THE BLACK SEA ...

OR A BLACK HOLE?
Ben Hodges

STRATEGY PAPER
 CEPA Strategy Paper | The Black Sea ... or a Black Hole?

CONTENTS “What happens in the Black Sea

doesn’t stay in the Black Sea”
Why the Black Sea Region Matters to the
Kremlin.................................................................. 3 Tihomir Stoytchev,
So, What Do We Do? ......................................... 3 Bulgaria’s ambassador to the United States
Counterarguments............................................... 14
Rebuttal................................................................... 14
Conclusion............................................................. 15
The Black Sea region (BSR) is where Russia,
Endnotes................................................................. 15 Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, and
the Caucasus come together. The region is
at the center of four great forces:
ABOUT THE AUTHOR • Democracy on its western edge
Lieutenant General (Retired) Ben Hodges holds
the Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the • Russian military aggression to its north
Center for European Policy Analysis and was
Commander of U.S. Army Europe from 2014 - • Chinese financial aggression to its east 
2017.
• Instability in the Middle East to its
south

The BSR is, in short, the literal and

ABOUT CEPA philosophical frontier between liberal
The Center for European Policy Analysis democracy and autocracy. It matters to
(CEPA) is a 501(c)(3), non-profit, non-partisan, the West and to the Kremlin. But U.S. and
public policy research institute. Our mission Western strategy in the region has been
is transatlantic: to promote an economically insufficient. Great-power competition
vibrant, strategically secure, and politically prevents great-power conflict. Conversely,
free Europe with close and enduring ties to failure to compete and to demonstrate and
the United States. Our analytical team consists
protect interests, in all domains, can lead
of the world’s leading experts on Central-East
Europe, Russia, and its neighbors. Through to power vacuums and misunderstandings
cutting-edge research, analysis, and programs that can, in turn, lead to an escalation of
we provide fresh insight on energy, security and tensions and actual conflict.
defense to government officials and agencies; we
help transatlantic businesses navigate changing Russia uses its new generation (or “hybrid”)
strategic landscapes; and we build networks of warfare to force NATO into an asymmetric
future Atlanticist leaders. contest, thus avoiding many of the
Alliance’s greatest strengths. Challenging
the Kremlin with military means only, in
its perceived sphere of influence, reveals
All opinions are those of the author(s) and do
not necessarily represent the position or views our lack of an effective long-term strategy,
of the institutions they represent or the Center potentially leading to an escalation where
for European Policy Analysis. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime
Cover: Russian sailors march during the Navy holds most of the cards.
Day parade in the Black Sea port of Sevastopol,
Crimea July 28, 2019. REUTERS/Alexey We need greater focus, vision, and
Pavlishak. willpower. This region must now be where
NATO and the West compete: holding the
line against anti-democratic forces, taking
the initiative, establishing our influence,
and protecting our strategic interests.

2
 CEPA Strategy Paper | The Black Sea ... or a Black Hole?
Why the Black Sea
Region Matters to the
Kremlin
Russia’s concerns are aggressive, but also
defensive. It fears growing Western and,
in particular, Turkish influence in the
BSR, which could turn the Black Sea into
a “NATO lake.”1 Moscow wants to ensure
that no new east-west energy corridor
can bypass Russia or weaken its grip on
oil and gas exports. The BSR is Russia’s
key strategic maritime domain now and
into the future. Russia believes it can
operate with near impunity in the BSR,
building and then projecting capabilities
into the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Middle
East, and beyond. The Kremlin’s growing
military capabilities in the BSR have, in
effect, surrounded Turkey, while enabling
Russian naval operations in the Eastern
Mediterranean and its support for Bashar
al-Assad’s regime in Syria and Gen. Khalifa
Haftar, the commander of the self-styled
Libyan National Army, in Libya.2 These
Kremlin actions have also “weaponized”
refugees, particularly from Syria, with
a huge negative impact on European
cohesion and budgets.3
The Kremlin is prepared to use force in the
BSR. Since 1992, it has backed the separatist
authorities in the Moldovan region of
Transnistria. It invaded Georgia in 2008
and continues to occupy 20% of Georgia’s
sovereign territory (Abkhazia and South
Ossetia).4 It occupied Crimea in 2014. It
seized three Ukrainian naval vessels in
November 2018.5 It continues to support
and lead separatist forces in Donbas while
preventing the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) from
fulfilling its monitoring tasks.6
Russia’s illegitimate claims to territorial
waters around Crimea also threaten
Ukrainian gas fields in the western Black
Sea and Romania’s Exclusive Economic
Zones (EEZs).7 A claimed “humanitarian
crisis” in Crimea due to water shortages
3
could be a pretext for military action. The
logistical and infrastructure legacy of the
Russian Kavkaz-2020 military exercise,
which ended in September, remains in
place and available for use in subsequent
weeks and months.8
So, What Do We Do?
On the other side of the continent, the
Baltic Sea has enjoyed considerable
attention from Western security planners
over the past 20 years, resulting in a
substantial improvement in regional
security. It is now time to close the
security gap in the BSR.
We need to shape events through military
alliances, diplomacy, private investment,
and effective deterrence instead of reacting
to or ignoring or accepting Kremlin
coercion and other interventions. This is
entirely feasible. Doom-laden talk about
the end of U.S. strategic interest in Europe
is overblown. U.S. attention is shifting
toward the Indo-Pacific region, but its
national interests depend significantly
on stability, security, and prosperity in
Europe. European allies are uniquely close
and effective. NATO is the most successful
military alliance in modern history and
remains the mainstay of U.S. security
efforts not only in Europe, but also in the
Middle East and Africa. 
The West needs to change the rules of the
game, develop its own approach to hybrid
warfare, use all the tools of national and
alliance power, and compete across all
four domains of the DIME (Diplomacy,
Information, Military, and Economic)
framework.
1. Diplomacy
The aim should be to build diplomatic
consensus between like-minded players
about the strategic importance of the
greater BSR, while communicating our
intentions clearly to the Kremlin. Black Sea
nations need to put their voices together
 CEPA Strategy Paper | The Black Sea ... or a Black Hole?
Adapted in 2020 from © Mapbox and © OpenStreetMap.
in cooperation with diplomatic efforts
in Washington, Brussels, Berlin, London,
and Paris to draw attention to the BSR and
highlight its strategic importance.
Successful templates include the concerted
efforts by Central European and Baltic
countries in the run-up to decisions on
European Union (EU) and NATO expansion
in the 1990s and early 2000s and the
decision at the NATO Summit in Warsaw
in 2016 to deploy Enhanced Forward
Presence (eFP) battle groups to Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.9
German leadership is key. Its rotational seat
on the U.N. Security Council and current
seat on the U.N. Sanctions Committee, as
well as its role (in the second half of 2020)
as president of the Council of the European
Union give it leverage and a platform. The
immediate goal of BSR-focused diplomacy
should be to reject any and all claims to
legitimize the Kremlin’s illegal annexation
and occupation of Crimea. In particular,
4
Russia should not be allowed to promote
creeping legalization of its land grab
over time, for example, by exploring or
developing gas fields around Crimea or by
using force to stop Ukrainian naval vessels
off the coast of Crimea.
This should include an international
boycott of any ships sailing directly
from Crimean ports. They should be turned
away from Western ports and denied
maritime insurance. Russian pressure
within the London-based International
Maritime Organization (IMO) has
unfortunately, so far, limited visibility of
these violations and hence the effectiveness
of these efforts.
More broadly, BSR diplomatic efforts
should review and, if necessary, expand/
extend existing sanctions. An international
monitoring and sanctions compliance
regime, which highlights violations of
sanctions in international media and
organizations, should be established.
 CEPA Strategy Paper | The Black Sea ... or a Black Hole?

Time for Turkey-U.S.-NATO 2.0

 
The most important long-term diplomatic goal is stabilizing and strengthening the relationship between
Turkey and the West, and, specifically, between Turkey and the United States. Failure to do so risks further
cracks in NATO cohesion in one of the most geographically strategically important parts of the Alliance —
cracks which are already being exploited by the Kremlin.

The EU’s prioritization of Greek and Cypriot concerns risks further alienating Turkey within the transatlantic
community, including in the Black Sea. Policymakers in Washington and Brussels must find a way to
embrace  Turkey as the strategic pivot linking the Black Sea, Levant, and North Africa and as a major
regional power that is at the crossroads of several regions and challenges. Turkey is essential for deterrence
in the Black Sea as well as a critical bulwark against the Islamic State group and Iran. Protecting all of this
must be a priority. 

Turkish geostrategic thinkers and planners know that the Black Sea has been an historical vulnerability for
them for centuries. Turkey has fought  more wars with Russia in its history than any other opponent, and
without much success.

Turkey would like to do more to advance NATO’s interests in the Black Sea, but it is distrustful of the
willingness of the United States and the rest of NATO to come to its defense if it does in fact push back firmly
against the Kremlin. The United States should make clear that it would stand with Turkey in such a case.

Additionally, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh puts a lot of pressure on
the Ankara-Moscow relationship. Turkey supports the Azeris while the Kremlin, which sells weapons to both
sides, has bases in Armenia. The United States should make clear to Ankara that while it doesn’t support an
expansion of the conflict, it will support Turkey if there is a problem with Moscow.

The United States should also cease providing weapons to the Kurdish YPG militia, recognize that Turkey
has legitimate internal security concerns regarding the Gülenists, and find a way to resolve the current legal
impasse regarding the extradition of their U.S.-based leader, Fethullah Gülen.

Western countries should recognize that Turkey is on the front line of the Middle Eastern refugee crisis, with
more than 3.5 million refugees in Turkey or on its border with Syria.

The United States should reframe structures dating from the Cold War, including changing the EUCOM/
CENTCOM and Department of State regional boundaries, which currently sit on the Turkish-Syrian border,
to one that is more mindful of Turkey’s strategic situation.

The United States should offer Turkey a way out from its misguided purchase of Russian S-400 air defense
systems. It should consider making a special case for Patriot sales to Turkey that include technology transfer
and co-development with the Turkish defense industry, similar to the arrangement for F-35 production and
then bring Turkey back into the F-35 program. However, Turkey’s current testing of the S-400 system on the
Black Sea coast makes this increasingly difficult.

 The Turkey-Greece conflict over drilling for gas in the Eastern Mediterranean should be resolved. Germany
should lead this diplomatic effort, with strong U.S. and U.K. support.

Offer to support construction of the proposed Istanbul Canal, not for the purpose of evading the Montreux
Convention, but to improve the economic potential of the BSR, assuming Turkey is able to adequately address
environmental concerns. Western investors should make this offer before China or Russia offer to do it.

5
 CEPA Strategy Paper | The Black Sea ... or a Black Hole?
Despite sanctions hundreds of vessels
sail in and out of Crimea each year, often
turning off their mandatory tracking
devices, changing flags, and using various
other methods to avoid restrictions.10
Vessels from several European nations have
been involved in side-stepping sanctions.11
Sanctions should be extended to businesses
that use Crimean ports, not just the vessels
themselves.
Sanctions should target oligarchs close
to Putin, who depends on their financial
resources, in an effort to weaken that
support. Measures should include travel
and study bans on oligarchs and their
immediate family members — for example,
they should be barred from schooling
or purchasing real estate in the United
States or the United Kingdom. BSR nations
should follow up on sanctions protocols
rather than leaving enforcement to EU
member states.
Combining such efforts would apply
broader pressure on the Kremlin to live
up to its international obligations and
agreements and act responsibly.
BSR diplomacy should also condemn
and restrict Russia’s frequent live-fire
training exercises that periodically block
large segments of the Black Sea, impairing
freedom of navigation.
Secondary BSR diplomatic priorities include:
• Resolving the dispute between Serbia
and Kosovo over the latter’s recognition
as an independent state. The Western
Balkans are the backdoor of the BSR.
The United States should work with
the EU to ensure continued Western
integration of Serbia and the rest of the
Balkans. NATO should also continue
its KFOR (Kosovo Force) peacekeeping
mission in the Balkans.
• Addressing Hungary’s issues with
Ukraine. Failure to do so limits NATO’s
ability to work more closely with
Ukraine, affecting, in turn, the security
and stability of the greater BSR.
6
2. Information
Besides criticizing Russian actions
in Crimea and elsewhere, we should
accentuate the positive. The West has a
better story to tell, winning the hearts
and minds of citizens through the ideals
of individual empowerment and dignity.
But we must live up to our own ideals
and tell that story better. Since the
end of the Cold War, the United States
has reduced its investment in cultural
influence, weakening the kinship Eastern
Europeans feel toward the United States
and the transatlantic relationship. However,
technology offers huge opportunities
to rekindle the U.S. ideal, and the BSR
is a perfect place to start. We need to
support independent media as well as U.S.
government-supported news outlets like
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of
America. The Russians and Chinese are
much more deliberate about directing
resources. 
We also need to revive our education
programs. In the past, some of the most
effective U.S. influences have been the
schools built by U.S. initiatives, especially
schools that taught the basic principles
of parliamentary and U.S. democracies:
direct representation, checks and
balances, decentralization, and judicial
independence. U.S.-sponsored and affiliated
universities, high schools, and other
programs offer great potential for the
competitive exercise of U.S. soft power.
From 1992-2013, the U.S. Congress made
available hundreds of millions of dollars
via the Edmund S. Muskie Graduate
Fellowship Program to provide U.S.
graduate-level education to the 25-35-year-
old demographic in the states of the
former Soviet Union. Now, the graduates of
these programs — “Muskies,” as they call
themselves — are ministers and deputy
ministers and have an understanding of the
United States and a transatlantic view. We
should reinvigorate the Muskie Program
 CEPA Strategy Paper | The Black Sea ... or a Black Hole?
or develop a successor as a long-term
investment in the region.
Montreux Convention: This treaty gives
Turkey sovereignty over the so-called
Turkish Straits (the Bosphorus, the Sea
of Marmara, and the Dardanelles) and
governs naval presence in the Black Sea.
Submarines based in the Black Sea are
allowed to transit the straits only for
purposes of repair.12 Russia has breached
this rule by sending a submarine from its
Black Sea Fleet to take part in operations
in the Eastern Mediterranean.13 We should
ensure Turkey is holding the Kremlin
accountable for any violations. A public
information device, perhaps something
similar to a virtual “Times Square”
billboard display, could display violations.  area denial (A2/AD) capability to protect
3. Military
The BSR is essential to Western security
and stability. Western defense planners
need to make the region a higher
priority and invest more resources. The
Russian Black Sea Fleet will always have
a numerical advantage, as a result of the
Montreux Convention, so the Alliance must
find innovative ways to gain the initiative.
The Alliance must develop a strategy
that places the BSR in the middle of the
geostrategic map. This strategy should be
underpinned by a Graduated Response Plan
(GRP), similar to what has already been
accomplished in the Baltic region. Such
a strategy and GRP will drive planning,
resources, exercises, and presence to deter
Kremlin aggression and provide a bulwark
against Iranian and Chinese inroads.
Unlike in the Baltic Sea, attaining “sea
control” in the Black Sea is not feasible, at
least not in the early stages of a potential
crisis, given the numerical advantage of
the Russian Black Sea Fleet over combined
NATO and partner naval capacities in the
region.14 However, achieving “sea denial” so
that the Russian Black Sea Fleet is unable
to enjoy complete freedom of navigation
and maneuver is feasible.
7
Ideally, Turkey should be NATO’s center of
gravity in the region. Given its strategically
decisive location and sizeable military
capabilities it should lead deterrence efforts
against the Kremlin. Turkey, however, is
focused on its southern border and the
Eastern Mediterranean.15 It is reluctant to
challenge the Kremlin or disrupt the status
quo in the BSR.
In the short to medium term, NATO
should, therefore, designate Romania as
its center of gravity due to its geographic
location, proximity to other allies as
well as Ukraine and Moldova, its robust
modernization efforts, and its strategic
transportation infrastructure. Accordingly,
Romania should create its own anti-access/
its coast and EEZ using standoff weapons
such as anti-ship missiles, HIMARS (long-
range rocket system), attack helicopters,
Maritime Unmanned Systems (MUS),
and armed unmanned aircraft systems
(UAS, also known as drones).16 Romania
should also offer to establish and host a
NATO Center of Excellence for Unmanned
Systems due to its ideal flying conditions
and long Black Sea coastline as well as
presence of the Danube River. Finally,
Romania should continue to expand
the training and logistics infrastructure
at Mikhail Kogălniceanu Air Base (MK)
and at the Smârdan and Cincu training
areas, improving capabilities for joint,
multinational live fire exercises that enable
training that meets U.S. Army and U.S. Air
Force qualification standards.
Gain the Initiative — a 12-Step
Program
1. Immediately invite Georgia into
NATO and put Ukraine on a fast track
to membership. Continue to train
and support modernization efforts
in Ukrainian and Georgian military
forces. The British Royal Navy should
establish a formal partnership with
the Ukrainian Navy to assist with
development, modernization, and
 CEPA Strategy Paper | The Black Sea ... or a Black Hole?

U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Ross, with the Blue mosque in the background,
sails in the Bosphorus, on its way to the Black Sea, in Istanbul, Turkey, February 23, 2020.
Credit: REUTERS/Murad Sezer.

training of the Ukrainian Navy. The encourage the purchase, development,

U.S. Army and Canadian Army should
continue to support training at Yavoriv
Training Center in western Ukraine
and look to develop the large maneuver
training area, Shirokyi Lan, in southern
Ukraine.
2. Make the Russian Black Sea Fleet
vulnerable in its illegal home ports in
Crimea. That means the deployment
of drones and cruise missiles with a
500-km range to NATO nations around
the Black Sea and the deployment of
mine-laying capability to disrupt or
neutralize Russia’s ability to deploy or
threaten NATO and partner-country
coastlines, harbors, territorial waters,
and EEZs.
3. Continue to support and
expand NATO’s MUS program and
and deployment of MUS to
complement the conventional naval
forces and surface vessels of Romania,
Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Georgia. One
frigate with an attached grouping of
four or five MUSes operating above,
on, and below the surface will greatly
enhance the capabilities of that single
vessel, particularly in the areas of anti-
submarine and anti-mine capability.
This alone can significantly change the
correlation of naval forces in the Black
Sea and blunt much of the Russian
Black Sea Fleet’s advantage.
4. Increase significance, size, and
sophistication of the annual Sea
Breeze exercise hosted by Ukraine,
including ground deployment of
U.S. and allied units from Poland
and Romania, through Moldova, into

8
 CEPA Strategy Paper | The Black Sea ... or a Black Hole?
Ukraine. Put this on a scale with
Russia’s Kavkaz-2020 or the U.S.-led
Defender 20 transatlantic military
mobility exercise. A scaled-up Sea
Breeze should be linked to Georgia’s
annual Noble Partner exercise and the
Saber Junction exercise in Romania,
Hungary, and Bulgaria, giving NATO
and its partners a chance to exercise
mission command, military mobility,
integrated air and missile defense, and
intelligence sharing and fusion with a
large multinational force. To maximize
impact and increase transparency,
Russian observers should be invited
along with international media.
5. Ensure a continuous non-littoral NATO
naval presence in the Black Sea 365
days a year. Establish naval support
infrastructure in Romania, Ukraine,
Georgia, and Bulgaria that enables the
maximum U.S. naval presence allowed,
within the parameters of the Montreux
Convention.
6. Convert Black Sea air policing to Black
Sea air defense, with attendant changes
to mission profile and rules of
engagement.
7. Encourage collaboration between Black
Sea allies and partners in intelligence
sharing, exercises, and interoperability.
Romania and Ukraine are good models
to follow and build on for the entire
region.
8. Establish a joint, multinational three-
star headquarters on the Black Sea,
responsible for planning, readiness,
exercises, and coordination of all
military activity in the greater BSR.
9. Develop a Common Operating Picture
(COP) for air, maritime, and land for
the greater BSR by fusing intelligence
from all sources/nations around the
Black Sea and NATO to create the
“unblinking eye” that ensures speedy
recognition of what the Kremlin might
be doing. Training and maintaining this
9
capability would significantly reduce
the possibility of NATO or Black Sea
littoral nations being surprised by the
Kremlin’s hybrid toolbox.
10. Enhance and integrate Air and
Missile Defense (AMD). Increase AMD
capabilities that are layered and fully
integrated. Conduct an annual theater-
wide AMD exercise with Command
Post Exercises (CPX) and live exercises
in alternating years. 
11. Give the Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR) the tools needed
to extend his Area of Responsibility
(AOR) to the BSR. This means
harmonizing the operational space and
rear area with greater investment in
transcontinental logistic infrastructure,
more frequent exercising, and
improved military mobility.
Improving the cyber protection of this
transportation and mission command
infrastructure is essential to rapid
reinforcement. Capabilities, including
communications architecture, mission
command, transportation, intelligence,
air/missile defense, fuel, ammunition
storage, and assembly areas, should be
trained and in place.
12. Improve military mobility to
enable more rapid deployment
and reinforcement. NATO, the EU,
and countries in the region must
address the challenges resulting
from underdeveloped transportation
infrastructure and traversing the
Carpathian Mountains. Make better use
of the Danube for large, bulk military
cargo, similar to what is currently done
on the Rhine.
4. Economic
A strong economy is critical to building
security and stability in the BSR. Like
the third leg of a three-legged stool,
private investment in regional economies
complements U.S. diplomatic efforts and
military/security cooperation efforts.
 CEPA Strategy Paper | The Black Sea ... or a Black Hole?
A strong economy is critical
to building security and
stability in the BSR.
Encouraging investment in the BSR by
businesses from the United States, the U.K.,
Germany, the Netherlands, and others gives
those nations skin in the game. Having real
economic interests means these countries
will care about Kremlin interference with
freedom of navigation, violation of borders,
illegal annexation, and claims to EEZs.
This is why the Kremlin did all it could to
kill the Anaklia Deep-Water Port project
in Georgia on the east end of the Black
Sea.17 This would have been a game changer
for the BSR, especially for Georgia and
Romania. Stopping the Anaklia port project
hinders the development of the proposed
East-West Economic Corridor, meaning
lost benefits to the Port of Constanta in
Romania, less incentive to improve the
Danube River, and no bypass of Russia.
But there are challenges. Black Sea littoral
states are generally weak on the rule
of law, transparency, and investment
attractiveness, and some still suffer to
varying degrees from oligarchic capture.
Only Romania and Bulgaria are EU
members. Ukraine is still struggling with
its own corrupt political and economic
institutions nearly thirty years after
independence. Georgia and Moldova’s
EU accession is stalled by economic and
political weakness. All nations in the BSR
need to increase investment attractiveness
by deregulating industry, improving
transportation infrastructure, creating
favorable tax incentives, and implementing
transparency in financing, banking, and
the judiciary.
Given the different risk/reward scenarios
across the BSR, unifying economic
structures have a lot of ground to cover.
Several organizations have emerged over the
10
past few years, each intended to improve
economic prosperity in the BSR. They have
all had some impact but they have not
been able to match Kremlin or Chinese
investment because they lacked resources or
political clout or a common focus. Russian
membership in some of these organizations
has also hindered their effectiveness.
These organizations include:
• BSEC (Black Sea Economic
Cooperation), based in Istanbul, is an
11-member organization that comprises
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,
Georgia, Greece, Romania, Russia,
Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine. It is
regarded as ineffective, outside of
some efforts in agriculture. It lacks
common perspectives and priorities. 
• BSTDB (Black Sea Trade and
Development Bank), headquartered in
Thessaloniki, Greece, is an international
financial institution serving its 11
member states: Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece,
Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey,
and Ukraine. (BSTDB’s membership is
almost the same as BSEC but excludes
Serbia and includes Moldova). It
is intended to support economic
development and regional cooperation
by providing loans, guarantees, and
equity for development projects and
trade transactions. Russian membership
in this bank is probably not conducive
to competitive development in the BSR. 
• GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan,
Moldova): GUAM’s charter was signed
during a summit in Yalta in 2001 by the
four current members and Uzbekistan,
which later withdrew. The charter
set objectives for cooperation, such as
promoting democratic values, ensuring
stable development, enhancing
international and regional security, and
stepping up European integration. One
of the issues associated with GUAM is
competition between two proposed
transportation corridors to better link
 CEPA Strategy Paper | The Black Sea ... or a Black Hole?

A woman holds Georgian, US and NATO flags as she takes part in a protest against the re-
sults of the 2020 Georgian parliamentary election held by supporters of Georgian opposi-
tion parties outside the offices of the Georgian Parliament in Rustaveli Avenue. With votes
from 97% of polling stations counted, the ruling Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia
Party has won 48% of the vote. Credit: David Mdzinarishvili/TASS.

Europe with Asia. Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky is attempting to
breathe life back into GUAM, working
with Azerbaijan on several projects.18
It remains to be seen whether the
ongoing conflict between Azerbaijan
and Armenia will disrupt these efforts.
• The Danube River Commission,
established in 1948 and based in
Budapest, was created to foster greater
development and ensure proper
maintenance of the Danube, part of
Europe’s economic backbone along
with the Rhine and Main Rivers. The
commission’s members include Austria,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Germany,
Moldova, Russia, Romania, Serbia,
Slovakia, and Ukraine. Yet the Danube
is not currently operating at anything
close to full capacity. The Danube River
Commission still includes Russia as a
member, more than three decades after
the breakup of the Soviet Union. Its
official languages are French, Russian,
and German — but not English, let
alone the languages of any of the other
Black Sea littoral countries. 
• Neither this commission nor other
bodies dealing with the Danube are
doing their job properly. Specific
actions need to be taken to improve
the quality of river port construction
and train and retain the personnel
necessary to operate effectively on the
river. Experts predict that most skilled
crews and shipmasters will be gone in
10 years. Action should also be taken
to dredge the Danube to four meters

11
 CEPA Strategy Paper | The Black Sea ... or a Black Hole?
to provide a more feasible route for
logistics and commerce. River water
levels are low due to climate change,
but also due to poorly managed dam
construction and usage as well as
maintenance and dredging.19
At this point, based on the lack of tangible
results, most of these organizations seem
to fall short when it comes to matching
the challenges posed by Russia and China.
In coordination with the EU, the United
States should inject sustained, substantial
support for these organizations through a
combination of measures that encourage
private investment.
A “Marshall Plan for the BSR”: The nations
of the BSR were left out of the original
Marshall Plan after World War II because
of Soviet objections. For the same reasons
that prompted U.S. postwar aid to the rest
of Europe, we should focus U.S. economic
assistance in the BSR to help grow and
accelerate economic development and
prosperity in the region. A second Marshall
Plan would provide financial resources,
training, education, tax incentives for
private investment, curb corruption,
and give legal protections to investors. It
would also support projects to establish
or expand U.S. universities in each of
the Black Sea capitals, teaching subjects
ranging from medicine and engineering
to journalism. It should broaden academic
exchange opportunities.
The economic impact of the Covid-19
pandemic makes it unlikely that the
United States will have the resources to
match the scale of the original Marshall
Plan. But something smaller, and more
targeted, in cooperation with the EU
might enable the West to compete more
effectively with Russia and China. This
effort should build on existing regional
framework organizations and initiatives,
enhancing their already-existing networks
and successes, while gradually reducing
Kremlin influence and offering a better
solution than Chinese Belt and Road
Initiative debt traps.
12
The U.S. Departments of State
and Commerce should work with
nongovernmental organizations to organize
a business development conference in
Romania with other BSR nations to
highlight the importance of Black Sea
economic, infrastructure, and energy
security. Such a conference should attract
major businesses and investors as well
as relevant Black Sea nation government
officials.
The U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation (DFC) replaced the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) as the U.S. government’s instrument
for enabling/encouraging private
investment overseas to support U.S.
strategic policy objectives. A DFC “road
show” into different capitals, focused on
infrastructure, would help clarify priorities
and requirements and preconditions for
attracting U.S. capital.
The Three Seas Initiative (3SI) provides
a structure and process for increasing
investment in transportation and energy
infrastructure. This effort seeks to
prioritize north-south connectivity, from
the Baltic Sea south to the Adriatic and
Black Seas. Greece and other countries
should be included in this initiative.
Finding a way to connect the 3SI more
closely to the BSR, figuratively and literally,
would be a major step forward.
DFC is the instrument through which
the U.S. government would contribute $1
billion to the 3SI, as pledged by former U.S.
Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo at the
Munich Security Conference in February
2020.20 Also, encouragingly, the DFC
opened an office in Belgrade in September
2020 moving the dealmakers closer to the
action — and creating the opportunity to
connect Serbia, a back door to the BSR, to
the 3SI.
Energy security cooperation is an area
with great potential and growing positive
developments. Turkey wants to build itself
as a hub for regional gas to further project
 CEPA Strategy Paper | The Black Sea ... or a Black Hole?
its power east and west. Ukraine, Bulgaria,
Georgia, and to some extent Romania have
moved farther away from the Russian
energy giant Gazprom. Exports of U.S.
liquefied natural gas (LNG) have put much
more U.S. gas into Eastern Europe and
provided a real commercial alternative to
Gazprom.21 Even Turkey has purchased
some U.S. LNG. U.S. exports could be
grown so that U.S. energy/technological
advantages bolster energy security.
A second EU-U.S. Energy Council Forum,
similar to the one held in 2019, would
focus attention. The 2019 forum was
designed as a ministerial-level event
to bring together U.S. and European
decision makers from government as
well as companies in the LNG sector. A
key objective was to encourage business
contacts and promote the further uptake of
competitively priced U.S. LNG in the EU.
U.S. and European businesses are poised
to invest in LNG opportunities spanning
the entire supply chain, including new
infrastructure for upstream development,
liquefaction, regasification, and pipeline
distribution.
On energy security, a number of Eastern
European countries, including Bulgaria,
Romania, and Ukraine, have been looking
to end their reliance on existing Russian
nuclear fuel contracts to develop their
own civilian nuclear capacity via next
generation small modular reactors.
A recent positive step was Romania’s
decision to shift its nuclear power plant
modernization program from a Chinese
contractor to a U.S.-owned company.22
Projects that exploit the potential of the
region’s many rivers, such as the E40
Black Sea to Baltic waterway, should be
considered. Also, increased river traffic
would reduce the load on European
highways, saving money and reducing the
carbon footprint. But these are expensive
and require sustained political will.
ACEBA (American-Central European
Business Association) is another platform
13
Energy security cooperation
is an area with great potential
and growing positive
developments.
for dialogue between U.S. corporate
executives and government leaders from
14 Central European countries. It provides
U.S.-based companies opportunities
for engagement with key decision
makers in these emerging markets. The
organization brings together five well-
established bilateral business councils
(Czech, Lithuanian, Romanian, Polish,
and Hungarian) and a platform to interact
with the 10 remaining markets into one
membership and a single point of contact
for companies. 
Counterarguments
There are three main arguments against
the strategy outlined above.
The first is the focus on Turkey. Many
Europeans and others do not wish to
reward Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan for regional saber-rattling and
internal repression. 
The second is that Russia’s built-in
advantage in the BSR means that challenges
will be provocative and largely futile. U.S.
interests lie elsewhere.
The third is that the United States cannot
trust the EU or European allies and
partners to the extent necessary to mount
an effective pushback against Russia and
China in the BSR. 
Rebuttal
While these are serious objections, the
alternative is defeat. Growing Russian
(and Chinese) influence in the BSR affects
wider Western interests in the Middle
 CEPA Strategy Paper | The Black Sea ... or a Black Hole?

Turkey’s drilling vessel Kanuni departs on her maiden trip to the Black Sea in Istanbul,
Turkey November 13, 2020. Credit: REUTERS/Yoruk Isik.

East, the Mediterranean, and Southwest
Asia. Turkey is not an ideal ally — and this
is not new. The United States and its NATO
allies have worked with Turkey with a
combination of pragmatism and vision in
past decades. This era is no different. Some
of the deterioration in relations between
the West and Ankara is indeed the result
of personality clashes and differences in
interests and values. But much of it is the
result of Western neglect and inattention.
That, at least, can be remedied. 
Russia does have a built-in advantage, but
not an insuperable one. It has no allies in
the region. It lacks soft power, economic
heft, and a technological edge over the
West. If the United States and its allies
devote resources and willpower, they can
out-compete the Kremlin.
European allies have their flaws, but the
United States is fortunate to have Romania
as a potential anchor country for its
immediate efforts in the BSR, as well as
an even larger partner, Ukraine. The real
security gap in the region is in leadership,
which the United States can supply if it
wishes. 
Conclusion
Given the dual great-power challenges of
China and Russia and other threats around
the globe, and the lack of U.S. capacity to
deal effectively with all of these alone,
a cohesive NATO is essential to protect
the strategic interests of the West. A
strategy that plays to our DIME strengths
will immediately begin to curb Kremlin
mischief-making in the BSR and lay the
foundation for a medium-term pushback,
enhancing credibility, cohesion, prosperity,
and security. 

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 CEPA Strategy Paper | The Black Sea ... or a Black Hole?

Endnotes
1 Bryan Frederick, Mathew Povlock, Stephen Watts, Miranda Priebe, Edward Geist, “Assessing Russian Reactions
to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements,” RAND Corporation, 2017, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_
reports/RR1879.html#purchase.
2 Power Vertical Podcast, “Empire Envy,” Episode 62, Center for European Policy Analysis, March 6, 2020, https://
www.cepa.org/empire-envy.
3 “Migrant Crisis: Russia and Syria ‘Weaponising’ Migration,” BBC News, March 2, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-35706238
4 Russia’s Occupation of Georgia’s Territories Intensifies,” Georgian Embassy to the U.S., April 20, 2020, https://
georgiaembassyusa.org/2020/04/20/russias-occupation-of-georgias-territories-intensifies/.
5 Michael Peterson, “The Naval Power Shift in the Black Sea,” War on the Rocks, January 9, 2019, https://
warontherocks.com/2019/01/the-naval-power-shift-in-the-black-sea/.
6 “Rebels without a Cause: Russia’s Proxies in Eastern Ukraine,” International Crisis Group, July 16, 2019, https://
www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/254-rebels-without-cause-russias-proxies-
eastern-ukraine.
7 Iulia-Sabina Joja, “Three Conflict Scenarios for the Black Sea in 2020,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 7,
2020, https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/01/three-conflict-scenarios-for-the-black-sea-in-2020/; Marcel Gascón
Barberá, “Russian Interest in Black Sea Gas Project Worries Romanian Govt,” Balkan Insight, January 7, 2020,
https://balkaninsight.com/2020/01/07/russian-interest-in-black-sea-gas-project-worries-romanian-govt/.
8 Sergey Sukhankin, “Kavkaz-2020 Exercises: A Preliminary Analysis,” International Centre for Defence and Security,
October 7, 2020, https://icds.ee/en/kavkaz-2020-exercises-a-preliminary-analysis/.
9 “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, July 9, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.
10 Oleksandr Humeniuk, Maksym Kytsiuk, Olena Loginova, Andrii Ianitskyi, “International trade with
Crimea ongoing despite sanctions,” OCCRP, August 15, 2016, https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/5553-
international-trade-with-crimea-ongoing-despite-sanctions.
11 Kristina Zakurdaeva, Mikhail Maglov, “The Crimea Circumvention: How EU Firms Are Sidestepping Sanctions
and Making Money on the Peninsula,” RFERL, November 3, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/crimea-how-eu-
firms-sidestepping-sanctions-making-money-on-peninsula/30303687.html.
12 “Implementation of the Montreux Convention,” Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/
implementation-of-the-montreux-convention.en.mfa.
13 H I Sutton, “Russian Black Sea Sub Deployments to Mediterranean Could Violate Treaty,” USNI News, July 8,
2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/07/08/russian-black-sea-sub-deployments-to-mediterranean-could-violate-
treaty.
14 For a definition of “sea control,” see: Vice Admiral Thomas A. Rowden, “Sea Control First,” United States Navy,
January 4, 2017, https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Pages/Sea-Control-First.aspx.
15 Christopher Pitchers, Efi Koutsokosta, “Calls growing for EU sanctions against Turkey over actions in Eastern
Mediterranean and Cyprus,” Euronews, October 15, 2020, https://www.euronews.com/2020/10/15/calls-growing-
for-eu-sanctions-against-turkey-over-actions-in-eastern-mediterranean-and-cy.
16 Iulia-Sabina Joja, “Dealing with the Russian Lake Next Door: Romania and Black Sea Security,” War on the Rocks,
August 15, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/dealing-with-the-russian-lake-next-door-romania-and-
black-sea-security/.
17 Giorgi Menabde, “Russia Tries to Bog Down the Anaklia Deep Sea Port Project,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume:
16, Issue: 73, May 20, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/russia-tries-to-bog-down-the-anaklia-deep-sea-port-
project/.
18 “Ukraine and Azerbaijan intensify cooperation in the sphere of international transportation – Volodymyr
Zleneskyy,” President of Ukraine, December 17, 2019, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-ta-
azerbajdzhan-aktivizuyut-spivpracyu-u-sferi-mizh-58929.
19 Anja Scholten, Benno Rothstein, Alberto Pistocchi, “Navigation on the Danube – Limitations by low water
levels and their impacts,” European Commission, November 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/
navigation-danube-limitations-low-water-levels-and-their-impacts.
20 Michael R. Pompeo, “The West Is Winning,” U.S. Department of State, February 15, 2020, https://www.state.gov/
the-west-is-winning/.
21 Frédéric Simon, “‘Freedom gas’: US opens LNG floodgates to Europe,” EURACTIV, May 2, 3019, https://www.
euractiv.com/section/energy/news/freedom-gas-us-opens-lng-floodgates-to-europe/.
22 “U.S. and Romania Announce Initial Agreement on Cooperation for the Cernavoda Nuclear Power Projects and
Civil Nuclear Power Sector in Romania,” U.S. Department of Energy, October 9, 2020, https://www.energy.gov/
articles/us-and-romania-announce-initial-agreement-cooperation-cernavoda-nuclear-power-projects-and.

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 CEPA Strategy Paper | The Black Sea ... or a Black Hole?

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