF 2010 AND 52 OF 1997 SHER SINGH V. CHAND BHATNAGAR AND
11/22/2020 Case Status : Search by Case Number
YOGESH DHAWAN
935
Case Details
Case Status
First Hearing Date : 03rd June 2014
Decision Date : 13th March 2019
Nature of Disposal : Uncontested--SINE-DIE
Court Number and Judge : 14-Metropolitan Magistrate

1) SHER SINGH

1) CHAND BHATNAGAR
Sub Matters
Case Number : /47295/2016
FIR Details
Police Station : Vasant Kunj North
FIR Number :
Year :0
27631/2016 19-08-2014 Prosecution Evidence
27631/2016 10-09-2014 Prosecution Evidence
27631/2016 25-09-2014 For Bail
27631/2016 10-02-2015 Misc./ Appearance
27631/2016 20-07-2015 Misc./ Appearance
27631/2016 12-10-2015 Misc./ Appearance
27631/2016 Metropolitan Magistrate 17-12-2015 Misc./ Appearance
27631/2016 Metropolitan Magistrate 15-09-2016 Misc. Arguments
27631/2016 14-11-2017 Misc. Arguments
27631/2016 Metropolitan Magistrate 02-05-2018 Misc./ Arguments
27631/2016 Metropolitan Magistrate 29-05-2018 Pre-Summoning Evidence
27631/2016 Metropolitan Magistrate Disposed
27631/2016 Metropolitan Magistrate 16-10-2018 16-11-2018 Restored
Orders
1 21-07-2016
2 15-09-2016
3 06-10-2016
4 06-01-2017
5 08-03-2017
6 20-05-2017
7 17-10-2017
8 06-02-2018
9 02-05-2018
https://services.ecourts.gov.in/ecourtindia_v4_bilingual/cases/case_no.php?state=D&state_cd=26&dist_cd=7# 1/1
936

Case Details
Case Status
First Hearing Date : 14th November 2018
Decision Date : 13th March 2019
Nature of Disposal : Uncontested--SINE-DIE

1) LT COL RETD SARVADAMAN SINGH
Advocate- ADV

1) CHAND BHATNAGAR AND ORS
Acts
Cr. P. C. 156(3)
FIR Details
FIR Number :
Year :0
Orders
1 13-03-2019
937
938
939
Case Details
Case Type : Ct Cases - COMPLAINT CASES 940
Case Status
First Hearing Date : 03rd July 2019
Decision Date : 03rd July 2019
Nature of Disposal : Uncontested--DISMISSED

1) LT COL SAVADAMAN SINGH OBEROI
Advocate- ADV.

1) CHAND BHATNAGAR
Acts
Protection of Child from Sexual Offence Act-2012 340
FIR Details
FIR Number :
Year :0

Order not uploaded by concerned court

941

Case Details
Case Status
First Hearing Date : 10th July 2019
Decision Date : 10th July 2019
Nature of Disposal : Uncontested--DISMISSED

1) LT COL SARVADAMAN SINGH OBROI
Advocate- adv.

1) CHAND BHATNAGAR AND ORS
Acts
Cr. P. C. 195
FIR Details
FIR Number :
Year :0

Order not uploaded by concerned court

942
ANNEXURE P-23(COLLY)/ 35 /1
CA No.44/19
Lt.Col. Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi (Retd)
vs
Chand Bhatnagar & Ors.
16.07.2019
Fresh appeal u/s 341 r/w Sec. 342 & 345 Cr.PC received by
way of allocation. It be checked and registered.
Present: Sh. Irfan Ahmed, Ld. Additional PP for the State.
Appellant in person.
Heard and perused.

Appellant has been questioned as to the maintainability of the
present appeal especially in the light of the prayers made by him in the appeal.
Strong objections are also taken to the averments made in the
appeal to the extent of questioning the dignity and authority of the higher courts.
Appellant has submitted that he shall file an appropriate
application for taking off from the record those averments. It is also submitted that
it was without any intention and since he is not represented by any counsel, may
be because of his limited knowledge of the law that he had made the assertions
in the present appeal.
During the course of hearing, appellant has also submitted that he
wants to restrict the present appeal to the imposition of costs upon him by the Ld.
Magistrate vide the impugned order date 10.07.2019. Appellant has sought time
to take necessary steps and to also avail legal aid since he is a senior citizen
aged about 70 years. Appellant may approach the Secretary DLSA for legal aid.
At the request of appellant, matter is adjourned for consideration
and for further orders for 25.07.2019.
(Satish Kumar Arora)

ASJ-02 (FTC)
NDD/PHC/New Delhi
16.07.2019
943
Case no. 136/19

CA no. 44/19
Lt Col. Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi vs. Chand Bhatnagar & Anr.
25.07.2019
Present: Sh. Irfan Ahmed, Ld. Addl. PP for the State.

Appellant seeks adjournment as he is still in the process of

availing Legal Aid. One opportunity given.
Be put up for consideration for 03. 08.2019.

ASJ-02 (FTC)
NDD/PHC/New Delhi
25.07.2019
944
Case no. 136/19
CA no. 44/19
Lt Col. Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi vs. Chand Bhatnagar & Anr.
30.07.2019
Present: Sh. Irfan Ahmed, Ld. Addl. PP for the State.

File has been put up today with an application u/s 438 Cr.PC
preferred by the applicant before the Ld. District & Sessions Judge, New
Delhi and having been assigned to this Court by the Ld. District Judge vide
order of today's date.
Appellant / ap+plicant has submitted that he is yet not
represented by any advocate from legal aid and that he be provided with
legal assistance. Considering his submissions and having perused the
record, ld. counsel Sh Akram Khan who is present in the court today
appearing in State Vs. Mohd. Asif & Ors, is assigned to appear and defend
the case of the appellant at the expense of the State.
Heard on the application. Record perused.
Being apprehensive of his arrest in the complaint preferred by
him before the Ld. Magistrate, that the applicant / appellant has preferred
the present application. The copy of the warrant of arrest and of the warrant
of attachment as received by the applicant through whatsapp, one from his
son and the other from the police constable, has been annexed with the
application. The warrants so issued appears to be in respect of the
impugned order dated 10.07.2019 vide which the Ld. MM-02 while
dismissing the application u/s 340 Cr.PC preferred by the appellant herein,
had imposed a costs of Rs. 25,000/- to be paid by the applicant / appellant
within two days of the said order in the Army Welfare Fund.
1/2
945
The appellant now being ably assisted by the Ld. Amicus

Curiae, has submitted that he may be given the liberty to approach the ld
trial court seeking waiver of costs and cancellation of warrants as whatever
has transpired before the ld trial court on the day when the impugned order
came to be passed, was unintentional and that the applicant/ appellant had
never intended to either overawe or to intimidate the ld trial court and that
he has utmost regard and respect for the Courts in general and the ld trial
court in particular. It is also submitted that in his zeal to bring to the notice
of the Court of the corrupt practices prevalent in the DDA, that he had
preferred an application u/s 340 r/w Sec. 195 Cr.PC. It is further submitted
that the applicant now wishes to take his cause before the court of
competent jurisdiction and that his present appeal and the application may
be dismissed as withdrawn.
Keeping in view the above submissions and as the appeal of
the appellant / applicant is still at the stage of consideration, he is permitted
to withdraw the same as well as the application u/s 438 Cr.PC.
Statement of the appellant has been recorded separately on
oath.
The present appeal and the application is dismissed as
withdrawn accordingly with liberty as prayed.
Considering the submissions made by the appellant, the ld
trial court may take a sympathetic view against him in respect of his
application, stated to be preferred today itself in the post lunch
session,seeking waiver of costs and cancellation of warrant.
Date earlier fixed i.e. 03.08.2018 stands cancelled.
Appeal file with the application be consigned to Record Room.
Copy of this order be given dasti to the appellant, as prayed.

ASJ-02 (FTC)
NDD/PHC/New Delhi
2/2 30.07.2019
District and Sessions Judge,New Delhi, PHC
Case Details
Case Type : CA - CRIMINAL APPEAL 946
Case Status
First Hearing Date : 16th July 2019
Decision Date : 30th July 2019
Nature of Disposal : Uncontested--DISMISSED AS WITHDRAWN
Court Number and Judge : 84-Additional Sessions Judge

1) LT COL SARVADAMAN SINGH OBEROI
Advocate- INPERSON

1) CHAND BHATNAGAR AND ANR
Acts
Cr. P. C. 397
136/2019 Additional Sessions Judge 25-07-2019 Misc./ Appearance
136/2019 Additional Sessions Judge 30-07-2019 Misc./ Appearance
136/2019 Additional Sessions Judge Disposed
Orders
1 16-07-2019
2 25-07-2019
3 30-07-2019
947
$~33
+ CRL.M.C. 3915/2019
LTCOL (VETERAN) SARVADAMAN SINGH OBEROI
.....Petitioner
Through: Nemo.
Versus
STATE OF DELHI NCT .....Respondent

Through: Mr. Izhar Ahmad, Additional
Public Prosecutor for State
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR
ORDER
% 08.08.2019
Even on the second call, none appears on behalf of petitioner.
In the interest of justice, adverse orders are deferred for today.
List on 5th November, 2019.
SUNIL GAUR, J
AUGUST 08, 2019
p’ma
Later on, petitioner appeared in person and submits that he has no

means to obtain legal assistance. He prays for appointment of an Amicus
Curiae to represent his case. Mr. B. Badrinath, Advocate on the panel of
Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee (DHCLSC), present in the
Court, is called upon to assist petitioner in this case.
SUNIL GAUR, J
AUGUST 08, 2019
p’ma
948
$~33
+ W.P.(CRL) 588/2013
LT.COL.RETD. SARVADAMAN SINGH OBEROI ... Petitioner
Through: Nemo.
Versus
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI THR. ITS REGISTRAR

GENERAL & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Ms. Sandhya Kapoor, Deputy
Registrar, RKD Branch, Delhi
High Court
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BRIJESH SETHI
ORDER
% 21.01.2020
None has appeared for petitioner even on the second call.

List on 8th May, 2020.
BRIJESH SETHI, J
JANUARY 21, 2020
r
At this stage, Mr. Jaideep Singh Sandhu, Advocate has entered

appearance on behalf of petitioner and he submits that this petition is to
be heard with Crl.M.C. No. 3915/2019 which is coming up for hearing
W.P.(CRL) 588/2013 1
949
on 24th January, 2020 before the Bench of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Suresh
Kait.
In view of aforesaid, subject to and after obtaining orders from
Hon'ble the Chief Justice, list this petition on 24th January, 2020 before
the Bench hearing Crl.M.C. No. 3915/2019. The date of 8th May, 2020
fixed in this petition stands cancelled.
BRIJESH SETHI, J
JANUARY 21, 2020
r
W.P.(CRL) 588/2013 2
950
$~45/48
+ W.P.(CRL) 588/2013 & CRL.M.A. 17171/2015, CRL.M.A.
1650/2020, CRL.M.A. 1649/2020
LT.COL.RETD. SARVADAMAN SINGH OBEROI..... Petitioner

Through Mr. Jaideep Singh Sandhu, Adv.
versus

ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through Mr. Daanish Ahmed Syed for Mr.
Syed Ahmed Saud, Adv. for R-1
Mr. Naveen Kumar Raheja, ASC,
Ms. Meenakshi Jha, Advs. DDA
Ms. Sandhya Kapoor, DR/RKD/DHC
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT
ORDER
% 24.01.2020
Counsel for the petitioner submits that he has been recently engaged
and seeks time to file Vakalatnama and assist the Court on the next date of
hearing.
Let needful be done during the course of the day.
Renotify on 20.03.2020.
SURESH KUMAR KAIT, J

JANUARY 24, 2020
ms
951
$~12
+ CRL.M.C. 3915/2019
LTCOL (VETERAN) SARVADAMAN
Through Mr. B. Badrinath, Adv. (Amicus)
versus
STATE OF DELHI NCT ..... Respondent

Through Mr. Izhar Ahmed, APP for State
Mr. Naveen Kumar Raheja, ASC,
Ms. Meenakshi Jha, Advs. DDA
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT
ORDER
% 24.01.2020
Renotify on 20.03.2020 along with W.P. (Crl.)588/2013.
SURESH KUMAR KAIT, J

JANUARY 24, 2020
ms
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
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978
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981
982
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984
ANNEXURE P-23(COLLY)/ 47/ 1
$~19
+ W.P.(CRL) 588/2013 AND CRL.M.A. 17171/2015
LT.COL.RETD. SARVADAMAN SINGH OBEROI..... Petitioner

Through Petitioner in person.
versus
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI THR. ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL

& ORS. ..... Respondents
Through Mr. S.A. Saud, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A. K. CHAWLA
ORDER
% 29.07.2019
Vide order passed today Tr.P. 47/2015 stands disposed of. Now,
only W.P.(CRL) 588/2013 survives.
As prayed by the petitioner appearing in person, list on 21.11.2019.
A. K. CHAWLA, J
JULY 29, 2019

rc
985
ANNEXURE P-23(COLLY)/ 47/ 2

986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
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1001
EXTRACT OF PAGES 258-259 ANNEXURE W-10(COLLY)/ VOLUME II 1002
CRL. M.C. 3915/2019 LT COL (VETERAN) SARVADAMAN SINGH OBEROI
V. STATE OF DELHI NCT NDOH: 09.02.2021 (H'BLE DELHI HIGH COURT)
1003
1004
MANU/OR/0040/1968
Equivalent Citation: AIR1968Ori144, 34(1968)C LT627
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA

Criminal Revn. No. 178 of 1966
Appellants: Paramananda Mohapatra
Vs.
Respondent: The State
S.K. Ray, J.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: R.N. Misra and R.C. Patnaik, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: Standing Counsel
ORDER
S.K. Ray, J.
1 . The petitioner has been convicted under Sections 193 and 199. I P. C.. and
sentenced to undergo Rule 1 for six months on each count and to pay a fine of Rs.
250 on each count, both the sentences to run concurrently In default of payment of
fine the petitioner is to undergo Rule 1 for three months on each count.
2 . The petitioner was tried under the aforesaid sections in the Court of the Sub-
divisional Magistrate. Sadar. Cuttack, in case No 751-C-2/720 T of 1961. cognizance
having been taken on those offences on the basis of a complaint petition filed by the
High Court of Orissa, Being convicted and sentenced as aforesaid by the S. D. M.,
Cut-tack, the petitioner filed an appeal (Cr. Appeal No. 2/C of 1964) which was
dismissed by Sri U. N. Misra, Additional Sessions Judge, Cuttack, by his judgment
dated 25-2-66 passed in the said appeal.
3. The facts leading to the prosecution of the petitioner are shortly these:
The petitioner was the outgoing Sarpanch of Bolagarh Gram Panchayat in
Khurda Sub-division. He filed an application under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, challenging the action of the Election Officer, Bolagarh,
in proceeding with the election of the new Sarpanch and Naib Sarpanch for
the aforesaid Grama Panchayat, notwithstanding the decision of the Sub-
divisional Magistrate. Judicial. Khurda, declaring the election of the members
of the Grama Panchayat to be void under Rule 24 of the Grama Panchayat
Rules and directing fresh elections.
The writ 'application which was filed on 14-12-60 was registered as O. J. C.
277/60. This application was moved by Sri D. Sahu, . Advocate, and it was
submitted that the Election Officer who was the Sub-divisional Officer of
Khurda in disregard of the order of the S D M (Judicial). Khurda declaring the
election of the members to the Grama Panchayat to be void, proceeded with

1005
the election of the Sarpanch and the Naib Sarpanch. To substantiate this
argument, with the permission of this Court, a new paragraph (para 12) was
added to the application under Article 226 This paragraph runs as follows:
"That the petitioner went with Sri G. S. Patnaik, pleader and met the
S.D.O.. Khurda, and showed him the order of the S. D. M. Khurda.
but the S.D.O.. remarked that it is an illegal order. After the said
illegal election of the opposite parties 2 and 3 as Sarpanch and Naib
Sarpanch, the petitioner preferred a petition and engaged two
lawyers. Sri G. S. Patnaik, Pleader and Sri Jadumani Patnaik,
Mukhtar, and offered the petition to the Sub-divisional Officer,
Khurda, on 12-12-60 through Sri G. S. Patnaik. Pleader, but the
S.D.O. did not accept the petition. The petition is filed herewith as
annexure 2 along with the Vakalatnama signed by the lawyers."
The facts contained therein were proved by an affidavit sworn to by
Parmananda Moha-patra the petitioner himself on oath before the Oaths
Commissioner of this Court on 15-12-60 or which date the same was filed in
Court Thereupon the S.D.O.. Khurda was called upon to make his statement
in regard to the allegations touching him The S.D.O Khurda Sri A K Roy.
submitted his explanation denying the truth of the averments that he told Sri
G S Patnaik. pleader of the petitioner. Paramananda that the order of the
S.D.M. was illegal when it was shown to him and that he refused to receive
any petition, which was offered to him on 12-12-60 by the petitioner's
lawyer. In corroboration of his written explanation he enclosed therewith a
letter sent to him by Sri G. S. Patnaik, dated 21-12-60. After receipt of this
explanation, the O.J.C. was not pressed by the petitioner's counsel for
reasons disclosed in the order which was passed following the motion on 22-
12-60. That order, which is Ext. 12 in this case, runs thus:
"Mr. D Sahu says that this O.J.C. is not pressed and that the order of
the S.D.M. is now being implemented. It is accordingly dismissed for
non-prosecution. The interim stay order dated 15-12-60 is vacated."
"In view, of the explanation of the S.D.O., Khurda, which is
supported by a copy of the letter of Sri G. S. Patnaik, pleader,
Khurda, let a separate proceeding be drawn up against Paramananda
Mahapatra for having intentionally made a false statement in
paragraph 12 of his petition supported by an affidavit on 15-12-60.
He should show cause why he may not be prosecuted for swearing a
false affidavit. Ask the S.D.O. to send the original letter sent to him
by Mr. G S. Patnaik, pleader."
This order was signed by both the learned Judges constituting the Division
Bench who were the then Chief Justice (Narasimham, C. J.) and Barman, J.
(as he then was) before whom the O. J. C. proceeding was pending and was
being dealt with. In pursuance of that order a separate proceeding under
Section 476. Cr. P C. was started which was numbered as Original Cr. Misc.
2/61. This proceeding was in the nature of an enquiry under Section 476. Cr.
P. C. and was dealt with by the then Chief Justice alone, and by his order
dated 14-1-61 complaint was directed to be sent to the S. D. M., Judicial,
Cuttack, for prosecution of the petitioner Paramananda for offences under
Sections 199 and 193, Indian Penal Code, for having made false statements

1006
in the affidavit in para 12 of the O.J.C. petition dated 12-12-60.

4. It appears from Exts. 14, 15 and 16 that the then Chief Justice took keen interest
in the careful drafting of the complaint petition and putting the Deputy Registrar in
charge of the case in general for purposes of piloting its prosecution, himself took
great care in giving written instructions as to the number and class of witnesses to be
examined and the documents to be proved in support of the prosecution case. The
Deputy Registrar also was directed to keep watch over the progress of the case and
to keep the Chief Justice continuously informed about it.
These exhibits which had no direct relevancy to the proof of the case were introduced
into prosecution evidence and. as complained by the counsel for the petitioner,
purposefully to make him aware of the intense interest of the Chief Justice in the
prosecution, and of his direct association with its conduct, and that must have
affected, it is argued the impartial attitude of the Magistrate. The alleged effect of it,
on the mind of the Magistrate may or may not be true, but it cannot be said that the
apprehension of the accused in that regard was baseless The gravamen of the charge
was that the two averments of fact made in the added paragraph of the writ petition
were false. One was as follows:
"Paramananda Mohapatra accompanied by his pleader Sri G. S. Patnaik met
the S.D.O. on 11th December, 1960, and showed him the order of the S.D.M.
(Judicial), and thereupon the S.D.O. remarked that it was an illegal order."
This was the subject matter of the first charge and the second statement which was
the subject matter of the second charge was as follows
"That Paramananda Mohapatra again went to the S.D.O. with his Mukthar on
12th of December, 1960 and offered him a petition challenging the election
of the Sarpanch and the Naib Sarpanch to the Bol-garh Grams Panchayat and
the S.D.O. refused to accept the petition."
5. The defence was firstly that the institution of the prosecution is bad due to non-
compliance of the mandatory requirements of Section 479A, Cr. P. C. which alone
applies to the exclusion of Section 476, Cr. P. C. and secondly, that the statements in
the impugned affidavit being true, the charge of swearing false affidavits intentionally
must fail.
6. The prosecution examined 7 witnesses including the two lawyers of the petitioner
and the S. D. O. who are respectively P. Ws. 4, 5, and 6. The defence examined one
witness who is Sri Latifur Rahman, Advocate of Puri Bar. It is said that on the basis of
the testimony of P. Ws. 4, 5 and 6 and of D. W. 1, the allegations in the charges have
been proved to be true.
7. The first question raised in this case is whether Section 476, Cr. P. C. was rightly
invoked by the High Court, due to the bar contained in sub-section (6) of Section
479A of the Code Sub-section (6) runs as follows:
"479A (6). No proceeding shall be taken under Sections 476 to 479 inclusive
for the prosecution of a person for giving or fabricating false evidence, if in
respect of such a person proceedings may be taken under this section."
The point to decide, accordingly, is whether appropriate proceedings could be
adopted under Section 479A against the petitioner, for if that could be taken then the

1007
action taken under Section 476 would be illegal.

8 . There is no dispute that if the factual allegations made in the affidavit of the
petitioner filed by way of amendment of the writ petition are untrue, that would
amount to intentionally fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in the
writ proceedings and thereby the offences under Sections 191 and 199, I.P.C., would
be clearly made out. One prerequisite for application of Section 479A, is that those
offences must have been committed by a person appearing before a civil, criminal or
revenue court as a witness. In such cases the provisions of Section 479A are
attracted thereby excluding the operation of Section 476 It has been laid down in Dr.
B. K. Pal Chaudhury v. State of Assam MANU/SC/0036/1959 that the court intending
to make a complaint, has to record a finding that in its opinion a person appearing as
a witness has intentionally given false evidence and that for the eradication of the
evils of perjury and in the interests of justice, it is expedient that such witness should
be prosecuted. Thus, the person sought to be complained against must be a witness
before the Court which makes the complaint. It has also been held in
MANU/SC/0208/1963, Babulal v. State of Uttar Pradesh that sub-section (1) of
Section 479A has a limited operation, it applies only to the prosecution of a witness
appearing before the Court who has intentionally given false evidence, or has
intentionally fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used, in any stage of
the judicial proceeding. The sub-section (meaning sub-section (1) > may, therefore,
be resorted to only if offences covered by Sections 191, 192 and Section 193, I.P.C.
and allied offences under Sections 194, 195 and 199 and the like are committed by a
witness appearing before a Court in course of judicial proceeding pending before it.
The phraseology used in Section 479A is plain and unambiguous. It excludes the
jurisdiction of the Court to proceed under Sections 476 to 479, in respect of offences
specified in Section 195(1)(b) and (c) only where they are alleged to have been
committed by a person appearing before the Court as a witness.
Mr. Justice Hidayatullah (as he then was) while delivering the judgment in the case of
Baban Singh v. Jagdish Singh, MANU/SC/0075/1966has also said the same thing in
the following terms:
"In respect of such offences (under Sections 192 and 193) when committed
by a witness, action under Section 479-A alone can be taken".
9 . Since the petitioner was not a witness in any proceeding relating to the writ
application before the High Court, Section 479A, Cr. P C. would not be attracted.
Accordingly, the contention that this is a case where Section 479A applies, must fail.
It necessarily follows from the above that the proceedings under Section 476 were
rightly adopted by the High Court before lodging the complaint. Even then, two
objections arise to the legality of that proceeding. The first is that the necessary
findings required to be recorded under Section 476. Cr. P, C. which alone empowers
the Court concerned to lodge a complaint and the Magistrate to take cognizance of
the offence, are wanting in the present case. The order in the original Cr. Misc. Case
2/61 does not disclose any such finding. It is incumbent upon the Court which
embarks upon an enquiry under Section 476 to record findings that an offence
referred to in Section 195(1)(b) or (c) of the Cr. P C appears to have been committed
in or in relation to a proceeding in that court and that it is expedient in the interests
of justice that an enquiry should be made into such alleged offences. The learned
Chief Justice while directing lodging of complaint petition held as follows:
"As these statements have been sworn on affidavit and as they are

1008
contradicted by the statement of the Sub-divisional Officer (who has also

filed an affidavit in this Court) and by the statement of the Mukhtar and the
Pleader concerned, I think there are sufficient grounds to initiate the
prosecution of the opposite party Paramananda Mahapatia for an offence
under Section 199/193, I.P.C. Serious allegations against a public officer, of
floutine the orders passed by a competent judicial authority, viz., the Sub-
divisional Magistrate (Judicial) were made ano these have been found to be
prima facie untrue. Swearing of false statements on affidavits. before this
Court, with a view to secure admission of an application under Article 226 of
the Constitution is a serious matter and I think in the interests of justice
Paramananda Mahapatra should be placed on trial."
There is thus no finding that in view of the learned Chief Justice it was expedient in
the interests of justice that an enquiry should be made He merely says that
Paramananda Mohapatra should be placed on trial in the interests of justice.
"Interests of justice" is one matter, but 'expediency in the interests of justice' is
another matter. There are cases where though it would serve interests of justice to
place a man on trial, nevertheless expediency may dictate against such prosecution.
Consequently before lodging a complaint, the Court must be satisfied that not merely
the bare interest of justice is served, but also that it is expedient if the interest of
justice to prosecute. The Court which is lodging the complaint must be satisfied
about this expediency and clearly record that jurisdictional finding before any step is
taken for prosecution.
10. The second objection to the legality of this proceeding is that the enquiry was
held under Section 476 by the then Chief Justice alone. The offence admittedly is
alleged to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding before a Court
comprising of two judges of whom the Honourable the Chief Justice was only one.
When Section 476 says that before filing the complaint the Court is to form its
opinion on all aspects and give its finding on matters referred to in Section 476, it
must be the opinion of both the members comprising the Division Court. On a careful
reading of the language of Section 476, Cr. P. C. it win appear that the Court before
whom a judicial proceeding was pending in relation to which offences referred to in
Section 195(1) (b) and (c) have been committed, has the exclusive duty of holding
preliminary enquiry and record necessary findings. The expression "such court"
following the first part of the section, viz., "when any civil, revenue or criminal court
is......of opinion .........that an enquiry should be made into any offence.....which
appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that court" makes
it abundantly transparent that the Court which was in seisin of the judicial proceeding
shall make the enquiry and record the finding. The satisfaction of one member of the
Court could not be the satisfaction of the Division Court, nor the findings of one
member will be the finding the Court.
11. The High Court Rules which provide for matters which can be heard and disposed
of by Rule tingle Judge, do not confer any power or authority or jurisdiction on a
single judge in regard to sou motu enquiry under Section 476, Cr. P. C. into an
offence referred to in Section 195(l)(b) or (c) committed in relation to a proceeding
before a Division Court Holding of such enquiry or recording of findings as required
under the Section must be the act of the Court, and this being a judicial, function, the
opinion formed by one member of the Court, consisting oÂ± two Judges, to the
complete exclusion of the other, will not amount to compliance with the mandatory
requirements thereof. It may be that while one member opines that it is expedient in
the interests of justice to prosecute the other may disagree. In this view of the matter

1009
and the position of law the initiation of the criminal prosecution on the basis of an
enquiry under Section 476 made by then Chief Justice alone appears to be illegal.
12. A portion of the affidavit which comprises the subject matter of the first charge
which is said to be false is as follows:
"That Paramananda Mahapatra accompanied by his Pleader Sri G. S. Patnaik
met the S.D.O., and showed him the order. Thereupon the S.D.O. remarked
that it was illegal order."
The second charge relates to another part of the affidavit in respect of another
incident relating to 12th of December, 1960 which runs as follows:
"When Paramananda again went to the S.D.O. accompanied by Sri G. S.
Patnaik and Sri Jadumani Patnaik and offered him a petition, the S.D.O.
refused to accept the petition."
P. W. 4 Jadumani Patnaik deposed as follows with regard to the incident on 11th.
"On 11-12-60 at about 8.30 a.m. I met the S.D Order . and told him that the
Gram Pan-chayat election of the Bolagarh G. P. had been declared null and
void by the S.D.M. and I requested him to stop the election of the Sarpanch
and Naib Sarpanchship which was going to be held on that day at 9 A.M. I
had gone there with a written application. Ultimately when I met the S.D.O
he did not see the petition The S.D.O. told me that he was not aware of the
decision of the S D.M. and actuailly indicated his surprise over the matter.
Notwithstanding the surprise of the S.D.O in the matter and my anxiety to
move the application it could not be moved
The S.D.O. had seen me holding the certified copy of the order before he eot
inside. From all these sequence of works I was left with the feeling that the
S.D.O. was not in a mood to receive my petition."
P. W. 6 deposed with regard to the incident of 11th as follows:
"I do not remember the exact date, but I remember Jadu Babu takins car to
my residence-cum-office in connection with Bolgarb G P election matters 1
do not exactly remember But I remember that at about 8 O' clock in the
evening, while I was having tea in my residence on the verandah he came in
connection with this G. P. election matter and mentioned about the S D M 's
judgment."
P W 4's further evidence is that he wanted to show the certified copy of the order of
the S D M. declaring the G. P. election to be null and void to the S.D.O. and during
his discussion on the matter with the S.D.O. he called out to the petitioner to give
him the certified copy of the order intending to produce it before the S.D.O. Earlier
be had stated that he had informed the S.D.O. about the decision of the S.D.M.
regarding the invalidity of the G. P. elections and within hit hearing had called out to
the petitioner to bring the certified copy and the petitioner supplied him the copy
immediately thereafter The S. D Order had just moved into the room and had seen
the certified copy of the order in the hands of this witness. Accordingly he reported to
the petitioner (his client) that in spite of all his efforts he had failed to obtain an
order from the S.D.O who was not in a mood to receive the petition in this state of
evidence the portions of the affidavit which is the subject matter of the first charge

1010
cannot be said to be false: on the contrary they are substantially true.

13. With regard to the incident of the 12th December P W. 4 says that on 12-12-60 a
petition was drafted by him and his junior (P W 5) for presentation to the S.D Order
and it was arranged that both of them would move the petition, but opportunity did
not come until 2 P M P W 5 went alone to move the petition as P W 4 was held up in
another Court. He was informed by P W 5 that the SDO. went to meet the Revenue
Minister P W 5 corroborates this by saying that he moved (sic) petition on 12-12-60
at 2 PM hut the S D O. said that it could not be accepted as he was then going to see
the Revenue Minister. P.W 6 deposed to this effect:
"On the day 1 said to P.W. 5 that I was going out. I had no time to receive
the petition."
This in my view is an admission of the al legations of the petitioner in his affidavit
that the S.D Order refused to accept the petition In view of this evidence it is
incomprehensible to me as to how one could say that the averments in the affidavits
which are the subject matter of the second charge are false. Things happened at
Khurda either if his presence or in his immediate vicinity of which he witnesses a part
and was informed by his lawyer about the rest. The petitioner thus treated, comes to
Cuttack and instructs his lawyer who drafts the affidavit in English language choosing
his own diction, and accordingly, it cannot be expected that the language used in the
affidavit which is alleged to be false would be identical with the language of the
accused in the dork in such circumstances, if what the prosecution witnesses say
substantially agrees with the averments in the affidavit, it would not be right and
correct to nomenclature the affidavit as false or to call swearing of such affidavit as
intentional fabrication of false evidence In my judgment in these circumstances, no
offence has been committed either under Section 193 or Section 199 I.P.C. Therefore
in my view of the law and facts as stated above, there is no case for convicting the
petitioner. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction and sentence passed on the
petitioner are set aside and the revision application is allowed and the petitioner is
acquitted.

1011
Madan Lal Mokhawal v. Delhi Development Authority 625
2005 (80) DR.J 625

HIGH COURT OF DELHI
W.P. (C) 15212/2004
Madan Lal Mokhawal............ Petitioner
Versus
Delhi Development Authority............ Respondent
S. Ravindra Bhat, J.
Decided on 21.02.2005
Constitution of India
Article 226 — Cancellation of allotment of flat on the ground of
non-payment of demand — Intimation not sent by registered post —
Held that the petitioner it entitled to relief claimed.
Case Referred :
Surinder Kumar Mehta v. DDA WP(C) No. 19095/2004 dt 15.12.2004 —
PRESENT : Mr. R.K. SAINI, Advocate for the Petitioner.
Mr. Anil Sapra, Advocate for the Respondent.
S. Ravindra Bhat, J.
1. By this petition a direction is sought for setting aside/quashing a
decision of the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) cancelling the allotment
of a flat to the petitioner by reason of non-payment of the demand.
2. The petitioner had registered himself in the "New Pattern
Registration Scheme, 1979" (hereinafter called “The Scheme") . Upon his
1012
transfer to Saoner, District Nagpur, the petitioner intimated DDA about the
change in his address by a letter dated 9.10,1999.
3. Apparently, the petitioner’s name figured in a draw of'lots and he
was declared successful, on 15.9.1998. Consequently, a
demand-cum-allotment letter was sent to the old, previous address of the
petitioner, despite his having intimated about the change in address. The
letter was received back leading to its being dispatched again by courier
service some time in February, 1999. The petitioner could not be served with
the demand-cum-notice and the courier returned the communication, as
undelivered. The DDA made no further attempts. After expiry of the date
stipulated in the demand-cum-notice, the allotment was cancelled.
4. The petitioner alleges that he did not receive the allotment letter from
DDA and he visited its offices on 26.7.2002 to enquire about the status of
his registration. He was then informed about the draw of lots being held in
1998, his allotment pursuant to such draw, the dispatch of the allotment
letter, its return and cancellation. The petitioner unsuccessfully represented
to the DDA. In these circumstances he has moved this Court under Article
226 claiming an appropriate direction.
5. The DDA in its return has not disputed the allegations contained in
the petition. It avers that in the first attempt the demand-cum-allotment
letter was sent to the old, New Delhi address. Later it was sent to his
changed address through courier which was received back unserved. The
DDA avers that on 18.9.1998 it had in fact advertised in leading newspapers
about allotment of various registrants with their priority numbers; that the
petitioner’s priority number was also included in this publication. The DDA
has also averred that on 21.11.2001 it decided that in cases where change
of address had been intimated by the.allottee but had not been recorded by
the DDA and the allotment letters were sent at the old or wrong address,
the allottee would be offered the flat at the same price given in the original
demand letter without payment of interest. However, it has been further
averred that the petitioner had been given a priority number in 1989 and
that when in fact he was allotted a flat in 1998, this was published in the
newspapers in addition to being intimated in the normal course. On this
ground, the DDA resists the petition.
6. Mr. R.K. Saini, learned counsel submits that the petitioner cannot
be made to suffer on account of lapses of the DDA. When the petitioner
shifted his residence from Delhi, he duly and promptly intimated DDA about
the correct address. However, when the allotment took place in 1998, the
intimation was first sent to the old address. Later it was sent to the correct
address through a courier which was received back unserved by the DDA.
Learned counsel submits that such mode of service is unknown and in any
case not recognized by law or practice in such cases. On this count he submits
1013
that the petitioner’s name should be included in a draw of lots and he should
be offered a flat at the rate prevailing when the allotment was made in his
favour in 1998. Mr. Saini had also relied upon a decision of this Court dated
15.12.2004 in WP(C) No. 19095/2004 and connected cases namely,
Surinder Kumar Mehta v. Delhi Development Authority. In that case
several other decisions dealing with facts situations arising out of omissions
in the amendment of the Scheme were considered; and the approach to be
adopted in cases where registrants were intimated about allotments, at
wrong addresses, were indicated. The Court held, inter alia that :
“Reasoning to be found in the aforementioned decisions is that DDA
would be liable to charge the price as on date when priority of the
registrant matured and DDA was negligent in either not entering the
name of the registrant of the draw of lots or posted the allotment letter
at the wrong/previous address. Further whenever the allottee responded
to DDA with promptness and brought to notice of DDA and its mistake
and did not approach the Court belately, interest liability was not
fastened on the allottee. Where allottee was negligent in not enforcing
his right within reasonable time, interest liability was sadled on the
allottee."
7. Mr. Anil Sapra, learned counsel for DDA submits that even though
the initial intimation was undoubtedly sent at the old or wrong address, the
DDA cannot be found fault in this case for two reasons:
1. The DDA in fact followed up its action by publishing the result
of the draw in this case in newspapers. This meant that all
concerned had an opportunity of informing themselves about the
result.
2. In any case DDA did its best, as is evident from the fact that it
’ sent the allotment letter to the correct address through courier.
It cannot be faulted merely because the letter could not be served
upon the petitioner. It is further submitted that service of
intimation by courier is one of the permissible modes, and there
was no obligation to send the allotment letter by registered post,
in the event of an unsuccessful attempt through courier service.
8. The decision in Surinder Kumar's case (supra) has dealt with various
situations. The Court, after considering other judgments, held that the
conduct of an aggrieved allottee has to be balanced with the fault alleged
against DDA. This reasoning was on the basis that all registrants were
assigned priority numbers and depending upon the seniority of such priority
number, were expected to show some diligence in making enquiries. It was,
therefore, held that generally speaking, a registrant whose allotment is
cancelled, is not expected to follow up on almost day-to-day basis and a
reasonable margin of time ought to be allowed to him before which he would
1014
be under an obligation to enquiry from the DDA. It was held that such
reasonable time period would be about 2 to 4 years from their date of actual
allotment after which the delay in approaching the Court for relief would
have to be reckoned against him.
9. If one applies the ratio in Surinder Kumar’s case, it would be clear
that the dispatch of the allotment letter to the correct address albeit through
courier was only some time in February, 1999. Ifa reasonable margin of time
as spelt out in Surinder Kumar’s case is given, the petitioner approached
the DDA in July, 2002 itself after which he moved the present petition, in
the year 2004. Hence, applying the ratio in that judgment I am of the view
that the petitioner is entitled to relief and the DDA has to offer a flat for the
same cost as was offered to him in the year 1988.
10. One last contention, requires consideration. The learned counsel for
the petitioner had asserted that service through courier is not recognized by
law as for as these proceedings are concerned. Mr. Sapra, learned counsel
for DDA on the other hand, submits that there is no obligation to serve
through registered post; it would suffice if the registrant is intimated
through some normal mode which may include service by courier.
11. The discussion with regard to service in my view has to be in the
back-drop of the provisions under the Delhi Development Act. Section 48 of
the Act deals with service of notices etc under the Act. The relevant portion
of the Act is extracted below:-
"43(1) Service of notices, etc. — All notices, orders and other
documents required by this Act or any rule or regulation made thereun-
der to be served upon any person shall, save as otherwise provided in
this Act or such rule or regulation, be deemed to be duly served—
(a) xxx
(b) xxx
(c) xxx .
(d) in any other case, if the document is addressed to the person to
be served and—
(i) is given or tendered to him, or :
(i1)ifsuch person cannot be found, is affixed on some conspicuous
part of his last known place of residence or business, if within
the [National capital territory of Delhi] or is given or tendered to
some adult member of his family. or is affixed on some
conspicuous part of the land or building to which it relates, or
(iii) is sent by registered post to that person."
12. Section 43(1)(a)(bXc) deal with different eventualities. Sub-clause
(a) deals with service or a Company; sub-clause(b) deals with service on a
partnership and sub-clause(c) deals with service on a public body or
1015
Corporation/Society. The mode of service in the case of others namely, which

include individuals in the present case is specific. It requires in the first
instance personal service upon the noticee. In the event of the person not
being found, the mode of affixation is permitted. The only other mode
recognised is through registered post. It may be kept in mind that the strict
letter of Section 43 may not, prima facie, be applicable, as the notices are
not statutory. Yet, it is to be remembered that DDA is an authority created
under the Act. Its schemes, including the scheme under consideration are
formulated in exercise of its statutory powers. Hence, the standards
prescribed under the Act, including the one relating to mode of service would
constitute norms imposed by the statute, and would bind the DDA.
Consequently, failing the mode of a personal tender of the comunication, the
DDA cannot escape its obligation to serve the notice of allotment as indeed
a demand-cum-allotment letter is, to every registrant, through registered
post.
13. It may also be useful to notice Section 27 of the General Clauses Act
which expands on the expressions "serve", "give" and "send" respectively. It
enacts that unless a-contrary intention appears the service in such cases
would be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and
posting by registered post a letter containing the document and unless the
contrary is proved it shall be deemed to have been effected at the time at
which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. A joint
reading of Section 43 of the Act and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act,
therefore, clearly obliges the DDA to ensure that every registrants in its
Schemes are intimated through registered post.
14. In view of the above findings, the petitioner is entitled to the relief
claimed. I, therefore, direct the DDA to restore the registration of the
petitioner, and include his name, in the next draw of lots, in the same zone
where he was originally offered a flat when his name figured successfully in
the draw of lots held on 15.9.1998. The DDA is further directed to charge
only the cost applicable on the date of such allotment. In other words, the
cost indicated in the demand-cum-allotment letter issued by the DDA on
15-9-1998 shall be the one indicated in the demand to be raised after the
draw of lots held pursuant to this judgment.
15. The above directions shall be complied with by the DDA within the
next six weeks.
16. Writ petition and applications are disposed of in the light of the
above directions with no order as to costs.

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703

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Sher Singh v. Vice Chairman, D.D.A. and others dt.

continuing position since defendant no. 1 applied in 2002

80 CPC dated 04.05.2015 (unreplied till date) (73pp.) /18 892-98

Mehra) passed Judgement and Order dt. 24.09.1991 in WP

DB IV Judgement and Order dt. 25.01.2017 most frankly

where a victim of crime is rendered remediless, has to be

dt 25.07.2019 passed by Sh. Satish Kumar Arora, Ld. ASJ-

30.07.2015 “With reference to your letter regarding

LEGAL NOTICE UNDER SECTION 80 CPC/ DELHI HIGH COURT

BEFORE A BENCH OF TWO JUDGES AS MAY BE NOTIFIED BY

1. That this is a notice, mischief ‘Repression’, [In Re Special Courts Bill,

Constitution of India, in a “collateral attack” [Bharati Reddy v. State of

“whistleblower” [Common Cause v. Union of India, 2015 (6) SCC 332

(3 judges) at SCC p.344 para 39 and Indirect Tax Practitioners Assn vs

grievous unintended mistake of the high court registry (while working

under confusing and antiquated pre-Constitution Rules that appear to

illumine even pre-independence statutes in the interpretative process”-

appropriate bench resulting into inadvertent violation of Articles 14, 19 &

21 fundamental rights of the applicant/ also informant (who as per law of

195 in CRL.M.A. 6982/2016 in W.P. (C) 699/1990 titled Sher Singh v.

Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority & Ors, and also in

W.P.(CRL.) NO. 588/2013 titled Lt.Col.Retd. Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi

29.07.2019 connected to CRL.M.C. NO. 282 of 2013 titled Lt.Col.Retd.

Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul r/w Sections 30

of Delhi High Court Notification F.6/13/2011-Judl./Suptlaw/721-725

Court to have notified Special Public Prosecutor (enjoying independence

from State Control under its International Obligations under two

International Covenants of 1966) in accord with Constitution and law,

more particularly Article 246 thereof, as per the constitutionally defective

mandate of Section 31 of Act 10 of 1994. That the Constitutional Defect in

Sections 30 & 31 of Act 10 of 1994 is also raised in this legal notice.

Chairman, Delhi Development Authority & Ors was dismissed in limine,

because the Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority & Ors

Delhi Development Authority files revealed active misrepresentation by its

13.02.1991 filed by Sh. Ashok Kapoor, Commissioner Housing, DDA.

That the factual matrix of collusion by officials of Delhi Development

Authority was confirmed by adverse comments of the trial court of MM-

recording statements of officials of Delhi Development Authority, which

have attained finality having been upheld by the Sessions Court in

Revision, adverse comments not having been challenged before this

W.P.(CRL.) NO. 588/2013 titled Lt.Col.Retd. Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi

29.07.2019 (connected to CRL.M.C. NO. 282 of 2013 titled Lt.Col.Retd.

Sarvadaman Singh Oberoi v. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul.)

5. In CBI v. Keshub Mahindra, 2011 (6) SCC 216 (5 judges) at SCC

excluded, can be read in a manner as to nullify the express provisions of

A ‘Offences Affecting the Administration of Justice’ is therefore not

relevant in this 340 CrPC saga.

Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397 (5 judges), Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab,

Maharashtra, 2002 (1) SCC 253 (3 judges), N. Natarajan v. B.K. Subba

para 38, it was mandated

“38…. The essence of that definition is that an order or notification in

law" must be distinguished from "the authority of law". Many orders

of conduct of a person or persons living in that community enforceable

through courts or other machinery provided therefore. Thus if an order

of conduct regulating the action of a person or persons living in the

community, it cannot be law, for such an order would not necessarily